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31 May 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

FOUO No. 637



AFRICA

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

LINE OF BLACK RESISTANCE TO ISLAMIC INFLUENCE NOTED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 16 Apr 79 p 33-34

[Article by Jean Grandmougin: "Blacks Against the Greens"]

[Text] Libyan retreat in Kampapa--Armed attack in Nouakchott--unstable balance in N'djamena--a line of Black resistance is forming against Islamic influence.

The thrust of Islam in Africa has run up against a growing resistance on the part of Blacks: from Nouakchott to Khartoum.

In Mauritani, on 6 April, a new "Committee of National Safety" brought to power as head of government Colonel Bouceif, while Colonel Saleck will remain as honorary president: that has led to the removal from his post as minister of the Interior of Commandant Jiddou, an advocate of severe repression against the Black community and to his replacement by one of the rare Blacks in the preceding government, Commandant Thiam el-Hadj.

Mauritania is made up 80 percent of Berbers, nomads living mostly in the deserts of the north and of 20 percent of Toucouleur Blacks, who form a permanent population of farmers and fishermen in the south on the shores of the Senegal River. At the end of the colonial period, the Blacks, who had been practically the only people to attend French schools, found themselves holding almost a monopoly on jobs in the public sector.

As the first president after independence, Ould Daddah made Arabic the official second language, on the same basis as French. His successors have worked at eliminating French from the civil service and from the schools, substituting for it Arabic, which has led to barring Blacks, who speak French and do not know Arabic, from access to the modern sectors of national life.

The Blacks have reacted to this militant Arabism. The new National Consultative Committee, which is supposed to advise the chief of state, since it is comprised of only 17 Mauritians of Black African origin, as opposed to 80 representatives from the Maure community, the Blacks, in a letter to Colonel Saleck, protested against "the unfairness of the ethnic distribution" within

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that assembly, from which they resigned. They feared that their Maure compatriots would call a halt to the improvement projects in the Senegal Valley, which would benefit the Black farmers.

While the army includes a large proportion of Blacks, many officers have relatives in the opposite camp and the Blacks did not see what advantage there was in "recovering" a part, a desert part, of the Spanish Sahara, populated by 25,000 Sahraouis, who are more or less Arabized. An armed front to fight for self-determinazation of the populations of Walo, of Fouta and of Guidimaca--which explains its name, the "Walfougui Front"--was set up under the leadership of a former officer of the Mauritian gendarmerie, by the name of Alloume Diaw. His objective: to liberate the "native populations subjugated by the Arab-Berber Mauritians."

Mr Leopold Sedar Senghor, the president of Senagal, who was to go to Nouakchott informed Colonel Saleck that, if Mauritania became part of a confederation with a "Sahraoui Republic," Senegal would support autonomy for Black Mauritians.

A comparable split between northerners and southerners exists in Chad. In the north: Moslems. In the south: Blacks. Since the south had a literacy rate of 60 percent and the north a rate of 3 percent, the power, with the coming of independence, had been given to the people of the south, the only ones capable of filling key positions. But while the Blacks had become accommodated to colonization, the Whites in the north, who are strict Moslems, had opposed it. That is the source of the personal quarrels, of guerrilla war and civil war. Moselems, Mr Goukouni Oueddei and Mr Hiscene Habre supported first by the Libyans of Colonel Qadhdhafi and then by the Sudanese, called upon their fellow Moslems. During the recent fighting, which has been bloody in N'djamcna, before the ceasefire, Moslems were massacred in the south.

Another battleground; the Sudan. For 17 years the southern populations of the Nile Valley, who are animists or Christians, have been fighting against the Nubians, who are northerners and who are trying to convert them to Islam. An agreement was reached in 1972, at the instigation of President Nemeiry, between the forces of Khartoum and the Anya Nya guerrillas of the south. Southern Sudan has obtained legal internal autonomy.

But the southerners, to whom the elections of 1978 have not been favorable, have all the more the impression of paying the cost of the national reconciliation sought by Mr Nemeiry now that Sudan has strengthened its ties with Egypt, to the point that the popular assemblies of the two nations held, in January, a joint session in Khartoum. The "separatists" do not dismiss the possibility of new hostilities. Having taken refuge in Ethiopia, many Anya Nya forccs have had military training there.

And in Uganda, the Moslem Libyans had called for Islamic solidarity to aid President Amin Dad, who is supported by the Nubian guard, which was originally from northern Sudan. The Libyans have also tried to stir up

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the Tanzanian Moslems against the regime of President Uyerere, since the Tanzanians are giving military support to the opponents of the regime of Amin Dada. But the rout of the battalion of Colonel Qadhdhafi was such that it is strengthening from east to west in Africa, all the Blacks opposed to Gren Islam.

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

BADEA FISHING PROJECT FINANCING--The board of directors of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), at a regular meeting in Khartoum on 7 and 8 March, approved the financing for a fishing development project in Cape Verde. The Abu Dhabi Fund, the Saudi Fund, and the Cape Verde government are also participating in the financing of the project. The investment should contribute to revival of one of the most important activities of the Cape Verde islands and to supporting the economic expansion of the archipelago as a whole. It is estimated that one year after its startup, this project, which will have provided for modernization of a key sector, will furnish the country with export receipts of nearly 2 million dollars per year--the equivalent of one-seventh of the GNP, and double the export income realized in 1976. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 p 873] 11267

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CONGO

ECONOMIC SITUATION DESCRIBED AS BEING FAR FROM DESPERATE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 pp 852-854

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "A Difficult Turning Point for the New Government of the People's Republic of the Congo"]

[Excerpt] The Third Extraordinary Congress of the Congolese Labor Party [PCT] closed its session on 31 March with the designation of Col Denis Sassou Nguesso as head of the party, chief of state and head of government. In the economic sphere the party decided to break definitively with the "international capitalist division of labor," which has been adjudged responsible for a failure of the economy that the party spokesman describes as "extroversion accompanied by hypertrophy of the tertiary sector, an industry of substitution and an archaic small-scale agriculture." The resolutions adopted are accordingly intended to reinvigorate the national economy with the aim of "achieving a socialist society in the Congo" by basing that society on a "revolutionary, autodynamic and self-contained revolutionary strategy." The article which follows emphasizes the difficulties of such a project.

In his closing address Col Denis Sassou Nguesso reaffirmed his country's intention to carry out "a policy of diplomatic openings, good neighborliness and international cooperation based on mutual interests and strict equality, without haggling and without relinquishing our options or abandoning our principles."

Subsequently, under the heading "Congo," the reader will find details concerning the decisions reached at the extraordinary congress of the PCT.

The replacement--as head of the People's Republic of the Congo--of General Yhomby-Opango, former student of Coetquidan, by Col Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who received a Marxist education in the USSR and Cuba, was reportedly motivated by ethnic rivalries and differences of opinion among men of

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diverse backgrounds in respect to education and training. It is conceivable that the country's economic problems also played a role, even though official governmental decisions have varied little (except for a few changes in wording) since the elimination of Father Fulbert Youlou in 1963.

This persistence is remarkable, not so much because it has been consolidated in the midst of changes in regime (this latest change did not involve a "settling of scores") as because it has eventuated in a system wherein state socialism requires the support of foreign capital and in fact "gets along" quite well with the latter. This formula--which has been made necessary by the absence of mechanisms for capital formation and by the necessity of technological assistance--is common to all of tropical Africa and does not differ from one country to another except as regards planning, which can be more or less authoritarian in character. Moreover, it rarely goes so far as to reject modifications suggested by the investors, whenever the latter have sufficient influence. The phraseology also differs, in that it is inherently dogmatic in those states that are under military leadership.

Despite the efforts made to codify it, this system remains a far cry from that of the people's democracies of Europe. Saturnin Okabe, who served as minister of the interior in the Yhomy-Opango administration, expressed the opinion in 1978 that enterprises capitalized at less than 25 million CFA francs should be reserved to the domestic private sector and those capitalized at between 25 million and 50 million should be reserved to partnerships between the domestic private sector and foreign investors. Enterprises capitalized at from 50 million to 1 billion CFA francs, he believed, should be the domain of mixed enterprises, with the capital contributed by the state (as distinct from that contributed by foreign investors) being apportioned in such a way as to give the state a clear majority of the stock in enterprises capitalized at more than 100 million CFA francs. In the case of enterprises of from 1 billion to 2 billion the state could be content with a controlling interest. Its participation in enterprises capitalized at more than 2 billion, however, would be "purely formal" in character.

Whether it reflects the Marxist dialectic or mere disillusionment, Okabe's economic stratigraphy expresses the simple concept that in tropical Africa the socialist way of development is in reality open only to the wealthy countries, that is to say, those countries whose underground resources constitute an initial capital large enough so that the revenue it produces will enable the state to buy up--in a relatively short period--the foreign-owned shares and thereby begin exploitation of those resources. The industries established by the former colonizers are able to perform this function adequately only to the extent that they remain integrated into the overall commercial framework on which their viability formerly depended. This is not the case with the Congo, however, where these industries were conceived in the context of a Federal structure and a communications network that has since been dismantled. The 37 percent share of the 1970 GNP that these industries represent should not deceive anyone, for the costs entailed by the nationalizations (and further aggravated by poor management) have since that time substantially exceeded their profits.

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It has unfortunately been demonstrated in the Congo that nationalization of industries under these conditions has been, for the nation, more of a "snare and a delusion" than an advantage. A total of 60 national companies currently owe to the national treasury--in the form of customs duties, taxes and various advances--a total of 11 billion CFA francs, or one-sixth of the national budget. The psychological balance sheet for the operation is equally unfortunate: despite their basically low profitability, these enterprises have in effect attracted the lower-level local cadres who were made available by the disappearance of the federal activities and whose appetites exceeded their technical skills. This has resulted in a sharp decline in production (that of SIA-CONGO [Congolese Agro-Industrial Company] dropped from 50,000 tons to 13,000 tons) and in a host of dismissals, suspensions and arrests that decimated the managerial ranks of the public enterprises and agencies, including the BNDC [National Development Bank of the Congo]; National Social Welfare Fund; Trans-Congolese Communications Agency; the Former Mory Industries; SOCOMAB [expansion unknown]; and National Hydrocarbons Company. The petty bourgeoisie were accordingly led astray into a hopeless struggle; but most important of all, their attention was diverted from the real problems by encouraging them to believe that socialism would allow them to continue to carry out (albeit in another form) the functions of a "staff"--a role that their training at Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire had basically prepared them to play.

This interpretation continues (more or less extensively) to wreak havoc, and is likewise reflected in the disproportionate burden of social welfare, in the hypertrophy of the civil service, and in the increased rate of urbanization. It also explains, to a certain extent, the eagerness of government officials to commit in advance the revenue derived from petroleum production.

#### Petroleum Production

The People's Republic of the Congo was on the verge of achieving the status of a country that possesses substantial mineral resources--a position that would have enabled it to justify, a posteriori, its choice of the socialist way. With a view to preventing the declines in agricultural production which in Africa--be it in Nigeria or in Guinea--have generally accompanied the development of mineral exploitation, and foreseeing that petroleum revenue will not continue forever, the 1975-1977 development plan quite wisely oriented the Congo toward truck farming, the growing of industrial crops, and the development of a food processing industry, in such a structure petroleum was merely a means to an end, and the already existing industry was a "determining factor." The projected 75 billion CFA francs in investments, however, was based on an anticipated petroleum production of 14 million tons for the 3-year period--a figure which in practice was reduced to a mere 5.4 million tons.

The Emeraude Marine deposit, exploited by ELF-CONGO [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of the Congo], which in 1974 had produced 2.5 million tons of crude,

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produced only 1.4 million tons in 1978 and is scheduled to be abandoned around 1981. Exploitation of the Likoola deposit will begin in 1980, but its production will come to no more than 600,000 tons per year. The Loango Marine deposit--an AGIP [Italian Petroleum Enterprise] concession--produced approximately 980,000 tons in 1978. The two companies, to be sure, are continuing their explorations, and a successful result is possible, especially in the Pointe Noire-Grand Fond region. On the basis of current data, however, the production goal of 5 million tons per year (which was considered reasonable in 1974) should be ruled out, and it is even doubtful whether the total tonnage of 1978 can be maintained beyond 1980.

Were the government's expectations based on overly optimistic estimates by the exploiting companies? The fact is that the error did not relate to the cubic content of the reserves but rather to the difficulties of exploiting them, with production having to be limited--for technical reasons, and especially because of the density of the crude--to approximately 15 percent of the reserves.

It would have been surprising if these circumstances had not given rise to distrust and protests on the part of Congolese politicians. At that time Jean-Pierre Thystere Tchicaya had in fact spoken of "the vast plan of imperialist sabotage designed to stifle the production of petroleum." The authorities, however, soon recognized that these vicissitudes had nothing to do with imperialist maneuvers. The permits were at first denounced but then renegotiated with the aforementioned two companies. In 1976 the latter were joined by the Getty Oil Company, which was specifically charged with deep-sea exploration north of the ELF-CONGO and AGIP concessions.

Misfortune never comes singly, and so when the production of sylvinites by the Congo Potassium Company--whose capital stock is held jointly by SOGEPAR [expansion unknown], BRGM [Geological and Mining Exploration Office], ELF-CONGO, and the Congolese State--was unable to attain the profitability threshold of 800,000 tons it declined rapidly. Exports of potassium in 1971 represented 13.6 percent (1.489 billion CFA francs) of all export sales; 10.4 percent (3.998 billion CFA francs) in 1975; 9.2 percent (3.294 billion CFA francs) in 1976; and lastly, 9.4 percent (3.066 billion CFA francs) in 1977. There have been no exports of potassium since 1978.

Overall, from 1974 through 1978 mineral products represented, on the average, 85 percent of all exports from the Congo, of which 45 percent represented crude oil alone. One can appreciate the serious consequences of this decline in mineral production. The 33 percent limitation on investments stipulated in the 3-year plan is less important in this respect than the exceptional increase in public expenditures based on anticipated revenue from petroleum. The national budget accordingly rose from 20 billion CFA francs in 1973 to 40 billion in 1975 and 60 billion in 1979, while at the same time no substitute resource--nor any genuine effort to reduce expenditures--was discernible. Expenditures for the civil service increased by 20 percent in 1979, and since 1975 the minimum wage has been increased by 75 percent. Thanks to hydrocarbons, exports attained their

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culminating point in 1976: 42.5 billion CFA francs. Exports began to decline in 1977 (to 36 billion CFA francs) whereas imports--which had increased constantly from 1975 to 1977--produced the first deficit in the balance of trade that had been recorded since 1973.

Reflecting these figures, service of the foreign debt in 1977 reached 7.4 billion CFA francs, or 20 percent of the total of foreign resources.

With the "red line" having been attained, the Republic of the Congo was faced with the problem of restructuring its economy. Did this need motivate the recent trip to Paris by Minister of Finance Lopes for the purpose of delivering a message from President Sassou-Nguesso to Valery Giscard d'Estaing? Moreover, can anyone say positively that the departure of Yhombi-Opango--who had already been forced to resort to the unofficial friendship of a neighboring government in order to meet pressing due dates--was unrelated to this need?

#### The Contribution Made by Foreign Cooperation

It might be expected that the ideology professed by the Republic of the Congo would entitle it, in these difficult circumstances, to the support of the socialist countries. There, however--as in other African countries--deliveries of arms on credit extended by Moscow are not accompanied by any economic participation that even remotely resembles our cooperation. The volume of trade with the USSR is small, being less than that of the Congo with France, the other EEC countries, the United States, Spain or Japan. An agreement signed last 26 December with the Soviet Government provided for the opening of a Russian trade office in Brazzaville, and this will perhaps ameliorate the situation. What we know of Soviet methods in tropical Africa, however, leads us to doubt whether the USSR desires anything more than reequilibration of the balance of trade, which currently shows a surplus in favor of the Congo. As for the Cuban interventions (which legend has, incidentally, greatly exaggerated), they are devoid of economic significance. Little is known concerning Cuban personnel who are providing technical assistance in the military and medical fields, but they probably total no more than 20.

Under these conditions, and despite its ideological preferences, the Congo was in fact obliged (in order to develop its 1978-1979 plan of action following on the heels of the 1975-1977 plan, which was not completely fulfilled) to solicit the support of Western enterprises and the major international development organizations. More than ever, this plan gives priority to the rural sector (food production, industrial crops and forest products) associated with agriculture. Other than the projects relating to coffee, cacao and oil palms, and a fruit-growing operation currently under study by the IRFA (Institute for Research on Citrus and Other Fruits), the plan centers on a revival of the production of sugar and edible oil in the Niari and Sangha River Valleys.

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The plan was obliged to limit itself to evoking the prospects for exploitation of the deposits of iron ore (estimated at 300 million tons of ore with a 50 percent iron content), phosphate, and marble. The chapter on infrastructure, on the other hand, is important. The principal item is the Congo-Ocean railway realignment project, for which multipartite financing in the amount of 41 billion CFA francs has been arranged. It was arranged, to be sure, at a time when prospects for the Congo appeared to be more favorable. One cannot help noticing a certain discrepancy between the financial scope of the operation and the now reduced prospects of the nation--a discrepancy all the more obvious in that various factors such as the nature of the terrain traversed, the increasing frequency of price revisions, the devaluation of the dollar and the reevaluation of the deutsche mark threaten to increase the final cost by approximately 20 percent, and the coparticipants will have to take cognizance of this fact at the meeting that will be held next May in Brussels. As things stand, however, the project should enable the Congo--by maintaining an adequate level of markets and jobs--to achieve an economic tempo more in keeping with its resources. The project also has the advantage of updating, and maintaining, a technical achievement which in its day was especially noteworthy.

Moreover, the situation of the Congo--be it in the area of public works or agriculture--is (if you disregard the administrative shortcomings) far from being desperate. There is a highway system of 10,000 kilometers, of which 1,000 kilometers are surfaced. There is a rail system of 800 kilometers (including the COMILOG [Ogooue Mining Company] line, which hauls the manganese from Moanda, Gabon) whose overall traffic totals 2 million tons per year. There are 4,500 kilometers of navigable waterways. Traffic at the river port of Brazzaville totals 550,000 tons per year, while traffic at Pointe Noire, with its 1,200 meters of wharves, totals 3 million tons. Air traffic at Brazzaville and Pointe Noire combined exceeds 60,000 passengers per year. Lastly, although the consumption of electric power (130 million kwh) is limited by the extent of the installations, the projects providing for expansion of the Djoue facility and for better utilization of the Bouenza Dam--which represent investments totaling approximately 13 billion CFA francs--could easily increase this figure sevenfold. A small-scale production of natural gas is also added to the energy potential of the Congo.

In the area of agricultural and agroindustrial activities, the decline in sugar production in the Niari River valley is certainly to be deplored. A revival of coffee production has been noted, however: it had dropped to 1,200 tons in 1973 but has now regained its 1968 level of 2,000 tons, representing total receipts of 1.9 billion CFA francs. In the case of cacao, the very substantial revival of production that began in 1977 could not, unfortunately, be maintained in 1978. The forest products crisis impacted the Congo just as it has the other producing countries, and caused exports in 1976 to decline to a total of 1,294,300 tons. Here, too, a substantial recovery was recorded in 1977 with export receipts doubling, leading to the hope that the 1974 levels would be regained not only for timber but for sawn lumber and veneers as well.

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A Look at the Future

The Congo has today rejoined the group of countries of tropical Africa that suffer from chronic underdevelopment and from which it was at one time thought to be detaching itself. We have already pointed out the artificial character of a GNP which at recently as 1977 was still 187 billion CFA francs, when in actual fact this figure included 36 billion for mining and 31 billion for manufacturing and electric power generation (not to mention 19 billion for governmental activities), all of which are components whose precarious nature--and whose decline--are obvious to all. It is a disappointment for the Congo to be constantly faced with these difficulties connected with revitalization of the economy--difficulties which it on two different occasions thought had been resolved.

One might well have expected that a method of development based on the existence of an initial capital which experience has shown to be either insufficient or unrealistic would officially undergo some revision on the part of those who had developed it. For a long time nothing happened, save for various decisions of a negative character that were intended, for example, to reserve to Congolese nationals a sector of retail trade that had been invaded by foreign nationals from Benin, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, of whom 5,000 were expelled without compensation in 1977 and not without strong reaction on the part of the affected states, notably Senegal. It should be recalled, however, that shortly before his replacement by Colonel Sassou-Nguesso, General Yhomby-Opango told a journalist: "The history--and the reality--of the contemporary world make coexistence with the private sector unavoidable. We are aware of this fact and are benefiting from it." This statement should be compared with other comments made by the former head of government concerning the shortcomings of tripartite management (enterprise, trade union and party)--shortcomings which he said "lead to irresponsibility" within the state enterprises.

Not to be able to advance--along the road to development--without financial support from foreign capitalist enterprises or international lending organizations is assuredly an uncomfortable position for a government that purports to be socialist. It is also understandable that potential investors are uneasy about the fate of their investment capital--and about conditions for operating--in the Congo. The results of the mission sent in 1978 to Brazzaville by the Group of Seven (headed by Afrika Verein) are quite eloquent in this regard. The mission--in which great hopes had been placed--reached positive conclusions with respect to the possibilities for certain types of participation: expanded plantings, technical assistance to the National Palm Growing Administration and SIACONGO and SOTEXCO [Textile Company of the Congo], the industrial processing of certain products, the establishment of units for the treatment of alkaloids, investment in the forest products industry, and even the exploitation of mineral waters. The mission, however, made this participation conditional on the adoption--within the structure of management--of certain criteria of profitability and competition and on the rationalization of marketing. Did



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these conditions appear to be redhibitory? The fact is that there was apparently no follow-up to these recommendations and consequently none to the projects themselves.

Fortunately for the Republic of the Congo, however, bilateral, multilateral and international public assistance is less demanding. The FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] in particular has invested in the Congo for the years 1975 through 1978 (in the form of nonreimbursable grants and not including technical assistance) a total of 5.5 billion CFA francs, or approximately 1.39 billion CFA francs per year. Of this total sum 25 million was devoted to general surveys, 635 million to rural development, 1.25 billion to a mining survey, 3.27 billion to infrastructure, 180 million to health and 205 million to education. EDF [European Development Fund] aid--centered primarily on the alignment of the CFCO [Congolese Railroad]--is in a substantially equivalent amount. If one then adds to the above participations those of the UNDP [United Nations Development Program] and various agencies of the United Nations; the loans from the ADB [African Development Bank]; the loans from the Central Bank; and lastly, the loan of 4 million dollars recently negotiated by the Congolese Hydrocarbons Company from OPEC, it is clear that in this respect the government enjoys broad possibilities.

These types of assistance are invaluable for the infrastructure and for rural development, but are poorly adapted to the creation of an economic fabric of enterprises, of which they cannot be more than the substratum. This is the main problem, and it is posed to the Congo on two different levels.

It is understandable, moreover, that certain kinds of verbal radicalism are not calculated to attract investors. This is not the most serious aspect of the problem, however, for many of these investors now regard African socialism (which is uniform in tempo if not in melody) as a basic fact to which one must adjust or otherwise withdraw one's participation.

The other problem resides in the influence exerted by a public whose state of mind, after years of indoctrination, is much less pliable than that of the cadres of party members who have been conditioned by the subtleties of Marxist self-criticism. The major people's organizations of the regime--the Revolutionary Union of Congolese Youth, Union of Congolese Socialist Youth, and Congolese Trade-Union Confederation--have spread the official mystique to such an extent among the general population that it appears impossible to modify their orientation in the absence of a certain ritual. Did General Yhomby-Opango transgress this "rule of the game" by expressing--though with considerable prudence--a somewhat revisionist position? The declaration by his successor to the effect that the extraordinary congress of the Congolese Labor Party should "immortalize forever Comrade Marien Ngouabi by achieving ideological clarification and unity within the party and by accelerating the process of economic and sociocultural liberation" undoubtedly had no other purpose than that. The internal logic of the system, however, requires that the orthodoxy of the vocabulary be in conformity with the scope of the change in policy to be adopted.

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GABON

PUBLIC OPINION POLL HIGHLIGHTS MAIN CONCERNS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 p 883

[Text] Last 12-16 February, a public opinion poll was taken at Libreville, based on a supposedly representative sampling of 513 individuals of both sexes of the adult population.

The results of this poll, which particularly highlight day-to-day concerns in worker sections of the Gabonese capital, were published in the 19-22 March editions of the daily L'UNION.

A first poll was taken in December 1977 at Libreville. Judging from the results of this 1979 poll, the essential problems of the people have hardly been solved in the intervening period of over a year.

The "biggest personal problems" in fact are still: the cost of living (37 percent of those sampled versus 41 percent in 1977), housing (21 percent, the same percentage as in 1977), unemployment (7 versus 2 percent in 1977) and health (6 percent, as in 1977).

More than ever, "neighborhood problems" are centered about the "shortage of water and public fountains" (28 versus 22 percent in December 1977) and electricity and lighting (15 versus 14 percent in 1977). The state of repair of the roads is, however, a concern that seems to be less shared (17 versus 26 percent in 1977).

Thus the general evolution of "Libreville problems" is as follows: the condition of the roads was the primary concern in 1977 (18 percent). It is today merely a secondary one (13 percent) as opposed to the cost of living (18 versus 13 percent in 1977) and health problems (16 versus 8 percent in 1977).

On the other hand, the people of Libreville who were polled feel that Gabon's two most important problems are still improvement of the road network (20 percent, as in 1977) and the cost of living (18 versus 19 percent in 1977).

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Recent national events that have affected them most are the Gabonese Democratic Party (FDG) Special Congress, cited at the top of the list by 35 percent of those polled and 47 percent of the officials questioned, and the inauguration of the Trans-Gabonese Railroad (34 percent of those polled and 26 percent of the officials).

While a large percentage of the sample feels that the explanations provided by the congress have "always been clear," 34 percent do not share this opinion, especially women and people with little means.

The February 1979 poll was conducted in such a way that the individuals questioned had to express their opinions on the importance of certain resolutions adopted during the PDG congress.

Thus they view as important those having to do with: "granting agriculture the necessary means of assuring the nation a food supply" (99 percent), with 45 percent of them of the opinion that the measures advocated will be effective (25 percent think not); reforming technical education (93 percent); "providing effective aid for the creation of small and medium-sized Gabonese enterprises" (93 percent); and combatting banditry (94 percent) and corruption (91 percent). Only 33 percent of those polled are convinced that the measures adopted against corruption are effective, whereas the same percentage is persuaded of their uselessness. "Declaring war on unbridled capitalism" seems to be an important resolution for 35 percent of those questioned, but only 59 percent feel that "pursuing an unfaltering policy of austerity in order to clean up and consolidate the Gabonese economy" is an "important issue."

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GHANA

BRIEFS

BONTANGA DAM COMPLETION THREATENED--According to the official responsible for the upper region of the Irrigation Development Authority, the construction work on the Bontanga dam, near Tamale, whose cost is estimated at 18 million cedis, is threatened with interruption for lack of raw materials--dynamite and cement in particular--but also for lack of machinery and qualified personnel. The work, which was begun nearly 4 years ago and on which military personnel and experts assigned to the Tono dam construction work have helped, has not even been able to have the benefit of the credits allocated for it in the 1977-1978 budget, not being able to use them for purchase of the necessary materials. The dam is to have a holding capacity of 20 million cubic meters of water, intended for supplying the city of Tamale and for irrigating 1,000 hectares of land. Completion of it is thus of the first importance, and Mr Osei has asked the government to take urgent measures on its behalf. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Feb 79 p. 514]. 11267

SUGAR FACTORY CLOSING ENVISAGED--The general manager of the sugar factory of Komenda, G.L. Okine, receiving the commissioner for the Central region, Dr K.G. Erbynn, has emphasized to him the difficulties with which his enterprise is faced, especially in procuring spare parts, and he did not hide the fact that the factory could be forced to halt operations completely before the end of the year if no measures are taken in higher circles on its behalf. According to Mr Okine, the sugar factory, several of whose machines are in poor operating condition, needs about 7 million cedis worth of import licenses for equipment. Dr Erbynn noted Mr Okine's request carefully--and all the more so, he said, inasmuch as this sugar factory, together with that of Asutsuare, is capable of supplying all of the country's needs and even of exporting. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Feb 79 p. 514] 11267

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

BUDGET INCREASED FOR 1979--Guinea's budget for 1979 has been decreed, in income and expenditures, at 11.26 billion sylis (or about 2.475 billion French francs, or 123.75 billion CFA francs). This budget is up 11.09 percent over the preceding one. The operating budget provided for is 6,792 million sylis (as against 5,715 million in 1978), and the equipment budget totals 4,460 million sylis (as against 4,430 million). The newspaper HOROYA notes that the income expected from mining products and their derivatives comes to 1,500 million sylis. This sum will be paid into a reserve fund of the general budget created especially for this purpose in 1978. The total in this fund at present is said to be 2,741.7 million sylis. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 p 874] 11267

ADHERENCE IN PRINCIPLE TO OMVG--Guinea has given its agreement in principle to joining the Organization for Development of the Gambia River (OMVG), which groups Senegal and Gambia. This indication was given on 30 March by Radio Conakry, which read a communique published at the conclusion of the 24-hour visit which Sir Dawda Jawara, president of the Republic of the Gambia, made to Guinea. This communique specifies that Sekou Toure, president of the Republic of Guinea, after receiving a letter from the Gambian chief of state, who is the current president of the OMVG, inviting him to join this organization, "gave his agreement and specified that the membership procedures would be completed after study of the dossiers relating to the organization." Guinea's joining the OMVG is necessary in order for the organization to be able to carry out its program for construction of two dams--one at Kekreti, for regularizing the watercourse and irrigation, and the other at Sambangoulou, for electric power. Construction of this latter dam must entail the creation of an artificial lake in Guinea and thus necessitates Conakry's agreement. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 p 874] 11267

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FRENCH EQUIPMENT FINANCING--Credit Chimique has just signed with the Friguia company a purchase credit agreement for financing the equipment required for processing the aluminum produced by the Kimbo plant in Guinea, as reactive aluminum, using the process developed by Aluminium Pechiney (cf MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 23 March, p 744). Credit Chimique is acting as leader of a group of four French banks. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 p 874] 11267

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

FISHING COOPERATION WITH FRANCE--Luis Cabral, chief of state of Guinea-Bissau, who has just made a 2-day trip to France, spent the day of 28 March in the port city of La Rochelle, on a private visit. President Cabral, who was accompanied by his minister of planning, as well as by the French minister of cooperation, Robert Galley, was received by deputy mayor Michel Crepeau, by the prefect of Charente-Maritime and by the administrator of maritime affairs. The purpose of this side-trip was to visit the installations of the Dubois Express Maree group, a La Rochelle specialist in fishing and processing of sea products, which 3 years ago created, with the government of Guinea-Bissau, a mixed company for outfitting and fishing which will run almost all the fishing activity in this country. This company began its operations on 2 April. It comprises a fleet of five boats for semi-industrial fishing as well as a plant which will process, freeze, and store the fishing products, essentially shrimp and sole. In a second phase of equipment acquisition, 8 new boats of about 100 tons each are to be ordered for 1981. This is the first time that a socialist state of Africa is making such an agreement with a private company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 29 p 873] 11267

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MALI

POLITICAL CLIMATE RETURNS, CONCERNS EXPRESSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 954, 18 Apr 79 pp 34, 35

[Article by special envoy Sennen Andriamirado: "First Incident of Trip"]

[Excerpts] Arrest of former regime big wigs following party congress distorts political debate.

Mali is rediscovering political life with its maneuvering and, of course, its politicians. Beneath a white-hot sky, gathered about neighborhood stoves on which dibi (grilled meat) is smoking and that national drug, tea, is brewing, people comment on the founding of the UDFM, the Malian People's Democratic Union (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 953). And then, the first incident of our trip: the arrest on the night of Monday-Tuesday, 2-3 April, of certain important persons of the former regime. The reason: the distribution of a pamphlet considered to be subversive. Actually, distribution of this notorious pamphlet has only just begun and even in Bamako the underground opposition has not been apprised of it. Everyone is talking about it but no one has read it. We must admit that the police were particularly fast. The first (and only) copies were distributed on Monday, 2 April, to a limited readership. That very evening, presumed suspects were picked up at their homes: Mamadou Gologo, who was deceased President Modibo Keita's (overthrown in 1968) minister of information, ex-Minister of National Education Abdoulaye Singare, former leader of the Malian Students Union Victor Sy, known here for his violent stands against the military regime, and others.

Victor Sy was released on Tuesday, 3 April. Mamadou Gologo and Abdoulaye Singare remained under a warrant of commitment.

This first incident that has arisen in Mali's new political life has not been very well received. A high official, a former member of the US-RDA (African Democratic Rally Section of the Sudanese Union), says: "Singare and Gologo no longer agreed on matters. The former was lumped together with the partisans of an Ivorian-style liberal economic policy and the latter was known for his radical and progressive statements. I do not at all believe that they could have agreed on a given text for even a second."

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The condemned pamphlet is supposedly not only hostile to the military regime and the party constituted on 31 March. According to certain sources, it is supposed to contain virulent attacks against UDPM political secretary Sory Coulibaly, accused of having turned his back on the Modibo Keita Regime whose ambassador to the United Nations he was.

Be that as it may, while the suspects have the premature benefit of the doubt as regards Bamako public opinion, their gesture (if it was a gesture) is deemed to be untimely.

At least for the time being, the political debate has in fact been distorted by this incident. With a unanimous vote by the delegates, the congress has demanded abrogation of Article 76 of the Constitution, which prohibits former US-RDA officials who held responsible positions between 1966 and 1968 from engaging in any political activity. Comforted by this initiative, several factions of the new party feel the time has come to endow the UDPM with some political substance, since the congress scarcely offers it any specific political orientation. Among the resolutions adopted, particular emphasis was laid on the fact that the UDPM is "a democratic, anticolonialist, anti-imperialist, antiapartheid, anti-Zionist party..." In short, anti many things but pro few. A high party official admitted to us that the UDPM was pro-Malian and nothing but that.

Now, like its statutes, the UDPM program makes use of words borrowed from the usual lexicon of socialist-inclined parties: democratic socialism and social justice, among others. President Moussa Traore assures us that it is not out of fear that the UDPM has not used the word socialist itself. Political secretary Sory Coulibaly (a civilian) and Col Filifing Sissoko have each independently informed us: "The experiences we have gone through have traumatized Malians. They no longer wish to have anything to do with the US-RDA infernal machine: daily meetings that last the whole day long, collective projects, harassment by the People's Militia."

President Traore even told me that in 1973, during his official visit to China, Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai had advised him to establish a national democracy before thinking of setting up a people's democracy. And Moussa Traore went on to say: "The Soviets said the same thing to Modibo Keita when he was in power."

This strategic caution in political matters has not been sufficiently understood by all Malian military leaders. The crudest antisocialist images have been revived by the governors of certain regions: atheism, depraved morality and collectivization of property, meals, even women. All these are concerns that have nothing to do with either President Moussa Traore or socialism.

UDPM leaders are, of course, aware of these distortions. "We must constantly educate party officials," we were told. Even the young members of the UNJM [expansion unknown] assure us that "we must not challenge the party. With

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the UDPM we have achieved lawfulness; it is up to us to find legitimacy." Sory Coulibaly himself maintains: "Better a poor institution than none at all." In plain language, up to now Mali had no law, but now it has.

It is up to us to respect it. The primary condition for this is that the military and civilians should be capable of sharing power. But that is another matter. The former have to get used to no longer being the only ones in the limelight and in possession of absolute power, while the latter have to get used to not being second fiddle leaders. For, as Col Youssouf Traore, UDPM secretary for information and culture, says: "A national life without a party and a national life with a party are two situations that cannot be compared."

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MALI

REVIEW OF UDPM CONGRESS PROCEDURES, RESOLUTIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 p 873

Text Mali is returning to political life after 10 years of a military regime. It has at its command a political party which should lead it to a normal constitutional life with a national assembly and establishment of a new government.

The new party, the Democratic Union of the Malian People UDPM, was started at the end of the constitutive congress held at Bamako from 28 to 31 March. It also elected Gen. Moussa Traore secretary general. Since the 1968 coup d'Etat, of which he was the principal author and which put an end to the regime of former President Modibo Keita, General Traore has exercised the functions of president of the Military National Liberation Committee MNLC, chief of staff and president of the government.

The election of President Traore took place in the National Council of the UDPM, an organ of 137 members (104 civilian, 27 military and 6 representatives of women's, workers' and youth organizations) which proceeded to elect a Central Executive Bureau of 18 members (who will ultimately be joined by the president of the future National Assembly). The Central Executive Bureau comprises 12 civilian and 6 military members, counting President Traore.

Four of these military men are former members of the MNLC who carried out the coup d'Etat in 1968. In addition to General Traore, they are Col. Amadou Baba Diarra, vice president of the MNLC and minister of finance and commerce, who will become the deputy secretary general of the UDPM; Col. Filifing Cissoko, the permanent secretary of the MNLC and president of the Preparatory Commission of the congress, who will become the treasurer general of the UDPM, and Col. Youssouf Traore, the arbiter of MNLC disputes and minister of education, who will become the UDPM secretary of information and culture.

Two members of the MNLC did not figure in the list of the new bureau. They are Cols. Mamadou Sanogo and Missa Kone, the ministers of justice and health, who are, however, members of the National Council.

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The two military who are not members of the MNLC but who have become members of the Executive Bureau are Lt. Col. of the Army Service Corps Sekou Doumbia, the administrative officer of the army and Cavalry Major Mohammed Keita, chief of staff of the military police.

The best known of the civilians in the bureau is Sory Couibaly, the former minister from 1968 to 1978, who previously was the only civilian to attend MNLC meetings as an MNLC deputy minister.

A Solemn Oath

In the course of his speech at the close of the constitutive congress, President Traore took a solemn oath to "serve his people" while making the six following points respected:

1. To leave no stone unturned in making the party effectively the party of "all the people".
2. To eliminate all prejudice between the military and "militants in uniform" so that they merge together to serve the objectives set by the congress.
3. To establish total collaboration between the authorities of the party and those of the administration.
4. To combat absenteeism, sloth and negligence, as well as incompetence.
5. To see to it that democracy does not become merely a pious wish.
6. To do everything possible for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Palestine.

For "Positive Non-Alignment"

In addition, the constitutive congress of the UDPM adopted a general policy motion in favor of "positive non-alignment". The UDPM is supporting OUA Organization of African Unity for "peaceful settlement of differences" between the African states. It favors developing and deepening relations between Mali and other African states, more particularly neighbors, especially in the regional and subregional organizations.

The UDPM economic plan favors a "new, independent and planned economy" which would include: a public sector to be cleaned up and developed, a mixed sector to be encouraged and a private sector to be guided.

The resolution, the AFP notes finally, establishes "democratic centralism" and makes the party "the supreme authority for guidance and control," adding that this primacy by no means signifies that the party authorities should take the place of other institutions of the state as to the prerogatives which have devolved on it under the constitution, the laws and the regulations of the public administration."

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President Giscard d'Estaing sent a letter of congratulations to Gen. Moussa Traore on the occasion of his appointment as secretary general of the Democratic Union of the Malian People.

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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, DAIO'S RISING INFLUENCE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Apr 79 p 1074

[Text] A Sao Tome national radio broadcast announced on 9 April that the post of prime minister was abolished and that Dr Federico Jose Sequeira, minister of health, was ousted from the government.

Former Prime Minister Miguel Trovoada has now become minister of industry, commerce and fisheries, a position entailing considerably reduced responsibilities, given Sao Tome and Principe's present economic development.

Trovoada was the founder in 1961 of the CLSTP liberationist movement (Committee for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe), which was recognized by the OAU in 1962 and subsequently became the MLSTP [Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe], the ruling party in Sao Tome whose secretary general is President Pinto da Costa.

The ministerial reshuffle follows the verdict issued against the accused in the "Cobra 77" plot in which certain historical MLSTP leaders were involved. Another reshuffle had taken place last September. Celestino Costa, formerly minister of justice and education, had lost at the time his second post. Leonel Dalva, formerly minister of foreign affairs (and the old prime minister in the transitional government before independence) had become minister of education. A parallel can now be drawn between the abolition of the post of prime minister in Sao Tome and the fate of Lopo do Nascimento in Angola last December.

Angola wields considerable influence in Sao Tome. President Pinto da Costa made an official visit to Angola in February. A military group of approximately 1,000 men from Angola and Guinea-Bissau led by Cubans has been stationed in Sao Tome since 1978 in the wake of alleged invasion attempts by a foreign power.

In another development, the increasingly important role played by Commandant Daniel Daio, minister of interior, in the political life of the two islands has been evident for some time. The former Portuguese military man, little known abroad, has successfully eliminated a number of

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rivals, among them Commandant Albertino Neto, who has just been sentenced to 21 years imprisonment because of the part he allegedly played in the "Cobra 77" plot.

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TOGO

BRIEFS

BUDGET FOR 1979 PUBLISHED--The ordinance of 29 December 1978, enacting the finance act for 1979, has established the Togolese budget for fiscal 1979, in income and expenditures, at 62.6 billion CFA--an amount close to the 1978 budget, which was 60.6 billion, the increase thus being 3.3 percent. The 1979 investment and equipment budget (15.8 billion CFA) includes 12.4 billion for prior commitments: the Togolese share in projects financed by foreign aid, interest and annuities, amortization of loans, etc. The investment credits total 3.4 billion CFA (current program and subsidy for supplying of fertilizers). The subsidiary budget for the railways in Togo has been decreed at 921 million CFA in income and expenditures. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 pp 876-877] 11267

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ZAIRE

ZAIRE TERMINATES ROCKET LAUNCH SITE CONTRACT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Apr 79 pp 28-29

[Article by Francois Soudan: "OTRAG Is Leaving"]

[Text] The vast Manono Plateau lies in the northeastern corner of Zaire's Shaba Province. Some 40,000 persons live in this region between the Lualaba River and the village of Kamelie on the shore of Lake Tanganyika. For them, the cessation of OTRAG's activities and the departure of a handful of white technicians will probably have little effect on the fixed tenor of their ways. OTRAG is leaving. So what?

Orbital Transport und Raketen AG, OTRAG, is a rather small German firm whose president, Lutz Kayser, a specialist in aeronautical engineering, is not lacking in ambition. His goal is to make money by using his ingenuity and resourcefulness. His special "niche" is space. He is engaged in building, launching, and placing in orbit small observation satellites whose launch vehicles will burn liquid propellants, the fuel used by the famous V-1 and V-2 rockets built by the Germans late in World War II. He is developing a sort of "poor man's" satellite one that Third World countries, organized into consortiums, will be able to obtain for peaceful applications. This satellite market also interests both NASA and the European Space Agency.

Like Kurt Debus, the chairman of OTRAG's board of directors, and OTRAG's projects manager Richard Gompertz, Lutz Kayser is a veteran of Peenemunde, the German V-1 and V-2 rocket research and development center. All three men were subsequently "rehabilitated" by NASA. All three formerly worked at the Kennedy Space Center. When NASA began to feel the pinch of tight budgets in the early 1960's, these men no doubt felt they had better things to do than "coast along" at NASA. So they decided to form their own business. Four banks, attracted by the prospects and also swayed by Kayser's persuasive glibness, lent them the money. But they still had to find a range for their launcher tests. They set their sights on Zaire, on its vast nearly uninhabited expanses, and thought of the severe economic problems plaguing that country. On 26 March 1976, they concluded an agreement with the Zairian authorities. They were granted a 24-year lease, extending to the year 2000, on 160,000 square kilometers of bushland bordered on the south by the Zambian

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frontier, the east by Lake Tanganyika, the north by the boundaries of Kivu Province, and the west by the Lualaba River. In exchange for this immense firing range OTRAG agreed to pay the Zairian Government 37.5 million dollars per year plus a percentage of the revenue earned by the company on each launch vehicle sold and a 20 percent discount on the first "Zairian" satellite.

Things went smoothly for OTRAG in 1976. It established a subsidiary, OTRAG S. A. [Limited], at Vaduz in the Principality of Liechtenstein, a tax paradise for a firm that is seemingly not entirely above suspicion in such matters. All funds destined for Zaire were funneled through OTRAG S.A. which also handled and routed all equipment and technicians sent to the Kapani-Toko Plateau. The parent company also installed a short-lived branch office, OTRAG-France, on Avenue Foch in Paris. Its manager was a rather strange individual hiding under the alias of Georges de Bierre. He is alleged to have been connected with the OAS [Secret Army Organization] during the Algerian War. The first rocket, christened Billigrakete, was launched on 17 May 1977 in the presence of H. D. Genscher [FRG's foreign minister]. It was a partial success: the vehicle reached an altitude of 10 kilometers before it started tumbling. Same story for the second test. In early June, with President Mobutu and a German television crew present, it was sheer disaster: a few seconds after launch, the rocket crashed along the shores of the Luvua River. OTRAG executives then decided to postpone regular production some 2 years, in other words, not before 1981.


Both the CIA and the German BND were aware of OTRAG's dealings as early as late 1975. But a third "partner" also had wind of the OTRAG-Zaire contract, namely the Soviet KGB. The Soviet leadership is known to be very sensitive to anything closely or remotely relevant to the possible rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany, sensitive to such a point that in early 1977 the Kremlin decided to place two "spy" satellites--Cosmos 922 and Cosmos 932--in orbit over southern Africa. These satellites made four passes over the Manono Plateau--4, 23, 24 and 25 July 1977--and carefully photographed OTRAG installations. During their flights, they also photographed South Africa's nuclear test site in the Kalahari Dryland. Did the Soviets really believe OTRAG was a front for the nuclearization of the FRG? Or did they want to deliberately magnify an issue the ins and outs of which were fully known to them? Whatever the reason, in late July they "leaked" the details of the contract.

The East Germans are obviously the most offensive in their criticism. The GDR charges that OTRAG enables the FRG to circumvent the post-World War II Potsdam Agreement and the Treaties of Paris and Brussels that prohibit the FRG from producing long-range rockets. During preparations in March 1978 for the second Shaba war, Angolan authorities were patently alarmed by the OTRAG rockets they believed were targeted on Luanda. Hence they insisted that one of the priority objectives of the "Katangese gendarmes" had to be the OTRAG installations. This plan failed, however, and OTRAG resumed its inconclusive test launches.

In Bonn, as well as in Kinshasa authorities seemed to have decided to terminate OTRAG's activities because these were becoming more and more of a nuisance. Zaire, who thought it had made a good business deal, found itself the center of a controversy it could have definitely done without. Moreover, one of the indispensable conditions of reconciliation with Angola was the dismantling of OTRAG. As for the Federal Republic of Germany, it wanted to settle this ticklish problem once and for all because it was jeopardizing its relations with the East.

The Zairian tests were suspended in August 1978. Then in December, the decision was made: Zaire was unilaterally canceling the contract. To the immense satisfaction of the FRG and the GDR (with whom Kinshasa reestablished relations in January 1979).

As for OTRAG, it is now practically bankrupt. Its last hope was that Brazil would authorize it to establish its launch and test facilities in that country. It was learned in early April, however, that in the wake of Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Brasilia, General Figueiredo had decided not to favorably consider OTRAG's proposals.



The Manono Plateau in the northeastern part of Zaire's Shaba Province. An immense firing range.

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