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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL  
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS  
(FOUO 9/79)



USSR

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INTERNATIONAL

ANATOLIY GROMYKO ASSESSES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SSHA: UROKI I DEYSTVITEL'NGST' 60-70-e GODY (U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons and Reality of the 1960's and 1970's) in Russian 1978 signed to press 17 Aug 78, I, III-VIII, 1-34, 252-281, 282-283, 300-304

[Annotation, table of contents, foreword, Chapter 1 and Chapter 10 from book by Anatoliy Gromyko, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 23,000 copies, 304 pages]

[Text] The monograph shows the confrontation of various tendencies in American political life, particularly in the periods of government by the Democrats from Kennedy to Carter. An analysis is made of the process of forming foreign policy concepts, strategy and tactics of the American administration on a number of key problems of world policy in the 1960's and 1970's.

After summarizing, in part on the basis of personal impressions, the experience in developing Soviet-American relations in the 1970's, the author draws a conclusion concerning the great potentials for strengthening peace and consolidating relations between the USSR and the United States on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The work is intended for scientific and practical workers in the field of international relations and all readers interested in problems of the foreign policy of the United States.

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Foreword

In the spring of 1971, during a scientific mission to the United States, as well as in subsequent years of work in this country, one of the questions most widely asked me was the following: "Just when, at last, will normal, friendly relations be established between our countries, America and Soviet Russia?" A second question was usually added to this one: "What is hindering this?" These questions were posed, of course, by various people, and one sometimes felt that it would have been more to the interlocutor's liking to hear a negative answer on the potentials for setting up widescale Soviet-American cooperation. Dogmas on the inevitability of the Cold War, decrepit, but still not collapsed by that time, had taken root in the minds of many Americans. It was necessary to explain patiently the essence of the foreign policy steps of the Soviet Union in the international arena.

The peace program adopted by the 24th and developed by the 25th CPSU congresses was a revelation for many Americans. For a long time the idea had been drummed into their heads that the Soviet Union "was preparing for aggression" against the West. These were, of course, absurd insinuations. All the same, the awareness of a large number of United States citizens had been dulled with such fabrications.

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It is important to note, however, that for the United States Government of the beginning of the 1970's the lessons of the numerous crises and failures in American foreign policy in the 1950's and 1960's, when the icy winds of the Cold War were blowing wildly in international life due to the fault of the capitalist West, were not wasted. The actual, real conditions, which confirmed the complete rightness of Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence, carved their way increasingly widely in the world arena. The 1970's pass by under the badge of escalating detente. At the same time, throughout these years the efforts of the adherents of confrontation to defeat detente did not cease in the West. This, unfortunately, is also a reality of our times. It constantly places on the agenda the need to struggle to preserve peace on earth and further limit the influence of those who are still dreaming of reversing the development of international relations.

Sensible Americans are coming out today for realism and a sober estimate of the situation, and against a return to a policy of dangerous, unreasoned actions. Similar voices were also heard earlier in the United States, of course, in the 1960's. They rang out in circumstances that were complicated for the United States Government and carried the great power of the emotional charge of anger and a persistent striving not to let oneself be deceived by militarist slogans. Sounding particularly loudly was the voice of protest of young America, which in the 1950's as a rule had believed the fables of anticommunism. The 1960's became for them years of ever-intensifying doubts, now not only about the government, but also about the sincerity of the dogmas of the Cold War and the "American Age" that were preached from the American political Olympus. The insolvency of the old foreign policy course was becoming increasingly clear.

At the beginning of the 1970's it seemed that all the stormy activity of American imperialism that had been formed in the frontal attack against the forces of socialism and progress had bogged down. A new alignment of forces had formed in the world that revealed the tremendous advantages of socialism as a social system. Forced to create a powerful defensive weapon, the USSR thereby proved the illusory nature of the West's counting on achieving the situation that John Foster Dulles had once dreamed of, of "supremacy" over the peace-loving country. Furthermore, interimperialist conflicts had grown sharper, the foreign policy ambitions of the countries of the Common Market and of Japan had intensified, the United States economic situation had become serious and the prestige of the once all-powerful dollar on the bourgeois financial markets had fallen greatly. In Western Europe, "crisis diplomacy" to a considerable extent ceded to the diplomacy of a search for mutually acceptable solutions. Finally, in Vietnam the arrogance of official Washington was taught an object lesson--a nation that defends the cause of its freedom is invincible.

The development of Soviet-American relations in the 1970's was a major success for the Leninist policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government with respect to putting into practice the Peace Program adopted by the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This program, which



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was developed at the 25th CPSU Congress, is supported by all the Soviet people, since it reflects their hopes for peace without wars.

1972 and 1973 inscribed a new, unquestionably significant page in the history of international relations.

L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the President of the United States signed the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in Moscow in 1972. In this historic document the foundation is laid for permanent fruitful development of Soviet-American relations. For the first time in the postwar period, the United States Government, having evaluated the lessons of the past, faced reality and acknowledged the enormous significance of the principle of peaceful coexistence for the cause of peace. As a result, it was recorded in the above document that both parties would "proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence."

The USSR and the United States took on the obligations of avoiding armed confrontations and resolving differences in a peaceful way. The necessary prerequisites for this were recognized as the interests of the security of the parties and rejection of the use of force or the threat of its use. In 1972 another historic document was signed at negotiations in Moscow-- the Interim Strategic Offensive Arms Agreement. This agreement was based on the principle of identical security for the parties. It checked the arms race and lessened the threat of nuclear missile conflict. Of course, the agreement adopted in Moscow on strategic offensive arms limitation was only the first, although exceedingly important, step along the road leading to universal disarmament. It became important for the USSR and the United States not to leave this path, advancing along it even farther, with complete persistence.

The results of the Soviet-American negotiations on bilateral collaboration were also fruitful. A series of agreements were signed in this area on the development of economic-trade relations, scientific-technical cooperation and cooperation with respect to outer space, public health, environmental protection and exchanges in science, technology, education and culture. In a joint Soviet-American communique the governments of the USSR and the United States expressed the conviction that the provisions formulated in the Basic Principles of Relations "would open new possibilities for the development of relations of peace and mutually advantageous cooperation between the USSR and the United States." In this way, Soviet-American bilateral relations acquired every chance of growing into relations built on a balanced basis and cemented by mutual trust.

The substantial shifts that took place in the first half of the 1970's in the international arena in the direction of securing detente were accompanied by a bitter ideological-political struggle, since a considerable

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number of the bourgeois politicians and the military continued to hold their stands on the Cold War and the arms race. They were still chained to the past and attempted to undermine the basic foreign policy tendency of our time--detente. L. I. Brezhnev pointed out the danger of their actions at the World Congress of Peaceloving Forces held in Moscow in 1973: "It goes without saying that further expansion of the arms race whipped up by the aggressive circles of imperialism and the detente that has begun are two processes going in opposite directions. They cannot develop endlessly, so to speak, on parallel courses."<sup>1</sup> The subsequent course of events showed that the struggle around the question of the fate of detente not only did not weaken, but was intensified. The turn toward detente continued, but at the same time sabotage of it grew more frequent and attacks were made under the most varied banners and to the most varied slogans, beginning with demands to carry out a "policy of peace, based on military force" and ending with a hypocritical campaign of "defending human rights."

The opponents of detente, as is known, take their reading of time and of events from the period of international relations when an atmosphere of fear and hostility was increasing pressure on them. They derive energy in the hope of again leading astray the Western community, urging the United States statesmen on in every way possible to a struggle with the "Soviet threat," toward shortsighted steps, striving to lull their sense of responsibility to their own people.

Through the efforts of the Cold War adherents in the United States, in 1978 detente underwent particularly severe trials. This situation was repeatedly emphasized by Soviet statesmen and the press. For example, PRAVDA, in the article, "The Present Policy of the United States Government," noted that "recent facts indicate that changes dangerous for the cause of peace are taking place in United States policy" and that "the farther things go, the more signs are accumulated that in this struggle the upper hand is beginning to be taken by representatives of the groups that would like to undermine detente, return the world to the Cold War and to new confrontations and to unrestrained military rivalry."<sup>2</sup> Under circumstances of anti-Soviet intoxication, Senator Barry Goldwater stated directly that "it would be a good thing to return to the days of John Dulles." In this way, the "hawks" of the 1970's often turn to the "experience" of international relations in the postwar period, altering it in their own way. They are obviously counting on the short memory of those people in the United States who forgot the lessons of the 1950's and 1960's. That is why revealing the true nature of American foreign policy of that period is an urgent task that the author of this book has also tried to fulfill, as well as to shed light on certain features of today's Soviet-American relations and ways of developing them further in the spirit of detente. It is the latter that is the only reasonable basis for a further advance in relations between the USSR and the United States. As the lessons of history indicate, no alternatives are given in this sphere.

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FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [In Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 4, Moscow, 1974, p 333.
2. PRAVDA, 17 June 1978.

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Chapter 1. Basic Directions in United States Postwar Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

There were a good many governmental shifts in the United States in the post-war years. At the White House, with pomp or without it, the presidential seat was occupied by both Democrats and Republicans. After the eminent American President Franklin Roosevelt, a man with, as was said of him, thin lips and a hard heart, settled down for several years in Washington. This was Harry Truman--a Kansan [as published] who asserted that he was an incorruptible president. In any case, visitors were struck by a little sign displayed on the desk in his office: "The buck stops here." It obviously referred to unscrupulous methods of getting rich. It could also, however, be considered with complete certainty that the power and influence of politicians and financial bigwigs of any type by means ended at the president's desk. On its polished surface, as in the center of a solar ray, was the base of the epicenter of the powerful forces of the United States, burning to cinders in American political life all those who did not know well or did not take into account the interests of the American elite and the financial "kings."

One digression appears to explain certain seeming paradoxes in the American way of life, system and politics.

I had occasion to live and work for many years in the United States. It is, of course, a country that is in many ways complex, settled by working and mainly well-balanced people, often with a distinctive sense of humor. The American, and especially the American woman, perhaps, strive toward nothing so much as personal well-being. As a rule, Americans are sentimental, love sports and classical music, nature and horror films, solitude and noisy merry-making. To each his own, as they say. Ordinary Americans, however, although many of them, worn out by everyday life, do not realize this, or realize it only quite vaguely, have a heightened sense of fear of violence that may be perpetrated, not abstractly, but on themselves. This feeling persecutes many Americans both in everyday life and in thoughts about politics.

There are many profound works, articles and essays penned by Soviet scholars and journalists that reveal the roots of this phenomenon. At the same time,

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it can quite justifiably be noted that the bosses of the capitalist system attempt to direct the ordinary Americans' fear in the face of the social conditions of their life against the "enemy from without." Socialism and communism are proclaimed as this, even though Americans know almost nothing about what they represent. While echoes of the dynamic life in the Soviet Union reach them, they scarcely penetrate the dense curtain of the bourgeois mass information media.

We will discuss the main factors in United States postwar foreign policy and diplomacy. Unless they are taken into account, it is difficult to understand the present period of American foreign policy and particularly its future, even the near future.

One of the important factors that has exerted the most negative influence, particularly on the foreign policy of John Kennedy's administration, lay in the strategic and tactical aims of American foreign policy and diplomacy of the postwar period and especially the heritage of U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. An analysis of the basic directions in the activity of the postwar governments of the United States, including those headed by the Democrats, aids in a deeper evaluation of President Kennedy's foreign policy and shows the truly rigid framework within which the policy of this government was carried out in the international arena. In addition, it aids in a better understanding of the essence of the artificial barriers constantly in effect in the foreign policy of the United States, that stand in the way of an improvement in Soviet-American relations. Militaristic aims occupy a noticeable place among these obstacles, including those at the present time, in the second half of the 1970's.

After the end of World War II, United States foreign policy and diplomacy underwent great changes, which were caused both by factors in the internal development of this country and by external factors. It is well known that in the 1950's and 1960's American imperialism acquired new expansionist features and began to thrust the so-called American way of life upon other peoples.

The United States was the main power that unleashed the Cold War directed against the USSR and other socialist countries. Even today United States foreign policy and diplomacy are to a considerable extent guided by forces that call in question the interest of the USSR and other socialist states in a fundamental lessening of international tension. This strategic line of American imperialism became firmly established after 1945. It is becoming increasingly difficult to implement it, however, since the international situation of the second half of the 1970's has changed radically for the better. Numerous international agreements were concluded, primarily at the historic meeting of the leaders of European states, as well as of the United States and Canada, at Helsinki. The Final Act of the European conference, signed by the heads of 35 states, including President G. Ford, became a historic event and a document, just as a number of bilateral Soviet-American agreements, particularly those pertaining to the bases of

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the interrelations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and the agreements reached with respect to strategic arms limitation.

In this way, detente in Soviet-American relations was cemented by mutual agreements and understandings. In the United States, however, this tendency always had many influential opponents. Their pressure, as the course of events showed, influenced the White House policy after the new Democratic President J. Carter came into power. He began his activity with respect to the Soviet Union from a position that can be called nothing other than shortsighted. The Pharisean idea of the United States as the "moral leader of the free world," which has the right to teach others how to "defend human rights," with no concern for the state affairs of this matter in its own country, began to be reintroduced into American political circulation.

All of this rang very dissonantly in the international relations of the second half of the 1970's, in which detente was a determining factor. On top of all this, in 1976-1977 American foreign policy made the regular zigzag in an important question such as strategic arms limitation, essentially casting doubt on the agreement reached at Vladivostok on the highest level in November 1974.

In this difficult situation there was a new display of the adherence to principle and firmness of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which came to the defense of everything positive that had been achieved in Soviet-American relations in the past years. After rejecting the unsubstantiated one-sided approach of official Washington to a revision of the agreement on strategic arms limitation and the ridiculous claims to the role of "universal moralist," the Soviet Government continued to carry out a vast amount of work on escalating detente in Europe and in other regions of the world and on maintaining a policy toward lessening international tension, including that in Soviet-American relations.

Words of wisdom, dignity and realism, based on the generally recognized prestige of the Soviet State and the solidarity and power of the countries of the socialist commonwealth, were heard from the Kremlin, addressed to those in the United States who wanted to carry out a "tough policy" in relation to the USSR. This line based on principle was continued in the message of greetings sent by L. I. Brezhnev on 4 July 1977 to United States President Carter on the occasion of this country's national holiday-- Independence Day. "I should like to express the hope," emphasized the head of the Soviet State, "that, by using the positive experience accumulated during the last few years, we will be able to ensure the stable development of relations between the USSR and the United States along the path of cooperation and interaction in the interests of consolidating peace and escalating the process of detente."<sup>1</sup>

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Let us, however, ask ourselves the question, why, all the same, did American foreign policy even in the second half of the 1970's, particularly with the Democrats' accession to power, again take on a zigzag nature? Why did rhetoric and lack of respect for the principle of continuity in international agreements begin to predominate in it? There cannot, of course, be a terse, one-word answer here, nor should the explanation be sought only in certain specific individuals on the American political scene.

American foreign policy has a class basis: large groupings of monopolistic capital stand at the helm of the state power. These groupings do not regard with favor the political leaders who make gross miscalculations. An example of this is the Democratic president, Lyndon Johnson, who suffered political defeat due to the failure of the American venture in Vietnam.

If, however, one speaks of the ideological-theoretical platform of American foreign policy, it is based on a ramified network of doctrines and concepts that are related by only one thing--ideas of "American exclusiveness" and a spirit of expansionism. Behind the diversity of these doctrines and concepts, dusted with the newest "achievements" of American bourgeois political thought, a single common aim was viewed--to strengthen the position of American capitalism, including strengthening it at the expense of other states, and after 1917, when Russia's workers took authority into their hands, to place all possible obstacles on the path of development of socialism, and if possible, simply to stop this natural process.

We will begin the analysis of the basic directions in American policy in the 1940's to 1960's with a study of the foreign policy doctrines and concepts of the Cold War period.

Just what sort of doctrines and concepts are they?

Among the American foreign policy doctrines and concepts there are those that served and will probably continue for a long time to serve the United States. This historical continuity is explained by the common factors inherent in American imperialism both at the beginning of the twentieth century and in the present--expansion, aggressiveness, lack of respect for the sovereign rights of other nations and reliance on force.

The doctrine of isolationism, which dominated from the end of the eighteenth century right up to the 1930's, should be particularly discussed. The inspirer of it was the first president of the United States, George Washington, who felt that America should stand aside from any international conflicts. The main goal of the doctrine in the early days was to protect the United States against the encroachments of stronger European powers and to create the conditions for consolidating the American nation and strengthening its state. In the nineteenth century the American bourgeoisie directed its main efforts toward maximum extension of the United States

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borders on the North American continent. The doctrine of isolationism contributed in the best possible way to achieving this aim. In accordance with the doctrine of isolationism, for a long time the United States avoided attaching itself to any military-political alliance.

Gradually the content of isolationism evolved and grew more complex. Isolationism began to become a doctrine that ensured the United States the opportunity of maneuvering relatively freely in the competition for world influence with its imperialist rivals. On the tactical plane, in accordance with the doctrine of isolationism, the United States Government for the time being preferred to stand apart from any specific international conflict or especially military actions, in order to intervene actively in the course of interimperialist conflict at a moment advantageous for it. A striking example of this is the United States position in World War I.

In the course of time isolationism increasingly adapted itself to the interests of the United States imperialist policy. It was completely discarded with respect to Latin America. The nature of isolationism acquired an expansionist slant, after the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed in 1823. At its basis lay the idea of limiting the influence, and then even forcing the European powers out of the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine signified that the United States, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, was gradually beginning to depart from the positions of "classic" isolationism and regard Latin America as a sphere of its own "special interests." With the development of American capitalism and its turning into the imperialism, the Monroe Doctrine was modified. At the beginning of the twentieth century it was already being used to justify Washington's imperialist intervention in the affairs of the countries of Latin America. After World War II the United States used the Monroe Doctrine mainly to substantiate its police actions, suppress the national liberation movements in Latin America and attempt to cut off dissemination of socialist ideas south of the Rio Grande. This doctrine was also dragged out into the light during the Caribbean crisis of 1962 to justify the dangerous actions of the United States Government with respect to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Therefore, right up to our times the renovated Monroe Doctrine can be found in the arsenal of American foreign policy and diplomacy.

At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, when the country entered the stage of imperialism, United States foreign policy took on an active expansionist nature. The new policy required that fresh ideas, doctrines and concepts be worked out. A more detailed theoretical platform was gradually worked out for American imperialist diplomacy. In this period a group of statesmen and scholars--President Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Admiral A. Mehan--worked out new doctrines. For example, the "Open Door Policy" was proclaimed, directed primarily toward Asia.



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All three basic doctrines on which American foreign policy and diplomacy rested to a considerable extent in this period, in supplementing each other, pursued the goal of ensuring the interests of the United States in three geographical regions of the world: isolationism--in North America and Western Europe, the Monroe Doctrine--in Latin America and the "Open Door Policy"--in Asia. These doctrines to a greater or lesser degree determined the strategy and tactics of American diplomacy in the international arena up to the 1930's.

Pluralization of the aims of American foreign policy and updating the diplomatic devices and methods occurred in the course of and after the end of World War II. The essence of American foreign policy and diplomacy in the postwar period amounts to the old aim--attempts to create a Pax Americana, that is peace in the American way, a worldwide American Empire, in which no one would dare to cast doubt on the supremacy of American politicians and monopolists. There are a number of reasons for this approach of the ruling clique in the United States to international affairs.

The American imperialists assumed that in the situation that had formed after May 1945 the United States was the only country that had emerged from World War II with a stronger economic and financial system. Approximately 23 billion dollars worth of gold was concentrated at Fort Knox and other gold reserve depositories of the United States. The imperialist opponents of the United States--Germany, Italy and Japan--were utterly defeated, and rivals such as England and France were gravely weakened. Washington had the monopoly on nuclear weapons. In Washington, furthermore, it was felt that the Soviet Union, which had borne the brunt of the struggle with fascist Germany, could not withstand the calculations of the United States to establish "trusteeship" over the whole world. These conclusions were obvious hasty, and underestimated the actual and potential possibilities of the Soviet Union, just as the magnetic force of socialist and communist ideas.

New doctrines and concepts had to be worked out for the political rearrangement of the world intended in Washington. There was not long to wait for practical steps in this direction. They showed completely clearly that in the struggle for world supremacy the ruling clique of the United States intended to be supported primarily by its military and economic potential.

Already being worked out by 1947 were the notorious concept of "containment" directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the "Truman Doctrine" and the "Marshall Plan," which pursued the goal of establishing the hegemony of the United States in Western Europe. In 1949 the aggressive military bloc of NATO was established. The ruling circles of the United States of America set out to embody the idea of establishing a world order in the American way, and the deformed offspring of American postwar foreign policy and diplomacy--the "Cold War"--was born.

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The concept of "containment" was reinforced by a series of political, economic and military actions of the American Government. In revealing the true aims of the concept of "containment," United States Secretary of State Dulles at the beginning of the 1950's advanced the doctrine of "liberation," even more frankly aggressive in nature, after proclaiming the goal of the United States to be elimination of the socialist orders in Western Europe. The Cold War had reached its apogee.

American diplomacy in the Cold War period took on hypertrophically deformed shapes. It discarded the positive experience in solving international problems that it had accumulated under President Roosevelt. Moreover, there is full reason for considering that everything Rooseveltian, which was of positive significance for both international and for Soviet-American relations, began to be cauterized from American diplomacy beginning in 1946. Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam--all of these historical landmarks of international diplomacy in Washington were deliberately defamed, and Roosevelt's name was discredited, at first reservedly, and then increasingly openly. The spirit of seeking mutually acceptable solutions to international problems jointly with the Soviet Union was eradicated from American diplomacy. Soviet-American relations were frozen.

It would seem that certain points in the present stage of development of Soviet-American relations recall, at least outwardly, this postwar period: a few influential gentlemen are striving to reduce to the minimum the positive experience in relations between the USSR and the United States that was accumulated in the first half of the 1970's. The tremendous difference, however, lies in the fact that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to cross out this instructive experience. Many American politicians and representatives of the business world realize quite well that great disadvantages for the United States itself are concealed behind escalation of the tension in Soviet-American relations. In the second half of the 1940's, however, there was no such realization.

Where they build their calculations on force, the means of peaceful settlement of international disputes fall to the side. After the victory over fascist Germany, in the United States it seemed that for many years they forgot what a responsible, friendly attitude toward the Soviet country and toward its friends and allies was. Instead of this, America's ruling elite concentrated its efforts on attempts to isolate, and if it worked, simply to undermine the socialist achievements of the Soviet people. Many American politicians came out openly in behalf of war against the USSR, seeking for this any kind of "convenient" pretexts, such as saying that the Soviet Union was preparing an "international conspiracy" with the aim of "overthrowing" the American Government. Let us remember how the fascist-type Senator Joseph McCarthy raged in the United States. Unfortunately, he was not alone. Of course, not all American politicians upheld such views, but they preferred to keep silent.

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The nuclear weapons testing performed by the Soviet Union in 1949 made the most unbridled anti-Soviets in the United States change their tune somewhat. The United States policy and diplomacy, dangerous for the cause of peace, of destroying everything positive that had been achieved during the war years with respect to mutual cooperation between the USSR and the United States, were in full swing, however. The United States established many aggressive military blocs throughout the world: NATO, ANZUS, CENTO, SEATO and ASPAC. Not only the capitalist, but also some of the developing countries fell into their trap. In most of these blocs the United States occupied the commanding position. In others, such as CENTO, for example, the United States did not formally enter, but actively participated in the work of its permanent organs.

The "arguments" by means of which American diplomats substantiated the need to put together the aggressive blocs were varied. It was announced, for example, that NATO was created for the purpose of "saving" Western Europe from "Soviet aggression," SEATO--to guarantee "order and security" for Southwest Asia, and CENTO--to combat "subversive activities" in the Middle and Near East.

It is quite clear what was really concealed behind the facade of the work of American diplomacy when it intensively split the world up into groups confronting each other. In Western Europe NATO became an obstacle in the path of relaxing international tension. NATO essentially restricts the sovereignty of the overwhelming majority of Western European countries and restrains their diplomatic initiative with respect to improving the international situation in Europe. The "danger from the East," preached by bourgeois propaganda, proved to be a myth, and the danger of prolonging American hegemony in Western Europe, of subversive actions against the socialist countries and of revanchism in the FRG--a reality. Under the cover of SEATO, at the end of the 1950's the United States drove Indochina into a bloody war. Finally, CENTO. This bloc was established in 1955. In 1956 aggression had already been unleashed against Egypt, in 1958--aggression by the United States and England against Lebanon and Jordan, and in June 1967--the Israeli aggression against Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

The open incursions into the sphere of foreign policy and diplomacy made by the CIA and the Pentagon became increasingly persistently criticized in America itself. In response to this criticism, the United States activated the operations of bourgeois scholars and propagandists directed toward proving that the world "had the communists to thank" for the origin of the Cold War. A more versatile version was drawn out into the light in the 1960's. It was stated that both the United States and the USSR were to blame for the origin of the Cold War, but the latter, of course, "to a greater extent."

For example, the American historian Arthur Schlesinger put forth the version that the orthodox approach existing in the United States, which most historians followed when explaining the sources of the Cold War, and

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which was that it was allegedly a bold and necessary response of the "free world" to "communist aggression," needed a reevaluation.<sup>2</sup>

In setting forth his approach to the origins of the Cold War, Schlesinger writes that in 1945 a point of view on world order dominated in the United States according to which all the states have common interests in all world affairs and should collaborate in international organizations. Actually, Roosevelt, upon returning from the Yalta Conference, announced that it had "put an end to the system of unilateral actions of closed alliances and spheres of influence, alignment of forces and all other devices that had been tested throughout the centuries and had inevitably failed to bring the desired result." It is in order to note, however, that Roosevelt made his statement in the spirit of a policy of mutual assistance by the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition and that he also regarded the possibility of postwar collaboration with the USSR with justified hope. American foreign policy practice after Roosevelt's death was a complete contradiction to this approach as it had been understood by the president. Deprived of the spirit of cooperation, it rapidly evolved toward the views of those who, intoxicated by the possession of the atomic bomb, called for establishing the dictates of the United States in international relations.

It is characteristic that even the concept of the "spheres of influence," when it did not secure the ruling clique of the United States, was also discarded and, conversely, was used intensively when it was advantageous for it. The concept of "spheres of influence" was rejected if it denoted to even the slightest extent nonintervention in the internal affairs of the countries of the socialist commonwealth, and at the same time, it was followed, for example, in relations with the countries of Western Europe. This approach, of course, had nothing in common with postwar reality and gradually forced tension in relations between the capitalist and the socialist countries, including between the United States and the USSR.

Arthur Schlesinger, for example, acknowledged: "The critics and even the friends of the United States sometimes note a lack of correspondence between the American passion for universalism, when it is a question of territory lying far from American shores, and the preference which the United States assigns to its own interests." Churchill, in striving for Washington's blessings for an initiative in the spirit of the policy of the English "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe, could not refrain from reminding the Americans: "We are following the example of the United States in South America."

It was President Truman who became the man to unleash, along with Churchill, the Cold War. In official Washington, notes Schlesinger, the opinion was stated that "If a conflict with Russia is inevitable, every sensible consideration suggests that it should take place in Eastern, and not in Western Europe."<sup>3</sup> Under the pretext of "disagreement with the division of the world into spheres of influence," American imperialism began an active struggle to eliminate the people's democratic states in Eastern Europe.

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Having reserved for itself the sphere of influence in Latin America and, essentially, having established it in Western Europe, American imperialism at the end of the 1940's fastened its eyes on the Eastern European states that had been liberated from fascist slavery. In conjunction with England the United States Government resolved to establish its "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe as well.

Just what practical steps did Truman's government take to derail postwar cooperation between the USSR and the United States and to start the Cold War? We will name just a few.

After Roosevelt's death in 1945, President Truman did not respond to the proposal on the development of economic relations between the United States and the USSR. In May 1945 the United States suddenly stopped Lend Lease supplies to the Soviet Union. The barbaric order to explode atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to a considerable extent dictated by the striving of the American ruling circles to put pressure on the USSR. Beginning with the autumn of 1945 the United States and England were already beginning to pursue a policy toward a Cold War against the Soviet Union. United States Secretary of State Byrnes, as the American researcher J. Wurzburg notes, went to the London Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs "with a firm intention of using nuclear weapons as an implied threat,"<sup>4</sup> having the according instructions from President Truman.

In this way, the United States Government, thousands of kilometers from its borders, tried to solve international affairs, without taking into account the results of World War II, the social changes in Eastern Europe and the interests of the security of the Soviet Union. The bourgeois scholars, however, even liberals such as Schlesinger, could not draw this conclusion. Their half-hearted criticism of United States policy after 1945 and the final answer to the question of the origins of the Cold War in no way coincide. On many questions they are close to the conformists and advocate mainly the old view of the origin of the Cold War, accusing the Soviet Union of almost everything.

Arthur Schlesinger, for example, states that the Cold War could have been avoided only if "the Soviet Union had not been committed to its convictions on the infallibility of the communist doctrine and the inevitability of the establishing of a communist world."<sup>5</sup> It seems that the "uncompromising Leninist ideology" is again "to blame" for everything. As for Roosevelt, the reason he cooperated so successfully with the Soviet Union was that he was "ignorant... in the mysteries of Marxism-Leninism," and this was "inexcusable."<sup>6</sup> Here one can clearly see the class position of the bourgeois scholar who does not wish to recognize the essence of the Soviet foreign policy of peaceful coexistence, which proceeds from the fact that the capitalists and those who serve this order cannot renounce their approach to the bases of organization of human society and, of course, cannot acknowledge as illegitimate the point of view that defends the

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preservation and then the "victory of capitalism" on a worldwide scale. They cannot, because the capitalists and their political system would then prove to be non-class institutions.

If one speaks of the aims of American policy in Eastern Europe, after the conclusion of World War II they consisted mainly of not permitting, in the countries of this region, elimination of capitalist orders and their development along a socialist path.

It is well known that the liberation movement against fascism, in which the communists played the main role, became the chief force, which after 1945 determined the development of events in the Eastern European countries. The United States did not want to acknowledge this. It pursued a subversive policy with respect to all the progressive forces of these countries. In its Eastern European policy the United States went obstinately against the actual facts. American diplomacy began to be guided in this region by exclusively ideological and military-strategic aims. As a result, for a long time a "hard" line dominated in United States policy and in the actions of American diplomacy in Eastern Europe. The methods by means of which the United States attempted to prevent the strengthening of the progressive regimes in Eastern Europe amounted to the following.

The State Department began to put into effect a "diplomacy of protest."<sup>7</sup> The United States Government protested against any measure carried out on liberated territories. In 1946 American propaganda was already actively taking up as armament the myth of the "Soviets' intention to seize Western Europe." American governmental and private propaganda services were used for this purpose: the press, radio and television. Local national bourgeois information organs also attached themselves actively to the misinforming propaganda directed against the peaceloving Soviet foreign policy. Having gradually gotten to their feet, the Western European bourgeois willingly helped to disseminate the myth of the "aggressiveness of the Soviets," since they were justly frightened by the defection of a number of Eastern European countries from the capitalist system. This was asserted about the Soviet Union which, having lost 20 million of its sons and daughters in the struggle against fascism, aspired toward peace and rehabilitated the economy destroyed by the war, in order to advance farther along the path of reinforcing socialism. The United States needed the invented myth so that, having made use of the economic and military weakness of the countries of Western Europe, it could thrust its hegemony on them and take under its control and affirm on European soil the American military presence. It must be acknowledged that the method of the "diplomacy of protest" brought American foreign policy definite success in Western Europe.

In this way, in the American foreign policy and diplomacy in Europe in the second half of the 1940's and 1950's, three basic goals were clearly revealed, one of which was purely propagandistic, and the other two--fully real. Since there was no "Soviet aggression" in Europe, the true goals of

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the American "policy of containment" were soon clearly revealed. They were essentially in the nature of attempts at intervention in the internal affairs of the peoples of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and expansionist in nature with respect to the peoples of Western Europe.

In their work to undermine the influence of the socialist countries in the international arena, American policy and diplomacy have so far been counting on weakening the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries. The leaders of the United States Government do not conceal their hopes that the nationalist tendencies in certain socialist countries will gain the upper hand over the principles of internationalism. A special term even appeared in the vocabulary of American politicians and propagandists--"national communism"--by which they mean the refusal of any country of the socialist commonwealth to follow the principles of proletarian internationalism. These hopes of the leaders of American foreign policy increased especially in the 1960's because of the splitting policy of Mao Zedong's group in China, which followed the path of arrant nationalism and chauvinism that had nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. They were also roused by the anti-Soviet policy of the present leadership in Beijing [Peking].

The American scholar John Campbell openly acknowledges that since the beginning of the 1950's the State Department has been "nurturing the hope" that the microbes of "national communism" will spread to the socialist countries. In this case American diplomacy, Campbell draws the conclusion, has counted on "trying to stir up antagonism" between the governments of the Eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup>

The United States Government's attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe occurred as far back as the meeting of the heads of the governments of the four great powers in Geneva in 1955. President Eisenhower insisted on including on the agenda the question of the domestic situation in Eastern European socialist countries. These demands were rejected by the Soviets. In December 1956 Secretary of State Dulles preached the idea of the "neutralization" of the Eastern European socialist countries.<sup>9</sup> At the end of the 1950's the United States Government began to make more active use of economic levers, trying to weaken the unity of the European socialist countries. Dulles called this tactic "friendly acts." Carefully concealed behind its facade were the old goals of American diplomacy--weakening the unity of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe.

In the 1960's, Washington, supported by assistance from Bonn and London, introduced a considerable correction into its foreign policy strategy with respect to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The doctrines of "peaceful involvement" and then also "building bridges" were proposed in this connection. As early as 1960 Senator John Kennedy expressed his lack of agreement with the tactics of President Eisenhower with respect to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The future herald of the "New Frontiers" proposed the idea of a "peaceful offensive" against the

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socialist commonwealth. Kennedy demanded a differentiated approach by the United States to the Eastern European countries and called for the use of the economic potentials of the United States to weaken the ties between the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR.

The policy of "peaceful involvement" and "building bridges" is by no means a synonym for the policy of peaceful coexistence. It serves as a supplement to other directions in the United States foreign policy and bears a clearly marked antisocialist nature. Some people in the United States did not conceal the fact that its goal was an aspiration to "tear down" the very states to which the "bridges were being built."

The father of American foreign policy strategy was Secretary of State John Dulles.<sup>10</sup> The burden of Dulles' ideas still lies on American foreign policy and diplomacy.

In the course of seven years, from 1953 to 1959, he was at the helm of the United States foreign policy course. It was said of Dulles that he "wears the whole State Department under his hat,"<sup>11</sup> that is, personally directed American diplomacy. That is essentially the way it was.

When he was the United States Secretary of State, Dulles carried out a foreign policy that secured for him the nickname of the "knight of the Cold War." He persistently pursued a policy toward the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Dulles preached a policy of "moral offensive" toward the USSR and did not hide the fact that the main purpose of his work he regarded as the transformation of the socialist system in the USSR in the direction of capitalism.<sup>12</sup> To achieve it, Washington resorted to the most varied devices and methods, really excluding only military actions.

Dulles assessed international relations primarily in the light of United States policy toward the Soviet Union. "There was hardly an hour during any working day," notes A. Berding, "when the image of the Kremlin did not appear in the thoughts of the Secretary of State."<sup>13</sup> Dulles formulated the basic tasks of American foreign policy and diplomacy in the following way: "In the first place, we should remain strong. We should oppose further Soviet advance. We should make them understand clearly that any significant aggression will entail the risk of war; in the second place, we should strengthen the unity of the free world. We cannot rely only upon our own force; in the third place, we should do everything in our power, by stimulating the evolution of the Soviet Union to greater individual freedom..."<sup>14</sup> These were militaristic, falsified, moralizing assertions, pursuing the goal of giving greater pressure to international tension.

Dulles constantly stressed the fact that the Soviet Union "should be feared," since its aim was "supremacy throughout the world." The Secretary of State deliberately distorted the nature of the processes taking place in the



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international arena after World War II. For example, he placed an equals sign between the growth of influence of the ideas of socialism and communism in the world and the "Soviet advance," denied the international nature of Marxism-Leninism and saw the "machinations of Moscow" in all the failures of imperialism. According to Dulles, "to remain strong" meant systematically augmenting the arms race in the United States, and "to strengthen the unity of the free world"--to put together aggressive military blocs.

One wonders, why did Dulles and other leading American politicians and diplomats, just as their predecessors, have to resort in their goals to the myth of the "aggressive strivings" of the USSR on an international scale? Why did the leader of American foreign policy select this precise tactical device to work on American public opinion? The answer to these questions was once given, in a burst of candor... by Dulles himself. He acknowledged that "There is nothing for the peoples of the United States and the peoples of the Soviet Union to quarrel about.... There has always been peace between the United States and the Soviet Union.... Both parties are to a considerable extent provided with everything they need...."<sup>15</sup> Therefore, if even in Dulles' opinion, there was nothing in the bilateral Soviet-American relations that could seriously damage them, the pretext for this "should" be sought in the international sphere. He did just this. Some responsible American political figures are continuing to do this to this day.

Such were the basic tasks and aims of Dulles for American Diplomacy in the 1950's. They deprived it of a positive basis and to a greater extent than before made a servant of the policy of "balancing on the brink of war." These same problems in general continued to be solved by American foreign policy and diplomacy in the 1960's, although, it may be noted, signs of a more sober approach to a number of international problems appeared, as occurred in 1963.

John Dulles left an unfortunate trail in the history of international relations. For a long time his views to a considerable extent determined the direction of work in American foreign policy, even when the Democrats were in power. He was the author of the doctrine of "liberation" of the countries of Eastern Europe, proclaimed in 1952, of the concept of "massive retaliation," advanced in 1954, of tactics of diplomatic pressure, or rather of the blackmail of his allies, known as the possibility of an "agonizing reevaluation" of United States policy in Western Europe, to which Dulles resorted in 1954, of the threat of "balancing on the brink of war," openly proclaimed in 1956, and of condemning neutrality as an "amoral phenomenon." In their aggregate these views also personified the American foreign policy that Dulles implemented so actively in the international arena--the policy of the Cold War.

The practical results of this policy were: the establishing of SEATO and the United States participation in it, the military treaties with Japan,

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South Korea and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, proclamation of the aggressive "Eisenhower Doctrine," and inclusion of the FRG in NATO and the West European Alliance. This was a type of "diplomacy of military blocs." In the 1950's it left no hopes for achieving agreements on solving international problems and for the development of Soviet-American relations.

Some new features appeared in American foreign policy in the 1960's. With a view to improving the prediction of foreign policy tendencies, a number of scholars were enlisted to assist American diplomats, especially when the Kennedy Government came to power.

A clear tendency toward closer interaction and coordination of efforts of bourgeois science and practical work in international relations appeared in the United States. There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon, above all, the fact that American foreign policy and diplomacy suffered a series of very major failures and defeats: Washington did not succeed in isolating the Soviet Union in the postwar world, attempts to undermine and eliminate socialist gains in the countries of Eastern Europe failed, including those made with the aid of the tactic of "softening socialism," a number of states in Asia and Africa followed the path of socialism and the socialist revolution in Cuba was victorious. The positions of socialism were strengthened throughout the world, despite all the efforts of American diplomacy to prevent this.

Moreover, Washington's political influence in Western Europe weakened noticeably and conflicts between the United States and other leading powers of the capitalist world began to be more strongly apparent. A struggle of the nations of Latin America developed against the dominance of American monopolies.

Under these conditions American foreign policy and diplomacy leaders, naturally, were faced with the question of how they should act next. In official Washington they became convinced that American foreign policy and diplomacy were in extreme need of a "shot in the arm," new foreign policy doctrines and concepts that would constitute a more firm, and, the main thing, more flexible theoretical basis for United States foreign policy and would serve as a type of compass for American diplomacy in the 1960's and 1970's. John Kennedy directly called upon ruling America to eliminate the "drought of ideas" in United States policy.

Under Kennedy American foreign policy planning was headed by Walt Rostow, special assistant to the President. Under President Johnson he even headed the work of the Council on Planning Foreign Policy of the State Department. In 1964 Rostow published a book, "The View From the Seventh Floor,"<sup>16</sup> in which he seemed to dispose of the past and outlined the future strategy and tactics of American foreign policy and diplomacy. It looked as if the view unfolded of international policy from the window of Rostow's office differed little from that seen from Dulles' office, although it did, of course, have its own nuances. After all, practical experience had corrected or even refuted many old dogmas of American diplomacy of the 1950's.

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Walt Rostow felt that the main goal of American foreign policy and diplomacy was ensuring the victory of capitalism over socialism in the confrontation of the two structures. The capitalist countries, in his opinion, embodied the "freedom" which allegedly did not exist in the socialist countries. Since the United States, you see, could not be in accordance with such a situation, it consequently had a right to struggle for "freedom on a world-wide scale." There is, of course, no denying that Walt Rostow was candid. He essentially acknowledged that the "crusade" of the imperialists against socialism and communism continued. Juggling the words "freedom" and "democracy," Rostow set United States foreign policy and diplomacy the aim of "complete victory" over the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. A great deal of this approach appeared after the Democratic victory in the presidential elections of 1976. A number of American politicians returned to the old songs, passing them off as a "new approach" to international affairs. In reality, however, the only thing new here is the names of these public figures.

In formulating the goal of "complete victory" over socialism, Rostow called upon the authority of United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk for aid. The latter, Rostow notes, said the following: "Sometimes one may hear that our tasks or policy do not pursue the goal of victory. This is completely incorrect. Of course we intend to win. And we will win. Our goal is victory for all mankind.... This will be a victory on a worldwide scale in the name of freedom."<sup>17</sup> This is the way the official leader of American foreign policy and diplomacy reasoned.

By the middle of the 1960's it had become clear that American imperialism still continued to put its trust in military force as the means of achieving its foreign policy goals. Washington relegated peaceful means of settling international disputes to the background. This was particularly indicated by United States aggression against the Vietnamese, attempts to deal with the Cubans through military measures, intervention in the Dominican Republic and many other cases.

This is how, for example, Walt Rostow described American diplomacy: "The main element in a policy of national security in the present-day world is the correlation between the military and non-military goals, between force and policy.... There are scarcely any diplomatic relations that we have implemented that would not be influenced by an estimate of the military power of the United States and the conditions under which we would probably actually utilize this power. Our military potentials and our will to use them in important national interests and aims are the inevitable background of our civil policy."<sup>18</sup> Rostow puts forth the same idea even more clearly in another statement: "Among the diplomatic relations implemented by us throughout the world, or diplomatic steps, there are hardly any that do not pose the question: Does the United States have the potential and the will to use military force to support its policy?"<sup>19</sup> Although Rostow also states that "in a broader sense our goals are political, and not military,"<sup>20</sup> this does not sound very convincing, because of the fact that it was precisely military force that Washington preferred over peaceful diplomacy.

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Even if the unfeasible goal of American policy and diplomacy--establishing world supremacy of the United States--is at first glance a political one, the road to it may be paved only with local wars and a major war. The American militarists resorted repeatedly to the former. The military aspect in major American policy in the 1950's to 1960's was an actual reality, and world cooperation to achieve political goals was to a considerable extent made up only of good intentions. The experience in international relations in those years indicates that at the moments when international relations would become strained, when capitalism would suffer periodic defeat in the international arena, and when the forces of the national-liberation movement were actively struggling for their freedom, American imperialism would even proceed to apply military force, using large contingents of the United States Regular Army for this purpose.

In modern international relations the tendency toward further activation of American military policy and crisis diplomacy, which serves it, is coming into conflict with the strengthening of the defensive power of the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union. That is why this same Rostow was always forced to state that "Military policy, which is the efficient servant of the great goal (Rostow is dreaming of the complete victory of capitalism over socialism--An. G.)," must begin with recognition of these basic factors: "The Soviet Union now has at its disposal sufficient nuclear power and devices for transmitting it to inflict tremendous destruction on Western Europe and even greater destruction on the United States. Therefore, an integral part of national policy is achieving our goals through means that would reduce the probability of nuclear war to the minimum, at the same time acknowledging that it is always possible, and should be proposed in defense of our important interests."<sup>21</sup>

It goes without saying that the Soviet Union's policy does not pursue the goals of unleashing nuclear war with the United States, even though the ruling circles of the latter are often captivated by the exultation aroused from time to time by the great waves of anti-Sovietism springing up in the political life of this country, and frighten their people with the "communist threat," including that on the military plane.

It can easily be noticed that usually a sort of "ninth wave," signifying impending danger, of anti-Sovietism rises in the period when the United States Congress is considering and approving military allocations. If, however, it is necessary to justify working out and putting into practice new systems of strategic weapons, like the neutron bomb, the waves of anti-Sovietism in the United States begin to be intensively disseminated in the mass information media at any time. For example, a fierce anti-Soviet campaign was stirred up in the United States in connection with the demands of American militarists to supply them with "winged missiles" for armament, moreover under conditions violating the Soviet-American agreement at Vladivostok. The political bosses of the Democrats yielded to this pressure in the spring and summer of 1977, which complicated relations between the USSR and the United States.

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The basis of a "rational military policy" was laid by General Maxwell Taylor at the end of the 1950's, and it was "improved" under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Its essence lay in the following basic components: further amassing of nuclear weapons, improving the means of delivering them to their goals and the launching systems, production of a large number of ordinary arms of all types, and also setting up special units--of "green berets"--to fight against the national-liberation movement. It was not legitimate, however, to attempt to impose this militarized approach to the international relations of the second half of the 1970's, when mankind had already gradually begun to forget about the Cold War of the pattern of the 1950's, by striving to set up a system of stable peace, and not a permanent military-political confrontation!

In the United States there is a quite extensive political school, the representatives of which attempt in every possible way to prove that cooperation between American and Soviet diplomacy is allegedly impossible because of the fact that the latter is guided by Marxism-Leninism. The representatives of this school, regardless of the facts, deny the possibility of achieving positive results in the course of diplomatic contacts between the USSR and the United States, just as of other capitalist states with socialist states, and promote the theory, already long collapsed, that "diplomacy can operate efficiently only if fundamental ideological and social problems are not largely the subject of the dispute."<sup>22</sup> The adherents of this approach argue that policies achieve great successes in the international arena only when they are in harmony with the ideology and social order of the other party. Since Soviet policies adhere to Marxist-Leninist ideology and deny the fairness of the bourgeois system, consequently, "it is impossible to do business with them."

In this theory there is complete confusion of the state and diplomatic functions with world view. As a result, it turns out that only the representatives of states with the same social formation can negotiate among themselves, even if their countries are at war with each other, since they do not cast doubt on the fundamentals of the basis--the social order of the other party. As for the interaction of diplomacy of the leading capitalist states and diplomacy of the socialist states in solving international and bilateral problems, it is allegedly impossible due to the fundamental ideological divergences. Practical experience, as is known, has long ago disproven this ridiculous approach.

It is easy to see what the authors of such views are driving at. They are engaged in utterly undermining the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with a different socioeconomic system. In their work, those who overthrow the principle of peaceful coexistence resort to every possible type of dishonest devices, ascribing to Soviet foreign policy ends that it is not pursuing and, conversely, denying its true aspirations.

V. Aspaturian, professor at the University of Pennsylvania, was, for example, a representative of this type of "school" of political williness. In the

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article, "Soviet Diplomacy," he stated that the theory of peaceful coexistence "does not seek to settle" fundamental international problems. He went on to draw the conclusion that the theory of peaceful coexistence has its own ultimate goal of eliminating the social systems of the countries of the West with the aid of both forcible and peaceful means. "Coexistence," Asaturian taught, "is simply a deception for carrying out the Cold War in accordance with the rules that are advantageous for this." The professor substantiates this statement with the fact that peaceful coexistence "does not in any case denote a lessening of the ideological war that pursues the end of eliminating capitalism."<sup>23</sup> Of course, peaceful coexistence actually does not specify any lessening of the struggle with bourgeois ideology. As for the "elimination of capitalism," here we may recall the words of V. I. Lenin that revolutions do not break out "to order," and that "It would be impossible to put an end to the supremacy of capitalism, if the entire economic development of the capitalist countries did not lead to this."<sup>24</sup>

In his speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on 7 June 1969, L. I. Brezhnev, head of the delegation, stressed the fact that the principle of peaceful coexistence of states "means that the debatable questions that arise between countries should be resolved not by force of arms, not by war, but by peaceful means. It has already acquired broad international recognition." After noting the great potentials that lie within the policy of peaceful coexistence, L. I. Brezhnev stated: "We make no exceptions here for even one of the capitalist states, including the United States. For us, peaceful coexistence is not a temporary tactical device, but an important principle of the consistently peace-loving socialist foreign policy."<sup>25</sup>

The opponents of the policy of peaceful coexistence in the United States hush up in every possible way the fact that it not only proclaims the rejection of war as a means of resolving debatable questions between states, but also provides for a firm international-legal basis for successful cooperation of different states in solving international problems and problems of a bilateral nature that rests on the principles of equal rights, mutual understanding and trust among states, consideration of each others' interests, nonintervention in internal affairs, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the development of economic and cultural cooperation based on full equality and mutual benefits. Is this not the reason why in the United States they fell silent concerning the Helsinki Agreement in all of its content? After all, the latter agreement is an achievement of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The American scholar R. Strauss-Hupe, who considered a nuclear war possible, was even more candid in his recommendations to the United States Government to undermine even further the principles of peaceful coexistence. While acknowledging that the communists "are impossible to defeat in a struggle for people's minds,"<sup>26</sup> he appealed, "instead of pursuing the illusion of peaceful coexistence with the communists," that "the solidarity of the West

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and NATO be reinforced and the Atlantic concepts be put into practice." Straus-Hupe regarded the period of the 1960's as only an "unstable truce." Acknowledging with bitterness that during the years that had passed since the socialist revolution in Russia, the achievements "of the communist system throughout the world are a supreme success in history," this adherent of a further intensification of international tension demanded that the United States activate the Cold War.<sup>27</sup>

There are a great many knights of the Cold War such as R. Straus-Hupe in the academic circles of the United States. Even today they are carrying out subversive work against peaceful coexistence, and are inspiring in the hearts of Americans a lack of faith in the possibility of lessening international tension even in the distant future.

There are also, however, among American political figures, diplomats and scholars, those who come out in behalf of the possibility and need of cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It is sufficient, for example, to mention the name of the former United States Ambassador to Moscow, Averil Harriman, and of Senator Edward Kennedy, the former permanent United States representative to the UN, C. Yost, the former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs W. Fulbright, the diplomat and scholar G. Kennan, Professor F. Neal, publicist J. Warburg,<sup>28</sup> and representatives of business circles, D. Kendall, A. Hammer and S. Eaton. Even among people of this type, however, there are different approaches and understanding of the "idea of cooperation" itself. For some this is only an attempt to look at present-day reality, while essentially remaining in the position of American expansionism; for others--it is a basis for requiring further development of new forms of American diplomatic activity, particularly in international organizations; for still others, the most realistically minded ones--it is an acknowledgement of the indisputable fact that in its time United States aggression in Vietnam was the chief obstacle in the way of solving many important international problems, and that a policy of peaceful coexistence must be followed. The problem, however, always lies in the extent to which such views are received in the governmental circles and whether they influence American foreign policy.

These views are reasonable if they are contrasted with the views of the circles in America that come out against peaceful coexistence between the USSR and the United States on the grounds that the world view of the Soviet people is Marxism-Leninism. Realistically thinking American politicians draw the conclusion that the differences in the approach of the USSR and the United States to the solution of their internal social and political problems should not prevent the solution of international problems such as the development of bilateral relations, disarmament, strategic arms limitation, complete banning of nuclear testing, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, banning the use of nuclear weapons by the former, etc.

A requirement of primary importance in the modern world is to "avoid the cataclysm of nuclear war."<sup>29</sup> A sensible point of view! The world is so

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diverse in the social, political and economic respect that it would be unrealistic to attempt to establish in it the hegemony of any one power or group of countries. Consequently, the idea of the Pax Americana is a fiction. But when those who seemingly come forth in behalf of peaceful coexistence state that the United States "is the only state that at the present time has wealth and firing power..., organizational abilities and, we hope, the political imagination to combine into a single whole an efficient international system of peaceful changes,"<sup>30</sup> they begin to contradict themselves in proposing clearly non-peaceful means for the "peaceful changes."

On the basis of an analysis of American foreign policy of the last three decades, the conclusion may be drawn that the contradiction between the attempts to understand the changes that have taken place in the world and the formulas for solving today's problems with old methods are a characteristic feature of political thinking and activity of a large number of American scholars and diplomats. They still often count on some sort of "exclusiveness of position" of the United States in the world arena, and attempt to thrust this interpretation of the international situation on each United States president that has newly come into power.

In the midst of the political palette of views on the question of the potential of peaceful coexistence of the United States with the Soviet Union, there should be particular discussion of the point of view of George Kennan, a well-known diplomat of the past, former United States Ambassador to the USSR and professor at Princeton University, who had a great deal of experience in studying Soviet-American relations. Kennan notes that in the United States there is a "serious crisis of public opinion" on the question of what policy to carry out in relation to the socialist countries, and states directly that the West "has no choice, it should initiate a search for peaceful coexistence as the basis of its policy." He also came out as an advocate of expanding trade between the East and West.<sup>31</sup>

The neocolonial aspects of United States foreign policy should also be discussed. This system of implementing the expansionist goals of American imperialism in the developing countries had been widely disseminated by the 1970's. It is an aggregate of economic, political, ideological and military methods by means of which imperialist exploitation in a somewhat updated form is essentially foisted upon the developing countries.

The situation that formed in the developing countries after the conclusion of World War II, in which the economic and political positions of the European powers and American foreign policy and diplomacy appeared to be weakened, was immediately attempted to be utilized in the interests of the United States monopolies. All of this was done under various pretexts, particularly under the pretext of struggling with the "communist danger" in the former colonial countries. The United States, which at one time was late to the dividing up of the "colonial pie," now tried to take



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revenge on its imperialist rivals. The American monopolists were quite successful in their aspiration: to a considerable extent they managed to crowd their competitors in Asia and Africa. As for Latin America, the United States, just as before, continues to dominate.

The aims of American foreign policy and diplomacy in the developing countries are, in the first place, the desire to prevent the appearance and development of socialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America and to retain these regions of the world and individual countries within the system of the world capitalist economy, above all depending on American monopolies, and in the second place, to crowd out the monopolies of other imperialist countries in the regions that are most important in the economic respect.

The use, in the developing countries in the interests of the United States, not only of the foreign policy state mechanism, propaganda and military force devices but also of America's economic and scientific-technical potential began to be characteristic of American diplomacy after World War II. The State Department was increasingly supported by economic levers: export of capital and economic "assistance." When this policy is carried out, a certain correction is made to adapt the interests of American companies and firms to the new conditions, when the exploitation of natural resources in the developing countries should take into account their political independence.

The neocolonialist policy, even though it mainly pursues the old ends, is not at all equivalent to colonialism. While the colonizers, for example, carried out and continue to carry out their policy in the colonies primarily with the aid of force, the neocolonizers achieve this primarily by means of indirect compulsion. At the same time, the latter, when it is advantageous for them, resorted to the old violent methods. It is sufficient to recall United States intervention in Guatemala, the Congo (Kinshasa), the Dominican Republic and, finally, the aggression of American imperialism in Vietnam. What took place in the 1970's in Angola, Lebanon, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Zaire reconfirms the fact that the United States was not rejecting methods of using force, even though something else is also clear. Under the conditions when the United States venture in Vietnam had failed, the politicians and generals of the United States in the situations of conflict that had arisen in some specific country began to resort more often to indirect than to direct use of force. They began to count mainly on reinforcing oligarchical and military regimes and on the use of mercenaries and economic pressure.

In his time, John Dulles called the colonial problem "America's dilemma."<sup>32</sup> He and his assistants resolved the dilemma by trying to make compatible what was incompatible: the relations of allies within the framework of NATO with official declarations that the United States "was in opposition to colonialism." Under these conditions, American diplomacy chose the course that Dulles formulated in this way: "We should be mediators between the European colonial powers and the peoples struggling for their

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independence." No support by the United States and its diplomacy of a single national liberation movement in the developing countries was ever seen, however. Moreover, American politicians, at any convenient instance in the UN and other international organizations, waged a struggle against decolonization. Dulles, giving an example to his subordinates, stated: "I am not sure that each colonial nation should automatically obtain independence just because it demands it."<sup>33</sup> There is a mediator for you!

The United States mass information media, carrying out the American policy, exerted great efforts to blacken Soviet policy on the national issue. The American propaganda myth on "Soviet colonialism" is exaggerated to this day. In the 1950's and 1960's, John Dulles, and after him Dean Rusk as well, strove to draw the attention of their listeners and collocutors to the non-existent "Soviet colonialism." Even today these false assertions are heard concerning Soviet policy, for example, in Africa. They are, of course, completely groundless.

While giving battle to "Soviet colonialism," the United States Secretary of State avoided in every possible way even meeting the representatives of the nations struggling against colonialism. Neither Dulles nor Herter, for example, felt like meeting the representatives of the national liberation movement of the Algerian people, since this might "offend" the French colonizers. American policy and diplomacy on this question changed somewhat only after President Kennedy came to power.

United States policy and diplomacy in the international arena is constantly embellished and defended by hundreds of bourgeois scholars, and not only Americans. Every year the publishing companies of the United States issue dozens of plump books in which the idea is persistently put forth that American foreign policy is guided by some "altruistic" motives and is implemented by "enlightened" politicians, who are thinking only of how to "help" other nations. This type of work carefully avoids the question of the class nature of American foreign policy, of its moving forces in the person of monopolistic capital and of the political bosses and military-industrial complex.

The works of the bourgeois scholars, politicians and diplomats who glorify American foreign policy and diplomacy are widely disseminated outside the limits of the United States, and millions of students in institutions of higher education in America and the countries of Western Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America study from them. Even though, of course, the coefficient of efficiency for Washington from this type of literature on international relations and American diplomacy is quite low, this does not mean that this type of apologetics does not leave its traces in the consciousness of the people, particularly the young people, who know about many historical events only from books.

As an example, we may discuss the book by the former English Ambassador to Moscow William Hayter, "The Diplomacy of the Great Powers."<sup>34</sup> This

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relatively small work contains chapters on American, Soviet, English and French diplomacy. Even though in the foreword to the book Hayter notes that it is not of a research nature and consists only of "personal impressions" from diplomatic service in Washington, London, Paris and Moscow, nevertheless the assessments expressed by the English diplomat are of interest if only because they are fully purposeful in nature and bear a full propagandistic load.

The assessment given by William Hayter of American diplomacy is most complimentary. He notes that the United States allegedly traditionally comes out against colonialism, and is grieved only that this position of American diplomacy "was often made difficult by its interaction with the colonial powers, England and France." Hayter thus attempted to state that American policy was not tangled up in the colonial division of the world and is devoid of colonialist aspirations.

The book extols American economic "assistance," which has grown up particularly since World War II and has become the means of economic and, following it, also political subordination of many countries to American monopolist capital. The author even states that if the United States had engaged only in "cultivating its own garden," "all the rest of the world would have gone to pieces." The English diplomat made another, more amazing discovery. It appears, in his opinion, that there is "simply no" "American imperialism" It does not exist, since in the United States "anticolonialist sentiments are widely disseminated." It would therefore be difficult for Washington to carry out an imperialist policy, "even if it ever needed it, which it did not."<sup>35</sup>

The example using William Hayter's book indicates that American policy and diplomacy are quite actively defended, in memoir literature, as well as in the university and academic world.

If one speaks of American political institutions and their influence on foreign policy, there is no question but that the President of the United States should be put in first place. He performs the function of head of state and head of the government. Being the leader of the system of executive power, the President of the United States naturally exerts considerable influence on the adoption of the most important foreign policy decisions.

According to the constitution, the President of the United States possesses such great authorities that it may seem that in his hands are concentrated all the reins of actual power that make it possible to act almost individually in matters of foreign policy. That is what often happens in the making of individual foreign policy decisions. The situation is different, however, when the overall strategic course of American foreign policy is worked out. Hundreds of people and numerous state institutions take part in this process. Working out and putting into practice the decisions produced in the depths of the United States political and state mechanism also take shape in the political line of American imperialism in the international arena.

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The president of the United States can restrain and even revoke the implementation of decisions that in his opinion endanger the country's interests. If, however, the president rejects proposals that seem unwise to him, then he thereby comes into conflict with the people from the state system of the United States, major officials and representatives of the military-industrial complex who have advanced these proposals. Moreover, presidents of the United States come and go, and the major officials (in the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, the FBI, the Cabinet and departments) serve for many years as a rule, change their views on the approach to international relations hardly at all, and if they do change, it is rather with a change in generations, which assess the balance of power in the international arena in their own way. It is precisely in such political jumps, when a change occurs not only in the presidency, but the rival party comes to power, a whole group of persons who determine the strategic line of United States foreign policy, that most often there arise in Soviet-American relations new complications, often with old roots, including the appearance of the passion of the "liberals" for moralizing, vacillations and inconsistency in foreign policy matters.

All of the postwar presidents of the United States were loyal to the prevailing political moods. Truman, Eisenhower and Johnson in general preferred not to go against the trend of the Cold War, and even the limited "hot wars." Even President Kennedy only in the last year of his being in power attempted to implement a number of measures which, as is now clear, to a considerable extent were counter to the ideas that had prevailed in the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA. Kennedy more than once refused to approve the adventurous plans of the American military with respect to Cuba and Laos, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. He detained, at least for two years, direct aggression of the United States against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. At the same time, he was unquestionably one of the authors of widescale aggression by the United States in Vietnam.

Therefore, the president of the United States is by no means a sort of "solitary figure" in the White House. Hundreds of people and forces determining the basic directions of United States foreign policy are at work behind his back.

The Pentagon and the CIA play a large role in United States foreign policy and diplomacy. This is how the American scholar James McCamy describes it: "They (the military.--An. G.) are now equal partners in making decisions and putting into effect the foreign policy, and will play this role until the states resort to pure force in carrying out their affairs."<sup>36</sup> The Pentagon is a unique "mixer" of the interests of the American military and military-industrial monopolies. In their actions they often encroach upon the sphere of foreign policy, often directing it, particularly, as Americans themselves customarily say, under "weak" presidents.

Of course, just as in many other large capitalist countries, in the United States the process of working out decisions on foreign policy is a complex

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ma' war. Pursuing class interests, clearly marked in the sphere of foreign policy strategy, the rival business circles and political groupings in America, which form the basis of bourgeois power, in questions of tactics, determining the moment for modernization and the most strategic line, are constantly in a process of struggle that reflects their competitive interests, so that often in the United States press an exchange of fire is started by the representatives of these forces that have come to grips with each other, and there are sharp discussions. Their struggle for decisions advantageous for them will go on constantly, particularly in questions that touch upon financial-economic interests. "The decision-making process in the sphere of foreign policy," notes James McCamy, "is so complicated that it is almost impossible to analyze. It is determined by many factors and carried out by many representatives both within the government itself and outside it. Behind each telegram signed by the secretary of state, behind each announcement by the president, behind the decisions of the combined committee of chiefs of staff and behind each vote in the congressional committee that has to do with international affairs stand the forces that give rise to all these actions." Further, McCamy acknowledges: "Before each decision is made, numerous facts are set forth by any representatives, groups of people, acting openly or behind a veil with the aid of the mass information media and exerting influence on the minds of those who have the responsibility of making the decisions."<sup>37</sup> This is nothing other, essentially, than an acknowledgement of the daily control of various pressure groups over the activity of the United States Government and American diplomacy.

In conclusion it should be noted that American foreign policy and diplomacy in the 1950's and 1960's showed itself as an active conservative force that strove to turn the development of international relations back to the days when the United States dominated in Western Europe on the political and economic plane, without taking into consideration the vital interests of the colonial countries and peoples, and tried to "thrust communism back" to Eastern Europe and Asia.

It would be a very sad thing if the United States ruling circles in the second half of the 1970's began to think in outmoded political categories and took the path of repeating the past errors in Soviet-American relations. Even in the past such an approach was sharply criticized in the United States on the part of those who would like to see American foreign policy and diplomacy liberated once and for all from the Dulles heritage. The adherents of this approach in the United States in the 1970's have become noticeably stronger and have begun to speak out more boldly against the recurrences of the Cold War in American foreign policy.

The second half of the 1970's can become an important stage in Soviet-American relations if a category necessary for relations between the USSR and the United States such as state wisdom takes the upper hand. The more dynamic the development and reinforcement of cooperation between the United States and the USSR, the better for the cause of peace and for the peoples

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of the two great powers. Putting into effect the agreements achieved, working out new agreements and the positive effect of a policy of peaceful coexistence--that is what is needed for this.

FOOTNOTES

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#### Chapter 10. Ways of Improving Soviet-American Relations

It is no easy task to analyze the possible ways of developing and improving Soviet-American relations. There are, however, certain features inherent in them that not only can, but also should be studied.

The international climate of the end of the 1970's in which the relations between the USSR and the United States are developing depends on both objective factors and to a considerable extent also on the actions which are carried out by the various powers affecting it.

Just what are the objective factors that today determine international relations and Soviet-American dialog? These factors are above all connected with the laws of development of human society. Only those who feel that such laws do not exist can fail to agree with this. But what, then, sets this world in motion? Can it be, as bourgeois science claims, "the biological essence of human nature"? Or only the "struggle for power" in all of its various manifestations? Unquestionably it is neither the one nor the other.

In the capitalist West whole schools of bourgeois ideologists attempt to deny that the development of human society takes place according to the laws inherent in it. They usually regard history as a heaping up of "chance circumstances," as the clash of the abstract concepts of "good" and "evil." They declare that history is made by "great individuals" or "heroes," but do not take into consideration the decisive role played by objective factors in its development. Moreover, the representatives of these bourgeois schools declare "unscientific" the Marxist-Leninist theory that has revealed and armed itself with the laws of development of human society and, particularly, international relations.

When speaking of the objective realities that to a decisive extent affect the development of international relations, allowance must be made for the fundamental conflicts between socialism and capitalism; class struggle and the movement of the national masses which profoundly affect international life as a whole; the struggle of the forces of the national-liberation movement against the policy of colonialism and neocolonialism; the balance of power between the USSR and the United States; the potential threat of

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a nuclear war arising and the need to avert it; the effect of science and technology in international relations.

The objective factors are in their turn influenced to a considerable extent by the subjective factors involved in the activity of individual major political figures or groups of influential persons. If their subjective actions, manifested in the state actions, are not in conflict with the basic positive directions in global sociopolitical development, including the international sphere, the relations between states with different social systems develop relatively peacefully. If, however, on the other hand, the subjective actions run counter to the objective course of development, then the temperature of our planet's political climate rises sharply. International conflicts and dangerous crises occur.

No matter what forms cooperation and rivalry between states take, even those such as the USSR and the United States, one thing is clear: the solution to the problems dividing them should be carried out only by nonmilitary means. The alternative to peace--is war. Nuclear war is particularly dangerous, and should be excluded from international life as a means of engaging in conflict. The foreign policy of all states in the 1970's and 1980's should be directed toward solving the international questions at issue through negotiations, and not by violent means.

There is at present an improvement in international relations in Europe. The European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, historic in its results, was held. Positive changes were achieved in the development of Soviet-American relations. Steps were taken to curb the strategic arms race. The Cold War period is gradually receding into the past. The policy of peaceful coexistence is finding more and more adherents. The bourgeois politicians who oppose the process of detente and attempt to breathe new life into the old Cold War policy are becoming fewer, even though they are still influential.

Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence is now recognized even by many Western leaders as the basis for reciprocal relations between socialist and capitalist states. The world is gradually, although not without difficulties, moving away from the extended period of tension and is making the transition to businesslike collaboration. Sometimes international conflicts still arise. L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated: "It is our deep conviction that the chief tendency in the development of today's international relations is the turn taking place away from the Cold War toward detente, away from military confrontation toward consolidating security and toward peaceful coexistence."<sup>1</sup> The agreements between the USSR and the United States achieved in Moscow and Washington, particularly the Agreement on Averting Nuclear War, are an important contribution to the development of this tendency. Therefore, as the result of negotiations at the highest level, Soviet-American relations have acquired the promise of becoming stable relations, supported on a firm and long-term peaceful basis.

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A clear understanding of the nature of the policy of detente is very important for present and future Soviet-American relations. When speaking at Tula, L. I. Brezhnev gave a thorough definition of just what detente is: "Detente is above all overcoming the Cold War and a transition to normal, equitable relations between states. Detente is the readiness to resolve disagreements and disputes not by force, not by threats and saber-rattling, but by peaceful means, at the negotiation table. Detente is definite trust and the ability to take into consideration each other's lawful interests."<sup>2</sup>

It appears exceedingly important for consolidation of world peace and security and for the cause of international cooperation that the responsible American political figures of our generation arrive at an understanding of the fact that there is and will not be any reasonable alternative to detente, to peaceful coexistence. Of course, peaceful Soviet-American relations, just because they are objectively necessary, cannot become anything in the nature of an irreproachable alliance or serene accord. The two countries represent different and mutually opposing social systems. The USSR and the United States exist in a complex, changing world, and each one of them has its own allies. The opponents of detente in the United States, on the basis of the different or opposite positions of the United States and the Soviet Union on certain specific questions, are ready to state that detente and the Soviet-American dialog allegedly did not stand the test of time. Such claims are an attempt to pass off the wish as reality and often also the intention of leading American public opinion astray. It is impossible, however, to delude the Americans concerning what is in their interests, whether to continue to carry out a policy of forceful confrontations or, conversely, to go farther along the road to relaxing tension with another leading nuclear power. Common sense will always choose the latter.

Detente, the lessening of tension between the USSR and the United States, is above all their mutual agreement to exclude the use of force, especially war, in relations with each other. It is the recognition of the inevitability of peaceful coexistence between the two countries. At the same time it is an extremely important postulate, an axiom of the reinforcement of cooperation between the two countries and a tremendous impulse in the development of economic, cultural, scientific and other relations between the two peoples. There is every reason for detente to become a permanent, growing process, and the Soviet Union is striving for it to become irreversible.

Some people in the United States connect the process of a further improvement in Soviet-American relations with the so-called "price for detente," which the USSR allegedly "should pay." This "price" is the right to intervention in the Soviet Union's internal affairs. The political thinking of the people in the United States who determine today's development of Soviet-American relations depends to a considerable extent on whether the serious politicians in Washington can withstand these absurd ideas, corrosive for detente, and everything that undermines relations between the USSR and the United States. In the USSR they hope and believe that they can.

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The last few decades have been characterized by an ever-increasing flow of information: the most varied, coming from the sources of the honest information media of the socialist countries and bourgeois sources, often not objective, and finally, sources, the information from which is of a slanderous nature. The latter are the mass information media that are under the control of the extreme reaction, Zionists and Maoists, the so-called "free world" radio station, financed by the CIA. In addition, puffed-up works distorting the truth often come from the pen of bourgeois historians. All of this makes it more complicated for many Americans to have the correct idea of the events taking place. Without, however, an understanding of historical processes and of the policy of a certain specific country, including the USSR, it is impossible to interpret soberly the present and future development of today's world. It is more difficult to understand the present than to be oriented toward events that have already taken place. It is more difficult for the simple reason that the events taking place today are in the process of their development, they have seemingly not stopped yet, and not all the factors explaining a certain specific phenomenon are known.

An understanding of the past and the present should lead to an understanding of the tendencies in the development of events in the near and distant future. Here it is right to speak of short-term, medium-term and long-term predictions. Those who are engaged in political or scientific work encounter the need to draw conclusions that would make it possible to judge the direction in which a certain specific political and foreign policy situation will develop. The ability to look into the future and to make considered assessments of the most probable variants in the development of a policy, including Soviet-American relations, requires, particularly, the correct methodological approach to them.

As for Soviet foreign policy, as well as the foreign policy of the states of the socialist commonwealth, they are conducted on the basis in principle of the theories of Marxism-Leninism. This is the scientific base on which a reliable understanding is achieved of what is going on today in the international arena and what determines the moving force of the foreign policy of a certain specific state. In order to gain an understanding of today's intricate international relations, one must have a good mastery of materialist dialectics and Marxism as a whole.

Marxism-Leninism is a continuously developing science that reveals its inexhaustible content in historically changing social practice. V. I. Lenin created the scientific theory of imperialism and studied its nature, contradictions and conformances to principle. Lenin's analysis of imperialism is the direct continuation and further development of the ideas of "Das Kapital" by Karl Marx. Lenin proved that the monopolistic stage of capitalism is its last stage, the eve of a socialist revolution. The thorough analysis of the new stage of world history made it possible for Lenin to determine the tremendous potentials of the revolutionary movement in the era of imperialism. He made a thorough analysis of the moving forces of

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socialist revolution in their indissoluble unity with other revolutionary flows, and armed the Marxists with a science of the strategy and tactics of communist and workers' parties under the new historical conditions. On the basis of a brilliant theoretical analysis, V. I. Lenin, in guiding the Bolshevik party, supported by the activity of the masses, was able in practical work to implement the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the 60th anniversary of which was widely marked by all of progressive mankind.

Under the conditions of the ideological struggle intensifying throughout the world, Marxism-Leninism is the only scientific method of approaching the most complex problems of today's international relations, including the Soviet-American relations. No matter how much the methods of imperialist policy and the historical circumstances have changed in comparison with that when V. I. Lenin lived and wrote, if we take stock of the existence in the international arena of the world socialist system of states and its increasing positive influence on the course of today's world development, it becomes quite clear that the basic principles and theories worked out by Lenin fully preserve their force.

V. I. Lenin repeatedly noted that the nature of international policy of states is determined above all by their socioeconomic system, classes and parties that are in state power. The main, determining influence on the nature of United States foreign policy proved, proves and will continue to prove to be the objective socioeconomic and class factors. "... The deepest roots of both domestic and foreign policy...", emphasized V. I. Lenin, "are determined by economic interests and the economic position of the ruling classes."<sup>3</sup> As applied to an analysis of the nature of today's tendencies in United States foreign policy one must primarily be guided by this theory of Lenin's that attests to the fact that the foreign policy of American capitalism is integrally bound with its domestic policy, and is a continuation of it.

The ruling class in the United States is the bourgeoisie. Epicenters of power are found in the hands of its monopolistic elite, which is able, with the aid of the state-monopolistic mechanism of class supremacy, a sort of exploitative machine of power of the second half of the twentieth century, to ensure itself the guiding role in the state affairs of the United States. The ruling elite in the United States consists of monopolistic families, the directors of extremely large corporations, generals and high-ranking politicians. The military-industrial complex exerts an unabating influence on the policy of American state-monopolistic capitalism. In the service of this power machine are numerous political institutions, including the basic bourgeois parties of large capital--the Republican and Democratic--which regularly and with varying success advance their proteges to the White House. United States foreign policy is conservative in its social nature.

The reactionary nature of the overwhelming majority of political captains who stand at the helm of the American ship of state is generally known.

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It is sufficient to mention the names of such American statesmen of the postwar period as Harry Truman, John Foster Dulles, Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson to breathe the spirit of the Cold War, aggressions and foreign policy adventures.

At times there have been more flexible political leaders at the apex of the pyramid of power in the United States, who understood to a certain extent that American capitalism was suffering defeat in the international arena because in its policy it entered into profound conflict with the objective circumstances, acted counter to the course of history, proceeding from ossified anticommunist dogmas and did not take into consideration the true balance of power in the world.

For example, President John Kennedy displayed the aspiration, although extremely inconsistent, to adapt American foreign policy to the modern world. His relatively short sojourn in the White House marked a small, but still positive change in American foreign policy in the direction of a more responsible approach to the problems of war and peace. Lyndon Johnson did not wish to continue this positive style that had appeared, and the Vietnam adventure dislodged him from the presidential seat.

A thorough explanation of the complex and contradictory processes in international relations and in American foreign policy is contained in the materials and documents of the conferences of communist and workers' parties, congresses of the CPSU and other fraternal parties and speeches of the leaders of the Soviet State. For example, as far back as the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers Parties (Moscow, 1960), two theories were noted that had the most urgent political and scientific significance as applied to the analysis of modern American foreign policy. In the first place, it was emphasized that "The development of international relations in our time is determined by the struggle of two social systems, the struggle of the forces of socialism, peace and democracy against the forces of imperialism, reaction and aggression,"<sup>4</sup> and, in the second place, the conclusion was drawn that "A definite part of the bourgeoisie of the developed capitalist countries, soberly assessing the balance of power and the grave consequences of modern war,"<sup>5</sup> was speaking out in behalf of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The theses of the CPSU Central Committee on the 100th anniversary of the birthday of V. I. Lenin contain the conclusion that even today the imperialists "have not given up hope of "replaying" the historic battles of the twentieth century, gaining revenge, hurling socialism from the heights of world influence and recreating colonialism in new forms."<sup>6</sup> This reactionary tendency in United States foreign policy is a reality, and it must be reckoned with. Something else is also clear, however. In the 1960's the aspirations of the United States ruling circles to damage socialism both by means of aggressive attacks and with the aid of more flexible policy methods failed. This has a sobering effect on the many "hotheads" in the capitalist camp, including the United States. "More than once during the

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past years," it was noted in the documents of the International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties, held in Moscow in June 1969, "imperialism has provoked sharp international crises that have placed humanity on the brink of a thermonuclear conflict. United States imperialism, however, was forced to take into consideration the balance of power that had formed in the international arena, the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union and the possible consequences of a nuclear-missile war, and it is becoming more and more difficult and dangerous for it to count on the unleashing of a new world war."<sup>7</sup>

Of course, despite the forced withdrawal of some American politicians to a better-considered position, United States foreign policy has its main front turned against socialism. The nature of imperialism continues to be manifested in American foreign policy. The adherents of its old methods have not laid down their arms. They would gladly torpedo any potential along the road to a further improvement in the international situation and to establishment of normal relations between the USSR and the United States. This type of power, in the words of V. I. Lenin, consists of representatives of the "camp of the crude bourgeois," the "aggressive bourgeois" and the "reactionary bourgeois."<sup>8</sup> At the same time, V. I. Lenin always made a specific approach to analysis of the alignment of forces in the intra-political arena of the United States, emphasizing the fact that "certain American entrepreneurs are seemingly beginning to realize that it is more reasonable to carry out profitable business in Russia than to wage war with Russia, and this is a good sign."<sup>9</sup>

The modern era, as was noted at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, is characterized by the struggle of two opposing social systems. The arena of this confrontation is the whole world. The principal force confronting imperialism is the world socialist system. The latter has already been in existence for about a third of a century. An extremely important component of the socialist commonwealth is the great peaceloving state--the USSR.

In the international arena of the 1970's the United States Government is implementing a policy of confrontation and struggle with the forces of socialism and the national liberation movement. This policy is being carried out under conditions in which, as L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the 24th CPSU Congress, the general crisis of capitalism continues to be intensified, with the United States itself suffering serious economic blows, accompanied by inflation and unemployment and aggravated by a serious crisis in the currency-financial system of capitalism. In this situation, "the forces of aggression and militarism, although crowded out, have not been rendered harmless.... It is impossible to regard the threat of a new world war as completely eliminated."<sup>10</sup> This is the situation that has actually formed, the reality in which Soviet foreign policy is carried out

A special characteristic of the present-day international situation in which official Washington must operate is the USSR's constructive line, clearly marked in world policy, toward resolving international problems by peaceful

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means, "toward maintaining normal, and when circumstances permit--good relations with states belonging to a different social system."<sup>11</sup> "Just as before," stated L. I. Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress, "we have consistently tried to vindicate Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence of states, regardless of their social system. This principle has now become a real force in international development."<sup>12</sup>

The Soviet program of struggle for peace and international security, advanced by the 24th and developed by the 25th CPSU Congress, is exerting a tremendous influence on the course of world events. This is a program of struggle against imperialist aggression, a reliable basis for a lasting peace. Against the background of the serious defeats and failures suffered by American foreign policy, this peaceloving program constantly draws the fixed attention of the American public, which it is becoming increasingly difficult to win around with myths concerning the "Soviet threat."

Gus Hall, general secretary of the United States Communist Party, when describing the United States domestic policy situation, noted in June 1971 that the program promoted by the USSR of a struggle for peace had become the subject of animated discussions in the United States. Gus Hall emphasized that "The new Soviet proposals were advanced at the moment when the situation in the United States had heated up abruptly. Something akin to a political crisis is developing in the country. It is primarily the result of the crisis in military policy, the result of the numerous contradictions in this policy."<sup>13</sup> These words have been fully confirmed. The contradictions in United States policy today too are deep and sharp. A substantial and, moreover, influential part of the political and business elite ruling in the country is coming out in favor of further development of Soviet-American relations. Convinced that it is useless to negotiate with the Soviet Union in a language of ultimatums and force, and realistically assessing the defense potential of the Soviet Armed Forces, they are drawing their own realistic conclusions and are advising the United States Government to solve the international problems at issue not on the field of battle, but at the negotiations table.

Former United States Deputy Secretary of State J. Ball, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs William Fulbright, Senator Edward Kennedy, former Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in Korea and subsequently United States Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway--all of them in their time openly acknowledged the failure of American strategy in Vietnam. "An idea cannot be killed by bullets or bombs,"<sup>14</sup> Ridgway concludes, in declaring American policy in Vietnam a "colossal mistake." Ridgway also directed attention to the inadmissibility of the ruling circles of the United States disregarding the internal problems, "which cry out for a need for the most urgent solutions."<sup>15</sup> He criticized the United States Government because it continued to cling to the bankrupt concept, tantamount to saying that "Our will can be imposed on our opponents by means of force or threat of the use of force."<sup>16</sup>

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In his turn, Senator Fulbright acknowledged that while a positive change had taken place in the sentiments of Americans, "these changes do not stem from wisdom, but from the consequences of failure. The shattering defeat of American policy in Vietnam aroused in scholars, journalists and politicians an inexorable readiness to revise the bases of American postwar policy."<sup>17</sup> Fulbright criticized the blind anticommunism of some of the American political elite, and rightfully saw the sources of the United States defeats in the foreign policy arena in the fact that after the proclamation of the "Truman Doctrine," "every American president... was under tremendous pressure from those who demanded that he demonstrate anti-communist orthodoxy."<sup>18</sup> Fulbright felt that Vietnam would "almost certainly" become a sort of watershed in American foreign policy, but at the same time he did not take the risk of predicting precisely in which direction it would develop further, stating that this was "not at all clear."<sup>19</sup> The senator was careful in his conclusions, but not by chance. He realized that the Cold War forces in the United States would not cede their positions without a fight.

By the beginning of the 1970's many influential political figures in the Republican and Democratic parties held the firm opinion that the hopes of the United States Government of strengthening its international position by means of a policy of aggression, and at the same time weakening the position of the USSR and other socialist countries were insolvent. This circumstance contributed to the fact that the United States Government was forced to a definite extent to reckon with the actual situation and the spirit of the times, and engaged in a search for foreign policy strategy and tactics that would answer to the potentials of American capitalism. It goes without saying that at the same time it did not renounce many old political goals, and moreover was constantly under the pressure of the ultra-reactionary forces, which did not approve of any positive changes, no matter what they were, in American foreign policy toward realism.

On the one hand, the Republican Administration repeatedly stated the desire to pass from the "era of confrontation" to the "era of negotiations." President Nixon ultimately approved a policy toward a certain activation of Soviet-American economic and scientific-technical relations. The United States also occupied a relatively positive position with respect to international problems. On the other hand, the Republican Administration made its policy repeatedly more rigid with respect to the USSR, threw itself into the maelstrom of new foreign policy adventures in Southeast Asia and showed indulgence toward Israel's aggressive policy toward the Near East. As L. I. Brezhnev accurately noted at the 24th CPSU Congress: "The frequent zigzags in American foreign policy, which are apparently also connected with certain domestic policy maneuvers of a market order, are complicating the conducting of affairs with the United States."<sup>20</sup>

The constructive program of regulating the basic international problems, worked out by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, is bearing fruit. A substantial part of the American public lets it be clearly understood that



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it is tired of the recurrences of the Cold War and no longer believes in the myth of the "aggressiveness of the Soviets." Americans seem to have grown up and have already ceased to take on faith many of the postulates of the Cold War. In United States political and business circles, including the White House, in the first half of the 1970's there began to be a more serious approach to the problems of seeking spheres of possible cooperation with the USSR in solving unsettled international problems and questions of bilateral Soviet-American relations.

The possibilities of improving bilateral Soviet-American relations are now quite substantial. Many of the potentials for this method have not yet been utilized. An analysis of bilateral Soviet-American relations shows that the lion's share of the efforts of the USSR and the United States, when the American leaders cede to the logic of the circumstances, falls to the solution of international problems, and not problems of bilateral Soviet-American relations. Of course, the former are very important, and the statesmen of both countries should still be concerned with them. The development of bilateral Soviet-American relations, however, continues to be one of the most urgent problems. Its gradual solution would place the building of international peace on an even sounder footing.

Therefore, the gradual awareness of the importance of Soviet-American relations for the fate of the United States itself, along with the recognition of the need to further commensurate the foreign policy potentials of Washington with the actual balance of powers in the world, marked by the further consolidation of the positions of the USSR and other socialist countries, has made the American ruling circles follow the path of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. Although the change for the better in Soviet-American relations, achieved during the last few years, has occurred primarily because of the purposeful and initiative foreign policy action of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, one must not fail to give its due to the leadership of the Republican Administration, which ultimately displayed a serious approach, and regarded an improvement in relations with the USSR as one of the most important priorities of United States foreign policy. In explaining the nature of the policy taken by the Nixon-Ford administration toward improving Soviet-American relations, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasized in one of his speeches in the autumn of 1974 that there could be no peaceful order in the international arena without the constructive development of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Kissinger noted that the efforts undertaken by the American side with a view to achieving more constructive relations with the USSR, "are implemented not on behalf of any single administration or single party for any definite period. These efforts express the unswerving striving of the overwhelming majority of the American people toward detente and their hope that any responsible government will aspire toward peace. No other aspect corresponds to a greater extent to the interests of mankind."<sup>21</sup> When he went into retirement, Richard Nixon, in his address to the American people, noted that his administration's period in power had denoted "the beginning of new relations with the Soviet Union,"

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that the United States "should continue to develop and expand these new relations, so that the two most powerful powers in the world would live in cooperation with each other, and not at odds with each other."<sup>22</sup>

Realizing the importance of continuing the policy toward improving Soviet-American relations, Gerald Ford, who replaced Nixon in the White House, stated that "he promised to preserve the continuity in carrying out the American policy of the last three years," since "in the thermonuclear age there can be no alternative to positive and peaceful relations between our countries."<sup>23</sup>

Everything indicated that, based on the fundamental agreements already reached between the USSR and the United States, it was fully possible to advance in the business of mutually advantageous collaboration and the solution of the problems that were of vital significance both for the Soviet and American peoples and for the peoples of other countries. At the initial stage of activity of the Republican Ford's administration, the gradual development of relations between the USSR and the United States had already been expressed in the agreement reached in Vladivostok concerning a new long-term agreement on strategic arms limitation.

It is characteristic that, while consciously proceeding toward these positive steps, the American leaders by no means regarded them as "concessions" to the Soviet Union or the obtaining of any unilateral advantages by the Soviet party alone. These results as a whole also were fully in accord with the interests of the United States itself. For example, when explaining the significance of the Vladivostok agreement, President Ford emphasized at a press conference in Washington on 2 December 1974: "We have achieved the establishment of solid and equal limitations of the strategic forces of each party, thus averting an arms race with all its horrors, instability, pressure of military tension and spending of economic resources."<sup>24</sup> In Vladivostok, in Ford's words, there was laid "a solid foundation for potential implementation in the future of curtailing armament," and "a positive step: was made "toward peace on the basis of equality, the only basis on which agreement could be reached"<sup>25</sup> between the USSR and the United States with respect to strategic arms limitation. The results of the European conference were evaluated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as a "useful step along the path to detente and the averting of war."<sup>26</sup>

The problem of the continuity of the policy toward the USSR implemented by the Republican Administration rose in all its acuteness in connection with the accession to power in the United States in January 1977 of the Democratic Administration headed by Jimmy Carter. In the preceding period many statements had been made from this quarter in favor of developing relations with the Soviet Union, the step forward of which had been delayed even before Carter's accession to the White House, because of domestic policy events in the United States, and particularly because of the offensive of the opponents of detente, including some in the Republican Party itself, during the period of the 1976 presidential elections. In reality, however, when the need to

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solve the most critical problems, that were of interest for both sides, especially advancement along the path of completing the draft of the new agreement on strategic arms, rose to the practical plane, the new government of the United States at first took an unrealistic position, obviously striving to achieve for itself one-sided advantages and benefits. Moreover, all this was taking place to the accompaniment of a thoroughly false, intensive anti-Soviet propaganda campaign (with the main emphasis on the Soviet "military threat" and on the question of "human rights"), against a background of activation of the opponents of detente, who called for the West's amassing arms and who tried to turn the positive development of Soviet-American relations back to the Cold War times.

As the well-known American columnist J. Kraft acknowledged, the Carter Government "blundered in Soviet-American relations from the very start."<sup>27</sup> According to the evidence of Brookings Institute associates B. Blechman and S. Kaplan, "historical experience shows that an inflexible anti-Soviet position as an end in itself, although psychologically possibly bringing satisfaction, serves as an obvious hindrance in settling crises."<sup>28</sup>

The attempts made by official Washington to put pressure on the USSR and to intervene, on the pretext of "defending human rights," in the internal affairs of the Soviet State did not bring their initiators the expected results. Moreover, this policy of Washington's was directed, essentially, toward freezing detente and aroused obvious anxiety among the leaders of a number of other leading capitalist countries--allies of the United States. As the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR noted in this connection, FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, French President V. Giscard d'Estaing and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau "expressed doubts concerning Carter's position on the question of 'rights' and mentioned its effect on Soviet-American relations."<sup>29</sup> According to the evidence of TIME magazine, because of the actions of the United States, "The European allies of the United States and even some American specialists in the study of the Soviet Union were obviously concerned for the future of detente."<sup>30</sup>

Former President Gerald Ford criticized the position of the United States Government on the question of "human rights" as applied to the sphere of Soviet-American relations. In a talk with American journalists he openly stated: "I think that these tactics should be criticized if they hinder the achievement of progress in important areas of relations with the Soviet Union such as negotiations on strategic arms limitation at the second stage...."<sup>31</sup> The Carter Administration approach to the question of mutual relations with the USSR could not help but have an effect on the overall state of relations between the two countries. As the magazine, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, close to the ruling circles of the United States, stated in this period, "American-Soviet relations are at present chillier than at any time in the last few years."<sup>32</sup>

The American press, therefore, throughout 1977 repeatedly pointed out the actions of the Democrats' administration as the source of a cooling in

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Soviet-American relations. "No matter what is said about any individual aspects of Carter's policy," wrote the WASHINGTON POST, "there is no question but that the President is acting extremely hastily..., without comparing individual factors, without directing the proper attention to the possible reaction of the Russians.... It (the policy--An. G.) looks as if it were fashioned off-hand. Even many of the people who are sympathetic toward the specific goals proposed by Carter think that his approach has flaws and is leading to the opposite results."<sup>33</sup>

In turn, Gerald Ford also stated: "The facts indicate that at present the situation is worse with respect to detente than it was nine months ago." Ford noted that when he left the White House, the Salt-II Agreement was 95-percent worked out," and "without a doubt, could have been reached before 3 October 1977,"<sup>34</sup> that is, before the expiration of the period in which the Interim Agreement was in effect.

Designated by the term, "controlled rivalry," the policy stresses what separates the two countries, and not the coinciding of interests of the USSR and the United States. Coexistence in a spirit of cooperation is much more in keeping with the spirit of the last quarter of the twentieth century than the so-called "controlled rivalry," from which, as is said, it is but a step to uncontrolled "confrontations" of various types.

The Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union acts as a powerful counterbalance to this whole lightweight structure of the adherents of "controlled tension." It is principled and peaceloving in its content.

The 24th CPSU Congress advanced the Peace Program, which directed Soviet foreign policy toward further active peaceful offensive. "In advancing this program," said L. I. Brezhnev at the World Congress of Peaceloving Forces in Moscow, "we have seen our mission in contributing to the elimination of the seats of tension, helping mankind to rid itself of the specter of thermonuclear catastrophe that hangs over it and contributing in every way possible to detente."<sup>35</sup> The 25th CPSU Congress, which adopted the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and for Freedom and Independence of Peoples, became a historical new stage in the peaceful offensive of the Soviet Union, of the entire socialist commonwealth and of the international forces of peace and progress. The task posed at it of restraining the arms race, a transition to curtailment of arms and then to disarmament is in accordance with the fundamental interests of the security of the peoples of the earth. The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union put forth a number of specific measures for the purpose of its implementation:

a) Do everything possible to complete the preparation of a new agreement between the USSR and the United States on limiting and curtailing strategic arms and to conclude international agreements on universal, complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests, on banning and destroying chemical weapons and on banning the designing of new types and systems of weapons

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of mass destruction, as well as affecting the natural environment for military and other hostile purposes;

- b) Undertake new efforts to activate negotiations on reducing armed forces and arms in Central Europe. After agreement has been reached on the first specific steps in this direction, to continue in succeeding years the cause of military detente in this region;
- c) Strive for the practice of systematic reduction of military expenditures of many states become a substitute for their present constant growth;
- d) Take all measures for extremely rapid convocation of a World Disarmament Conference....

Strive to conclude a world agreement on non-use of force in international relations."<sup>36</sup>

The 25th CPSU Congress emphasized the exceptionally important significance attributed by the USSR to reaching agreement with the United States in negotiations on strategic arms limitation. Throughout 1976 and for a considerable part of 1977, however, these negotiations proved to be paralyzed due to the zigzag position of the American party.

A component of the process of international detente is the development of long-term and large-scale economic-trade and industrial-technical collaboration between East and West.

When speaking at the CPSU Central Committee October (1976) Plenum, L. I. Brezhnev stressed the fact that, "In complete accordance with the program approved by the 25th party congress, we are continuing work on developing equitable mutually advantageous relations with capitalist states.

This work has its special characteristics at each stage. Five or 10 years ago there was the problem of creating a basis for normal relations of peaceful coexistence with France, the FRG, the United States of America, Canada, Italy, England and other capitalist countries and of ridding these relations of the chief extraneous features of the Cold War. When this had in general been done, we went farther, and began to develop increasingly widescale cooperation in politics, economics, science, technology and culture."<sup>37</sup> All of this is the fabric of lasting peace, including that in relations with the United States. Even the opponents of detente realize this. That is why they would like to tear it up, to test, if it may be expressed this way, its soundness.

Since it is the result of the positive political changes that have taken place in the international arena, the accelerated development of economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the socialist and capitalist countries in accordance with the feedback procedure itself contributes to reinforcing detente in political relations. The development of economic

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collaboration between East and West is important, on the one hand, as the material basis of detente, and on the other hand--as one of the factors in the development of international economic cooperation. Due to detente, states are for the first time in their history acquiring, under appropriate conditions, the opportunity of enjoying the wealth and advantages of international division of labor within the framework of all of mankind.

It is sufficient to recall just environmental pollution, which recognizes no national borders, as well as the growing scarcity of mineral-power resources, which require uniting the efforts of all the states to solve a number of urgent problems of scientific-technical progress. Only on a global basis can the most efficient solution be found to a number of demographic problems, providing all of mankind with food and complete elimination of the poverty that hurts the right and dignity of mankind.

Detente had a favorable effect on economic relations between the USSR and the United States. During the period from 1972-1977, Soviet-American trade expanded at quite rapid rates, even though its growth was held back by a number of unfavorable factors. The volume of Soviet-American trade in 1976 exceeded the 1971 level by 11-fold, which is indicated by the table given below.<sup>38</sup>

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Commodity turnover (in million dollars)	220	640	1415	960	2090	2595	1950

Still, despite the rapid growth of export from the United States to the USSR, in 1976 it was only 2 percent of the total indicator in this sphere, so that there were great potentials in Soviet-American trade. They are not, however, being opened up as quickly as many American businessmen and the Soviets would like, primarily through the fault of the opponents of detente.

As far back as October 1972 the United States signed a trade agreement with the USSR that specified granting the Soviet Union "most favored nation" trade conditions, as well as the placing in the United States of a large number of Soviet orders for agricultural and industrial products, commercial arbitration in third countries and an improvement of the conditions for the operation of representatives of American firms in Moscow. The adoption in 1974, however, of the discriminatory Jackson-Vannik amendment to the law on trade, which linked the "most favored nation" conditions in trade and its being extended credit with "emigration from the USSR," prevented the 1972 trade agreement from going into effect.

Still, the process of detente was gathering force. Beginning in 1972 the USSR and the United States concluded a number of agreements with a view to development and regulation of economic-trade relations between them. Among them are: the 1972 agreement on regulating settlements for Lend Lease (payments by the USSR to pay off indebtedness for Lend Lease are linked to

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problems of trade, economic and financial collaboration of the countries); the 1972 agreement on reciprocal extending of credit. The 1972 agreement on certain questions of merchant shipping (renewed in 1975) eased the restriction on Soviet ships entering United States ports and fixed the extent to which the ships of both countries could participate in merchant marine trade shipments carried out within the framework of bilateral trade. As the result of Soviet-American meetings at a higher level, the two sides adopted measures to reinforce the organizational structure of economic relations between the USSR and the United States.

In 1972 a Joint Soviet-American Committee on Trade Problems was established, which meets alternately in Moscow and Washington. In 1973 a USSR Trade Delegation in Washington and a Commercial Bureau at the United States Embassy in Moscow were opened. In the same year the American-Soviet Trade-Economic Council (ASTES) was established, the members of which are over 200 firms from the United States and a number of Soviet organizations. Over 20 American companies obtained permission to open their delegations in Moscow.

In accordance with the agreement on civil air transport (1966), in July 1968 regular air communications were opened between Moscow and New York. After the summit meetings in 1973, Aeroflot obtained the right to make runs between Moscow and Washington, and Pan-American Airlines--between Leningrad and New York; in 1974 a long-term agreement was signed on assistance in economic, industrial and technical collaboration; the USSR and the United States are participants in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, the Final Act of which calls for activating cooperation in economics, science and the environment.

In January 1976 the agreement between the USSR and the United States on the problem of tax assessment, signed in 1973, went into effect; in 1976 a fishing agreement was signed.

In accordance with the communication of the United States State Department (July 1977), "expansion of trade with the USSR is advantageous to the United States, since it increases employment, improves the balance of trade, ensures access to valuable raw material and reinforces the elements of stability in political relations." It must once again be emphasized that in the business circles of the United States it is newly recognized that further development of normal economic collaboration between the two countries is being prevented by the restrictions imposed by the American side itself (absence of the "most favored nation" regime and of loans of the Export-Import Bank, export control and numerous non-tariff barriers). These barriers could have been surmounted to a certain extent through developing the most progressive forms of economic-trade collaboration, particularly joint production on the basis of cooperation. In the opinion of the majority of American experts, it is important to seek new forms of industrial-technical collaboration, mutually acceptable to the USSR and the United States.

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The presence of discriminatory restrictions on trade with the USSR led to the fact that recently the Soviets have been forced to shift a number of orders to other countries. This resulted in the fact that in 1977 the USSR-United States commodity turnover was less than in 1976.

Curtailling the commodity turnover between the United States and the USSR causes anxiety in the business circles of the United States. According to the estimate of Yudzhin Milosh, vice-president of the American-Soviet Economic Trade Council, since the discriminatory trade legislation went into effect, that is, since January 1975, American firms have lost 2 billion dollars worth of orders from the USSR at the minimum, which means an employment cut in the United States of approximately 80,000 persons, at a time when almost 7 million Americans cannot find work.<sup>39</sup> By the end of 1976 the insolvency of the Jackson-Vannik amendment had already become obvious to many people in the United States.

United States business circles, interested in trade with the USSR and with other socialist countries place definite hopes on repeal of the discriminatory regulations of the 1974 law on trade. It is characteristic that the final document of the regular fourth session of the American-Soviet Trade-Economic Council in December 1976 (represented at it were 234 American companies, producing 25 percent of the United States gross national product) once again confirmed support of the trade agreement of 1972 and, particularly, provisions of it such as reciprocal, unconditional granting of the "most favored nation" regime, reciprocal extension of loans under normal conditions of export and those adopted in business practice, including the use of the potentials of financing of the Export-Import Bank of the United States and loans of Soviet organizations.

The documents of the 25th CPSU Congress also pointed out the important political significance of scientific-technical relations with foreign countries. L. I. Brezhnev noted in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee that "economic and scientific-technical relations with capitalist states also expand the material base of the policy of peaceful coexistence."<sup>40</sup>

The USSR and the United States are two countries that have a powerful scientific-technical potential. Moreover, successful development of scientific-technical collaboration between them goes beyond the framework of their interests alone. As is noted in Article 2 of the agreement between the government of the USSR and the government of the United States on cooperation in Science and Technology, its goal is affording broad possibilities by both parties for uniting the efforts of scholars and specialists of both countries in working out the most important problems, the execution of which will contribute to the progress of science and technology for the well-being of all countries and all mankind.

Progress on the road to normalizing Soviet-American relations in 1972-1974, as well as further expansion of scientific-technical contacts and mutual striving for accelerated solution of the most pressing scientific problems,



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led to the concluding of 10 interstate and intergovernmental agreements on cooperation of the USSR and the United States in science and technology, exploring outer space, developing nuclear power environmental protection, agriculture, studying the World Ocean, transport, power engineering, construction, medicine and public health.

In this same period Soviet organizations established contacts with over 300 American industrial firms, and agreements on scientific-technical cooperation were concluded with a number of leading corporations. There are now over 60 such agreements. Among the firms that have established contractual relations with Soviet organizations through the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Science and Technology may be named such giants of the capitalist world as General Electric, Kaiser Industries, Boeing, Monsanto, Gulf Oil, Sperry, Control Data, Hewlett-Packard, Singer, Standard Oil of Indiana, Deere and Co., and others.

Considering the growing interest of American business circles in cooperation with the Soviet Union within the framework of the American-Soviet Economic Trade Council, a special Committee on Scientific-Technical Cooperation Between the USSR and United States was established to assist in the development of scientific-technical and industrial cooperation between Soviet organizations and private American firms.

The fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation between the USSR and the United States in science and technology, however, since it is also an important factor in the materialization of detente, does not suit the most reactionary American circles. They are striving to hinder the development of this type of cooperation with the USSR. Sometimes measures are taken by the United States Administration, under pressure from them, to restrict the volume and subjects of joint research carried out according to the programs agreed upon within the framework of the Soviet-American scientific-technical agreements. Despite this malevolence, however, American scientists and specialists show great interest in cooperation with Soviet organizations.

There were interesting results, published in August 1977, from an anonymous questionnaire, carried out among major American firms and specialists on trade between East and West by a United States congressional committee. Of the 88 firms that answered congress' questions, 85 came out in favor of granting the USSR and other socialist countries the "most favored nation" conditions, that is in behalf of repealing the discrimination in export of the socialist countries to the United States, preventing normal development of economic trade collaboration between them and the socialist countries. Of 24 representatives of American academic circles queried, only one came out in favor of the Jackson-Vannik amendment, which had made the development of Soviet-American economic relations dependent on certain problems that related completely to USSR internal policy. It was again confirmed that the majority of the representatives of American business and scientific circles are supporters of further development of scientific-technical and economic-trade collaboration with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

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Detente continues to carve its way into the future and is finding numerous supporters in the United States. During 1976-1977 collaboration between the USSR and the United States was successfully developed in such fields as special electrometallurgy, chemical catalysis, metrology, automated control systems, using computers in administration, economic model study, microbiology, railroad transport, the study of the World Ocean, use of the reactions of thermonuclear synthesis for power, etc. Soviet-American cooperation is being developed successfully and mutually advantageously in designing generators on an industrial scale. Joint work of great practical importance is being carried out by Soviet organizations and American industrial firms. For example, in the collaboration with the American General Electric Company, joint industrial developments are being implemented in the field of turbogenerator building, new types of high-voltage power cables and cryogenic and superconductor equipment; work is being done in collaboration with the Dresser Industries on designing and testing new types of equipment for the petroleum refining industry, and with the Hewlett-Packard Company on automation of continuous steel teeming.

Soviet-American cooperation in agriculture has great perspectives. In conjunction with the American FMS-Corporation, the Moldavian SSR is performing test-experimental work on highly mechanized vegetable cultivation. This experiment is regarded as the first step on the road to joint design of a large-scale agroindustrial complex with a high degree of mechanization and automation of the processes of raising vegetables and their industrial processing and packaging.

On condition of a responsible attitude toward the progress in detente held by the American administration, the solid base now established for scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the United States will also make it possible in the future to develop it on the basis of mutual advantage and respect for the interests of the parties, which would correspond to the level of the scientific-technical potential of both countries, their possibilities, interest, and also the current and future demands of the key sectors of science, technology and industrial production, which will ultimately serve the improvement of Soviet-American relations and reinforcement of the process of international detente.

The new, far-reaching proposals concerning international detente advanced by L. I. Brezhnev at the ceremonial meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin, dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, are being widely responded to in world society and are an additional basis for the further development of Soviet-American relations. The goal of these proposals is to begin to "drive down the curve of the arms race, gradually lower the level of military opposition..., essentially reduce, and then eliminate the threat of nuclear war--the real threat of danger for mankind."<sup>41</sup>

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It was proposed that an agreement be reached on the simultaneous cessation of production of nuclear weapons by all states. At the same time, the nuclear powers could take on the obligation of beginning gradual curtailment of the stocks already accumulated to the point of their complete, 100-percent elimination. It was also proposed that nuclear weapons tests be banned not only in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, but also underground, and that agreements be reached on announcing a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as well.

This is what is dictated by state wisdom. Today's arsenal of nuclear weapons has now reached such power that it could, as is calculated, destroy the entire world population 15-fold. In 1976, according to the calculations of the American scientist Lester Brown, world military expenditures reached 350 billion dollars, and there were 30 million people in the ranks of the armies. Just two-day expenditures for weapons were equal to the yearly budget of the UN and all its specialized organizations, and, incidentally, every fourth scientific associate in the world is now engaged in developing increasingly new, "more efficient" systems of armament.<sup>42</sup>

The United States military departments are not dying out. The Pentagon, which in the 1977/1978 financial year reached a military budget amounting to 116.6 billion dollars, a record in the country's history, is already demanding 134.2 billion dollars for 1978/1979.<sup>43</sup>

The reactionary circles in the United States Congress are increasingly setting the tone of the new militarist campaign. "Hawks" well-known in the United States--senators Barry Goldwater, Henry Jackson and a number of congressmen--have come out with appeals to the United States Government to stiffen up the American position in Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms limitation. These opponents of detente have accused the Democratic Administration of allegedly, in the name of signing the new agreement, being prepared to all but "capitulate" to the Russians. This was the voice of the military-industrial complex.

The international situation that was forming in the spring of 1978 was not, therefore, a simple one. The development of detente was caught in a tense struggle. Under these conditions, the consistency of the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy course, directed toward stopping the arms race and achieving true disarmament, was revealed in full measure. As L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, stated in his speech on the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin," "It is in this precise direction that there will be a solution to the fundamental question of how the international situation will develop further and here that the keenest struggle is developing now."<sup>41</sup> L. I. Brezhnev noted that in November 1974 a high-level Soviet-American meeting was held in the Far East during which an agreement was reached on conclusion between the USSR and the United States of a long-term agreement on strategic offensive arms limitation. Soon after the Vladivostok meeting, however, work on this agreement proved to have virtually come to a standstill because of the

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inconsistency of the United States Government. Due to the constructive stand of the Soviet Union it was then possible to turn the negotiations into the channel of the former agreement. In the course of bilateral Soviet-American meetings resolutions in principle of certain issues were found, and on the whole the group of provisions of the agreement that had not been finally worked out was narrowed. At the same time, under these conditions too, the United States Government continued to avoid taking sides and even strove to thrust on the world a new type of weapon for mass destruction--the neutron bomb. "It is time for certain Western leaders to begin to think seriously about their responsibility to their own peoples, and to all peoples for the fate of the world," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "and to show, in actuality, their readiness to undertake effective steps toward curbing the arms race.

For its part, the Soviet Union will continue efforts to achieve a steady advance along the path of military detente and transition to true disarmament. This is our firm policy, and we will be steadfast in putting it into practice."<sup>45</sup> These words were greeted with tremendous satisfaction by the world public.

The spring and summer of 1978 showed that many influential political figures in the United States were obviously trying to achieve a breakdown in the process of detente, and a return, if not to the "cold," then to a "cool" war. This was manifested particularly graphically during the intervention of the NATO countries, including the United States, in the internal affairs of Zaire. Yet another attempt was made to ruin detente. At the same time it was claimed that the reason for the people's uprising in Zaire was either the "Soviet" or the "Cuban" involvement in it. This malicious propaganda in the spirit of whitewashing imperialist aggression by certain NATO countries in Zaire essentially attested to the fact that the adherents of the Cold War in the United States were applying the same methods of misinformation and slander that had been for such a long time issued as the "truth" when American imperialism trampled the earth of Vietnam under the pretext of "aggression from the North," that is, "aggression" of the Vietnamese in their own country, which was, of course, in itself absurd.

Just what really lay behind the interventionist policy of the United States and a number of other NATO countries in Africa? This is worth discussing. When the aggressive actions of the United States and their accessories in intervention are justified by virtue of a noticeable deterioration in Soviet-American relations, it is a very serious sign, indicating a sort of calculation for the world, and particularly the American public, to forget the lessons of analogous imperialist actions of the preceding years. The truth, however, is that in Africa there was a threat to the strategic policy of the West, the aim of which was to thrust the system of new colonialism on independent Africa.

Serious political and socioeconomic changes are taking place in Africa. A number of African countries have followed the path of progressive social

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development, having chosen in favor of socialist orientation. The collective voice of the independent African states is being heard increasingly decisively in support of detente, in behalf of reinforcing peace and in behalf of affirming the principles of equal rights in political and economic relations between states. On the agenda is elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism and racism in the south.

Under the conditions, complicated for imperialism, in the NATO countries alarm has arisen: it has turned out that neither Washington and London, neither Paris and Brussels alone have it in their power to stop the national liberation process in Africa. Hence we have the unification of forces within the framework of the aggressive NATO bloc.

An important question arises from this. The aims of the new colonialism do not lie in solving any local problem, as for example, saving the regime in Zaire. It is a question of a considerably broader intention--to stop the advance of the African states along the path of reinforcing independence and preventing a weakening of the dominating position of capitalism in the economics of Africa. The specific nature of the present African policy of the basic shock force of the bloc of imperialists--the United States--lies in increasing efforts with a view to weakening the liberation struggle on the continent, splitting the anti-imperialist unity of Africa and inhibiting the process of international detente.

The return to the policy of interventionism will not bring the United States the desired dividends. A direct conflict with the national liberation movement in Africa in the style of classic colonialism will still further undermine the prestige of the United States in the developing countries and will have an adverse effect on their faith in the declarations of American statesmen. It is not by chance that in the American press at the height of the events in Shab, warnings appeared that the "long-term consequences of the hostility with the huge majority of the independent states of Africa will be catastrophic for American positions and influence."<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, it may be considered that the policy of "crisis diplomacy" in Africa would have the gravest domestic policy consequences for the United States.

That is why a return to interventionism in Africa after the disastrous failure in Vietnam aroused definite disagreements in the ruling circles of the United States.

The decisive resistance on the part of most of the African countries to the recurrence of "crisis diplomacy" caused a certain "lowering of the tone" of the pronouncements of a number of leading figures in the Carter Administration. The danger of further armed intervention by imperialism in the internal affairs of the African countries--both in the south of the continent and in regions of other conflict situations--remains, however. The reinforcement of the unity of the African states and of their friendship and all-round cooperation with members of the socialist commonwealth is a powerful covering force against the recurrences of "crisis diplomacy" in the developing countries.

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In 1978 there were also other shortsighted steps taken by the American administration in the international arena and in Soviet-American relations. What is the worth, for example, of the striving, against the national interests of the United States itself, to use the "Chinese card." In this case the United States shows political nearsightedness in relations with Beijing, for the present Beijing leadership is trying to strain Soviet-American relations and to achieve a military confrontation between the USSR and the United States. Only people blinded by anti-Sovietism and anti-communism, much like gamblers in "political poker," could fail to realize this obvious truth. In falling under the influence of the activated coalition of opponents of detente, these statesmen cease to convey the national interests of the United States, and are placing themselves in the service of the narrow but influential group of persons who represent the military-industrial complex and ultra-rightist circles and organizations of counter-revolutionary emigrants. We observe that in the United States, instead of firmness in the matter of protecting detente, adherence to the spirit and letter of the Soviet-American agreements and a striving toward mutual understanding, actions of the opposite nature are undertaken. They are pursuing the goal of undermining confidence between the USSR and the United States, are charging the atmosphere with suspicion, are urging on the arms race to a new orbit and are announcing that detente is undermined because of the "aggressiveness of the Soviets." This course is far from the political wisdom and state approach to international affairs. It is fraught with grave dangers, and this is increasingly clearly realized by many responsible political figures and businessmen in the United States. The overwhelming majority of Americans continue to speak out regularly in behalf of detente. They demand from their statesmen a responsible attitude toward the interests of mankind and the problems of world policy. So far it is hard to say whether this truth has been assimilated by the present Democratic Administration.

The road to improving Soviet-American relations is clear. It lies in the direction of acknowledging the realities of today's world, in a struggle with the political blindness of the opponents of detente, in the responsibility of the governments for it and in the inadmissibility of letting international relations slip, including Soviet-American, back to the Cold War. The opponents of detente see the future of international relations a nothing but a "great military-political glaciation," in the ice of which detente would perish. What happens after that does not worry them. It would appear that the fate of the present and following generations of people does not worry them. This is, of course, unnatural, but militarism and humanism, as is well known, have always been antipodes.

There is no doubt that the common will of all peaceloving and progressive forces of today, despite any attempts made by the opponents of detente, will take the upper hand in this complex struggle that is observed in the international arena in the 1970's. The objective processes that are forming the need for detente for the world fellowship of states, speak their weighty word. "There is no task more urgent and vitally important than to create

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peace solid and inviolable.... As for the Soviet Union, we will not hold things up."<sup>47</sup> These words of L. I. Brezhnev attest to the inflexible will of the CPSU and of the Soviet people to try to achieve further progress in detente, including the development and reinforcement of friendship with the American people.

FOOTNOTES

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47. L. I. Brezhnev, "Vydayushchiysya podvig zashchitnikov Tuly," p 13.

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NATIONAL

BOOK DISCUSSES LANGUAGES OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES

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Professor K. Kh. Khanazarov is the author of the books "Sblizheniye natsiy i natsional'nye yazyki" [The Rapprochement of Nations and National Languages in the USSR], "Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i natsional'nye yazyki" [The Construction of Communism and National Languages], a number of pamphlets and articles, devoted to theoretical questions of the development of national languages in our country.

In the new book, the experience of solving the national-language problem in the USSR is summarized, questions of the further improvement of languages in the conditions of developed socialism and the development of a new historical community of people--the Soviet people--are examined. The book tells how in the course of the growing collaboration and friendship of the nations and nationalities of the USSR the Russian language, with their voluntary agreement, became the language of international intercourse.

The book is intended for all people interested in the problems of national relations.

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FOREWORD

Language as a means of expressing thought, as a form of its objectification is gradually being perfected as is the ability of man to comprehend and to make known the regularities of objective reality. Social changes create conditions which promote the acceleration of the development of language or, on the contrary, slow down its perfection. The Great October, having radically transformed the sociopolitical, economic and cultural spheres of our life, also introduced enormous changes in the languages of the peoples of the USSR. A revolutionary leap has taken place in their development.

Sixty years of Soviet power is an exceedingly insignificant length of time for a language. But, as L. I. Brezhnev said in the Summary Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Congress, "during this time our country traversed a path equal to centuries".<sup>1</sup> During these six decades, a developed socialism has been built, a new society, the likes of which mankind has not known before, a socialist way of life has arisen and a socialist type of person--the Soviet man--has been created. During the years of Soviet power, the fraternal friendship of all the nations and nationalities which make up the great and powerful Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed and went through severe trials. As is noted in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution", in our country "the factual equality of all nations and nationalities in all spheres of social life is guaranteed, culture--national in form and socialist in content--has flourished, a genuine brotherhood of the people of work has been firmly established, regardless of their nationality, a brotherhood that is welded together by the community of basic interests, goals, and the Marxist-Leninist ideology".<sup>2</sup> For the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union, all-round flourishing and voluntary rapprochement in all spheres of life are characteristic.

The present book makes an attempt to subject to analysis those basic transformations in the language life of the peoples of the USSR which have been accomplished during the years of Soviet power, to examine questions of the development of the national languages and the perfection of the language life of the peoples of the USSR in the stage of developed socialism, to reveal the historical necessity and progressive character of the growing dissemination of the international Russian language and on this basis--the mass bilingualism of the population.

In his work on the book, the author based himself on the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, party documents, and also on the research of Soviet scholars in the sphere of scientific communism, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and linguistics: V. A. Avrorin, A. G. Agayev, I. K. Beloded, Yu. D. Desheriyev, M. S. Dzhunusov, M. I. Isayev, S. T. Kaltakhchyan, M. P. Kim, V. G. Kostomarov, M. I. Kulichenko, I. F. Protchenko, P. M. Rogachev, M. A. Sverdlin, F. P. Filin, A. I. Kholmogorov, and others.

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The author will be grateful to readers for their observations and desires which can help him in the further thorough elaboration of the questions examined.

Chapter IX

The Native Language and National Belonging

National membership, i. e., the nationality of a person, cannot be established only on the basis of outward signs--color of hair, shape of eyes, distinctive cheekbones, shape of nose, etc. The gradual rapprochement and mixing of peoples in the course of a thousand years has now led to the fact that among the representatives of any nation and nationality one can find people who are similar in their external features to the representatives of any other nations and nationalities. Among the Azerbaijanis, for example, we encounter people which by their outward signs we can easily take for Iranians, Kurds, Turks, Armenians, Turkmen, Syrians, Bulgarians, etc. Among the Tatars we can encounter people who do not differ from Russians, Chuvash, Bashkir, and Nogaytsy. Similar examples can be cited for any other nation and nationality of the USSR.

National membership of an individual cannot be determined only by his place of residence or birth, by the length of time he has lived among the representatives of other nations and nationalities. Moldavians, for example, may live and work in Tadzhikistan for a decade, but this does not give us the justification to count them as belonging to the Tadzhiks. Or Ukrainians who were born and grew up in Kazakhstan are not deprived of their Ukrainian national membership.

And finally, the national membership of a person can also not solely be determined on the basis of his native language. A citizen of the USSR, for example, a Karelian, a Tatar, an Armenian or a Buryat, who was born, grew up, or lived for a long time among the Russian population, gradually masters the Russian language to such an extent that may call it his native language. And vice versa, a Russian, who has lived for a long time among the Kazakh or some other population, may thoroughly master its language and call that language his native tongue.

It is precisely these propositions which constitute the point of departure for the "Instruction of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR on the Conduct of the All-Union Census of the Population in 1970 and the Completion of the Census Questionnaires". It states that in determining nationality "the nationality is listed which is indicated by the respondent himself. The nationality of children is determined by the parents. Only in those families where the father and mother belong to different nationalities and the parents hesitate to determine the nationality of the children themselves, preference must be given to the nationality of the mother."<sup>3</sup>

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As far as the question of the determination of the native language is concerned, the instruction determines that "the name of the language is registered which the respondent himself considers his native language. If the respondent hesitates to designate any language as his native language, the name of the language must be registered which he knows best or which is usually used in the family.

The native language may not coincide with nationality."<sup>4</sup>

The importance of the problem of the correlation between native language and national membership has to do with the fact that with each new level of the deepening internationalization of production and culture the number and proportion of people is growing whose native language and nationality do not coincide.

For the absolute majority of people, the coincidence of native language and nationality is natural. Contemporary nations and nationalities are historical formed stable communities of people with their own language, territory, economic life, and culture. Every individual who considers himself as belonging to a certain nation or nationality, as a rule, associates himself with its language, considers this language his native language.

Discrepancies between the native language and national membership arise already under capitalism, when millions of people move from one country to another, from one continent to another in search of work, a better fate, when the industrial centers and complexes being created are gathered in the cities and the developing economic regions of the representatives of dozens of nations and nationalities, tearing them off from their native national environment. Living for a prolonged period of time (not infrequently since birth) in another national environment, as a rule, results in the fact that the individual little by little forgets his native language, which coincides with his national membership, and adopts the language of the local population. The more capitalism develops, the more the processes of the internationalization and merging of the population intensify, the more significant the stratum of such people.

Bourgeois science and statistics prefer to determine national membership of a person on the basis of his native language. As a result, together with the loss of his native language, the individual also loses his nationality. Capitalist society commits violence against millions of workers, implements a policy of their forced assimilation.

In socialist society the number and proportion of people whose native language and nationality do not coincide also increase gradually from year to year. But, in contrast to capitalism, under socialism these processes unfold voluntarily, on the basis of the principles of socialist democracy. Socialism accelerates the development of productive forces, intensifies the economic specialization and cooperation of the republics, intensifies the intercourse and exchange of cadre among them, leads to the growth of

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the mobility and multinationality of the population of the republics and economic regions. Having established relations of mutual trust, friendship and cooperation among the peoples, having instilled the ideas of internationalism and a scientific world view, it more and more accelerates their voluntary coming together, forever eliminates the spirit of hostility, mistrust, and alienation among them. All nations and nationalities are guided by a single ideology, strive for a common goal, are based on common principles of socialism. The consciousness of millions has been deeply penetrated by the understanding that all republics are inalienable parts of a single socialist Fatherland, all nations are indivisible parts of the Soviet people.

The solution of the problem of the change of the native language under socialism takes place painlessly because socialism protects the national feelings of people, gives them the right to keep their national membership upon changing their language. This is a manifestation of the profound democratism and humanism of the socialist solution of the question of native language and and nationality. The change of native language of a significant part of the population thus is accompanied under socialism by the complete freedom to keep their national membership. And this promotes the acceleration of the process of bringing the peoples together.

In contrast to language, the question of the national membership of a person does not require immediate settlement since the fact that the members of a given collective belong to different nationalities by no means prevents them cooperating, from solving common tasks, if they speak a commonly-understood language. It is not national membership, but the unity of views, criteria and aspirations of people, their devotion to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, which guarantee the success of communist construction. National membership, in substance, does not raise any obstacles to the unity and rallying of the workers, language differences, by contrast, create serious complications for their intercourse and elucidation of common goals. For this reason, socialist society carries out purposeful work in regard to the dissemination among the workers of all nationalities of a common language of international intercourse and cooperation side by side with the free development of national languages. Complete freedom by the citizens of the USSR to retain their national membership upon changing their language does not hinder, but promotes coordinated activities, cooperation and mutual assistance of the peoples of the USSR. It is fully in line with the consistently democratic character of the socialist order and proceeds from a calculation of the relative stability of national consciousness and national peculiarities of psychology, the influence of which on the determination of national membership is essential.

A relationship of interdependence exists between the growth of the number of people living outside the republic of their nationality and the growth of the proportion of citizens who consider as native a language not of their nationality. As statistical data show, this growth is very significant. During the years 1959-1970, the number of Ukrainians living outside



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the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR increased by 374,000, of Belorussians outside the boundaries of the Belorussian SSR by 381,000 people. The corresponding indices were 493,000 for the Uzbeks, 238,000 for the Kazakhs, 157,000 for the Azerbaijanis, 67,000 for the Moldavians, etc.<sup>5</sup>

The friendship of peoples and their cooperation in conjunction with the consistently realized principle of complete freedom of movement and settlement of the population within the boundaries of the entire country regardless of national membership leads to the gradual growth of multinational republics, economic-geographic regions, and production collectives. The Kirgiz SSR may be cited as an example. According to the 1926 census, the representatives of 63 nationalities of the USSR and foreign countries were registered on the territory of the republic. In 1959 this figure was equal to 100, and the 1970 census revealed that the representatives of 118 nations and nationalities of the USSR and foreign states were living in the Kirgiz SSR. During the census of the population in 1970, it was noted that residents in Kirgiziya included Udmurty, Altaytsy, Aguly, Laktsy, Tabasarany, Taty, Shortsy, Gagauzy, Tuvintsy, and others who were not in the republic at the beginning of the socialist reforms, i. e., in 1926.<sup>6</sup>

In the aggregate, these factors lead to the gradual growth in the country of the number and proportion of people whose native language and nationality do not coincide. If according to the 1959 census, of 94.7 million non-Russians the native language and nationality did not coincide in the case of 11.7 million people or 12.4 percent, this figure noticeably increased according to the 1970 census--of 112.7 million non-Russians, 14.8 million, i. e., 12.98 percent, of the population considered as their native language a language not of their nationality.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, in 1959, 10.2 million people, in 1970, 13.0 million non-Russian people named Russian as their native language. Here we have, thus, a growth during 11 years of 28 percent. At the same time, the growth of the number of people who name as their native language not the language of their nationality (with the exception of the Russian language) amounted to a total of 10.4 percent for the period under review (a growth from 1,558,000 to 1,615,000), that is lagged behind a little in terms of rate of growth.

The study of statistical data shows that these processes are found among all nations and nationalities and in all republics of the USSR. Their intensity varies depending on concrete conditions: for example, among the national groups the proportion of people who consider as native a language not of their nationality is by far higher than among other nations and nationalities (among Greeks--60 percent, among Poles--67.5 percent, among Iranians--63.1 percent, among Czechs--57.1 percent, etc.). This proportion is significant in the case of nations whose republics are exceptionally multinational or the great part of which lives beyond the boundaries of their republic (13.1 percent of the Chuvashi, 10.8 percent of the Tatars, 33.8 percent of the Bashkiry, 37 percent of the Karely, 22.2 percent of the Mordva, and 17.4 percent of the Udmurty consider as native a language not of their nationality), and very insignificant among the indigenous

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population of the majority of union republics (in 12 republics out of 15 this proportion does not exceed 1-3 percent). However, for all that, the increase in the proportion of people among whom a discrepancy of native language and nationality can be observed is a general tendency--on the whole for the USSR this index for 1959 and 1970 amounted respectively to 5.7 and 6.1 percent (including Russians).

The facts and figures show that in these processes the leading tendency is the transition of the representatives of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR to the Russian language as their native language. During 1959-1970, the number of people throughout the country whose native language and nationality did not coincide increased by 2.92 million people, of these 2.84 million are those who preferred calling Russian their native language. And this is understandable: the workers choose the international Russian language as the most convenient for intercourse within the boundaries of the entire country and because it equips them with a powerful means of spiritual growth and enrichment of knowledge.

The change of the native language forms one of the basic paths for the spread of bilingualism since it does not signify rejection of the former native language. Changing the language of instruction and the change in the native language connected with it are an essential step in the further coming together of nations and nationalities, in the intensification of the processes of their interpenetration.

Instead of a Conclusion

The experience of the Land of the Soviets shows that socialism has found the only correct road to the solution of the national-language problem. This is the free development of all national languages on the basis of equality of rights and mutual enrichment with the simultaneous broad and voluntary utilization of one of the equal languages, Russian, as the common international language.

The socialist order not only proclaims, but creates real conditions for the realization of the equality of languages.

At the present time, we have achieved a level when support on two languages --national and international--has become a daily necessity for every nation and nationality, one of the compulsory conditions for their further flourishing and coming together, for successful communist construction.

The construction of communism is the business of the hands of millions of workers of all nations and nationalities of our great Fatherland. The stronger their unity, close cooperation, the more successful the movement ahead in the creation of the new society. The international Russian language emerges as a powerful lever for rallying the peoples of the Country

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of the Soviets in the realization of the historic plans of the Communist party. The attainment of complete mastery of the international Russian language by the entire population of the USSR is the most important task of our society, an organic and integral part of the education of the Soviet man--the builder of communism.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 87.
2. "O 60-y godovshchine Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 31 yanvarya 1977 goda" [On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 31 January 1977], Moscow, 1977, p 12.
3. "Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya--vsenarodnoye delo" [The All-Union Population Census--A Common Cause for the Nation], p 45.
4. Ibid., pp 45-46.
5. Calculated according to the data: I. Yu. Pisarev, "Narodonaseleniye SSSR" [The Population of the USSR], Moscow, 1962, pp 88-89; "Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda" [Results of the All-Union Population Census of 1970], Vol IV, Moscow, 1973.
6. Based on data of the Central Statistical Administration of the Kirgiz SSR.
7. Calculated according to the data: "Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda. SSSR (svodnyi tom)" [Results of the All-Union Population Census of 1959. USSR (Summary Volume)], p 184; "Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda", Vol IV, p 20.

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NATIONAL

EXCERPTS FROM BOOK 'ISLAM AND SOCIETY'

Moscow ISLAM I OBSHCHESTVO in Russian 1978 pp 1, 2, 254, 253, 3-12, and 232-236

[Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction and Conclusion from book by T. S. Saidbayev: "Islam and Society; An Attempt at a Historical-Sociological Study," signed to press 19 Jun 78, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 11,000 copies, 254 pages]

[Text] Annotation

On the basis of the Marxist theory of cultural transfer the monograph offers a study of the history of the dissemination and establishment of Islam among a number of peoples of our country, and of its social functions in the pre-revolutionary period. A number of sections deal with the main stages of secularization in the republics of Central Asia following the victory of the October Revolution and provide a study of the social functions of Islam today.

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Introduction

The headlong development of society, change of generations, and renovation of socioeconomic conditions related to the development of science and technology, and the increased conscientiousness, culture, and level of information of the Soviet people have raised the requirements governing all ideological work among the masses. The path "which, if followed, would enable us to upgrade the effectiveness of this work," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, is the "comprehensive approach to the organization of the entire matter of education . . . in accordance with the characteristics of the various groups of working people" ([Biography reference] 66, p 24).

The practical atheistic education of the masses makes the comprehensive, all-round study of the social functions of religion under the conditions of a socialist society necessary. On the basis of the achievements of history, ethnography, social psychology, folklore studies, and other sciences, the religion experts must bring to light the general natural relations and ties between the various aspects of social life and the functioning of religion, and interpret them on a broad conceptual and methodological level. The integral study of the problem of "religion and society" alone will enable us to structure the work on surmounting religious vestiges, comprehensively view the object of atheistic influence, and take into consideration and foresee the nature of the influence of socioeconomic factors on changes in religious feelings, properly determining the immediate and long-term tasks, skillfully selecting the ways and means for atheistic propaganda, and conduct it in a state of close unity with ideological-political, labor, and moral upbringing.

In recent years the "religion-society problem" has drawn the attention of a number of Soviet researchers. Let us note, above all, works studying the methodological aspects of the problem as a whole (402, 406, 407, 426, 427, 428, 429, 469, etc). Works have also been written on various aspects of the problem--interrelationships between the individual and society in the light of the struggle against religious ideology (455), interrelationships between religion and social life in the various historical periods of different societies (327), the process of secularization of the socialist society (249), the dialectics of the social roots of religion (275), the social functions of religion (292), etc. Works have also been published directly related to the study of the problems of "Islam and society": on some characteristics and ways of molding an atheistic outlook among the Tadzhik peasantry (105); surmounting religious beliefs under Tadzhik conditions and achieving a conversion to socialism while bypassing capitalism (286); secularization of the rural population of the Karakalpak AFSR (104), the influence of social progress on changes in the way of life and religious awareness of the population of Uzbekistan (178), and the evolution of Islam in the USSR (103). Works were written on the general problems of specific sociological study of religion and atheism as a whole and of Islam in particular (110), as well as on the results of specific sociological studies conducted in

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individual areas (287). So far, however, no works have been published which, using the principles based on the Marxist-Leninist understanding of religion, would offer a broad analysis of the social functions of one or another widespread religion.

With identical socioeconomic conditions and a single social ideology, naturally, a number of common features exist in the manifestations of all religions operating under the conditions of our country. However, we must not fail to take into consideration also that each religion, in accordance with its historical past and the contemporary conditions of the development of the nations among whose believers it has been disseminated, as well as the characteristics of its specific dogmas and cults, has its own unique features.

Therefore, when we discuss Islam which, in terms of its followers, is the second most widespread, following the Orthodox religion, we must consider it from a general viewpoint applicable to all religions without, however, applying to it in its entirety the already-existing concepts applicable to other religions. In this case it is a question of the all-round study of the entire variety of religious manifestations in the socialist society. According to the Marxist doctrine people must be the target of the social studies, however, people taken in their factual, empirically observed development process occurring under specific circumstances (20, p 25).

The present work does not pretend to provide an exhaustive study of the entire problems of interrelationships between Islam and society. The author has focused his attention on the solution of a number of main problems such as a sociological study of the reasons for the dissemination and consolidation of Islam on the territory of our country, the functions in the pre-revolutionary society, and the stages of secularization of the areas where it is widespread, as well as the social functions of Islam under the conditions of Soviet republics which have bypassed the capitalist way of development. Most of these problems pertaining to Soviet Islamic studies have been insufficiently studied or totally neglected. Some of the views which have been established on individual aspects of the problem demand, in our view, clarification or even revision. That is why the author pays a certain attention also to the elaboration of some methodological aspects of the "Islam and society" problem.

F. Engels's statement on Christianity, "one could not set aside religion which took over the worldwide Roman Empire and, for 1,800 years, ruled over the overwhelming segment of civilized mankind, simply by proclaiming it a nonsense concocted by frauds. In order to remove it, we must, above all, be able to explain its origin and development, proceeding from the historical conditions under which it appeared and reached its domination. . . . Here we must answer the question of how did it happen that the popular masses of the Roman Empire preferred this nonsense to all other religions . . ." (23, p 307).

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The Moslems which profess Islam are found among the Uzbeks, Avars, Kirgiz, Tatars, Tadzhiks, Cherkas, Uygurs, and Chechens. Each of these nations has its own history, distinct from the others. However, it was precisely Islam that turned out to be a religion whose acknowledgment and reverence was accepted by their ancestors. Why was it precisely Islam that was able to push out here the previous religious beliefs? How to explain the fact that it was precisely Islam that became the ruling ideology and that it had a deep influence on the mentality, culture, and value orientations of said peoples?

A study of the reasons for the dissemination and establishment of Islam inevitably leads to the determination of the social grounds for this phenomenon. The answers to the question of why precisely Islam was able to push out the previous beliefs of the peoples who became its followers, rather than the followers of Buddhism or Christianity with their centuries-old history, developed theology, and well-trained clerical cadres, are linked with the study of the characteristics of Islamic dogma and cult, ignoring which would make it impossible to determine to the fullest extent the level of its influence today. Ignorance or unwillingness to take into consideration this specific feature largely leads, in our view, to subjectivism in assessing the level of religious beliefs among the populations of areas where Islam is widespread.

The author does not assign himself the universal task of studying the process of the appearance and establishment of Islam in the light of all the peoples of our country professing it. In each separate case the process took place under unique specific circumstances. His purpose is to study this process from the general sociological viewpoint, and the determination of the common laws governing the dissemination and establishment of Islam within our territory. Being of general theoretical significance to a certain extent, this approach makes it possible to compare the history of each nation within the framework of universal history, and to establish differences in the nature of the manifestations of Islam in a specific area.

The author has studied extensively the functions of Islam in the pre-revolutionary feudal society, for the proper understanding and interpretation of the functions of Islam in the socialist society and its place in the social structure of this society can be accomplished only by the study of its origins and the role it played in pre-socialist society. The steady quantitative changes and quality transformations, the constant appearance of the new and elimination of the old, inherent in a historically developed society, contain also a recurrence of certain qualities and phenomena. One of the development characteristics is the "recurrence at the higher stage of certain features, characteristics, etc, of the lower stage," a development which seems to go over pages already covered yet which repeats itself on a different and higher level (negation of the negation) (45, p 203).

Therefore, the contemporary condition of Islam cannot be presented as something entirely new or totally unlike the old. Naturally, however, nor



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could one speak of an automatic repetition of its former status in society, for such recurrence is relative and maintains a state of dialectical unity with its opposite--the non-repeatable. Certain functions and features of Islam are repeated within the socialist society but in a new way, following new laws.

The author then traces the basic stages of secularization of Central Asian society following the establishment of the Soviet system. Such an approach to the problem of "Islam and society" is necessary, in our view, for the following reasons: above all, it proves the vitality of the Marxist understanding of religion, its social origins, and functioning, and the fact that ". . . religion will disappear to the extent to which socialism will develop. Its appearance must take place as a result of the social development in which education plays a major role" (21, p 470). A clear example is provided of this fact in the Central Asian Soviet republics where, with the growth of the economy and the political conscientiousness of the working people and their literacy, Islam is gradually being removed from the various realms of social and private life. Furthermore, it is important also to sum up the experience in resolving the religious problem under the conditions of republics which have bypassed the capitalist way of development, as acquired by the CPSU and the Soviet state.

The need to study such problems is created by yet two other important reasons. First, we must take into consideration that with a view to triggering a hostile attitude toward the ideas of socialism and communism and the Soviet system, and to discredit its policy in the field of national and religious relations, the ideologs of anti-communism continue extensively to promote the thesis of the "persecution of Moslems" and of their organizations, particularly in the period of the building of a socialist society, and the "particularly" hostile attitude of the Soviet state toward Islam, and so on. They claim that the secularization of the Islamic areas is the result of administrative rules and pressure on the part of the authorities and is of a superficial, purely external nature. In their view, the Moslems are not susceptible to the ideas of atheism, for they are particularly attached to religion and, allegedly, Islam provides a particular immunity to the influence of various forces. The main objective of anti-communism is to belittle the successes and tremendous changes which have taken place in the lives of the Central Asian nations following the October Revolution and which became the base for their abandonment of religion.

Under contemporary conditions, when many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, having rejected the colonial yoke, have taken the path of socialist development, interest in the experience of the building of socialism in our country, particularly in the republics of the Soviet East, has become exceptionally great. Such an interest is legitimate, for the socioeconomic living conditions of pre-revolutionary Central Asia and Kazakhstan and of a number of Afro-Asian countries at the initial period of the gaining of their independence have a great deal in common. Today the Afro-Asian countries following a socialist orientation are resolving, in many

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cases, the same problems which arose at the initial stage of the revolutionary changes in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. That is why the study of the historical experience of the transition of previously backward nations in our country to socialism, bypassing capitalism, is of exceptional importance. Addressing the June 1976 Berlin conference of communist and workers' parties of Europe, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized the importance of the study of the experience in the building of socialism under a great variety of conditions. He discussed the need to study and sum up acquired experience, the more so since, in addition to the unique specific features related to national characteristics, it mandatorily includes common features of general interest (70, p 19).

The contemporary non-capitalist development of Asian and African countries is not a repetition of the path covered by the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. However, the existing differences do not lower the value of the Soviet experience which directs the revolutionary forces of other countries toward the proper solution of similar problems enabling them to approach this solution on a planned basis, taking into consideration the sum total of circumstances and confronting forces. The countries with a socialist orientation, said Comrade Sh. R. Rashidov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, need a specific experience in resolving one or another problem which arises in the course of building a new life, and specific ways, means, and methods for resolving it in our country (77, pp 33-34).

An important problem which must be resolved by the developing countries, and which we too had to resolve, is that of religion, its function in society, and the interrelationship between the state and religious organizations, and between believers and non-believers. This problem is common also because here it is a question not of religion in general but, specifically, of Islam which dominated in pre-revolutionary Central Asia and Kazakhstan and is the most widespread religion in countries with a socialist orientation. Islam has had a major influence on the molding of the official ideologies of these countries. Reverence to Islam in some of them is based on the need to abolish ownership based on exploitation calling for the redistribution of the wealth acquired by a population minority in favor of the poorer majority. In such countries religion continues to have a noticeable influence on all aspects of the life of society and of the believers--economic, political, and spiritual. It is natural that under such circumstances the choice of the proper ways and means for the solution of the religious problem assumes a major significance. The experience acquired in the course of the socialist changes in the Soviet republics which bypassed capitalism is of unquestionable practical interest to the developing countries.

The study of the social functions of religion, as a characteristic addition to the theory of non-capitalist development, enables us to predict the future of religion in our country and in many other countries with a socialist orientation.

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The study of the social functions of Islam on the retrospective level means, essentially, the study of the laws of the way existing social relations influence on such functions and the gradual development of the objective narrowing of the realm of its influence.

The study of the social functions of Islam under the conditions of a developed socialist society holds a leading position in this work. Considering Islam as an element of society, the author determines its interrelationship with the other elements of the social structure. He explains its position in social relations (the need of the people it satisfies and the ways it uses to accomplish this). As we know, to its followers, religion is a general theory of this world and its encyclopedic compendium and popularly expressed logic (6, p 414), and a "science of life." For this reason, the author also describes the influence of Islam on the outlook and views of its followers and on their life orientation and values as well as on the various aspects of their lives and activities. All this contributes to the determination of the objective and subjective reasons for the existence of the Islamic vestiges, the means to surmount it, and the interrelationship between atheistic and other trends of ideological work.

The initial methodological principle in this study is the Marxist view that religion is not an accidental phenomenon in history, or the result of ignorance and even stupidity but is "nothing other than an imaginary reflection in the mind of external forces which dominate the people in daily life--a reflection in which earthly forces assume unearthly shapes" (22, p 328). According to Marxism religion is socially based and has held different positions in society at different times.

At the same time, the present situation of religion retains a great deal of what was related to its past role. The experience of the past is a prerequisite, the starting point for subsequent development. This determines the other methodological principle of Marxism--the specific-historical approach--using the work to clarify the contemporary social functions of Islam. The trip into the past, found in this book, pursues the single objective of interpreting profoundly the manifestations of contemporary Islam and to establish and explain their characteristics and try to determine means for surmounting religious beliefs. Historicism, as V. I. Lenin taught, is a structural component of dialectics, a method for the study of phenomena in their appearance and development and their link with specific conditions, a method for clarifying both general and specific features. The lack of a historical attitude toward social problems deprives us of the opportunity properly to interpret the nature of facts which reveal general and specific features of phenomena and which lead to emphasis on illustrations, facts, and citations. Marxism, V. I. Lenin emphasized, stems from the fact that the past, present, and future in various phenomena are always dialectically inter-related: the present stems from the past. One way or the other, it is determined by it and is the basis for the future. Since in reality there are no absolute contradictions among the individual ages of the historical process, their separation is equally inadmissible on the theoretical-cognitive level. "The most reliable aspect of the question of the social

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sciences . . .," V. I. Lenin wrote, "is not to forget the basic historical link, to consider each problem from the viewpoint of how did a certain phenomenon develop in history, what were the main stages covered by this development and, to consider, from the viewpoint of this development, what has become of this problem today" (38, p 67).

Applying Marxist methodological principles, the author studies the social functions of Islam in accordance with the characteristics of the distance covered by the republics of Central Asia and the conditions of the socio-economic and cultural development of its nations at the present stage.

In the course of their development the Central Asian peoples avoided an entire socioeconomic system--capitalism--proving, yet once again, to the entire world the tremendous advantages of the socialist system. However, this leap cannot take place without a trace in the life of a nation. It cannot be a simple ascension in a straight line, merely the appearance of something new without the repetition of the old. "We," V. I. Lenin said, "can build communism only on the basis of the sum total of knowledge, organizations, and establishments, and a stock of human forces and means left to us by the old society" (44, p 301). V. I. Lenin frequently emphasized that there has been no historical case in which a new production method has appeared suddenly, without being preceded by a long series of failures, errors, and recurrences. We must remember that the transition to socialism, bypassing capitalism, "is not ensured by a proper economic foundation and a respective historical and psychological experience" (299, p 216). "The absence of one or another stage in historical development demands its own 'compensation, a fill-in'" (279, p 14).

The author not only interprets the social functions of Islam on the basis of the general laws governing the development of the socialist society but tries to clarify the specific features of its condition which stems from the characteristics of the non-capitalist way of development of the area it covers. In the author's opinion this enables us to note the various aspects of a single condition. Whereas the first applies to the general methodological problems of the study of religion, the second enables us to determine development characteristics. Naturally, here we must proceed on the basis of the common aspect of the general and the specific. "The general," V. I. Lenin wrote, "exists only in the separate, through the separate. Everything separate is (one way or another) general. Everything general is (a particle or aspect or essence) of the separate" (43, p 318).

The specific-historical approach to the study of Islam has an independent value as well in terms of the atheistic education of the working people. Under circumstances in which the party calls for the shaping of a scientific outlook in all working people, the all-round study of the problem of the dissemination and establishment of Islam and of its function in the past and the present will enable us to bring to light the historical and social base of religion, and the gradual yet steady process of the withering away of its role and influence on society and on the believers. It is important to

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surmount the religious faith in man before he has realized its reasons and seen its earthly origins. Therefore "today the sociology of religion carries out an important function, inspiring the believers to interpret to a certain extent their faith, outlook, perceptions of the world and feelings, converting an object of blind faith into an object of study. It is this, precisely, which is being resolved by the most important task of atheistic education--awakening a conscious attitude toward conceptual problems" (109, p 72).

Historicism in the study of religion assumes particular importance under present circumstances, when young people enter in life whose awareness of the reactionary role played by Islam in the past comes only out of textbooks. Historical knowledge alone can shape in the young people a proper attitude toward Islam. Therefore, we must obviously discuss the development of a feeling of historicism among the young people through atheistic propaganda.

The importance of the specific-historical approach increases under contemporary conditions for yet another reason. Our times are characterized by increased reciprocal information among representatives of related ethnic groups on the differences existing among them, not only of ethnical but of socioeconomic nature. In our time a trend has been noted toward increased ethnical awareness. Interest in the past of one's nation, its origins, and role of individual components in its history has increased. This "ethnical paradox," manifested against a background of the weakening of ethnic relations, is explained by the fact that the latter are compensated by concepts related to the common historical destinies of the members of each individual ethnic group. "The strengthening of this concept is, in the final account, the result of the nearly comprehensive growth of literacy as well as the radical changes triggered by the scientific and technical revolution in the development of information media (press, radio, television, motion pictures, and so on). It was thus that the necessary prerequisites were created for the increased level of information on the part of the broad masses in many countries concerning the historical past of their nations. Spontaneously developing concepts of this past (such as legends, and other folklore traditions) have begun to be replaced to an ever-greater extent by knowledge based on special . . . research" (148, p 106).

The entire history of the peoples professing Islam is largely linked with a religion which has had a serious impact on all aspects of their life. The concept of the unity between the religious and the national has been established in social psychology and of the attitude toward Islam as an age-old attribute of national life and keeper of national values. Claims have been voiced linking with Islam all cultural accomplishments of the nation in the past. Frequent attempts are still being made to present religious faith as a feature of national originality and the non-observance of religious ceremonies and holidays as betrayal of the behest of the ancestors, and disrespect for the nation and its culture. All this makes exceptionally topical the



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exposure of the link between religion and nationalistic vestiges (481, 15 September 1972). The implementation of this task set by the party is possible only through the adoption of a historical approach to the interpretation of Islam and the definition of its role in ethnic processes and influence on the life of its followers.

Finally, yet another problem of a methodological nature is the extent to which it would be legitimate to study the reasons for the dissemination of Islam throughout the territory of the country and its social functions by taking as an example a big area such as Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Manifestations of Islamic vestiges in one or another republic or oblast have, unquestionably, their characteristics and specific features. The party press has condemned the enthusiasm for narrow local topics, pointing out that research in the field of the social sciences should cover a broad range of phenomena and reveal patterns or existing characteristics leading to the manifestation of such patterns (241, p 59).

It seems to us that the numerous materials available today on the individual parts of the country are obviously insufficient for developing, on their basis, fundamental works on the social functions of Islam, for quantitative accumulations do not always lead to the determination of a general case. It seems more accurate to us to go from the general to the individual. The study of the reasons for the dissemination of Islam and of its most important functions throughout the territory of the country or in a big area is not the equivalent, either in terms of assignments or methods, of the study of such phenomena in an individual area or within the history of a single nation. The scientific study of such problems covering a huge area makes it necessary to determine and define the main features and lines of development, and to depict the process in its entirety. It seems to us that, following general theoretical ideas ranging from the establishment of a most general law to the gradual concretizing of the problem within the limits of a separate area or the history of a single nation or nationality, we would find within already-known facts a richer content which, with an empirical strict approach to them would remain concealed should we consider individual features outside the overall system. Following the approach we have chosen each fact should yield considerably more information, converting into a link within the historical process as we study its interconnection with other facts and phenomena. In turn, this enables us to reveal better the characteristics of the social functions of Islam in one or another area and its role in the fate of one or another nation. We consider this one of the purposes of this work.

Conclusion

The study of the functions carried out by Islam in the past and under the conditions of the developed socialist society convincingly proves the accuracy of the Leninist views to the effect that in the country of the victorious

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proletarian revolution atheism becomes possible not as a result of banning religion (which would only contribute to the strengthening of religious fanaticism) but thanks to the systematic persuasion of the believers, and their involvement in active social work, as well as as a result of socio-economic and cultural changes. Such an attitude toward religion has been reflected also in the new USSR constitution which proclaims the freedom of conscience as one of the basic rights of the Soviet citizens.

The comprehensive and complex problem of interrelationships between society and Islam, naturally, cannot be resolved within the limits of a single study. However, even this has enabled us, it seems to us, to express some preliminary suggestions effecting the further application of the comprehensive approach to practical atheistic work conducted by party, state, and public organizations and establishments.

We consider important the problem of the correlation between the comprehensive approach and the other principles and methods of atheistic education of the working people. We believe that the comprehensive approach is not merely one of the principles of this education, as some researchers believe, the way we cannot consider separately and apart from the specific-historical and differentiated approach the other principles and methods. The application of the comprehensive approach would be impossible without the observance of all these principles and methods, and without their integration within the organization and content of the work aimed at surmounting the influence of religion.

The comprehensive approach must be based on scientifically substantiated data on the needs of the citizens living under contemporary conditions and the results of the established "vacuum" which religion fills, and so on, in order to earmark and implement measures for the elaboration of the true earthly requirements and substitute them for the religious requirements. The all-round concept of the functions fulfilled by Islam in modern society will enable us, above all, to make more extensive use of the entire organizational and technical and socioeconomic factors for surmounting its vestiges and use more purposefully and intensively the public environment in exerting an atheistic influence on the individual. Thus, the steady increase in the strength of the national working class, the development of the educational and cultural standards of the working people, and the migration of the population, as a result of which republics, oblasts, and rayons become ever more multi-national, leading to the appearance of multi-national production collectives, and so on, could greatly influence the narrowing of the functions of Islam.

Knowledge of the characteristics of Islamic dogma and cults and the specifics of their manifestations today are contributing to the practical utilization of a number of additional requirements related to the adoption of a comprehensive approach. One of them is familiarity with the object of atheistic education to be influenced. The proper determination of the object of atheistic propaganda largely determines the proper determination of its

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content, objectives, and tasks, and the singling out of the main and leading direction which is the mandatory requirement of adopting a comprehensive approach to surmounting religious prejudices.

In this matter, it seems to us, some as yet unresolved problems exist. Let us take as an example the problem of religious faith and its criteria. Many studies consider as objective indicators of religious faith external manifestations of the attitude toward religion: attending mosque services, praying, fasting, fulfillment of other religious ceremonies, and so on.

Islam, as we pointed out, faces the believers with a number of requirements dealing with the observation of ceremonies. Nevertheless, it does not require their mandatory implementation and grants a number of indulgences. Therefore, such criteria of religious faith could, on the one hand, lead to belittling it, should the believers fail to fulfill a number of religious ceremonies, and, on the other, to overemphasizing it, since, for a variety of reasons some Islamic ceremonies are observed even by non-believers.

However, nor could we agree with researchers who suggest that people who observe religious ceremonies as national ceremonies should not be considered as faithful. It is well known that atheistic education should not be limited to separating people from religion. Its purpose is to mold a scientific outlook, an atheistic conviction, and an immunity to all religious influences.

Along with the believers there exists a rather numerous group of people who lack a strong immunity against religion or the principle-mindedness and convictions needed to oppose religious people. In our view, this calls for broadening the influence of atheistic propaganda. It complicates its tasks and faces it with specific problems. The latter does not mean that in the areas of dissemination of Islam propaganda must be waged distinguished by their final objectives and tasks from work conducted among the followers of other faiths. It is a question merely of the special ways, means, and methods used to attain the same objective.

For example, a head-on criticism of the Islamic doctrine, ceremonies, unseemly actions by its clergy, and so on, would be hardly effective. In many cases it leaves the people indifferent and, sometimes, merely irritates them. A propaganda structured regardless of the characteristics of the attitude of the believers toward Islam and its clergy or of the position of Islam in the public mind could not yield expected results.

It is precisely in the areas where Islam is widespread that what V. I. Lenin considered the most important fact in atheistic propaganda becomes particularly important, i.e., developing in the masses a conscious attitude toward religious problems and a conscious criticism of religion. Naturally, this task must be implemented on a differentiated basis, in accordance with the characteristics of the various groups of working people, paying particular attention to the upbringing of the young people and the intelligentsia. The



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molding of a proper understanding of most important concepts of the Soviet person such as patriotism, love and respect for one's own nation, and understanding its true interests and that which indeed ennobles and glorifies it, must hold a leading position in the atheistic and internationalist education of the latter. The combination of atheistic with internationalist education must contribute to the realization not only of the ideological harm of religious ceremonies but also of the fact that identifying them with national customs pulls the nation back, to the past, rather than contributing to its development.

In our view, a considerable role should be assigned in propaganda work to the Marxist interpretation of the reasons for the dissemination and establishment of Islam, its true position in history, the role which Islam plays in the preservation of obsolete concepts, and the distinction between religious ideology and cultural values presented in a religious coating. In order to develop a proper attitude toward national values a depiction of the unity of human history and the general nature of the laws governing the development of human culture, emphasizing in propaganda work common features, traditions, and customs of different nations, and showing the social base for their appearance and strengthening in the life of one or another nation could greatly help the development of a proper attitude toward national values. Let us emphasize that historicism in propaganda means not only the depiction of the way, under the pressure of social progress, the development of science, technology, culture, and education, religion has been gradually losing its most important functions and becoming a matter of merely individual conscience. Historicism calls for considering propaganda in terms of the future as well--the interpretation of inevitable doom of religion and of its total elimination from all realms of social and human life.

The study of the functions performed by the ceremonies and prescriptions of religion in the life of the nations which had accepted Islam in the past poses, it seems to us, yet another problem. The introduction of new, Soviet ceremonies has been, and is considered, unquestionably, accurate, being one of the most important means for restricting Moslem religious ceremonies. However, their application encounters certain difficulties, since a certain segment of the population is opposed to the new forms of life and is supporting the old. A number of reasons hint at the success of the new and the restriction of the old, linked with Islam. In our view, among the many there are two most important reasons for such difficulties. The first is that, frequently, the main purpose of the new ceremonies is reduced to the lowering of essentially material outlays. The educational and ideological content they should have does not hold a proper position or is totally neglected. The second is that it is forgotten that the new ceremonies will have their desired educational influence only if efforts to apply them become a structural part of a thoroughly planned and well-organized ideological process, aimed at changing value orientations related to Islam, and promoting a new world concept. This is a process aimed at developing true and durable life values, free from the influence of religion and of the feudal past.

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We have considered merely several possibilities for upgrading the effectiveness of work to surmount the vestiges of Islam and develop the theory of atheistic education made possible by the study of its social functions. The theory of atheistic education will become a necessary manual for action only when it is imbued with the results of the specific-historical study of the role of religion in the past and the present, closely linked with the development of society. A theory based on this analysis could provide an all-round substantiation of the contemporary religious circumstances, bring to light the objective and subjective reasons for Islamic vestiges, earmark the means for reducing the reproduction of Islam in the new generations, and upgrade the effectiveness of atheistic propaganda.

All this calls for the further development of the sociology of religion and the involvement of the effort of specialists in many related scientific sectors in the study of its social functions. The topical nature of the significance of this work is dictated by the attention which the Communist Party pays to the education of the new man, the builder of the new society. "In all realms of life and development of our society," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his report "The Great October and the Progress of Mankind," "the level of conscientiousness, culture, and civic responsibility of the Soviet people will play an ever-greater role. Promoting in man an aspiration toward lofty social objectives, ideological convictions, and a truly creative attitude toward labor is one of the primary tasks. This is one of the important fronts in the struggle for communism. The course of economic construction and of the socio-political development of the country will depend to an ever-greater extent on our victories on this front as well" (476, No 16, 1977, p 11).

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