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TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 34/79)



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CONTENTS

PAGE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Problems With FRG Foreign Aid Efforts Outlined
(Mario R. Dederichs; STERN, 26 Apr 79) 1

Shortcomings in Nuclear Reactor Safety Noted
(Wolfgang Barthel, Peter Blechschmidt; STERN, 3 May 79). 4

FRANCE

PFC Seen Declining in Strength
(Andre Lesueur; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 7 May 79) 6

PSF's International Relations Secretary Interviewed
(Lionel Joseph Interview; PARIS MATCH, 11 May 79) 8

Flight Training Schools Receiving Alpha Jet Trainers
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 12 May 79) 11

Briefs
New 'L'HUMANITE' Editor 16
Approach to Cubans 16

PORTUGAL

Soares Interviewed, Concerned Over President's Policies
(Mario Soares Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
30 Apr 79) 17

- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]

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CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
SPAIN	
Peace Prospects for Basque Region Assessed (CAMBIO 16, 13 May 79)	21
Background Details Given	
Foreign Affairs Minister Views Situation	
Sanchez Drago Looks at Basque Problem, by Fernando Sanchez Drago	
Views of Autonomy Negotiator, by Antonio Fontan	
PNV President Voices Views, Carlos Garaicoechea	
Interview	
Tarradellas' View of Basque Problem	
Major Figures State Views	

- b -

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

PROBLEMS WITH FRG FOREIGN AID EFFORTS OUTLINED

Hamburg STERN in German 26 Apr 79 pp 220-223

[Article by Mario R. Dederichs: "'Risk a Failure Once in a While'"]

[Text] A stubborn bureaucracy, reluctant financing and exaggerated FRG foreign aid failures are harming German foreign aid efforts.

The man from Baden who is ordinarily quite reserved was enthusiastic. Rainer Offergeld, minister for economic cooperation, was fascinated when he was shown German projects in Kanye in South Botswana--helpful inventions for a country with too much sun and not enough water: solar ovens made out of metal boxes which bake bread in 5 hours; a windmill which operates a waterpump; a power mill which in a few minutes shells more kernels of the main food, sorghum, than a Botswana housewife does in a day. Says Offergeld: "If that promises success, one must also risk a failure once in a while."

During his first year in the FRG Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ), Offergeld has learned how closely success and failure are related when it comes to foreign aid, for which Bonn is spending DM 4.7 billion in tax money this year.

Even in Kanye, the decisive task of bringing technical improvements to the people is still unsolved and a failure not impossible. Offergeld says: "If everything functioned as well there as it does here, we would not need any foreign aid." To be sure, to date he has been spared any really big failures; nevertheless, this is by no means an indication that everything is running smoothly:

On the Indonesian island of Java, Bonn will abandon the Soropadan agricultural project in July. On behalf of Offergeld's ministry, the FRG Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) invested DM 1.4 million and two German experts in the experiment of switching rice farmers to the higher-yield production of corn, sorghum, soybeans and sweet potatoes. The switch went well, but farmers were left high and dry with their products--there is no market for them. A BMZ expert complains that the GTZ and the Indonesian partners in the project "should have been better able to predict it."

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In Egypt an attempt was started a few weeks ago to save the El Nahda agricultural project (price tag: DM 16.5 million). A new project director is supposed to create order where his predecessor took the third step before taking care of the first one. He had European cows flown in without first instructing the fellahin in husbandry and feeding. There were quarrels among the German experts and problems with the Egyptian administration, which assigned El Nahda to new agencies several times and thus created confusion as to jurisdiction.

Foreign-aid politicians are now more than ever willing to admit mistakes. Says GTZ Manager Hans-Joerg Elshorst: "We are continuously learning new things and know now that we could have done better with regard to many projects." Offergeld, however, is angry because government critics are exaggerating failures and, as a consequence, are encouraging "a sentiment" against foreign aid "that is unfortunately still widely prevalent among the population." CDU expert Juergen Gerhard Todenhoefer, for instance, brandished a half-finished accounting office report which criticized the German Development Service (DED)--attached to the BMZ--for failures costing millions, massive mistakes in the assignments of volunteers and sloppy bookkeeping. In the meantime, the final verdict has been reached, and according to the BMZ the accusations were dismissed as "not justified, premature and exaggerated."

Many developing countries, however, consider German on-site preliminary tests too thorough and too time-consuming. Last year alone, the GTZ appointed 550 experts. "The Germans don't waste a single mark," said Zdenek Cervenka, director of research at the Scandinavian Africa Institute in Uppsala, "but because of extremely bureaucratic and inflexible management they are creating aid without real meaning. For instance in Costa Rica: Because a third of the banana harvest was rotting before being transported overseas, DM 24 million was to be used to expand Porto Limon, the Atlantic seaport. That was in 1970. Subsequently, the Germans spent years examining and assessing. An agreement was not reached until 1976 and construction on the seaport (time of construction: 3 years) did not begin until last year. In the meantime, however, Japan expanded Puntarenas, Costa Rica's Pacific seaport. It took only from 1972 till 1975.

Nevertheless, thorough preliminary studies can save a lot of money. For instance, Bonn established the "economic infeasibility" of and withdrew from the Egyptian Kattara Valley project that would run into the billions. The object was to build an irrigation canal (employing atomic blasts) extending from the Mediterranean Sea to a desert valley located below sea level. Anyway, the tests alone cost DM 11.3 million.

Bonn's aid is slow as well, because the entire diplomatic apparatus with foreign ministries and embassies has to be set in motion before an agreement with a developing nation can be concluded. Most of the time it takes between 1 and 2 years before the concept reaches the final agreement. An additional complication arises from the fact that projects that take

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several years to complete (approximately one-third of all projects) require that the government frequently has to renegotiate four or five times, because the laws governing the German budget restrict specific and legally binding financial commitments by the BMZ to a period of no more than 2 years. Being forced into "piecemeal financing," a project organizer complains, "makes continuous planning impossible. Suddenly the money is available and projects have to be found quickly." Nobody in the ministry is able to predict today how much money the Bundestag will approve in 1982, say for Peru or for Pakistan.

At any rate, it is supposed to be more than it has been to date. Bonn has given its word before the entire world: According to a UN resolution, the FRG has agreed and is supposed to increase its share of foreign aid to 0.7 percent of its gross national product during this decade. In 1979, however, the real figure is only 0.27 percent, less than for most of the Western industrial nations. Consequently, according to a confidential government analysis, "the credibility of our arguments suffers on the whole in international negotiations"--in the near future at the Manila World Trade Conference in May.

Whatever Offergeld is concerned about, the chancellor is less disturbed. Although the cabinet meeting on development problems decided this week on a small supplement to foreign aid programs, Helmut Schmidt remains reserved. "We are a small country and we are giving more than the entire Soviet Union," he proclaimed recently to petitioners in South America. And he is also not concerned about criticism in international meetings: "Conferences like that have outlived their time. Ten years from now nobody will talk about them any longer."

The chancellor seems to have a short memory. In 1973, when he was the minister of finance, he promised to double the foreign aid share of the FRG gross national product by 1978. Since then it has been reduced by 0.05 percent.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SHORTCOMINGS IN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY NOTED

Hamburg STERN in German 3 May 79 pp 199-201

Article by Wolfgang Barthel, Peter Blechschmidt: "A Hole in the Stack"

Text Federal Minister of the Interior Gerhart Baum (FDP) has acknowledged the citizens fears of the atom: "The outstanding critical questions must now be answered." And even Kiel's Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU), up to now a fan of nuclear energy, is suddenly calling for "a frank statement of all findings." That is the end result of the near-catastrophe at Harrisburg.

Only the German nuclear industry and the competent supervisory and licensing agencies are carrying on as before. They prefer to discuss breakdowns and mistakes behind closed doors. There is, for example, Dr of Engineering Wilhelm Schoch, member of the supervisory board of the Mannheim power plant and of the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK). At an internal conference of the nuclear stack producer "Kraftwerk Union" (KWU) he reported "serious damage" and "dangerous cracks" in nuclear power plants. Then there is Dr of Engineering Helmut Werner of the State Material Testing Institute (MPA) in Stuttgart, who gave a lecture, complete with X-ray film, on cracks in nuclear power plants: "The faults described confirm the necessity to improve basic safety."

Neither lectures nor, of course, the X-ray film of the cracks have been published so far. Yet Werner had been compelled to admit: "Though these cracks were up to 2.1 mm deep (while wall thicknesses range from 6.3-8 mm), they were not initially spotted by the inspection; the pipes were built in." In June 1978 such a fracture in a live steam line had resulted in the escape of 145 tons of radioactive steam from the Brunsbuettel nuclear power plant.

Schoch reported faults in feed water containers at Biblis A nuclear power plant where cracks up to 14 mm deep and 2½ meter long were found. The container wall is only 17 mm thick.

To STERN both Schoch and Werner downplayed the significance of these faults. Schoch said: "We optimized the construction materials by every means in

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our power, so that a failure of pressure tanks is out of the question." Werner's comment: "All damage and faults were made good." The two experts were not even willing to say in which nuclear power plants the X-ray film was taken. The majority came from the Philippsburg I hot water reactor-- and hot water reactors are particularly prone to develop cracks.

Leaks and fractures, therefore, are a constant topic at the meetings of the Reactor Safety Commission. According to the minutes of the 136th meeting, for example, a report was given regarding the Isar nuclear power plant in Ohu near Munich: "Another inspection of the discharge lines found cracks up to 40 mm wide running toward three circumferential seams."

With reference to the unfortunate Brunsbuettel reactor, out of commission now for a year, the RSK minutes complain that safety inspections "cannot quite avoid uncertainties" in view of smudgy welding seams at the live steam lines." Decoded this means: The power plant may be but is not necessarily safe. The RSK minutes continue: "The Stuttgart MPA points out that in 1981 all original internal fixtures in the safety tank...will be exchanged." And not only these, because the important feed water lines have long ceased to be in good order.

Even the Kruemmel hot water reactor--though not even in service yet--is already demonstrating serious defects. Concerning the sheet connections at the safety tank the RSK briefly comments: "The construction does not meet the advanced requirements with regard to the quality of the safety tank." The experts seem not to have noticed that similar designs are used in the Isar and Brunsbuettel nuclear power plants.

Lately some doubts regarding safety seem indicated also for the Stade hydraulic reactor (hitherto considered a prize specimen), which has been operating since 1972 and until now achieved 85 percent utilization. As far back as January 1976 the RSK found that the reactor pressure vessel had become brittle as the result of the action of the neutrons freed by nuclear fission.

The RSK therefore called for a grace program, according to which the reactor would be operated at lower pressure and temperatures--otherwise the safety of the reactor (designed to serve for 40 years) could be guaranteed only up to 1981.

On 20 May 1977 Prof Karl Kussmaul, director of the Stuttgart MPA, said in a letter to the RSK: "I would like to stress that U.S. light water nuclear power plants do not use stronger steels liable to brittle fracture." His summing up: "Following the obviously negative experiences of the past 7 years...no new nuclear power plants demonstrating an evidently smaller safety margin than previously assumed should be taken into service until all defects have been remedied."

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5
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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PFC SEEN DECLINING IN STRENGTH

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 7 May 79 p 43

[Article by Andre Lesueur: "Communist Sociology"]

[Text] There is a possibility that the Communist Party is in decline. This is what Mr Jean Elleinstein, a historian and one of the leaders of the dissatisfied Communists, reports to VALEURS ACTUELLES. It is also confirmed by a geographical and sociological analysis of the areas occupied by the Communist Party.

A quick look at the results of the legislative elections reveals first of all a continual erosion of its electorate, although it is slow. From 28.6 percent in 1946 it has shrunk to 20.55 percent in 1978, while passing through 25.75 percent in 1956 and 22.5 percent in 1967. This phenomenon may be due in part to the reappearance of a strong socialist movement. And to the improvement in living standards.

An analysis of its electorate also shows that the PC [Communist Party] seems to have lost the bet involved in the strategy called "the union of the people of France." This consisted of making the PC, starting with the union of the left, a great national party representing all strata of society on the model of the Italian Communist Party.

Now the PC is still - and this is its refuge as well -- essentially a workers' party. According to an inquiry made by IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute], its electorate is in fact 52 percent composed of factory workers and 15 percent of office workers. As for the cadres, which the PC has tried to seduce, specifically after 1974, they do not make up more than 2 percent of its electorate.

A more and more localized geographical spread corresponds to this very typical sociology of its electorate. The abandonment of the countryside as well as the difficulties that the PC has in spreading its words of order in a rural setting explain the astonishing shrinkage of the Communists among the peasants: the peasants do not represent more than 2 percent of its voters,

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compared to more than 10 percent in 1968. The consequence: the Communist vote is more and more urban.

A scrutiny of the map shows this: the zones under strong Communist influence are the most industrialized (the surroundings of Paris, north Pas-de-Calais, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Bouches-du-Rhone). A reading of the figures confirms it: the PC finds nearly 30 percent of its strength in the region of Paris, while this region represents only 17 percent of the French population.

Without prejudicing the "historic decline" which Mr Giscard d'Estaing promised, the "marginalization" of the Communist Party has been begun by the "specialization" and the localization of its voters.

As far as the party itself is concerned, it is not possible to speak of a decline. The PC is recruiting, even if its declared effectives (700,000 adherents) are much fewer than those that it claimed in 1946 (1 million). However, the organization really seems fragile.

First, the rate of rotation of the PC's members is unique in France: every year, 10 percent of its membership is new. This mobility results without a doubt from the methods of recruiting used by the Communists, which are adapted to circumstances.

This rotation also implies that the majority of the adherents of the PC have been members only a short time. Thus, three-quarters did not join the Communist Party until after the events of May and June 1968. And more than half of the present militants came to the Party after the signing of the common program in 1972. That explains the reticence of the base with regard to the PC's withdrawal from the union of the left.

However, those movements are practically without any consequence at the top. Out of the 121 members of the Central Committee, only 22 joined the PC after de-Stalinization in 1956 and only one -- Mrs France Merlin -- after the signing of the common program. Hence the stability of the apparatus.

The composition of the Party itself is a little closer to that of its electorate. An inquiry carried out by the Political Bureau confirms it. Mr Paul Laurent, secretary for organization, made the results public on 28 April: the effective militants of the PC are 51 percent factory workers and technicians, 28 percent white-collar workers, 11 percent intellectuals (and teachers), 3 percent farmers, and 3.5 percent artisans and tradespeople.

The directing organisms do not contradict this image. Out of 121 members on the Central Committee, 59 workers (or former workers) can be counted, 23 teachers, 22 office workers, 11 middle- and upper-rank cadres and 6 farmers.

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7
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FRANCE

PSF'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SECRETARY INTERVIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 11 May 79 p 43

∟Interview with Lionel Joseph by Laurence Masurel∟

∟Text∟ At 41, Lionel Joseph is national secretary of the PSF, responsible for international relations.

∟Question∟ Now you are the number two person in the Socialist Party. Is it hard to follow Pierre Mauroy?

∟Answer∟ In some respects, I am not following him; he was concerned with party coordination, and that is not one of my responsibilities. For the rest, it isn't easy, because I don't have all the experience he had. But as I don't have important duties in the provinces, as he did, I will be more available than he was. And besides, I know this new party as well as he did, for he may have believed a little too much in the permanence of the old party.

∟Question∟ But the party militants recognize Mauroy as the heir of traditional socialism. That is not true of you, is it?

∟Answer∟ Mauroy's decisions in the past 6 months have cut him off somewhat from traditional socialism. Besides, you have to understand that the new PS has had the time to create its own tradition. I am a fairly good expression of this tradition. And I will add that I am the son of a socialist who joined the party in 1924. So the old tradition is by no means alien to me.

∟Question∟ When someone looks at the new organization chart of the PS, do they get the impression that the new generation has taken the place of the old one?

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Answer No. There are several people well over 40 in the secretariat. But it was normal for a young party to have leaders from its own age group. We feel this phase is necessary to better "blend" the PS at its head.

Question Is this "rejuvenation" operation aimed against Rocard?

Answer No. But if Michel Rocard thinks so, it is because he has a problem with his own youth. When you are 50 years old, you have to act your age.

Question Why do you think Georges Marchais refuses to conclude a non-aggression pact with the PS?

Answer You just have to see Marchais' behavior on television to understand why our proposal might embarrass him. His attitude actually justifies our proposal. We will keep it open.

Question Is the PC, as Mitterrand said, looking for "allies" other than the PS?

Answer Since the PC can not offer any political alternative by itself (with less than 25 percent of the votes), and if it cuts itself off from its socialist partner, it might be tempted to look for other allies. But its problem, in such a case, is that the other political forces are not only on the right, but are actually reactionary. So what sort of alliance can it have?

Question But Marchais did say that "a new union has to be built at the grass roots level, based on concrete objectives corresponding to the workers' needs."

Answer You always have to start from the workers' needs. That isn't the problem. The first problem is that the PC, whatever it may say, is taking no initiative toward any union at the grass roots level, and moreover, it is rejecting any moves we make; the second problem is that it pushes off into the future the union of the left, while the problems of the workers need attention now.

Question Do you feel that the PC is definitely renouncing the union of the left strategy?

Answer No, for it would then have to face very quickly the most serious problem in its quite long history, the problem of the grass roots level, including those in the PC, who want a union of the left.

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Question Do you think you can do as well on 10 June as you did in the cantonal elections?

Answer Yes, we would be disappointed if we didn't. And doing better would have very great political significance.

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10
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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FLIGHT TRAINING SCHOOLS RECEIVING ALPHA JET TRAINERS

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 May 79 pp 21-23

[Article by Jean de Galard]

[Text] For all the world's air forces the arrival of a new aircraft in one of the units of those forces always constitutes a special event. In 1973, within the space of 6 months, once with the arrival of the first Dassault-Breguet Jaguar aircraft (twin Rolls Royce/Turbomeca Adour turbojet engines) at the 7th Fighter Squadron at Saint-Dizier in June, and again with the arrival of the first Dassault-Breguet Mirage F1 aircraft (SNECMA [National Company for Aircraft Engine Study and Manufacture] Atar 9K50 turbojet engines at the 30th Fighter Squadron at Reims in December, the [French] Air Force twice experienced such events.

In 1979, with the arrival at the Instruction Base 705 at Tours, where the Instruction Group 314 (GE 314)--otherwise known as the Christian Martell Fighter School--is installed, of the French-German (Dassault-Breguet and Dornier) Alpha Jet training and combat aircraft (two SNECMA/Turbomeca Larzac engines) the Air Force will again, 6 years later, experience such an event.

For it, and in particular for the Air Force School Command (CEAA), which has direct jurisdiction over the GE 314, the delivery of the Alpha Jet to the units constitutes a grand "first" for more reasons than one.

In the first place, because the Alpha Jet was specifically designed as a combat training airplane and this is the first time that the CEAA and GE 314 will have available an airplane which, from its initial study phase, was designed for training fighter pilots. Up to now the Fighter School and the CEAA, with the T33 at Tours and Mystere IV at Cazaux (8th Fighter Squadron), had available two aircraft which had very largely served their time in the operational units.

Next, the excellent performance of the Alpha Jet as a trainer puts it close to modern fighter airplanes which the student-pilots trained upon the Alpha Jet will fly in the units. The operating attitudes, up to now between 15,000 and 25,000 feet with the T33, will henceforth be between 20,000 and 40,000 feet. The equipment with which it is outfitted (with ILS [instrument landing system])

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like the F1 and incidence indicator, like the Jaguar) will facilitate preparation of student-pilots for operation of their future armed airplanes. Besides they will learn with a high performance airplane how to pull out of a spin.

Last, a fortunate combination of circumstances--in this case it must indeed be said that some delay in starting production of the first airplanes because of administrative slowness and, on the other hand, persistent delays in realization of infrastructure programs at the Tours base and in the scheduled delivery of the first component parts--has resulted in the Air Force. For the first time, having available an aircraft which is arriving at the units when everything is ready to receive it: mechanics trained, buildings completed, spare parts stocked, and instruction manuals published.

Especially for the Fighter School, now under command of Lt Col Michel Gaillard, who is assisted by his second in command, Lt Col Jacques Ratie, and for all his instructors and mechanics (in this case the Specialized Aircraft Equipment Support and Repair Group 15/314 [GERMAS 15/314] under command of Maj Denis de Gouville) the arrival of the Alpha Jet is a breath of new life. It engenders a new motivation in all personnel with the view of putting into operation, upon the ground and in the air, an airplane whose outstanding qualities have already been emphasized by the aircraft type qualification team, now at the military Aircraft Test Center (CEAM) of Mont-de-Marsan, and which will enable higher performance, and hence more interesting, missions to be accomplished. For instruction in general the Alpha Jet offers the advantage of having two engines which makes it safer and facilitates application of procedures; it is capable of high performance and highly maneuverable, which makes possible its use under a wider range of flight conditions. Especially for the instructors, who generally occupy the rear seat, it provides the two-fold advantage of great comfort and excellent forward visibility, which is important during landings.

Organization of the Fighter School

In addition to a staffing section, an operations office, and a studies directorate responsible for the courses of study and supervision of student-pilot instruction on the ground and in the air, the GE 314 includes: a ground instruction squadron which provides the beginning courses for the young future pilots; four flight instruction squadrons (EIV); one squadron, called the Standardization Squadron (responsible for training instructors, defining standardized procedures, final examination of students, and all missions outside the scope of instruction, properly speaking); and a squadron for on-the-ground training of flying personnel (responsible, in particular, for use of the Alpha Jet simulator; the first such has been in place and operational since the beginning of the year; a second will be installed in June). The GE also supervises the training provided to mechanics and pilots by the Mobile Instruction Wing (EMI)--so called because such a unit is usually moving from place to place as required by new equipment items in the various units in whose use pilots, mechanics, and service personnel must be instructed. Instruction by the EMI is given by 25 mechanic-instructors from the Rochefort Technical School who have at their

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disposal several "teaching mock-ups" (flight controls, electrical circuits, air conditioning, fuel, weapons, radio, and navigation) which enable students to be instructed.

Instruction activity of the GE 314 in 1977 represented 14,080 flight hours and 88 commissions conferred (of which eight were granted to foreigners and nine to navy personnel); in 1978, 15,000 flight hours and 100 commissions conferred (of which 14 were granted to foreigners and 13 to navy personnel). Activity planned for 1979 is 15,400 hours (125 commissions, of which 13 will be granted to foreigners and 21 to navy personnel); by the end of April, 6,025 hours had been realized. Of the total remaining it is planned that about 2,600 hours will be effected with the Alpha Jet. The GE contemplates using each Alpha Jet about 25 hours per month in the beginning.

Before the Alpha Jet Arrived

Before the Alpha Jet arrived at Tours it was necessary to carry out an infrastructure building program on the base, principally for the benefit of the GERMAS, responsible for first echelon maintenance at the Instruction Base 705 in addition to providing a GERMAS in the units. Shops were built, three hangars renovated, a paint shop established for the first time, two jet engine test stands constructed, and a fabrication center and liquid oxygen depot erected. These were the technical facilities which had been deliberately given priority.

None of the GE instruction buildings were renovated. But the buildings to house the simulators (mobile cabins and breakdown command posts) and to house the mock-ups and EMI benches were constructed.

As for the personnel, the arrival of the Alpha Jet at Tours was preceded by the retraining of a nucleus of GE instructors and a first group of GERMAS mechanics in the CEAM at Mont-de-Marsan.

At the beginning of May the GE had nine instructors retrained after 50 hours of courses (1 week by the EMI) and 23 hours 20 minutes of flight time in 18 flights. The Fighter School on 8 May had six Alpha Jet airplanes. For its part, on that date the GERMAS could count upon some 45 mechanics, also retrained at Mont-de-Marsan (practical course) after having taken an initial course with the EMI at Tours.

Progressive Entry Into Service

The first Alpha Jet of the Fighter School, piloted by Col Guy Cassagne, commanding officer of Instruction Base 705, landed at Tours on 3 May. The next day five more Alpha Jet airplanes coming from Mont-de-Marsan, accompanied by two others from the CEAM landed at Tours, under escort by the GE commanding officer.

By the end of May the Fighter School will have 10 Alpha Jet airplanes at its disposal. Between now and 30 June seven new instructors will have been trained

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by the nine now returned from Tours; between the end of June and 15 August there will be 10 more of them. At that time these 26 instructors will be divided between the 1st Flight Instruction Squadron and the Standardization Squadron.

It is the 1st Flight Instruction Squadron, equipped entirely with Alpha Jet airplanes and all of whose instructors will have been retrained, which will [starting] 15 August, provide training and instruction to the first group of students (coming from the School of the Air at Salon) who will form the 79/D class, completely trained upon the Alpha Jet.

Plans for conversion thereafter to the Alpha Jet are as follows:

3rd EIV--conversion accomplished in May 1980; the squadron will then have 27 Alpha Jet airplanes;

2nd EIV--conversion accomplished in October 1980 (42 airplanes);

4th EIV--conversion accomplished at the end of February 1981 (52 airplanes); and

Standardization Squadron--conversion accomplished at the end of June 1981 (65 airplanes, the full fleet planned for the GE).

In October 1981 the 1st Squadron of the 8th Fighter Wing at Cazaux will be equipped with the Alpha Jet; the latter, at the end of 1982, will have 30 airplanes available in its two squadrons.

Advantages of Training on the Alpha Jet

Student-pilot training on the T33 extended over 33 weeks (34 for non-commissioned officers and future officers) and includes in particular, 105 hours 30 minutes of flying time in 82 flights. With the Alpha Jet the course of instruction will extend over 29 weeks (30 for non-commissioned officers): 3 weeks of ground instruction by the EMI and in the simulator; 3 weeks of progressive instruction in flight up to the class "cut"; 3 weeks of mixed instruction; and 20 weeks of full time instruction in flight during which 89 hours 30 minutes of flying time will be effected in 71 flights. The gain is therefore as follows: 4 weeks in the total course, 16 hours of flying time, and 11 flights. Of course, much recourse will be had to the simulator which will be used notably to have the student acquire a mental piloting process similar to that he must have in the air for piloting the aircraft, for controlling the engines, and for the reflexive actions (survival, emergency). The use of the simulator will particularly permit saving a number (10) of actual flight hours (blind flying at high altitude). It is planned for the instruction to include 12 sessions in the simulator before the class "cut," nine of them pre-flight; in total, 29 sessions during the full course of instruction, corresponding to 37 hours 20 minutes. By way of comparison let us point out that the future Hawk pilots of the Royal Air Force spend 21 hours in 21 sessions in the simulator; the future Alpha Jet pilots of the Belgian Air Force spend 25 hours in 25 sessions in the simulator.

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The progression of the instruction in flight on the Alpha Jet will not differ appreciably from that which has been adopted for training on the T33. The school command, certainly, in this case has been anxious to innovate, but not to revolutionize. This will be an evolving program, perhaps modified in accordance with lessons learned during its operation, or at the end of the first few courses. In any event it will be completely reviewed in 1981 with the arrival of the Alpha Jet in the 8th Wing for the purpose of better adaptation to fighter aircraft.

In fact, it is not possible to contemplate establishment of a "revolutionary" instruction program with a new airplane and, in addition, while the activity of a wing equipped with a new airplane generally decreases in the weeks following arrival of that airplane, there can be no question of the Fighter School's decreasing its activity since the number of pilots it must train is going, on the contrary, to increase each year.

Within the scope of technical assistance, two representatives of Dassault-Breguet and one of SNECMA-Turbomeca are now at Tours, after having been at Mont-de-Marsan. At present, periodic airframe inspections are planned every 600 hours; the engines will be removed every 250 hours. These capabilities are going to be gradually increased.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NEW 'L'HUMANITE' EDITOR--Rene Andrieu, editor-in-chief of L'HUMANITE, will probably be replaced soon by Francette Lazard, his assistant, who has just become a member of the PCF Politburo. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 May 79 p 83]

APPROACH TO CUBANS--France has approached the Cubans in an effort to get them to stop printing the autonomist propaganda tracts that have been distributed in Guadeloupe, Martinique and Guyana. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 May 79 p 83]

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COUNTRY SECTION

PORTUGAL

SOARES INTERVIEWED, CONCERNED OVER PRESIDENT'S POLICIES

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 30 Apr 79 pp 60, 61

Interview with Mario Soares, secretary general of the Portuguese Socialist Party and former prime minister, by special correspondent Rene Backmann, date and place not given

Text Mario Soares, at 55, has twice been prime minister since the hectic time of the Carnation Revolution. Now in the republic's reserve resources, the secretary general of the Portuguese Socialist Party perceives that the pluralist democracy of which he dreamed for his country is beginning to look very peculiar: the right is galloping back, and in Lisbon a curious "government by presidential initiative," without a parliamentary majority, is in power. Mario Soares told us about his extreme anxiety.

Question On Wednesday, in a rather tense and gloomy political atmosphere, despite the organized festivities, Portugal celebrated the fifth anniversary of the Carnation Revolution. Many things have changed since the euphoric spring days of 1974. Sometimes one has the impression of a return to the past. What do you think about it?

Mario Soares We have taken a few steps backward, it is true, but I am still convinced that we have made a lot of progress. What were the basic objectives of the 25 April movement? First, end the colonial wars: that is done. We have completed decolonization, and today our former colonies are sovereign countries. Second objective: overturn a retrogressive fascist regime and bring in a pluralist democracy: that is done too. We have a few problems of the political-institutional type, but we have established political and trade union democracy. Third objective: development of the country, reform of archaic economic and social structures, and integration of Portugal into Europe. We have also made some progress in that direction. The admission of Portugal to Europe has been requested; we have gone ahead with some nationalization, and created workers' commissions; we have taken a few steps toward self-management and worker control of enterprises. All these attainments have been consolidated by constitutional guarantees. But

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still, it is true that we are now seeing an offensive by the extreme right to liquidate these guarantees and create an authoritarian regime with the appearance of being democratic.

[Question] Is this the project of the extreme right only? Does it not also belong to the institutional right, present in the parliament? Or is that what you are calling the extreme right?

[Mario Soares] There are some people of the right in the Portuguese parliament, but I believe that the Portuguese parliamentary right wants, more or less, to play the game of democracy. Having said so, it is true that some men are thinking about establishing an authoritarian regime of the presidential and military type. And that is a real danger. For there is a Portuguese rightist tradition: the sidonist tradition, so named for President Sidonio Pais, who was assassinated in 1919. He was a dictator president-general. He tried, by using his personal power, to destroy the democratic regime, which had been established by the founders of the first republic. This tradition was revived in 1926 by the 28 May people, Gomes da Costa and Salazar, with a few slight differences. But that is the line to which belong the present calls for a providential man capable of instantly solving all the country's problems.

[Question] How do you interpret what in Lisbon is already being called the "witch hunt"? In the diplomatic corps, the press, radio, and television, people are being dismissed from their functions because they support the left, and especially for being socialists.

[Mario Soares] It is true that this government, the fourth constitutional government, has started a vast plan of placing men devoted to it in key posts. Socialists have been dismissed, it is true, and more generally, progressives, so that they could be replaced by others. It is not yet what could really be called a witch hunt, but there are alarming signs, notably, as you have mentioned, in information and the diplomatic corps.

To my mind, the replacement of the present ambassador to France, Antonio Coimbra Martins, for example, is very disturbing. Coimbra Martins is a great ambassador who has done a lot for Portugal. The present good relations between Portugal and France are to a large extent his work; his role was a decisive one in the negotiations that preceded the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, and also in the improvement of our relations with the Arabic countries. The serious thing is that Coimbra Martins has been relieved of his functions and not appointed to another post. It is not unusual for a diplomat to be transferred; what is less normal is his being purely and simply eliminated from the service.

[Question] Some people are saying that you socialists are partly to blame for the appearance of this witch hunt climate? When you were in power, you dismissed the communists from certain posts where you thought they might be dangerous, and today, it is the socialists being chased out.

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[Mario Soares] As you know, we came to power at a time when the PC [Spanish Communist Party] was trying to seize it by force using stalinian methods. That must not be forgotten. If a danger of the same sort should present itself again, we should have no choice but to repeat the same measures to preserve pluralist democracy as we conceive of it. But since 25 November, we have never tried to throw the communists into a ghetto; on the contrary. We have tried to reintegrate them into national life, which is not easy, because they have not learned anything. I think we did what we had to do and what we could do, but now there is a situation that is getting out of our control and against which we must rise in protest. In 1975 the danger came from, let us say, the communists: we did everything we could to prevent their coming to power, to chase them away from it. Now there is danger from the extreme right. We shall do all we can to preserve the country. What we want is a pluralist democracy, but I have to admit that it is difficult.

[Question] Putting Portuguese policy of the last five years into some perspective, one notes that since April 1974, the governments succeeding each other are, in a general way, more and more toward the right. How do you explain that?

[Mario Soares] It is true that there is a gradual slipping toward the right, and what in my opinion is serious is that there is also a military shadow being cast over the civilian life of the country, as a result of the attitude of the head of state, who has become the center of power. The government is no more than an epiphenomenon, invested with the confidence of the head of state -- although the president heads the present government very little, really.

[Question] Do you mean that the present government does not represent the reality of the political forces and their relationships within the country?

[Mario Soares] That is right. The government is not at all representative; it has no parliamentary representativity because today it is supported only by the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] -- and even then, with reservations and criticisms; and even less popular representativity because nobody, in the country, is concerned about politics. Everything goes on as if it did not exist. In any case, it does nothing. It could not even get its budget voted in.

[Question] But then what is the underlying explanation for this sliding toward the right and this personalization of power?

[Mario Soares] The turning point, in my opinion, was the revocation of the second government of which I was president. The first one of which I was president was overthrown by an association that was as strange as it was unhealthy: that of the PC and the two parties of the right: the PSD [Independent Social Democratic Party] and the CDS. Perhaps today the communists regret what they did, but they did it, and it cannot be forgotten.

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But my second government was overthrown by an action of the president of the republic, a direct personal intervention. General Eanes wanted to impose a first government of his own choice: that was the ministry of Nobre da Costa. He was not able to succeed in this. He started the same thing with the present government, and it is not working, either.

We are facing a rightist government, that is clear. A rightist government which still respects certain forms, which of course we must not discount, for worse things could happen.

[Question] Agrarian reform, like decolonization, was considered one of the fruits of the April revolution. What is left of it?

[Mario Soares] There have been some occupations of lands that we wanted to put into a legal framework. We got a law through the Assembly of the Republic and we wanted to have it applied. There were some exaggerations in the application of the law -- after the fall of the socialist government, to be exact -- and from it had resulted an explosive situation in Alentejo. By the expedient of credit, as well as by repression, there is now an effort to stifle workers who are in the collective production units of the PC or in the socialist cooperatives.

[Question] What about the army?

[Mario Soares] In the army, all the changes about which we have spoken are even more evident. There are captains' meetings again. The principal army posts are now in the hands of men of the right, and there are in the hierarchy officers who exert upon the units a pressure that is growing heavier day by day. Some have even recently emerged from the past, with the mental habits of the past.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

PEACE PROSPECTS FOR BASQUE REGION ASSESSED

Background Details Given

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 May 79 pp 16, 17, 19-21, 23, 24

[Text] King Juan Carlos de Borbon is prepared to intervene in the Basque issue and to promulgate the statute at Guernica, the birthplace of Basque nationalism, where a tree is the symbol of all the traditions and the history of the Basque provinces.

Such a meeting between the Spanish crown, as the representative of the new democratic order, and the representatives of Basque nationalism would once and for all put an end to the Basque-Spanish confrontation that has characterized the past century and a half of Spanish and Basque history. In the opinion of reliable circles, the "Guernica embrace" would mark the end of a process of democratic normalization that began when King Juan Carlos took the throne after General Franco's death. Not only the government but the opposition as well would be in total agreement with such a move. At this moment the new government is hurriedly working out an entire pacification strategy for the Basque Country that would conclude with the "Guernica embrace" and the approval of a wideranging Statute of Autonomy, the general guidelines of which would be similar to those of the 1936 statute. The appointment of Antonio Fontan as minister of territorial administration has hastened the Madrid government's desire to reach an understanding with the Basque Country, which for more than a century has struggled amid misunderstanding, oppression, terrorism and injustice.

It is noon on 7 June 1968, and a number of shots shatter the calm in the Guipuzcoa town of Villabona. A civil guard, Jose Pardines, is fatally wounded at point-blank range. The ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] has just been born to the sound of gunshots.

It is noon on 28 April 1979, and the noise of the traffic in the Vizcaina village of Durango is punctuated by the sound of some explosions. Municipal policeman Pedro Ruiz Rodriguez is hit by two bursts of submachine gun fire at point-blank range and collapses to the ground mortally wounded. The ETA has just committed its latest crime.

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But between Pardines and Rodriguez there is a history of blood and suffering. The ETA has killed 130 persons, and 40 of its members have fallen in confrontations with the forces of public order, figures that have caused Josep Taradellas, the president of the Catalan Legislative Assembly (Generalitat), to say that the Basques are in "a quasi civil war."

Their problems stem from a former civil war. The Vergara embrace, which put an end to the first Carlist war, brought a wave of centralism to the Basque Country, as the cutbacks on tax privileges began.

Another civil war, the second Carlist conflict, brought the abolition of the system of privileges. The privileges were revoked on 21 July 1876, and the Basque people then began their long journey through the desert to recover them.

Traitorous Provinces

But the close of another civil war, that of 1936, showed that they had not yet gone through the worst. On 23 June 1937 Franco threw around all his dictatorial weight and not only revoked the economic pacts that had replaced the privileges but also declared Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa "traitorous provinces."

The large and deep wound opened up by the 1876 revocation act, and which was only briefly closed during the years of the Second Republic, was to be constantly irritated during the 40 years of the Franco dictatorship.

Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa are no longer traitors. They have had to wait many years, until November 1976, to get rid of that Franco-imposed scarlet letter. But they do not want to wait any longer to get rid of the laws that for 50 years have reflected a misunderstanding of the Basque identity.

Joseba Elosegui, the old Basque whose deep-seated nationalism led him to set himself on fire in Franco's presence 10 years ago at the Anoeta jai-alai court in San Sebastian, described things very clearly to CAMBIO 16.

The historic PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] member sees it like this: "The currently deteriorated situation in the Basque Country is mainly due to despair stemming from the frustration of Basque nationalists." To the man who burned like a torch and was miraculously saved, "Basques no longer believe in nice words. Our history offers all too many examples of attempts to deceive a people characterized by their honesty and good faith."

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A Problematic Statute

Elosegui, like so many other Basques, wants a statute for the Basque Country, and he wants it to be the one that all of the Basque political forces passed on 26 December 1978 at Guernica, the draft of which was sent to the Cortes on the last day of the year.

"Madrid is running a serious risk if it tries to water down that draft statute, which falls within the guidelines of the constitution if the latter is interpreted in a broadly liberal way," Elosegui said.

It is what the Basques have always wanted: a statute of autonomy to replace in some way their revoked privileges. They were not able to achieve this either with the government of Alfonso XII or of Alfonso XIII, but just a few days after the Second Republic had been proclaimed, representatives of 427 city governments met at Estella on 14 June 1931 to call for a unified statute.

But the enthusiasm of the dawn of the republic also had cold water poured on it. They had to wait 5 years for the Spanish Cortes, meeting in Valencia, to approve the statute, which some Basque circles regarded as a poor relative of the Estella draft.

Their enthusiasm was dampened not so much because of the wait but because the Cortes rejected it as being unconstitutional 1 week after they had introduced it. Among other things, the draft stipulated the "the right of the Basque Country to establish its own concordat with the Vatican."

We can get an idea of what they were asking for by seeing what was left to the Spanish state: individual and social rights, the criminal and commercial codes and international relations. There were also cutbacks on the way from Estella to Valencia, and the statute that was approved on 1 October as a "granted charter" did not last, nor was it extended to all Basques. It survived only 254 days, until Franco swept it away with a stroke of his pen. It was tried only in Vizcaya, because the other Basque provinces had already been occupied by Franco's troops.

Franco not only did away with the statute; he imposed his repressive laws and declared war on Basque nationalism. There are still major upshots of those attitudes. Members of the Security Forces in the Basque Country have told this magazine that they are aware of the gap between them and the people they are supposed to serve.

According to those members, who did not want their names published, the people see in the Security Forces the representatives of a power that oppresses them and view as undesirable the units that meted out the long and harsh repression that Franco sent them.

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The Security Forces know that insurmountable barriers have been erected that the people reject at the very least and that many of them hate. Most of the 130 persons that the ETA has slain over its history belonged to these forces.

In light of this situation, the conclusion that CAMBIO 16's sources reached was that as they are now, the Security Forces do not serve the people. The statute could resolve the problem by setting up a native Basque police force, although small numbers of state police would remain but not act except in extreme situations.

In the opinion of those interviewed, two of the policemen with posts of responsibility in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, the native police force should be quickly and carefully established so that this serious focal point of social disorder, a people and a police force at odds, can be eliminated as soon as possible.

During the 40 years of the Franco dictatorship most of the Basque people did not forget their former politicians, whether in exile, persecuted or dead. Out of all of them, the members of the PNV are the ones who have kept the flame of the underground burning the brightest.

"Euskadi," the Basque Homeland

Sabino Arana founded the Basque Nationalist Party in 1903, and it took up many of the Carlist and privilege-related aspirations.

Arana also coined the word "Euskadi" and in a show of independent ideology proclaimed that "Euskadi is the homeland of the Basques."

The party still needed a slogan, and this one quickly emerged: "Jaungoikoa eta lege Zarrak" (God and the old laws). It became the rallying cry of the militants, whose numbers quickly multiplied, especially in Vizcaya.

The recently formed party held a great attraction at the time of its founder's death, as Primo de Rivera's dictatorship persecuted them harshly. But then came the republic, and the PNV was legalized, winning 10 deputy seats in the Cortes.

As the gunfire of the Civil War resounded all over Spain and as the statute was approved in Valencia, Jose Antonio Aguirre, the mayor of Guecho, was named the first president of the Basque Country Government and he formed his government team, which included Leizaola and Telesforo Monzon.

Mola, who had rebelled in Navarra, was advancing along the northern front. The Basque Government, supported by the Socialists, was forced to create a volunteer army. Isolated and with a statute that took effect

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only in Vizcaya in hand, the Basques organized their own merchant marine, coined money and even secured diplomatic representation from a number of countries.

On 27 April 1937, the "holy city" of the Basque Country, Guernica, was bombed by the German Air Force with Franco's approval. He later denied this and accused the Basques themselves of having destroyed the city.

Many years later, on 27 April 1979, at a plenary session that the democratic city council of Guernica held to commemorate the anniversary of the bombing, it passed a measure stripping Franco of the Guernica medal of diamonds.

The Underground

Two months after the bombing of the Basque city, Bilbao fell to Franco's troops. Thousands of persons were shot or imprisoned, and close to 250,000 Basques went into exile at the close of the war.

Franco did away with anything that smacked of a statute or autonomy and branded Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa traitors. Political parties were persecuted to the death. The PNV went underground and from the government in exile encouraged the Basque resistance inside the country, where it was and would in recent years continue to be the majority force.

In 1945, when Aguirre thought that the United States was going to play the role of liberator after the allied victory, a wave of activism was unleashed in the Basque Country. There was a harsh crackdown; 43 militants were beaten, and the nationalist Inaki Santurun was shot to death in San Salvador del Valle.

The word "Euskadi" appeared for the first time in large graffiti, and the "ikurrina" also made numerous underground appearances. Basque guerrillas fought along the Pyrenees border with the approval of the government in exile, and on 1 May 1946 the first major domestic strike took place: more than 12,000 workers on the left bank of the Nervion stopped working.

There was no statute, no party, no freedoms, but the PNV kept hopes alive and in 1946 set up a radio station in France to broadcast propaganda. "Euskadi Libre" was to fall silent many years later, in 1954, when Francois Mitterand, the then minister of the interior, ordered it closed down.

The Statute of 1936

The statute of 1936 under which the PNV governed for the 254 days from the time that it was passed until its death at the hands of Franco is

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again very much in the news. Reliable political circles are giving assurances that the Suarez government is prepared to put it into effect, and at the same time the Congress of Deputies is debating the draft approved at Guernica on 26 December of last year, with an eye towards pacifying the Basque Country.

Jon Castanares, the mayor of Bilbao, a member of the PNV, a 54-year old bachelor and the holder of a degree in economic sciences, voices this categorical verdict: "A wideranging statute must be approved quickly," he told this magazine.

"The statute of 1936," he went on to say, "could have been valid if it had been approved a year ago, and although a rapid recognition would still be positive and valid, today many people are going to view it as a ploy. It is dangerous to try and adulterate the current draft statute, and the government will have to change its ways and meet its commitments."

Nevertheless, a spokesman of the Basque delegation in Paris made it known that a recognition of the 1936 statute would, in addition to acknowledging historical legitimacy, open the doors to a rapid return of "Lendakari" Laizaola. A number of nationalist leaders in Bilbao share this view.

This is what the PNV is saying. What about the government? Antonio Oyarzabal, the current civil governor of Guipuzcoa, where he was born 43 years ago in the town of Azpeitia, and a career diplomat who has asked to be relieved as governor, describes the statute in three words: "Necessary, urgent and feasible."

In Oyarzabal's view, the statute must mark the end of this struggle, this war of attrition between Spain and the Basque provinces. Its passage can no longer be delayed. A postponement would only aggravate the situation.

What if the 1936 statute is passed and goes into effect until the draft now in Congress is acted upon? "I think that that idea would be a bit reactionary," Oyarzabal adds. "That statute was promulgated under abnormal circumstances. The country deserves to have us exercise some imagination in order to kindle everybody's hopes."

Onaindia: A Prisoner of War

He was condemned to death but saved by the skin of his teeth. He was one of the historic members of the ETA and sat on its Executive Committee; at the Burgos trial he said that he was "a prisoner of war."

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He is no longer with the ETA, but Mario Onaindia has not abandoned politics. Formerly an underground member of an activist group, he is now the secretary general of the ETA [Party for the Basque Revolution], a legal party that belongs to the Coalition of the Basque Left.

Onaindia speaks firmly about two things: of how dearly it cost the government party when it tried to push the PNV out last autumn, for the sole purpose of consolidating a strong UCD [Democratic Center Union] in the Basque Country, and of how a watering down or postponement of the statute approved at Guernica "could lead to further frustrations on the part of the people and to a radicalism for whose consequences the government alone would be responsible."

The former ETA member also has an opinion regarding the 1936 statute: "The only objective of such a move by Madrid," he asserts, "is to reach an agreement with the PNV, in order to shatter the hegemony achieved by the majority of the Basque parties."

In addition, Onaindia has analyzed the danger that could be involved in an emergency passage of that statute, "which would certainly entail a postponement of the draft that is now before the Congress of Deputies."

The Sons of the PNV

When one of this magazine's writers asked the honorable Josep Taradellas why the ETA had emerged, the Catalan politician's answer went right to the point: "Everybody knows that it is the child of a PNV splinter group."

The sons have branded their parents do-nothings. In 1952 a number of youths founded the group Ekin. All of them came from nationalist families and accused the PNV of having stood still in time. They themselves adopted more radical stands.

They became very radical and in 1956 culminated their political transformation with the creation of the ETA. The founders and first leaders of the group were Benito del Valle, Txillardegui, Julen Madariaga and Jose Manuel Aguirre.

For 2 years they limited themselves to streetside graffiti, but in 1961 they revealed their intentions. They set off two bombs at the Bilbao police station and in the elevator of the Vitoria civil government building. On 18 July of that same year they failed in an attempt to derail a train carrying war veterans to San Sebastian.

The vain attempt cost the ETA dearly. The first massive dragnet was undertaken, and more than 100 ETA members were arrested and sentenced

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to between 15 and 20 years in jail. The founders and leaders fled, crossed the Pyrenees and lived in exile in France.

With their intentions now quite clear, they held the organization's first assembly in 1962, and the ETA defined itself as a "revolutionary, unrepentant and anti-racist movement of national liberation."

A few more years had to pass before the entire scope of the movement became known. What was originally Ekin is now a terrorist organization that pulls the trigger over and over, as easily as it announces its "demands": total amnesty, the withdrawal of the forces of public order from the Basque Country, the right of self-determination, recognition of Basque as an official language and improvements in the conditions of workers.

This is the ideology that motivates the group and exalts its first fallen: Xabi Echevarrieta, who perished in a confrontation with police 3 hours after the ETA's first victim was mortally wounded, and Eustakio Mendizabal, the head of the military front, who was riddled with bullets in Algorta on Holy Thursday, 1973.

Two years later, after Carrero Blanco had been blown up by the explosives that the ETA had set off, two other front-line ETA members were executed on 27 September 1975: Txiki and Otaegui were their names.

Lerchundi: from the ETA to the Communists

Roberto Lerchundi's political movements have been very simple: he belonged to the ETA and he is now with the Basque Communist Party, of which he has been secretary general since November 1978.

Lerchundi, alias "Bubi," was born in Bilbao in 1948. A doctor by profession, he is married and has one son. He was a member of the ETA from 1969 to 1973, when he joined the Communists. His views are also quite clear regarding the Basque issue.

"If the ETA's bid holds up," Bubi told this publication, "we will all have to give some thought as to why this is so and confess that its bid still attracts a lot of people. It is also true that the short-sightedness of the government, which has regarded the Basque problem as just another problem, not as a major one, has also facilitated the violence. This government is gambling its very future in the Basque Country."

Like the other former ETA member Onaindia, Lerchundi describes as a "pirouette" what the government apparently wants to do with the 1936 statute. "And it's of no use to us," he notes.

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He defends the draft statute that is before Congress and "which is perfectly constitutional, and negotiations ought to be undertaken without prejudices. Trying to go back to a former solution is not viable, inasmuch as the political forces that approved the statute at the time do not have the same representativeness, and times have changed."

Symbolic Monzon

He grows old elegantly, cane in hand, the number one man in the angriest nationalist movement. His name is Telesforo Monzon. He is 74 years old, was born in Vergara, was a monarchist and the Basque interior minister during the Civil War, as well as a deputy on two prior occasions in different legislatures of the republic. He collaborated in drawing up the 1936 statute. He lived in exile in France while Franco was alive.

Monzon is nostalgic, because when CAMBIO 16 asked for his opinion on the possibility that the 1936 statute might again be unearthed, the old nationalist did not hesitate: "Which statute do they want to give back to us by decree? The one that the Spanish Republic granted to the Basque provinces in 1936, in a desperate situation, after having denied us any sort of autonomy for 5 years, or the statute of full-fledged sovereignty that the Basque Country experienced and symbolized from October 1936 to June 1937, in other words, 9 months of a Basque state. The Basque Country was a sovereign state."

Monzon does not answer our reporter and continues the questions: "What are they going to return to us, just the writing in a pamphlet called the Basque statute, arriving by plane from Madrid, and which was never viable in the Basque Country, or the reality of a de facto state that we used to know and that was swept away with the blood and tears of an entire people?"

The ETA, a Deadly Escalation

Franco is dead. Democracy is entering Spain through half-opened doors. Not all agree, but most feel that the development is irreversible, except the ETA, which stubbornly adheres to its advocacy of independence and keeps the Basque Country permanently tense.

There have been times after Franco's death when the machinery of the state and the government began to grind, and this has been when the ETA has pulled the trigger, kidnaped or extorted revolutionary tolls. Many industrialists have left the Basque Country, and many businesses are going under. The ETA addresses itself to public opinion as if it had declared a formal war on the Spanish state.

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There is no time for election campaigns during a war. The ETA is not legal, but no ETA sympathizer, cloaked as an independent, ran in the June 1977 elections either, with one exception: Francisco Letamendia, who, however, was unable to stand up under the tension of his lonely struggle and tendered his resignation before the houses were dissolved for the 1 March elections.

ETA has said that it is struggling for the freedom of the Basque Country, and criticism has rained down on it, with the charge that it is struggling against democracy. Each murder that it commits provokes outcries in Spain, but in the Basque Country demonstrations are organized at which people astonishingly shout "ETA, herria zurekin!" (ETA, the people are with you), if not "ETA, kill them!"

Herri Batasuna

When Letamendia left the Congress of Deputies, he also left his party, the Basque Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra), but he was not an orphan for long because the seed of what would become Herri Batasuna was already present.

Telesforo Monzon has been one of the most visible figures in the creation of that party, which practically overnight has become the second leading party in the Basque Country, especially in the municipal elections rather than the general balloting, where it won four deputy seats and one senatorial position.

It is in the municipalities that Herri Batasuna has its strength. In commenting to this magazine on the chances for the 1936 statute, Monzon said: "We have to put an end to the 150-year war and bring about a new Iberian Peninsula. The war in the Basque Country could end tomorrow if the terms are acceptable. Until such time the Basque Country must be mobilized and prepared for the greatest of sacrifices, with Herri Batasuna, the number two Basque political force, and with unified action."

A Valid Spokesman

Herri Batasuna was formed by people from many parties and with differing ideologies, although almost all of them agree with the demands that the ETA formulates with such facility. The shadow of the ETA has drawn near Herri Batasuna, which has practically become the political snorkel of the terrorist organization.

But the Basque Country needs a valid spokesman to negotiate with Madrid. Julen Guimon, a lawyer, professor of constitutional law and a UCD deputy from Vizcaya, admitted as much to this magazine: "The UCD has not found a valid spokesman. The government has a great responsibility, but not all of the cards are in its hand, because the Basque problem is everyone's responsibility, and not everyone is meeting it."

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"The solution," he added, "is obviously negotiations free from excessive publicity and with a determination to arrive at an agreement. The negotiations could be conducted based on the first draft of the statute that is before Congress and on a quick acceptance of the 1936 statute."

In Guimon's view, "acceptance of the 1936 statute would be a starting point in which each party's honor would be preserved. Neither would such a solution close the door to improvements or to the possibility of updating certain issues."

If the 1936 statute was not a swindle then, why should it be now?, the UCD deputy wonders. "However, by trying to defend the draft submitted to Congress at all costs," Guimon adds, "we could come up against some difficult problems, such as that the sovereignty and the position of the PNV might be faced with unpleasant surprises."

Santiago Brouard, a 50-year old doctor from Bilbao and the president of the Hasi (a party that belongs to Herri Batasuna), sees things differently. To him, peace in the Basque Country is possible immediately if the government and the de facto forces take the problem of the Basque Country seriously, basing themselves on political realities.

What Do the Basques Want?

Herri Batasuna, KAS [expansion unknown] and ETA, Brouard recalls, say a number of minimum conditions have to be met for peace to be possible in the Basque Country: total amnesty, an end to repression of political refugees in France, full democratic freedoms including the legalization of all political parties, even those advocating independence, a staggered withdrawal, with a fixed deadline, of the repressive forces from the Basque Country, a national statute of autonomy with a right to self-determination and including the entire Basque Country, including Navarra.

"Under these conditions," the president of the Hasi said forcefully, "peace would come immediately. The business of the 1936 statute is a diversionary tactic to create expectations so as not to take care of other problems."

Well then, but what do the Basques want?, Taradellas wondered in the presence of a reporter from this magazine. And after he accordingly reviewed the conditions that the ETA is demanding, specifically the withdrawal of the forces of public order, he again wondered: "But who is going to believe that the government, no matter what government we have here in Spain, is going to abandon the perhaps 30 or 40 percent of the citizens of the Basque Country who are not Basque?"

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The ETA's extremist conditions are unacceptable. But everyone, both inside and outside the Basque Country, agrees that in one way or another we have to seek a solution to the Basque question, because Spain is gambling with its last opportunity to end a war that has lasted 150 years. The solution seems to be a pact between the majority political forces in the Basque Country with the government, either through the implementation of the 1936 statute or the quick enactment of the draft statute that is before Congress.

The former step does not rule out the latter, but either of the two would result in the immediate return to the Basque Country of Lendakari Leizaola, which would conclude his exile and open the door to peace.

A decision is urgent. Basque Socialist Enrique Mugica said in a speech at the Siglo XXI Club: "A statute right away or civil war."

Foreign Affairs Minister Views Situation

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 May 79 p 21

[Text] Mistakes Can Be Ironed Out

Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, 44, the minister of foreign affairs and a UCD deputy from Guipuzcoa, is also optimistic about the possibility of a pact at the present juncture.

Oreja, a true "kamikaze" who won his deputy seat despite all the forecasts, admits that "there have been a lot of historical mistakes in connection with the Basque people," and he does not object to listing them: "the disappearance of the privileges, the elimination of the economic pact, the disregard of rights that stemmed from their historical constitution and that should never have been altered without a free decision by the people..."

In the minister's view, the solution entails constitutional recognition of respect for the historical rights of the Basque people and the reestablishment of the General Boards. "All that we have left to do now," he adds, "is to approve a statute that is acceptable to the majority of the parties and that gives back to the Basque people the civil peace that they need."

"When the fateful law abolishing the privileges was passed 103 years ago," explains Mr Oreja in his government office at Santa Cruz Palace, "Mr Emilio Castelar said that they were witnessing the funeral of a race's freedom with the same feeling of withdrawal and pain with which people always witness the sublime melancholy of death. Today, faced with tragedy, injustice, pessimism, crime and misunderstanding, the Basque people want new hope. We must all work hard at this task."

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Sanchez Drago Looks At Basque Problem

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 May 79 pp 23-24

[Article by Fernando Sanchez Drago]

[Text] May the seven-headed serpent of the Basque Country help me. In this matter the Basques are like feminists and Jews. Woe be to them who dare to get involved in their business without belonging to the group! I can already see the sacks full of venomous mail overflowing my mailbox, and in truth I am really sorry, because there is nothing that I would like less than to earn the animosity of individuals with whom I have always had, ever since the dungeons of Carabanchel, friendly, surrealistic and closely linked relations. Pitfalls of the job.

As if this were not enough, the Basque quarrel is beginning to escape my understanding, even though there was a time when I thought that I had a firm grasp of it. Today, I no longer do, and I think that the same perplexity afflicts all Spanish outsiders. Today they could only begin to unravel the ball of yarn, and I am not even sure of that.

My confusion stems from two disconcerting episodes, both of which occurred recently. The first one took place around October when, sponsored by television, I traveled to the ETA sanctuary of Ataun to interview the ethnologist, anthropologist, prehistorian and historian Mr Jose Miguel Barandiaran, who to all Basques, whether Spanish or Basque nationalists, is a symbol of concord rising above the discord of stands and ideas. "Aitatxo," little father, they call him, the bomb-throwers, renegades and "shut down Spain" advocates finally agreeing on something.

Jose Miguel, a Barojas-like priest who has seen many years pass from under his beret, received us at his small country house at the foot of the Aralar and near the string of dolmens that he himself discovered many moons ago, thus returning with a stroke of his pen several millenia of prehistory to his region's history. But getting back to where I was, two supposedly "abertzales" (patriotic) youths asked for permission to be present at our talk. We granted it, they listened, and towards the very end I brought up the risky business of the ETA, because I thought it unavoidable to try and elicit his opinion regarding the sticky business of who is most and best informed about all of the issues in the Basque Country. For these reasons I remained sober, avoiding drunkenness and trying to place the ETA within historical coordinates of Basque irredentism far predating those of Franco's twilight. Meanwhile, Jose Miguel fell to leeward in no man's waters, without course, and bundled up in his double fur-lined jacket like a nonagenarian priest and squirming to understand (if not back up) the ETA stand ("You should see how they come out of the barracks.") as well as his simultaneous conviction that "in spite of everything, that road leads us nowhere."

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The chitchat ended, and we left, without Barandiaran but with the two onlookers, to have an unpleasant meal of fruit and pork chops nearby. And what an unpleasant meal it was, not because of the victuals in the region, may God preserve it, but because as we ate, emotions welled up, dissent arose, there was shouting and motioning (you can imagine why), and finally, as our final course was being served, the "abertzales" lashed out at me: "Who are you, you Madrid newsman, to ask Jose Miguel about the ETA? You should have asked him about the Royal Society!"

That was exactly what they said, and I thus began to suspect what I had always refused to believe: that in the Basque Country's holy war (no sarcasm here) there is not only a miracle and a search for freedom, although there is much of both, but also, and in troubled waters, confusion, misleading commentary, brainwashing, blackmail, fascism and even industry. I do not know what kind of industry this might be nor who benefits from it, but I do know that in almost 15 years of journalistic travels through Asian and African countries, and as such irreddentist, no black, Muslim or Vietnamese ever treated me like that.

The second episode took place in February, the day before the elections, during the presentation of my work "Gargoris y Habidis" in smoldering Bilbao. Assuming that it was relevant, I spoke there about the myths, fables and olden days of the Basque Country that were mentioned in the book; about Basque as a possible link with the language of the Atlanteans; about the "lauburu" and the "eguzkilo;" about the method of prophecy using the flight of birds; about the serpent Erensugua's relation to the Aztec god Quetzalcoatl; about Juan de Echaide, the alleged discoverer of America; about tubalism; about the jai-alai that the Mayas played and called pok-a-tok...and all of this, and much more, was skeptically received, amid smiles and sarcasm, by a youngish, pseudo-intellectual, swaggering, Carbonarist Basque audience that was, of course, nationalist to the very core. Acrobatics from Sabino Arana, they surmised, to shore up a myth: the greater antiquity and resulting strangeness of the Basques in comparison to the other ethnic groups of Spain.

And since all the while they applauded my book and my person, I deduced that their motive was not my meddling into the Basque Country's dirty or clean linen, but the public's unthinking resistance to acknowledge the hypothesis of those untransferable origins, without which the proclamation of the holy war is neither understandable nor justifiable.

I have been kicking around the country for many months now for the same reason that brought me to Bilbao, and the people with whom I have talked, no matter what the region, have always quickly and joyfully swallowed the bait of the ancient roots (cosmogonies, archetypes, customs) that justifies my book in the eyes of all the Spanish tribes.

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How then can we construe and explain the absurd fact that of my fellow countrymen only the children of the Basque Country, and of them those who most resolutely advocate independence, reject for psychological reasons the pedigree of a differentiating factor the emphasis on which has provoked so much discord?

I am a Taoist: every contradiction conceals an enlightenment. Reflecting on matters after the letdown, I thought: Wouldn't the Basque Country's "casus belli" evaporate from its own pot if we let it stew in its own juice? Wouldn't the violence thus wind down, and at a good pace, because no one would bother indulging in it with his shadow? From that point on, wouldn't the ETA and its members, astutely or absent-mindedly, shift into the mechanical process of reconciling all of the contradictions, not counting the ones brought directly from outside, that are today fracturing the apparent homogeneity of the Basque nationalist movement, which, in my view, is only the result of belligerency in which it is confined?

My space is running out (what agony this business of writing!). What I propose can be summed up as follows: sign a separate peace, as Christ taught us to do, and in two phases. One: have them leave (it is useless to specify who, as useless as proposing marital reconciliation to a cuckold without the offender leaving the nuptial bed). Two: drastic autonomy right away. The Madrid politicians cannot continue to deal with matters on an individual basis when the overall phenomenon has more facets than a fly's eye. Much less can they try to stubbornly encourage from above an anti-Basque movement that to the people down below already looks somewhat like the anti-Sephardic Jew movement of yore. This is a crude conspiracy whose scheming is not only treacherous but ungrateful. Those who have been luxuriating for such a short time in the soft lap of democracy ought not to forget, and no doubt have not forgotten, that their life is like, because of and thanks to the execution of Carrero. If the admiral had been in the driver's seat when his maker called his number, we would all at this moment still be in the catacombs with our shackles on.

A problem of the Basque Country or a problem of Spain? Let us not confuse the latter with the former, nor the former with the government's zeal to come up with a scarecrow to frighten those who are frightened by the army or with a scapegoat on which to foist off dead people who are difficult to bury. The problem of Spain is not in the Basque Country; it runs from north to south and is to be found, in particular, in the Moncloa.

Views of Autonomy Negotiator

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 May 79 p 29

[Article by Antonio Fontan]

[Text] Antonio Fontan is the minister in charge of handling the complex issue of the autonomies. A former president of the Senate and a former editor of the daily paper MADRID, Fontana has been accepted

35

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by almost all of the Basque political parties as an honest negotiator who can cool down and settle the burning Basque problem. CAMBIO 16 asked him for his impressions on the eve of the big negotiations. The following is his reply.

In recent years we have achieved in Spain a political transition for which history offers few precedents. There have been neither purges nor retaliations. For the first time since 1808 we are a country without exiles and in which no one is in prison for ideological and political reasons. Moreover, we have put together a form of government in which opposing parties and ideologies can live together and which, moreover, is capable of accepting all of the country's variety and richness. The principle of the autonomies has been sanctioned as an axis of the political organization of Spain's various peoples, but in keeping with state unity and solidarity among citizens and communities. The most telling reaffirmation of these principles was the acceptance by almost all political forces, with hardly any reservations, of the constitutional provision that "recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of nationalities and regions" along with "solidarity among all of them," as well as the unity of the nation.

This has come about because Spain's political transition has consisted of a prudent and systematic articulation of a series of political affirmations. The principle of the autonomies is the major affirmation that the country's representative political forces now have the duty to develop.

This should not take place one by one, individually, but rather in common cause, one's own autonomy and the autonomies of others. Basque autonomy must not be looked upon as an individual grievance to which the rest of Spain must accede, but rather as the fulfillment of a commitment of which we are all part and from which we will all benefit.

It is within the historical framework of these considerations that I would like to place my response to the editors of CAMBIO 16, who have asked me for some statements or to write a few words on the "Basque problem." First of all, I have to say that I deny the existence of a "Basque problem," just as I would deny the alleged existence of a "Catalan problem" or a problem of the identity and self-realization of any other people in Spain. There is a Basque fact, just as there is a Catalan fact and other facts, with more or fewer points in common, relating to the rest of the peoples who together constitute the Spanish state. But these facts are not antagonistic, nor do they generate mutual incompatibilities. The Basques and "Basqueness" are a problem neither of nor for Spain. They are, I repeat, a fact, a reality. Spain

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without the Basque Country and without the Basques would not be Spain; it would be something else. Moreover, it would be like a tree without roots, because our country has its roots in the north, in the vast cradle extending from Finisterre to Rosas, in whose geographic center we find the territory and people of the Basque Country.

Contrary to what some people might be inclined to think, this historically, culturally and politically differentiated yet united reality is now finally in a position to once again fit in perfectly with the form of government, a state with autonomies, that our country has taken on. The overwhelmingly majority of the Basque people have acknowledged this, and quite recently. On 1 March and 3 April, the Basque people, like the peoples elsewhere in Spain, went to vote in the general and local elections, which there also included balloting to restore the historic General Boards in those territories. In both absolute and relative numbers, the voter turnout was higher than in previous elections, which proves that throughout Spain there is the determination to settle political issues through the peaceful and democratic method of the ballot box.

Commentators differ in their interpretations of the election results, and naturally so do the parties, which try to put the statistics in the most favorable light for their political positions and interests. It is true that radical options garnered more votes than many people had anticipated, but it is no less true that these were truly free elections in which all options were able to compete and that the ones that we could term extremists won the support of only a minority.

The overwhelmingly majority of the Basque people have voted decisively for peaceful political and social coexistence within the state that in one way or another, with one ideology or another, is advocated by the parties that won 80 percent of the votes cast. All of these parties advocate recognition of the Basque Country's own personality, through a statute, but always in keeping with the unity of the state and the solidarity of the other peoples who constitute it.

This type of autonomy, an autonomy that is not a negation of anything but rather an affirmation, is the road that opens on to a horizon of hope not only for the Basque Country but for all Spain.

PNV President Voices Views

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 May 79 pp 30-31

[Interview with the president of the PNV, Carlos Garaicoechea]

[Text] A Basque native of Navarra, an attorney and the holder of a degree in economics,

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the president of the PNV, Carlos Garaicoechea Urriza, a 41-year old resident of Pamplona, is firmly and absolutely convinced that peace is possible in the Basque Country "if we act quickly."

He knows what he is talking about because he is the leader of the party that controls 80 percent of the Basque city halls, holds a parliamentary majority in the zone and today represents the majority of the Basque people.

Under the current circumstances there are few people who doubt that a solution to the "Basque problem" necessarily involves the PNV, of whose Euskadi Buru Batzaar (its number one body) Carlos Garaicoechea is president.

The PNV president also knows that we have to begin taking the steps towards peace in the Basque Country immediately, "because we have very little time left before irreversible situations are with us." Nevertheless, he is optimistic. In his law office very near the Pamplona bullring Garaicoechea forecasts the storm that looms on the horizon but talks about how to deal with it.

Peace Is Possible

In any case, this politician, a key person today throughout Spain, is prepared to weather the storm and remain on board with the same determination with which he learned to speak Basque just 8 years ago or with the same tenacity with which he learned Latin so that he could read all of that language's classics "just because I wanted to."

Beneath a serigraphy of the sculptor Chillida and a pen and ink drawing that depicts a corner of the Basque coast, between the past and the future, the president of the PNV told CAMBIO 16 what, in his opinion, are the steps that we must take so that the Basque Country can achieve peace.

CAMBIO 16: To what extent is peace possible today in the Basque Country and under what conditions?

Carlos Garaicoechea: I think, of course, that peace is possible. What we need to do is kindle our imagination and courage to come up with the tools that can make it possible.

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Although it sounds trite, we have been insistently repeating that political measures are the only ones that can restore normalcy and coexistence in this country. To date, the political measures have not been taken, at least not in the required sphere.

C 16: What would these measures be?

C.G.: There are different political considerations at each moment, and I think that we have missed a great opportunity over the last 2 years to take a number of temporary measures towards the autonomy arrangement that is constitutionally possible today. I am not going to refer to those measures but to the ones that are possible today, especially the major step of the autonomy statute, along with the self-government arrangement for the Basque Country that is included in it.

C 16: Is the current draft statute non-negotiable?

C.G.: The draft is up for discussion by the parliamentary bodies stipulated by the constitution, and such discussions, or negotiations, have to adhere, in our view, to the mechanics of the constitutional system, not the content of the draft. An analysis and a reconsideration will be pertinent to the degree that the representatives of the assembly of Basque legislators demonstrate that the content is or is not unconstitutional.

A Balancing Tool

C 16: Nevertheless, there is the feeling that the PNV is presenting the draft statute as a "take it or leave it" proposition...

C.G.: If that feeling exists, it is an erroneous one. The PNV has wanted to pursue a honest and realistic policy towards its people and conceived a statute that is viable at the present time. From our point of view, this draft is a tool to balance the political demands of the Basque people with the political conditioning factors that we are going to encounter in Madrid. Since we honestly feel that it is a balancing point, we honestly believe that any attempt to pare it back shatters the equilibrium of the draft statute.

C 16: One of the draft's key points is the financial issue...

C.G.: As far as finances are concerned, it is clear that we want to recover the historical system, which we view as a right that we were stripped of, the economic pacts in other words. The economic pacts ought to be reestablished as the foundation of a truly autonomous finance arrangement. The draft makes it clear, however, that we pledge to coordinate tax regulations with the rest of the state and that we also pledge to have our tax burden no lighter than elsewhere in Spain and to

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contribute equitably to general tax revenues and to inter-province solidarity. With all of these premises, the financial arrangement offers every guarantee, so that no one should say that we want a "tax haven," that we are divisive, discriminatory, etc.

C 16: Will Basques pay income tax, for example?

C.G.: Of course. We Basques have never tried to get around these taxes, which are at least, and I emphasize that word, as heavy as anywhere else in Spain.

Basque Police

C 16: A Basque police force is another key issue...

C.G.: Yes, and first I would like to make a clarification: we want our own public order, not because of any special desire but as an important and logical element in our aspirations for self-government. It is true that people are especially sensitive about this issue as a result of what has been happening in the country in recent times, as well as the tension, if that is the proper word, that exists between the current forces of public order and the Basque people.

Now then, we believe that this autonomous police force is compatible with a state police for those matters that exceed the bounds of strictly Basque jurisdiction, as, for example, immigration, etc. I also feel that we must also discount the concern that some sectors often voice about our police force being a breeding grounds for infiltrations and terrible situations. In this country, if someone had wanted to infiltrate, he could have done it in the state security bodies long ago.

C 16: During the transition period could the two police forces, the state and the autonomous units, coexist in the Basque Country?

C.G.: Yes. If they were subordinate to the institutions of self-government for a reasonable period of time, there could be a gradual transfer of jurisdiction.

C 16: Is a Basque police force going to be capable of coping with terrorism?

C.G.: In the first place, I think that, to begin with, a Basque police force is going to do away with a situation that no one likes. When it takes up this jurisdiction of public order, it will mean a substantial reduction in the use of violence and in a number of activities by sectors that today more or less actively revolve around that philosophy.

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So we will not only have a much less complicated picture, but the people, in addition to the police, will facilitate police work. The people are going to back up their activities, and that way we are going to have a much easier solution to the Basque problem.

C 16: People often say about you that the statute is just the first step towards independence...

C.G.: I am going to clearly explain what our stand is in relation to the issue of the Basque Country vis-a-vis the rest of Spain. We have always advocated a restoration of the privileges. What does this mean? Before the privileges were taken away, we had a sort of monarchical confederation, in terms of the political concepts of the time. The historically Basque territories had their own political power in the form of institutional bodies such as the General Boards or the Cortes of Navarra. In other words, there was a complete political and institutional picture with native political sovereignty and a pact with the crown that meant voluntary participation in a number of state bodies that the crown represented at the time. To us, a restoration of the privileges means putting in up-to-date language, in current political concepts, that presence of the Basque Country in the state. In other words, it means in the first place: a return to self-government with the degrees of political power that those institutions used to represent, and second, a return of the original title to that political power to the Basque people by reinstating the voluntary pact in the makeup of the state. We are willing to try out coexistence within the state, but I would like to state firmly that as far as we are concerned, our people are the natural and sacred political institution. And there is no way that we would want to sacrifice this because of an unconditional obligation to belong to a certain type of state.

Historic Weight

C 16: Could the statute that the Basques drew up in 1936 be reestablished now as a temporary solution?

C.G.: Yes, of course. Speaking quite personally, I think that at present the 1936 statute could be an interesting transitional measure. Individuals and political groups who are questioning the current draft statute here in Spain would have to take a more receptive stand in relation to that one. Moreover, I think that I remember Adolfo Suarez himself saying that everything in the 1936 statute is constitutional. Therefore, a person who has made such a statement ought not to have any qualms about reestablishing it.

C 16: Would the people welcome its reestablishment?

C.G.: I think so. It would be much less controversial among the Basque people than the new draft, which contains opposing stands, perhaps

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due to the influence of sheer partisan positions. As a purely provisional measure, the 1936 statute could attract a wider following as a result of the entire historical weight, all of the emotional memories...

Tomorrow Is Too Late

C 16: About how much time is left to make decisions that will settle the Basque problem?

C.G.: Time...A few months ago I said that we had about 6 or 8 months. Now there are about 4 or 6 months left, to put it in numbers. The situation is getting worse quickly; the radicalization is more evident every day, and the political skepticism that fuels this radicalization is increasing to an incredible extent. This is the kind of skepticism whereby many people are developing the conviction that there is no basis to the political method.

Moreover, I think that time is going by very quickly. What is possible today might not be tomorrow.

Often in processes of national emancipation, solutions that were regarded as acceptable one day have not been feasible when the attempt was made to adopt them as a last recourse, because the nations were subject to dynamics that led to much more radical options.

Tarradellas' View of Basque Problem

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 May 79 p 32

[Interview with the president of the Catalan Legislative Assembly, Josep Tarradellas]

[Text] In the opinion of 80-year old Josep Tarradellas, the president of the Catalan Legislative Assembly, a solution to the Basque Country problem entails a much-needed unity of action among Basque political forces. If they sit down at a table and negotiate, peace is possible, the Honorable Tarradellas says.

To many he is an ambitious politician wrapped up in himself. To others he is a political genius who has led his fellow Catalans to the highest degree of autonomy in Spain today, without fuss and without serious confrontations with the central government.

Tarradellas' opinions on the situation in the Basque Country and the way that the Basques have conducted

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their negotiations with Madrid have been very controversial. The Honorable Tarradellas spoke with CAMBIO 16 about this issue and a possible peaceful solution for the Basque Country.

CAMBIO 16: Do you think that peace is possible in the Basque Country?

Tarradellas: Yes, I have always thought so. But the first condition is that the Basques sit down at a table and talk. They have to be pragmatic. This was how we Catalans reached quite satisfactory solutions, and without violence.

Around a Table

C 16: And why do you think that the Basques have not sat down at the negotiating table?

T: Perhaps because of the violence going on. I told them this once, and they got angry with me: that it was a small civil war among Basques. But they have to overcome this. They have to start talking, discussing things and having it out around a table because without solutions this thing is going to wind up worse. If they reach an understanding among themselves, they can and will be listened to by Madrid. We Catalans are obsessed about pacts, and even though I do not want to give the Basques any advice, because then they get angry with me, I can tell them to arrive at a pact, reach an agreement among themselves and then hammer out a pact with Madrid if they can. And even if they were not to reach an agreement with Madrid, they could still be quite right in saying to their people that they exhausted all avenues. But they are not going to get anywhere with gunshots.

C 16: Can Herri Batasuna and the PNV reach an agreement?

T: Why not? The political forces of Catalonia have come to an agreement, because the question is whether they really want to reach such an agreement.

C 16: But you don't have the ETA...

T: This business of the ETA! This is a domestic problem for the Basque Country; it is a problem of Basque nationalists. Because why did the ETA emerge? Everybody knows that it is the child of a PNV splinter group. And why did this ideological split occur? Simply because of something that did not take place in Catalonia, thanks to which we have been able to arrive at a pact with the government. When we republicans crossed the border in defeat, we had two options: one, wage war; two: reach an agreement...But there was another problem: who ought to speak on behalf of our countries? The Basques felt that they themselves

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ought to conduct policy inside the Basque Country. I felt that this was not possible and that's why I did not form a government in exile. The Basques did. Why didn't I? For one simple reason: because I thought that the new generations that were born under Franco would not agree to let a group of defeated men conduct the domestic policy of the Basque Country or Catalonia from Cochabamba or wherever. During Franco's 40 years there were very respectable persons who thought that domestic policy could be conducted from Paris. The result of all this? Well, that I, who refused to form a government, am here, and the ETA is stronger every day. But looking to the present rather than the past, I would say that they have to start talking, that the Basques have to reach an agreement among themselves, because otherwise the problem will get bigger every day.

C 16: You were one of the first politicians who said that we had to negotiate with the ETA. Could negotiations have been undertaken at that point?

T: I think so. The highest representative of the state asked me that same question...Look, France had an extremely serious problem with Algeria, and while De Gaulle was saying that he was not going to make agreements, he was secretly doing so. As far as we are concerned, if policy is not made in the streets, it's of no use, but at certain times you don't have to make it in the streets, but rather in a quiet room speaking in low voices.

C 16: And is it more difficult now to reach an agreement with the ETA than 2 years ago?

T: Yes, much more difficult, and the difficulties are aggravated as times goes by. But what are politicians? Men who resolve serious problems, not easy ones. To be a politician is to get involved where no one else would, to get involved in sticky matters. That's why, no matter how hard it might be, they have to take the first step, they have to reach an agreement.

C 16: And for example, what if Herri Batasuna does not arrive at an agreement with the PNV but the PNV does come to an agreement with the government? Do you think that such a pact could be the basis for peace in the Basque Country?

T: It would be a big mistake. Nothing can be done without unity. I have traveled to France to speak with Mr Leizaola, whom I hold in great esteem. I have often been in Saint Jean de Luz and Bayonne talking with activists, and my attitude has always been the same: if they fight among themselves, they are not going to settle anything, and moreover, that benefits the government.

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A Question of Nerves

C 16: And what could happen if the PNV and Herri Batasuna do not come to an agreement?

T: A disaster. I think that it is a question of nerves, although Madrid is the winner in the long run because it has more experience. The government has won in connection with the Navarra problem. Look, last June when I came to Madrid to negotiate, under dramatic conditions, at one point I came out and said that a million people were going to take to the streets in Catalonia, and Suarez told me, good, let them. We must not think that violence is going to force the government to pursue a policy that Spain does not want. As far as the Basque problem is concerned, the government can wait, Spain can wait, the Basques are the ones who cannot wait. I hope that they realize that the only solution is to come to an agreement.

C 16: Do you think that peace would come if the government gave the Basque Country the 1936 statute?

T: That wouldn't resolve anything, because then they would want the 1979 version. I don't want to discuss whether the Basques are right, far from it. I am discussing tactics. My friend Monzon says: "We want this," but I know a little bit about how things are, and if that were given to them, tomorrow they would want more.

Major Figures State Views

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 May 79 pp 35, 37-39

[Text] Twelve figures from the world of politics, law, the arts and intellectual pursuits, and who have an interest in the problem of the Basque Country, feel that peace is not only possible but necessary. They explained to CAMBIO 16 what roads they feel lead to it.

Justino de Azcarate, a senator by royal appointment, was born in Madrid 74 years ago. The minister of foreign relations of the Second Republic for just 1 day, he was imprisoned in Valladolid when the Civil War broke out. After being exchanged for Raimundo Fernandez Guesta in 1937, he went into exile and established himself in Venezuela, where he remained for 38 years.

I am going to talk very briefly about the handling of the Autonomy Statute of the Basque Country.

First of all, we have to recover a "good form" so that all of us together (not against each other) can serve the common goal of restoring order and harmony, in other words peace, to the lives of all people who work,

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play, sleep and have longstanding or recent roots in the Basque Country and who do not want to live elsewhere.

We must discuss the Basque problem immediately. This is the mandate that the Basque people have issued through the municipal balloting and expressed with comparable urgency through the various political groups or parties.

This desire must be met. I think that the voting signified an implicit and even explicit rejection of violence, because "terrorism" that wants to discuss things and that votes is not really terrorism.

Now then, before they begin the very dangerous discussion of every paragraph and every word, all of the national and local political forces must achieve a detente, give their express, broad and categorical political support to the granting of the Basque Country statute of autonomy and accept the powers and jurisdictions stipulated in the constitution.

The Basque problem is a national problem, and it is on that level that the solemn pledge should be made to reject dealings with or recognition of any political force that by resorting to violence opposes the peaceful arrangement of autonomy that the Basque people desire.

I alluded previously to the now imminent debate on the wording of the draft statute introduced last 29 December. Without a prior, formal and joint declaration, I fear that a dangerous attrition might take place which would lead to dead-end situations, to the maintenance, with the best good faith, of rigid and intransigent views. In a word, and although it might seem contradictory to what a discussion is, the commission and its members ought to know, as they begin their sessions, that they will be able to conclude their work only through a general agreement.

Now is the only time that we have to carry out this difficult, but feasible, unavoidable task.

I am sure that the enormous number of "newscomers" to the Basque Country, who are so close to this their "land," will help to make the process of transference safer and more balanced. "Without pause but without haste" could once again be a good guideline.

I am sure that the Basques will soon wind up putting the services of their "first" home in better order and will then continue to revel in what naturally belongs to them because it belongs to all.

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J.M. Leizaola, the 82-Year Old President of the Basque Government in Exile

Peace is very possible in the Basque Country. I am full of hope and have a total determination to serve this goal. Let us not forget that the phenomenon of violence and terrorism unfortunately exists in many countries. Nonetheless, we all have to struggle to pacify our country, by following the example of countries like Germany that have been able to shake off this onslaught.

Although the process of autonomy in the Basque Country could have been quicker, I think that over the last 2 months we have entered a positive dynamic in terms of a solution to the problem. I am optimistic at this point because of the sincere interest shown by a number of Madrid politicians in resolving the problem.

With regard to the possibility that the 1936 statute will be approved very soon, this shows that the conditions and stands are positive at the moment for seeking formulas that are acceptable to all. How can I say anything against that statute when what we have so far always defended firmly and honestly has been precisely the legitimacy that that same statute conferred on us.

At the moment I am outside all of this, and my return will be decided by both the people and the representatives of the political forces. If things do not change, I will continue in my post. I am no deserter.

Anton Menchaca, 56, formerly in the Navy and now the owner and president of the Menchaca Shipping Company in Bilbao.

Based on the current strife-torn situation, I think that a remedy, not a solution, to all the problems would be for the Basque legislators to obtain a statute as similar as possible to the one they introduced, for the simple reason that this would satisfy the aspirations of most of the segments of the Basque people...If the legislators do not come back soon with such a statute, the new formal democracy might lose prestige in our region, and the most important path towards a solution would be closed off.

I think that the Basque people, even segments that have not been nationalists and some of them even advocates of integration or Francoists, defend the statute today, because they realize that it is the only viable option. With regard to the potential incompatibility or unconstitutionality of the current draft, the law is flexible and ambiguous enough to satisfactorily handle the country's problems. I do not think that the problem can be resolved by using Sagasta's method, by putting it in a big closet to be taken care of by time. Time will have the opposite effect and complicate matters further.

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Miguel Castells, a native of San Sebastian and a notary, a former vice president of Basque Christian Democracy (Gil-Robles), 74 years of age.

The real reason for the fear and tension that exist in the Basque Country today is primarily, and no one can really deny this, the long years of tragedy that the Basque people have suffered.

We must not take the issue of pacification lightly; we must examine it conscientiously, and to do this we need to restore Spain's true face and also overcome existing anti-Basque attitudes.

The autonomy statute could be the solution. The Basque Country has given evidence of being able to govern itself within the framework of Spain as a whole.

I personally think that a well-trained native police force could eventually function better than the current police force. It is totally puerile to think that a native police force could turn into an army.

The Guernica statute must be recognized quickly. I recall that about 2 years ago the Spanish Communist Party called for the reestablishment of the 1936 statute, which was perhaps useful at the time but not now, although if it enables a Basque government to be set up again while the Guernica draft statute continues under discussion, I think that it could be a proper measure.

Luis de Michelena, born in Renteria on 20 August 1915, a linguist and philologist, chairman of the Department of Indo-European and Basque Linguistics of the Division of Philology at Vitoria and Salamanca, member of the Academy of the Basque Language.

I think, naturally I would say, that peace is possible. I am talking about a real peace, one that makes possible coexistence in the full sense of the word and that enables our country, which has been restrained by coercion for so many years, to develop.

We have lived too long under a fear born of manifest or concealed violence to want a situation like that to continue in one form or another. This does not, of course, mean that the conflicts and their causes are going to disappear.

If there is life, there is conflict, but the confrontations that life causes should take place within regulated channels. This means that right here and now I believe exclusively in political solutions. But this principled belief must be borne out by the facts, and if such solutions fail because of stubborn emotions or too much partisan "skill," it would wind up being a catastrophe for the entire Basque people.

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In the first place, I am speaking simply as a witness to "old memories." Now then, as such I can only say that ever since I was 15 years old, I have always thought a necessary condition so that our aspirations would not be poisoned and poison us all was for the Basque Country to enjoy autonomy. In no way do I believe that our historical rights expired with the former regime, but I do think that they must be brought up to date now within a different framework. That framework, which Jose Antonio de Aguirre foresaw, to mention just him, is a statute of autonomy, whether it is called that or anything else.

Since I cannot believe in direct, assembly-style democracy, which failed in the days of Athens, I am with the majority of the representatives that we have elected. In other words, I am favor of the Guernica statute, and my only fear is that some people will go about watering it down with such determination that they will make it invalid for the urgent and immediate goal that we are pursuing.

I am with Aguirre, with Ajuriaguerra and so many others and I sincerely believe that a Basque statute that is not niggardly watered down is an indispensable requirement for channeling our problems along the political path of negotiated conflict, not the military path of armed conflict, and I hope that all of those responsible on both sides finally see it that way.

Manuel de Irujo, a former deputy from 1921 to 1930, a PNV deputy in the Cortes in 1933 and 1936, minister of the republic in 1936, minister of justice in 1937 and minister without portfolio in 1938, president of the Assembly of Basque Legislators from 1977 to 1979, former senator and current chairman of the Peninsular Federal Council of the European Movement, born in the capital of Navarra 86 years ago.

It is urgent to begin serious discussions with Madrid about enacting the current statute that the assembly of legislators drew up and signed at Guernica last year. I have no doubts or hesitations about wagering on the statute, while trying to make the most of it. Let us not forget that the draft statute was ratified also by the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], Euzkadico Ezkerra and the UCD itself.

The only thing that I ask is that our current leaders not forget about the broad-based national movement that exists today in the Basque Country. If the statute is substantially watered down, the people will not accept it, and we could lapse into civil disobedience.

If effective and sincere solutions for the Basque Country come quickly, I am convinced that violence will subside. We, like the people in Madrid, have to open our eyes and open the doors that have been shut on our aspirations for decades. I do not think that we can wait much longer.

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Patricio de la Sota, from Bilbao, holder of a master's degree in economics from Cornell University. He returned to Spain in 1957 after 20 years in exile and joined the management of the Franco Espanola de Alambres firm, where he is currently president. He was recently elected vice president of the Bilbao Chamber of Commerce.

The statute of autonomy can rapidly settle the Basque Country's problems. I am in favor of the economic pacts and I think that with our own finance arrangement we would succeed in solving many of our problems. The basic problem that I am referring to is whether we are going to continue depending on Madrid, as we have, because I do not think that it does much good. Madrid has lost its image in the Basque Country, and in turn the Basque Country has lost confidence in Madrid.

The recent elections showed that the policy of centralism has led a major segment of our population to extremist stands. Centralism and its catastrophic policy in recent years has to a large extent created Herri Batasuna. The current radicalization is due to disillusionment and weariness with so many promises, and we are all responsible. We are the fore-runners of democracy, but it bothers us when they continue to kid us.

Jose Maria Setien, the bishop of San Sebastian since 19 March 1979. A Basque speaker, he received his degree in theology from the Gregorian University of Rome and earned a doctorate in canon law.

Peace is possible in the Basque Country, not only as an abstract postulate or an ethical imperative, but as an historic situation that we must achieve. But peace will not come merely by eliminating violence as long as sociopolitical and cultural relations do not develop towards normalcy, as required by the dynamism of a people that are becoming increasingly more aware of their own identity, along with the tensions and conflicts prompted by abnormal past situations in history, the lack of proper sociopolitical institutions and the decided will to live.

The Basque people's sociopolitical process of self-affirmation must become independent of the dialectic of actions and repressions triggered by violence. This is possible; moreover, it will be the path of genuine pacification.

We can foresee that without the statute it will be impossible to satisfy the Basques. The political and institutional adjustments required for the affirmation of the Basque people's identity cannot take place without a special provision, the basic expression of which must be the distinctive quality introduced by the statute or another suitable judicial format.

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The most appropriate solution will be the one that is in keeping with the historical awareness attained at this moment, without the dogmatic approaches that bring to politics a severity that runs counter to the evolution of history. We must prevent the Parliament from becoming a forum for the discussion of political or judicial theories, in order to seek out suitable formulas that are duly flexible and in keeping with historical demands.

Ramon Rubial was born in Erandio (Vizcaya) in 1906, spent 21 years in jail, was president of the PSOE and is currently a senator from Vizcaya and the chairman of the Basque General Council.

Peace is possible, and we must all set about seeking it. If we had been in a more buoyant economic situation, the solution would have come more easily and less tensely.

We have to concern ourselves with two things in order to defuse the situation that the Basque Country is going through. First, the economic situation, over which the Basque Country has no control because it is reflected throughout Spain. Nonetheless, it is hitting basic sectors here hard, such as iron and steel and shipbuilding. Second, the rapid formulation of a statute whereby we Basques can secure the self-government that we exercised in 1936 with an efficiency that no one can take away from us. As the survivors of that period, we remember those months of war when from nothing we had to create a political administrative machine with an army and merchant marine. We must not forget, however, that we attained that degree of self-government in a special situation of strife.

Moreover, a positive awareness has arisen today that can be channeled towards the attainment of peace, if we see to it that the statute that has been drawn up is not watered down, so that it can satisfy the overwhelming majority of the political forces that are active in this region.

Recognition of the 1936 statute could create a false image in people's minds because it would be hard to enact at the present time. There is the danger of a backslide in this regard, and a true solution to the problem necessarily entails the current draft of the Guernica statute and urgent discussion of it in Madrid. The negotiations cannot be put off any longer, because this would only lead us into a dead-end street that radical groups would take advantage of to continue their violent activities.

Juan Linz, Spanish sociopolitical analyst and currently a professor at Yale University. He taught previously at Harvard and the Autonomous University of Madrid. He received his doctorate from Columbia University and has an honorary PhD from the University of Granada. He is presently preparing a wideranging study on the Basque problem.

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Perhaps we have to distinguish between problems. 1) I think that if we all realize how difficult the problem is, that no one can have a perfect, short-term solution, we will have to negotiate. 2) Peace between the central government and nationalism entails an agreement among all Basque forces as to what their realistic objectives are and negotiations that all are willing to undertake. The major difficulty in this regard is the explicit or latent conflict among Basques as to their views of the future, their bargaining platforms.

No solution will be definitive or satisfactory to all. Autonomy within the constitution that we Spaniards and a large plurality of the Basques approved is the only short-term solution, although there are Basques who would like to go further. The problem is for all Basques to postpone that "further step" and negotiate with a single voice within that framework. I do not view this as easy because of the competition between the PNV and Herri Batasuna.

A more or less broad autonomy within the constitution must be negotiated with deliberate speed but without a deadline and, if possible, with a united Basque delegation and another delegation of state parties who agree beforehand on minimum and maximum points. This latter aspect is also difficult, because the state parties have electoral interests in the Basque Country. Once an agreement has been reached, the signers should consider it their duty to defend it to their voters even though it might not reflect their highest aspirations and to impose, with force if necessary, on a minority that might not accept it and keep trying to impose a utopian solution.

Julio Caro Baroja, historian, ethnologist, anthropologist, member of the Royal Academy of History.

I think that peace is still possible in the Basque Country. If the malignancy in the Basque Country stems from the Civil War, what the monarchy easily could have done is not return to the Basque statute during the republic, but begin to take political action based on reshaping what the Basque Country had during the monarchy of Alfonso, the economic pacts, for example. If Primo de Rivera's dictatorship was able to give the Basque Country legislation like the type it had, there is no reason why a democratic monarchy today cannot even give the Basques what they had under the Alfonso monarchy. They have thus caused the nationalist parties to return to the Basque Country with their hands empty and exasperated public opinion.

There is no reason why the UCD, with a Basque Nationalist Party, cannot say, well, if they're asking for 100, let's give them at least 25. If it hasn't even been able to do this, I think that we are lost. They cannot continue to regard the Basque Country, as they have so far, as if they were the same provinces as in the time of Charles IV.

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Peace can come with the parties that were in the underground up to now, such as Herri Batasuna or Euskadiko Eskerra. When they take over the city halls, they will have to be much more open to dialog. If this obligatory coexistence in public activities lasts a number of years, the opportunity might arise for a better understanding among Basque political forces.

Miguel Herrero Rodriguez de Minon, attorney; he studied at the Universities of Madrid and Lovaina, with further studies in Luxembourg, Geneva and the United Kingdom. Author of various books on constitutional law and political science, including "El principio monarquico" (The Monarchical Principle), a lawyer with the Council of State, director of inter-province relations at the Institute of Local Administration Studies.

I think that the pacification of the Basque Country is absolutely necessary for the consolidation of democracy and peace throughout Spain. Such an indispensable peace is still possible, in my opinion. It cannot be secured without political measures; in other words, without the active involvement of the Basque people, the more positions become radicalized, the more costly everything will be.

In my judgment, the only way to restore civil peace to the Basque Country is to renew the tradition of statutory autonomy that was severed last century. The privileges as they existed in the old regime are unquestionably not viable today, because of the inherent changes in modern society, but the principle of self-government that the privileges entail is perfectly adaptable to a modern state.

Bavaria's wideranging autonomy in Germany, that of the Austrian regions, or the recognition of the Scots personality in Great Britain, do not threaten the unity of those countries.

Moreover, the tradition of the privileges never leads to independence but to a complete integration of territories and peoples endowed with their own personalities and with full-fledged autonomy in the inexorable destiny of something as united as the Spanish monarchy.

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