
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
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TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOUO No. 639







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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TANZANIA EMERGING AS REGIONAL POWER FOLLOWING AMIN'S DEFEAT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Apr 79 pp 12-13

[Article by Marc Yared]

[Text] The disappearance of Idi Amin should not hide the principal lessons to be learned from the war in Uganda. Amin has again become, and quickly, what he had been—a caricature, more important is the victory of the man who overthrew Idi Amin: the Tanzanian president. Several weeks ago we wrote (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 948) in connection with the Idi Amin—Juluis Nyerere encounter, "For Africa and for the world, something new is at stake: it is a matter of finding out whether a circumspect idealist can truimph over a cynical buffoon." It is indeed the circumspect one who has triumphed: Julius Nyerere.

Now international opinion has been enlightened: "Big Daddy" has fallen before the staggering blows of the army of the Tanzanian "Mwalimu" (teacher). Julius Nyerere has won a four-fold victory: the victory of democracy over tyranny, of progressivism over obscurantism, of East Africa over the expansionison of forces foreign to it, and last, of Tanzania, which is emerging as a regional power henceforth to be reckoned with.

1. By overthrowing a shameful dictator who has caused hundreds of thousands of his fellow citizens to be killed and terrorized millions of others, the Tanzanian chief of state has succeeded in a "first." Africa is no longer solely this "union of chiefs of state anxious to perpetuate themselves in power, even be it to the cost of their peoples," which the "Mwalimu" castigated again in December 1978. Perhaps tyrants are no longer assured of impunity within the OAU or of the consideration of their peers. The despot is no longer unvincible. Equitorial Guinea will one day perhaps be liberated in the same way from the bloody regime of Macias Nguema, a counterpart of "Big Daddy."

The "Mwalimu" will gain all the more disciples in Africa since he has made an African solution to the Ugandan crisis prevail. There was not internationalization, and no intervention of foreign troops on the continent, as there has been in Angola, Zaire, Ethiopia, Chad, and Mauritania.

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The fact remains that the Tanzanian-Ugandan precedent is not without danger. Nyerere used force to make the right prevail. Other leaders, too, may decide on radical military solutions, but with less praiseworthy intentions.

For the Idi Amin-Julius Nyerere encounter has demonstrated the political impotence of the OAU. Impotence not only to resolve a serious armed conflict but also to preserve its sacrosenct principles: territorial integrity, flouted by the Ugandan invasion of the Tanzanian Kagera region in November; non-interference in the internal affairs of a state; and respect for the sovereignty of others.

2. The success of Nyerere, the socialist, against Idi Amin, the reactionary, is also a new victory for progressivism on the continent. The supporters of Tanzania are the pillars of militant Africa: National liberation movements (Zimbabive Patriotic Front, the Namibian SWAPO [Southwest African People's Organization], and Front Polisario Sahravoui), and states in the front line of opposition to the racist regimes of southern Africa and Marxist countries (Ethiopia, Madagascar, and so on).

These manifestations of solidarity appear as homage to the "Mwalimu," whose capital houses the Liberation Committee of the OAU, who provides aid to the guerillas in southern Africa, and who supports most of the revolutionary undertakings in the Indian Ocean. In the Seychelles, for example, where the conservative regime of James Mancham was swept out in 1977 by a commando unit trained at Dar-es-Salam.

Kinshasa and Khartoum are afraid that the fall of Idi Amin will free hundreds of Simba and Anya Nya mercenaries who were observed several years ago in the bush of Zaire and southern Sudan.

3. In the face of 2,500 Tanzanian soldiers the humiliating defeat of the Libyan expeditionary corps perhaps also tolls the knell of the expansionist dreams of Colonel Qadhdhafi in black Africa. Not only were the forces of the Jamahiriya subjected to heavy losses (400 dead, according to some sources) but Tripoli is said to have gone so far as to offer Dar-es-Salam and the National Front for the Liberation of Uganda 20 million dollars if they would allow the Libyan soldiers to evacuate Kampala without hindrance.

In Uganda Qadhdhafi intervened overtly and massively outside his own borders for the first time, after calling upon Nyerere to withdraw his troops. No doubt the Libyan colonel wanted to copy, on his own, with much show, the airlift to Ethiopia organized by the Soviets in January 1978, unless he wished more modestly to imitate the "punch" launched a year ago by the Moroccans in Shaba. Now it remains for him to face up the fallout from his adventure.

The Libyan defeat in Uganda will strengthen the determination of Chadian nationalists to resist a take-over by Tripoli. It also risks provoking waves in the Jamahiriya itself where many citizens and a number of leaders

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are beinning to reflect upon the causes of the defeats their country has sustained in Africa: $f_{\rm IR}$ Egypt and Tunisia, in Chad and in Sudan. Now in Uganda.

4. President Nyerere has finally, above all, shown that his country, one of the poorest in the world, could effectively repel agression and assert itself as the leading power in eastern Africa. Since he ame to power the "Mwalimu" has never concealed his ambition to rejoin the former British colonies of Zanzibar, Uganda, and Kenya into a powerful federation.

In 1964 the uprising by the black majority of Zanzibar against the Arab sultan gave Nyerere the opportunity to incorporate the island and realize the first phase of his grand design: Tanzania was born.

Now, the excesses of Idi Amin were favorable to the intervention of Dar-es-Salam at Kampala. Special relations between the two capitals may be instituted. With 30 million inhabitants the combination of Tanzania and Uganda would then be the most populous entity of black Africa, after Nigeria, Kenya, and Rivanda and Burundi especially, are already fearful of the formidable attractive force of the new Dar-es-Salam-Kampala axis.

And to think it was only a few years ago that western chancelleries took only listless and amused notice of a certain Julius Nyerere, originally a classical scholar, who talked of transforming his miserable country into a society of communal villages.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

NIGERIA'S ROLE IN CHAD SUBJECT TO QUESTION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 May 79 pp 28-29

[Article by Marc Yared]

[Text] The interim national union government of 29 members formed at N'Diamena on 29 April quite faithfully reflects the ethnic and religious diversity of Chad, Goukouni Queddei and Hissein Habre, principal leaders of the Arabic Moslem North, hold down, respectively, the interior and defense portfolios. It was a compromise between these two strong men, recently rivals, that resulted in the choice of the new chief of state and of the government, Loi Mohamed Chawwa—himself a Moslem but from the central region—practically an unknown on the very eve of his appointment. Gen Negy Djogo, the vice president, and Capt Koumbamba Dering, heading diplomacy, are both Catholics from the south.

At the time the formation of this interim government was announced, hostile and "indignant" reactions were manifested. They came from Christian and Animist separatist circles in the south (see JENUE AFRIQUE, No 956) and from the Libyan Arab Jamahiruya, whose expansionist designs are no longer a mystery to anyone. Major Jalloud, Colonel Oadhdhafi's right hand man, moreover, naughtily proclaimed on 27 April, "Any solution in Chad that does not meet with our approval is doomed to failure."

In order to cause the failure of the N'Diamena authorities Libya has even extended its hand to the separatists. On 14 April, and on 21 April, a Libyan Mystère 20 landed at Moundow, the capital of the southern recalcitrants. And, on the 25th, a Dakota DC 3 of the Jamahiriya, bringing arms to them, crashed in central Chad.

Above all, it is to this unusual coalition that the new executive owes his principal "letters patent of nobility." First of all because, for various reasons ranging from patriotism to economic interest, many Chadians, even in the south, are categorically opposed to any separatist prospect.

As for Libyan meddling, it has already caused a formidable protest on the part of the overwhelming majority of Chadians, Christians and Moslems, in the north and in the south. Foreign aggression has often, in the course of history, been the effective cement for fragile national unities.

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The Jamahiriya is in fact finding itself more and more isolated and discredited in Africa and worldwide, especially since the smarting defeat in Uganda. Who has failed to observed the less and less consistent and credible, the more and more improvised and confused nature of its diplomacy? In Chad, for example, it has suddenly forgotten all about Islam and pan-Arabism, the obvious motivation of support for Goukouni and Habre, whom it opposes, in order to fly to the aid of the latter's present adversaries... The troops led by Goukouni and Habre have amply proved themselves in the field. No one doubts that the Tubu warriors, this time benefiting from discreet help from Paris, will succeed in routing the forces which have infiltrated from Libya.

Must we conclude that henceforth all is for the best in the best possible Chad? Will the capital of that country at last deserve the name of N'Dyamena, which means "haven of rest?" Nothing can be less certain. For there is no guarantee that the Goukouni-Habre bloc will maintain its cohesiveness. On the contrary, recent history demonstrates how ephemeral are coalitions in Chad.

The characters of the protagonists must also be taken into account. A man with iron fist and iron will, Hessein Habre is quite impulsive and ambitious. Can a show of force with Goukouni, much more level-headed and scrupulous, be avoided?

Another unknown factor which will weigh heavily in Chad's future is the "game" of its large neighbor, Nigeria. That country has played host for the Kano I and Kano II Chadian National Reconciliation Conferences. It is even maintaining a military contingent of several hundred men at N'Djamena. Last, it enjoys special relations with the MPLT (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad) and with former president Malloum who, incidentally, is living in Lagos.

The new masters of Chad, in the course of the last few weeks, have increased the gestures of goodwill toward Nigeria--in particular, sending delegations there. The appointment as chief of state of Loi Mohamed Chawwa, a member of the pro-Nigerian MPLT, perhaps is a part of this "offensive of charm" directed at Lagos. But, for the moment, two vital questions remain: will Nigeria conduct an operation of diplomatic prestige in Chad (active presence in a theater of African conflict) or one with geopolitical aims (making a weak neighboring country a satellite)? Will it decide upon a strategy of understanding or a confrontation with Libya?

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CAMEROON-EQUATORIAL GUINEA AIRLINE REOPENS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Apr 79 p 1009

[Article: "Air Transport: Reopening of Connection with Malabo"]

[Text] The capital of Equatorial Guinea, Malabo (on Macias Nguema Island), has once again an airline connection to Douala.

The connection between the two countries was discontinued on 1 November 1978, when LAGE (Equatorial Guinean Airlines) had to cease all activity because its two Convair planes, piloted and maintained by Spanish personnel, were out of breath and replacement parts. Cameroon Airlines, a national company, took over the route and now provides round trip service between Douala and Malabo every Wednesday morning. The flight is effected by a De Havilland Twin-Otter, the type of aircraft used on Cameroon's secondary interior routes.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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ETHIOPIAN REINFORCEMENTS FOR TANZANIA—The support of the progressive African countries for Tanzania was not of a moral kind only. In fact, Mozambican soldiers had joined with the fighters of various liberation movements to back up the Tanzanian army. This decision was made after the announcement by Tripoli of the sending of Libyan troops to fly to the rescue of Marshall Idi Amin Dada. Ethiopia, for its part, held itself ready to dispatch reinforcements to ensure Julius Nyerere's victory. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Apr 79 p 30] 11267

TUNISIAN SOLDIERS IN LIBYAN-UGANDAN FORCES--The Tanzanian-Ugandan war has had some Tunisian victims. Certain young Tunisians, recruited and armed by Tripoli, were in the ranks of the Libyan expeditionary corps which did not succeed in saving Idi Amin's regime. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Apr 79 p 30] 11267.

FRENCH AID TO CAE ASKED BY HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY--Giscard d'Estaing has agreed to aid Emperor Bokassa financailly, after the riots of January 1979, thus yielding to the entreaties of President Houphouet-Boigny. Thanks to this emergency aid, the emperor was able to pay the civil servants, whose salaries had not been paid for 3 months. The Ivorian chief of state stated that this was the last time he would make such a request in favor of his "son" in Bangui. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Apr 79 p 30] 11267

SOUTH AFRICAN TRAVELERS TO REUNION-The people of Reunion cannot believe their eyes: by scheduled or charter flight more and more South Africans-tourists, businessmen, journalists-have been arriving in Reunion. Five thousand are expected in 1979. Recently a South African Airways jumbo jet landed with a large delegation of the Durban Chamber of Commerce. The delegation was met by many officials and a gendarmery escort, and the arrival was given favorable coverage by local radio-television, which for 20 years has stubbornly refused to give a voice to the local opposition. At least a third of the population are dismayed at the arrival of these ambassadors of apartheid. [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 May 79 p 24]

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SOVIET WEAPONS FROM LIBYA TO CHADIAN REBELS--Grateful Chad: Njamena's new leaders sent to France specimens of Soviet weapons delivered not long ago by Libya to the Muslim guerrilla movements. In particular, Sam 7 portable anti-aircraft missiles and Kalashnikov assault rifles. These weapons were "peeled" by arsenal specialists before being transferred to the French military schools, for use in instructing young officers. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 7 May 79 p 50] 8946

NIGERIA PROPOSES SUMMIT ON CHAD--Nigeria is advocating holding a "summit" on Chad, after the failure of the Kano 2 Conference. Participating would be the chiefs of state of the neighboring countries (Nigeria, the Sudan, Niger, Libya and Cameroon), as well as representatives from the various Chadian groups. Meanwhile, the Lagos authorities are putting pressure on the African states not to recognize the new Njamena government. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 May 79 p 18] 8946

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

FRENCH RURAL DEVELOPMENT AID--The Central Economic Cooperation Fund (French) decided on 26 April to grant Cameroon a loan for 45,200,000 French francs (2,260,000,000 CFA francs), to finance for the first time an integrated rural development project in the Southeast Benoue region. The project's objective is to open to internal colonization a region rich in agricultural potential whose development has however been impeded by onchocerciasis [parasitic infection] the inadequacy of means of communication. The program includes a combination of complementary actions: prevention of endemic disease, creation of a network of trails (400 km in the first stage), social equipment (schools, dispensaries), well-drilling, technically orienting the peasants and processing of food products (cotton, corm, rice). These actions are the first phase of a development program to be realized under the aegis of SODECOTON [expansion unknown], a semi-private company, by the CFDT (French Textile Fiber Development Company). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 1979 p 1196] 8946

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

FRENCH FOOD PRODUCTION ASSISTANCE—The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation is going to grant its first loan to the Republic of Cape Verde, in the amount of 4.8 million French francs. This loan will be earmarked for development of food production in the Sao Nicolau and Santiago islands. This loan, which includes a gift component of close to 70 percent, is conjoined with a subsidy from the Aid and Cooperation Fund (1.2 million French francs), within the framework of the program of special aid to the countries of the Sahel. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1186] 11267

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

BOKASSA TURNING TO LIBYA AFTER FRANCE REVISES STAND

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 May 79 p 29

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima]

[Text] "The Emperor Bokassa has just signed the writ of his own condemnation." It was in these terms that Robert Galley, French Minister of Cooperation, is said to have privately commented upon the Central African decision to lodge a complaint against France with the next French-African summit meeting at Kigali. As a matter of fact the imperial emissary caused a sensation by asking the council of ministers, meeting at the end of April in the Ravandon capital, to enter upon the agenda of the summit meeting the "Anti-Central African campaign orchestrated by the French press." In the eyes of the Central African authorities that campaign is not just tolerated, but encouraged by the French officials. Paris naturally denies this and emphasizes the independences of French journalists. Nevertheless the Central African step has just confirmed that relations between Bangui and Paris are now far from the idyllic ones of the past. It is, nevertheless, in large part thanks to the support of President Giscard d'Estaing that the Emperor Bokassa I, has been able, somehow or other, to contain the popular rage. It is France which, for several months -- at least in part -- has been paying the civil servants. Even though it is an exaggeration to impute to the French press the unrest (see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 957) which is growing within the empire, on the other hand, an agonizing revision fo the French position is highly probable. Numerous Central African ministers have followed one another in the French capital, to gauge the government's basic intention. The situation appeared so disturbing to them that it was decided to encircle, with "muscle," the Central African colony living in France. Probationary Central African police came from Bangui and were dispersed in the Paris suburbs. Supposed overseer of this activity: M. DaSilva, whose last stay in France coincided with the police deployment, Minister of State to the imperial court in charge of party organization and secretary-general of MESAN (Movement for the Social Development of Black Africa), he is the master of the party's political police.

For France's part, it appears certain that the Elysee [i.e., the President] will bring together the elders of Bangui, governors during colonial days, and ambassadors since independence, no doubt to contemplate alternative solutions.

At the same time we see the surprising return to the political scene of Mme Domitien, former prime minister, appointed on 12 April as a court counselor with rank and prerogatives of vice-prime minister. She, who for a time opposed the decision of the Marshal-president for life to have himself crowned emperor, passes for a "liberal." Is her rehabilitation a gesture aimed at France, intended to provide reassurance in the face of mounting repression? But in this case, is it not too late since, as far as Paris is concerned, the die is cast? It is undoubtedly foreseeing such an eventuality that the emperor has again turned toward his own alternative solution: Libya. After denouncing, on 20 February 1979, all accords with Libya, this is again an about-face. In fact, on 7 April the Central African Empire reestablished all relations with Libya. But recent history demonstrates that Qadhdhafi has not yet succeeded in imposing any man whom he supports.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

BRIEFS

INFORMATION MINISTER ARRESTED--/Emperor/ Bokassa has had his information minister arrested; he accuses him of having been in contact with Soviet spies. /Text//Paris PARIS MATCH in French 1 Jun 79 p 81/

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13

CHAD

DANGER OF MAINTENANCE OF 'DE FACTO' PARTITION CONTINUES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 30 Apr - 13 May 79 p 39

[Article by Fode Amadou: "Setback for Kano"]

[Text] It had to be expected. Despite all the diplomatic efforts made by numerous chancelleries, the second Kano conference, in Nigeria, has not produced any concrete results. The Chadian delegations present were led by Goukouni Cueddei (FROLINAT), Hissein Habre (FAN [Armed Forces of the North]), Abdelkader Kamougue (Chadian Armed Forces of the South), Abubakader Abdelrahmane (Movement for Liberation of Chad, 3rd Army), supported by Lagos-all signers of the first Kano agreement--Ahmed Acyl (Volcan army), Abdallah Danna (other branch of the Volcan army), Aba Siddick (historic chief and founding father of FROLINAT), Mohamed Abba and Hagerro Sanoussi, who represent two unidentified tendencies.

Two significant factors were to be adopted, to judge from reading the communique published at the conclusion of the negotiations. Furthermore, five African countries—Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Niger and Cameroon—had joined with the various Chadian factions.

1--The creation of a commission of inquiry charged to go to Chad immedianely to verify the positions and the respective importance of all the factions that want to sign the first Kano agreement, concluded last March.

The commission will include a representative of each of the signatories of the first agreement, a representative of each of the new Chadian tendencies, and representatives of the five African countries participating in the conference.

2-The decision taken by the Kano II participants that "all the other Chadian tendencies may not only attend the next conference but may also sign the first agreement, if the provisions seem acceptable to them."

But the differences within the various Chadian delegations remain profound, for it is obvious that the Hissein Habre faction would like to maintain a

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status quo enabling it to continue to play a leading role in the management of the country. A spokesman for Habre--who represents practically nothing in Chad--declared that suggestions had been submitted during the Kano II negotiations whereby the distribution of the principal posts in the future government would be as follows: president of the Council--Mohamed Abba, a friend of the founder of FROLINAT, Ibrahim Abatcha, killed in combat against the French colonial forces in 1968 (it was Dr Aba Siddick who was then elected leader of FROLINAT); vice president--Lt Col Kamougue, "strong man" of the Malloum regime; foreign affairs--Dr Aba Siddick; national defense--Ahmed Acyl, chief of a rival faction to Goukouni's within FROLINAT, and a former deputy from Batha, in central Chad. The chief of state would be, in these conditions, Goukouni Oueddei.

The reality of the situation was clearly explained by Dr Aba Siddick, one of the historic chiefs of FROLINAT: "It is important," he says, "to understand that Chad no longer exists as a state. One of the immediate problems is to give it body. Some may have fun playing gangleaders or guerrillas, but Chad's problem is not a question of power relationships, but rather a political problem. The united FROLINAT (of Goukouni) and former prime minister Hissein Habre's Armed Forces of the North present themselves as the existing power in Chad and have refused to sit with the other Chadian representatives—whom they describe either as unrepresentative or as satellites of Libya—whereas their attitude is in contradiction with the texts signed at Kano I."

As for the declarations by the N'Djamena authorities (taken up immediately by the big Western press and the subservient press) that the Libyan troops had invaded Chad, the denials by the officials in Tripoli, which asked the sending of a commission for on-the-spot investigation, were practically ignored by the big media.

Dr Aba Siddick, for his part, declares that there is no concrete proof on the subject of any incursion into Chad by Libyan troops.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

ISRAELI AGENT'S MEETING WITH GOUKOUNI--An important person from the Israeli Secret Service (Mossad) recently went to Njamena, where he met with Goukouni Oueddei. The Israeli agent promised that an important contingent of Israeli commandos would be sent to support the Goukouni-Hissene Habre clique in Chad. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 May 79 p 43] 8946

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16

GABON

BRIEFS

AUSTRIAN PARTICIPATION--By virtue of an agreement signed by President Bongo in Libreville on 2 May, the Gabonese state has ceded 9 percent of its share-holdings in SOMIFER (Mekambo Iron Mines Company) to the Austrian firm Voest Alpine. The signing of this agreement is the outcome of long negotiations, Mr Mbouy-Boutzit, Gabonese minister of state for mines, energy and hydraulic resources, indicated. We note that as of 10 July 1974, the Gabonese state held 60 percent of SOMIFER's shares. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1197] 11267

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GHANA

BRIEFS

LOSS OF IMPORTED CHEMICALS--Large quantities of chemicals imported a year ago which were to be used in the new 8-million cedis iron and steel foundry at Takoradi have become unusable, as the plant has not become operational because of a lack of the last equipment needed. The foundry should have opened in April 1978, but since 1976 it has been waiting for funds from the National Investment Bank to purchase high voltage transformers. The two West German experts responsible for its initial operation and for training Ghanian workers believe that the facility itself is threatened because of its prolonged period of idleness. The plant was scheduled to employ in its first phase 300 persons, and later, when it reached full production capacity, up to 600 workers. \(\subseteq Text \) Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Apr 79 p 106 \(\subseteq \subseteq \) 7679

NEW BOATS LAUNCHED, ORDERED--At Viareggio in April, the Ghanian commissioner for agriculture, Col S. M. Akwagyiram, launched a new fishing trawler, the "Tono." This is the third boat built for the State Fishing Corporation by the Italian shipyard Esercizio Cantieri. This shipyard received a contract for four trawlers and two tuna boats from the Ghanian fishing organization. Only two trawlers had been launched to date. Their cost was not revealed. Elsewhere, the West African Ship Builders, a subsidiary of Mosaic Parquet Production, Ltd, a firm specializing in the manufacture of paneling, door and window frames, and furniture, has signed a contract to build 300 flat-bottomed fishing boats made of local woods for the Volta River Authority. The boats are to be used on Lake Volta. These boats, evaluated at a cost of 12,000 cedis, should bring in an annual catch of between 6,000 and 7,000 tons of fish. The West African Ship Builders firm, whose administrator is M. S. E. Amissah, has construction facilities representing an investment cost of 2.7 million cedis. Text/Paris_MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1132/7679

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GUINEA

FURTHER LIBERALIZATION MEASURES IN PRIVATE TRADE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Apr 79 p 1063

Text Guinea's government authorities have just taken new measures to liberalize private trade. According to the terms of these measures, private businessmen are now authorized to handle imports and exports; until now this sector had been reserved for the state company Importex. To engage in this business, they will have to pay a fee of 150,000 sylis (approximately 1,500,000 CFA African Financial Community monetary unit to the Guinean treasury.

These businessmen may freely import merchandise and goods and may export cigarettes and fruit juices, said President Sekou Toure, in a speech to the National Economic Conference of his country on 22 April.

A second category of private businessmen, a group which must pay a fee of 50,000 sylis, will be authorized to handle sales of goods and merchandise and to be supplied by small state wholesalers.

The Guinean president also stated that bakers and butchers will form a third category of private merchants; they will be subject to payment of a fee of 25,000 and 10,000 sylis, respectively, but they will be exempt from the industrial and commercial profits tax.

The AFP /French Press Agency/ thus reported that private trade, which already existed on a small scale in Guinea, will extend its activities to the import-export field. It

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will coexist with "popular trade," which holds a monopoly on grains, dry manioc, peanuts, coffee, palm and beef products.

President Sekou Toure said that private businessmen in the first category will receive permission to export Guinean products other than cigarettes and fruit juices whenever the level of production exceeds consumption.

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

OFFICIAL POSITION RECTIFICATION--It is Moussa Diakite who is presently replacing, in the post of minister of economic and financial domain, Ismael Toure, who was expelled from the government on 28 April. He has been mentioned as head of this department by Radio Conakry in the second broadcast of a report, repeated several times, on a signing ceremony for an agreement between the Guinean government and a French company for construction of a prefabrication plant in Guinea. In the first broadcast, whose version we echoed in these pages, Mamady Keita was mentioned. Official confirmation should now be awaited. We note that Moussa Diakite, a member of the political bureau of the Guinean single party, has been minister of domain of interior, security and justice since April 1972. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1190] 11267

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

FRENCH FISHING COOPERATION--A shrimp boat given to Guinea-Bissau by the French government was launched on 27 April at the naval shipyards of Sables d'Olonne. The joint French-Guinean fishing firm, SEMAPESCA, will soon begin operation. This information was reported at the close of the meeting of the joint cooperation commission on fishing. Guinea-Bissau and France signed an agreement in January 1977. During this meeting it was decided that the terms for access of French ships in waters under the jurisdiction of Guinea-Bissau will remain valid until an agreement is signed between Guinea-Bissau and the EEC. The French delegation, led by Bertrand Lebrousse, deputy director of fishing, restated its willingness to continue to help Guinea-Bissau to develop its fishing industry. The Guinea-Bissau delegation was led by Jose Turpin, secretary of state for fishing. An EEC delegation, led by Gunter Weisse, principal administrator of the office of fishing, also took part in the meeting. /Text//Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1122/ 7679

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MALI

ARAB FUNDS PLEDGE ROAD FINANCING: SAUDI HEALTH AID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79
p 1126

Text The directors of the Arab Funds, meeting recently in Kuwait, pledged their organizations' participation in the financing of the Sevare-Gao road (approximately 575 kilometers) for a total cost of 30 billion Malian francs, Mr Abdoulaye Amadou Sy, Malian minister of transport and public works, said on 24 April at Bamako. He had just returned from a mission to the Arab countries, where he had borne a message from Gen Moussa Traore, chief of state. The funds involved are the Kuwait Fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Saudi Fund, the BADEA and the OPAEP expansions unknown funds.

On 14 April in Bamako, Ahmed Zaki Saleh, charge d'affaires of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Mali, gave a check for \$3 million (1.350 billion Malian francs) to Col Amadou Baba Diarra, vice president of the Military National Liberation Committee and minister of finance and commerce of Mali. This money is to be used to finance social and health projects.

This third installment of the Saudi aid program raises the amount granted to 80 percent of the total scheduled in this friendly cooperation program established between the two countries since the reign of the late King Faisal.

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MALI

MULTI-DOOR SELINGUE DAM PROJECT REVIEWED

London THE MIDDLE EAST in English No 55, May 79 p 98

[Article by Karl Lavrencic]

[Text] For people in the small village of Selingue in Mali, about 150km south of the capital, Bamako, life has changed radically since work started on the Selingue dam at the end of 1976.

Most of the able-bodied men have found jobs on the site, many earning cash for the first time in their lives. Women have been able to sell their surplus fruit and vegetables to the workmen. And the new 53km asphalted road connecting the project with the main highway to Bamako has opened up the once-remote region, encouraging townspeople to come to buy firewood and other goods.

When the \$142mm project opens this August, there will be other changes too. Some 12,000 people now inhabiting the site of the future reservoir will be settled in new housing and allocated land irrigated by the multipurpose scheme.

It is expected that over 137,500 acres can be watered along the river Niger when the Selingue dam, situated on the Sankarani river (an important tributary of the Niger), is completed. Irrigation all year round will make possible double-cropping of rice or other crops, providing some measure of prosperity for thousands of people now on the brink of starvation and facing drought hazards.

In addition, the main component of the project, the power station, will serve Bamako, where modern city life has been made a misery by frequent and prolonged power cuts.

But, beyond this there are several reasons why the Selingue dam has attracted world attention and has been visited by delegations from Western countries, China and the USSR. It is one of the few recent development ventures in Africa where no cost overrun has taken place. It is

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also one of the few in which the original implementation schedule has been strictly adhered to with no construction delays of any kind. It is, finally, widely regarded as a model of the celebrated "triangle" of Western technology, Arab money and African natural resources.

For Arab donors, the scheme marks one of their first major collective commitments to Black Africa and as such it is something of a pathfinder for similar projects. The Khartoum-based Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) has alone contributed a long-term loan of \$15mn at 2% interest—the biggest single loan it has ever made.

Other soft loans have been provided by the Saudi Development Fund (\$15mm) and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (\$17mn) together with the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development and the State of Qatar. The Saudi Government has also made a grant of \$5mm towards the 53km access road.

Close co-ordination between the Arab contributors, who concentrated on financing civil engineering work on the dam, has meant streamlining of calls for tender and awarding of contracts. Joint consultants for the project are SOGREAH of France and Lahmeyer International of West Germany, who are supervising work carried out by French, West German, Belgian, Canadian and local companies.

The rest of the finance has come from the African Development Bank (\$11.5mn), the European Development Fund and the governments of Canada, West Germany and France. The United Nations Development Programme has also played an important part.

The experience gained at Selingue will thus form a basis for developments inside and outside Mali. For Mali in particular the scheme has provided a training ground for the country's young engineers and technicians and employment for over 1,000 of its people. When the Selingue dam is finished this workforce is likely to move wherever the next dam is built.

In fact, construction of Mali's next dam is something that could happen very soon, as part of the giant scheme for the development of the Senegal river, involving Mali, Mauritania and Senegal and again financed to an important degree by Arab funds.

One dam is planned under this scheme at Diama in the river delta in Senegal and work on this should begin later this year. Construction of a second dam, at Manantali in Mali, should start in 1980. An invitation for tenders has already been issued for the Diama dam, costing an estimated \$173mn, and bids for Manantali, costing an estimated \$490mn, will be called for later in the year.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi have together pledged \$218mn to co-finance the Senegal river scheme while various international agencies, including the European Development Fund and the African Development Bank, together with West Germany, France and Canada, have committed \$225mn.

Although this is still short of the \$663mn needed for the first phase, the planners in the Organisation for the Senegal River Development (OMVS) are confident that the money will come in the course of project implementation.

The project will make possible irrigation over some 750,000 acres of the river basin, turning a drought-stricken region into one of Africa's grannies. Navigation on a 1,000km stretch

of the river will also become possible throughout the year, which is of special importance for land-locked Mali.

Mali was rather disappointed by a recent OMVS decision to relegate the hydro-power component of the Manantali dam scheme to a subsequent phase of construction. But Lamine Keita, Mali's Minister for Industrial Development and Tourism and the prime mover behind the dam construction in his country, told The Middle East that there was no question of giving up the plan for the power station as the country would soon be needing energy to help develop its mineral resources, including uranium, bauxite, iron and manganese.

Some of the sources of finance, including Kuwait, which have specified part of their commitment for the power station, will now have to agree for the money to be used on other aspects of the project.

A potentially more scrious obstacle was removed last February, when the powerful West German aid agency. Kredietanstalt fur Wiederaufbau. due to contribute \$90mn, lifted its technical objections to the project as being too ambitious. Some of the Arab funds, including KFAED, are said to have been swayed by the German change of attitude.

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MALI

BRIEFS

FRENCH FOUR-PRONGED FINANCING--Four agreements, in the form of subsidies, were signed between Mali and France in Bamako on 27 April. The first of these agreements relates to the financing, in the total amount of 1.5 million French francs--equivalent to 150 million Malian francs--of the second phase of the Baguineda Market-Garden Production and Canning operation. The second concerns the public health aid project (point G hospital in Bamako), for a total of 800,000 French francs, or 80 million Malian francs. The third concerns the project to support livestock-raising operations in the Sahelian zone. It provides financing for this project in the amount of 400,000 French francs, or 40 million Malian francs. The fourth agreement, relating to the Tilemsi phosphates project, grants financing of 1.4 million French francs, or 140 million Malian francs, for carrying out the project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1186] 11267

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FIGURES.—Agricultural production for 1978-1979 is higher than in the preceding years, declared Fagnanama Kone, Malian minister of rural development, on 24 April, as he opened the 19th annual session of the National Committee for Agronomic Research (CNRA). Production of milletsorghum reached 1 million tons. For paddy, it is close to 300,000 tons, and for cottonseed, 130,000 tons—very close to the Plan's target, which was 136,000 tons; and for peanuts, it was 125,000 tons—49 percent less than provided for in the Plan. Finally, the minister stressed that "the rebuilding of the livestock herd is proceeding satisfactorily." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1186] 11267

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RHODESIA

RURAL ECONOMY REPORTED IN DIRE STRAITS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1144

[Article: "Economic Situation Very Precarious in the Rural Zone"]

[Text] The FINANCIAL TIMES of London reported recently that the Rhodesian army had given the code name "Operation Dinde" to the program it has started to starve out the nationalist guerrillas of the Patriotic Front who have installed themselves in the rural areas.

Since these guerrillas get their food from the black population of the rural zones, the army has strictly limited the entry of foodstuffs into these zones, so that the peasants have available only enough to keep them from starving to death and thus cannot supply food to the guerrillas.

In the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL), the London daily states, the mills and shops have been closed by the army to a very great extent. On the other hand, the 1978 drought raises the prospect of serious nutrition problems in the rural zones starting next August.

A document published by the Rhodesian Catholic "Justice and Peace" commission on the eve of the elctions declared that in the African rural zones, sowing had been reduced to a minimum, granaries destroyed, and mills and shops closed. The curfew, a result of the martial law over 90 percent of Rhodesian territory, keeps people from giving proper care to the harvests and the livestock. In particular, the livestock have not been able to have tick baths regularly, and checking for tripanosomiasis is no longer done. According to the commission, 500,000 head of the Rhodesian cattle herd have thus been lost in recent times.

The commission also states that malnutrition is developing in the rural areas, and cites a recent study involving 2,400 5-year-old children: 17 percent of them do not have the weight considered minimal for their age in the TTL. The effects of malnutrition on very young children and the unborn in the womb (mental retardation, physical defects) are presently developing.

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On the other hand, the president of the Rhodesian Medical Association has drawn attention to the development of epidemic diseases in the rural zones.

The "Justice and Peace" commission states that the number of physicians in the missions in the bush (all denominations) went from 44 in 1975 to 7 in March 1979. Hospitals and clinics numbered 67 and 30, respectively, in 1975; today there are only 45 and 12. In 1979, there are only 4 hospitals with interns, whereas 4 years previously, there were 26.

One thousand one hundred primary schools have been closed; they had a total of 262 pupils [as published]. The number of African jobseekers is high, as is the number of refugees—said to be about 50,000—fleeing to the towns. On the other hand, according to the commission, there are 30,000 Rhodesian refugees in Zambia and 80,000 in Mozambique, and they are fleeing to Botswana at the rate of 2,000 per month.

On 1 May, the FINANCIAL TIMES published a map of the zones under martial law and the operational zones in Rhodesia. It showed that except for the Salisbury-Gwelo-Bulawayo and Salisbury-Kariba axes, the entire country is under martial law. One noted two zones of operations against the ZIPRA, Nkomo's army, in the west, and three others against ZANLA [Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army], Mugabe's army, in the east. Another zone, "Salops," comprises the environs of the Rhodesian capital.

A Parallel Administration in the Bush?

Justin Nyoka, former Salisbury correspondent for the OBSERVER of London and the RAND DAILY MAIL of Johannesburg, gave a press conference in Paris on 26 April to report his experience among the guerrillas, with whom he lived for several months in 1978.

In what constitutes the only report by a journalist on life in the rural areas controlled by ZANLA, Mr Nyoka declared that in the regions he visited, east of Salisbury (Mtoko, Buhera) and between Bulawayo and Fort Victoria (Belingwe), he had sometimes noted the creation of a "parallel administration" at the instigation of the guerrillas. Especially at Buhera, abandoned by the Salisbury administration more than 2 years ago, the peasants recognized an authority and paid taxes to a committee responsible for the organization of daily life. This committee, according to Mr Nyoka, was directed by a chairman who was elected by the peasants and who had under his authority various officials responsible for health, education, agriculture and logistics (=supplies). A "popular tribunal" is even said to have settled certain matters relating to disputes among the peasants about land, and has handed down sentences against "spies" for the signatories of the "internal agreement" of 3 March 1979. Furthermore, according to the journalist, the Western press has also reported several thousand hectares of maize cultivated by ZANLA in this region, and recently discovered and destroyed by the Rhodesian army.

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White farmers and missionaries are said to have collaborated with ZANLA in certain zones. The roads and bridges are reported to have been repaired by the guerrillas in the regions which they control.

In conclusion, Mr Nyoka siad, Mugabe's forces are reported to feel more secure on Rhodesian "liberated" territory than in Mozambique, where they are subjected to air attacks. On the other hand, they are said to have inspired in the black peasants a new devotion to the lands which they have "liberated" from white colonial domination.

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SENEGAL

PREMIER CONTINUING ECONOMIC RECOVERY PLAN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1185

[Text] The prime minister of Senegal, Abdou Diouf has really decided to continue economic revival policy which was begun in 1978. He said it again on 1 May to the delegates from the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS) federation that is affiliated with the Socialist Party in the government, who had come to bring him a list of demands.

Mr Diouf stated that the revival would be "vigorous enough to ensure growth." He added that it was ruling out "unrealistic demands," but not "legitimate demands." Among the latter he cited "maintaining the purchasing power" and announced that in 1980 the government would adopt a series of measures designed to readjust prices and wages, while continuing to come closer to the truth of prices.

Mr Diouf intends to ensure the creation of new jobs by implanting new firms from the modern sector of the economy in Senegal and by greater productivity in the rural sector. He indicated that his government would continue to call for foreign aid in order to supplement its investment budget, adding that he was granting priority to investments that would create jobs, and to social housing; on that subject, he announced that a Senegalese mortgage bank is soon to be created.

The principal demands of the CNTS, which conducted a grand march through Dakar on the occasion of 1 May, have to do with wages and prices, the revalorization of the SMIG [Interoccupational Guaranteed Minimum Wage], as well as pensions, transportation and housing, and with creating a single national collective bargaining agreement for all workers.

On the other hand, the Union of Free Senegalese Workers (UTLS), which fought hard against the CNTS in 1978, at the time of the election of business delegates, declared itself in favor of the revised special collective bargaining agreements.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

INDIAN PROTOCOL--India is about to participate in several developments in Senegal, by virtue of a protocol on industrial and economic cooperation signed on 30 April in New Delhi by the Senegalese minister of Industrial Development and Crafts, Cheikh Amidou Kane, and his Indian counterpart, George Fernandes (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 May p 1125). The following activities are concerned in the operation: manufacture of agricultural tools, light tractors, machinery replacement parts, installation of machine workshops and industrial establishments. Indian aid is also envisioned in the area of food technology, processing of fruits and cereals, preservation and canning. On the other hand, Senegal would be able to call upon India in matters having to do with processing of industrial raw materials and training of craftsmen and skilled laborers, to the profit of small rural industry. Several Indian firms, governmental and privately-owned, as well as a number of other institutions, would be associated with these cooperation programs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1185] 8946

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

SECRET CONTACTS WITH PRC--Diplomatic sources in Pretoria confirm that secret contacts were held recently between South African and Chinese officials. The latter even led the racists to understand that they would be prepared, under certain conditions, to recognize the puppet Namibia and Zimbabwe regimes and to persuade other African states to do likewise. An important PRC political-military delegation is said to have visited Namibia recently. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 May 79 p 42]

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UGANDA

POST-LIBERATION PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 1138

[Text] The Ugandan liberation forces, aided by the Tanzanian allied forces, are continuing to eliminate pockets of resistance formed by the fleeing army of Idi Amin Dada and it was learned at the end of April that after making sure they would control Jinja and Owen Falls dam, the Ugandan and Tanzanian forces had seized the two strategic cities of Tororo and Mbale and had been able to go ahead with reopening the road and the railroad line, both of which connect Uganda with Kenya. Moreover, telephonic communications between Uganda and the rest of the world were reastablished on 30 April after having been interrupted for two weeks.

Kenya finds it does not know what to do with the refugees who have poured in, but the Nairobi authorities are still hesitant to make a decision about them, despite numerous voices demanding that they be extradited. President Daniel arap Moi even solemnly lied on 29 April, saying that ox-President Idi Amin's former adviser, Bob Astles, had been extradited from his country, where he had been captured.

In Kampala, Mr Lule's new government has recalled all chiefs of diplomatic mission abroad and he has announced that the former vice-president and Defense Minister of the ex-marshal, Gen Mustafa Adrisi, who was recently arrested, would be tried for his "crimes against the nation." He also intends to form an army "in the service of the people."

As for the ex-marshal himself, no one knows exactly where he is. But he is still being actively searched for.

Finally, liberated Uganda is arousing the solicitude of the West. London, Washington, Stockholm and the EEC are already prepared to aid in its reconstruction. Kenya and Tanzania, for their part, are disposed to renew closer relations with Uganda and already there is talk of reviving the East African Economic Community.

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UGANDA

EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Apr 79 p 1077

[Text] In its efforts to reestablish the country's economic situation while continuing military operations aimed at assuring it the control of the whole territory, one of the first initiatives of Mr Lule's government was to send a high-level delegation to Nairobi to meet with Kenyan leaders. Uganda has always been closely dependent on Kenya for its supplies. The reopening of the Kampala road to the Kenyan border and from there to Mombasa is essential for Uganda. The fate of the Ugandans who took refuge in Kenya after Idi Amin's fall must have been mentioned. Some members of the Kenyan government believe those Ugandans--among whom are several civilian and military leaders of the former regime, notably Bob Astles, a British native who became a Ugandan citizen, private adviser to Marshal Amin Dada, considered to be his "condemned soul" and probably responsible for the assassination on last 6 April of four. Western journalists who disappeared at the time of the fall of Kampala--should be considered, not as refugees in good faith, but as "fugitives", and should be sent back to the new Ugandan authorities.

Conversations also took place in Kampala between Mr Lule's government and a Tanzanian ministerial delegation.

The new Ugandan regime, which could never have overthrown President Amin without Tanzania's aid, is thought in Nairobi to be about to attempt to have more balanced political and economic relations with its two neighbors, whereas, since Marshal Amin came to power, Dar-es-Salaam and Kampala were ignoring each other completely.

Thus one could go back to the situation that prevailed when the three countries were associated within the East African Community. A rebirth of the latter, which ceased to function de facto two years ago, remains out of the question, but one might envisage a normalization of relations between the three partners; this subject must have been discussed in Nairobi in the conversations between representatives of the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments.

On the military level, after making sure of Jinja and the bridge, as well as the dam at Owen Falls, the Tanzanian troops, supported by elements of the

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Ugandan liberation forces, undertook to continue their progress toward the Kenyan border on the one hand, toward the north on the other hand. This progress is difficult and slow (it scarcely exceeds 15 km per day) because the troops are advancing on foot for lack of vehicles or fuel, and because they have to clear the villages and roadsides of the remnants of Idi Amin's army, especially the Nubians and Kawkas who are giving themselves over to massacring the civilian populations.

For the moment, the new authorities and the Tanzanian army are only in control of about half the country. Some Tanzanian officers estimate that two or three months will be needed to clear it entirely of elements of the former Ugandan army.

As for Marshal Amin Dada, according to unconfirmed information circumspectly gathered in London, he went first to Tripoli with the hope of obtaining from Col Qadhdhafi the military means to reconquer the government. Shown the door, he then went to Bagdad to solicit from Iraq the means that Libya refused him. It is more than doubtful that the fleeing marshal is getting satisfaction. In fact, it seems that higher-level contacts had taken place between Tanzanian and Arab representatives during the weeks prior to the collapse of Idi Amin Dada's regime. Those consultations would have resulted in a compromise on Mr Lule's appointment as head of government—he is known for his moderation—and the setting aside of Milton Obote, whom the Arabs judge to be too favorable to Israel.

The All Africa Conference of Churches (ACC) launched an appeal for primary emergency help of \$600,000 for the Ugandan victims of the Amin Dada regime, or of the war. The ACC estimates at 3,000,000, out of a population of 12,000,000, the number of Ugandans who have suffered from the former regime and who need aid. The Sudan, for its part, has asked for international assistance in providing for the needs of the Ugandans who, according to the Sudanese press agency are arriving "by the thousands" in the Sudan.

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UGANDA

COMBINED FORCES OF EXILES REGROUP

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Apr 79 p 1014

[Article: "Uganda -- After the Fall of Marshal Amin Dada's Regime"]

[Text] The combined forces of the Ugandan exiles--regrouped within the Ugandan National Liberation Front [FNLO], which includes not less than 18 organizations and movements--and the Tanzanian army captured Kampala on 11 April after heavy shelling by artillery. The fall of the capital was preceded by heavy fighting on 5 and 6 April in the capture of the Entebbe international airport, where 400 Libyan soldiers were killed and a number of them taken prisoners. The Tanzanian newspapers DAILY NEWS and UHURU published photographs of the prisoners, thus demolishing Colonel Qadhdhafi's denials wherein he refuses to acknowledge his intervention in support of Marshal Amin Dada and lending credit to the story, published by the Western press, according to which the Libyan head of state paid a ransom in the tens of millions of dollars to retrieve the prisoners belonging to his expeditionary force.

On the morning after the fall of Marshal Amin Dada's regime, the new cabinet named by President Yusuf Lule held its first meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, bud weather having prevented the cabinet ministers from traveling to Kampala until the early afternoon of 13 April. President Lule and the 16 members of his government took the oath of office shortly after their arrival there.

It is noted that former Ugandan President Milton Obote is not part of the new government. He is not very popular among a large number of his country's ethnic population, the Bugandans, whose kingdom he eliminated in 1966, and moreover, his personal ties with President Nyerere almost made him appear to be the Tanzanian president's liegeman and under the latter's control. Milton Obote's absence from the new government also enables President Nyerere to respond to his detractors who suspect him of having wanted to chase Amin Dada from power in order to reinstate Obote. One of the strongmen of the new government appears to be Lt Col Tito Okello, a former officer exiled in Tanzania since the failure of the attempted uprisings in 1972, who appears to have organized and directed the entire military campaign and who was presented to the crowds by Fresident Lule as the commander-in-chief of the Ugandan liberation forces.

Immediately upon its arrival in Kampala, the new government issued an appeal for the cessation of looting and executions of former supporters of the fallen marshal. Kampala was ravaged by looters. As for the members

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of the former regime's administration and army, they fled in large numbers to take refuge in Kenya, where their arrival is posing serious problems to the Nairobi government, which is requesting United Nations assistance to copy with this influx of refugees.

After appeasing the general state of mind, which will undoubtedly not be easy to do, the new government must turn its attention to rebuilding the country's economy and, above all, to reestablishing communications with Kenya, through which virtually all Ugandan imports and exports must transit. It was announced on 17 April that the new authorities had taken control of the city of Jinja which commands the railway to Kenya, and of the Owen Falls Dam which constitutes the sole bridge over the Victoria Nile and at which is installed the electric power plant that feeds at the same time all of Uganda and part of Kenya. But the route between Kampala and Jinja, laced with forts, was not yet secured because of the presence of elements of Marshal Amin Dada's army.

Supplies have not been able to reach the country for many days and the capital, like the rest of the country, will not return to normal living until the route to Kenya has been completely cleared. According to Western sources, Kampala is awaiting the arrival soon of urgent international aid by air.

The same sources indicate that inflation reached 700 percent during the last days of the regime and that the counterfeit presses turned out several billion shillings.

The new Ugandan regime is counting on outside aid for its reconstruction task. The EEC [European Economic Community] has already decided to send a mission of experts to Kampala to assess its most urgent needs. The Western countries, including America, will probably be receptive to Uganda's requests, which it has also addressed to the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc with the intent of following a nonalinement policy.

As for the immediate present, a source of anxiety is the uncertainty which still prevailed at week's end regarding Marshal Amin Dada's intentions. Totally contradictory rumors are circulating in his regard. The possibility cannot be discarded that he may have taken refuge in the northern part of the country and that he intends to continue the fight. The new authorities, in fact, are far from being in control of the entire country and may have yet to face renewed combat in a region where the former marshal can still rally loyal followers. Although a major portion of his army has disbanded, certain elements appear determined to fight to the end. The fact is that the Tanzanian army, a foreign army, has carried on the war until now. President Nyerere has affirmed that his army is prepared to leave as soon as the Ugandan authorities request it. But they will remain in Uganda as long as those same authorities deem its presence to be useful even if not indispensable.

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ZAIRE

ORBITAL COMPANY, MAGAZINE, AND LETTER

German Orbital Company and Magazine

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 May 79 p 27

/Article_by Francois Soudan: "Orbital Transport and Rocket Company and JEUNE AFRIQUE"/

Text Badolite, northern part of Zaire, Thursday, 26 April. At the end of a special meeting of the political bureau of the MPR (Popular Movement of the Revolution), the only party, held in the native village of President Mobutu, it was learned that Zaire had just ordered the West German Orbital Transport and Rocket Company, OTRAG, to stop operations "pertaining to research on and launching of satellites from Zairian territories."

For us and for you, that was only official confirmation: five days earlier, as a matter of fact, in its Issue No 955, which hit the newsstands on Saturday, 21 April, JEUNE AFRIQUE told its readers that this Zairian decision had already been made and that as a matter of fact it was made at the start of the year. "OTRAG will pull out," we wrote.

However, OTRAG obviously is not in the processing of pulling out. Evidence: the storm in a tea cup which was stirred up between Paris, Brussels, Bonn, Kinshasa, and Munich by the publication of the article entitled "OTRAG Will Pull Out" in JEUNE AFRIQUE.

Besieged by numerous phone calls coming from Belgium and German newsmen, OTRAG President Lutz Kayser, on 25 April, through his Paris attorney, Master Paul Garson, let us have a five-point statement reproduced below. This was a rather unfortunate statement since it opened with the following denial: "there was no cancellation of the contract between the Republic of Zaire and OTRAG." Now, on the very next day, the Zairian authorities announced the decision which we already know about and there is every reason to believe that the West German company managers were informed of this cancellation for at least two months. Concerning the other points taken up by Mr. Kayser, nobody is unaware of the fact that OTRAG—treated somewhat like a leper by the international community, after Iran and Brazil refused to put it up—is today experiencing serious financial difficulties. The existence of a company

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called "Otra S.A." in Liechtenstein, as well as the presence, in a private capacity, of the West German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans Dietrich Genscher on the Manono plateau on 17 May 1977 were underscored by numerous western press organs in 1977 when the "OTRAG affair" became big news. As for the "technical success" which Mr Kayser speaks about, two booster rocket launches out of three made by OTRAG can be referred to as such; that is not too bad in the final analysis. But during the third test, which took place in June 1978 in the presence of President Mobutu and a German television corporation, the rocket blew up after a few yards because of a failure of a "valve," as reported at the time by the Zairian government news agency AZAP Zairian Press Agency/.

In Bonn, the West German authorities, when questioned by newsmen, did not conceal their "happy surprise" after the publication of the article entitled "OTRAG Will Pull Out."

"We doubted that Zaire would cancel the contract overnight," a foreign ministry spokesman declared unofficially. "Chancellor Schmidt had asked the President of France to intervene in this sense with his Zairian counterpart. That is a big load off our minds; this affair had begun to poison our relations with the countries of the East." To one of our fellow journalists who questioned him upon this "exclusive" published in JEUNE AFRIQUE, the spokesman added: "JEUNE AFRIQUE is a very well-informed journal."

OTRAG Letter

Text/ Following the publication in your Issue No. 955 of 25 April 1979 (p. 28), under the title "OTRAG Will Pull Out," of an article seriously challenging OTRAG and Mr Lutz Kayser, its president, I demand that you publish, by virtue of my right of response, the following statements:

- 1. There was no cancellation of the contract between the Republic of Zaire and OTRAG.
- 2. The allegation to the effect that OTRAG is in a state of bankruptcy is false and mendacious.
- 3. There is no such company as Otrag S.A. at Vaduz, Liechtenstein.
- 4. Foreign Minister H. D. Genscher did not witness the first launch of the OTRAG rocket on 17 May 1977.
- 5. The three OTRAG rocket launches were technical successes.

Paul Garson, Attorney, Paris Bar

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ZAIRE

GERMAN AEROSPACE COMPANY REPORTED IN TROUBLE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 May 79 pp 15-16

/Article by Jack Bourderie: "Is The Orbital Transport and Rocket Company Going Bankrupt?"/

Text/ Who has sufficient influence to suggest to the founder-president to call in his notes?

Early in August 1977, AFRIQUE-ASIE published the complete text of the agreement which took effect on 6 December 1975 and which was signed between Mobutu's Zaire and a West German company by the name of OTRAG Orbital Transport and Rocket Company, Inc. (see AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 141). This contract assured the company of a territory roughly as big as the FRG, located on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, to enable it to create "a vast operating area suitable for launching booster rockets into the atmosphere and outer space as well as all activities of any kind directly or indirectly connected with that."

This information immediately produced indignant and virtuous denials on the part of the Zairian authorities, along with more or less artificially worried or intrigued commentaries from western foreign offices, but above all anxious reactions from all of the public opinion of the Third World-oparticularly in Africa—and demands for explanations from the progressive regimes.

The French general staff itself seemed worried by a state of affairs which it could inturpret as one way of getting around the 1945 Potsdam accords barring West Germany from engaging in any kind of nuclear rearmament. According to the French daily LE MATIN, the SDECE (Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service), at the end of 1978, "assigned to a French airline pilot a survey mission. Air photos were taken in the area controlled by OTRAG and passed on to the French intelligence services." What did those photos reveal that could have persuaded President Giscard d'Estaing firmly to advise his Zairian hunting companion, during his last trip to Paris, unilaterally to break a treaty which formally established, in favor of OTRAG, "the right of exclusive use up to the year 2000?"

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On the other hand, in Angola, Zambia, and the Congo, the governments did not like the idea of having firing ranges at their very doors--firing ranges, not all of which were civilian.

In spite of the reconciliation between Kinshasa and Luanda, trouble persisted between the two countries, for which OTRAG was not the least reason. The "guide" had tried to smoothe the situation over by successively inviting the President of Angola to visit him on the spot and by then sending an Angolan military mission to the area in question; but President Neto would not go for that. Nor did he like the prospect raised by OTRAG managers to put the launch area under UN control.

All of these "arrangements" thus could not secure the support of the RPA (People's Republic of Angola) for whom the only solution was the pure and simple dismantling of OTRAG.

The German Government in turn, pressed to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with Luanda, ran into rejection from Angola.

Certain authorized circles affirmed that the German IMF expert, Erwin Blumenthal, assigned to the National Bank of Zaire, had discreetly advised his government publicly to disavow OTRAG and to force its managers in private provisionally to renounce their designs. During his African trip last July, Chancellor Schmidt hinted that his government was doing everything to stop this entire undertaking.

The OTRAG people increasingly realized that working in Zaire with sophisticated techniques turned out to be an untenable wager. They had much trouble importing everything, organizing the few hundred Zairians constituting the man power in a Draconian fashion; they did not manage to triumph over the corruption, over the system of simply muddling along, of the tiny acts of sabotage, as well as theft which in that country had been raised to the status of an institution. It was necessary immediately to stop any further graft. "Let somebody indicate to me another country that would agree to receive us and I would pull out of Zaire tomorrow," less than a year ago confided an OTRAG manager in private.

Pull out--but to go where? India? Brazil? It does not seem that those countries ever expressed any great enthusiasm for this prospect. For obvious reasons, Mobutu had to be permitted to save face by making it seem that the initiative was here.

On 27 April Mobutu thus ordered the OTRAG to stop operations.

Some questions now arise. As far as Zaire is concerned, what will happen to the annual utilization lease of 250 million francs which were not supposed to be turned over "until the end of the year during which, following the first launch of a booster rocket from this territory, OTRAG will have received, from a client, its full remuneration in money other than the currency of that country"--meaning of course Zaire? And what will become of the installations and investments put up by the German engineers?

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Should we think that another agreement has been drawn up in financial terms and that the two parties will get together? In that case, who could be that much interested in the Mobutu regime that he could have permitted the release of such sums of money? That is the crux of the question. And it continues to be of interest for the future of the political situation in the southern part of Africa.

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END