15 JUNE 1979 **(FOUO 7/79)** **1 OF 1**

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JPRS L/8518

15 June 1979

U S S R

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 7/79)

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INTERNATIONAL

PARTICIPATION OF MILITARY IN AFRO-ASIAN REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

[Article by Professor G. I. Mirskiy, doctor of historical sciences, chief
of the Economics and Politics of Developing Countries Department, Institute
of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences:
"The Role of the Army in the Social Development of Asian and African
Countries"]

[Text] I

The collapse of the imperialist colonial system has had a significant
effect on the development of human society. V. I. Lenin's prediction that
"time is coming when all of the people of the East will take part in decid-
ing the fate of the entire world"[1] has come through. The colonial system
disintegrated under the powerful blows of the national liberation movement
in the Asian, African and Latin American countries. L. I. Brezhnev has
said the following: "On the whole, the colonial system of imperialism in
its classic forms can be considered completely liquidated."[2] The economic,
political and cultural problems of the developing countries are attracting
the constant attention of Marxist researchers, and it is becoming increas-
ingly obvious that any analysis of the political situation in the develop-
ing countries will be incomplete without a study of the role played by the
armed forces in the political life of the former colonial and dependent
countries. This is due to the following fact.

One of the most remarkable features of the contemporary development of the
Asian and African countries--perhaps the most prominent feature--is the
paramount role of the military in sociopolitical life. One does not have
to be an expert to know of the countless military coups taking place in
one after another of the former colonies; all one has to do is read the
newspapers. During the postwar period, there has been open intervention
by the armed forces in politics in Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Thailand, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, North Yemen, Lebanon,
Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Ethiopia, Somalia, Ghana, Mali,
Nigeria, Uganda, the Congo, Zaire, Madagascar, Chad, the Central African

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Republic, Benin, Togo, Burundi, Upper Volta and Sierra Leone. The army has not acted openly as an independent political force in India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia, Kenya, Tanzania, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Zambia and Malawi.[3]
The ratio of two to one speaks for itself.

The widespread nature of this phenomenon in the developing countries provides food for thought: After all, direct and open intervention by the army in politics, if we take European history as an example, is an exception to the rule and not the rule. Naturally, it is, by its nature, a political force, and the military power structure is part of the system of governmental power and a tool of the ruling class. V. I. Lenin wrote about the hypocrisy of those who declared that "the army should not be involved in politics."[4]
The direct control of the government, however, cannot be a function of the armed forces, and if this occurs it means that something has been disrupted in the system. In Asia and Africa the exception is becoming the rule, and if we add Latin America, where not a single country has escaped military coups, active participation by the army in political life, extending all the way to the seizure of power, would seem to be a natural tendency.

And it is precisely this, The fact is that neither the natural tendencies of capitalist society nor those of socialist society are completely applicable to the former colonial and dependent countries. Here it is necessary to immediately make two stipulations: In the first place, this does not in any sense signify recognition of some kind of special path which would supposedly lead neither to socialism nor to capitalism but to some kind of new structure: Some developing countries are taking the path of capitalism (although in specific, non-Western and "non-classic" forms) while others are moving toward socialism. In the second place, there is already a group-- as yet, small--of countries which are governed by avant-garde parties guided by Marxist ideology (Angola, Mozambique and some others), and in these countries some of the tendencies characteristic of socialist society are gradually developing, at least in the potential sense. On the whole, however, one of the factors which makes it possible to include all of the developing countries in a special category is precisely their backwardness or lack of development (the "disease of underdevelopment" is the result of colonial exploitation), and this means that they cannot be measured by the standards of the industrially (and socially or culturally) developed society.

It is precisely this "underdevelopment," which is particularly reflected in the absence of strong "basic" classes capable of achieving social hegemony-- the bourgeoisie and the proletariat--(basic in relation to another society-- that is, the developed bourgeois society), that lies at the basis of the following curious and important phenomenon: Two sociopolitical forces-- socialism and capitalism--are actively influencing the development of the liberated countries, but not one of them has an adequate social base in the majority of these countries as yet. World capitalism is backed up in the developing countries not so much by the developed class of the national industrial bourgeoisie (which, in principle, should be the agent of capitalist

development) as by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, representing the state-capitalistic structure (a kind of "surrogate" bourgeoisie), while the socialist tendency is supported in the majority of the progressive states that have freed themselves of colonial dependence not so much by the proletariat, which is only now becoming a "class for itself," as by the revolutionary democrats, an anti-imperialist and non-capitalist force that is not proletarian and not Marxist but is, to a large extent, petty bourgeois and nationalistic.

For this reason, something that represents an exception to the rule for the industrially developed bourgeois society is becoming the rule for the under-developed society. The incomplete class differentiation and the fragmented and chaotic nature of the social structure are creating the necessary pre-requisites for an unprecedented increase in executive authority and the power of state agencies which are capable, as K. Marx and F. Engels demon-strated, of temporarily, under certain historical conditions, realize their inherent tendency to rise above society, to alienate themselves from it and to dominate it. The possibility of a relatively independent governmental authority, the role and ambitions of the bureaucracy, the "artificial caste system" and other related issues have been discussed in several classical works of Marxism.[5] This state-bureaucratic caste cannot be examined in isolation from its military variety, from the ruling clique in the army--that is, the military bureaucracy. "The organized force of the state, the army"--this, according to Engels, is one of the two deciding forces in politics.[6] This occurs in societies where the main classes exist in a state of equilibrium, at which time the army can maintain "its own supremacy" over the public in general,[7] and to an even greater extent in societies where these classes are weak and undeveloped, in an atmosphere of incomplete class differentiation which gives the army an opportunity to temporarily play an independent role, and sometimes even the deciding role. Naturally, in either case the army objectively promotes any course of socioeconomic de-velopment which is in the interest of certain classes, even if these are still in the potential or embryonic stage. By their actions, the military (this refers primarily to officers, who are generally obediently followed by the soldier masses) are always "working" toward a particular future course of social development, even when these actions appear to be autonomous.

The struggle between two opposing tendencies--the tendency to serve the interests of the dominant class and the tendency to alienate oneself from society and to rise above classes--can be traced throughout history, includ-ing the history of Europe. As soon as the class of strong and independent property owners rose and achieved supremacy, the first tendency began to prevail and the second began to abate. Proof of this can be seen in the weakness of the centralized authority at the height of the feudal era in Europe.

This did not occur, however, when the pre-capitalist forms of ownership in the East were prevalent. As a result of the absence of an economically dominant class and as a result of the multiple structure, which made it

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impossible for the class of large property owners to dominate the entire
economy at any time, a favorable situation took shape for the rise of the
central executive authority. In a society with no clearly defined dominant
class and a prevalence of small producers who have been included in the
system of capitalist commercial production only to a slight extent or not
at all, only the state is capable of mobilizing the necessary resources
and accumulating capital (and in the era of the technological revolution,
which is affecting even the backward countries if they are striving for
industrialization, the need for capital grows immeasurably and far exceeds
the capabilities of the private sector). The economic weakness of private
capitalist business preserves and nurtures the relative independence of
the superstructure. There is a growing tendency toward authoritarianism--
based on excessive economic regulation and excessive emphasis on the state.

But why is this authority usually the military in the developing countries,
why is it precisely the military element of the state system that acquires
such significance in it? The fact is that most of these countries do not
have adequate conditions for the stable functioning of an authoritarian
civilian authority, which must always look for support in an exploitative
society to the strong class of private property owners with their economic
power and political prestige. It is this class that is absent in the
majority of the former colonies, although not in all of them (for instance,
India). Feudal and semifeudal landowners are ruined or severely weakened
by agrarian reforms, and in the overwhelming majority of the nations of
Tropical Africa these landowners never even existed. The industrial bour-
goisie, as mentioned above, is financially weak and, in addition to this,
cowardly, it has no authority and it has no experience or skill in the
sphere of modern business. In many countries, the bourgeoisie (primarily
commercial) is made up of foreigners--Chinese in Southeast Asia, emigrants
from Hindustan in East Africa, Arabs in West Africa and so forth; naturally,
this kept the bourgeoisie from gaining authority in the eyes of the native
population. In several countries, the bourgeoisie compromised itself by
cooperating with the colonizers or by proving incapable of effectively
waging an anti-imperialist struggle. Finally, the role of tradition and
religion must be taken into account. We know that the Eastern religions
did not encourage the individual to engage in private enterprise. For
example, Islam with its idea of predestination and its justification of
abuses of power was not a strong stimulus of production activity and impeded
individual efforts. Islam, just as Buddhism, did not encourage the indi-
vidual to strive for personal success. Warlords, landowners and bureaucrats,
but not private businessmen, stood on the highest rungs of the ladder of
hierarchical social values. Religion and tradition have not given these
people willingness to take a risk, a thirst for personal success or a
desire to save and accumulate capital (and this applies precisely to capital,
or resources put in circulation, and not simply to wealth), and successful
capitalist business is impossible without these qualities. All of this
worked together to create a situation in which wealthy people either did
not allow their money to circulate or only invested it in land and real
estate and deposited it in banks. At best, they engaged in trade or moved

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into the service sphere, but they never displayed any desire or taste for
investments in the industrial sphere, particularly in heavy industry, which
is so necessary to a young state. Heavy industry remained a sphere of
government activity, and this alone radically diminished the prestige and
social significance of the bourgeoisie.

A weak clas having neither a solid economic base nor authority in society
nor mass support could not give rise to a strong authority, and even the
very nature of the state power structure did not promote this. When the
colonizers were leaving, regimes were established (with their participa-
tion) which were copies of the political systems in the former mother
countries--that is, bourgeois-parliamentary regimes. But just as the
bourgeoisie in the majority of liberated countries was a "quasi-bourgeoisie,"
the democracy which was calculated and "programmed" for its supremacy turned
out to be a pseudo-democracy. This "democracy," which was brought from
outside and transplanted in unprepared soil, which was not backed up by
tradition and which had not been achieved through centuries of struggle for
civil rights and freedoms, became, under the conditions of domination by
the "quasi-bourgeois" nouveau riche, a charicature of even the customary,
bourgeois democracy of the West, which is itself a far cry from real justice
and equality. The struggle between political parties deteriorated into
unprincipled bickering between factions, cliques and clans; the most scan-
dalous corruption spread irrepressibly; the incredibly insolent new elite,
which was cynical beyond belief, which had already been decayed through and
through even at the time of its birth and which had inherited and absorbed
the vices of all exploitative classes known to history, grew rich in full
sight of everyone and zealously snatched at luxury and the "sweet life."
In many countries, the state arena was swarming with political pygmies,
greedy and impotent individuals fighting each other for a piece of the pie.
The puny and sickly system needed only the slightest push to collapse and
disappear forever--so it is no wonder that in some African countries two
companies of soldiers were enough to turn the entire regime upside-down
along with its whole gang of mercenary ministers and demagogue-parliamentarians?

During the very first years after the declaration of independence, however,
the defects of the "borrowed" civilian system became completely apparent,
and it also became obvious that many regimes were incapable of coping with
the tremendous tasks facing the liberated country, which was poverty-
stricken, wretched and in desperate need of everything--currency, machines,
workers and food. The national liberation revolution is often called the
"revolution of rising expectations." The masses believed that the "golden
age" would return after the departure of the foreign oppressors. They
believed the leaders who promised them this. But miracles do not happen,
and the reconstruction of a backward economy with a structure crippled by
the colonial yoke, the creation of a modern developed economy and the resolu-
tion of problems in connection with employment, food and accumulation and
other problems within just a few years are not within the power of any
authority, particularly the kind of authority left behind by the colonizers,
who had chosen kindred spirits in advance to serve as the new elite--an
elite with virtually no concern for the public interests. The wretched

rates and results of economic progress gave rise to severe disillusionment, which was intensified by the scandalous growth of social contrasts and the irrepressible widening of the gap between the top-level bourgeois bureaucrats and the people, and they eventually led to widespread and severe socio-political crisis. The need for change was totally obvious to everyone, and it was in this atmosphere, against the background of the extreme weakness of civilian political institutions and the absence of the normal constitu-tional machinery capable of guaranteeing that the necessary changes would be achieved by non-violent means, that the army turned out to be the only force capable of doing away with the decayed and discredited regime.

Therefore, the countless military coups in the former colonies are a natural result of the extreme political instability which results from mounting social tension, and the latter, in turn, is primarily due to absolutely unsatisfactory results in the area of economic development and the elevation of the public standard of living, the bankruptcy of the pseudo-democratic political system, mismanagement and corruption. Since the masses were not organized and there were no strong and authoritative mass political organiza-tions with a progressive platform, the armed forces were given a unique op-portunity to initiate change and control the fate of the nation.

In addition, there was the extraordinarily strong influence--which was also, in general, favorable for the activization of the army--of pre-bourgeois relations and pre-capitalist social forms, primarily communal relations, which have traditionally fostered a strong central authority in the backward society (we should recall that K. Marx said that "the idyllic rural com-munities...were always a firm basis of Eastern despotism").[8] Communal traditions had very little to do with the emergence and establishment of even the rudimentary democratic institutions or with the arousal of the initiative of the masses; rather, they aided in the cultivation of passivity and the habit of relying on "elders," on the heads of the community--that is, the bosses. Under present conditions, it was easy for the "new military bosses" to take advantage of this spirit in social relations, which was antidemocratic in general and which fostered paternalism.

In Tropical Africa, pre-capitalist relations also give rise to the dreadful evil of tribalism, the militant and irreconcilable local form of nationalism which has severely threatened the integrity of the state in some countries, and this motive has played an enormous role in substantiating the reasons for military coups. Finally, one other phenomenon deserves mention: The sharply increased role of the state in all spheres of social and economic life led to a situation in which the social prestige of a career in the civil service or the armed forces rose considerably. As Ruth First, English expert on African affairs, writes, administrators in a military uniform or a civilian suit became the new "power bureaucracy."[9]

II

Despite all the similarity of the motives for military coups and their under-lying causes, there are significant differences in the nature and goals of the groups of officers who have established military regimes in Asia and Africa.

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Here and further on, the word "army" will signify the officer corps, who
are obeyed virtually without question by soldiers in the overwhelming
majority of cases. In Asia and Africa the soldier is a semi-literate young
peasant (usually from the outlying districts and from a backward tribe)
who is happy that he has been able, as a result of extremely fierce competi-
tion (there is no universal draft, the army is small and is made up of
volunteers), to enter military service and thereby guarantee himself a
future career. Because he quickly loses touch with his previous milieu
and because he is ignorant in political matters, he blindly follows the
officers. The officers, on the other hand, in most cases do not come from
the proletariat or the peasantry, but neither do they come from the elite;
they come from the petty bourgeois, middle and intermediate strata, they
are the sons of minor employees, teachers and small landowners, and most
of them are not from the capital but from the provinces.[10] This, inciden-
tally, is the main reason for their hostile feelings toward the rich elite
in the capital--feelings which cause the officers to approve of the idea
of overthrowing the government and rulers imposed on the country by the
colonizers.[11]

The attitude of the petty urban bourgeoisie, particularly the provincials,
toward the elite in the capital stems from a long-established stereotype.
As an ideal, it arouses envy, but because it is unattainable, it arouses
hatred. On the other hand, as if in compensation, the ideal is contrasted
with virtue, which is extolled in every way possible during the period of
the military coup. The bourgeois society of the capital is completely made
up of degenerate, amoral, egotistical and cosmpolitan parasites. For this
reason, moral simplicity is extolled, as well as piety, rigorous honesty
and the traditions of mutual assistance which go back go the patriarchal
peasant virtues.

The consequences of this sociopsychological phenomenon are two-sided. On
the one hand, hostile feelings develop for the corrupt antinational caste,
for large landowners, for financiers and, in the Arab countries, for the
aristocracy. On the other hand, all of this arouses contempt for parlia-
mentarism, for parties and for democratic standards in general. Parlia-
mentary maneuvers, party intrigues and eloquent rhetoric--all of these
attributes of "liberal democracy" are alien to the officers, who are taught
discpline and order, in the spirit of subordination. Besides this, officers
pride themselves on their nationalism and patriotism (indeed, after the
masses become disillusioned with the mercenary and antinational "civilian"
elite, they look upon the army as a symbol of national spirit and the
personification of incorruptibility). Patriotism and anti-imperialist
nationalism prompted the actions of Nasser's "Free Officers," the Iraqi
officers in 1958 and the Yemeni officers in 1952.

These sociopsychological characteristics of the officers contribute to mis-
trust in independent action by the masses. Nationalism and anti-imperialism
can coexist with extremely limited and mediocre social ideas, an antidemo-
cratic spirit and petty bourgeois anti-intellectualism. A limited and

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narrow outlook, a lack of trust in anything new and different, stagnation, religious prejudices and firmly entrenched conformity give rise to a suspicious attitude toward democrats and communists.

The new, enormous, complex and multifaceted world, the gates of which have suddenly been opened wide for the backward society, is frightening and seems incomprehensible and strange. This gives rise to an instinctive need for simplicity and stability and the desire to preserve all that is traditional, customary and comprehensible, to preserve primitive moral values and time-honored beliefs. Military training teaches the person to mistrust theorizing and a broad outlook, and the habit of relying only on "one's group" within the framework of the barrack-room conspiracy does not promote contact with the masses. The belief in the need for control over political thought and, consequently, over parties is enforced. There is growing fear that the masses, under the influence of pernicious party agita- tion, could fall into "error," and this gives rise to a fear of the masses and a fear of parties and to a paternalistic approach toward the people, who "need to be led." This is also the reason for the desire to "conduct a revolution from the top" and for the belief in the special mission of the army, which sometimes evolves into tendencies toward elitist and corporate isolation and toward the enforced institution of barrack-bureaucratic methods of control.

All of this applies to the more developed countries—in Asia and North Africa—but it could become applicable to the countries of Tropical Africa in the future.

We will now analyze the motives and goals of the military's action in Asia and Africa. At first glance, there would seem to be two main variants: The first is a purely patriotic attempt to liberate the native land from imperialist domination and from the power of the internal reactionary forces associated with imperialism; the second is the fiasco of the "civilian" regimes set up after independence has been won. Right-wing reactionary coups, however, have also taken place in the Afro-Asian world and in Latin America (Ghana and Bangladesh). The first type (Nasser's "Free Officer Corps," the Iraqi military in 1958 and the revolutionary officers headed by Qaddafi in Libya in 1969) does not require any special explanation and is already a thing of the past. In this article, as could be discerned from the very beginning, we are investigating the second variant, which is still of topical interest even today. Here it is quite easy to distinguish between two "sub-variants": One of them is the coup that takes place entirely at the top level, in which the military acts to prevent social upheaval at a time of crisis and strides to preserve the conservative course by overthrowing the civilian regime. This applies to the coups in Pakistan, Thailand and several countries in Tropical Africa (Nigeria, Togo, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, the initial coups in Dahomey and others). The military leaders heading these coups have no penchant whatso- ever for social revolution; most of them are men who once served in the English or French armies, who fought in the colonial wars in Indochina and

Algeria, who were trained in English and French military institutes, who
have been assimilated into the "European" milieu and who are accustomed
to looking at things through the eyes of a white officer, distinguished
by his bourgeois conservative views and anticommunist prejudices. An ex-
ample of this kind of officer can be seen in the military leaders who
overthrew Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966, even though this coup itself
was of a different nature--a "preventive-counterrevolutionary coup," close
to the actions taken by the Latin American military leaders against the
leftist regimes.[12]

This description applies to Tropical Africa. In Pakistan, Thailand and
Indonesia the coups were carried out by military leaders of different
views, but with no less antipathy toward democracy and revolutionary social
change. Just as in several Latin American countries, imperialism here is
trying to deal with the absence of a sufficiently "reliable" and strong
local bourgeoisie by using the army as a kind of "substitute," as a sur-
rogate bourgeoisie capable of setting the wheels of capitalist development
in motion. The army is supposed to provide a "cover" for the development
of the bourgeoisie and to assist this class to complete the establishment
of itself as the leader in society. This reliance on military regimes is
apparently one of imperialism's latest attempts at the artificial creation
of favorable conditions for the establishment of capitalism in the develop-
ing countries.

Revolutionary military coups are of a fundamentally different nature (for
example, the ones in Burma, Syria, Iraq, Benin, the Congo and the Malagasy
Republic). The group of Burmese military-revolutionaries headed by Ne Win,
the Syrian Ba'ath military and the Congolese, Beninese and Malagasy revolu-
tionary officers, whose evolution began with anti-imperialist nationalism
and a desire to modernize the economy and improve social conditions,
logically and eventually arrived--as Nasser once did--at the realization
that only socialism could become an alternative means of national rebirth,
liberation from imperialist exploitation and the achievement of social
justice. These are revolutionary democrats in uniform. They are not
striving to perpetuate the military regimes as such, but regard the army
as one of the elements of the national forces fighting for the progressive
transformation of society. In the Congo, as was pointed out by Denis
Sassu-Ngesso, first deputy chairman of the Military Committee of the
Congolese Labor Party, a fierce struggle resulted in the "triumph of the
thesis of the army which is constructed and perceived as a political force
and the position of which reflects the class struggle in society.... Now
the CLP has a firm structure in the army. There is not a single unit with-
out a party cell. Besides this, socialist youth organizations are active
in the army. The army in our country is an integral part of society. And
it is natural that, when the structure of the people's government was being
established, military men were elected deputies of municipal councils and
the councils of provinces, regions and so forth."[13]

Therefore, the policy of the late state and party leader, Major Marien Ngouabi, who demanded that the army "be revolutionary" and instituted a corps of political commissars, are being implemented in the Congo.[14] The army, it was stressed when the Center for Military Education was being established, must be simultaneously a political, military and productive organism."[15]

In any discussion of the relationship between the army and the revolutionary ruling party, some mention should also be made of the experience in Tanzania-- one of the few countries in which the socialist orientation was not chosen by the military and where no military regime has existed. The problem of the organic inclusion of the army into a society headed by an avant-garde party is naturally of great importance in this country as well. The Tanzanian army is completely under the jurisdiction of the ruling party and is, as it were, a component of the party structure. Servicemen are also party members. The post of political commissar of the armed forces was created with the rank of colonel, and a party cell headed by a company commander was formed in each company. Military recruitment is carried out by the youth movement of the ruling party, which details around 1,000 young people each year for military service on the recommendation of party organizations. After a 3-month training period, some of them are sent to work in agriculture, some are assigned to construction projects and the rest are sent to serve in the regular army and on the police force.[16]

By announcing their choice in favor of socialism, the military revolutionaries proved that the army could play a serious progressive role in the developing countries under certain conditions. To put it more precisely, it is not the army in itself that does this, but its revolutionary wing of common soldiers, acting in alliance with other progressive forces.[17] After all, the military regime is a temporary phenomenon, and "army unity" is a myth which conceals inevitable class differences. This becomes most apparent after the military takes power.

The army frequently enters the political scene wearing the glorious halo of "saviour of the fatherland." The military leaders declare their intention to put an end to internal struggle and restore national unity and honor. Many people are convinced that a new stage has begun in the nation's history and that, from now on, this nation, headed by a military government which stresses the importance of integrity, duty and patriotism, will move, with all forces united, toward prosperity. During this process, the military government is naturally considered to be temporary: the officers will put everything in order, will put an end to everything that is slowing down development and splitting the nation, will guide the state onto the true path and will then return to the barracks.

There is no need to speak here of how groundless these hopes generally turn out to be. In most cases, a military government turns out to be less ef- fective, less stable and less temporary than it seems to be in the beginning. The reasons for this are easy to understand. Western authors usually stress the inadequate professional background of officers for the management of

state affairs when they discuss the factors contributing to the failure of military regimes.[18] Actually, this is not the main factor, although it is true that the strict army style of operations based on orders, the lack of experience in work with the masses and incompetence in economic and social matters seriously complicate the effective functioning of the new authorities. But the essence of the matter is to be found elsewhere.

In a heterogeneous, split society without a clearly defined leading force, the army does appear to be the particular factor of national unification which is capable of subordinating individual and group interests to the common interests and of guaranteeing united action. But this is an illusion. The army as such is only the apparent leader of society. The assumption of power by the military does not solve the problem of finding a force capable of organizing and leading a united front, within the framework of which all national, patriotic and anti-imperialist forces can be unified and the masses can be mobilized for struggle to attain the goals of the new stage in the national liberation revolution. This force should not simply represent various population strata and social elements and be "nationwide" in this sense, it must also be strongly "motivated" ideologically and it must have a precise ideology and program and a sufficiently strong social basis of support. The army does not have all of these.

The ideological motivation of the officer corps might consist of nationalism, patriotism, professional solidarity and a dislike for intrigue and corruption. All of this is not even enough for the attainment of the objectives mentioned above. And the army is even more incapable of doing anything further, with the possible exception of some individual elements of the military. This problem is connected with the social and ideological heterogeneity of the military men, who, despite all of their corporate spirit, solidarity and discipline, cannot represent a unified social group with its own integral ideology. This does not contradict the indisputable, in our opinion, thesis concerning the possibility--for a certain length of time--of relative autonomy on the part of the army in the developing countries. This autonomy, however, is more passive than positive or constructive.

When a nationwide crisis comes to a head, during the course of which events can threaten, in the first place, the state itself and, in the second place, the army as a privileged institution, the military acts as a united force. But as soon as the time comes to do constructive work after the assumption of power, the heterogeneity of the military becomes totally apparent. It becomes clear that the monolithic nature of the army is nothing more than a myth. It is only held together by a common threat. When the threat is removed, it becomes evident that even among the officers there are rightists and leftists, moderates and radicals, representatives of the same ideological political currents which exist in "civilian politics." And this is not simply a matter of the army being a "chip off the block of society"; this is not entirely correct, because in the military service the members of different classes and social strata come together, acquire new traits and merge into a single organism. A standard corporate outlook is developed.

Even when officers come from the lowest population strata, the "relative share" accounted for by the heritage they have received from their families and their social environment in early childhood is not very great in most cases in comparison to the huge amount of professional training they have been given during their long years in the institute and the barracks. The process of unification goes quite far and quite deep. In most cases, the corporation absorbs and assimilates members of various social strata.

Something else is of importance: This standard corporate outlook is too narrow, it covers an excessively limited sphere of theory and practice and it is only sufficient for a demonstration of solidarity in a crisis, but is completely inadquate for the accomplishment of constructive social, political and government tasks. Whether they wish to or not, the officers have to make use of the ideas and programs of civilian politicians. After the officers have become accustomed to political activity, they emerge from the barracks, circulate in the civilian milieu and are increasingly influenced by certain parties, factions or representatives of various socio-political currents. They realize that certain tasks are facing them and that their purely professional and military ideology of solidarity is no longer sufficient for the performance of these tasks. They look for an answer to their problems in the traditional political environment, and the answers they find, naturally, can vary dramatically. It is difficult to predict the particular individuals to whom a specific political line will appeal--it is possible that the almost forgotten "social heritage" acquired prior to military service will once again play its role here, but it is probable that social ties established throughout life and contacts with various circles of the civilian intelligentsia will be even more significant. Naturally, the development of society and the dynamics of its contradictions are extremely important in this area. In any case, the unity of the officers is eroded. All of this either leads to the establishment of relative equi- librium between various factions and groups in the military, not one of which is capable of gaining the upper hand, and the subsequent loss of power by the military through a process of "mutual extermination," or to a situation in which one particular faction bends all of the others to its will or eliminates them. But this is no longer government by the army as such, but by one of its groups, acting in the interests of certain "civilian" groups or some particular variant of sociopolitical development. In principle, this does not differ from the customary political struggle of civilian forces. The "purely military" regime ceases to exist at this point. The army--or, more precisely, the triumphant faction of the army--moves to the right or to the left and finds a more or less specific basis of support in society, although it might formally continue to act on behalf of the nation as a whole.

The triumphant army group, in an alliance with certain social forces, already has a more or less integral political platform in the areas of domestic and foreign policy. With the entire military under its control (since all other military factions have been eliminated), it holds all the power. It has a monopoly on armed strength and a monopoly on force, which was not accessible

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to any of the civilian political groups fighting for power prior to the arrival of the military. This gives the military a tremendous advantage and provides it with a unique opportunity for leadership in society. We will repeat that the role of leader is taken on in this case not by the army as a whole, but by the victorious military faction in an alliance with kindred civilian factions. It must be said that this kind of combination of a monopoly on physical and military force and the support of quite influential social groups can, given the presence of a definite political course, permit the authorities to implement their chosen line quite resolutely and purposefully and to guarantee relative stability within the country. The strength of the regime is directly proportional to the intensity of the preceding political struggle and the severity of the defeats suffered by opposing factions. It is not surprising that the military regimes with the most "seniority" are regimes like the one in Indonesia (established in 1965), which came into being during the course of a crisis marked by the unprecedented upsurge of leftist parties and groups, followed by their overthrow--that is, regimes established in an atmosphere of the fiercest internal struggle. There can certainly be no discussion of "natural national leadership" in these cases, since the social forces reflecting the interests of the majority of the population have been physically excluded from the political scene. These regimes (which are no longer military, strictly speaking, but military-civilian), which the present regime in Zaire (also a long-lived one) resembles, represent the interests of the new privileged bourgeois bureaucratic groups that are hoping to ally themselves with foreign capital.

Other variants of political action by the military, however, also exist. In Ethiopia the feudal monarchy was liquidated and the process of profound social reform was begun on the initiative of a revolutionary military organization which had gradually gained predominance in the armed forces and then conducted a radical purge of all elements connected with the emperor's regime.

In Afghanistan, military leaders with revolutionary inclinations overthrew the regime of the top-level aristocracy at the request of the National Democratic Party on 27 April 1978. The victory of the progressive forces was also made possible by the fact that revolutionary tendencies managed to gain a toehold in the army.

The tendency toward the "interruption" of capitalist development and the investigation of new avenues, which inevitably leads to a choice in favor of socialism, only became prevalent after many influential representatives of the armed forces began to support it. Under the guidance of military revolutionary groups, which had allied themselves with progressive civilian forces, the unity of the general public was ensured and the idea of a national alliance became a fact.

On the whole, it must be said that it is one thing when, under the conditions of a pro-imperialist, feudal, antihumanitarian or corrupt regime, honorable and patriotic officers establish their own control in order to save their

native land and put an end to oppression, backwardness and degradation. But it is quite another matter when the military initiates the process of profound social reforms in a country which has already won independence. In principle, there is a difference (although there does not have to be) between military men acting as national revolutionaries and as social revolutionaries. The former do not necessarily become the latter. While the "national revolutionary character" of patriotic officers in the developing countries could be called unconditional, their "social revolutionary character" is conditional and selective. It would be a serious mistake to call the army as such the leading force in the anticapitalist revolution and the leader of society in countries with a socialist orientation.

The only condition which can guarantee the truly progressive development of the liberated countries is the organization of the masses and the creation of a progressive party with a scientific socialist platform. This kind of party can guide the army and assist in transforming it into a people's armed force devoid of "elitist" and caste biases.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Completed Collected Works], vol 39, p 328.

2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 590.

3. This does not include the small states, most of them islands. None of the categories include Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, where the revolutionary democratic regimes were established not by the army, but by a party headed by armed liberation forces. "Army intervention" does not necessarily mean a military coup, it can also mean an attempted coup. Besides this, the limited length of this article does not allow for the analysis of the role played by the military in the political life of Latin America, where 550 military coups, not counting unsuccessful putsches, have taken place in the last 150 years.

4. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 12, p 113.

5. See K. Marx' "The First Drafts of 'Civil War in France,'" "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," "The Class Struggle in France from 1848 Through 1850" and "Revolution in Spain," F. Engels' "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany" and "The Constitutional Question in Germany" and other works.

6. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 21, pp 446-447.

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7. Ibid., vol 12, p 413.

8. Ibid., vol 9, p 135.

9. R. First, "The Barrel of a Gun," London, 1970, p 112.

10. In the armies of Indonesia, Burma and Egypt, 25-30 percent of the generals and senior officers were the sons of servicemen and civil servants and 28-30 percent were members of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie ("Zarubezhnyy Vostok i sovremennost'" [The Foreign East and the Present Day], Moscow, 1974, p 443.

11. The "known democratization" of the power structure, including the officer corps, has been discussed by B. G. Gafurov (see his book entitled "Aktual'nyye problemy sovremennogo natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya" [The Current Problems of Today's National Liberation Movement], Moscow, 1976, p 69).

12. One of the organizers of Nkrumah's overthrow, Colonel Afrifa, wrote of how he was influenced by his studies at England's Sandhurst Military Academy: "I spent the best years of my life in Sandhurst.... I am a great admirer of the English way of life and the English legislative system" (Afrifa, "The Ghana Coup," 1966; London, 1967, pp 49, 27).

13. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 4, 1978, p 45.

14. Commandant Marien Ngouabi, "Le Role de l'Armee Service Presidentiel de Presse et l'Information," p 12.

15. "Au Pouvoir du peuple--armee du peuple," Brazzaville, 1970, p 8.

16. J. M. Lee, "African Armies and Civil Order," New York, 1969, pp 149-150.

17. For a discussion of this topic, see K. N. Brutents, "Sovremennyye natsional'no-osvoboditel'nyye revolyutsii" [Contemporary National Libera-tions], Moscow, 1974, p 244.

18. See "Le Role extra-militaire de l'Armee dans le Tiers Monde," Paris, 1966, p 409; PANORAMA, Rome, 4 October 1973; B. Vernier, "Armee et politique au Moyen-Orient," Paris, 1966, pp 109-110; and others.

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NATIONAL

ETHNOGRAPHER REVIEWS STUDY OF NATIONALITIES QUESTIONS

Moscow ISTORIYA SSSR In Russian No 2, 1979 pp 58-67

[Article by Academician Yu. V. Bromley: "Toward the Study of the Basic Stages and Directions of National Relations In the USSR"]

[Text] The successes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the implementation of the basic principles of the Leninist national policies are an achievement that, as L. I. Brezhnev noted, "can justifiably be placed on the same level as victories in the building of a new society in the USSR, in industrialization, in collectivization and in the cultural revolution."[1] Nevertheless, even in a developed socialist society which sees as its goals for the future the development of all peoples in the USSR, the convergence and strenghteneng of unity among them, friendship and brotherhood, and the formation of an international world view, the necessity remains to constantly consider national factors in the practice of socialist building. This consideration is unthinkable without the broad utilization of scientific achievements and primarily of those branches that have as their subject the study of complex and multifaceted national phenomena, international relations and processes encompassing a broad spectrum of subjects ranging from economic and state and legal to psychological.

It is apparent that the most important prerequisite for an analysis of modern national and international processes and for predicting the tendencies of their future development is the study of their historically-directed national experiences.

During the 1970's a number of works were published presenting a historiographic evaluation of the study of a number of aspects of national relations in the USSR.[2] However, until now there has been no summary of their inter-disciplinary study. Moreover, at various stages of the historical ascent of our society the study of national relations had its own special features arising from the tasks of socialist building as well as from the development of these very relations and also of the scientific disciplines studying them. This article attempts to indicate some of the common landmarks in the history of the study of national relations in our country by the representatives of various societal disciplines. The study unavoidably is of a preliminary nature.

Already during the period when Soviet historical science was in its beginning, when on the basis of the works of V. I. Lenin, the decisions of the 8th, 10th and 12th congresses and other party documents on the national question the first works on national relations were published, written mainly by active participants in the Great October socialist revolution and active party members, the necessity arose to deal not only with socio-economic and political aspects but also with legal aspects relating to national-state building, national-ethnic aspects relating to demarcation, language aspects relating to the literacy in an illiterate people, etc.[3]

At the end of the 1920's and into the 1930's the study of national relations proceeds within the framework of civil history. Here the study of a newly-developed problematics such as for example the historical process of industrialization is accompanied by an examination of questions of eliminating the economic inequalities of previously backward peoples, of eliminating a multi-structure, of forming national cadres of the working class, etc.[4] Individual attempts are being made to study cultural changes that have taken place in the lives of kolkhoz peasants of various nationalities in the USSR. The first steps are being taken to examine national problematics within a generalized scheme. Here most attention is directed at the history of national-state building and primarily at the formation of the Union of the SSR. During the first decade after the war the exploration of these themes becomes even more extensive.[5] As is justifiably noted in historiographic literature, the works of these years "In examining the formation and development of nations and nationalities quite often speak of the development of economics, culture and national state in general. There is no clear division of the national aspects in the lives of the peoples as compared with the social."[6]

In approximately the late 1950's a new stage began in the study of the history of national relations in the USSR. It is related to the publication of the Complete Works of V. I. Lenin, where for the first time there was the printing of works such as, "On the Formation of the USSR" and "On the Question of Nationality or of Autonomy," and to the publication of the decisions of the CC CPSU dedicated to the 90th and 100th anniversaries of V. I. Lenin's birth. It is also related to the expansion of the source base for the topics. This stage is characterized by two tendencies that are rooted in the preceding period. On the one hand there is increasing specialization in the study of the development of nations and on the other hand--the isolation of purely national subjects as the purpose of study (or in other words, national processes and concepts as changes occurring in nations not only as a result of internal developments but also because of external interrelationships among themselves).

A great deal of attention is given to the assimilation of the Leninist ideological-theoretical legacy on the national question and to the elucidation of the historical role of V. I. Lenin in the development of the Soviet multi-national state, the national state system of the USSR and the solution of national problems.[7] Participating in the study of various aspects of national processes are specialists on the history of the USSR, on the history

of the CPSU, on philosophy, law, economics, literature, linguistics and on ethnography.

During the 1950's and 1960's the histories of all the union republics, most autonomous republics and oblasts were written. At this time civil historians and philosophers continued the work of studying national culture and the forma-tion of socialist nations.[9] Significant attention was given to the elucidation of the role of the CPSU in the implementation of Leninist principles of national policies in our country.[10] A number of important aspects of this theme were discussed in a two-volume work published in two editions devoted to the history of national-state building in the USSR.[11]

Documents from the 23rd, 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and from the 50th anniversary celebration of the formation of the USSR encouraged the continued development of works on national relations in the USSR on a level of developed socialism.[12] Our historians increased their study of the various aspects of cooperation and friendship between the peoples of our country, of their social and cultural convergence, of questions on the international training of workers.[13] They turned to the criticism of bourgeois falsificators of the history of national relations in the USSR.[14] There was continued study of the role of V. I. Lenin in the elaboration of important questions in national relations, including the problem of national-state building.[15] The study of national relations in the countries of socialist cooperation was begun.[16]

Our lawyers made a considerable contribution to the elaboration of a national problematics and primarily to the study of the creation and development of the USSR, the formation and development of the sovereignty of the Soviet state, to questions dealing with the constructive bases of interrelations between the state and union republics and to the study of the development of state-legal forms and principles of soviet federalism. Works on the history of the state and the law have been published in all union republics. A summary of this is presented in the three-volume "History of the Soviet State and Law."[17] In recent years the elaboration of the aforementioned themes has continued. New and valuable material is being introduced. An example of this is the extensive collection of documents entitled, "The Formation and Development of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

In the mid-1960's economists began to take an active part in the study of national problems. Now we already have considerable specialized literature[18] on equalizing the level of economic development of the peoples of the USSR. In this area insufficient study has been made of the following questions--the formation of republic budgets, the mechanism of the effect of economic processes on spiritual life, etc.

The last decades have been noted for the increased work of linguists. In the area of the study of the languages of the peoples of the USSR their efforts are being directed at the elaboration of purely linguistic aspects,[19] as well as at the study of the processes of development of social functions of languages.[20] This is the approach taken in the four-volume collective work

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entitled, "The Laws of Development of Literary Languages of the Peoples of the USSR."[21] Since the second half of the 1960's and especially in the 1970's attention has increased to the study of the processes of bilingualism[22] and the interrelationships of the languages of the peoples of the USSR.[23] The first very important steps have been made to study the national-cultural characteristics of speech patterns.[24]

During the last decade the study of the cultures of the peoples of the USSR has become very important. Here, whereas the general characteristics of national culture were presented, as we saw, mainly within the framework of civil history as well as in the combined works of philosophers,[25] its individual components were studied by a whole series of special disciplines. Literary criticism traditionally played a leading role. Of course here we must mention the leading work of the early 1970's, the six-volume "History of Soviet Multi-National Literature."[26] From the point of view of national problematics in this fundamental research the disclosure of the unity of development of the multi-national soviet literature is especially valuable. This unity is revealed in all the fullness of its national-historical embodiment in each literature, in the diversity of the most varied of its forms as determined by the age of the literature, the period in which it became a part of the general literary process, its traditions, its regional ties, i.e. by everything that determines the individuality of each literature. During the 1960's and 1970's many volumes were published on the history of the dramatic theater, music, fine arts, cinema, etc.[27] In these as in many other works dedicated to the art of the peoples of the USSR during the Soviet period a great deal of attention is given to the problem of the relationship between the national and international in the art under discussion.[28] In such works researchers focus their attention on how works of art reflect and express national moments while at the same time artistic cultural works become actual components of national processes and national relations, only becoming the property of the majority of one or another nationality, penetrating into its daily life and its everyday consciousness.[29] Unfortunately, this real participation of art in the national process is hardly studied at all.

As we know, the social cultural level is within the field of interest of ethnography, which in the post-war years began to give a great deal of attention to changes mainly in the village population. Nevertheless, for a long time there was no research done on the relationship between mores and customs and the national process.[30] This work has begun only in the last decades. Here ethnographers give greatest attention to ethnic (ethnic-cultural) aspects of national processes,[31] elucidating them mainly on the basis of materials relating to traditions and customs. Recently scientists have dealt with the question of the penetration of occupational standards into everyday life and of their fulfillment of actual ethnic functions.

Ethnic-social research done in recent decades to a certain degree encouraged the elaboration of this aspect of the problem. The ethnodemographic study of national processes in the USSR has also begun.[32]

In characterizing the specialized and so called "componential" study of
national problematics it is essential to mention the psychological aspect
of questions of national and ethnic self-consciousness which began to
be more greatly developed during the 1960's and 1970's. There is a certain
amount of divergence on these subjects. There is obviously a necessity to
continue the empirical study of specific spheres in which the national
peculiarities of the psyche are exhibited.

On the whole even this cursory survey quite evidently shows how much has
been done during the last decades by the representatives of various branches
of social science in the area of the study of various aspects of national
problematics.

Already in the mid-1950's and especially in the 1960's there began to be felt
a need for works that would show the main directions for the development of
national relations while isolating national problematics in the form of a
subject for special study. In accordance with this need there is a tendency
to produce generalized descriptions of national processes in the USSR.
The role of the pioneers in this undoubtedly belongs to our philosophers and
mainly to specialists in the area of scientific communism as well as to
party historians. The aforementioned tendency has its roots in the preceding
period when it was expressed in collective as well as individual monographs.[35]
To a definite degree this tendency gave rise to and encouraged the well-
known discussion of "pation" in the journal VOPROSY ISTORII during the second
half of the 1960's.[36] In the course of this discussion the complexity of
national phenomena became clear and attention was drawn to some aspects of
national problematics that previously had remained in the shadows (for
example, national self-consciousness, the correlation of the ethnic and
strictly social in the national). In connection with this we must mention
the discussion about ethnicity in the pages of SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA.[37]
It is true that the circle of participants (as well as readers) in this
discussion was significantly smaller and thus its results are revealed more
slowly and right now are affecting mainly the research of ethnographers.

Among the general works coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the USSR
we should specially note the collective work of the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism of the CC CPSU, "Leninism and the National Question Under Modern
Conditions," which is already in its second printing.[38] The main role in
the creation of similar general works as previously belongs to philosophers
and specialists on the problems of scientific communism and to party
historians. Ethnographers have also made an important contribution to the
publication of such studies. I have in mind the work "Modern Ethnic
Processes in the USSR," which has also gone through two printings.[39]
In all of these works the national is characterized in its indissoluble
ties with the international. At the same time the further strengthening
of the internationalizing tendency under conditions of developed socialism
in the development of nations and nationalities in our country required
intensive attention. The result of this was the creation of an entire
series of works devoted to the study of a new historical community--the Soviet

people. The first works of this nature appeared in the mid-1960's to the
early 1970's, but extensive publications on these themes have appeared in
recent years.[40] A new stimulus for the elaboration of national problematics
was the preparation for celebrating the 60th anniversary of October,
including scientific conferences devoted to this anniversary.[41] Here a
significant step was taken to elucidate national relations under conditions
of developed socialism.[42] The increased attention to the study of national
relations in our country that is characteristic of the modern social
sciences was expressed in the intensification of studies of the various
aspects of national relations[43] as well as, and this is especially
vital, in the strengthening of the tendency toward inter-disciplinary
cooperation. This tendency appeared quite obviously in the publication
of a collective work by the Institute of History of the USSR
Academy of Sciences entitled, "The Soviet People--A New Historical
Community of Peoples." Workers of other scientific institutions of the
USSR Academy of Sciences (Institutes of Government and Law, of Philosophy,
Linguistics,World Literature, Ethnography, and so forth) participated in
the preparation of this work. The interdisciplinary approach was clearly
evident in the aforementioned "Modern Ethnic Processes in the USSR."
Although this work was written by the workers of a single scientific
institution (Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences)
it examined not only ethnocultural, but also ethno-linguistic, ethno-social
and ethno-demographic aspects of national processes as well (in connection
with this we should note that frequently one and the same scientist can
simultaneously be a specialist in various branches of knowledge and that
his scientific profile by no means is determined by his association with
one or another scientific institution and especially not by that with a
primary vuz specialization). In the development of inter-disciplinary
cooperation on national problematics a special role is played by the
Scientific Soviet on National Problems of the Section of Social Sciences
of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which has already been in
existence for over 10 years.

In the course of the complex research on national problematics it became clear
that it was necessary to move from an establishment of the results of
national processes and relations to an elucidation of their internal
mechanism, to a determination of the correlation between various components
of national processes as well as factors that determine them. This required
massive quantitative data which was partially provided by the population
censuses of 1959 and 1970. In connection with this it became necessary to
expand the base of sources for research by performing specific sociological
research. This was also required by the growing attention to the problems
of the individual under conditions of developed socialism.[44] The determination
of the main directions for this type of study was based on the fact that
the most important thing for the understanding of the internal mechanism of
national processes is the elucidation of the interrelation between their
ethnic and social parameters. The new scientific direction studying this tie
is known as ethnosociology. The first studies of ethnosociologists that were
representative of the science as a whole were conducted in Tatariya in 1967.
The results of the studies are presented in a book published in 1973.[45] At

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approximately the same time individual specifically sociological studies related to national problematics were made in Estonia and Latviya,[46] as well as among the peoples of the lower Amur.[47] In 1971-1976 the ethnosociologists of the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences conducted mass studies according to a single program in Estonia, Moldavia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Armenia and the RSFSR. Although the geography of ethnosociological studies is still not great, the results are clearly perceptible, and not only in the purely cognitive but in the applied plan as well (I have in mind the various recommendations of ethnosociologists based on the materials of their research made to republic practical organizations). It is also considered essential to propose that ethnosociology in no case become simply a study of just the social parameters of the nation (without a correlation with ethnic factors) because this would already be simply concrete sociology. Of course it is also important to make ethnosociological research complex by coordinating it with other disciplines studying national problematics. This should be done not by duplication but by specialization and in particular by conducting specifically sociological studies of national aspects in the development of Soviet art, literature, etc. It should be said that it is important to develop ethno-psychological research of an empirical nature within ethnosociology.

In summary all that has been said apparently enables us to confirm that as a result of the efforts (frequently still separate) of the representatives of various social science disciplines a field of knowledge has developed, the subject of which is the national processes in our country during the years of Soviet power. A primary task in its development is further cooperation in the efforts of the representatives of various disciplines, each of which examines national processes within its own framework, has its own research point of view. Therefore one of our most important tasks is the careful examination of everything that has been amassed by the representatives of social science disciplines in order to theoretically interpret this special branch of knowledge. Only theoretical mutual-enrichment will permit us to more thoroughly understand it and to secure the continued cooperation of efforts by specialists of various profiles.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" ["Following Lenin's Policies. Speeches and Articles."], Vol 4, Moscow, 1975, p 50.

2. S. I. Yakubovskaya, "Basic Stages and Problems in the Historiography of National-State Building in the USSR," in book: "Aktual'nyye problemy istorii natsional'no-gosudarstvennogo stroitel'stva v SSSR" ["Urgent Problems in the History of National-State Building in the USSR"], Dushanbe, 1970; D. A. Chugayev, "Kommunisticheskaya partiya--organizator obrazovaniya SSSR" ["The Communist Party--the Organizer of the USSR"], Moscow, 1972;Chugayev"Questions of Historiography in National-State Building in the USSR" in book: "Torzhestvo leninskoy natsional'noy politiki" ["Celebration of Leninist National Policies"], Cheboksary, 1972;

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V. Ye. Malanchuk, "Istoricheskiy opyt KPSS po resheniyu natsional'nogo voprosa i razvitiye natsional'nykh otnosheniy v nashey strane" ["The Historical Experience of the CPSU on Solving the National Question and the Development of National Relations in Our Country"], Moscow, 1972; M. I. Kulichenko, "Natsional'nyye otnosheniya v SSSR i tendentsii ikh razvitiya"["National Relations in the USSR and the Tendencies of their Development"], Moscow, 1972; M. I. Kulichenko, "Commemorative Literature on the Place and Role of the National Question in the October Revolution, VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, 1969, No 3; M. I. Kulichenko, "Questions of the Formation of the USSR in New Works by Soviet Historians" VOPROSY ISTORII, 1962, No 1; Yu. S. Kukushkin, "Problems in Studying the History of the Creation of the USSR," ISTORIYA SSSR, 1972, No 6; M. S. Akhmedov, "Some Questions in the History of the Creation of the USSR," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, 1973, No 2; I. K. Dodonov, "The Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" in book: "Istoriografiya istorii SSSR" ["Historiography of the History of the USSR"], Moscow, 1976.

3. I. M. Vareykiye, Ye. O. Zelenskiy, "Natsional'no-gosudarstvennoye razmezhevaniye Sredney Azii" ["National-State Demarcation of Central Asia"], Tashkent, 1924; See also: "Yazyki i pis'mennost' narodov Severa" ["Languages and Writing of the Peoples of the North"], Vols 1-3, Moscow-Leningrad, 1934; L. M. Zak, M. I. Isayev, "Problems with the Literacy of the Peoples of the USSR During the Cultural Revolution," VOPROSY ISTORII, 1966, No 2; S. A. Tokarev, "Early Stages in the Development of Soviet Ethnographical Science (1917-mid-1930's)" OCHERKI ISTORII RUSSKOY ETNOGRAFII, FOL'KLORISTIKI I ANTROPOLOGII, Issue 5, Moscow, 1971; V. V. Antropova, "The Participation of Ethnographers in the Practical Implementation of the Leninist National Policies in the Extreme North (1920-1930)," SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1972, No 6.

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ETHNOSOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF CULTURE AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN UZBEKISTAN

Tashkent OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V UZBEKISTANA No 1, 1979 signed to press
15 Jan 79 pp 36-41

[Article by Yu.V. Arutyunyan and S.M. Mirkhasilov]

[Text] The materials of the 25th CPSU Congress indicate that the development
of the socialist way of life and of the many-sided Soviet culture is among
the important problems whose working out "requires the united efforts of
representatives of different sciences."[1]

Formerly the study of the questions of the life and culture of the peoples
of the USSR was done mainly by ethnographers in accordance with the principles
and methods that had been developed in ethnographic science. But with the
second half of the 60's, sociological research has been increasingly widely
practiced in this sphere, and its methods and materials have been widely
penetrating ethnographic research of the contemporary way of life. At the
same time, ethnosociological research is also developing.[2]

Ethnosociology is, on the one hand, a subdivision of ethnography and, on the
other, sociology; it studies the interaction of general social and specifically
ethnic phenomena and processes. Most authors consider ethnosociological re-
search as research in the comparative plane of the specific nature of social
processes in different ethnic environments and special features of ethnic
changes in various social groups.[3] A most important task of ethnosociology
is the study of assimilation of culture by different strata and groups of
the people, as well as the relation of traditional to contemporary and na-
tional to international in the cultural make-up of a nation, social strata
and groups within it.[4]

It is namely among such ethnosociological researches undertaken by the Insti-
tute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences that we would include
works conducted in Uzbekistan within the framework of all-union problem re-
search "Optimization of the Social-Cultural Conditions of Development and
Drawing Closer of the Nations in the USSR," which is being carried out with
the materials of individual regions of the country.[5] One of its most impor-
tasks is to show the diversity of the national forms of Soviet culture and to
disclose its general and particular features in the republics and to delineate
more deeply the perspectives of its development.

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The selection of Uzbek SSR as a subject of ethnosociological research in the Central Asian region is no accident. The settling in the republic of representatives of two large nations--the Uzbek and the Russian (comprising respectively 65.2 and 12.5 percent of the UzSSR population) and also of representatives of almost all the nationalities and peoples of our country provides favorable possibilities for the study of social and cultural-everyday life conditions of the development and drawing closer together of the nations in the USSR.

The materials of the research make it possible to disclose the tendencies of development of contemporary ethnic and cultural-everyday life processes, the influence on international relations of the character of the ethnic environment, contacts, common character of the territory, language, educational system and several other channels of reciprocal influence of nations; to elucidate a number of questions of development of international relations, especially interpersonal, making it possible to judge of the rate and results of development of the inaternational community in the USSR and of the establish-ment of internationalism as a system of views and norms of behavior of Soviet people; to disclose the significance of certain social-cultural and social-economic conditions determining national interrelations; to disclose the spiritual make-up of contemporary man--his needs and interests, value orienta-tions, use of contemporary culture by the urban and rural population; to more deeply elucidate the developmental tendencies of the present-day family, family and social life and also the formation of new traditions, customs, norms of behavior and establishment of atheistic views. All this is of major theoretical and practical importance, particularly for optimization of the cultural develoment of the Soviet nations.

For collection of the necessary information, two sources were used--relatively speaking, the historic-economic and the sociologic. The necessary documentary and statistical information, reflecting the general trend of social-cultural development of the Soviet people has been and is being studied according to a coordinated interrepublic methodology. But the most labor-intensive and original source is information obtained as the result of mass survey of the population of a republic according to a program of research common for the country.

The questionnaire clarified basic information on the conditions of life of the person interviewed, such as place of work, position, and education. Characteristics were recorded reflecting cultural habits, speech behavior, level of information; a group of questions made it possible to relate the objective characterization of the person interviewed.to his national self-consciousness in order to compile a picture of the significance of individual factors in the inculcation of internationalism. Special attention was paid to a characterization of social-occupational mobility, recording of employ-ment and education of the person surveyed not only at the time of the survey but also at the beginning of his labor activity and also the employment of his parents.

As a result of analyzing all the statistical information, in 1974 Tashkent-skaya, Andizhanskaya and Samarkandskaya oblasts (where 77 percent of the

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population of Uzbek SSR lives) were chosen as subjects of research as adequately representing the general tendencies of the republic's social-cultural development. A sampling aggregate in these oblasts was formed separately for the city and the rural population. For the making up of an urban sample in the first stage, cities were selected (with consideration being given to the size of the residing population, its ethnic make-up, sectorial structure, functional role of the cities and their economic-geographic position) and in the second stage, a selection was made of respondents (through mechanical selection from voting lists).

The size of the urban sample was determined with the help of mathematical-statistical methods in the number of 2,500 respondents.[6] This sampling aggregate included representatives of both the Uzbek and Russian nation (in proportion to their numbers). For study of the urban population, there were selected: Tashkent, Samarkand, Andizhan, Angren, Bekabad, Kattakurgan, Pskent, Leninsk and Shakhrikhan. In 1976, material was collected from among representatives of other nationalities in five cities of Uzbekistan--Tashkent, Samarkand, Katakurgan, Angren and Bekabad. A total of 729 persons were interviewed.

The rural sample was made up somewhat differently, which is to be explained by a different system of settlement and differences in the social and occupational structure of the rural population. In the first stage of the selection, rural rayons were picked out in each oblast, then specific residential centers and, finally, respondents were chosen from each social and occupational group on the basis of household books [pokhozyaystvennyye knigi].

On the basis of the differences in the character of the units of the sampling (rayons, residential centers, rural inhabitants), specific characteristics on which the selection would be based were determined at each stage of the sampling. For example, when selecting rayons, there were taken into account the relative share of the rural population, its ethnic make-up, share of machine-operator cadres among the employed population, correlation of kolkhoz and sovkhoz production, level of the rayon's cultural and economic development and so forth.

The rural sampling aggregate consisted of 1,600 units. The sample took in social-occupational groups of the Uzbek population in 25 villages of three rayons of above-mentioned oblasts--Leninskiy, Pskentskiy and Kattakurganskiy.

A comparison of certain indicators for general and selective aggregates enables us to speak of the high level of representativeness of the obtained data. Sampling error in the cities and villages was in the limits of ±5 percent. Corrective coefficients were used for over-all statistical characterization of the city and rural population in processing of the materials on a computer. In addition to a survey of the population, objective materials were being collected at the same time, which made it possible to a certain

extent to reflect the environment and in the final analysis to relate in per-spective the social-psychological characteristics to social-economic and ecological ones.

The results of the investigation make it possible to characrerize certain tendencies of cultural-everyday life processes among the republic's Uzbek population.

Analysis of the state of education, examined particularly from the point of view of age dynamics attests to a profound difference in the levels of educa-tion of the extreme age groups, especially in rural areas. The oldest age group of the Uzbek rural population (60 years and older), whose school years were in the pre-Soviet period and in the first years of the Soviet power, remains as the much less literate group.

On the average, but more particularly in the younger generation, the situa-tion is undergoing a radical change. The generation under 40 years of age for the most part has received an incomplete secondary, secondary or higher education. Thus the leap from illiteracy to a secondary education (including incomplete) education was made in a historically short period--in two decades. Practically all persons under 30 have a 7-year education, with more than 70 percent of them receiving a complete secondary or higher education.

The urban population started getting higher types of education, especially specialized education, about ten years ahead of the rural population. On the whole, the Uzbek urban population is still ahead of the rural population in regard to persons with a specialized and even more so with a higher education. At the same time, the substantial gap in the education of men and women has been overcome. Although the educational level on the whole is still lower for the women than for the men, in the younger ages the gap between the sexes is minimal.

There is a significant difference in the educational level of the representa-tives of different social-occupational groups, which is connected first of all with the character of labor. Managers and specialists of the highest echelon have primarily higher education; middle-level specialists--mostly a secondary specialized education, and higher and medium skilled workers en-gaged in physical labor--incomplete and general secondary education (partly tekhnikum).

More than half of the Uzbeks are oriented toward work requiring a higher ed-ucation, while the share of parents trying to provide for their children a higher education has grown to 91 percent in the cities and 87 percent in the country.

Literature and professional forms of art (cinema, theater, music, painting and the like) have become the most important elements of culture, with simul-taneous retention of the best elements of traditional national culture--folk dances, music, artistic handicrafts, folklore and so on.

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In regard to forms of use of free time, the orientation in rural areas is toward reading, watching of television broadcasts and listening to radio. In the city, with its greater possibilities for the spiritual development of the personality, the forms of spiritual activity are much more diverse. In those spheres which are roughly equally accessible to urban and rural residents (television, fine literature), the advantages of the city are less perceptible.

The influence of age, sex differences and belonging to this or that social-vocational group is clearly manifested in orientations. We should point out as a positive influence the roughly identical share of men and women assimilating contemporary culture, constantly reading fine literature, watching television broadcasts, going to the theater. But there are still more women than men, especially rural areas, who are not involved in these forms of activity.

Raising of the level of education and culture serves as an important means of establishing internalist views. International contacts in the production and everyday spheres are constantly being expanded. About one-third of Uzbeks work in collectives where no less than a half consists of persons of other nationalities, while one-third have relatives of nationally mixed marriages.

Elements of traditional material culture are being rather stably preserved, especially those of them which are less subject to "competition" from mass industrial production (for example, food). Eighty-seven percent of urban Uzbeks prefer national food. But such orientations are dictated less by national habits than by regional natural-climatic features. Characteristically, Uzbek national dishes have also come to be liked by representatives of other nationalities living in the republic.

The persistent existence of individual national elements of dress is connected with preserved tradition, especially in rural localities and with the fact that certain elements of dress play the role of kinds of ethnic symbols.

While national traditional forms predominate in the choice of food and separate elements of dress, even the older generation of the rural population does not show a persistent interest in traditional forms when it comes to the selection of an interior. On the whole, a somewhat greater preference for national dress, interior and food exists among the rural population.

In the emotional spheres of spiritual culture the national are also retained and nonnational are being assimilated. Among the youth, especially the urban youth, there is a growing interest in light, variety music and contemporary dances. Great popularity is enjoyed by professional music, which has rapidly developed in the years of the Soviet power; persons engaged in culture, including professional musicians of local nationality, are growing in popularity.

The repertoire of professional performers includes both works of national authors and the best examples of world classics. Growth in the popularity

of professional artists is graphic evidence of the attained level of listeners and viewers, the result of internationalist education of the workers of our country.

Preservation and development of national forms of culture and increasingly broader assimilation of the best of the national culture expand the general range of culture of the Uzbek people.

A change in the spiritual aspect affects life ideals, notions of norms of behavior. In defining, for example, the idea of the "good life," most of the persons interviewed present a friendly family and interesting work, including in this concept prestige of occupation and rather high earnings.

Together with the preservation and development of Uzbek national forms of culture, including language, mastery by Uzbeks of the Russian language is being perceptibly accelerated from generation to generation. Among the young generation about nine-tenths of urban dwellers know the Russian language freely.

The general educational school plays an important role in the mastery of the Russian language by Uzbeks in cities and villages. In response to the question of where they learned the Russian language, 41.5 percent of urban and 29.8 percent of rural Uzbeks indicated the school.

At the same time there has been an increasing tendency of late for representatives of other nationalities living in the republic to learn the Uzbek language. Of the Russian residents in Uzbekistan 27 percent of those aged 20-24 speak Uzbek and 25 percent of those who are 30 or older do the same.

Survivals of religious outlook and outmoded customs and ceremonies are being increasingly eliminated. The position of religion is weaker in the cities than in rural localities. The larger the city, the smaller the influence of religion. For example, in Tashkent the percentage of believers is almost one-third less than in small and medium-size cities. The urban environment is more diversified in its ethnic and religious features, here all social and ethnocultural processes occur more actively.

Among other conditions affecting secularization, an important role belongs to education and a person's social-occupational status, as well as age. While among the older generation, a significant portion is still religious, among the middle and especially the young generation not only in the city but in the country as well, the number of believers is being sharply reduced. Most believers are of older age, persons engaged in unskilled physical labor.

About 80 percent of the persons interviewed favored marriage with its traditional ceremonies. But this does not mean that all the customs and rituals of a traditional marriage are preferred. More than 80 percent of the persons interviewed were decisively against bride-money [kalym] as a harmful survival which it was necessary to fight against.[7]

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The investigation showed that the specific character of family-life relations among Uzbeks was expressed relatively more strongly than in other spheres of life. There are to be found more often among them expanded, multi-generation (undivided) families, more children and much stronger traditional family relations as a whole.[8] In the city 88 percent and in the village 92 percent of the persons interviewed believe it necessary to have the consent of parents before being married, which attests to the durability of traditional relations between parents and children. Traditional elements are likewise more lasting in the relations of a married couple; there is a predominantly negative attitude toward divorce, especially in a family with children.

It is no accident that the number of divorces per thousand residents in the republic dropped from 2.9 in 1940 to 1.4 in 1977.[9]

The specific character of traditional culture and life, the habits and attachments have an effect on the relatively smaller mobility of the indigenous, especially rural, population.

Thus the special features of life style, traditions and psychological cast exercise a definite influence on the social behavior of people, which has to be more fully taken into account in the practice of economic and cultural construction.

FOOTNOTES

1. XXV s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. 24 fevralya-- 5 marta 1976 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet [The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 24 February-5 March 1976. Stenographic Report]. Vol 1. Moscow, 1976, p 98.

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5. Concerning his program and methods see: Arutyunyan, Yu.V., "Social-
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    GRAFIYA, No 3, 1972, pp 3-20.

6. For more details on methods of sampling, see: "Sotsial'noye i natsional'-
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8. Mirkhasilov, S.M., "The Contemporary Family of the Rural Population of
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