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TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOUO No. 640









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22 June 1979

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CUBAN NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA DETAILED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14 May 79 pp 54-55

[Article by Basil Davidson: "Surprises on the Isle of Youth"]

[Excerpts] We are on a Cuban island a few kilometers to the south of the main territory of Cuba. Today this island has 50,000 inhabitants, half of whom are children of school age. It was made famous in the past by its parrots and its pirates. Then it was a prison.

Today it is the Isle of Youth, and this is not just a name.

There are today on this island 46 newly built schools, and of this number, 10 are reserved for children from Africa, with 9 already in use: 2 for Angolans, 4 for Mozambicans, 2 for Ethiopians and 1 for Namibians.

These young Africans number 5,000 in all. And when the 10th school is finished, there will be still more.

There are also African teachers, for these students come with their teachers who work with the Cuban ones.

"They all had medical problems when they arrived," the Cuban comrade who heads the establishment told us. "They suffered from parasites of course, but also from malnutrition problems. Each child gets a medical examination on arrival and then suitable treatment. The food is plentiful and proper, we see to that."

Later Fidel Castro asked me simply: "Did you visit the Nambian school?" And then he went on about the Cuban assistance to the children, with great enthusiasm and also great modesty, like all the Cubans who talk of it.

In truth, seeing this aid concretely is a remarkable experience and one which warms the heart.

Much has been written about the military aid Cuba is supplying Angola and the brotherly countries formerly part of the Portuguese empire. The

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generous and unselfish undertaking in 1975 and 1976 making it possible to save Angola merits full praise. But little has been said about Cuban non-military aid. It is perhaps less spectacular, but no less generous and unselfish, and no less useful.

Today this aid involves 15 African countries.

Old Ties

For a long time, it was entirely free. It still is to a great extent, but the countries which are able to do so can now participate in the costs. However, Cuba has demanded nothing in return and has not accepted anything either. The trgures we are giving (see table) are a bit out of date, and should be higher today. Cuba is still providing Vietnam, Jamaica, Guyana, Yemen and Iraq with substantial medical aid.

"It is not correct to say that our people get nothing in exchange," a doctor told me. "We derive a moral benefit which is valuable to us."

A moral benefit! What unusual language! And yet I do not doubt the sincerity of this doctor for a moment, any more than I doubted the happiness of the young Africans I saw on the Isle of Youth.

And the quality of this aid is only matched by its quantity. We expected to find some hundreds of Africans on the Isle of Youth, but we saw there thousands.

There are more than 2,000 Cubans working in the medical field in Africa today: doctors, specialists in tropical diseases, nurses, technicians. And they are not concentrated in the cities. Insofar as I could find out, they are in the most distant and hard-to-reach places, far from the beaten path, where one rarely finds medical personnel.

The Cuban minister of health, in charge of the medical aid, gave me detailed figures for last February. The medical care and instruction provided the 5,000 young Africans in Cuba and the work done by more than 2,000 persons in the medical field in Africa itself do not account for all of the non-military aid from Cuba. It involves other major aspects. For example, party members, cadres, graduates and university students from Africa come to Cuba for specialized courses, while Cuban teachers also go to Africa. These Cubans go above all to the Portuguese-language republics. On the one hand, this is because Cuba has very old ties with these countries, and on the other, it is because on the technical level, Spanish and Portuguese are both easy for speakers of the other to learn.

Last year, for example, there were 700 Cuban teachers in Angola. This year, the plane on which we flew carried a group of volunteers who will take over from them.

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Cuban Medical Aid to Africa

Country	Physicians and Surgeons	<u>Dentists</u>	Nurses	Technicians	Total February 1978	Present Estimated Total
Angola	329	18	224	296	867	915
Congo	8		6	6	20	
Guinea-Bissau	31	1	5	,	41	20
Guinea-Conakry Equatorial	, 5	ī	2	i	9	41 10
Guinea	5	1	2	1	9	•
Tanzania	13			•	15	9
Mozambique	24	2	2			39
Sao Tome	14	ī	ī	۸.	28	33
Cape Verde	4	î	i	4	20	21
Mali	6		1	2	8	9
Benin	11				6	6
Libya		2	3	1	17	19
	82		136	25	243	320
Algeria	61	1	6	6	74	87
Polisario Fron	t 5	1	3	2	11	11
Ethiopia	<u>133</u>	_3	83	83	302	310
Total	731	31	474	433	1,669	2,250

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

KIGALI FRENCH-AFRICAN SUMMIT REVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 May 79 pp 16-17

[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet]

Text The Sixth French-African Summit should be appreciably different from previous summit meetings because of a particular situation. We offer you here the Kigali file.

It is in this manner, after a concluding speech given in Gaullist terms in Alsace on 15 May defending European construction, that Valery Giscard d'Estaing left the hexagonal hubbub Thursday, 17 May. Far from noise and furor (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 958) d'Estaing came to African territory for the 14th time since his arrival at the Elysee. More precisely, he came to Rwanda for an official visit of 3 days before taking part in the Sixth French-African Summit on 21 and 22 May.

There will be a familiar atmosphere hovering over the meeting: is it not a question of adhering to a rite meeting thus, first in Paris and then in an African capital, around the French president? The man who advocates "Africa for Africans" will be pleased in Kigali to meet his faithful friends among the continent's 20 or so heads of state, government officials and delegation leaders--namely, Leopold Sedar Senghor and Felix Houphouet Boigny.

However, we are told that there will be new blood. First, the participants: there will be Portuguese-speaking people as in Paris in 1978 but also an English-speaking representative, from Liberia, which should, moreover, get him the next presidency of the OAU; this is a good illustration of the French breakthrough outside its traditional area of influence. Then, returning from Kigali, d'Estaing will stop in Khartoum where, as acting president of the EEC, he is to meet his Sudanese counterpart, General Nimeiri, current president of the OAU. There, in Giscardian imagery—which is not without foundation despite all—is the symbol of this desire for dialog extended to all Africa and, beyond that, to the outline of a Euro-Arab-African "trialog" (according to the expression—not very avorable—of the Elysee spokesman).

All the same, we must not exaggerate the significance of these new individuals. Ever since France set foot in Zaire, no Prench-speaking person is a foreigner

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in Paris any more. As a general rule, the acceptance of Portuguese-speaking and English-speaking people is still limited to small countries near the area of French influence and in essentially economic matters. There are two important exceptions: Kenya and Sudan. But two large countries--Angola and especially Nigeria--remain reserved, even distrustful, in the face of French advances. At the top of the list among France's customers in Black Africa, on a par with Ivory Coast and France's foremost supplier from the continent as a whole, Nigeria quite often finds itself at variance with French initiatives. We can still see this at present in Chad.

As for a Euro-Arab-African dialog, as attractive as the idea is, it has little chance of being realized over the short or medium term. Although the African countries might be interested, it is not apparent what counterparts France can offer to an Arab world (where, moreover, it is opposed by some) obviously concerned with other matters.

Should the Kigali summit therefore be transformed into a simple remake? Undoubtedly not. But the innovation lies elsewhere. There are three series of factors which might make this summit different from the previous ones.

On the occasion of the Dakar meetings (1977) and especially the Paris meetings (1978), there had been talk of "summits of fear." At each of those meetings a number of the participants were shocked by the situation in Zaire (Shaba I and Shaba II), by the French military interventions (in Zaire but also in Mauritania or Chad) and by the threats of destabilization which seemed to weigh on Africa's moderate regimes.

Now the black continent no longer seems to be the stake of a worldwide confrontation as in 1978. The question of security (strictly in the military sense), in view of a destabilization arranged by the "Russo-Cubans," will not haunt the people's minds this year. As there is a desire to remain prudent, "exchanges of viewpoint" on conditions of Africa's security have been included in the agenda prepared by the ministerial conference in April. But we shall not see, as we did in Paris in 1978, African delegates demand the establishment of a Franco-African military pact.

A second factor is the coincidence in the timing of major negotiations of economic interest to Africa and France. First, there is the renewing of the Lome Convention which is to take place in June with the signing of a new accord. Then there is the holding in Manilla until 1 June of the fifth meeting of UNCTAD. These are two areas in which important questions are at stake relative to the future of African countries and their relations with developed countries. This is to say that problems of development are more current than ever.

Under the subject of aid Valery Giscard d'Estaing can presume to have liquidated the debts of the poorest nations. But, contrary to his wishes, he will not be able to count on progress relative to the Fund for Exceptional Aid to

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Africa which he wanted to promote among other Western countries. Reduced to a "program" (which excludes putting up new funds but implies a certain coordination), the fund does not always satisfy France's partners (the United States, the FRG, Great Britain and Belgium) which refused to become involved on the basis of a simple common declaration.

All things considered, concrete results will be obtained only on the basis of Franco-African cooperation properly speaking. So much so--and this is the third factor--that although Africa's condition has been alleviated somewhat the economic situation has further deteriorated in all countries including those which are achieving a certain measure of prosperity, like Ivory Coast. For landlocked countries in particular, the situation is scarcely reassuring. Moreover, it is those same states which harbored resentment against the summit of 1978 for having dodged economic questions.

Increased aid by France to the Sahel and landlocked countries is thus expected. In this respect, Giscard, confirming the change in France's position, is expected to show his support for regional organizations of the CEAO West African Economic Community and CEDEAO Economic Community of the African States of the West type. This is in the interest of greater effectiveness of aid which is of necessity limited.

Although the sixth summit was intended to mark a return to the original concern, that of taking stock of Franco-African cooperation, politics are far from being absent. In private conversation, small committee meetings or in larger groups the heads of state will converse about the crises which are jolting the continent. The situation of the Central African Empire was even included in the official agenda prepared by the ministerial conference—at the initiative of the Central Africans themselves! The latter had wanted a discussion about the bad treatment their country had received by the press. After the Bangui massacre and at a time when France appears ready to drop Bokassa, we are wagering that it is not on those terms that Central Africa will be summoned to Kigali. One more strong point is Chad for which Giscard will surely be asked not to forget his responsibilities in view of the Libyans and Nigerians.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN ZAIRE TO RECEIVE AID

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Apr 79 p 1076

[Text] The High Commissariat of the United Nations for Refugees announced in Geneva on 18 April that a shipment of medicines for the Angolan exiles in Zaire arrived in Kinshasa, where it was immediately dispatched for distribution at Kimpese in the lower Zaire region.

These medical supplies, worth approximately 125,000 marks, were sent by plane from Frankfurt as a contribution from the FRG to the aid programs of the refugee organization for the some 93,000 Angolan refugees currently benefiting from the assistance supplies in the Cataractes sub-region.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

UGANDAN REFUGEES IN ZAIRE--According to AZAP [Zairian Press Agency], about 12,000 Ugandan refugees are now in northeastern Zaire following the fall of President Adi Amin Dada. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1318]

UGANDAN DELEGATION TO ZAIRE--A Ugandan delegation led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Otema Halimadi arrived in Kinshasa on 19 May for a 2-day goodwill visit in Zaire. The Zairian ambassador to Kampala, Mr Busaka, also went to Kinshasa. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1318]

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

CABINET CONSIDERS BUDGET--In a session in Yaounde on 25 May, the Cameroonian Cabinet considered the 1979-1980 draft budget presented by Minister of Finance Marcel Yondo. Showing an increase of 12.9 percent over that of 1978-1979, this budget is made up of 186.6 billion CFA francs in receipts and expenses, divided into 129.6 billion in running expenses and 57 billion in investments. The minister of finance recalled the difficulties encountered in achieving a balanced budget. The chief of state, Mr Ahmadou Ahidjo, asked each of the ministers to use his budgetary allotment rationally. During its session in June, the National Assembly will take up this finance bill. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 p 1497]

FRENCH RICE, MINING AID-Two financial agreements for 100 billion CFA francs each were concluded between France and Cameroon. They were signed on 23 May in Yaounde by Acting Minister of Economy and Plan Maikano Abdoulaye and by French Ambassador Hubert Dubois. The first provides for a contribution to the development of rice growing in the upper Noun valley (western Cameroon). It involves a first installment of 250 million CFA francs financed jointly by the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] and the CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation]. The second concerns the financing of geological studies and of mineral prospecting in the southwest. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 p 1497]

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CHAD

FRANCE SAID TO HAVE SUPPORTED HABRE DURING NDJAMENA BATTLE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 May 79 pp 14-15

[Article by H. Abou Feriel: "The Battle of Ndjamena"]

[Text] The battle of Ndjamena took place in February 1979 between the troops of Gen Felix Malloum, at that time president of Chad, and those of Hissein Habre, the then prime minister. It led to the emergence of a third individual, Ouaddeimi Goukouni who came "to support" the FAN [Armed Forces of the North] of Habre. But the only information which has so far been available regarding this battle, which underlies the existing situation in Chad, is that which the French military authorities have allowed to filter through.

The details that we publish today make it possible to complement them and especially to identify the political stakes of this battle for the control of Ndjamena, the country's nerve center, and beyond that of the whole of Chad. It also makes it possible to pinpoint the complicities which the armed groups of Hissein Habre enjoyed in fighting their battle of the streets against Felix Malloum. Finally, to a large extent, this information makes it possible to project the future of that unlikely political twosome, Goukouni and Habre.

It all began in August 1978 with the formation of a government of "national unity" after the failure of the Libreville talks (June 1978) between the FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front] and General Malloum, at that time president of Chad. In Libreville Abba Sidick, on behalf of the FROLINAT, had set as a condition that the president should reign but not rule. In a transitional stage it seemed necessary to him to endow the prime minister with the power to really govern Chad. The role of the Chadian president was to be limited, according to him, to the strict upholding of constitutional law. This demand by the FROLINAT and its secretary general seemed "excessive" to Felix Malloum and to France for whom "the sights had been placed very high."

It is then that the Habre solution came to the mind of those who make policy in Chad, Habre assuming in fact the role of spokesman for

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the president. Psychologically, the Habre operation had chances to succeed were it not for the personality itself of the former jailer of Mrs Claustre and the designs of his sleeping partners.

The Fundamental Charter, legal basis of the new government, was so ambiguous, however, that one is still wondering today with surprise how it was possible to believe for one moment that the team formed on that basis could last. As soon as it went into effect, the charter triggered the process which was to lead to armed clashes in the streets of Ndjamena. The contradictory interpretations of this constitution indeed led in short order to a comical exchange of correspondence between the Chadian President and his Prime Minister, Habre requesting, for example, from Malloum in an official letter that the President "change on his seal the term of office of the head of government' and replace it with that of 'office of the president of the Council of Ministers". Was this traceable to the deficiency of the drafters or the result of planned ambiguity? Whatever it is the French diplomat, Mr Dallier, who had approved the [French] Sudanese-Chadian document in the name of his country, knew what the score was. Dallier was raised, incidentally, to the coveted position in the French foreign office by being appointed France's ambassador.

From the start France's attitude had been ambiguous. Its action ended up by setting up two centers of power which could only lead to an armed clash between Malloum and Habre, each having his own army and both benefiting from French technical assistance. In addition to supplies of heavy and light weapons to Habre, France agreed to accommodate at Habre's request 22 trainees, all of them hailing from Habre's tribe, to be trained as officers in Montpellier, France.

This favor was completely contrary to the spirit of the Fundamental Charter which stipulated that the Armed Forces of the North of Hissein Habre were to be integrated in the FAT [Chadian Armed Forces]. But the French military authorities in Chad had decided otherwise. It was necessary that Hissein Habre be able to have available for all appropriate purposes a private army, independent of the central government. General Bredeche's recall following a request by Felix Malloum did not change things a lot. General Forest, who replaced Bredeche, pursued with more subtlety and discretion the same policy as his predecessor who had established here and there throughout the city of Ndjamena stores of arms and ammunition for account of the FAN of Habre.

The armed clash between Malloum and Habre broke out on 10 February 1979 after an order for a general strike issued by Hissein Habre but which was not followed. His militiamen then undertook to force the students of the "Lycee Felix Eboue" [public high school] to leave their classrooms, thereby provoking the intervention of the regular police force to protect the entrance to the school. The militiamen responded, firing into the crowd. That was the excuse which the forces were waiting for to involve the entire city in the clash.

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Indeed, for Habre and his advisers it was necessary "to heat up the atmosphere" in order to establish a new force relationship.

With a Spokesman

During the entire battle only the gendarmerie, a squadron of 200 men lad by Abdel Kader Kamougue, clashed with the armed units of Habre. The Chadian army had not intervened to any practical extent. At the peak of the fighting it was very simply consigned to barracks. The only explanation of this immobilism lay undoubtedly in the fact that Chad's armed forces were under the command of the French general staff which, from the outset, behaved as an interested party on the side that it had chosen: That of Habre. There was even a French officer accompanied by a Chadian officer equipped with a loudspeaker who summoned a Chadian unit to surrender to Habre's FAN. The energetic intervention of the presidential guard was necessary to oblige this deluded unit to return to its barracks. Furthermore, the units stationed outside of Nhjamena in the garrisons of Bokoro, Mongo, Mao, and elsewhere were intercepted by French troops and barred from intervening on behalf of Felix Malloum.

In Briefs Across the River!

The chief of staff of the Chadian army, Guemerou, also prevented from exercising his command, even had to resign and leave the country under grotesque circumstances after a spirited argument with Malloum. Tearing off his clothing Guemerou shaped it into a ball and hurled it at the dumbfounded Chadian President before diving, in briefs, into the riverto swim to Cameroon!

The French military command in Chad unquestionably had the possibility and the means to impose a cease-fire. In addition to the 3,000 men available to it on the spot, the French command had one foot in each camp and was the effective master on both sides. Why did it not attempt to halt the clash between the two belligerents? Even more serious, why did the French contingent go to the point of giving its assistance to Habre's troops in the Sara Moursol district, for example? In fact, the French command had clearly chosen its side. For it the confrontation between Malloum and Habre was the prelude to the formation of a new Chadian army around the armed groups of the FAN. This was to enable France to withdraw its expeditionary corps while securing its interests in the area, and to appear with clean hands in front of international public opinion.

On his part, Ouaddeimi Goukouni imposed himself later. Not having vexatious antecedents with France, Goukouni could serve as a screen and to "shoulder"--according to the term used by the French military themselves--Hissein Habre. In the scenario envisioned to have Habre replace Malloum, it was anticipated that Habre's FAN would in no more than a few days seize the capital and be in control of the situation. Nothing came of it but the French military authorities in Chad decided not to stop when they

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were making such good progress. Hence their decision to assist Habre to keep up his pressure on Malloum's troops while waiting that Goukouni decide to rally to Habre. Indeed, until the last minute Goukouni played a double game, maintaining his contacts with Libya and initiating others with the French command. Finally, his troops were ferried from Largeau to Ndjamena in French Transall transport planes. The sequel is known.

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

RELATIONS WITH FRANCE EXPANDING--Franco-Guinean relations have visibly improved since French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Guinea from 20 to 22 December of last year. Agreements on cultural, scientific, technical, economic and financial relations cooperation, which were prepared since that time are slated to be signed in June. These agreements constitute the framework within which contracts for the implementation of various projects may be signed later between French and Guinean enterprises. Meanwhile, several projects have been started. An ELECTRICITY OF FRANCE team is working in the Konkoure River valley to study the building of a dam considered extremely important by Guinea. Moreover, the French company COGEMA [expansion unknown] is continuing uranium prospecting by helicopter in the north of Guinea, and specialists believe that the signs are encouraging. A first boring may be effected in November. Two ELF-ERAP [expansion unknown] engineers arrived in Conakry on 16 May to study oil prospecting. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 p 1490]

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

GENERAL, INVESTMENT BUDGETS ADOPTED—The National People's Assembly of Guinea-Bissau has adopted the general budget and the investments budget for 1979. The general budget amounts to 1,474,261,889 pesos for expenses and to 890,348,889 pesos for receipts. The 583,913,000 pesos difference will be made up through National Bank of Guinea-Bissau credits and international financing funds. This budget follows a policy of fiscal austerity. As for the investments budget, it amounts to approximately 3.5 billion pesos, a total which includes part of the investments that will be made by the public enterprises. The ministries which have priority are: Public Works, Construction and Urbanism (671,634,400), Natural Resources (355,961,800), Commerce, Industry and Crafts (333,450,000), the state Secretariat for Fisheries (305,298,000) and Education. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 p 1489]

PORTUGUESE CIVIL AVIATION COOPERATION—Portugal will cooperate with Guinea-Bissau in the field of civil aviation. It will specifically contribute to the restructuring of the airports and the AERO-LIA air transport enterprise, as well as to the training of specialized personnel. This announcement was made by Manuel Ribeiro Santos, commissioner of state for transportation and tourism of Guinea-Bissau, in the course of an official visit to Lisbon from 19 to 22 May at the invitation of Marques da Costa, his Portuguese counterpart. Already, a certain number of mechanics, air controllers and pilots from Guinea-Bissau have been trained or are following courses in Portugal. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 p 1489]

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MADAGASCAR

FIRST 1978-1980 INDUSTRIALIZATION PLAN EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 pp 1141-43

[Text] The "first 1978-1980 plan" of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar is part of the long-term strategy defined and traced in the "Basic Options for Socialist Planning," which adopted the year 2000 in the future as a significant stage in Malagasy economic development.

Goals for the Year 2000

With a mean rate of population growth of 2.88 percent per year, Madagascar will have 16.6 million inhabitants in the year 2000. From 1976 to 2000, its output has to be multiplied by 4.32, for a mean annual growth rate of 6.3 percent. Between the two periods of development activities, the comparative structure of the output would be established as follows in percentages, at 1976 prices:

	1976	2000
Primary sector	47.1	33
Extractive industries	1.2	2.5
Conversion industries	17.6	30.4
Buildings and public works	3.9	6.1
Services	30.2	28

It is estimated that in the year 2000, the gross domestic output will reach 2,662 million Malagasy francs.

From now until the year 2000, investments have been figured at 430 billion FMG, representing a rate of 24.3 percent with respect to the gross domestic produce; their average annual rate of increase should be 9.7 percent.

Exports in the year 2000 are estimated at 275.4 billion FMG, or 4.3 times those of 1976. They will be made up of 61.9 percent raw or converted agricultural products, 13.7 percent mining products, and 24.4 percent industrial products. This projection reveals a foreign trade surplus of 1.7 billion in the year 2000—this is a minimum estimate, since the national merchant fleet should carry a growing share of the imports, at lower cost.

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In the year 2000, the gross domestic product will reach 1,766.5 billion Malagasy francs, or 4.2 times the 1976 level; the annual growth of the GDP should be set at an average of 6.1 percent.

The socialist sector will dominate all activities, with the private sector subsisting. Thus the distribution of the overall value added in the year 2000 (estimated at 1,537.5 billion Malagasy francs at 1976 prices) would appear as follows, in percentages: employees, 20.39; co-operators, 35.53; cooperatives, 6.77; socialist enterprises, 14.33; individual enterprises, 16.11; private companies, 6.87.

The 1978-1980 Plan

In 1977, the gross domestic product was estimated at 425.2 billion FMG; with a mean growth rate of 5.5 percent per year, it should reach 499.3 billion FMG in 1980, at 1976 prices, or 620.3 billion at current prices.

In 1980, the value added by the various production agents should total 420.1 billion FMG, at constant 1976 prices. The individual enterprises will have a share of 47.3 percent, employees of 21.1 percent, socialist enterprises of 44.3 percent, private companies of 9.6 percent, and cooperatives of 7.7 percent.

The creation of cooperatives will still be in its initial stages: they will take up 10 percent of construction, 15 percent of commerce and 10 percent of transportation. In addition, in the primary sector, the government will participate at a level of 10 percent in agriculture and also 10 percent in cattle breeding, in the form of state farms.

From 1978 to 1980, the gross fixed capital unit will rise to 184.4 FMG at constant prices (237.1 billion at current prices); the government's investments will total 74.1 billion (at constant 1976 prices), business investments will represent 81.7 billion, and family investments will amount to 28.5 billion.

Productive investments will total 103.1 billion (1976 prices); of this amount, 27.7 percent will go to agriculture, 29.5 percent to industry, 16.6 percent to transportation and telecommunications, 9.5 percent to mines and energy, 7.1 percent to trade, and 5.8 percent to industrial equipment, buildings, and public works.

Social investments and investments in infrastructure will rise to 81.3 billion FMG (1976 prices); they will be distributed as 42.7 percent in housing, 35.9 percent in economic infrastructure, and 21.4 percent social equipment.

Primary Sector

As far as the primary sector is concerned, the goals of the plan are summarized on the following page.

In paddy, a balance between production and consumption will practically be achieved in 1980 (predicted deficit: 43,000 tons). The cultivation of wheat

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is still in the experimental stage. The development of peanut cultivation is necessary to increase the domestic output of fatty foodstuffs and to make the existing conversion plants profitable. The master plan for oil sets the amount of palm oil necessary for food and for supplying the soap factories at 7,000 tons. The cultivation of soy-beams is not yet very widespread on the island. The increase in sugar cane will raise the amount of sugar available for local consumption and for export. The figure given below for the output of cotton in 1980 can be subdivided into 25,200 tons of cotton seeds (to supply the Tulear oil factory, which does not have enough sources) and 16,800 tons of fiber intended for the Malagasy textile industry. Exports will take up 80,000 tons of the 1980 coffee output.

	Situation 1974	Objective 1980
Agriculture (in tons		
Paddy	1.930.000	2,300,000
Corn	131,000	168,000
Cassava	1.292.000	2,000,000
Vanilla	6,000	6,000
Clove	15,000	19,000
Tobacco	4,100	5,000
Sugar Cane	1,178,000	1,356,000
Pepper	2,000	3,000
Hemp	22,000	26,000
Peanut	38,000	50,000
Cotton	35,000	42,000
Coconut palm		1,800
Oil palm trees		
Coffee	87,000	103,000
Livestock (number of heads)		
Cattle	6,118,000	7,305,000
Pigs	555,000	716,000
Sheep	566,000	729,000
Goats	1,069,000	1,377,000
Poultry	17,441,000	23,700,000
Fishing (in tons)		
Continental	39,000	56,000
Marine	28,000	38,000

Mines and Energy

In the mining sector, the predictions for the 1980 output have been set as follows: Chromite ore, 23,000 tons with a value of 5.2 billion FMG; graphite, 21,000 tons and 1.3 billion; mica, 1,100 tons and 0.2 billion. The local conversion of part of the chromite ore into carbureted ferrochrome will be performed from the beginning of 1982 on. For this purpose, the necessary investments are provided for in the 1978-1980 plan.

The lack of appropriate technology does not yet allow the industrial use of the Bemolanga deposits of bituminous sandstone. Thus the investments scheduled for the energy sector concern only the strengthening of the electricity output and the water resources.

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Industrial Sector

One of the basic goals of the "socialist plan for the country" resides in the liberation of the national economy from all external constraints. Considerable efforts will be devoted to this goal in the industrial sector; a strict choice has been made for the period 1978-80, as a function of the possibilities for financing.

In the area of basic chemistry is included the creation of a nitrogen fertilizer plant, which will involve 13 billion Malagasy francs in investments and which will be operational in 1980, with a potential output of 90,000 tons of ammonia-urea per year. The plan also provides for the resumption of operations by the Malagasy Gelatine Society (Somagel), which has interrupted its activities.

The strengthening of the cement industry will be guaranteed either by the creation of a new cement works in Soalara (Tulear), with a capacity of 300,000 tons per year (15.8 billion FMG of investments), or by the expansion of the existing Amboanio plant, whose production capacity would be increased to 250,000 tons per year (10.1 billion FMG).

As for the metallurgical industry, the planned unit for the production of carbureted ferrichrome, with a capacity of 60,000 tons per year (10 billion FMG), will not be operational until 1982; the immediate program concerns the creation of an ilmenite and zircon concentrate plant, with a potential output of 276,000 tons per year, requiring 5.3 billion FMG in investments.

Concerning the mechanical and vehicle assembly industries, the 1978-80 plan includes 1.5 billion FMC of investments for the manufacture of screws and bolts, and the assembly of tractors, utility vehicles and motorcycles.

Under the heading of light industries, the 1978-80 programs include an increase in the real capacity of the paddy conversion plants, the renovation of the materiel and equipment of the oil factories (reorganization of the SNHU [National Oil Factory Company]), the construction of a fifth industrial sugar mill under the Chinese-Malagasy cooperation program, making it possible to reach a total output of 160,000 tons of sugar in 1980.

All together, 12.7 billion Malagasy francs have been planned for the textile industry, including 7.5 billion for Sotema, whose production capacity will be increased to 14 million square meters per year, and 5.2 billion for Cotona, whose potential output will reach 9 million square meters per year. These two nationalized companies will have a total turnover of 4.4 billion FMG in 1980, and will produce 1.7 billion in added value.

Terriary Sector

The plan assumes that, as in all developing countries, the tertiary sector is enlarged with respect to the secondary sector, especially where the number of jobs is concerned (280,000 persons, including the civil service and domestic servants).

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The banking establishments located in Madagascar are completely in the hands of the government. The reorganization implemented in three categories-rural development, promotion of industry, and the commercial area--makes it possible to bracket the national economic activity better.

The state monopoly on insurance operations concentrates the use of the collective resources on the country; two large companies in which the government holds the majority share cover the activities of this sector (ARO and Ny Havana).

The establishment of an integrated set of socialist cooperatives for production and commercialization in each decentralized community constitutes the first phase of the reorganization of the commerce area.

As for foreign tade, the nationalization already impelemented in the importexport area are opening the way to the state monopoly that is the principal goal to be reached in the long run.

Transportation and Tourism

The reorganization of highway transportation requires the regrouping of the resources and materials necessary for proper service to the country into businesses or socialist cooperatives.

A share in the development of tourism is reserved, in a supplementary and not complementary sense, for contributions from foreign capital.

The highway network, which is rather small in comparison with the size of the country, covers a total of 38,000 km; extending and modernizing it will require large financial outlays. The private companies specialized in highway construction are to be socialized; the program as a whole entails 45.9 billion FMG in expenses from now to 1980, of which 36.5 billion is for the main national highways.

The railroad network, built between 1901 and 1952, covers 883 km. The plan includes 7 billion FMG in expenses up to 1980, for studies, improvements, and infrastructures (4.8 billion), and in the purchase of equipment (2.1 billion).

In the area of naval infrastructure and communications, the 1978-1980 plan provides for 5.9 billion FMG (construction of piers, warehouses, and platforms in various ports, acquisition of port and marine signalling equipment, and purchase of an ocean-going cargo ship for coasting--this addition to the national fleet has a provision of 3.1 billion).

The improvement of the navigable river routes will receive 0.7 billion in labor and equipment.

Although air service to and from the interior is satisfactorily provided, the charter of the Malagasy socialist revolution emphasized the necessity of reviewing, on the local level, the organization of air transportation on the whole.

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From now to 1980, the plan includes 18.5 billion FMG in provisional expenses (of which 14.3 billion is for the acquisition of aircraft and the rest covers expansion and improvement of landing fields, technical equipment, radio connections, etc.).

The total allocation to the postal and delecommunications service amounts to 7.2 billion FMG; it is concerned with the expansion and modernization of the local and long-distance telephone networks (2.8 billion), the radio connection between Antananarivo and Toliary, the acquisition of equipment, and the construction of buildings.

Social

Great efforts are to be devoted to housing. From now to 1980, the program involves 28.2 billion FMG in expenses, including 22 billion for the construction of low-cost housing and 4.8 billion for cleaning operations in Antananarivo and five capital cities.

In 1977, expenditures for public health (hospital personnel) represented 11.57 percent of the government's budget. The plan provides for an allocation of 3.8 billion between now and 1980 for the construction of various health establishments, and another allocation of 3.6 billion for the recruitment of new personnel. At the same time, the share of the budget in the operation of hospitals is being revised; the communities will take the responsibility for the construction of medical and maternity centers, and the public and private businesses will share in the hospital expenses.

The diffusion of culture and the development of the media will take place gradually. The activities are concerned with cultural centers, the press, radio broadcasting, and the movies, with the idea of asserting the national character.

At present, expenditures for education represent 25 percent of the government's general expenditures. The program involves making the material taught and the teaching staff more Malagasy (the percentage of foreign teachers in technical education must not exceed 50 percent). For the whole area (basic, secondary, professional, technical, and higher education), the expenditures included in the plan amount to 10.5 billion FMG for equipment, materials, and expansions, and 28.8 billion for operating expenses.

All together, operations for the benefit of youth and sports will require 5.7 billion; the Toamasina youth center (1.7 billion) will be completed in 2 years, while Fianarantsoa teachers college and social and sports center will require 3 years of work.

The Financing of the Plan

Over the planning period of 1978-1980, the effective and direct public investments, in billions of Malagasy francs, will be distributed as shown on the following page.

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	Constant Prices (1976)	Current Prices
General services	2.9	3.7
Teaching	6.8	9
Health	4.6	6
Housing	3.1	4
Various social services	2.1	2.7
Agriculture	22.6	29.5
Transportation and telecommunicatio	ns 29.1	37.9
Industry	1.9	2.4
Miscellaneous	1	1.2
Total	74.1	96.4

As for the investments of the companies in the socialist sector and the private sector, they will be separately valued as follows, in billions of Malagasy francs.

	Constant Prices (1976)	Current Prices
Agriculture	3	4.5
Mines and energy	4.3	6.5
Manufacturing industries	11.3	17.2
Buildings and public works	2.6	3.9
Transportation and telecommunication	ons 6.5	9.8
Trade	2.6	3.7
Miscellaneous services	1.4	2.1
Workers housing	1.3	1.8
Total	33	49.5

In the direct effective public investments, new investments account for 68.6 billion FMG. The relative share of net savings in the gross domestic product should double between now and 1980; its use will represent 63.5 percent of the new investments. The other 36.5 percent will be financed out of foreign contributions of the order of 25 billion, of which 6 billion is expected in grants and subsidies and 19 billion, in long-term loans; part of these have already been obtained.

This appeal to foreign loans will increase the national debt somewhat; its amount will be around 13 percent of the gross domestic product in 1980, as opposed to 8.4 percent in 1977. But this increase will be easily bearable, since the interest on the debt will represent only 5 percent of the export receipts in 1980.

The required domestic savings will have to rise to 51.7 billion FMG, or more than 17.2 billion per year, an amount that implies considerable efforts on the part of both of administrations and of individuals. Consequently, where public expense are concerned, operating expenses should not increase at a higher rate than 11.5 percent per year, in current prices.

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At the same time, an improvement in the amount received in taxes is expected. The increase in receipts from direct taxes will be of the order of 30 percent over the 3 years, with the change in tax receipts being expected more from an increase in the number of taxpayers than from an increase in the existing tax rates. In addition, property and luxury goods will be more heavily taxed.

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TWAIAM

DEVELOPMENT PLANS 1979-1982 OUTLINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANNEENS in French 27 Apr 79 p 1079

[Text] The government of Malawi operates its development program on a triannual basis, with annual adjustment in function of the local resources available and any eventual changes of objectives. Consequently, only the first year of this plan has a rigid character. External aid is the principal source of financing for this program, with the balance from local savings.

The development plans since 1964 have involved the following amounts (in thousands of kwachas [the Malawi kwacha, abbreviated K or MK, is worth about 5.2 French francs or 260 CFA francs]):

1964 5,370	1972-1973 26,702
1965 9,458	
1966 12,760	1974-1975 40,774
1967 10,114	1975-1976 70,001
1968 13,960	1976-1977 55,907
1969-1970 21,318	
1970-1971 35,169	1978-1979 136,860
1971-1972 3.167	

As of 1 January 1979, more than K 68 million had been expended, out of a planned total of 136.8 million K.

As has been the case in recent years, the continued closure of the Rhodesia-Mozambique border and the congestion of the ports of Beira and Nacala have made it difficult to obtain supplies of equipment goods and have contributed to the rise in their costs.

The 1979-1980/1981-1982 Plan

The 1979-1982 3-year development plan, the details of which are given in the table below, anticipates total expenditure of about 771 million kwachas, including 207 million K for the first year, 261.6 million K for 1980-1981, and 302.1 million K for 1981-1982. Of this amount, 87 percent, or 666 million K,

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will come from foreign financing sources; the government plans to invest the balance--nearly 105 Million K--during this period.

Of the 207 million K planned for 1979-1980, 184 million will be provided by international assistance, and only 23 million by local resources.

1979-1980/1981-1982 Development Plan

Allocation of Expenditures

(in thousands of kwachas)

	1979-1980	1980-1981	1981-1982	1979-1982
Social Education Finance, Commerce and Industry	457 11,384 14,981	102 11,860 50,232	14,037 60,025	559 37,281 125,238
Public buildings	9,179	12,975	27,415	49,569
Health	4,184	3,894	11,310	19,388
Housing		6,432	6,952	22,769
Miscellaneous services	7,675	10,582	7,925	26,182
Agriculture	31,708	32,948	34,703	99,359
Fishing	1,106	400	451	1,957
Natural forests and parkland	9,406	8,481	11,013	28,900
Bridges and roads	2,419	936	1,365	4,720
Veterinary service	7,377	7,217	8,896	23,490
New capital	1,310	7,720	9,600	18,630
Posts and telecommunications	5,638	9,212	17,032	31,882
Energy	8,774	6,647	4,100	19,521
Transport	74,323	86,770	82,064	243,157
Water	7,921	5,181	5,146	18,248
Miscellaneous	40	40	100	180
TOTALS	207,267	261,629	302,134	771,030

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MALAWI

BRIEFS

EEC LOAN--At the beginning of the year, at the conclusion of a 3-day official visit to Lilongwe, Claude Cheysson, EEC commissioner for development, signed with the government an agreement for a loan of 11.28 million Malawi kwachas. The grand total of the European package offered to Malavi is now 87.5 million K [kwachas], intended for financing various local projects. Of this amount, 77 million K has been devoted to the agricultural development plans, infrastructure, and services of a social nature, while the remaining 10.5 million K is in the form of two loans within the framework of the Dwanga sugar project and a third loan enabling Indebank to lend its aid to development of the local PMI's [small and medium-size industries]. Citing Malawi as an example as regards the country's use of European aid and for the fact of having linked its currency to the Special Drawing Rights, Mr Cheysson let it be understood that upon the conclusion of Lome II -- the negotiations for which, presently in progress, should be completed by the end of 1979--STABEX [expansion unknown] could open up to new products, including tobacco, Malawi's principal resource. In the course of his visit, the European commissioner declared he was strongly impressed by the importance assigned by Dr Banda's government to agricultural development. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Apr 79 p 952] 11267

BLANTYRE WATER SUPPLY--An engineer from the World Bank recently went to Malawi to evaluate the progress of Phase V of the Blantyre Water Board, estimated, after review, at 14 million K. The delays due to technical problems in the carrying-out of the project's previous phase have postponed its completion date until June 1979. The cost of Phase IV should approach 8 million kwachas. Phase V should not be completed until 1981, even though the personnel-training program, which is part of it, has already begun. After execution of these two projects, for a grand total of 22 million K, it is expected that water distribution to Blantyre will rise from the present flow of 30 million liters per day to 65 million and even 80 million liters at peak hours. Phase IV has been financed jointly by the Commonwealth Development Orgnization, whose participation totals 3.4 million K, the British government, and the Water Board, while Phase V has been supported by the International Evelopment Association (IDA), a subsidiary of the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB), and

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local funds. In addition, the World Bank has let it be known that it would participate in the amount of 6 million K in improvement of the main Walkers Ferry canal, and that it would assist the Water Board within the framework of the financing of its electrical and mechanical equipment. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANNEENS in French 13 /pr 79 p 952] 11267

INCREASE IN GNP--Since 1964, Malawi's Gross National Product (GNP) has had a considerable increase, as evidenced by the following figures (at current prices, in millions of kwachas): 1964, 152.9; 1973, 401.6; 1974, 487.1; 1975, 571.0; 1976, 659.8; 1977, 769.3; 1978, 896.2. The average rate of growth of the GNP between 1973 and 1978 comes to 17.4 percent, with 1978's increase over 1977 reaching the slightly lower figure of 16.5 percent. Thus, the GNP has nearly sextupled in 15 years, and this evolution has been accompanied by a considerable modification in the allocation of expenditures. Thus, in 1964 consumption represented 99.9 percent of the total product. This percentage has dropped to 84 percent in the last 2 years, whereas the proportion of investments has undergone the opposite development. Taking into account the rate of population growth, on the order of 2.5 percent per year, the per capita GNP increased by nearly 6 percent per year between 1968 and 1978, risin from \$55 in 1977 to nearly \$200 at the end of 1978. These figures, however, do not give any indication of the evolution of distribution of the GNP among the population since 1968. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-RANEENS in French 20 Apr 79 p 1016] 11267

AGRICULTURAL DIVERSIFICATION -- In the agricultural area, the year 1978 was marked in Malawi by the introduction into the country's rich soil of new crops in which much hope has been placed by the local authorities. Thus the Macadamia nut, after a series of poor harvests, has become an export product, more than 2 tons having been marketed abroad in 1978. This nut, presently cultivated on 600 hectares by 18 farmers, has three qualities. The first two are put on the market after processing, while the third is used as a byproduct for poultry and pig feed. As regards tobacco, an auctioneer from the state of Tennessee, on a private visit to Malawi, has assured the local planters that he will see that they receive a high-yield variety which is having great success in the United States, so as to encourage an increase in productivity. Another sector for which the national potential is great is the growing of the Irish potato, which is presently being experimented with on the Zomba plateau and production of which would both meet local demand and provide for exportation to neighboring countries. It seems that this potato, whose ability to adapt to climatic conditions is considerable, could easily be introduced into the mixed farming system practiced in Malawi. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANNEENS in French 20 Apr 79 p 1016] 11267

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SUGAR CANE PRODUCTION, EXPORTS—Cane sugar planting began in Malawi in 1965 following the establishment of the Sugar Corporation of Malawi (SUCOMA), and, in 1966, 3,500 tons of sugar were produced. The amount has increased regularly each year. In the beginning it was all used for local consumption, but beginning in 1971 American and European quotas encouraged exporting which has since increased to a high level. At the same time, domestic consumption has increased. In 1976 a second firm was established in the Dwanga delta in Nkhotakota: the Dwanga Sugar Corporation. It cost a total of 59 million kwacha, uses an area of 5,280 hectares, and employs about 4,000 people. It can process 150 tons of cane per hour. Production for 1979 is estimated at 41,000 tons; for 1980,74,000 tons; and for 1985, 110,000 tons. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 pp 1502-1503]

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MALI

NATIONAL ECONOMY, 1978 PRODUCTION REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 May 79, pp 1229-1231

[Excerpts] At a time when the new political structures born of the constituent congress of the Democratic Union of the Malian People are being established, it seems opportune to us to describe the present economic situation of Mali, based on the total figures for 1978 which are available to us.

From the first statistics containing the essential data of the economic and financial activity of Mali in 1978 the following are noteworthy:

- -- the improvement of most agricultural production;
- --a slight rise in total industrial production;
- -- an aggravated deficit in the trade balance;
- -- a noticeable increase in the total budget and of money in circulation;
- --an unfavorable trend in foreign payments which is covered only through larger contributions of foreign aid.

This situation is due largely to the concurrence of unfavorable factors. The return of the drought in 1977 caused a large deficit in food crops, a drop in cash crops, and the unit costs of imports could only increase at the same rate as world inflation. Construction materials, certain machines and vehicles necessary to the execution of works provided for in the plan swelled the volume of imports still further.

It is also, above all, the fault of the very structure of the Malian economy, which has not changed basically in decades. An agricultural economy, especially a subsistence one, the modern sector of which rests upon agriculture, animal husbandry, and fishing, is necessarily dependent directly on the rains, their quantity and distribution. The harvests of the main products which take place between September and December--cotton, peanuts or rice--require a primary processing before being marketed, and the

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results of a harvest campaign, whether good or bad, are felt over the whole of the economy only in the following year. Therefore 1979 should be much more favorable.

Agricultural Production and Commercialization

In 1978 agricultural production regained the excellent level of 1976. Taking into account the imports of cereals derived from foreign aid, foodstuff needs were noticeably satisfied in 1978 and the reserves among peasants largely restored.

Commercialization for the purpose of supply of the urban centers is facilitated from them. The Malian Company for the Development of Textiles (CMDT)--in charge of integrated rural development in the southern part of Mali--collected, in response to government directives, without difficulty and without jeopardizing either home consumption or family reserves, a little more than the 11,000 tons of sorghum, millet, and maize which had been allocated to it, while the peasants sold it almost 128,000 tons of seed cotton (unginned cotton), compared with 118,900 tons in 1976 (the best former year) and 113,200 tons in 1977.

Peanut production of interest mainly to the western part of Mali--led one to hope for market sales of 70,000 tons, lower by 10,000 tons than that of the 1977-1978, which reached only 42,000 tons.

However good these results were, it is estimated that the importation of large quantities of food commodities, mainly grains, will be necessary to restore the balance in 1979 and to reconstitute family and national reserves. The figure of 60,000 tons has sometimes been advanced. One must hope for as good an agricultural year in 1979 as in 1978. Once the foodstuff situation is cleared up, exports of cereals would even be conceivable. Let us mention in passing that in the frontier zones the disparity between the prices paid to the producer in Mali and in neighboring countries causes clandestine exports, which falsify, sometimes noticeably, especially for peanuts, the results of marketing.

If one excepts sugar production—which rose from 8,000 tons in 1976 to 15,600 tons in 1977 and 19,700 tons in 1978—while that of bleached rich fell from 50,700 tons to 32,800 tons, industrial production has not noticeably progressed, showing slight drops in certain sectors, compensated by moderate increases in others. And in conclusion the production of electric power at Bamako increased from 75.1 in 1977 to 83.8 million kilowatt—hours, compared with 53 million in 1974.

Foreign Trade

CAF imports and FOB exports went from 78 to 93 billion and from 61 to 42 billion Malian francs, showing a deficit of 50.5 billion and a rate of coverage of 45.7 percent.*

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^{* 1} Malian franc (FM) = 0.01 French franc or 0.50 CFA francs.

Although the trade balance is traditionally in deficit, this is one of the worst rates since the years of the great drought.

Everything leads one to believe that the good results of the 1978-1979 harvest campaign will make it possible to bring the rate of cover up to a more acceptable level, although the price of cotton has hardly strengthened at all up to the present time. But cotton accounted for almost 60 percent of the total value of exports in 1977 and for about 50 percent in 1978.

Public Finance

The budgets of Mali, both national and regional, are mainly devoted on the expense side to covering the costs of operation, and above all, to the salaries of officials. Going from 54.64 billion to 61.48 billion Malian francs from 1977 to 1978, with a rate of increase exceeding 11 percent, they constitute a heavy burden for a monetary economy which is so poorly developed and the balance of which is assured only by external contributions.

Fortunately there are not just dark clouds, and the great operations of rural development constitute a framework which is well adapted, and in the southern part of Mali at least a success due to long patience, to very good management, to a receptive peasant environment built around an income crop which makes it possible to establish the indispensable capital (agricultural implements and livestock) and which, conducted according to the principles of good agriculture, is pulling foodstuff production along and is creating the economic conditions of development of the peasants and the sociological conditions of an important forward step in social progress.

Finally one is entitled to hope that with the filling of the Selingue dam, envisaged in 1980, an essential element of the regulation of the Niger and the continuation of the downstream projects, especially at the Office of the Niger, the economic development of the whole country will be able to make a new surge.

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MALI

BRIEFS

SWISS AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE--During a visit by Marcel Heimo, director for cooperation in developmental and humanitarian aid matters of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an agreement was signed with Malian authorities regarding a project aimed at training agents in the field of agricultural machinery. Switzerland also offered training and study scholarships as well as a 250 million CFA subsidy to Mali. The Swiss representative expressed the hope that his country's cooperation with Mali would continue to benefit the rural population. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 p 1490]

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MOZAMBIQUE

DIFFICULTIES BURDENING NATIONAL ECONOMY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 May 79 p 1266

[Excerpt] Economic restraints are causing the Mozambique of President Samora Machel, without disavowing its Marxist options, however, to bend the rigidity of its concepts and to seek some accommodations, both domestically and abroad, in order to strive to overcome the difficulties which it faces and which have not yet permitted it to regain the level of development which it had reached on the eve of independence, according to a recent study published by the FINANCIAL TIMES.

These difficulties are encountered in several sectors. First of all in the financial sector. According to United Nations estimates the total balance of current accounts and capital has deteriorated steadily, the deficit rising from the equivalent of \$6 million in 1973 to \$185 million in 1977 and \$225 million in 1978. These figures do not include the total of sales of gold corresponding to part of the wages paid to miners working under contract in South Africa and which formerly covered a large part of the deficit in foreign payments. It should be noted that since last year South Africa assesses the value of this gold at the market price and no longer at the old "official price," thus depriving Mozambique of an addition to its resources amounting to \$100 million per year.

The United Nations estimates the cumulative budget deficit of Mozambique at \$170 million, the major part having been financed by inflationary bank loans.

In the agricultural sphere the main resource of the country, the departure of the Portuguese planters, the chaotic system of distribution and a certain number of natural catastrophes have had serious consequences. For example, in the region north of Maputo, exports of cashews reached only 60,000 tons last year, compared with the usual 100,000 tons.

Sugar production has been sharply reduced as a result of the events which occurred last year in the principal enterprise of this sector, Sena Sugar, controlled by British capital. Accused of "economic sabotage," the company was nationalized in July 1978. What happened to Sena also happened to

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many other firms left in the private sector but subjected to governmental control of wages and prices. Heavy losses were thus shown, the management of these enterprises being unable or unwilling to utilize productive capacity to the fullest—which provoked the authorities to measure of retortion.

Beyond its financial difficulties and those it has faced in the agricultural sector, Mozambique has suffered resulting from the armed conflict in which it has engaged against Rhodesia. One diplomat estimates that this war costs it \$350 million per year. The closing of the Mozambique-Rhodesian frontier, in March 1976, and the interruption of links between the two countries have transformed Beira into a sort of ghost town. Port traffic fell to 671,000 tons last year compared with 1,600,000 in 1975. In addition the destruction caused in the infrastructures of Mozambique by the Rhodesian armed forces and dissident groups remote-controlled by Rhodesia, causing stoppage of telecommunications and transport, can be set at \$100 million. The Rhodesians are suspected of having been at the bottom of the fire which burned two large oil storage sites near Beira recently. Furthermore, Mozambique must bear most of the costs of maintaining the 100,000 Rhodesian refugees on its soil.

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NAMIBIA

SWAPO LEADER HITS SOUTH AFRICA-BACKED 'UDI' IN NAMIBIA

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 May-10 Jun 79 p 17 LD

[Interview with South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) President Sam Nujoma by Jane Bergerol: "Pretoria Is Defying the United Nations"-- date and place not specified]

[Excerpt] [Question] "Interim government, "National Assembly," martial law! What is happening in Namibia?

Sam Nujoma: This is a UDI by the Pretoria racist regime. It is a smoke-screen to try to confuse the Namibian people and world opinion. The regime is pretending that this is not a UDI, but it certainly is. SWAPO is prepared to take part in elections supervised and monitored by the United Nations, and we would undoubtedly win them because no patriotic Namibian would vote for the continuation of Pretoria's illegal occupation and exploitation of the people.

[Question] What is the group of five--the United States, Britain, France, Canada and the FRG--now doing? Is it preparing to recognize this UDI?

San Nujoma: We were surprised when, after resolution 435 was adopted last year, the Western powers sent their foreign ministers to Pretoria where the racist prime minister "warned" them against SWAPO gaining power--which, according to him, would result in Namibia's wealth (uranium, diamonds, copper) being "handed to the communists." The actions of the five will now show whether they were convinced by that argument.

[Question] Do the application of martial law in Namibia and the intensification of repression against SWAPO mean the possibility of SWAPO being banned as a legal internal organization?

Sam Nujoma: First, martial law changes nothing at all. We have had a law against terrorism, a law suppressing communism and a state of emergency. Moreover, this is not the first time that they have decreed martial law. There is no freedom of movement. Indeed, there has been a state of emergency ever since Pretoria has administered the territory, in other words since 1920.

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However, the decisive factor is the people's will to fight for liberation. SWAPO is the masses and the masses are SWAPO. Some 50 leaders have been arrested. Others will take their place. The struggle will go on whether SWAPO is officially made illegal or not. Every day they bombard Angolan villages along the border, killing and maiming innocent civilians. They are bombarding both sides of the border in Namibia and Angola. They are trying to create a buffer zone. They are starting to move the puppets in the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola into the zones in southern Angola which they have been bombarding since March. The fact that they now have to use French Mirages and British Buccaneers clearly shows that they are in disarray. They are incapable of discovering where our guerrillas come from because our guerrillas are among the people.

[Question] What is the military situation?

Sam Nujoma: The national liberation war started mainly in the eastern Caprivi. It then spread to the northeast, north and northwest. But we developed the center-north, center and southern fronts 2 years ago. Military actions have been carried out south of Windhoek as far as Keetmanshoop. During the last year we have destroyed several racist military bases such as Elundu, Kongo and Katima Mulilo. We have captured weapons, supplies, yehicles and radio communications equipment.

[Question] Have you taken South African prisoners?

Sam Nujoma: A few. We will show them to the public when the time is right.

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RHODESIA

UNIQUE TRANSFERRAL OF POWER EXAMINED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 23-29 Apr 79 pp 32-34

[Article by Francois d'Orcival: "The Whites Remain"]

[Excerpts] On 13 April at 0300 hours, 4 days before the voting began, Rhodesian commandos, transported by vehicles painted in the colors of the Zambian Army, attacked, in the very center of Lusaka, in Zambia, 500 kilometers from Salisbury, the headquarters of the army of Nkomo. The building was reduced to ashes; the Rhodesians let Mr Nkomo escape. The objective was reached. Before returning without loss to Rhodesia, the commandos were able to smash the guerrillas in the head in their home base. And furthermore, most of these soldiers were of the black race.

The operation was set up by the combined general staff of Gen Peter Walls, who learned his trade in the Special Air Service (SAS) of the anti-guerrilla forces in Malaysia. He reorganized the SAS in Rhodesia: European units, compact, few in number, specialized in "split-second blows." He backed them up with the Selous Scouts, 70 percent black, real terrorist hunters, more often operating beyond the frontiers.

These are only the specialized units. Walls had almost 100,000 men under his orders at that time. Since early April all of white Rhodesia, aged 16 to 59, has been mobilized to guarantee these elections, that is to say, to transfer power to the black majority.

The case is unique in the history of decolonization.

Rhodesia, it is true, had not been a colony for a long time. Endowed with its own government since 1923, it had declared itself independent in 1965 but it preserved its white government. "A minority power," objected the international community when examining the figures: 200,000 whites, 6,000,000 blacks.

As for the heads of the rebellion, Mr Smith replied to their intimidation with demoralization.

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"If there has to be an escalation in the war, it will be to the detriment of the terrorists," Gen Sandy McLean, new chief of the land army, had warned.

The escalation took place.

At the beginning of September a four-motored Viscount of Air Rhodesia, carrying 59 persons, was shot down by a missile. The plane crashed. There were 20 survivors. The terrorists massacred them with machine-guns. A month and a half later Rhodesian aircraft and airborne commandos leveled three guerrilla training camps in Zambia. The score: 2000-3000 killed.

On 10 December rockets burned up part of the reserve of hydrocarbons of Salisbury. A very serious blow for a country subject to an oil embargo. On 23 March the 18 oil tanks of the port of Beira, in Mozambique, another anti-Rhodesian guerrilla base, were entirely destroyed.

In February several shells reached the Salisbury airport without doing damage, but another Soviet-made SAM-7 missile hits a second Viscount with 12 passengers. Rhodesian aircraft reply with 12 raids on guerrilla bases in Mozambique, in Zambia, and even in Angola.

In 6 years the guerrilla war has claimed 12,000 victims, of whom 3,500 were civilians, of whom 400 were whites. The Rhodesian security forces lost 772 of their own (black and white), while killing 7,421 guerrillas.

But in six years the guerrilla war has gained nothing. It has not established itself in any region, holds no road, controls no village. There were fewer assassinations in 4 1/2 years in Salisbury (600,000 inhabitants, including 100,000 whites) than in the month of last March in Paris.

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The airline lost two aircraft but continued to show a profit in 1978 for the 11th consecutive year. The railroads were disturbed by sabotage, but they had to rent locomotives in South Africa to cope with the increase in traffic, since neighboring Zambia, although a member of the anti-Rhodesian front, was forced by famine to reopen its frontier to import fertilizers and grains.

The guerrilla war nevertheless achieved one goal: it created a climate of insecurity, forced the government to double its military expenditures, mobilizing the maximum of manpower (the reservists are called up for 140 days per year), setting a curfew and martial law in the rural zone.

The economy was thus affected. The national income has dropped since 1977. Emigration exceeded immigration since 1976. During the past 2 years the country has lost 25,000 Europeans, a 10th of its white population.

But Rhodesia is holding well, due to the natural checkerboard formed by the 6,000 farms of Rhodesian whites over the country. Terrorism has reduced their value. There have been sales, but they have always found takers. This network has prevented the implantation and development of the guerrillas.

The 6,000 European farms provide a little less than 20 percent of internal production (which is worth 2 billion dollars) but they earn 50 percent of the foreign exchange due to exports (tobacco, coffee, grains, meat) and above all they employ 40 percent of black labor and feed a quarter of the population.

"If one wants to keep one's labor, one must not oneself fear terrorism, one of these farmers," Mr Ernest Fayd'herbe, 46 year of age and today the owner of five farms, told me.

Scion of a very old Mauritian family, he arrived in Rhodesia in 1964 when the country was undertaking the development of a sugar region, the Lowveld, in the southeast. He received 100 hectares of brush; 5 years later he doubled his investment in coffee. Affected by the coffee-plant disease, he replanted, bought another piece of land, and started tobacco farming. And to finish up he acquired 2,000 hectares of cattle land on which he is raising 1,000 head.

All this is going on in an area of terrorist incursions. The Europeans move in convoys, roads are closed at night, and houses are surrounded with barbed wire and concrete walls. The "farmers" do one night of patrol duty per week, taking turns, reporting every morning by radio to the military authorities.

"Everything I own is here," says Mr Fayd'herbe. "And I shall remain here because I have confidence. To be able to live normally I can't be thinking every minute of terrorism."

He gives employment to 800 black agricultural wage earners.

Mr Ian Smith is also one of these farmers. He was brought to power by them and succeeded, with them, in maintaining confidence. The whites who have left lived in the large centers, not in the countryside. In the Veld they are waiting for the harvest. And then there are the neighboring examples. Zambia had to keep 400 large European farms; in Malawi the plantations are also entrusted by the black government to whites.

If the elections lead to lifting of the British and American boycott, and to official opening (and no longer clandestine as is now the case) of the frontiers, the markets offered to the Rhodesians are enormous: thus, to supply only the needs of Zambia, Rhodesia would have to increase its production by 40 percent.

The whole economy is in suspense.

The first results of the election give the following line-up: the party of Bishop Muzorewa, followed by that of the Reverend Sithole, and finally that of Chief Chirau and some others. These men, while of varied ethnic or religious origins, have learned to govern together for 2 years with Mr Smith.

Bishop Muzorewa, who has a good chance of being the next prime minister, is certainly not a strong man. He rather resembles the Abbe Fulbert Youlou of the Congo in 1960. But he has with him a second man who has just passed his tests as co-minister of Finance: Mr Ernest Bulle. He has the temperament of a leader.

He told me last January:

"Once the elections have been held and a black government formed, the terrorists will no longer have any choice but peace."

The transfer of power is going to be undertaken without shock. Maintenance of order, of the army, of the police, and of the judicial system is not changing hands. And Mr Smith will have his seat in the new parliament.

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UGANDA

IDI AMIN LEAVES BLOODY HERITAGE

Brussels SPECIAL in French 26 Apr 79 pp 27-28

[Article by Jacques Buob: "The Bloody Heritage of Amin Dada"]

[Text] Kampala has lost its tyrant. Of Idi Amin Dada, there remains nothing but photos of decapitated bodies lying in the streets. It almost appears that nothing is left but things that one stumbles over while wandering through the capital devastated by the looters.

But the shadow of the black giant still hangs over the city. Only a few weeks ago, men wearing dark glasses and heavy high-heeled boots exercised a reign of fear. They took their victims, suspected of treason, of everything or nothing at all, to the Nakaseyro hill, where a pink building served as the headquarters of their organization: the State Research Bureau, the secret police of Amin Dada.

They had no need for arrest warrants. They were above the law. They were accountable for their actions only to the president-for-life.

Those who entered the house concealed by the greenery -- also used as a residence for the French ambassador -- knew that they might never come out alive. It was here, behind the walls of the cells in the basement that the savage executions took place, following a rite that had become commonplace in Uganda. The prisoners themselves were forced to murder their co-prisoners by bludgeoning them to death with hammers.

"I was being held on the first floor," says one Ugandan who spent more than 3 weeks at the State Bûreau, "but I could hear the hammer blows and at night, I could see the bodies being loaded on pickup trucks." If this man was freed, it was only because he had connections. Not everyone was so lucky.

An unbearable stench of death now rises from the basement. Invisible, unidentified bodies are piled up in the gloomy cells. Others are lying in the hallways. Tanzanian soldiers and members of the Ugandan National Liberation Front (FNLO) who took the city on 8 April roam through

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the building, passing the piles of ammunition, mortar shells and explosives accumulated by Amin's men. Confidential files are scattered on the floor and in one cabinet are hundreds of cheap medals with the effigy of the field marshal, a paltry reward for those who "pleased him."

Further to the south is the vast Makindye military camp, at the foot of the hill bearing the same name, the headquarters of the military police. Between the clinic and the school for the officers' children is a low building housing two enormous cells. It was here in 1971, 2 months after he had taken power, that Amin Dada had some 40 officers from the Langi and Acholi tribes stabbed to death by bayonets and knives: They had been too close to former President Milton Obote.

Prison Full

Since that time, the prison has scarcely been anything but full. A slate hanging in a little office indicates that on 2 April, 14 persons were still being held here. Desperate graffiti on the walls mark their passing.

"God bless our children who are still alive." Another, explaining to himself the regime of terror and anguish, writes in broken French: "I am afraid of dying because I am in prison, but I ask forgiveness for my sins." A little further on, a body lies wasting away, the ribs exposed to the sun.

In order to avoid attacks on his life, Amin, who created a reign of terror, lived in terror, constantly changing residences, going from his Nakaseyro lodge to his Kilolo command post, from his villa in Makindye to the presidential apartment at the Entebbe airport.

Of all these residences, his lairs where he fled like an animal at bay, there subsist traces of his life, official films and photos, his children's notebooks, reports, letters written by the Asians deported in 1972 turning over their property. There is not a stick of furniture, because the looters have made their visits. However, well hidden in a nook of the president's lodge is the famous sedan chair in which the former journeyman baker of the King's African Rifles made a triumphal appearance at the OAU summit meeting in 1975, riding on the shoulders of four black businessmen. Stripped of its decorations, it is now only an ordinary wooden chair affixed to two long metal bars, the absurd throne of a fallen monarch.

Where is he now? What is the "great conqueror of the British Empire" doing? He has become the prey of a vast hunt launched by the new Tanzanian Government and Army. He was not stupid enough to be caught while fleeing, as did many of his ministers, men such as Col Abdula Nasur, for example, the governor of the central province, who crossed the Kenyan border at the head of his train of booty: a convoy of 20 Mercedes and 40 trucks. Then there is his British private adviser, the enigmatic Robert Astles, the noted founder of the State Research Bureau, a distinguished soldier of fortune, also "called to account" in Kenya when he landed at the port of Kisumu after crossing Lake Victoria on a scout boat.

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After making one final mad cry on his portable transmitter, Amin disappeared. It was said that he was going to go to Sudan and then Iraq, where he had already sent his family and his two favorite sons: Moses, 9, and Mwanga, 5. Commandos were on his heels. In Israel, the relatives of Mrs Dora Bloch (the 70-year-old Israeli woman executed by the men in the dark glasses following the raid on Entebbe) promised a reward to anyone who would tell where he was hiding. The very cunning he had used when heading the country he now applied to his survival. On Tuesday, it was indeed announced that he was in Baghdad, where he had been received somewhat coolly. But it was in Libya, with his latest ally Qadhadhafi, that he was to find the safest refuge.

Years of Hatred

The crows, vultures and long-legged storks hover over Kampala. In the silence of the liberated city, swarms of flies still cover a few forgotten bodies in the parks. In the evening, one hears sporadic machine gun bursts, a sign that the Tanzanians or the men of the FNLO are executing a spy or person claimed to be a spy. "Actually," says one student wearing the red gown of the University of Makerere, "it is a good time to get rid of your wife's lover!"

Kampala, the pearl of Africa, so named by Winston Churchill, was empty during Easter Weekend. A few passers-by could be seen on Kampala Road, the major commercial artery. As far as one could see, the stores exhibited their gaping windows, broken glass was strewn on the ground and the iron bars hung from their hinges. Burned houses were still smoking.

"Shame on you!" Catholic Cardinal Nsubuga exclaimed during the Easter mass celebrated at Rubaga Cathedral. "Is this what a city that has just been liberated is supposed to look like?" Nor did the prelate congratulate the "Tanzanian liberators." But the soldiers from Dar es-Salaam were not the last to help themselves. The motorcycles they rode were not bought from the Honda dealer and the radios they carried were not paid for at the supermarket on Kampala Road. The only authorized looting was that of sugar at the warehouses of the Foods and Beverages Corporation, where for reasons that are not very clear, Amin had stored enough of the product to feed the city for 6 months. During that time, sugar had disappeared from the shops and on the black market, it reached astronomical prices.

Deprived of water and electricity for a week, the city came back to life little by little. Food is still scarce. The International Hotel, the only one to remain open for newsmen and the Tanzanian soldiers, invariably serves rice with green beans. But the night club has once again opened its doors and in the evening, soldiers in fatigues dance to an African orchestra, their Kalatchnikov rifles over their shoulders.

From the State House in Entebbe, the new head of the provisional Ugandan Government issues appeals for people to go back to work. President Yusuf Lule, 68, was chosen by Julius Nyerere, whom he met at the University of

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Edinburgh where they were students together. The president preferred this wise and respected man to former President Milton Obote. Amin's predecessor, who was widely debated among the refugees, would undoubtedly have endangered the precarious unity of the Front, which brings together no fewer than 18 movements, from monarchists to Marxists. Exiled in Lagos since 1973, a Muslim by birth converted to Christianity, Lule should reassure the two communities separated by years of hatred maintained by Amin.

The Western countries do not look very favorably upon Kenya's encirclement by a socialist belt made up of Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia. Yusuf Lule's appeal for American aid might reassure them. The recognition of his government by Great Britain, which will soon reopen its high commission in Kampala, should soon convince Western foreign ministries.

There remains the Tanzanian Army, which will withdraw "as soon as the situation has returned to normal." But when? Lule still needs it. Lost soldiers of Amin remain in the north and it is also necessary to maintain order or a semblance of order. "The Tanzanians will still be there for another 6 months at least," says one European diplomat.

On Tuesday, long lines of Ugandans returning to work could be seen on the Entebbe road. Policemen in grey uniforms appeared in the city. The first street sweepers began to clean up debris. On the runway of the international airport, the shell of a Libyan Hercules C 130 will soon be removed. But out of all the vestiges of 8 years of a dictatorship, there is something that no one will ever be able to sweep away: the shadow of Amin.

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ZAIRE

REPATRIATION OF MOROCCAN CONTINGENT IN SHABA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1137

[Text] King Hassan II and President Mobutu are reported to have studied a plan for withdrawal of the Moroccan Expeditionary Corps from the Shaba in three stages, during their talks in Rabat in mid-April, it has been learned from a diplomatic source in the Moroccan capital.

July, October and December will be the dates of the three stages for with-drawal of the Moroccan contingent of 2,000 men, making up the essence of the pan-African force entrusted with the protection of the mining installations of the Zairian national GECAMINES [General Quarries and Mines Company] along the Kolwezi-Lubumbashi route.

By 1 January 1980, the whole of the Moroccan contingent could be back in the kingdom "if conditions allow."

These conditions would depend on the training condition of the Zairian army, which is currently undergoing reorganization with the assistance of French, Belgian and Chinese instructors. Both in Rabat and in Kinshasa, there is heavy reliance on accelerated training, which a 3,000-man airborne Zairian division is currently undergoing with the help of French instructors at the large Mzili base near Kinshasa. One battalion in this division is reported to be nearly ready for operation.

Another problem is reportedly still pending: the return to Morocco of the valuable quantity of military materiel which the Moroccan Expeditionary Corps took with it a year ago. The Moroccan high command did not in fact intend to leave behind this precious and costly equipment as it did in 1977 when the Moroccan contingent of 1,500 men made available to Zaire at the time was repatriated. However, the Benguela railroad line linking the Shaba mining zone with the Atlantic is still out of commission due to the uncertain conditions prevailing on the central Angolan plateau, and there is little hope that this railroad line, of which 1,000 kilometers lies in Angolan territory, can soon be reopened to traffic.

Under these conditions, the equipment must be transported by plane, which cannot fail to pose major logistical problems.

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It was learned from the same diplomatic source, finally, that the cost of maintaining the Moroccan Expeditionary Corps in Shaba will be in large part covered by France and the United States, and not by Saudi Arabia, as had been reported on a number of occasions.

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ZAIRE

GOVERNMENT WAGING STRUGGLE AGAINST TRIBALISM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1137

[Text] The Political Bureau of the Popular Movement of the Revolution decided during its 26 April meeting to wage a battle against the tribalism which prevails within the Zairian administration. With this in view, it entrusted to the Executive Council the task of pursuing a detailed study in order "to put an end to the abuses noted in this connection" in government departments and the state enterprises.

The conclusions of this study are to be communicated to the Political Bureau within the shortest possible time, and disciplinary steps will be taken against the officials found at fault. An appeal was made to the cadres in the public and private sectors urging them to realize "that tribalism does harm to the higher interests of the nation, and Zaire cannot develop harmoniously except to the extent that the same opportunities for school and vocational advancement are provided to all citizens, without any kind of discrimination."

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ZAIRE

CLOSER RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION PLANNED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Apr 79 p 1076

[Text] On 18 April, the USSR and Zaire made an exchange in Kinshasa of the documents ratifying the cooperation agreements signed on 10 December 1976 in Moscow, having to do in particular with a master agreement between the Soviet Union and Zaire calling for much more dynamic cooperation in the realm of trade and maritime transportation. A protocol of agreement is also to be signed shortly in the scientific and cultural field. In addition, the first direct air link between Moscow and Kinshasa was established on 18 April by an Aeroflot flight, pursuant to an agreement signed between Moscow and Kinshasa in 1974.

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

NEW COFFEE OFFICE--A 7 March ordinance established a new organization, the Zairian Coffee Office (OZACAF), which replaces the National Coffee Office established in 1972. OZACAF will be a public agricultural, technical, and commercial enterprise headquartered in Kinshasa. Its purposes are: control of coffee negotiations and exporters; coordination of all coffee warehouses and stock centers in Zaire, particularly their conformity to regulations; study and control of prices; publication of international statistics after study and consultation with the organizations concerned. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 p 1499]

SERIOUS FLOODS--Part of the Eastern Region in Zaire has been declared a disaster area following serious floods caused by heavy rains during the first half of May. According to Zairian Government spokesman Umba-Di-Lutete, state commissioner for orientation, several cities in the subregions of Nord-Shaba, Sud-Kivu, and Maniema were flooded and there were cave-ins in the large city of Bukavu (near the Rwandan and Burundian borders). The Zairian spokesman did not indicate that there was any loss of life or serious damage caused by the floods. Zairian chief of state Gen Mobutu Sese Seko allocated 4 million zaires in aid to the disaster regions and the daily SALONGO, in an editorial, stressed the necessity for a "general mobilization" of the Zairian people to meet this situation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1318]

PRC AID-On 17 May, Mr. Li, Chinese vice minister in charge of basic development, arrived in Kinshasa to participate in the 20 May inauguration of the "People's Palace," a building constructed in the center of the Zairian capital through Chinese cooperation. This inauguration, chaired by the Zairian chief of state, Mobutu Sese Seko, coincides with the celebration of the 12th anniversary of the establishment of the Zairian national party, the MPR. The "People's Palace" constructed by the Chinese includes a conference hall seating 3,600, nine conference rooms, and a banquet hall seating 600. The work begain in 1975. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1318]

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ZAMBIA

GOVERNMENT HAVING PROBLEMS WITH UNEMPLOYMENT, CORRUPTION

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 May 79 p 25

[Article by Fode Amadou: "Kaunda's Problems"]

[Text] After expelling in part the illegal immigrants from the country, the Zambian authorities are now striving to solve the problem of the unemployed in the cities. The government plans to amend an article of the Constitution so as to be able to have the unemployed work in agriculture.

The article in the Constitution which would be amended is worded as follows: "No one can be deprived on his freedom of movement. This freedom includes the right of moving about freely within Zambia's borders, the right to reside anywhere in Zambia, the right to enter Zambia, and the impossibility of being expelled from it." However, in a speech that he delivered in Lusaka at the time of the inaugural meeting of the new government, President Kenneth Kaunda tried to define the amendment of this constitutional provision. Accordingly, he asked the government headed by Daniel Lisulo to elaborate a plan that would make it possible to send the unemployed to work on the land and ordered that this be done through a national service, such as the compulsory 20-month service accomplished by students after they complete secondary school and during which they receive military as well as agricultural training. "The lazy ones have to be disciplined," Kuanda also said. "I need discipline. This country must advance and it will advance." Unfortunately, a large number of unemployed then "recycled" themselves in the black market which is becoming increasingly widespread. They purchase cigarettes or other products, hoard them (which leads to dramatic shortages), and resell them at exorbitant prices. One pack of Stuyvesant cigarettes normally costs 56 Zambian kwacha. On the black market it fetches 90. Many of these traffickers have managed to buy very handsome automobiles for themselves, send their children to private schools, and some have even started prosperous businesses.

President Kaunda had already requested this "return to the land" at a national congress of the UNIP [United National Independence Party] in June 1975. Since that time he has spoken of it in public very often.

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But practically nothing has been done. At the end of 1977 he even submitted to parliament a government bill (providing, among other things, for the compulsory removal of the unemployed to rural regions) which was slated to revolutionize the country's agricultural production and achieve success within 6 months. This time period has now lapsed easily without any progress in this respect.

At a public meeting Grey Zulu, former secretary general of UNIP, declared that before and after Zambia's independence the party had drawn up innumerable plans which had never been realized. "We have elaborated too many programs," he said, "and today there is practically nothing which justifies our official declarations."

Widespread Corruption

To try to solve these problems the government therefore decided to add to the system of national service a program for restructuring the agricultural sector. Members of the central committee, ministers, provincial governors, and municipal councilors worked on this plan. Its results are still pending.

Furthermore, the government has problems with trade unionists. The Zambian Trade Union Congress has severely censured Kaunda's decisions.

It recalled that Zambia had signed the charter of the International Labor Office whose Article 105 provides that no signatory state can impose such or such other form of work on its citizens. Newstead Zimba, secretary general of the Zambian Trade Union Federation, noted that in the rural areas there are already thousands of unemployed and that it was thus absurd to send there more people who would not find work.

In the meantime, President Kaunda requested the government to take drastic measures against the corruption which is becoming increasingly widespread. In fact, it has reached such a degree that in order to obtain the slightest service from a civil servant it is absolutely essential to pay him backshish and this is true in every field. Such a system has now become standard procedure in Zambia.

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