

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

21

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8532

21 June 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 26/79)



NEAR
EAST



NORTH
AFRICA

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8532

21 June 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

(FOUO 26/79)

CONTENTS

PAGE

NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Bousseif's Paris Trip Did Not Help Saharan Peace Prospects
(Cherif Rachid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14-27 May 79) 1

AFGHANISTAN

Briefs
New Army Formation 4

ALGERIA

Foreign Cooperation Discussed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 May 79)... 5

Foreign Participation in Housing Construction Described
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 May 79)... 6

Delivery of New Methane Tanker Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 May 79)... 7

Briefs
Uranium Study 9
Algiers Port Problems 9
Bordeaux-Algeria Maritime Route 9
Algerian-Indian Industrial Cooperation 10
Railroad Traffic 10
Bechar Airport 11
Merchant Fleet Data 11
New Algeria-France Maritime Route 11
Algerian-Italian Company 11

EGYPT

Referendum on Peace Treaty Criticized
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 27 Apr-3 May 79) 12

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Secret Military Information Said Available to United States (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 27 Apr-3 May 79)	16
Suppression of Political Dissidents Reported (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 27 Apr-3 May 79)	17
 IRAN	
Women Express Views on Revolution (STERN, 10 May 79)	19
'JAPAN TIMES' on Reemergence of Iranian Communists (Richard Wallis; THE JAPAN TIMES, 26 May 79)	25
 MOROCCO	
Discontent in Morocco Reported (Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 May 79)	28
 SUDAN	
Opposition Seeks Unity, Downfall of Regime (Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18 May 79)	32
 SYRIA	
Communist Party Factions Quarrel Among Themselves (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 4-10 May 79)	35
Gromyko Reportedly Attempted To Heal Rifts in Syrian CP (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 4-10 May 79)	37
 TUNISIA	
MDS Opposition, Press Described as Having Factions (Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 May 79)	38
Potential Candidates for Arab League Secretary General Assayed (Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 May 79)	40
Ex-Foreign Minister Masmoudi Comments on Inter-Arab Affairs (Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 May 79)	44

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Move of Arab League to Tunis Criticized (Anis Rachid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14-22 May 79)	46
New Militias Reported On (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14-22 May 79)	49
Hunger Strike by Political Prisoners Reported (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14-22 May 79)	50
Prisoner Gives Testimony on Torture (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14-22 May 79)	51
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	
Ruler of al-Shariqah Interviewed on Recent Events (Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammed al-Qasimi Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 20-26 Apr 79)	52

- c -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BOUSSEIF'S PARIS TRIP DID NOT HELP SAHARAN PEACE PROSPECTS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 May 79 p 39

[Article by Cherif Rachid: "Giscard's Ambiguousness. Ahmed Bousseif's Trip to Paris Did Not Contribute Much to Clearing Prospects For a Just Peace in Western Maghreb." Passages between slantlines in italics]

[Text] /We are not in favor of a war between Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania breaking out in the Maghreb. A period of instability might not only hasten the intervention of non-African troops in this area, it might also, above all, open the doors to all kinds of interference on the part of certain powers...friends or foes. In addition, we do not feel that the Soviet Union is, at the present time, in favor of a conflict in this area. This is the impression I gained from my talks with Soviet leaders..."/

This, in substance, is what President Giscard d'Estaing told Mauritania's new "strong man", Col Ahmed Bousseif, on Thursday 3 May. The latter had come to Paris with a double mission to fulfill:

1. To find out to what extent France would be willing to help Mauritania against the Sahraoui fighters of Front Polisario, should the latter denounce the unilateral cease-fire and resume their offensive to regain control of their territories now illegally occupied by Morocco and Mauritania. In other words, would the French government be willing, once more, to mobilize its military forces, air force and navy, to "protect" Mauritania against the Sahraoui insurgents and prevent these from regaining their territory? If not, what else could the French president suggest?
2. To find, jointly with the French government, an alternative to the present conflict through a direct intervention of Paris with Rabat, Algiers and the Polisario.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

While it is true that the "hawks" around Mr Giscard d'Estaing, in the Elysees Palace, seem of late to have the upper hand, the French president nevertheless warned the Mauritanian leader against /"any suicidal policy which might further weaken Mauritania and place it at the mercy of its Moroccan, Algerian and Sahraoui enemies!"/

/"Your vital interest, / President Giscard d'Estaing is reported to have told Mr Bousseif, /is to avoid a double pitfall: do not change allies in favor of Algeria, but do not allow yourself to be drawn against your will into the wake of a policy of war in the Maghreb. Algerians and Moroccans will pull through one way or the other, but the survival of Mauritania as an independent and sovereign state is at stake..."/

A Hazardous Calculation

Obviously, Bousseif's position is not an easy one. A man from the right, his ideological choices make him lean towards the Alids monarchy rather than towards Algeria. On the other hand, he knows that if he plays a strictly Moroccan card, the Mauritanian people (and its military leaders), who are tired of war, will not follow him.

In addition, should a military coup d'etat take place in Morocco, he would lose decisive support and be left to a fate not to be envied.

This became very clear to him during conversations he had in Nouakchott with a large delegation of the Algerian political bureau, sent specially by President Chadli Bendjedid to find out what Bousseif's real intentions were, and at the same time warn him of the consequences of a full alignment on Rabat.

These were the conditions, both paradoxical and conflicting, which formed the background of a Mauritanian delegation's visit to Tripoli where it is reported to have signed a protocol of an agreement giving back to the Polisario the part of Western Sahara now occupied by Mauritania. After a few hours of silence, and no doubt under pressure from Morocco, the Mauriticians backed up and just said they had only discussed the right of the Sahraouis to self-determination, a statement which is fully contradicted by the minutes published jointly by both countries.

Will Giscard's advice and warnings have the effect anticipated? Will the joint mission of the Milian and Nigerian heads of state, Moussa Traore and General Obasanjo, and of the secretary general of the OAU, in Rabat, Algiers, Nouakchott and with the Polisario bear fruit?

It is still too early to tell. What is sure, however, is that neither Rabat nor Nouakchott are in a position to afford a war with Algeria

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

without Paris', and to a certain extent Washington's consent. Of course, King Hassan might think that by starting such a war he would force his western and Israeli allies to come to his help. But this is a hazardous calculation. And the question remains as to whether the army would follow and, if it did, whether it would not take the opportunity to overturn him. At any rate, it is on such mined ground that the Elysees seemed to find itself after Col Ahmed Bousseif's visit to Paris: "Try to reach a direct agreement with the Polisario," the French president is reported to have told him, "but to avoid to go through Algerian or Moroccan channels. Above all, avoid to enter into a coalition against Morocco..."

Lieutenant-Colonel Bousseif probably did not need this new piece of advice. This was the "advice" already given to him by Mr Rene Journiac, eminence tint of the Elysees, during his latest trip to Nouakchott which had resulted in the coup against President Ould Saleck.

· COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

9294
CSO: 4400

3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

NEW ARMY FORMATION--The communist government of Afghanistan is setting up a new army officered entirely by political commissars so as to be able more efficiently to combat the Islamic dissidence originating in the eastern and central parts of the country. Fifty percent of the non-commissioned officers and enlisted men of the old army are said to have deserted and joined up with the rebels since the 1978 revolution. Text
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 4 Jun 79 p 30

CSO: 4900

4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

FOREIGN COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1178

[Text] Cooperation with Canada

A protocol was signed on 3 May in Ottawa between Chaeib Taleb, Algerian ambassador, and the Canadian Finance Minister. An Algerian-Canadian intergovernmental economic, scientific and technical cooperation commission, which is to meet once a year, is responsible for promoting bilateral relations in a number of areas. Its creation followed the October 1978 agreement, by means of which Canada is opening a line of credit for Algeria of \$1,200,000.

Cooperation with Spain

During the visit in Algiers of Carlos Bustelo, the Spanish minister of Industry and Energy, the decision was made to send Spanish experts to study the methods of cooperation in urbanism, construction and housing.

Cooperation with Tunisia

The Algerian-Tunisian negotiations on communications, begun on 3 May in Tunis, envisage computerizing the postal services and training their staffs, with cooperation between the two countries in this area.

Cooperation with Australia

Brian Chatterton, Australian Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry Minister, on 5 May began a one-week official visit to Algeria. He is to visit in particular the Ksar Chellala integrated project area, which was undertaken with Australian cooperation and will soon become active.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979

8946
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION DESCRIBED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1117

[Text] Two West German construction firms that have recently fallen into bankruptcy because of difficulties with the domestic market while they were executing important contracts in Algeria, lead this country to wonder about the sincerity "of the West German partnership in its entirety" (EL MOUDJAHID, 25 April). One of them in particular had concluded with Algeria in 1976 a total of 18 contracts totaling 2,500,000,000 dinars, in which it entered as subcontractor into the construction of 4,000 housing units, 10 CEM [expansion unknown] and some civil engineering projects. The Algerian newspaper's chronicler concludes: "The FRG is our country's second commercial partner. Let the lessons be learned--all the lessons!"

One of those "lessons" seems to be the Algerian government's abandonment of the "key-in-hand" formula, to the profit of the temporary group of firms, jointly and indivisibly pooling technical, material and human means of firms (national and foreign) sharing the risks and the advantages of the operation. An early accord of this type was signed in March 1979 between the Algerian national firm ECOTEC [National Office for Economic and Technical Studies] and the Dutch company Bredero International, to develop at Tizi-Ouzou a university, a city and a university hospital (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 3 March p 561). Proposals of that nature have also been sent by the Algerian minister of Urbanism, Construction and Housing to the building firms of various socialist countries visited in 1978: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the USSR.

Groups of French firms are also interested in this unprecedented effort being undertaken by Algeria in housing construction, notably the Rhonalpin Group for the Study of Construction in Algeria (GRECAL) (See MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 March p 734) and ALBRECO (Algeria-Britain Construction) [see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 April p 864].

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979

8946
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

DELIVERY OF NEW METHANE TANKER REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1178

[Text] Following the "Hassi-R'Mel" in 1971 and the "Larbi-Ben-M'Hidi" in 1977, the largest methane tanker delivered by Mediterranean Ship and Industrial Construction, the "Bachir-Chihani" was handed over on 23 April at Seyne to the Algerian National Navigation Company [CNAN].

In the speech he gave on that occasion Mr Herlicq, president and general manager of Mediterranean Ship and Industrial Construction, placed great hopes on participation of these shipyards in the CNAN's new building program, especially where methane tankers are concerned. In fact, Algeria recently announced that it proposed to order, before the end of the first quarter of 1980, six 125,000-cubic-meter methane tankers and two others of 50,000 cubic meters--the latter might be replaced by three 35,000-cubic-meter vessels which would offer more flexibility of use. That represents a great hope for Mediterranean Ship and Industrial Construction, but "even though there is complementarity between France and Algeria, which are neighboring countries and friends, the prices are still the determining factors in concluding the hoped-for markets." Competition from the shipyards of Asia and the Scandinavian countries will influence the decision. The La Seyne shipyard, however, has in its favor the excellent results given by the first two methane tankers in service.

Mr Guendouz, the president of the CNAN, recalled that the engineers, workers and technicians had gone from the 40,000 cubic meters of the "Hassi-R'Mel" to the 129,500 cubic meters of the "Bachir-Chihani", which proves their technical capability.

Concerning the new order from the CNAN, Mr Brongniart, the director in France of the commercial fleet, stated that he was very much looking forward to the meeting with the Algerian government that will take place in June. "The past has not always been easy, our relations have sometimes been strained, but we hope for better days ahead, first of all by having the desire to enforce the accord for distributing maritime traffic. Algeria is a young country, but its CNAN is experiencing amazing growth. We hope to obtain orders, but we cannot ask for exclusivity if our prices are higher. The problem of revising prices during construction can certainly be settled. In fact, some shipowners have

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

complained of having had to suffer significant updating of prices because of the economic situation, especially three years ago. We must find a way to propose definite prices to those we talk with."

The main characteristics of the new methane tanker are almost the same as those of the "Larbi-Ben-M'Hidi": length between perpendiculars, 226.20 meters; width outside of timbers, 41.60 meters; depth at top deck line, 27.60 meters; maximum draft, 10.85 meters; test speed, 19.4 knots; total cargo capacity, 129,500 cubic meters; number of tanks, 5; capacity of largest tanks, 31,450 cubic meters. Its installations are designed to transport liquefied natural gas at a temperature of -160°.

The "Bachir-Chihani", after tests off Toulon, will approach Arzew, where it will load its first liquefied natural gas cargo for the United States.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979

3946
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

URANIUM STUDY--Within the framework of its program to develop Algerian natural resources, the National Mining Exploration and Exploitation Company (SONAREM) recently awarded to a temporary partnership including the companies McKee (US), Traction and Electricity and Union Mining (Belgium) and Cotecna Engineering Company (Swiss) a study contract dealing with the second phase of developing uranium deposits at Abankor and Timgaouine in the Algerian Hoggar. The study is dealing with mines, a concentration plant, general industrial divisions, water supply, the mining town, etc. It includes all activity, in offices or on-site, leading to precise definition of the project and the delivery of bids for its realization. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1117] 8946

ALGIERS PORT PROBLEMS--Algerian newspapers periodically relate the troubles the ports are experiencing, more precisely the Algiers port, where merchandise imported by the national companies is accumulating. On 24 April Salah Goudjil, Transportation Minister, and Ahmed Ali Ghazali, Public Works Minister, visited the port and held two working meetings at the headquarters of the National Ports Office (ONP). The Transportation Minister stated that "important decisions have been taken in this area, and orders have been given to begin the work" (of refitting the port). The warehouses of some firms, improperly built within the boundaries of the port, will be removed. "The potential exists," the minister concluded, "but there must be the will capable of settling (the doubtful) questions." We state that Mr Goudjil, during the open coordination conference at the government palace on 23 April (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 May), recommending decentralizing the port sector, notably the autonomy of the ports and their tie-in with the governor's authority. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1117] 8946

BORDEAUX-ALGERIA MARITIME ROUTE--The JOURNAL DE LA MARINE MARCHANDE said in its 3 May issue: "Can the resumption of direct maritime relations with Algeria be anticipated? That is the question being asked by the shippers who use the port of Bordeaux, who have to ship through other ports significant to unage of manufactured products produced in the region; according to them, the freight equipment which is there permanently would justify resuming that line. Lacoste Inc., for its part, by way of example, was to receive on consignment the Algerian

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

vessel "Cabo-Sidero", owned by the Algerian National Navigation Company (CNAN), which was coming to load 700 tons of structural steel representing about 2,000 cubic meters--equipment for a fruit-canning plant, equipment to be de-barked at the port of Skikda. An additional shipment of equipment, also manufactured by Desse Brothers, is expected in May. Lacoste Inc had previously shipped to Algeria several thousand tons of equipment for a new shoe factory. These two examples are not isolated ones." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1178] 8946

ALGERIAN-INDIAN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION--Mohamed Liassine, the Algerian minister of Heavy Industry, took to India in April a delegation of leaders of the heavy industry sector. After a visit to various engineering, electronic and heavy equipment complexes and conversations with the Indian leaders of those industries, the potential for Indian-Algerian industrial cooperation was examined. The mission, the minister stated, was in response to the directive to seek development and diversification of Algeria's industrial relations with the non-aligned countries. There is, he added, a definite possibility of acquiring in India some of the goods and services now purchased by Algeria in the industrialized countries: heavy industry, mechanics, electricity, electronics, metallurgy. Cooperation could also develop in the field of engineering. An official report outlining the potential for bilateral cooperation was signed in New Delhi, and product-by-product discussions are to be held between the two countries' national companies. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1178] 8946

RAILROAD TRAFFIC--We have already mentioned (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 13 April, p 928) the contract concluded between Algeria and the Italian firm COGEFAR [expansion unknown], to double the El Gourzi-Constantine-Skikda railroad. Here are some details on the traffic, 7,000,000 tons per year, predicted for this section by 1990, including mainly: steel products (tubes, sheet metal, extrusions, commercial iron, billets, iron pellets) from the SNS [National Steel Company] complexes at El Hadjar and Jijel, destined for the southern oil zones, from the processing units and distribution centers for steel products implanted over the whole national territory (2,200,000 tons per year, eventually more, considering new options envisioned for the Jijel complex); iron ore from the Bou-Khadra mine and various raw materials for the Jijel complex (900,000 tons per year); fertilizer for the national market, produced by the Annaba fertilizer complex (600,000 tons per year), and products (phosphoric acid) and raw materials (sulfur) engendered by valorizing the Djebel-Onk phosphates (1,200,000 tons per year), to go through the future port of Jijel-Djendjen; cement from the Hadjar-Sound and Hamma-Bouziane cement works (300,000 tons); raw materials (El Outaya salt) and products (plastics, sodium tripolyphosphate) of the chemical industry at Skikda and Annaba (200,000 tons per year); cereals for storage silos in the East and Southeast of the country, imported through the Skikda and Jijel-Djendjen ports (1,400,000 tons per year); general merchandise from or for the East and Southeast, passing through the Skikda and Jijel-Djendjen ports (600,000 tons per year). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1118] 8946

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BECHAR AIRPORT--The economic takeoff of the Bechar governorate is marked by the spectacular development of air traffic. Between 1976 and 1978 the number of passengers increased by 60 percent, freight by 400 percent, and postal traffic is steadily increasing. This progress is the result of socio-economic changes in the governorate since 1976, which justified putting into service, in October 1975, Boeing heavy transport equipment on the Algiers-Bechar, Oran-Bechar, Algiers-Bechar-Tindouf lines. Currently 11 weekly flights connect Bechar with Algiers, 6 flights with Oran, 3 with Tindouf, and 5 destined for Adrar, Timimoun, El Golea and Ghardaia. The 3,000-meter runway will soon be reinforced, and a new runway laid out, to frequently receive 707-type planes, with landing aids. Bechar envisions becoming a stopover on the potential international line serving the airports of Southwest Africa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1118] 8946

MERCHANT FLEET DATA--The journal ALGERIE INFORMATION has put together the following figures, showing the economic importance of the country's merchant fleet: 3,000 sedentary agents, 5,250 sailors, including 1,000 officers; a 1,400,000-dinar turnover; 12 maritime agencies and 20 travel agencies in Algeria, representation in all world ports; a fleet of 68 vessels, whose total weight is 1,350,000 tons, that is: 34 conventional cargo ships, 14 transports, 5 car ferries, 6 oil tankers for refined products, 5 tankers for crude, 3 methane tankers, a GPL [liquefied petroleum gas=LNG] carrier, 4 vessels under construction, including 3 methane tankers and one cargo "wine tanker"-- during the years 1979-1980 this will make a fleet of 72 units with a total dead weight of 1,550,000 tons; 70 vessels chartered for a fixed period and 90 chartered by the voyage; a fleet of 22 tugs with a total power of 37,500 horsepower; a network of over 40 regular lines, serving the countries of Africa, Asia, Europe and America and offering 100 departures per month; activities in tramping, freighting, consignment, transit, brokering, towing and passenger transport; an active presence in numerous maritime conferences; a cooperation acting with the maritime companies of 11 countries that have signed intergovernmental maritime accords with Algeria; full-share participation in semi-public maritime transport companies: AMPTC [expansion unknown], COBENAM [expansion unknown] and CALTRAM [expansion unknown]. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1118] 8946

NEW ALGERIA-FRANCE MARITIME ROUTE--Two new maritime lines, departing from Algiers and Oran for the port of Sete are to be opened after 15 June to transport passengers and vehicles by car-ferries. This new connection, to be provided by vessels of the National Algerian Navigation Company, is intended to decongest Marseilles harbor as the summer period approaches, which is marked by massive movements of Algerian emigres between Algeria and France. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1118] 8946

ALGERIAN-ITALIAN COMPANY--A semi-public Algerian-Italian food industry company was created on 25 April by the terms of a contract signed in Algiers between Italy's Cooperative Muratori Cemenstisti and the Algerian national company, SEMPAC [expansion unknown]. The activity of this semi-public company, whose capital is divided into 51 percent for the Algerian state and 49 percent for the cooperatives belonging to the Italian cooperative movement, will be carried out in the fields of design, study, development of industrial units, of extending and modernizing them, as well as creating distribution centers and storage centers in Algeria. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1118] 8946

CSO: 4400

11

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGYPT

REFERENDUM ON PEACE TREATY CRITICIZED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 27 Apr-3 May 79 pp 22-23

[Article: "The Family Crow: A President for Life"]

[Text] President al-Sadat gave himself 99.9 percent of the votes of the 10 million angry Egyptians who he claimed went to the polling centers last Thursday (19 April) to give their view of his treaty with Israel, his dissolving of the People's Assembly and his effort to "deepen" democracy. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's correspondent in Cairo reports on his observations, impressions and expectations following the referendum.

Foreign correspondents and journalists were quite surprised last Friday night when the official results of the referendum were announced: 99.95 percent of the voters say "yes" to the al-Sadat-Begin treaty and to Palestinian self-rule; 99.9 percent support the president on dissolving the People's Assembly and on his effort to deepen democracy. The cause of the journalists' extreme surprise is that in touring the polling centers the day before, they had observed a light voter turnout. Some polling centers, in fact, especially those designated for women voters, were empty, except for committeemen.

The political circles, however, were not surprised by al-Sadat's string of nines [reference to the voting results, 99.9 and 99.95 percent], for these have come to be identified with all of al-Sadat's previous referenda, especially those that were conducted for him by his interior minister, Maj Gen Nabawi Isma'il.

The fact is that there was no urgent need for the referendum on the treaty, particularly since it has already been signed and endorsed by the now dissolved People's Assembly. The whole affair appeared as an attempt to accomplish what has already been accomplished. But President al-Sadat wanted, in his own words, "to show the Arabs that Egypt is behind him on the treaty." He also wanted to demonstrate to the American people that he is a popular, tolerant, democratic man, and, therefore, worthy of assistance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

There was no preparation for the referendum, except one televised address by al-Sadat and three meetings with educational and student groups, during which he threatened everyone, beginning with the students and ending with the Arabs. Even before the referendum, newspaper headlines were trumpeting the results: Yes, yes, yes!

The dissolving of the People's Assembly immediately after endorsing the treaty struck members of the ruling National Party like a thunderbolt. Their president's action fell from a clear, blue sky, and appeared as a calculated attempt to punish them, undeservedly, and to discipline the "minority" which had objected to the treaty. In the past, the National Party has, without fail, done the bidding of the authorities, never rejecting a request or turning down a proposal. If a request demanded that a dissident be silenced, he was silenced or removed from the party altogether. If a request demanded that a "chief" of the open economic policy be protected against opposition questions [in hearings], the party created enough noise and smoke to smother the questioner. On the day the treaty was endorsed, the party members were exuberant at al-Sadat's words of praise for them. "I am proud of you and of your work," he had told them. They actually danced, yes danced, and hugged each other in congratulating themselves. They sang the national hymn "My Country" with member Fayidah Kamil, wife of the interior minister, conducting. When they went home, they had no inkling that their president was about to undertake a "constitutional coup." The constitution has two provisions for dissolving the People's Assembly: a dispute between the executive and legislative branches of government--which did not occur--and an emergency situation under which the president is authorized to hold a referendum as a means of resolving an issue.

An emergency as specified in the second provision did not exist in this case, since the People's Assembly had already gone along with the president on what he had called a "problem of destiny," that is, endorsing the treaty with Israel.

There are many theories as to why the president dissolved the People's Assembly and called for new elections, as well as for his campaign to "deepen" democracy. Among these:

The president was acting under American direction in a calculated attempt to divert the people's attention from the treaty to a local problem, one from which al-Sadat would emerge as a democratic leader. After his Iranian experience with the shah, President Carter wants all America's allies to have popular and democratic leaders. But, according to diplomats of the U.S. Embassy, the Americans were the first to be disappointed when al-Sadat insisted on his 99.9 percent victory margin.

A rush to normalize relations with Israel, contrary to the statement made by the state minister for foreign affairs, Dr Butros Ghali, during a hearing in the People's Assembly on the treaty, that "normalization would begin 15 months after the signing of the treaty."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Growing opposition within and without the People's Assembly, stirring of dissent among students and in religious circles and concern about official opposition by the Socialist Labor Party.

In the absence of a People's Assembly, the constitution authorizes the president to rule by decree.

Political observers note that the president appears intent on striking against the opposition to abort any national movement aimed at scuttling the peace treaty. The attack, of course, will be carried out in a completely "democratic" manner. It will be launched as an attempt to preserve the "sovereignty of the law" or on the pretext of safeguarding Egyptian "values," "village morality" or "presidential" or "head-of-the-family" authority. It is not unexpected that al-Sadat may exploit the constitutional provision which permits the formation of political parties to form alternate parties, or parallel but counter-opposition parties. The possibilities include a "coalition party," a "religious," but pliant, party, and a new, splinter Wafd party.

This may not be sufficient to gain complete control of our "pending democracy," and the effort may extend to professional and labor unions, and, in particular, to the press.

Our "pending democracy," hidden behind a smokescreen of a multiparty system and camouflaged in demagoguery, has all the hallmarks of a personal dictatorship, on a scale unprecedented in Egyptian history.

Al-Sadat's closest advisers say that President Carter has advised the Egyptian president to pay attention to two important areas after signing the peace treaty: cleaning up corruption and building a democratic facade. What appears certain, is that President al-Sadat has decided to follow the second half of President Carter's advice, the half which offers a greater opportunity for attractive sloganeering. To launch a frontal attack on corruption at this point is much more difficult and may, in fact, be impossible. The best that can be accomplished in this direction is to punish some of the small-time thieves or a few of their leaders who show an inclination toward independence from the ruling circles.

Al-Sadat's experiences with the masses on 18 and 19 January 1978 convinced him that flirting with liberalism at any level can be a dangerous game. That experience marked the beginning of his retreat from all democratic measures that he had announced earlier. The short freedom spell enjoyed by the political parties ended horribly when al-Sadat moved to quell all real opposition from the right or the left.

If there is any truth to the assumption that the May 15 reform movement was haped by the conditions prevailing following al-Sadat's rise to power, then the coming "May 15" movement will, necessarily, be determined by the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

treaty. Specifically, the movement will reflect the ramifications of al-Sadat's attempt to forge with Israel a comprehensive and complementary alliance, i.e., politically, economically and culturally.

Al-Sadat's "new democracy" will bear the imprint of this agreement. This new democracy, directed from outside the country, will be fraught with the danger of military adventurism in the Arab world and Africa.

Internally, the new democracy will be characterized by suppression of the working classes behind a slogan of higher production and greater prosperity.

Observers believe that al-Sadat's second revolutionary democracy will have all the trappings of a real democracy. Simultaneously, however, it will involve total suppression, fascist style. They foresee the following consequences:

1. Al-Sadat, the hero of peace, may be chosen president for life. He may become the first leader to occupy the supreme position in a new "hereditary republic."
2. A review of the present party system--as announced by al-Sadat behind closed doors, when he referred to the presence of unacceptable political opposition, which must be ended, and, in his own words, "as quickly as possible."
3. An announcement that the press will become a fourth branch of government, an innovation without precedent, anywhere. This new branch of government will be charged with brainwashing the masses into accepting all the requirements of his "open" policy toward a cultural alliance with Israel and a rapprochement with international Zionism.
4. An avowal to secure freedom, in every respect, to all supporters of his peace treaty and to isolate dissenters. Heading the list of dissenters are the leftists, regardless of shade, the numerous Islamic organizations, all nationalistic elements and groupings, as well as the liberals--for whom the shock of the so-called new democracy will be greatest.

It will not be long before the ordinary citizen will realize that the new democratic comedy and the promises of prosperity have gone too far. The deep crisis facing the government will lead it to extremes of propaganda, to a point where its efforts will become contemptuous of human common sense. This is already becoming clear to ordinary citizens, who contract the reality of the treaty--a very sad and bitter one, indeed--with the orchestrated attempt to make it appear more attractive and easier to swallow.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

9063
CSO: 4802

15

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGYPT

SECRET MILITARY INFORMATION SAID AVAILABLE TO UNITED STATES

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 27 Apr-3 May 79 p 15

[Text] U.S. infiltration of Egyptian military records started with the air force, the shield of the armed forces.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI learned that the supreme commander of the armed forces, President al-Sadat himself, has issued orders permitting Pentagon experts access to air force records to enable them to evaluate Egyptian defense needs.

A number of American missile experts are studying Egypt's air defense network, consisting of Soviet Sam 2, 3 and 6 missiles. The experts believe that most of these have become obsolete, and blame Egypt's desert climate and the unavailability of replacement parts for the inadequacy of the system.

The Egyptian Air Force had been extremely careful to maintain absolute secrecy about its missiles, and used elaborate camouflage techniques to hide them from U.S. spy satellites. Egyptian military commanders were convinced that information about the missile network was being relayed to Israel by the United States.

In a related development, the United States has agreed to provide Egypt with a small number of F-4 fighter bombers, the plane which forms the backbone of the Israeli Air Force. The agreement came on the heels of a decision to equip the Israeli arsenal with F-15 and F-16 aircraft, which are superior to the F-4 in armaments, load capacity, speed and maneuverability.

The F-5 airplane deal approved for Egypt last year will be speeded up, with the first delivery coming this year instead of next year. The F-5 aircraft will be the mainstay of the Egyptian Air Force in the 80's.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI learned that Saudi Arabia has not yet paid the nearly \$500 million cost of the deal. It is believed that the delay is due to Saudi Arabia's occupation with other Arab obligations.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

16

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9063

CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGYPT

SUPPRESSION OF POLITICAL DISSIDENTS REPORTED

Paris AL-WATAN AL'ARABI in Arabic 27 Apr-3 May 79 p 14

[Article: "Al-Sadat Bypasses Al-Minya Governorate to Avoid Demonstrations"]

[Text] President al-Sadat cancelled a scheduled visit to al-Minya and al-Sa'id Governorates to avoid student demonstrations that began a week earlier. The demonstration by Koran-toting students of al-Minya University was sparked by a campaign of arrests by security men directed against members of Islamic organizations. In the ensuing clash, in which knives and similar weapons were used, one student was killed and two soldiers were taken hostage. The following day, veiled Moslem girls took to the city streets to protest the trampling of copies of the Koran during the police attack against the students. Security men quickly turned the town into an armed camp and imposed an early evening curfew against the residents.

The campaign of terror and arrest against political dissenters is in marked contrast to President al-Sadat's announced intention to "deepen" democracy. In a press release marking the third anniversary of its formation, the Progressive National Coalition Party disclosed that 543 of its members were subjected to arbitrary arrest and interrogation, and that its weekly paper AL-AHALI was confiscated 11 times in the past six months before it was shut down permanently by the Egyptian government. The report disclosed further that the party's central offices were raided three times in the past three months, and that each time security men confiscated typewriters, publications and other party documents.

There is a rumor in the judicial circles that the attorney general, 'Anwar Abu Sahl--legal adviser to the well-known businessman 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, the president's in-law--is preparing a list of phoney charges against top Coalition Party leaders, particularly Khalid Muhyi al-Din, Lutfi al-Kholi, Yahya al-Jamal, Milad Hanna, Muhammad Ahmad Khalaf Allah, Lutfi Wakid and Husayn Fahmi, in order to arrest them and end their political activity, after the referendum is out of the way. The "official" opposition, on the other hand, enjoys the government's protection. It is very interesting that Mr Mustafa Kamil Murad, chairman of the Liberal Party and former leader of the opposition, has now become a leading businessman

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in one of the "open economy" enterprises. His fortune began to improve when his party agreed to go along with the ruling party. Mr Murad's enthusiasm for the peace treaty was, reportedly, greater than that of many National Party members. Not only did he endorse every provision of the treaty, but complimented the prime minister, Mustafa Khalil, on his supreme negotiating skills on behalf of Egypt and the Arabs. It is just possible that Mustafa Murad has become the spokesman of those who look toward economic cooperation with Israel.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

9063
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

WOMEN EXPRESS VIEWS ON REVOLUTION

Hamburg STERN in German 10 May 79 pp 92-100

[Text] Monavar is 76 years old and has been a widow for 36 years. She had nine children; seven died; she raised two. "When it was a son that I lost, it was very bad," she says.

The fact that she suffered less when a daughter died never irritated Monavar. "Men are preferred to women." It says in the Koran in the fourth Sure that that is the way the world is set up. To discover injustice there is as impossible for her as it was for people of the Middle Ages to understand that the earth rotated about the sun.

But the news of the equality of women has reached even her country, Iran. Ayatollah Khomeyni, the conqueror of the shah, learned this when he took over power. His order that women should wear the veil again drove thousands of Iranian women into the streets. With the freedom slogans of the revolution still ringing in their ears they asked: "Is there no freedom for us in the dawn of freedom?" The veil issue made headlines. In Frankfurt feminists--with Simone de Beauvoir at the head--established an "International Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights" and sent a delegation to Persia to support their sisters solidarily. Kate Millet, the American feminist, also came, but was quickly sent away. She had called Khomeyni a "religious tyrant."

The old Monavar deeply respects Khomeyni. I met the old woman at Nasrin's, our interpreter. Nasrin, 33, studied political science in Germany. Two months ago, full of hope, she returned to her country from exile. Meanwhile she has become concerned: "No one knows what the new constitution will contain."

We are on our way to Monavar's granddaughter, Asam, who lives in the southern part of Tehran, in the poor section of the city. Tehran lies like a crooked plate at the feet of the Elbur mountains. Up in the northern part are the palaces of the shah and the villas of the rich. Below in the southern part a dirty slush runs together when it rains or when the snow melts. Here live three-fourths of the 4 million inhabitants, mostly crowded together in huts--sometimes in tents.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

While the taxi driver threads his way through the chaotic traffic with the blind dexterity of a mole, Monavar tells more about her life. She was never interested in politics--until the revolution. Then she felt that something was happening that concerned her. She sensed the good luck that a political landslide might bring for the little people. "I am too old to see better days now," she says, "but something has to change for the young people."

Her husband was a small tenant farmer. When he died she moved to the city with her children. Since she is illiterate, like 70 percent of all women in Iran, she did domestic work. Couldn't she remarry as a 40-year old woman? The thought never occurred to her. "That isn't proper." She receives no pension. If her daughter Fatimeh did not take care of her she would have to beg or starve. Asked about her three biggest wishes she says: a car for her son, a wife for one of her grandsons, and a trip for herself to Karbala, a Shiite place of pilgrimage. Husayn, a grandson of the Prophet, died there as a martyr.

If she could come back to the earth to live again would she rather be a man or a woman? She does not hesitate for a second: "A man."

The sorrow for the people whose lives were sacrificed in the revolution against the shah--75,000 in one year--has not stopped yet. There are little glittering towers all over the streets, especially in the poor sections, to honor the dead--about the height of a person, decorated with pieces of glass of many colors and small pieces of mirror. In the middle, easily visible, is a picture of the dead person. "That is an old tradition, when a young man has died who was not yet married, that is, who had not enjoyed life yet," explains Nasrin. The tradition knows of no such way to honor young girls, who died in equal numbers.

The place where Asam lives is called Chardonghe and was once a village. Meanwhile the corrugated iron huts of the city have spread to the village, but its nucleus has remained intact. Here not one woman without a veil can be seen. "Chador" is the name of this clothing that reaches the ground, made of one half-circular piece of cloth. It does not have either hooks or eyes and is pulled far into the forehead, held together by the hands over the chest. Often women hold the cloth clenched between their teeth when they need an arm for a child or a purse.

Foreigners are immediately noticeable in Chardonghe. Young boys in jeans, with their shirts open as far as the belts, shoot past us on their noisy mopeds. They look at us openly, and show off according to the ancient male ritual. It would be exactly the same in the Bavarian forest. The women on the other hand remain close to the wall, seeming to disappear in the walls; they follow us with their eyes only. Five-year old girls are already wearing veils walk and their posture expresses the plan for their future life: head bent, shoulders drawn in, arms tightly pressed to the body. The chador leaves them no choice.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Nevertheless, this clothing was a symbol of resistance during the revolution. It signaled a rejection of the cultural violations by the West, of the culture of comic books, coke, and night clubs, of foreign domination in general. In 1936 the shah's father had prohibited the veil. He was not concerned, however, with the liberation of women, but with the mobilization of cheap female labor for the coming industrialization. Since 1942 women have been able to choose whether or not to wear the veil.

We do not find Monavar's granddaughter at home but in the bath house. This communal arrangement belongs to the men before noon, to the women in the afternoon. Stone steps lead to a dark catacomb. In the hall with its niches and the Turkish cold water basin in the middle I feel like a time traveler who got out in the Middle Ages. Light streams from above through an opening in the dome-shaped ceiling. It is lively in the adjacent bathing room. There is steam, and sounds of slapping and squealing. The women have their small children with them.

Asam says later that at first she thought that we were sent by the authorities because of her separation. Asam is 33; for 6 years she has been living separated from her husband. He has been married again for a long time and has two children with his now wife. Every Persian man can marry a second woman if the first wife agrees, according to a decree of the shah of 1967. This agreement is often forced or the men simply disregard this restriction. Asam cannot marry again as long as she is not officially divorced. But with three children no one would take her anyway, she thinks.

In Iran marriage for a certain time is still common, a special form of prostitution. It comes from the days when men were on the road for months with their caravans and stayed for a long time in strange places. With Allah's blessing, they did not have to do without the services of women on these trips. They paid the price of the bride for a certain time, got married, and at the same time set the time of the divorce.

Asam is an unskilled worker in a factory. She checks and packs panty hose. Almost all her coworkers there are divorced. Since the shah legally allowed women to sue for divorce also, Iran has the fourth highest divorce rate.

At the present time eight people live on Asam's income--between 500 and 600 DM per month: she and her three children, and her unemployed brother with his wife and two children. The house belongs to her mother-in-law. Since she has not received a penny of support from her husband, his family pays at least this way a kind of alimony.

The "house" consists of two ground level rooms without a door between them, a small court with an outhouse in one corner and a stone basin with a water faucet. The only furniture in the rooms is a television and two dressers. Two pictures are hanging on the wall: Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, and a color photograph of Ayatollah Khomeyni. In each room there is a stack of mattresses that are spread out at night. Asam and her three children sleep in the front room, her brother and his family in the rear room.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Six years without a husband means 6 years without a sex life for a Persian woman in the traditional environment. I am looking for a careful formulation and finally ask Asam whether she does not feel lonely sometimes. She understands immediately. "One gets used to it," she says.

A Persian woman has no right to sex outside marriage. Within marriage sex is her duty. Even if her husband has beaten and insulted her during the day, at night the wife must obey. "The women are your farmland," says the prophet (Koran, second Sure), "come into your land in what ever way you want."

The holy book of the Moslems has a series of corrective measures for disobedient wives. "Reprimand them, abstain from them, lock them in their rooms and beat them." Such places cannot be erased by the fact that the prophet was generous in other areas--he allowed women to own property, for example.

When a husband catches his wife in flagranti with a lover he can kill her. There is a paragraph in Persian law which states that a court must declare him innocent in such a case.

"Many murders of wives are not atoned," says Farideh, 29, a lawyer in Tehran, "because the men simply claim that the woman deceived them and was caught by them."

"A woman belongs where she wants to be." This slogan is in the office of the biggest Iranian women's organization, which was formerly headed by Princess Ashraf, the twin sister of the shah. The money that was given her was correspondingly royal in quantity. The organization had 500 counseling places in the whole country and 3,700 women coworkers.

During the time of the king Sohre, an elegant representative of the middle class who will certainly never exchange her linen blazer for the chador, was responsible for publicity work. We had already telephoned several times and I was consoled again and again: The organization will be headed by new women; everything is changing; probably not even the old name will remain.

The new women in the leadership, who are coming into a ready-made nest and want to take over the budget, reveal themselves as strictly religious fighters for Islam, a fact made obvious by their layers of black cloth. Their belief is: In Islam women have equality. Whoever helps religion to win, helps women win. Whoever takes care that Mohammed's laws, as they are written in the Koran, are kept, frees women from their oppression.

I ask: "But in the Koran it says, for example: in court two female witnesses have the same weight as one male witness. Is that not a clear discrimination?" "No," I am taught, "because women are by nature more sensitive than men, since they all become mothers, and therefore the statement of one women cannot be trusted."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"I do not understand that," I say, "if all women are equally emotional, since they will all become mothers, it is meaningless to listen to a second woman."

The brows are furrowed; there is a long discussion; finally the answer comes: "Only God knows people. He created them. He knows why He made this law."

Khomeyni, God's right hand on earth, is omnipresent in Tehran. Imperiously he looks from every wall and every display window. Banks and government offices, boutiques and bakeries, bosses and beggars--all confess their faith with the picture. Whoever does not is denounced by religious fanatics as a follower of the shah or a communist.

Meeting place: a conference room of the former Pahlavi foundation. With the help of this foundation the shah filled his private treasuries and controlled the Persian economy. The building was occupied by the Moyahedin, the "faith fighters," during the revolution.

The Moyahedin are guerillas. Together with the people's fedayin they formed the leadership of the revolution. Politically they are leftist, but they are--in contrast to the Marxist fedayin--faithful Moslems.

Fatimeh, 26, and Sahra, 22, our two interview partners, tell about "black Friday" which should really be called "red Friday." The military had encircled a big square that is called Shohador today: "Martyrs' Square." At first the soldiers shot into the air; finally they aimed at the crowd. "There were many women in the square," says Fatimeh, "they were ready to die, they were not afraid." After the massacre the corpses were removed with bulldozers.

The Moyahedin are fighting for a society in which there is no more exploitation of man by man, where all are free. Also women? Fatimeh and Sahra do not wear the chador but scarves that completely cover their hair and evenly cut, knee-length coats. "Hedyab" is the name of this clothing, which means "chastely covered."

Moyahedin women carry weapons. They fought and died with equal rights. What role do they now have in the hierarchy of their revolutionary liberation organization? "The women do the same thing as the men," says Fatimeh, "they stand guard, teach, organize meetings." It depends always on what a person is most suited for.

Finally they are honest: "We do not have any illusions. In our organization women have a worse position. Intellectual work is almost exclusively restricted to men." Private plans? Marriage? Only if it can be harmonized with our political struggle. Our time and strength belong to the organization."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"I am proud of the women in Iran," said Ayatollah Khomeyni in his speech in Qom, in which he promised women equality. "You stood at the very front and inspired the men. You have the hearts of lions."

Meanwhile the positions are newly distributed. "The duty of the sisters is the pacification of the brothers," is the slogan on walls, with the hypocritical flattery next to it: "Your black chador forced the enemy into flight more than our red blood."

In an almost whining tone a flyer pleads to women to veil themselves "for Allah's sake." "You cannot imagine how our nervous system reacts when you show your beautiful bodies. How are we supposed to think of our work?" Besides it is unfair to the older women, "who are not as pretty any more."

"I would never look after a girl in jeans," says our taxi driver, "but when a veil is blown open a little bit...."

In Lalehzar Street young people have put up wooden plates with photographs of the shah and his wife as targets: Farah Diba in a bikini, the king in a military parade, both together with their children. Round green pieces indicate the places where a good shooter has to fit: forehead, neck vein, heart. Five shots cost 10 rial (25 Pfennig). Business is good.

Also used as targets are pictures of women, bosomy stars with standard faces. Formerly they were thought to be pretty and were copied by upper-class women. Today they are "sex objects," symbols of moral decay--free for shooting.

When Badieh, 31, a secretary, wanted to enter her office a few days ago, she was stopped by a member of the weapon-carrying revolutionary committee that is guarding her firm, an American business. With his rifle the young man pointed to the top two buttons of her blouse. He wanted them buttoned. Badieh did him that favor. "But only for you," she said to let the self-appointed guard of virtue understand that she viewed his hint as personal advice and not as an order from the top.

Bahieh does not trust the new rulers: "They want to dictate to us what to wear, where we can go, and how we should live. I did not fight for this."

The struggle has just started," says Behdyat Mobasheri, the wife of the minister of justice. On the day that we visited her, her husband offered to resign, but was asked to remain in office. He does not agree any more with the politics of the religious rightist wing. "Women cannot give up now," says Bahdyat, "they have to continue to fight--for their rights, the rights of all people, with all means."

Even with arms?

She answers in German: "Naturally."

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.

9232
CSO: 4403

24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

'JAPAN TIMES' ON REEMERGENCE OF IRANIAN COMMUNISTS

Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 26 May 79 p 12 OW

[Article by Richard Wallis: "Iran Communists out in Open Against--Tudeh Leader Back from 23-Year Exile, Balancing Pro-Soviet and Pro-Ayatollah Line"]

[Excerpts] Tehran (KYODO--REUTER)--After 30 clandestine years of persecution the Tudeh (Communist) Party considers itself legal again and is operating openly in Iran.

The party's new secretary-general, Nur-e-din Kianouri, 63, returned to Tehran last month after 23 years of exile, most of it spent in East Germany. The Tudeh has established its headquarters in an office block next to Tehran University and has started bringing out its weekly NARDOM (THE PEOPLE) newspaper.

This time the Tudeh has thrown its support entirely behind revolutionary religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni. But it remains as pro-Soviet as when it was driven underground, even though this is probably the main obstacle to the growth of its popularity.

Anti-Left Demonstration

Hunched on a simple metal chair in a sparsely-furnished office, Kianouri dismissed the dangers of a civil war or a split between the left-wing and Islamic supporters of the revolution. But he insisted that there was still a possibility of a coup by pro-shah right-wing officers.

While he offered Ayatollah Khomeyni's Islamic republican party an alliance in a broad popular revolutionary front, hysterical crowds of mourners vowed death to communism only a few miles away at the funeral of the head of Iran's secret revolutionary council.

The Tehran funeral of Ayatollah Morteza Motahari, gunned down by unknown assailants here on May Day, turned into a huge anti-leftwing demonstration and devout Muslims blamed his death on the left.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Kianouri, whose party has blamed the assassination on reactionary forces, dismissed the anti-communist slogans, saying they had been inspired by fascists, right-wingers and agents of imperialism and Savak (the deposed shah's secret police).

The Islamic supporters of the revolution have since the overthrow of the monarchy shown themselves increasingly intolerant of their erstwhile secular allies, but Kianouri appeared less afraid of a purge of the left than of a coup by pro-shah remnants among the military.

Constitutional Fears

The Tudeh leader welcomed the proposals to nationalize insurance companies and heavy industry in the draft constitution of the Islamic republic. But he voiced fears that other articles of the proposed constitution could be used against the left.

The draft said deputies to the future parliament could not be affiliated to the left or the right. Their only affiliation was to be to the nation, according to the text.

Kianouri blames the Marxist-Leninist Fedayan Khalq (Peoples Guerrilla) organization for stirring up most Muslim feeling against the left.

With a paternal smile, he called the Fedayan sincere, but said their youth and inexperience had led them to make many tactical mistakes. The Fedayan has repeatedly denounced the Tudeh as Soviet tools, but Kianouri said he was still willing to bring them under the umbrella of his proposed popular revolutionary front.

Kianouri was promoted to secretary-general last January in a move widely seen as an attempt to project a new image by a party which was slow in joining the Khomeyni bandwagon.

Supports Kabul Regime

Kianouri, for instance, strongly supported what he called the progressive policies of the Kabul regime which has been accused by the Iranian Government and religious leaders of persecuting Muslims in neighboring Afghanistan.

He said reactionaries inside and outside Iran were trying to provoke a conflict between the two countries. The Tudeh believes Iran should sign a treaty of nonaggression and nonintervention with Afghanistan and all its neighbors as a move toward the establishment of an Asian collective security system--a long-cherished Kremlin project.

For him, Iran's northern neighbor--which has invaded this country in both world wars--could never pose a threat to the Iranian revolution. "We believe

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

that the Soviet Union and its socialist allies have never represented a danger for the liberty and independence of countries fighting against imperialism," is the way he passes over the Kremlin's record of armed intervention.

Reaffirming his fidelity to the principle of international cooperation among communist parties and hailing the Soviet one as the best-organized and most experienced, he dismissed the Eurocommunist experiment in Western Europe as irrelevant.

"History shows that the Soviet Communist Party line on international issues has always been justified...we know of no country where socialism has been constructed and triumphed by any other principles than those followed by the Soviet Communist Party and its socialist allies," he said, but rejected accusations of Tudeh subservience to the Kremlin.

On one point, at least, Kianouri said there would be no return to the past. There is to be no revival of the Tudeh military organization--the group which in the late 1940's and early 1950's established a solid communist network in the shah's armed forces.

The Tudeh leader said there was no need for such a cell in an army which supported the revolution but added a thorough purge of the military was still necessary.

Old-Fashioned

A student of architecture in Nazi Germany for three years before returning to teach at Tehran University in 1940, Kianouri is an old-fashioned communist with no time for ideological innovations.

Aware of the glamour gained by the Fedayan and other guerrilla groups for their part in the overthrow of the shah, the Tudeh claims to have lost more street fighters than any other political organization in last February's battle of Tehran.

Founded 37 years ago, the Tudeh is the oldest political party in Iran. Kianouri says it will take one or two years before its strength can be properly gauged. As long as the country's present rulers accept his claim that the 1949 ban on the party was illegal, the Tudeh will at least be able to offer Iran the traditional communist values of experience, discipline and organization--increasingly valuable commodities in a country thrown into chaos by revolution.

COPYRIGHT: Tokyo Japan Times, 1979

CSO: 4920

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOROCCO

DISCONTENT IN MOROCCO REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 May 79 pp 24,25

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "The Social Democratic Temptation"]

[Text] A new language is being spoken in the kingdom of Hassan II. That of social justice and of the struggle against corruption and the abuse of power.

As 1 May was drawing near, everyone held his breath: labor day could give free rein to the anger of tens of thousands of demonstrators. The new prime minister, Mr Maati Bouabid, chose this moment to defuse the "bomb." On Friday, 27 April, he announced a series of measures which would clearly lighten this heavy atmosphere which was due to a net loss in the purchasing power of the vast majority of Moroccans.

Among these measures, the SMIG [Salaire minimum industriel garanti; guaranteed minimum industrial wage] (which was 391 dirhams, 430 French francs) was raised 30 percent with an additional increase of 10 percent as of 1 January 1980; in private enterprises, wages below 500 dirhams were raised by 116 dirhams, and those between 500 and 3,000 dirhams by 100 dirhams. The SMAG [Salaire minimum agricole garanti; guaranteed minimum agricultural wage], which is very low, made a 40 percent jump and the small wage earners in the public sector received a 15 percent raise. Moreover, the prime minister promised a reduction of rents and a contribution by the enterprises to housing costs; a tougher fight against price increases; more substantial reimbursements of social security and even the cancellation of the last rate increases for water and electricity.

This increase had been set at 40 percent, but during the last few months, the bills of electricity, gas and water consumers had been multiplied by two and even three when compared to the old ones! There were thousands of protests. The answer was invariably: the country needs money because ... of the burden of the war in the Sahara. Was it the zeal of a few high officials who wanted to improve the increasingly critical situation of the treasury in this way or ministerial directives?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Having thus placated the sharpest tensions, the prime minister took advantage of it to present the general lines of his program on Wednesday, 2 May, to the parliament. It was his first important political act since his nomination on 27 March to head the government in place of Mr Ahmed Osman. Mr Maati Bouabid spoke of "continuity." But everything leads one to believe that a serious change of direction is in the offing. In Osman times, the economy experienced a liberal period which reached its climax in 1975, thanks to a soaring of the market price of phosphates, which is the main resource. The five-year plan 1973-1977 was revised upwards. Investments, which were on the order of 1.2 billion dirhams in 1973, had to be multiplied by 8 for 1977 (10 billion dirhams).

This euphoric atmosphere was accompanied by a fresh start for democracy which up to then had been clearly muzzled. At the same time, there was an explosion of national pride and unanimity around the matter of the Sahara, culminating in the Green March of November 1975. The first snags appeared in 1976 and 1977. A reduction of 50 percent in the market price of phosphates, stagnation of international trade, growing consumption of increasingly expensive energy, galloping inflation, bogging down of the partial war in the Sahara -- a war which, not including the maintenance of the troops in Mauritania and in Shaba, costs more than a million dollars a day ...

Suddenly, the euphoria turned into anguish, the anxiety of the rich, the grumbling of the poor who were tired of carrying the main burden of this crisis, without mentioning the price of blood. It was a dead-end. There had to be a change of direction.

As if nothing were going on, Maati Bouabid is quietly leading Morocco out of its traditional liberalism to take it into a social-democratic era. A social democracy structured by "Islam, the constitutional monarchy, democracy, public freedoms, territorial integrity, social justice, dialogue, an opening to all political tendencies ..." While enumerating, on 2 May, the basic principles and values of what Moroccan society should be like, the prime minister did not hide the difficulties and handicaps.

First of all, "the stubbornness of the leaders in Algeria, which represents a hindrance to the achievement of prosperity in the region." To that end it will be necessary to bring an end to the ruinous "half-war, half-peace" situation. But, as a preliminary to peace, there is no question of reconsidering territorial integrity.

On the other hand, in order to maintain national unanimity about the Sahara, "it will also be necessary to arrive at a more equitable redistribution of the national riches and revenues." A balancing which can only be achieved through "a bigger struggle against certain social ailments such as nepotism, corruption, the abuse of power, wherever they may occur." This daring passage was punctuated by vigorous applause, even though a number of representatives are from the most advantaged classes. Everybody feels that "something" will have to be done to counter the crisis, which is at the same time an economic and a moral one.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

With the agreement of King Hassan II, who remains the main strategist of the change, Maati Bouabid not only tried to scare those rich individuals, some billionaires who in the past have abused all the situations. He did not fail discreetly to call the USFP [Union socialiste des forces populaires; Socialist Union of Popular Forces], the main opposition party on the left, to order by stating that "the evolving democracy must be protected against all anarchies and higher bids." As a matter of fact, these last few months the party of Mr Abderrahim Bouabid has been the main beneficiary of the discontent in the country. The number of its activists has greatly increased since the relative failure of the June 1977 legislative elections. This has placed the other big parties, such as the Istiqlal, the Moroccan Popular Movement [MPM] and the National Rally of Independents [RNI], in a sometimes difficult position.

There is a serious debate going on within the Istiqlal: "It would be better to abandon the government ship if we have to continue emptying our ranks." In order not to withdraw its eight ministers, the Istiqlal has been given satisfaction in foreign policy with a more vigorous condemnation of Sadat and the departure of the Shah of Iran. There are anxieties of a different kind within the RNI: about the middle of April, 30 representatives wanted to secede in order no longer to be mixed up with the big businessmen and billionaires in the party. These "big shots" arouse certain doubts and rumors, magnified by public opinion, have circulated about flights of capital and impending arrests ...

This climate seriously worried even the Palace, where numerous people suspected that this "crisis of confidence" operation was caused by malevolent foreigners who may have found sympathetic ears within the country. This led to a veritable mobilization on 10 and 11 April, to neutralize a strike by teachers and health officials.

These strikes, which were incited by the new union branch of the USFP, the Democratic Confederation of Labor, were fought by means of large numbers of arrests and firings, even an alarming return to the practice of torture which was inflicted on several teachers, students and workers. One need only read various local newspapers, such as AL-MUHARRIR, to find out, thanks to real freedom of the press, about the misdeeds of some policemen or of a few local administrators. AL-BAYANE, in turn, cited 5 million hours of strikes for the three last months alone, strikes which affected the mines, the banks, the railroads, the longshoremen, the teachers ...

At the beginning of May, the government plan managed to unfreeze slightly this heavy atmosphere. The name Bouabid has become very popular, but without knowing whether it refers to Abderrahim or Maati. While awaiting a change, it is the second one who conducts the policy of the first by trying to cut him out. But some people are afraid for Abderrahim, afraid that he might meet with the same fate as Tunisian union leader Habib Achour, who was pushed too far by his young lieutenants who demanded "everything and everything immediately" ...

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

But in Morocco, Abderrahim Bouabid has a window opening onto the National Security Council. There, he meets once a week with King Hassan II and all the party leaders, including the communist Ali Yata, to talk about a sacred cause: the Sahara. It is a bit like a vicious circle.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

8463
CSO: 4400

31

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUDAN

OPPOSITION SEEKS UNITY, DOWNFALL OF REGIME

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18 May 79 pp 27-30 JN

[Interview with al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, exiled leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, a Sudanese opposition group, by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI correspondent Badr al-Haj, in London--date not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] Undoubtedly, you have been following the official contacts between Sudan and Libya. It has also been reiterated that official Sudanese contacts were made with you in London. Is this true? What is your explanation of these activities, undertaken by President Numayri's regime at this particular time?

[Answer] The revolutionary crisis has reached its peak in Sudan, both on the public and military levels. At the same time, the pan-Arab siege of the Sudanese regime has been tightened. All 18 Arab states at the Baghdad Arab summit stood together, while Sudan and Oman alone stood on the side of al-Sadat.

In my opinion, Numayri's activities are suspicious, because their purpose is to extricate Sudan from the strangling crisis, which has taken on different aspects in recent weeks. Some of these aspects are visible, while others are not. Yet they all indicate that the revolutionary crisis is ripe on the nation, pan-Arab, military and public levels. Therefore, the purpose of these activities is to water down this revolution, which is bound to explode.

I repeat, we are not a party to these activities. We cannot possibly sit down at the negotiation table unless Numayri declares that he will step down from government in Sudan or proclaims a pan-Arab position, meeting the maximal demand made by the Sudanese people, who adhere to their pan-Arab stand.

[Question] You have been quoted recently as asserting that the downfall of President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri's regime is imminent. Do you still hold this view?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] Yes. As a matter of fact, I am even more convinced now and I hold to my opinion. I would like to assure all my brothers in Sudan and in the Arab homeland that this regime's downfall is very near. The regime is breathing its last. The regime's current activities and convulsions are nothing but a desperate attempt to prolong it for a month or two.

[Question] On what do you base your belief? Do you have a complete picture of the real internal situation?

[Answer] The many reports and information we have speak of activities, outbursts and individual attempts within the armed forces and of ambiguous incidents in which a number of officers, NCO's and troops fell victim. There is also talk about arms being smuggled across the border into Sudan.

[Question] There is talk about differences among members of the Sudanese regime, such as the differences between President Numayri and his deputy Abu al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim.

[Answer] The talk about differences between Abu al-Qasim and Numayri and between this man and that man is characteristic of Sudanese policy. Numayri's objective is to turn people against each other, in order to stay in power.

[Question] You said that Numayri has deceived some of the Sudanese statesmen. Do you mean Sadiq al-Mahdi? If this is so, there are reports of a renewed dialog between your party, the National Union Party, and al-Mahdi.

[Answer] There is no dialog between Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Sudanese opposition. What has happened is that all those who were represented by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi in Sudan are now in the Sudanese opposition. These people come here and then they go back to al-Mahdi to warn him against slipping into the government's ranks. They come to us to confirm that they are adopting the opposition line inside the Sudan.

We know these people very well, because we have worked with them in the opposition. As for al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, we cannot and must not conduct a dialog with him, unless he clearly defines his role in Sudan: Is he working for the overthrow of the current regime or not?

Al-Sadiq is now following a middle course, a compromise course. And even if al-Sadiq al-Mahdi adopts a definite attitude against the Sudanese regime many people will not feel confident. They believe that al-Mahdi might change his attitude again.

The important thing is that there is no dialog between us and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. There is no agreement, and this is definite.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Regarding the other groups and parties, there is a continuous dialog with them based on adopting a line of clear opposition to the Sudanese authorities. This dialog is being conducted among the Democratic Unionist Party, the Ba'th Party, the communists and other opposition groups. So far, we have not reached a formula for a pact. However, we are meeting and consulting with one another and discussing the question of reaching a joint formula for the unity of the Sudanese opposition movement against the current regime.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI

CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SYRIA

COMMUNIST PARTY FACTIONS QUARREL AMONG THEMSELVES

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 May 79 p 32 JN

[Excerpts] Damascus--It is no secret that the Syrian Communist Party--one of the oldest communist parties in the Arab world--experienced internal divisions during the seventies, and that these divisions precipitated the presence of two parallel communist parties. These are: The Syrian Communist Party under the leadership of the 65-year-old Khalid Bakdash, which has drawn the old guards who are in sympathy with the Soviet Union's political and ideological line; and the Syrian Communist Party--political bureau, under the leadership of Riyad al-Turk, which pursues a more independent line from Moscow's.

During the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party--political bureau, and then during the meetings of the party's central committee 2 months ago, the party's line and policies and its ability to attract the masses, and especially the party bases, were debated.

Informed observers here say that the lengthy discussions precipitated the differences among the party's various trends. These currents can be formulated as follows:

1. Riyad al-Turk's faction, which is supported especially by the group known as "the Homs Group." Homs is an industrial town in Central Syria which used to be one of the active centers of the communist party in the past.
2. The faction of Yusuf Nimr. This wing is supported by the Damascus group, and includes party members who were involved in levelling strong criticism publicly at Khalid Bakdash's leadership.
3. The faction of Badr-al-Din al-Tawil. This includes a group of party members who expressed their dissatisfaction with the manner the party's internal elections were carried out, claiming that the elections were divorced from the spirit of democracy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The communist party led by Bakdash is in a no better state than the parallel party led by al-Turk. Differences inside Bakdash's party have led to the postponement of party elections for slightly more than 1 year. At times the party leadership found itself unable to control the currents which clashed inside the party. These currents were governed more by personalities and loyalties than by political and ideological considerations.

The most important and prominent currents inside the party can be represented by the following factions:

1. The faction of Murad Yusuf, member of the political bureau, who--it was reported here--threatened a few weeks ago to "explode" the party from within, declare publicly that the matter is no longer tolerable and put all the facts before the party.
2. The faction of Yusuf Faysal, the party's deputy secretary general and strongman, who accuses Murad Yusuf's faction of attempting to impose its nominees, views and line on the party through party elections.

Party leader Khalid Bakdash appears to be the main loser as a result of this split. He finds himself unable to take the side of either of the two sides, especially since both sides claim to speak on his behalf.

Observers note that no measures have been successful in preventing the party from splitting. Even the decisions adopted by the party's central committee at the end of last year did not prevent the split and division.

The split inside the communist party in the seventies is due to several personal, political and ideological reasons. There were strong objections to "the personality cult" inside the party.

This accusation is levelled against Khalid Bakdash who has retained the party leadership for more than 40 years, and--in the words of his opponents--directs the party in a "personal and arbitrary" manner. This accusation has gained strength while Bakdash's advanced age and poor health have greatly affected his party activities. This has brought about more than one person who aspires to be his successor.

On the political and ideological level, the new party leaderships and bases have felt the need to pursue an Arab line that is in harmony with the Syrians' aspirations, national hopes, and great and constant commitment to Arab causes, above all to Arab unity.

Th's line is represented by Riyad al-Turk, Daniel Ni'mah, Zafir 'Abd-as-Samad and Ibrahim Bakri. Differences reached the point of a complete split and al-Turk formed a new party, while most of his aforementioned supporters returned to the party fold under Bakdash's leadership.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SYRIA

GROMYKO REPORTEDLY ATTEMPTED TO HEAL RIFTS IN SYRIAN CP

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 May 79 p 32 JN

[Text] During his recent visit to Damascus, Andrey Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Foreign Minister, met with several members of the political bureau of the Syrian Communist Party. Among the more important topics which Gromyko discussed with them was the attempt to contain the crisis that was threatening to explode inside the party.

Gromyko talked about the circumstances facing the area, especially in the wake of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and the Soviet Union's responsibility in this matter. Gromyko said that he does not want trouble from the Syrian Communist Party, and that the party's unity is very important for the Soviet Union's influence on events in the area.

Gromyko's meeting took place at Khalid Bakdash's home, and was attended by Bakdash, Murad Yusuf, Daniel Ni'mah and 'Umar al-Siba'i. Yusuf Faysal, leader of the opposition faction inside the party, did not attend the meeting because he was touring some socialist countries.

It is well known that the CPSU has made several ineffective attempts to intervene and contain the differences and splits inside the Syrian Communist Party during the past few years.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

MDS OPPOSITION, PRESS DESCRIBED AS HAVING FACTIONS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 May 79 p 17

[Article by Tunis correspondent Souhayr Belhassen: "The Tunisian Opposition and Its Newspapers"]

[Text] "Our newspaper hailed the initiative (establishment of a political party) of a certain number of social democrats headed by Ahmed Mestiri. This does not mean for all that that our organ is the spokesman of that party. Our taking of position is a consequence of our attachment to fundamental freedoms underwritten by the Constitution." It is in these terms that the editorialist of AL-RA'Y introduced the second year in business of the opposition newspaper after 3 months of interdiction.

These comments did not go unnoticed among public opinion which, during the past year, had found differences in tone between AL-RA'Y and DEMOCRATIE, the two publications of the MDS [Movement of Social Democrats]. The former, headed by Hassib Ben Ammar, reflected the opinion of the radical wing of the movement which formed the executive committee established, even though it was not approved, on 12 June 1978. In contrast, DEMOCRATIE has always been more careful in accommodating the government.

Ben Ammar seems to want not only to have the two weeklies cover the entire spectrum but also to outline a reaction of greater independence with regard to the factions which animate the movement. If AL-RA'Y, it is also asserted, "defended Habib Achour and the trade union leaders...and supported the demands of some individuals to have newspapers..." it was in order to defend fundamental public freedoms. AL-RA'Y thus backed the founding of a party by Ahmed Mestiri just as it had backed the students.

"Our position is a reaction before the disrespect of the authorities vis-a-vis public liberties," the editorialist continued. This concern is perhaps not alien to the interdiction measure against AL-RA'Y or the six cases now before the courts in which the two newspapers are the defendants.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Accordingly, the factions which coexist within the movement reflect more strategic and tactical differences than disagreements over essential goals. Besides, all see a sign of political maturity in it.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

2662
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL ASSAYED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 May 79 pp 68-69

[Article by Tunis correspondent Souhayr Belhassen: "Arab League--The Candidate From Tunis"]

[Text] A candidate for the post of secretary general of the Arab League (whose headquarters will be transferred to Tunis as a result of the Baghdad summit conference which suspended Egypt from the League), Tunisia faces a touchy problem, namely, which candidate to propose for the job? The initial response of the man-in-the-street overlapped that of the politician, both of them thinking in the past.

Indeed, the names mentioned were those of personalities who are no longer on the political scene today but who have identified--each in his own way--with Arabism: Bahi Ladgham, who for 15 years was the right-hand man of President Habib Bourguiba, and Mohamed Masmoudi, former Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, shunted aside after the aborted Tunisian-Libyan union of 1974. "Why would we hold political grievances against rather than trust these individuals, the real activism which motivated their action and which identified Tunisia's image through them?" a diplomat noted. Today, it is found that this image has persisted despite the receding of the individuals into the background. Bahi Ladgham represents the Tunisia of the 1950's and 1960's which used to advocate Arabism with faith and moderation. Mohamed Masmoudi represents another, more controversial and partisan, generation. Each one thus symbolizes an age of "Tunisian Arabism" and they appear--including to those outside Tunisia--as serious candidates. Other "high-caliber" candidates besides those who have managed Tunisia's foreign affairs and thereby become known in the Arab world such as Habib Chatty cannot for various reasons be considered as candidates for the Arab League position. One could also think of a career diplomat such as Taieb Sahbani, who has the virtues of the profession. Descreet, he enjoys a moral authority which raises him to the leading rank of "professional" candidates. Just as the choice of Tunis as the seat of the Arab League, so the selection of the Tunisian candidate for the position of secretary general is somewhat of an elimination game.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This procedure can only lead to the choice of an individual who has at least been in contact with the Arab world. That is the case of Chedly Klibi, the present Tunisian minister of information, who has benefited from his government's confidence. A university professor of Arabic literature and philosophy at the Sorbonne, Klibi has been a member of the Academy of Arab Literature for nearly 10 years now. Both on this score and by virtue of his writings, he is known in cultural circles and in the media (sectors which he had headed almost uninterruptedly for the past 13 years).

A cultured man whose past is that of a senior government official, Chedly Klibi has a noteworthy presence in international cultural circles (UNESCO) and especially Arab ones. His following and influence cannot be challenged. Endowed with a penetrating spirit of analysis, Klibi has the sense of discreet and moderate language, but a language that is fair and eloquent. When he has to make a decision, he listens, relates to people, and is prudent. Aged 54, of frail build and with graying hair, he moves with as much ease in Arab and Islamic circles as in French-speaking circles.

A member of the politburo of the Destourian Socialist Party (the highest political organ in Tunisia), Chedly Klibi, despite his time in President Bourguiba's cabinet, has never had the opportunity to distinguish himself in special circumstances. In addition, his experience with international politics is academic. He is little known in Arab political and diplomatic circles. That undoubtedly explains why his candidacy surprised the participants at the Baghdad conference. Some even suggested that they viewed with favor the candidacy of Bahi Ladgham whose qualities as negotiator had been appreciated at the time of his intervention at the head of an Arab delegation sent to Amman to put an end to the Jordanian-Palestinian clashes of "Black September" [1970]. The name of Mohamed Masmoudi, in contrast, was not put forward by many delegates, who often preferred Taieb Sahbani to him.

Taieb Sahbani chaired in Tunis, during the first half of April 1979, the working sessions of the Committee of Six (Kuwait, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) entrusted with transferring the Arab League headquarters.

Bahi Ladgham, who had shunted aside by President Bourguiba in 1970 (in favor of the present prime minister, Hedi Nouira), said: "If I could help improve the existing state of inter-Arab relations I would not refuse the position." According to Ladgham it would be necessary, even with a truncated organization, to take an "optimistic" view "of rediscoveries and reconciliation to give it a new breath of life and to consider what has just happened as a passing incident."

The negative side of the sanctions will not be long in making itself felt in all the Arab countries, especially in the committees of the Arab League which had plans pending. "We shall see then whether we have gone too far," Bahi Ladgham said. According to him, the secretary general

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of the Arab League should be impartial regarding the currents which agitate the organization so as to find a "modus vivendi" and, without recanting, throw a stick to Egypt and bet on the future. Ladgham goes further. Indeed, he feels that a revamping of the League's secretariat should give the secretary general not a role of executive secretary as in the case of the Organization of African Unity but rather of initiative and, proportionately, arrange so that his functions might parallel those of the United Nations secretary general. In other words, to arrange things so that the executive may be "the manager of a cause rather than the administrator of an institution and--what is even worse--the manager of sanctions, that is, of the negative side of inter-Arab relations." The secretary general of the Arab League must in some way--still according to Bahi Ladgham--be "the conscience of the Arabs but it is also necessary to find a noncontroversial personality who is not just seeking a position either in his country or elsewhere. Personally, I am not fishing for anything, Ladgham said. "One takes a big chance in being secretary general of the Arab League."

It is thought that the Council of the Arab League might be convened before the scheduled date (September 1979) to elect the new secretary general, and it is barely probable that the Tunisian Government should change its mind about supporting the candidacy of Chedly Klibi. However, some individuals feel in Tunis that if an action is taken by the Arab heads of state in favor of Bahi Ladgham, as [Egyptian President] Gamal 'Abd-al-Nasir did at the time of "Black September," it is not inconceivable that President Bourguiba might allow himself to be persuaded.

According to Mohamed Masmoudi, the transfer of the Arab League headquarters to Tunis could be "an excellent thing for the Arab world." But given the divisions which fragment it today, the candidate for the position of secretary general needs imagination and a perfect knowledge of the individuals and problems in order for the League to become more effective. That is why Mohamed Masmoudi declares himself to be ready--he too--to respond to a possible call by his government even for a limited period, long enough to "put the machine into motion."

While the initial reactions to the decision to transfer taken in November 1978 were marked by its reservations, Tunis is today not only the seat of the Arab League but also the home of an accepted candidate for the position of secretary general. This unaccustomed combination is not the result of the resolve of Tunisians but rather than of the pressure of Arab countries which had no other choice. Especially for Algeria, the transfer of the organization was an occasion of rapprochement with its eastern neighbor. The Algiers Government evidenced enthusiasm and unusual warmth in congratulating the Tunisians "for this proof of trust" and made it known

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

that Algeria supported the Tunisian candidacy. In the long term, it is believed, Algeria could benefit from a "Maghrabization of the League" without having to bear its inconvenient features.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

2662
CS/: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

EX-FOREIGN MINISTER MASMOUDI COMMENTS ON INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 May 79 p 23

[Article by Tunis correspondent Souhayr Belhassen: "Al-Qadhdhafi Has To Stop"]

[Text] "Revolution has become a goal for Qadhdhafi. He cannot stop any more. One must know how to become conservative in order to retain the achievements of the revolution. However, Qadhdhafi's permanent revolution is crazy." Coming from the mouth of Mohamed Masmoudi, former Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, these words may be surprising. Considered as the artisan of the Tunisian-Libyan merger plan of Jerba (January 1974), Masmoudi lives today under house arrest, a victim of this aborted union. He has thus had all the time necessary to mediate on this "soul in rebellion" as he characterized Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi in his book, "The Arabs in the Storm," and to revise his attitude regarding the Libyan head of state.

Isolated, a prisoner without being one, Mohamed Masmoudi has never been under such heavy guard as he is today, even when he was the Tunisian foreign minister. Six sentry boxes painted in Tunisia's national colors serve as shelter for the police who watch Masmoudi's residence of the Manouba district. A police stationwagon is parked on a permanent basis in front of the entrance and no fewer than seven policemen in mufti check on the identity of the new visitors. Depending on instructions, these are allowed or not to see the master of the house. He is alone at home, his wife and seven children living in Paris. Masmoudi phones them on Fridays from his parents-in-law's home where he visits after his weekly prayer at the mosque. During this only outing his car is preceded and followed by police vehicles.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni has replaced Qadhdhafi in Masmoudi's thinking. The Iranian revolution thrills him. "It is the most important event in these past 50 years," he explains. "It is now necessary to avoid seeing it pre-empted by the Americans or the Russians or by anybody else. To convert it into a political movement to assert its authenticity would be to denigrate Islam. The Iranian Islamic regime will be the best in the world or will not be at all.

44

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"To follow the West is to espouse it to the end. Now, one finds today the failure of materialism. We must therefore be imaginative, innovative, creative, for progress stems from the difference. One must be proud of one's difference, espouse it. And when, as in Iran, the people without arms, without anything, face even death for the sake of being different, that is a great lesson for us. The Shah was going against the current and he came up against the formidable rejection of a people who had only their faith."

For Mohamed Masmoudi support of the Palestinians is the other primary aspect of the Iranian revolution. He said: "The Palestinians lost Egypt but they won Iran." The former Tunisian foreign minister is not a partisan of President Anwar al-Sadat. Masmoudi commented: "He is a man whom the mass media have driven out of his mind," who believes that he is terrific. For Masmoudi, al-Sadat has been nothing more than a toy in the hands of President Jimmy Carter, who did not know even how to make an important ally of Anwar al-Sadat by preserving his power or by giving him resources. According to Masmoudi, it is Prime Minister Menachem Begin who drew the most benefits from the Washington [peace] treaty.

"Being involved in domestic politics is of no interest to me whatever," he continued. "It is necessary today to fulfill the dream of the young who wish to fight in an Arab-Muslim cultural context so that they may find what is appropriate to them anywhere in this area." Between an organic union of this Arab-Muslim area and what is in existence today there is nothing. However, what would be exalting, still for Masmoudi, is to strive to concretize this dream," which will not happen from one day to the next."

The transfer of the Arab League to Tunis has made the name of Mohamed Masmoudi newsworthy once more. Some countries reportedly proposed his name as candidate for the position of secretary general.

The clashes which divide the Maghreb will calm down one day, Masmoudi observed. "I am convinced that countries will end up by getting together," he noted regarding the Algerian-Moroccan dispute. The way in which succession has taken place in Algeria, "without hitches or problems," is a lesson for the Third World in his eyes. Like a lion in a cage, Mohamed Masmoudi commented on current events with his grating voice by looking at distant horizons which keep him from bumping into some more immediate realities.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

2662
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

MOVE OF ARAB LEAGUE TO TUNIS CRITICIZED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-22 May 79 p 42

[Article by Anis Rachid: "An Arab Gloss"]

[Text] Since Bourguiba still chooses the Western camp, setting up the Arab League in Tunis will involve serious threats.

Tunis is decked with Arab flags. Since the announcement of the transfer of Arab League headquarters to the Tunisian capital, the recovery campaign is in full swing. Every man jack in the country has been daily invited to celebrate the event.

But while in Baghdad the consensus as to Tunis seemed to be rather that it is the lesser of two evils, in Tunisia matters took quite another turn. In the course of statements issued, people shifted briskly from "the lesser of two evils" to a "judicious choice" and to the a posteriori justification of Tunisia's Arab policy, which would thus be sanctioned.

One might think one was imagining it but the fact is that in reality one hears sympathetic comments from Palestinian resistance organization spokesmen as well as from some member nations of the Firmness Front.

Tunisian diplomats are firmly counting on pushing their advantage to the limit, aided, to be sure, by the usual litanies on the "new vistas" that will now be opened to the organization as a result of its being located in Tunis. Without provoking the slightest reserve or the slightest unrest, the government has assumed the offensive. It already has its candidate in the league's secretariat general, Mr Chadli Klibi, who has always been a full-fledged member of the Destour establishment and is qualified to teach Arabic, which is something for a regime whose obsession with the West is boundless.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

We can quite rightly say that the history of relations between Tunisia and the Arab League is that of the former's successive breaks with the latter.*

Tunisia had to wait two and one-half years after gaining its independence before officially applying for admission to the organization. According to the former president of the Tunisian Assembly and one of the barons (today somewhat forgotten) of the Destour Regime, this was the condition imposed by France and accepted by Bourguiba for the granting of independence. Moreover, Edgar Faure, then French prime minister, used this argument to convince the French deputies of Destour's good intentions toward the West. But as soon as Tunisia was admitted, it distinguished itself far more by its systematic obstruction than by its support of the common causes of national liberation. At that time, Bourguiba gave the campaign against what he called "Nasser's hegemony" over the Arab world top priority in his diplomatic policy.

An Attentive Ear

The Bourguiba Regime was at its peak. It automatically identified itself with the West against the "dogmatism of the backward Arabs." This was the era when, abandoning La Marsa, Bourguiba decisively chose to reside in Carthage in order to clearly mark the distance that should separate "his" Tunisia from the "backward multitudes of Mashreck."

People no longer bothered to count Tunisian snits with the Arab League. When it was not busy absenting itself from meetings, Tunisia most often added its voice to those of the organization's reactionary faction.

Through God only knows what cruel irony of history, it was the diplomat who most distinguished himself in this role of spoilsport Bourguiba had assigned to him who chaired the six-man commission responsible for seeing to the Arab League's move to Tunis. We are referring to Mr Taieb Sahbani, the current secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

If we now look at the matter from the standpoint of the Arab cause, the factor that has done the most to mobilize the league throughout its 30 years of existence, we find a perfect illustration of what Tunisia's Arab policy was and still is.

In a secret letter to Nahum Goldmann, Bourguiba wrote: "Palestine does not interest Tunisia. What concerns us is the communist danger and the vagaries of Arab nationalism. Israel constitutes no danger for us." Later, every time he felt it necessary, he tuned his violin to Western diplomacy: the United States and the EEC in the region. And when the EEC differed with American plans for controlling the situation, Bourguiba differed with the EEC. So in 1974, Bourguiba, Nouira, Chatty and Sayah one after another counseled a PLO delegation to directly contact the Americans rather than to address themselves to the EEC, "which will be of no help to you." Thus during each phase of the American-Zionist plot, Washington found an attentive ear in Bourguiba.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The defeatist trend that today threatens the Arab world did not come into being with Sadat. Bourguiba has been the initiator since 1965 when, in his well-known speeches of sad memory on Jordan and Lebanon, he appealed to the Palestinian masses to surrender, to accept the 1948 partition plan.

Likewise, Israeli-Arab contacts do not go back to Dayan's visit to Rabat in 1977. Ten years earlier, in 1967, Bourguiba met with Baron Edmond de Rothschild in Switzerland before turning the reins of government over to his minister of foreign affairs (today in disgrace), Mohammed Masmoudi. On two occasions the latter secretly met with Israeli officials: in Wiesbaden (FRG) in 1971 and in Athens in 1972.

After 1970, Masmoudi was in fact the promoter of a "Tunisian Arab policy" set in a framework of Saudi hegemony over the Middle East and in Africa. His flair for business directed him toward the petrodollar countries. He turned this into a policy. He was even in the pay of a wing of the Palestinian resistance organization, which he cleverly used to endow himself with credibility.

And so it is this country, Tunisia, and under the Destour Regime, that the Arab League will henceforth be located in. There can be no doubt that the influence of Tunisian diplomacy on the organization's future orientations will be immense. We are willing to bet that one of its top priorities will, insofar as is possible, be to limit the damage caused by Egypt's economic encirclement, which was decided on in Baghdad. This will be in the nature of things because the United States is already threatening to do so. And can the Destour Regime and the American Government refuse to perform favors for one another?

* In connection with this, see the details provided by Tunisian national opposition leader, Mr Ibrahim Tobal, in his book, "The Fall of the Bourguiba Regime," published in Arabic.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

11,466
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

NEW MILITIAS REPORTED ON

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-22 May 79 p 44

[Text] In the country of "dialogue and collaboration," of "social peace and joie de vivre," a new "democratic" institution has just come into being. An employers militia will usefully complement the political militia, directly administered by PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] director Mohammed Sayah and the Watchmen's Corps at the university in order to maintain order.*

The members of this new militia, dubbed "company watchmen," who will wear an unusual uniform "reminiscent of those worn by American policemen," writes a Tunisian newspaper as naively as you please, will be recruited from the Army, the National Guard or the police. Trained in the use of weapons and organized into brigades under the command of a chief who must be a noncom in the Army, the National Guard or the police, they will of course be chosen by the heads of the National Security Police. This will guarantee professional management, leaving administration to the firms involved. (In plain language, they will be responsible to the police without receiving their pay from the latter.)

It is interesting to note that this new militia was created in the wake of a circular issued by Prime Minister Hedi Nouira -- as we know, a man who favors dialogue -- dated 13 February 1978. Any connection with the 26 January massacres of that year is purely fortuitous. Another way of celebrating the workers' First of May.

* In a communique published on the occasion of the First of May, the MUP [People's Unity Movement] vigorously denounced this new attack on labor union rights and particularly on the right to strike.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

11,466
CSO: 4400

49
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

HUNGER STRIKE BY POLITICAL PRISONERS REPORTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-22 May 79 p 44

[Text] The Destour Government thought they were submissive and resigned to their fate. But now "the forgotten ones of Bordj er-Roumi," who have been rotting in Bourguiba's jails for over 10 years, have broken the wall of silence behind which the Tunisian Government wanted to keep them.

Noureddine Ben Khedder, Gilbert Naccache, Ahmed Ben Othman, Abdallah Rouissi, Mohammed Salah Fliss and Rached Bellalouna have gone on a hunger strike to remind the people of Tunisia and the world of the circumstances of their arrests and convictions. These activists are serving long prison sentences for having exercised the right of freedom of expression Article 8 of the 1959 Tunisian Constitution recognizes.

This hunger strike marks the fifth anniversary of the revocation of the presidential decree that pardoned them (!) which, as Mr Patrick Baudouin stated at a press conference held by the International Federation of the Rights of Man on 24 April, constitutes "an amazing and unheard of procedure for the withdrawal of a pardon."

We know that torture is currently practiced in Tunisia and that it has been applied to hundreds of opponents [of the regime] these past few years. Union activists Houcine el-Kouki and Said el-Guagui died of it. But when we read Ahmed Ben Othman's testimony (see page 56),* we can only once again vomit at the thought of a regime that has turned repression, torture and arbitrary judgment into a system of government.

* Ahmed Ben Othman's complete testimony has been published in the April issue of the review LES TEMPS MODERNES.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

11,466
CSO: 4400

50

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

PRISONER GIVES TESTIMONY ON TORTURE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-22 May 79 pp 56, 57

[Text] In Bourguiba's Tunisia, Hedi Nouira did not want holders of degrees from the Universities of Vincennes or Nanterre. He preferred those with degrees in torture, earned in his police stations. And with "talent," as one of their victims, Ahmed Ben Othman, in prison since 1972, testifies: "They dragged me into the torture chamber. They tore my clothes to shreds and, naked, they tied my hands together. They shoved a long iron rod between my hands thus tied and between my knees and arms, then suspending me between two tables with my head hanging down. Then blows delivered with horse whips, clubs and rubber hoses rained down on me, all over my body, but most often on the soles of my feet. From time time, they wet down my wounds, one of them letting water drip on them drop by drop, the others beating me one after another and still another counting the blows aloud. An old acquaintance, a dirty cop, Hedi Kassem, bragged to his colleagues: 'I gave him 500 blows at one stretch and he didn't cry once.'

"Once I had passed out and the soles of my feet had no feeling left in them, they took me down from my perch, untied me and forced me to drag myself along on my feet. To do so, they grabbed my penis and forced me to run by pulling on it with all their might. Then, once I was up, they started all over again: perch, blows, water drop by drop on the soles of the feet, on my bleeding wounds, on my eyelids and nose to keep me from breathing and concentrating on my suffering. More passing out, buckets of icy water in the face, ether to revive me. Then the head of the torture team that was working me over, Abdelkader Tabka, sent for a small pair of pliers and started to tear out shreds of bloody flesh from between my fingers, my nails, the tender tips of my toes. The blood flowed and he poured ether and alcohol over my wounds to try to get me to scream. Someone else poured alcohol over my pubic hair and testicles and set fire to them. It took months for the burns to heal and the scars are still very clearly there and will be there for the rest of my life...

"Eight hours of this hell without a break. Finally, they couldn't revive me. So they dragged me into an empty room and shackled me with heavy chains to rings anchored in the wall. They left me there for 2 days, during which time I refused to eat or speak to them."

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

11466
CSO: 4400

51
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

RULER OF AL-SHARIQAH INTERVIEWED ON RECENT EVENTS

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 20-26 Apr 79 pp 30-31

[AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI interview with Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammed al-Qasimi: "Unity Needed To Face Persian Gulf Crisis"]

[Text] This AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's second interview in 4 months with Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, ruler of al-Shariqah, one of the seven pearls of the United Arab Emirates. There are several reasons for a second interview with Shaykh Sultan, but the leading one is related to the rapid developments that have taken place and continue to take place in the Arab world and the Gulf region in the wake of the Egyptian-Israel peace treaty and the Baghdad conference. The significance of the interview with Shaykh Sultan rests on the fact that, as usual, he is capable of reconciling his role as a ruler with his feelings as a citizen, aware of the danger that threatens his nation and its security at this decisive juncture in its history.

[Question] There has been much talk lately about difference of opinion among the rulers of the UAE. Can you give us a clearer picture of what is happening?

[Answer] There are no differences of opinion. All of us are in agreement that at this decisive, historic juncture we need unity, not only in the UAE but in the Gulf region and throughout the Arab world. This region has a direct influence on the world's economy. It supplies 60 percent of the world's oil needs, and the demand for oil is increasing. In 1982-1983 Russia will experience a critical need for oil. Furthermore, there is increasing competition over oil among the Western companies. Whether we wish it or not, an international conflict over oil will soon develop, and we might just become the victims of that conflict. An American official was asked whether the United States would intervene militarily in the event of an oil stoppage or an unstable situation that might threaten the oil supply. His response was that individual Europeans [sic] will fight. The implication is that the West depends entirely on this oil, and that oil has become a matter of life and death for it. From this it is easy to see that this region must depend on itself. It must pull together and set aside personal and regional disputes. Those clamoring for unity in the UAE are fully aware of the potential dangers. Thrones and governments

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

are collapsing and changing around us, but we are oblivious to what is taking place around us. The fact is that the Gulf region is in the eye of the brewing storm. During the past few years of its existence the UAE has successfully weathered a number of crises capable of destroying the union. We have surrendered the helm of the ship of state to a wise and capable man. In response to your question, therefore, there is no reason to worry about the UAE.

[Question] You appear to be optimistic, but what about the future of the UAE?

[Answer] It is an observable fact that the UAE enjoys democracy and freedom. The people and the government are in direct touch with each other. There is no gap. Much of the government business is common knowledge to the citizenry. The UAE has its own foreign policy, one that is admired throughout the Arab world and internationally. Lately, there have been demands to consolidate the government's services. Some of these demands went to the extent of insisting on complete unity--a goal desired by all. God willing, the UAE will soon become one nation. The artificial boundaries drawn by the nation's enemies will disappear. Domestic policies will be unified, and the people will have freedom and security.

[Question] Al-Shariqah is becoming noted for its many beautiful buildings, reflecting the Arabic architectural heritage. There is also an emphasis on the construction of tourist facilities. Would you care to comment?

[Answer] The building boom in al-Shariqah is not the work of one individual; everyone has contributed. New construction was so rapid that it outstripped the capacity to supply services--something we had never expected. The most fundamental requirement for al-Shariqah is that everyone work for unity and set aside all parochial considerations. This spirit must be demonstrated not only as a sentiment but must be translated into action. This same spirit must also permeate our actions and policies. We are Eastern Arabs and this must be reflected in the architecture of this city. I believe that you agree with me that al-Shariqah strikes one as an Arab city. We plan to build more public squares and gardens and will soon initiate a cleanliness campaign.

We then moved from internal UAE concerns to the central point of the interview, namely, the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

[Question] How do you assess the situation in the Arab world following the signing of the peace treaty and the establishment of an alliance with Israel?

[Answer] The peace treaty was not signed recently: It was signed in 1973 at Kilometer 101 in the Sinai desert when Egypt and Israel endorsed the first disengagement agreement. That was the first danger signal which went ignored by all the Arab countries. The peace treaty was in Kissinger's hand while he shuttled between Cairo and Jerusalem. The peace treaty was signed in those days; what took place recently [the signing] was merely an after-the-fact theatrical production. What we must do now is to forget the treaty and search our Arab soul to find answers to what went wrong. The land of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

this nation has been occupied for nearly 30 years now. At first, we blamed the colonizers. Later on we justified our shortcomings by blaming the residual effects of the colonialist era. What can we blame now?

The other point I wish to emphasize is that, in the past, we dealt with the Palestinian problem as though it were the problem of the Palestinians only. Yes, Palestine gave the Jews and Zionists an opportunity to create a state and a Zionist presence. But when that state was being planned, it was not designed with a specific map in mind. There were no clearly marked boundaries on that map. From the moment of its birth, the Zionist state began to expand. Today, it occupies the territories of Arab countries. The problem, then, is not restricted to Palestine; the whole Arab world is in danger. The problem is the problem of all the Arabs. In addition to the territorial nature of the conflict, I believe it has another, more serious aspect: It is a cultural conflict whose aim is to change the map and character of this region, not in the next year or two, but in the next 10 or 100 years. It is imperative, therefore, that we give the future generations a truly Arab upbringing if we are to preserve the Arab identity of this region and restore our conquered territories. The first step in this direction is for each one of us to ask: What have I done for the Arab cause? The answer may be this or that or possibly nothing. It is here that we must begin. Every Arab has an obligation to contribute. To be truly a part of this nation one must serve it faithfully with all his capacities. This must be the guiding principle of our actions. True membership in this nation demands that each of us contribute to solving its problems.

[Question] What is your assessment of the most recent Baghdad conference and the punitive political and economic measures taken against the Egyptian government?

[Answer] The conference and the unanimous agreement that resulted from it are a good thing. America's aim is to undermine the Arab solidarity manifested at the conference. As Arab states, we must recognize that we face a problem of destiny, one that has been with us for over 30 years. Our solidarity must not be a transient one; it must continue and grow in the coming years.

[Question] How do you assess the situation in the Arab Gulf region following the creation of an Islamic republic in Iran?

[Answer] The establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran is the most important, historic event in this region. We could say that history has been speeded up by tens of years. The Islamic republic came as a response to popular demand; therefore, we wish it well. As neighbors to Iran in this region, we are affected directly by the new republic. Iran borders both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan and will serve as a protective shield to the Gulf region in the future. We, who live on the other side of the Gulf, must unite and be ready to face whatever changes and exigencies that might develop. We must be vigilant to foil any attempt to split our ranks.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
9063

CSO: 4802

END

54

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY