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JPRS L/8485

30 May 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 31/79)



WEST

EUROPE



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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

STATUS OF VOTING RIGHTS OF NON-RESIDENT WORKERS

Belgium: Socialist Majority Predicted

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 23 Apr 79 p 7

[Article by Renato Ferraro: "Belgium--Voting Fever in 'Little Italy'"]

[Text] The date is drawing near: on 10 June, people are going to vote to elect the European Parliament. For the first time, our fellow citizens, who live abroad, will not have to return to Italy, to their countries of origin, to cast their ballot. They will have to--or they should--do so, but to present their preference in the "political" elections of 3 June. What do these dates mean for our fellow citizens who work beyond the Alps? What is the meaning of "Europe?" In these pages we are beginning a fact-finding trip to the little homelands of Italians abroad.

Brussels. For the first time the emigrants, second-class citizens, will be able to vote. "We do not expect miracles from the European elections," says Achille Stefanoni, a factory worker in Brussels, summarizing the thinking of the majority of his fellow citizens, "but it is important that we are at last allowed to vote in our place of residence, without having to make an expensive trip to Italy that is almost impossible for everybody. Who knows, some day perhaps we might be able to elect our own Italian parliament from abroad, as the French and the Spaniards, for example, are already doing." Among the 286,000 Italians living in Belgium, potential voters number about 210,000; it is expected that more than half of them will go to the polls on 10 June, to participate in the high-level European voting.

The judgments of the emigrants concerning Italian turnout are generally critical if not negative but on that occasion our fellow citizens praise the efficiency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the consulates (with one small exception for the one at Liege) in the organization of the European voting. "This is the first time we have been called upon to prepare elections abroad," said the Italian consul at Brussels, Umberto Lucchesi-Palli. "This has not been an easy job but the result is satisfactory."

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
How are these people going to vote in practice? "The emigrants will vote in the Belgian election sections but in a room reserved for the Italians. The chairmen at the polling places will be Italians, appointed by the chief justice of the Rome Court of Appeals, according to Italian legislation, upon indication from the consulates, and the tellers will be designated by the political parties. Propaganda will be handled according to local standards. To use the mass media, the parties will have to associate with Belgian brother parties; the socialists and the Christian Democrats inevitably will have an advantage.

The consul-general in Charleroi, Ernesto Rech, is also satisfied: "The Italians are very much interested in these elections because this is the first time they can vote and they at last feel equal to the Belgians." Ettore Anselmi, managing editor of the weekly IL SOLE D'ITALIA, expects as much as 70 percent voter turnout.

As far as the voter turnout in Italy on 3 June is concerned, Anselmi is pessimistic: "During the last legislative elections, in 1976, only 6 percent of the voters residing in Belgium came back and this very meager result was attained only thanks to the efforts of the major parties that organized free trips. This time, given the coincidence with the European elections, abstention will certainly be bigger." How will the emigrants vote? "In general we can say that 35-40 percent of our workers in Belgium are pro-socialist and will vote for the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] or the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party]; 25-30 percent are Christian Democrats; and 7-12 percent are communist."

[There are 286,000 Italians residing abroad. They will not have to return to their hometowns to cast their ballots. That is the first thing that is new; and this novelty is considered an "advance"; "Who knows, some day we might also be able to vote for both Houses in Rome from abroad."]

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The first Italian emigrants arrived in Belgium before World War II but the big waves did not come in until after the war and during the fifties, to work in the mines. Today the Italians number about 286,000 (in the little box above, with the symbols of men, we indicate the concentrations in terms of social status). Our community achieved good social advancement and there are more and more individuals among the Italian laborers who are skilled workers, technicians, white-collar employees, businessmen, and professional men, especially among the young people of the second generation born abroad. There are many Italian restaurants. Quite a few among those who go into retirement stay in Belgium to remain with their children.

Key: 1--Miners; 2--Laborers; 3--Restaurant operators; 4--White-collar employees; 5--Retirees; 6--Low countries; 7--Antwerp; 8--Brussels; 9--Germany; 10--France; 11--Luxembourg.

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Germany: Statistical Data

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 24 Apr 79 p 6

[Article by Sandro Scabello: "The Bitterness of the Italians in Germany"]

[Excerpts] Our fellow citizens, who live under very precarious human and social conditions, are facing the voting with conflicting attitudes. There are those who feel that "everything is useless because the politicians always do what they want." And there are those instead who are convinced that they can bring about a double change with their ballots: because of their status as emigrants and because of the relatives they left at home. There is much ill will toward the Germans and toward Rome.


They came from the Italian consulate at Frankfurt to explain to us what the election of the European parliament will mean. Many frequently heard the word "democracy" and thought that the speaker was making propaganda for the Christian Democrats and they therefore challenged him. They know little or nothing about the 10 June elections. In general they prefer not to talk about them and, if you pressure them, they reply angrily, downing Italy and the "politicians in Rome."

A young metal worker from Sardinia, married to a German woman and, in spite of his degree, forced to work in the assembly line, said: "Before we feel as Europeans we would like to feel as Italians. A united, democratic Europe and the European parliament are nice things but we are convinced that many things are being done in Rome only so that they can tell us: now you are Europeans, you are no longer Italians. And that way they eliminate even the last scruples. But we are and remain Italians and we want actively to participate in Italy's life even though we live abroad. How? They should at least give us the basic right to vote; they should enable us to vote here in the political elections. Perhaps the importance of the European elections is beyond us; perhaps we do not understand their significance; but we are only too familiar with problems in Italy. We experience them every day very personally. So long as we cannot vote, we will remain third-class citizens." Everybody nods in agreement and the discussion becomes very lively. They hurl invective, accusations, protests. This is an outburst of love-hate toward "the Italy that has betrayed them" but it is still our country.

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On the map, the arrows point to the cities in Germany where Italian emigrants are concentrated. In the box in the upper right-hand corner, we can see the six main employment sectors in which our Italian fellow citizens found jobs; 33 percent of the Italians in Germany are under the age of 35; the youngest are more unionized than their fathers and they are very busy learning German which is considered a tool in self-advancement.

Key: 1--Steel workers; 2--Constructin workers; 3--Restaurant operators; 4--Metal workers; 5--Electrotechnicians; 6--Chemical workers [chemists]; 7--Denmark; 8--Holland; 9--France; 10--Czechoslovakia, 11--Bremen; 12--Hamburg; 13--Lower Saxony; 14--Westphalia; 15--Cologne; 16--Rhineland; 17--Hesse; 18--Frankfurt; 19--Palatinate; 20--Stuttgart; 21--Freiburg; 22--Bavaria; 23--Munich.

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(1) EMIGRAZIONE STRANIERA IN GERMANIA			
	(2) OCCUPATI	TOTALE (occupati, non occupati, figli e casalinghe) (3)	(4) DISOCCUPATI
(5) Turchi	508.000	1.100.000	35.000
(6) Jugoslavi	380.000	830.000	18.000
(7) Italiani	280.000	580.000	21.000
(8) Greci	150.000	320.000	7.000
(9) Spagnoli	97.000	200.000	4.000

(10) PROVENIENZA		(13) CENSIMENTO PER ETA'	
(11) Sicilia	75.000	Al di sotto dei sei anni (14)	58.000
Calabria	40.000	Dai 6 ai 10 anni (15)	37.000
Puglia	37.000	Dai 10 ai 15 anni	38.000
Campania	33.000	Dai 15 ai 18 anni	24.000
(12) Sardegna	32.000	Dai 18 ai 21 anni	35.000
Veneto	14.000	Dai 21 ai 35 anni	190.000
Trentino	11.000	Dai 35 ai 45 anni	91.000
Basilicata	9.000	Dai 45 ai 55 anni	56.000
Friuli	7.000	Dai 55 ai 65 anni	27.000
Lazio e Abruzzi	6.500	(15)	

(16) OCCUPATI ITALIANI PER PRINCIPALI SETTORI DI IMPIEGO				
		1972	1976	1977
(17) Agricoltura e pesca		4.250	2.450	2.700
(18) Edilizia		89.900	35.200	34.000
(19) Commercio		21.800	15.750	15.500
(20) chimico		19.000	10.600	18.800
(21) elettrotecnico		25.500	19.200	19.300
(22) TRASFORMAZIONE	(23) automobilistico	23.850	22.450	23.800
(24) macchine		25.900	14.500	14.700
(25) tessile		21.300	11.800	11.600
(26) siderurgico		52.000	39.500	39.200
(27) Ferrovie		5.900	4.600	4.300
(28) Alberghi e altri servizi		26.750	32.900	34.700

[See key on following page]

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[Key to chart on preceding page]

Key: 1--Foreign emigrants in Germany; 2--Employed; 3--Total (employed, unemployed, children, and housewives); 4--Unemployed; 5--Turks; 6--Yugoslavs; 7--Italy; 8--Greece; 9--Spaniards; 10--Origin; 11--Sicily; 12--Sardinia; 13--Age breakdown; 14--Under the age of 6; 15--From ... to ... years; 16--Italians employed per main employment sectors; 17--Agriculture and fishing; 18--Building construction; 19--Commerce; 20--Chemical; 21--Electrotechnical; 22--Processing; 23--Automobiles; 24--Machinery; 25--Textiles; 26--Steel; 27--Railroads; 28--Hotels and other services.

France: 'Anger, Indifference'

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 25 Apr 79 p 6

[Article by Mino Vignolo: "The Indifferent Italians in France"]

[Excerpts] In the North and the South, in the cities and in the small towns, the vote does not trigger any hopes among our fellow citizens. "The French will remain French, the Italians will remain Italians, and we will remain just poor emigrants." The situation has improved but there is still job discrimination and not all school diplomas and degrees are recognized. "Ninety percent are not registered with the union." Few will return for the political elections.

Paris. It would be wrong to say that the twin vote next June is being anticipated with anxiety or hope by Italian emigrants who live in France. Feelings range from powerless anger to total indifference and they do not change from the mining country in the north to the sunny south and the Mediterranean, from the big cities to the little towns. The reactions which are produced among our fellow citizens by words such as "European parliament" or "early political elections" cannot and do not deserve being simply dismissed as very easy labels of Qualunquism." That would mean that they did not understand anything. Bitterness and pessimism can be justified; those are people who suffered the drama of poverty and abandonment on their own hides although they were lucky enough to find a host country that was "friendlier" than many others. On a trip through areas with the heaviest Italian emigration, we heard sometimes furious and sometimes ironic statements. We will only report a few of them here. It was not difficult to pick them out among so many; we were lucky because the words might have been changed but the basic ideas remained the same in the responses from the emigrants. The content of their remarks might seem repetitive and monotonous even hundreds and hundreds of kilometers away. This is a sign that the reasons for dissatisfaction are real and identical.

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What Is Europe?

Mario Falola, 53, is a fisherman in Marseilles. He came from Sperlonga, province of Latina, 28 years ago. After having worked "under a boss" he managed to purchase a little fishing boat. "The mother country remembers us only when election time comes around because that is an opportunity to get some votes out of us citizens who are otherwise always forgotten. But those last-minute appeals are not heard. Less than 10 percent of the Italians in France returned to vote in the earlier elections and those who went home did not do so out of love of politics but because they wanted to see their relatives back in Italy. Besides, we do not have sufficient information of the elections here anyway. From what we read in the newspapers, it is clear that Italy is swamped in chaos and I do not think that early elections will change anything. Talking about Europe makes me laugh. What is Europe anyhow? A new system that allows some politician to have a new seat and a big salary. You talk to me about the European parliament but I will tell you that the French are going to remain French, the Italians are going to remain Italians, the Germans are going to remain Germans, and everybody will push his own country's interests. And we will remain poor emigrants."

Maurizio Zocco, from Molise, with 20 years in France, lives in Roubaix, an industrial center in the north close to the Belgian border. He worked as a carpenter in a construction company until 6 years ago. A work accident forced him into retirement and he now lives on his disability pension. He stays in France in the hope of finding a position for his 20-year old son who has a degree and is unemployed. "We are in the dark about everything. We do not even know why we are supposed to vote and for whom we should vote. The Italian situation looks confused to us and distance certainly does not help us understand. We are more knowledgeable on French politics. As far as the European voting is concerned, participation undoubtedly would be better than what we have had so far because we could vote here, in France. This may be a good opportunity for making everybody realize that the Italians must be able to vote abroad also in the legislative elections. All the other emigrants vote from here, and even the Algerians voted for their president while they were in France. I do not believe that many things will change after the European parliament comes in, at least not for us poor devils. However, although the situation for us Italians improved greatly as compared to 20 years ago, when I arrived, there are some things that this European parliament could do. We still encounter job discrimination; we cannot get government and semigovernment jobs, we do not get any family allowances for family members who remain in Italy and not all degrees and diplomas are recognized."

Giuseppe Zingone, from Torre Annunziata, province of Naples, is 54 years old and has 8 children. He emigrated in 1957. He worked in a textile factory for 13 years until he had a heart attack. He is now on a disability pension. He lives in a little two-room house in a new section of Tourcoing, near Roubaix. He receives us in his living room. He had retained his pleasant Neapolitan loquaciousness and he is fully aware of his rights. "The political freedoms guaranteed by the Italian Constitution are being systematically

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violated here in France. In applications for association membership, you have to swear that you will not engage in any political activities. The federations of the Italian parties are outlawed and we cannot even register with the French parties."

Zingone also said: "The law of this country denies civil political freedoms to foreigners. When it was learned that we are going to vote for the European parliament, they increased the controls."

"Be Careful"

A police inspector, who is a friend of mine, warned me: "Be careful," he said to me. France is insanely afraid of foreigners making left-wing propaganda in the factories. Now there is more repression than during the times of de Gaulle. Strikes have almost disappeared because the workers are afraid. Those who are most afraid are the Italians because they run the risk of losing their jobs if they prove to be too enterprising. In 1973 I was ordered expelled because I had registered with the Italian Socialist Party. The police chief who summoned me said: "That is what French legislation is. If you do not like it, go home." The order was then revoked because the French do not want their intolerance to become known. In view of these restrictions, it is no wonder that the Italians in France are not politically informed. This is an emigrant group which mostly consists of older people who came here during fascism and immediately after the war. He never voted and he retained the mentality of those days of the past. He does not know what the DC [Christian Democratic Party], the PCI, or the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] are. Above all, he does not know what the EEC is. The Italians are disorganized and do not even have a labor union outlook; 90 percent of them are not registered with the union. They are indifferent toward the European elections and they are partly correct on that. But no party, no organization ever really seriously concerned itself with them. We are too few and it is not worth thinking of us. I give you an example: in the area of Tourcoing and Roubaix, there are about 20 of us Neapolitans. The candidates in our district could not care less. The Italians react by shrugging their shoulders and those who go back to Italy to vote, do so only for the trip.

Not even the special-status regions are safe from accusations of disinterest. The little group of Sardinians we met in the Garibaldi Club at La Ciotat, a pretty little town in Provence, famous for shipyards, talked very clearly: "The government in Rome does not even know any more that we exist," says Antonio Amadu, 65, who came from a little village in the province of Sassari. "And even the Sardinian government is indifferent. Will they go back shortly to vote in the political elections and, as far as Europe is concerned, do they believe that anything will change after the European parliament comes in? "Apathy is aggravated also by the fact, if you are an activist, you are in trouble here. There is more political freedom in Germany than in France. That is the only point we can criticize here in France because as for the rest we live much better than in Italy."

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(7)

The map shows the activity areas and concentrations of about 550,000 Italians living in France. According to the statistics, the most numerous communities, apart from the students (132,000), are those of the unskilled workers (78,000) and of the construction industry worker.

Key: 1--Farmers; 2--Miners; 3--Bricklayers; 4--Textile workers; 5--Lumberjacks; 6--Shipyard workers; 7--Fishermen; 8--Lille; 9--Paris; 10--Normandy; 11--France; 12--Toulouse; 13--Marseilles; 14--Lorraine; 15--Savoy; 16--Provence.

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

ITALY

COLLABORATION OF AUTONOMOUS ETHNIC GROUPS PROVES DIFFICULT

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 11 Apr 79 p 9

[Article by Dario Fertilio: "On the Eve of the Double Call to the Ballot Box in June--Elections: the Autonomist Coalition Moves, but Behind the Scenes There Is No Common Strategy"]

[Text] The last Verona conference has demonstrated that collaboration among the ethnic minorities is not easy. The Volkspartei of Magnago, strong with Christian Democrat support, stands alone for the European contest. The game of alliances among the various movements.

Milan--Even the autonomists, it seems, have their prophet. He is Enrico Pruner, a fullblooded Trentino who in the last regional elections guided his miniparty, the PPTT [Trentino-Tyrolese People's Party] to 13 percent of the votes. He had predicted great things for its little sister parties throughout Italy: "They will multiply like mushrooms on a hot summer night." Now, with the approach of this very hot election summer, he will be able to boast about his instinctive perception. The bigwigs of politics are thronging the roads to Rome and to Strasburg, and behind them they are leaving the field open for the sprouting of the "mushrooms."

The first impression given by the variegated geography of the regional independence groups is of an anthill of groups, clubs, and suggestive movements such as "Middle European Civilization," exotic ones like those of the Provençals and the Occitanes, half-unknown ones like the PDU [expansion unknown] of Bolzano. But how much will they really weigh in the political balance? If they could put all their forces together, scraping up every vote, there would be no doubt about their electoral impact: the strongholds of Trentino Alto Adige, of Friuli Venezia Giulia, of Val d'Aosta and Sardinia, plus the lesser contributions, would wreak havoc with the local electoral quotas and would also make it possible, with the rest, to grab other seats in the Chamber.

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But the beautiful dream of the autonomists lasted only a short time: the last Verona conference demonstrated that there is not complete unity of intentions, even though the challenge to the Roman bureaucracy has spread, even if the latest election results showed autonomist advances on the periphery, even if the Melon of Trieste--that is, Mayor Cecovini's Civic List--has sprouted among the "mushrooms." It is not enough, and one can understand why: it is not easy to set Ossolan, Triestino, Slovenian and Sardinian independentists down at the same table and then expect them to behave like a fine patriarchal family. The first-born and the latest-born have not hesitated to litigate, splitting the electoral framework in two: the European one in opposition to the national one.

Let us look at the first one. It lacks the Volkspartei [People's Party] of Magnago, which would have been the natural guide party, with its absolute majority in Alto Adige, its experience of government and its tradition. But precisely for these reasons, the South Tyrolese feel themselves to be already strong enough on their own, and they did not even take part in the Verona "summit." They have the road to the European elections opened up to them by their alliance with the Christian Democrats, which should then be translated into a "safe" seat in Strasburg.


Among the autonomists in a position to raise their own flag for the European elections, there remained the Val d'Aosta Union: a few 10,000's of votes, a senator, and the image of the lion rampant. It is now certain that the Occitane, Sardinian, Provencal and Ossolan troops, and those of the Piemonte Renaissance, the European Federalist Party, the South Tyrolese Socialists and Social Democrats, and the independent Catholics will flock to march under this banner. And then there is Pruner's PPTT, the Sardinian Action Party, and the Sicilian National Front.

There remains one big knot to be untied. The Slovenian Union does not even want to discuss the idea of marching alongside the Trieste Melon. Political reasons? Yes," admits Luigi Tul, of the provincial steering committee, "but also protest against the civic list's campaign against the program of overall protection for the Slovenian minority." The Slovenians said to the Val d'Aosta Union: either us or the Melon. The Friuli Movement supported them too.

What will the Val d'Aosta leaders decide? The secretary, Bruno Salvadori, speaks of a pro-Slovenian tendency: "We will have to give precedence to the ethnic-linguistic communities. Much will depend also on the prestige of the candidacies which they will propose to us. Of course, the name of Cecovini has its weight." At the other end of the Alps, the mayor of Trieste, Cecovini, announces that he will not be a candidate; the name for the appeal "to the 99 percent" will be that of Aurelia Grubero Benco.

"We will not be able to stand for the European elections on our own," says Cecovini, "because the signature-collection procedure seems designed on purpose to prevent it. We have chosen alliance with the Val d'Aostans because

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On the left, the Italian electoral districts for the European elections, with the number of seats at stake. On the right, the major autonomist groups that are to stand united in the European elections under the Val d'Aostan symbol of the lion rampant.

Key:

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Northwest | 12. Movement for Friuli |
| 2. Northeast | 13. Civic List of the Melon |
| 3. Center | 14. Trentino-Tyrolese People's Party |
| 4. South | 15. Provençals |
| 5. Islands | 16. Piemontese Renaissance |
| 6. Sardinia | 17. European Federalist Party |
| 7. Sicily | 18. Occitanian Movement |
| 8. Adige Socialists and Social Democrats | 19. Sardinian Action Party |
| 9. Ossolans | 20. Sardinia |
| 10. Slovenians | 21. Sicilian Justicialist Front |
| 11. Val d'Aosta Union | 22. Sicily |

they are a movement and not a party, and we have rejected offers from the Liberals, Republicans and Radicals. But the Slovenians don't want you."

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"We shall see. As for the Friulans, even if they excluded themselves out of solidarity with the Slovenians, they would not deny us their election support later." Thus one waits in suspense to know whether the Union will be forced to throw out the more than 50,000 Melon votes or the package of Friulan-Slovenian votes, which is nearly equal.

For the national elections, though, the autonomists are in scattered order. The Val d'Aostans, the Trentino People's Party and the Volkspartei will not come out of their boundaries, but none of the three should fail to achieve the objective of at least one full electoral quota. The Melon remains by itself. But if the seat in Parliament is almost a sure thing in Trieste, the Civic List is also attempting the national adventure. "We have had requests for display of our symbol in Sicily, Brindisi, Rome, Milan, Padua," says Cecovini, "and we won't pull back; we will open up to these forces. As a guarantee, we will establish that there will be a Melon representative in each electoral district."

The dream would be to get more than 300,000 votes, winning one more deputy seat with the leftovers. But Cecovini himself does not believe in miracles. The real objective is to deprovincialize the Melon, so that it becomes a symbol of Italian autonomism--a primogeniture which few of the other small parties are disposed to recognize. But once out of the little local ports, the open sea frightens everyone.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET INTERVIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 27 Apr 79 p 83

Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Francois-Poncet by Michel Gonod, place and date unknown

Text Question Reforming the Quai d'Orsay while restructuring the administration is one thing. Making states of mind evolve is another. How do you intend to do this?

Answer You are right. In order to change things it is always necessary to change people in a certain manner. As for the Quai d'Orsay, all the incumbents of the command posts in Paris and abroad must be rejuvenated. The diplomatic career must be opened to internal promotion as well as to external appointments, provided that they are of exceptional quality. The diplomats must be specialists on the problems of our times: strategy, nuclear energy, technical cooperation, legal problems, treatment of information. They must also become specialists on certain regions of the world: the Arab world, China and the Soviet Union.

Question Is this the end of "tea-table diplomacy"?

Answer Tea-table diplomacy has been dead for a long time. I was trained by one of the great ambassadors of the diplomatic service of yesterday. I will vouch for the fact that there was nothing in his demeanor that evoked the "tea-table".

Question The president of the republic is expected in Moscow next week. The French side is presenting this trip as being important. Why?

Answer This trip does not merely mark the continuance of the policy of detente and cooperation between France and the Soviet Union. It also underlines the fact that after a period which has been marked by serious tension in the Far East which could have imperilled world peace, detente remains the rule of conduct that the great powers respect and apply. We understand better today that the policy of detente is not a hollow slogan, a false window in the facade of our policy, but a vital element of our foreign policy, an element on which world peace depends.

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Question France has been reproached of betraying its moral conscience for its economic interests, notably with regard to oil. What do you think?

Answer Let's not be hypocrites. One of the duties of the government is to see to it that the national economy is supplied, whether with the oil, raw materials or equipment on which growth and employment depend. But let's not defame France. Its major foreign policy decisions are not dictated by its interests but by its convictions. They do not reflect selfish motives; they express values: peace, respect for the human being, struggle against poverty in the world.

Question In other words, if South Africa had had oil, would its rugby players have come to France?

Answer That's absurd. South Africa is one of the principal world reserves of raw materials, and if selfish, mercenary interest inspired French foreign policy, it would not have declared its hostility to apartheid so plainly.

Question When you examine the international situation, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?

Answer The crisis which menaced world peace in the Far East should give us reason for hope. Indeed, all conditions could have combined to produce a major confrontation. The self-control which the different parties concerned gave definitive proof of shows the sense of responsibility which moves the leaders of the great nations, their will to prevent the crises that do happen from degenerating. This is one of the consequences of the policy of detente which characterizes relations between East and West, a policy to which the president of the republic, in going to Moscow, will make a new and important contribution.

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ITALY

COUNTRY SECTION

NATIONAL ELECTION FOCUSES ON ROLE OF PCI

Communists in Election, Government

Milan IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 8 Apr 79 p 1

[Article by Gianfranco Piazzesi]

[Text] Communists and Christian Democrats alike are moving into the election campaign with considerable assurance, and all indications are that within the next few weeks the level of polemics will rise by several degrees. The communists are out to win back the support they lost while they shilly-shallied half way across the ford, and are couching their demands for a place in the government in peremptory, all but ultimatum-style terms. The Christian Democrats are convinced they would lose a lot of their support among the electorate should they show the slightest sign of yielding, and are therefore making loud noises about all-out resistance. It was all but inevitable that this clash between the two major parties in Italy would be a bloody one. In politics, however, one of the first rules is never to resign one's self to the worst. Let's try to see, as of now, just how some of the graver damage might be avoided.

We'll start, then, by stating a fact which, in the excitement of the past few days, has often got lost in the shuffle. Vear in mind that the last legislature was the shortest, though not the most dramatic, in the history of the Republic. The leftwing parties, particularly the PCI, not only scrapped the "worse is better" approach, but gave strong support to the Andreotti cabinet, and also lent stalwart assistance in the fight against inflation and in defense of the lira. The PCI has fit into the western system better than expected. This is worth recognition. The source of concern is something else: the deeper and more comfortable that fit, the worse its relations with the other parties have become.

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The same thing has happened as happened between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists during the days of the center-left alliance. Then, too, results of capital importance were achieved by bringing the PSI into what was known as the democratic area in a stable way, but unfortunately the conflicts within that area became unstable. This time collaboration between the DC and the PCI has been broken off even earlier: the same scenario is being played out at a faster pace.

With these premises in mind, we must agree that the election campaign thus far has not centered on the right issues. If the Italian voters are asked to vote on a single issue -- whether or not to allow the Communists into the government -- we shall, at least in our view, be making a grave mistake. If, back in June, Berlinguer's requests had gone unheeded once again, the Communist leader could strike back at this further instance of "discrimination." We should have a very weak government, striving to cope with some very difficult problems. Nor can the alternative be another government in which the Communists were grudgingly accepted, only because there was no way to keep them out. Alliances between parties last and, most importantly, work only if they are based on understanding and trust. Two parties with little or nothing in common cannot be pushed by main strength into enforced cohabitation. In the best of cases, they will take turns paralyzing each other.

A good many Italians, not all of them leftists, do not seem to share this opinion, but argue that "you cannot govern without the Communists." And yet the PCI leaders themselves are saying that Italy will be spared the fate of Chile, and that 51 percent of the vote is not enough to hang onto the lead. In short, Italy cannot be governed without the Christian Democrats, either. The untimely death of the last legislature, however you look at it, proved conclusively that the Christian Democrats and the Communists together couldn't even manage to get along in the same majority. Before we write this country off as wholly ungovernable, we certainly ought to explore some alternative solutions.

We are the first to realize that conclusions of this kind may be misinterpreted. For example, the Communists rose up against Flaminio Piccoli for suggesting that there might be a majority without the PCI or without the DC, tacking his suggestion to an electoral reform bill. Some of the reactions to that trial balloon are understandable in that the Communists are afraid that the DC has its own views as to letting anybody else take over the government, and is actually thinking of creating a new system of government that could survive -- spare the mark -- for another 30 years.

The argument against consociative democracy can be stated only after Italy, too, has experienced the emergence and establishment of a body of political thinking and, most importantly, political

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habit, in which the cabinet is not synonymous with government and opposition is not synonymous with exile to Outer Mongolia. There are, of course, some elementary truths which are a lot easier to state than to put into practice; even so, this is the road along which our parties ought to be getting started, beginning right now.

This is the only way out of a dilemma which is absurd from a logical point of view and fraught with peril on the political plane. We cannot, at least in practice, make the PCI's compatibility with the western system a condition for its remaining in government. We cannot make any expression of solidarity among Italian political parties contingent on the formation of a cabinet in which each of them is represented. It may be that some such solution may be adopted sooner or later; but it must come about only when such an experiment looks to at least a majority of us like a move whose time has come, not just another inevitability.

Pannella Dreams of 40 Percent of Vote

[Interview with radical gadfly Marco Pannella, transcribed in part from recorded telephone conversations by Bruno Tucci in Rome and Brussels, dates not given]

[Text] Whenever Marco Pannella is involved, something peculiar is bound to happen. Even an interview can turn wierd. This one with IL CORRIERE was conducted in two parts, in two different cities: Rome and Brussels. Let me explain. Pannella was supposed to leave yesterday morning for the Belgian capital, purportedly to hold a press conference. We managed to talk with him for a couple of minutes while he was waiting to board a Sabena jet. Pannella looks tired. He has lost some weight, and now looks downright emaciated. Some say he is the "man of the week," or the "ace of the week," as our sports writers would say. What with his outbursts of righteous wrath and his talent for getting his foot into his mouth, he has caused embarrassment and touched off some unseemly brawls.

Here, though, we say: let's just start the tape and hear your own voice telling us what you are thinking. Pannella agrees; he is willing to go along with the idea, but he absolutely must not miss that 10:40 flight 812. He will put in a call from Brussels to Emma Bonino. Just the time it takes to come in for a deft three-point landing, and the radical leader is on the other end of the line again.

"First get me GR2, then the hearing room of the Parliamentary Commission on RAI-TV." The lines are busy.

[Question] What does Pannella want? What do the radicals want?

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[Answer] Convinced as we are that the foundation and the essential condition for the democratic process is honest, reliable information, we want every citizen to know what the real dimensions of the various parties are. Einaudi used to say: "Get to know the ins and outs before you make up your mind." Back at the beginning of this century, the condition for building a civil society was literacy. If we want to build a democratic society today is essential that we have the "commodity of news," of knowing, of familiarity. And this is what we are fighting for in an unflagging and spectacular way.

[Question] L'UNITÀ charges that you are defending the nazi leaders, calls your speeches "showing off," and says that Pannella winks at the right...

[Answer] We are determined to storm every Bastille in which men are held prisoners for life because they are guilty of anything at all, because for at least two centuries no civilization of laws has tolerated them. I am defending the strength of democracy, because the fantasy of keeping men locked up like demons because they are supposed to be symbols of nazism or barbarism is itself a fetishist and barbarous illusion.

[Question] Are you doing all this just for the publicity, or what is it that motivates you?

[Answer] You wouldn't ask questions like that of any other man in politics. This shows that I am very tolerant. Here is a symbolic example: the entire Italian press saw me at the Communist congress wearing a great black cloak. What I wore to that congress was a navy blue loden cape, which I have worn since early January. How do you explain this phenomenon of mass hallucination at so tragic a time?

[Question] Why did Pannella sit in at GR2 rather than TGI?

[Answer] That morning I had been listening to GR2 and I live a mere quarter-mile from the editorial offices on Via del Babuino. Rather than bothering with TGI (which is carrying on in the old Bernabei tradition, lightening it as it goes), I had to go to TG2, which is a crying shame to the lay parties and to the socialists. The extreme violence of its disinformation and its partiality reaches fascist and Stalinist heights.

[Question] If you were standing on top of a tower with Gustavo Selva and Emilio Rossi, and if you had to choose, which one would you throw off?

[Answer] Nobody. Not even Barbato or Grassi.

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[Question] Hasn't it ever occurred to you that they would like to toss you off?

[Answer] They have been proving that every day for the past 20 years, but I get the impression myself, from their increasing level of violence, that they know their cause is hopeless.

[Question] Do you see yourself as a controversial person, or how do you see yourself?

[Answer] I don't spend a lot of time contemplating myself...

[Question] Those fasts of yours... Just how real are they? A lot of people say that you eat on the sly.

[Answer] People who charge me with that sort of thing simply have to keep telling themselves that nobody can lead a better life than they do.

[Question] You preach non-violence, but don't you consider taking over a RAI studio violence?

[Answer] If the takeover is done the way we do it, it amounts to nothing more than inflicting a slight annoyance, and always in a polite and civilized way, as has been generally admitted. I ask you: have you ever seen one person take over a building with 500 people in it? It is merely a way to keep the violence from continuing to fill the minds of those who listen to it and those who work at it.

[Question] If the Christian Democrats and the Communists were to form an alliance, what would Pannella do?

[Answer] The DC and the PCI have been allies one way and another for 30 years. First they did it by assigning each other a rôle to play: the "monopoly of government" and the "monopoly of the opposition." But invariably, true to the worst of each side's tradition, they have demonstrated their official, or quasi-official understanding over the past 4 years. Right now they are pretending to quarrel, so that the PCI can more easily con the communists, and the DC can more readily pull the wool over the Christian Democrats' eyes. And together, they can con the whole country.

[Question] At the Radical congress, you lashed out at the communists and the socialists. But then, apparently, your party wants to throw in with the PSI. What do you all really want?

[Answer] The party wants unity, wants the renewal and the alternative of the left. In other words, we want what classic democracy

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demands: a big labor party on one side and a big capitalist-conservative party on the other.

[Question] Will you give us a prediction on the elections?

[Answer] If the electoral process were genuine and not rigged; if we were not playing against a table of tinhorn card-sharps; if every party's policies were as "newsworthy" as every other party's; and if citizens could really get to know the ins and outs and make up their minds about us as well as about the rest, well, then, we would be the "yes" party in the referendum, say with 40 percent: and maybe of a lot of "no" vote shaped by the mass media con and the Stalinist way in which the media are manipulated.

Pannella Spells It Out

Milan IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 20 Apr 79 p2

[Continuation of interview with Marco Pannella, conducted by Mario Pandinelli, Rome, date not given]

[Text] Marco Pannella is still running stubbornly after a referendum score. In his eyes, 3 and 4 June, and then 10 June for the "European Parliament" members, will offer voters a clear choice: "between the 'lumped-together' parties on the one hand," he says, "and us radicals on the other. In the "lump," according to Pannella, are the "parties that rallied to Andreotti to make a majority in 1976 and are still there, and -- at a distance -- around Giovanni Leone." He spells it out: "These are the same old ones: the ones who voted "no" on both the public financing for political parties proposal and on the Reale Act in the referenda; the front-runners in the "national unity fascies" and in the breakup of republican institutions and of civil society."

On the opposing lines are the radicals, whom Pannella defines as "the party of non-violence, of the Constitution, of civil rights, of morality in public life, of the non-confessional, Christian, socialist, libertarian alternative. The party of the great civil and political victories in the referenda of 1974 and 1978, in the recent elections in Trento, in Trieste, and in Bolzano. But we are also the party that, with only four deputies, managed to be the third force in Parliament, right behind the DC and the PCI. The rest simply didn't exist!"

[Question] Pannella, just where are you trying to go? Some say you're a little tetchy in the head. In 1976, your party garnered just a hair over 1 percent of the vote. So? Have you really gone bonkers?

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[Answer] We shall see. Last year, there was only a tiny minority of us telling people to vote "yes" on both the radical referenda, and we were up against the Brancaloneo armada, with 95 percent of the votes in Parliament. The real clash came between the radicals and the bureaucratic summit of the PCI. The rest were more or less just along for the ride. But on television and in the papers, the campaign was antidemocratic, mercilessly cut; we actually had to invent a gag rule to get a message across that would help people to realize what was going on. Even so, the results proved that we were not the only people in this country to think this way. And if we go back even further, to 1974, when we were the pro-divorce league, and all the parties, including the labor unions, came out against the referendum, who was right? We were the ones who wanted that test, and out of it came the push to the left in the administrative elections of '75 and the political elections of '76. We were hoping that we had triggered a vast process of renewal, or democratic progress. That was enough for us. We didn't want to take on the job of managing it. But then, to our bitter regret, we saw how the swindle worked. People who had voted in good faith for Berlinguer and De Martino were actually voting, unknowingly, for Andreotti. So we are not the ones who are bananas, after all. It's just that we don't want the country to be pushed into madness as it contemplates terrorism, dishonesty, disorder, and unemployment.

[Question] What is it you are hoping for, then? Do you really want to get into the government?

[Answer] Does that surprise you? A political party must always be ready to do that. We, however, will never agree to govern along with our adversaries. We shall never stand up for their banners, their laws, as the PCI and PSI have done as a matter of course. We are fighting to change this system, not to let it change us! We are not like some of them, who have just staged these pre-election brawls, so that they can more easily get back to bed with each other after the elections.

[Question] Come on, now, Pannella, what are you really shooting for?

[Answer] We are for a leftist alternative, but a democratic one, that is forged within a traditional democratic political context of the British and American type. We think that we are going to have to come, much sooner than people think, to a system that allows repeated swapping of places in government and in the opposition to two alignments, one representing conservative interests and the other representing the workers, the professional classes, the unemployed and the underemployed. Unity, new leaders, and a leftist alternative: if we are to achieve this, the first thing to do is to defeat the PCI's policy of historic compromise, which

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in itself a corruption of ideals and a corrupter of others' ideals, based on dubious choices, and subordinate to the DC. Which is a losing policy, and one that serves to divide the left. We must change things now if we all want to save ourselves.

[Question] Are you hoping to change things yourself?

[Answer] Not I, but the radicals can, surely! Either they can do it, or nobody can. In a short span of year, now almost 50, and after almost 35 years of no-truce fighting for civilized politics. I think I have earned the right to be counted among those who vote, rather than with those who are voted. I should like to be able to cast my ballot like everyone else, and then go to the beach, and to get back again to living days and nights filled with diverse, complete, mature felicity. But I know that if the election dice weren't or aren't loaded, if voting in these elections did not mean, at least to a degree, sitting down to play with a bunch of card-sharpers, if Italian citizens were really allowed to understand what everybody is saying, so as to be able to choose wisely and to judge aright, I know that we should have (maybe after all we shall have) an avalanche of votes for us. Too many, for one who would hope soon to be free of the burden of commitments that are too great, too heavy, too long. What we should do instead is to ask all the Italians who voted "yes" and all those who voted "no," and who know now that they were robbed, to vote radical. If you want this kind of life to change, you have to change your vote, or else everything will go even worse than before.

[Question] What about after the elections? What does Pannella have up his sleeve?

[Answer] We shall see. Of course we are utopians, but in our utopia we know how to govern with prudence and humility. I hate making promises during election campaigns. Anyway, we shall do as we always have done, just as they will do what they always have done for 30 years, and never mind what they promise and announce -- I mean the DC, the PRI, the PSDI, the Socialists, the Communists, and even the MSI. If you would like some examples, though, since we have already done this, we shall be bearing down hard on the issues of the courts, of law and order, of the defenseless non-violent people like ourselves, of workers who no longer have the foggiest notion of what their unions are up to, or their traditional parties, either; on civil rights, on the military, the police, the carabinieri, and the Treasury guards... on massacres by the government forces or anybody else, on tax dodgers, on "clandestine" exporters of capital, on the Bank of Italy, on ENEL... and on the referendum issues.

[Question] That's a pretty long list.

[Answer] That's only the beginning! We are going to stand really tough on the matter of the handicapped, of the sick, and of the

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elderly, with their miserable little pensions. And in the very middle of it all, we shall mount fanatical opposition, for one thing, to the madness of the decision to go nuclear, be it military or civilian: it is the most uneconomic, the most irresponsible, the most alien to any hope for a "free" economy in a just and well-governed society. We shall fight hard, as we have already done all by ourselves, for a national and even a European energy plan, one that is genuinely compatible with the figures, with the economic outlook, and with boosting the work and production capacity of the society and of individuals. These are our issues: this is why, with a fascist-style violent operation, the people at the top of the PCI are trying so hard now to block a free and democratic election campaign on RAI-TV; they're afraid to let the people know.

Two-Party System in Italy

Milan IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 13 Apr 79 p 10

[Interview with PSI Deputy Secretary Claudio Signorile, conducted by Mario Pandinelli in Rome, date not given]

[Text] Socialist deputy secretary claims nothing left of the joint DC-PCI dominance of the political scene that seemed to emerge in the wake of the 1976 elections: "It was that very clumping of consensus around two poles that made the political system ungovernable."

The first bit of real news would appear to be this: the voters have reacted in a way approaching indifference to the dissolution of the legislature and the third round of early elections in 7 years. Are they disillusioned? Is this just a phase? Or is this indifference merely an apparent phenomenon, cloaking the increased political maturity of Italian voters? What do the parties make of it? Will they be making allowances for it during the upcoming election campaign, and (more importantly) after it is over?

Replying to these questions today is Claudio Signorile, deputy secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, and, with Craxi, a prime mover in the "new direction" that has been given the party.

[Answer] I'm not at all sure that there really is indifference. Of course, there's a lot of uncertainty. Why are we having elections now? Nobody knows. I shouldn't like to talk about maneuvering, but there is no getting around the ambiguity that has pervaded the whole of this latest round of politics: from the precipitation of the crisis to the tortuous procedure chosen to set the double election date for the purpose -- or at least with the result -- of separating Italian politics from the European

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elections. True, everything is a lot cooler than it was 3 years ago. But then we thought we had a glimpse of a turnaround, a chance for the leftwing parties to try to overtake the others, a possibility of putting an end to Christian Democrat hegemony. The choice then seemed clearer, and that fact alone made emotions run high. And yet this time the stakes are no lower -- maybe they are even higher.

[Question] What is at stake, Deputy Signorile? What can these elections actually do?

[Answer] The bipolar pattern, based on the preeminent rôle of the DC and the PCI, as it took form after the 1976 elections, has not worked. That is why the legislature was dissolved, although a lot of people are trying to keep that fact quiet. The DC is getting ready to ask for more votes to block the Communists' way into government, and the Communists are going to ask their voters for a special effort to force the DC to let them into the government. The real danger is that, as of the end of June, they will shift right back to the very same deadlock situation that led to early elections in the first place. The fact is that it was the clustering of consensus around two poles -- the major parties -- that made the political system ungovernable. A two-party system, given the institutional and social state of affairs in Italy, leads to precisely that: no government at all.

[Question] But in the Anglo-Saxon countries....

[Answer] In the Anglo-Saxon countries the two-party system means that the sides take turns running the country, and this comes about for various reasons: the roles of the parties are more clearcut, conservatives on one side, and progressives on the other. The cultural pluralism, like the social and political, is less set, more various, than in Italy. And, finally, even the institutions in those countries were designed expressly to allow the two-party system to work. In Italy, though, the two-party system cannot, for political, cultural, and social reasons, the great changes that have occurred in the alignment of forces, and instead has given rise, starting in 1976, to a secret, cat-and-mouse immobilism that seeks at every turn to stay out of sight. It is for all the world as though they were trying to throw up a screen between the real crux of the crisis and the voters, so as to cover up the misdeeds of the DC and those -- albeit different ones -- of the PCI.

[Question] This crisis has a lot of issues involved in it: terrorism, the stagnation of the economy, inadequate governmental structures. Will what the voters do at the polls settle these issues?

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[Answer] The elections will never solve the problems altogether. And they may well solve nothing at all. I get the impression that people are trying to boil everything down to a matter of vote-counting, and thereby trying to avoid coming out and saying just what they think about the way such support should be used, what policies they intend to pursue, and what programs they intend to implement. Proof of that argument lies in the fact that the DC is going to hold its congress, which means making its real choices, only after the elections. There is no point in listing the issues and the problems: everybody knows only too well what they are. The truth, though, is simple: you can never settle anything until you get out of this deadlock, this no-government bind which the de facto two-party system has brought about.

[Question] Will this at least be a smooth election campaign, a civil confrontation?

[Answer] I hope so. I am afraid, though, that it may turn edgy, turn into a doctrinal shouting-match between conflicting acts of faith and statements of principle. We shall do whatever we can to avoid that. We shall try to explain how important it may be to have a stronger socialist contingent in the next legislature, precisely in order to snap the leading-strings of the two-party system and to render the Italian political system governable again, within the context of a policy of national unity correctly perceived. This policy perforce would get us out of the Italian crisis by expanding, rather than chipping away the areas of freedom for citizens and for autonomy for institutions: we cannot just sit back and watch it painted as a stagnant cesspool where everything is rotting away in the motionless standoff between the two major parties.

[Question] You have set yourselves an ambitious goal. How do you plan to go about achieving it?

[Answer] We know that we are going to have to blow away that smoke-screen, or whatever, that has been set up between the voters and the facts. That is not going to be easy. We know that we have taken on a demanding task, considering the financial, human, and organizational means at our disposal. We are aware of our weaknesses and we are calling on citizens -- not arrogantly, but with humility -- for help. We are not merely after votes: we are perhaps even more concerned with forcing clarification, talking eyeball to eyeball with the other parties, with people, as to the best way to set about a free and untrammelled reorganization of our imperilled democracy.

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Macaluso: Majority in Nation

Milan IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 14 Apr 79 p 2

[Interview with Emanuele Macaluso, member of the PCI directorate, conducted by Mario Pandinelli in Rome, date not given]

[Text] The Communist spokesman says: "Nobody has proposed any government as an alternative to ours... A recovery policy involves sweeping changes... The 3 June elections are not a pointless exercise; they will make a crucial difference."

On Via delle Botteghe Oscure the PCI leaders deny that they are desirous of using the election campaign as a sort of referendum on their party's entry into government. Senator Emanuele Macaluso, a high-ranking spokesman for the Communist leadership, says:

"We have made a political proposal which stems from the need to make this country governable again. Until now, no other party -- not the DC, nor the PSI, nor the minority lay parties -- has suggested an alternative solution for government to the one we have put forward. Nobody is telling the voters clearly and forthrightly how it would govern this country or with whom: and yet this is the paramount duty of any political party.

[Question] There are those, however, who say that you Communists would like to reduce all the issues to a single question: whether or not you should be allowed into the government.

[Answer] It's quite the other way around. Three legislatures in a row have been dissolved before their term. Meanwhile, grave and weighty issues have been left untended and grown gangrenous: issues like terrorism, the bankruptcy of the governing apparatus, unemployment among the young, and the women's question. Wherever you look, from the protection of our institutions to the functioning of government, from job security to civil rights (properly understood as the achievement of freedom and room to breathe, not as a lot of nonsensical and unrealistic demands), you see reason for deep concern, notwithstanding a few major bits of progress. Complete collapse has been averted over the past 3 years by the sacrifices individual Italian citizens have made, with the working classes in the forefront, and also by the sense of responsibility we Communists have displayed. It is not enough, though, just to avert total collapse. And besides, collapse cannot be simply averted indefinitely. Either you apply a recovery policy, and that will involve sweeping changes, or else the worst will be inevitable.

[Question] Is it true that you have assigned considerable weight to the need for getting legitimacy for the Party in your proposal for admission to government?

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[Answer] Come on! Does anybody really think that we are asking for legitimacy? I don't want to engage in rhetoric, nor am I about to cite the crucial contributions we made in the Resistance movement, in building the Republic, or in drafting the Constitution. Nor yet shall I refer to more recent events, such as our still continuing struggle against terrorism. Legitimacy comes to us, as it has always come, from the voters, from the millions of Communist Party members. The real issue is something else: in the situation we have right now, we must put together a government that can rely on the consensus, on the strength of the nation, to bring about the necessary reforms, to turn us clean away from the old way of governing. It is this imperative that has given rise to the Communists' proposal.

[Question] The DC, though, has already given you its answer. Zaccagnini, Piccoli, Bodrato, all the Christian Democrat leaders who really count, have turned you down. Now what do you do?

[Answer] But a party, particularly a party that bears heavy responsibility for having governed the country (worse rather than better) for so long, can simply say "No." We have a crisis in governability in Italy: how does the Christian Democrat Party plan to resolve it? The DC knows it cannot hope for an absolute majority. What will happen after 4 June? So far, the only answer forthcoming from the Christian Democrats has been a pussyfooting approach: we'll reform the electoral system -- one of them ventured -- so as to enable the DC to go on governing, even though it has no majority, but represents only a minority -- albeit a large one -- of the electorate. That, in our view, is an unacceptable response.

[Question] Why unacceptable, Senator Macaluso?

[Answer] Because of an elementary sense of democracy and justice. But then there is another reason. To govern in Italy, it is not enough to win a majority in Parliament, even through a legislative trick: you need a majority in the nation. Industrial reconversion, Southland development, proper accounting for government spending, the fight against the tax jungle and the wage maze, resistance and counteroffensive against subversion and terrorism -- none of these are the stuff of ordinary administration. To cope with them we need clear-cut, courageous decisions: either we have mass participation and a mass struggle to achieve these goals, or no appreciable result can be achieved.

[Question] What do you think will happen after the elections?

[Answer] First hypothesis: the Christian Democrats (and they won't be the only ones) will realize that there is no way they can govern without the Communists, and in this case they will

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agree to the changes, the sweeping innovations which our presence in government would involve. Hypothesis number two: discrimination, calculated or unthinking, against our Party goes on after 4 June. Of course, we should mount a constructive and responsible opposition, a sober one, as is our wont. But would the others really manage to solve the problems, to make Italy less ungovernable without us? What worries us most is not whether or not we become part of the government after 4 June. We are concerned primarily with the pervasive slippage toward destabilization, toward chaos, which has surfaced here over the past several months. I was and still am of the opinion that here in Italy, as elsewhere, there are forces unresigned to the idea of any democratic change in the nation's situation; sometimes they bet on one card, sometimes on another; but their purpose is always the same: to weaken the democratic system so that they can fatally wound it. When you look at it this way, 3 and 4 June will not be meaningless dates. The verdict at the ballotbox will have weight, perhaps decisive weight.

Democratic Security

Milan IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 25 Apr 79 p 2

[Interview with Liberal Party Secretary Valerio Zanone conducted by Mario Pendinelli in Rome, date not given]

[Text] "We must face the real issues." "The way out of crisis is the way the great European democracies have taken." "The historic compromise has not yet come to pass, but it is not yet buried." "The understanding between the DC and the PCI has been put on the back burner for the time being, until after the elections."

Valerio Zanone, PLI secretary, thins the field down to two scenarios: "I'll tell you what the stakes are," he says; "after 4 June, either the communists will move into the government with the DC, breaching the flimsy wall of Christian Democrat resistance, perhaps using the emergency as an alibi; or else we shall see a government committed to democratic security that will deal with the issues head-on, and resolve the real problems that have plunged us into this crisis. We are fighting for this latter outcome."

[Question] But the DC has already rejected the idea of forming a cabinet with the PCI. Does that Christian Democrat wall truly look all that flimsy to you?

[Answer] Senator Chiaramonte, one of the PCI summit's most able spokesmen, reminded us in a recent interview in the CORRIERE that on the eve of the 1976 elections the DC swore that it would never

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form a majority with the Communists. The DC asked for and got votes on the basis of that commitment, but once the election was over it changed its line, thanks partly to the PSI's troubles in pursuing a policy of true independence of the Communists, and to the covering fire afforded it by the Social Democrats and the Republicans, who agreed to join in a majority including the Communists. As a matter of fact, the Republicans publicly stated that not only was that decision 'inevitable,' but so was its natural outcome: the historic compromise.

[Question] And yet the historic compromise never happened. So now what?

[Answer] It hasn't happened yet, but neither is it buried, as some have prematurely claimed. The historic compromise is still the PCI's prime tactical goal, and at the same time the hole card for a sizable part of the DC. A governing agreement between the DC and the PCI is an eventuality that has been set on the back burner just for the time being, given a low profile until the elections are over. And then, too, there is the experience of one legislature, the one that has just been dissolved, that should teach us all not to make rash decisions; once we struck out along the big majority road, we saw the hard-core aspects of the Italian crisis worsening and, in the end, even the majority crumbled and fell apart, thus necessitating early elections for the third time in 7 years.

[Question] Some people are beginning to argue that Italy stands on the brink of being ungovernable. Do you think so too?

[Answer] That ungovernability stems from political causes, not institutional ones. The crisis in our institutions has its roots in the Christian Democrat pattern of governing, and therefore it cannot be corrected (as Piccoli would have us believe) by endowing the DC still more richly with a majority-oriented election law. A party like the DC, which makes a practice of deliberately abetting the suicide of its own government, as Andreotti did in the Senate, is the last party to be asked for prescriptions for smoother governability.

[Question] Do Secretary Zanone and his Liberal Party have the prescription?

[Answer] The first and soundest prescription is one that dates back to antiquity: don't mistake the disease for the cure. The Italian disease took a turn for the worse in March 1978 when the DC formed a majority with the PCI, thereby launching a formula for government whose pretext was the need to deal with the emergency, and whose effect has been to worsen that emergency.

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[Question] You deny the need, or at least the usefulness, of a confrontation with the PCI?

[Answer] No. I assert the need for a confrontation without compromise. Confrontation is the opposite of snuggling in together. There are several streets that lead out of the crisis. The Communists would have us take the one that leads to a socialist society. That is a legitimate proposal, but the Liberal road is a different one. In our view, the way out of the crisis is to follow the road taken by the great European democracies: Western solidarity, the market economy system, restoring to individual initiative a broader margin of elbow room free from interference by a ubiquitous and inefficient State. It would seem that these Liberal goals are shared, to greater or lesser degree, by other parties, but, if this is the case, it is, to say the least, for those parties to have accepted the DC-PCI majority in 1978, and for them today to go along with Andreotti's stated intention of putting that same majority back together again when the polls close on 4 June.

[Question] Back in '76, the Liberals complained that they were victims of a "they're gaining" psychosis. How about this time?

[Answer] This time the DC won't be able to point at the PCI and frantically shout "They're gaining on us!" The PCI now is on the defensive. The Christian Democrats certainly have something to gain from the elections, so much that they were ready to cheat in order to get them. That means that this time around, everybody will be able to vote according to his own beliefs and conscience, and never mind psychoses. The Liberal vote will go to strengthen the only party that said no, thanks to the invitation to jump into bed with the rest, and which, throughout 1978, stood up against the bankrupt policy of the DC-PCI majority with constructive opposition. If, on 4 June, the DC-PCI majority is pasted together again, there will be a need for a stronger Liberal opposition; and, on the other hand, if the Liberal Party is stronger on 4 June, there will be a possibility for that democratic security alternative we have always advocated.

[Question] There doesn't seem to be much emotional heat around the parties in this election campaign. Why is that?

[Answer] The big majority, with constant resort to hypocritical rhetoric about so-called national unity, has depleted our feeling for political dialectics.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

LEFT SPECULATES ON FORMULATION OF POST-ELECTION GOVERNMENT

Bettino Craxi--Socialist Party

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 23 Apr 79 p 1

[Article by Luigi Bianchi: "Craxi Critical toward the Policies of the DC and the PCI--the Controversy on the Difficult Post-Election Phase Has Already Ignited"]

[Text] The Socialist secretary is thinking about a government led by a layman. Piccoli replies: "The problem lies not in the choice of the president of the Council but in the 'real convergences' which can make the executive an authoritative one." The PLI [Italian Liberal Party] and the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party] are for a centrist solution.

Rome--Apart from any judgment as to merit, the conclusions which the national council of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) arrived at the day before yesterday have had the effect of posing the problem of the post-election period again in even clearer terms. It is the problem of the governmental formula by which, after the voting of 3 June, it will be possible to run the country. And the way in which they posed the problem anew has given a second wind to the middle forces, to the Socialists, the Republicans and the Social Democrats, who, concerned about being left crushed in a vise between the major parties, made use of it immediately to throw themselves into battle.

One sentence of Craxi's in Cagliari yesterday evening sums it all up. "The script, it seems," the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] secretary observed, "is all written and thoroughly read. The Communists ask to go into the government, and the Christian Democrats oppose this. Both the one side and the other ask for more votes, and offer in exchange a promise of ungovernability."

Put plainly, the question raised by the Socialist leader can be summarized as follows. If the Communists have set as their sole objective their entrance into the new government, and the Christian Democrats reply with a refusal, what other roads remain if they are not to end up in a blind alley?

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Is there a way to avoid being faced, a month and a half from now, with the same problem which led to the dissolution of the Chambers?

Two proposals emerge from yesterday's Sunday speeches, especially those of the spokespersons of the middle groups. The first, aired by the Liberals and the Social Democrats, is a solution of centrist type. The second, supported by the Socialists, is more complex, and consists, in fact, of a government no longer led by the Christian Democrats.

The first hypothesis is based on growth of the three parties which make up the present government, so that together they would cross the 51 percent threshold and thus be in a position to form a majority government.

After 3 June, if the conflict between the Communists and the Christian Democrats and the Socialists' refusal to march in step with the DC in a center-left coalition made it impossible to form a new government, the three-party coalition could stand on its own feet, possibly with the support of the Liberals. An observation made by Preti yesterday is indicative in this regard: "What can happen after 3 June," the minister of transport said, "depends largely on the measure of success which the secular parties presently involved in the government will achieve. If they get a majority, they might even put the Socialists in the position of having to get out of the uncertainty in which they find themselves."

Craxi, though, is thinking about a change. He wants something new: "a concrete alternative," he said yesterday, but one which is not a Communist brand of alternative. It is obvious what formula he is proposing.

It is a Socialist-led government that he has had in mind for some time and has been pursuing since the day he took over the leadership of the PSI. A government that would have to obtain the consent of both the major parties.

Yesterday Craxi, in the Cagliari speech, delineated his objective clearly. He said that as far as the Socialists are concerned, "there will not be any headlong rushes toward notions of overall alternatives, for which the conditions are not at all ripe, nor return to formulas of the past, about which there may be different judgments but which are not repeatable today."

And he attacked the DC and the Communists. He accused the Christian Democrats of wanting "to reestablish a hegemonic position" and the Communists of not being capable of freeing themselves from their uncertainty. To Andreotti he directed a threatening blast, reminding him of the proverb "sooner or later, all the foxes end up at the furrier's."

Among the Christian Democrats, Craxi's idea is finding an audience among some representative figures (Bisaglia, for example), but it is also encountering resistance or polite objections--like that of Piccoli, whose reply to it yesterday, in an interview in L'ESPRESSO, was to wait for the electoral re-

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sponse. It will indeed be the voters who decide, and in any case, the problem of the government will not lie in the choice of who is to preside over it, but rather in the "real convergences" which can make it authoritative. Piccoli repeated that the DC does not intend to renege on the policy followed in the last 3 years, but as for government with the Communists, "it will not do it."

Achille Occhetto--Communist Party

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 27 Apr 79 pp 1-2

[Article by Luigi Bianchi: "The Parties Begin to Talk about Programs Rather than Formulas--The Controversy between the DC and the PCI Shifts to the Things to Be Done"]

[Text] The themes are: the economy, public order, and foreign policy. According to IL POPOLO, the question of the government cannot be dissociated from the general political question. The Communists of the Central Committee rule out any return by their party to "an opposition of protest." Craxi: the country's problems have so far been ignored.

Rome--Blocked by the mutual interdictions on the problem of the new government, which will have to be formed after the trial of 3 June, the parties are beginning to shift their fire and seek broader grounds on which to develop the confrontation. Not that the topic of the government has fallen by the wayside: it remains the real knot to be untied through the response from the ballot box, and it will continue to fuel the controversy even beyond the election date. The leaders of the political forces have intuitively realized, though, that by reducing the debate among themselves to an abstract dispute about formulas, they run the risk of cheapening it and at the same time trapping themselves in a blind alley.

It is for this reason that in the recent statements, beyond the various hypotheses about the coalitions that could be formed with Christian Democrat or secular presidents, the topic of the program has been revived. The Communists talked about it yesterday, in the Central Committee of the PCI. And also the Christian Democrats, the Socialists and the Social Democrats--besides, of course, the Republicans--have made it the pivot-point of their speeches. Not only this, but the Christian Democrat leaders, in this morning's IL POPOLO, also accuse the Communists of having "heavily" altered the tone of the debate, with their "either-or" to the DC--as if ignoring the fact that "the topic of the government cannot be dissociated from the more general political question, unless one intends on purpose to avoid it." And Craxi, in a speech in Salerno, said more or less the same things when he observed that "in the course of the crisis, the country's problems, the so-called 'contained' problems, whose importance has always been rightly emphasized, have been ignored."

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Considering the emphasis by the chiefs of the DC and the PSI, one might say that yesterday's debate in the Communist Central Committee was a reply in advance. Indeed, Achille Occhetto, who read the report, gave the reason for the request to enter the government as being solely the appeal for things to be done.

"It must not be forgotten," he observed, "that the first of the contained problems, indeed the principal one, which makes all the others feasible, is the new mode of governing, and not, as Fanfani says," he added, "a new mode of distributing the portfolios."

Occhetto, coming from the Ingrao ranks, is considered in the PCI to be one of the leaders to the left of Berlinguer. And even though he has held important posts in the past (secretary of the youth federation, and then regional secretary), never before has he been given the responsibility of preparing a report for the Central Committee. The fact that he has been chosen to set out the election program is therefore indicative. It means that Occhetto is on the "staff" of the ascending stars, destined to go into the secretariat when, in the autumn, the PCI chiefs overhaul the leadership organs. This is confirmed also by the style of the propositions which he expounded--all of pure Berlinguer type, and aimed mainly at reassuring the segment of middle-class voters who voted for the PCI in 1976 and whom the Communists now fear losing.

Occhetto attacked the Christian Democrats, accusing them of being the true cause of the political instability in Italy. He called for greater clarity from the Socialists. But he also defended "the value and the breadth" of the experience of the last 3 years and sharply denied that his party intends to return to a type of "opposition of mere protest." He confirmed the "autonomous role" which business firms must have within the framework of the economic program. And speaking of democratic order, he used very tough language with regard to the autonomists. He said that it is true that "no one can be condemned for his ideas."

But this does not prevent the Communists from "viewing uneasily the attempt to hide behind obvious and emphatic reaffirmation of a guarantee of freedom of style the reality of the facts, of the crimes committed against property and persons, of the unheard-of and horrifying violence of which the city and the university of Padua have been the scene in recent years."

He was no less explicit when he referred to foreign policy. The PCI, he stated, "declares that it bases all of its own view of Italy's foreign policy on full respect for the international alliances entered into by our country."

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PCI STRUGGLES TO MAINTAIN PREVIOUS ELECTORAL GAINS

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 26 Apr 79 pp 1, 2

[Article by Gaetano Scardocchia: "The Worries of the Communists"]

[Text] Rome. The PCI is responding rather well to the call to battle perhaps because, in spite of everything, it has remained more of a fighting party rather than a ruling party. Along the periphery, the election campaign has had a tonic effect: it has snuffed out any doubts and it has removed the confusion. There is a strong determination toward recovery but everybody is aware that the great hopes of 1976 are gone. At that time it was fighting to win; today it is fighting to keep its losses down.

Let us begin a short journey on Botteghe Oscure Street [PCI headquarters] through the various parties in an attempt to discover some change in the election campaign, in other words, the things that are not being said on TV and during meetings, the conjectures on results, the prophecies on what happens after the elections. The election situation such as it really is has two facets: on the one hand, the din of propaganda; on the other hand, the realism of expectations. Since these two facets cannot ever touch, our conversation partners will remain anonymous. Their testimony turns into summary impressions of the chronicler.

So, what are the feelings of the communist militants?

A leader who has just returned from a trip to the federations in central Italy describes them as follows: "There is something like a sense of relief, of liberation. Several months ago we were really in hot water: everybody accused us of everything, everybody blamed us for everything. Now things have changed. By leaving the government majority, we demonstrated that we know how to be autonomous. We have more freedom of action and judgment; we are once again on the offensive.

This is an attack which is intended to defend the positions already gained, although that will not be easy. A popular opinion survey institute in Milan conducted a survey for the PCI on several segments of the electorate: the big cities, the farming areas, two or three worker centers, several provinces in the south. The most satisfactory results came from the rural

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areas where the ratio of communist consensus appeared higher than what it was in 1976. The most striking disillusionment came from the big urban centers where the party is definitely on the skids. Nevertheless, the overall loss seems to be rather slim as compared to last year's administrative elections when the PCI lost 8 percent of the votes.

Here is the political nub of communist analyses and forecasts: "We will pay a price but it will be less high than what we were afraid to pay 6 months ago. There will be no upheavals or earthquakes for us. They are once again going to have to reckon with us." In other words, the election loss is anticipated to fall within limits that should not alter the balance of power between the three major parties. The PCI's primary objective remains what it always has been: push the DC [Christian Democratic Party] against the ropes, prevent it from governing without the communists. Some people however with increasing frequency are putting the accent on a complementary motivation: "It is to all intents and purposes a good thing for the PCI to be strong also in order to play a role that will influence the opposition benches."

Let us take a closer look at the analysis of the vote which the communist leaders have come up with. There is no doubt as to the fact that the party appears more vulnerable in those election areas where, 3 years ago, its success was most unexpected: white-collar employees, professional people, self-employed workers, small businessmen, that portion of the middle class that has been cut short for so long, that segment of the mobile and errant electorate that was swept up by the PCI after it had dropped out of the parties with a liberal-democratic and socialist tradition. This is an unknown, volatile electorate outside the normal orbit which the party apparatus never controlled and guided. In 1976, it was attracted to the PCI by an iridescent and unprejudiced election campaign. Here we might recall Luciano Barca and Eugenio Peggio who rallied meetings of business in the name of such liberal values as the logic of the market and the ethics of risk.

Today the PCI fears a hemorrhage on this most fragile side of the right. To the extent possible, it is trying to repair the situation by once again falling back on independent candidates. In 1976, the slates were opened to Catholics, such as La Valle and Pratesi; today they are being closed to personalities of the laic world such as Stefano Rodota and Felice Ippolito. The PCI presents itself as a rallying and amalgamation point for the most diverse tendencies: there is room for the radical socialists and for the heirs of the La Malfa. We do not know how many lay candidates there may be. But we do know that many candidacies were offered. Some attempt at recovery, although it looks less convincing, is in progress also on the left: there could be two candidacies jointly with the PDUP [Proletarian Unity Party] for the Senate. The names of Umberto Eco and Federico Caffee have been making the rounds.

In point of fact and disregarding any more or less slight dip as compared to the 1976 voting, the communist leadership chalked up to a result that will not be able to break up the current lineup: the frame of reference,

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it is believed, will remain unchanged and the same will be true of the problems deriving from that. Having made this point however the communist leaders admit that certain situation estimates must in part be revised. It is expected that the DC will conduct a more toned-down and ambiguous campaign with heavy anticommunist emphasis by individual candidates (from Donat Cattin to Rossi di Montelera) but with an attitude on the part of the leadership group that from time to time would leave some margins for the day after the elections. That expectation is evaporating. And the PCI will have to draw some conclusions from that: it is difficult to continue to propose an alliance which almost all other potential partners reject.

Several communist leaders have been repeating the idea that the DC several times in the past reneged on its election promises, that the DC is playing a political game, that the vote-gathering slogans are one thing and that the need for governing the country is another thing. But the conviction is now beginning to spread to the effect that certain words (the "solemn commitment" of the DC National Council not "ever" to collaborate in the government with the communists) this time sound firmer and are an iron collar which will influence the moves of the parties during the coming months. Somebody in the PCI admitted this without reluctance: "Unless there are some unforeseeable election results, it is clear that we are going to have to remain in the opposition for a more or less long period of time.

The really uncertain thing is something else however: what will the possible governing coalition be like? Agreeing to venture a little bit into the area of predictions, some PCI leaders distinguish two factors in Italy's political future:

A first phase, immediately after the elections, during which the DC, failing to form a stable government, will be forced to fall back on a risky and slender majority: "A three-party setup with the abstention of the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] or some other similar concoction";

A second phase, after autumn, with an attempt by the DC to build a stronger alliance through the inclusion of the socialists in the administration.

It is clear that the assumptions on the first phase (transition or caretaker government) are easier than the assumption on the second phase (agreement between the DC and the PSI). The critical unknown in these elections is the behavior of the PSI itself: "If we communists suffer a slight loss, then nothing happens. We can accept that. If there is a drop in the PSI, anything can happen."

All communist leaders say that they hope for a PSI election success but many would like to take a closer look at socialist strategy. There is one proposal which is making headway in the PCI--so far it has come up only in passing--and that proposal is for the PCI to present itself as a force that can govern also without the DC. "A government blueprint could be put together around us and the socialists. We are going to have to say so clearly sooner or later." One thing is clear: the PCI is not thinking of a

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left-wing alternative but it is not ignoring the temptation of making a possible return of the PSI to collaboration with the Christian Democrats more painful and traumatic. "We could tell the socialists: why not go on the assumption of a coalition without the DC?" Somebody right away pours cold water on that temptation: "It is clear that we would have to demand the abstention of the DC. It is true that one cannot govern without us. But it is also true that one cannot govern against the DC.

And what happens if a second phase does not emerge? That is one question that inspires fear not only in the communists. Then the prospect of an election reform--which nowadays is a topic for a theoretical debate--would become a motive for a bitter clash among the parties. Says one PCI leader: "I cannot imagine an election law that would favor the DC without at the same time destroying all other parties, except for ours. With what forces could the DC approve such a law?"

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PSI: POORLY-DEFINED ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL PROGRAMS, GOALS

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 5 May 79 pp 1,2

[Article by Gaetano Scardocchia: "The Cautious Electoral Ambitions of the PSI"]

[Text] Rome--If prophets are those who predict the future or reveal hidden truths, it is clear that today they do not abound in the ranks of the PSI. And with good reason. Still more than the Christian Democrats and the Communists, the Socialists are obsessed with details of the vote. Their fate hangs by a very weak thread. Everything is entrusted to the numbers game. A senior leader says: "We are hypersensitive about the vote. After an electoral disappointment there is an inevitable internal earthquake. That is how it was in 1968, then in 1972, and finally in 1976. Therefore we cannot afford defeats. Prophecies can begin only with a hope: that the PSI will not lose votes."

Three years ago, the PSI came to the elections with the conviction of winning it. And instead it emerged humbled. This time the socialist leaders are more cautious, also because they foresee in Marco Penella an adversary who is an obstruction--cumbersome and showy--on the road to their potential success. On via del Corso [The Avenue], headquarters of the party, a further withdrawal is excluded; and it is recalled that in the partial administrative elections of a year ago the PSI received 13.3 percent of the votes--a leap ahead of about four points with respect to the 1976 political elections. Being a hardly representative comparison, today's forecasters are more cautious. There is talk of an 11-12 percent. But in truth the amount of advance is not as important as the fact of there being an advance. For the PSI this is a makeup examination. If the vote is positive, even if only by a little, everything is still possible. In the case of failure, everything will have to start over again.

The PSI believes it has good arguments to put forth. Let us cite some statements--always anonymous, as is the custom in this survey of parties--gathered from the via del Corso. "The PSI is the only party that has com-

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pletely and relentlessly changed its leadership elite. Our faces may not be to one's liking, but at least they are new faces." In 1976 we were an inert appendix of communist policy. Today we are uncomfortable, troubled, frustrated, but we are autonomous." The PSI can now boast of a greater presence among workers, young people, and men of culture. They all want a return match. In 1976 we were deflated and isolated." "The crisis with respect to relations between the DC [Christian Democratic Party] and the PCI [Italian Communist Party] makes us indispensable. Italy will be governable only if we become stronger."

Of course, there are also negative factors, and they are not concealed. The PSI has been caught off balance by the elections, at a moment when its image is dull with respect to the blaze of the Turin congress. Behavior during the crisis was irresolute. And finally its message regarding the post election period cannot be clear in all details and nuances. Let us say that its basic inspiration is very intelligible, but that its outlines are hazy. It must be reconstructed and explained. Let us try to do so with a series of answers to the question: What will you do afterwards?

A representative of the old guard revealed his sentiments through a parable. "When Riccardo Lombardi was an autonomist, he told a little story of two sisters who, in a city in the south, were hoping to find a husband. The younger of the two finally met a person who wanted to marry her. But in southern families there was still a custom at that time that a younger sister could not be married if the first-born was not already married. The parents were unyielding, and the marriage plans were broken off. Result: both sisters remained spinsters. We socialists, who are the younger sister with respect to the PCI, must not make the same mistake. I say that if the younger sister finds a husband more easily, it is also because she has some additional virtues that the other does not have; and so she should live her own life."

A leader who is now pro-Craxi, but who came from other parts: "What will we do afterwards? Well, after some temporary solutions that will last until the DC congress, we must devise a program and a formula that will oblige the Christian Democrats and the Communists to come closer together. Admittance of leftist independents to the government may be proposed. There might be a long-term agreement that provides for a rotation of the presidency of the council (for example: two years to a DC and two years to a lay party or in any case to a non-christian democratic one). And if the PCI remains outside the government, some appointments to public agencies could be offered to communist candidates. In short, a step must be taken toward an evolution that will reopen a dialog also with the PCI.

A pro-Craxi Milanese: "the PSI is not in a hurry to enter the government, and after the elections will not venture into governmental operations. But

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we make a definite promise to the electors when we say that in any case we will guarantee the stability and the governability of the country. How? We will wait to evaluate this after the vote. It is obvious that the stronger we are the better will be the conditions that we will be able to present to the D.C. Our basic policy is to keep the door open to a further consideration of the PCI, but in the meantime we will not let ourselves be caught by the spiral of ungovernability. That is the difference between the PCI and us. The communists are rigid--both in the government or in the opposition. We are more flexible; we do not exclude other solutions."

A non-Craxi person who knows the PSI secretary well: "Certainly there is some ambiguity in our words. But there is ambiguity also in the DC; also in the PCI. Why are we, who represent less than 10 percent of the electorate, asked to offer prefabricated and ready to use solutions? What I do know is that Craxi is not the old subordinate-type of autonomist who wants to go to the government at any cost. He is too ambitious a man to be content with such banal aims. The DC is making a mistake if it thinks it can bring him back to a form of center-left. Something quite different is needed. I can visualize a situation in which the PSI will greatly succeed in conditioning the DC, both with respect to a program and a presence in the government. And then we will say to the communists: there, it is possible to take half of its supremacy from the DC. Which do you prefer: a DC with 100 percent supremacy or with only 50 percent?"

A representative of the Signorile current: "I start from two presuppositions. First, there can no longer be a meeting between the DC and PCI without the socialists, or against the socialists. Second, the country should not be split between a DC that is destined to govern forever and a PCI that offers eternal opposition. Therefore no party can be self-sufficient. It will be necessary at all costs to resume cooperation on a national scale. This time, however, a long respite is needed, solid ground--no longer just a simple emergency, but something like a constitutional agreement (quite different from the one proposed by DC De Mita) for a reform of the institutions and for a serious economic policy plan. In this operation, the PSI role is that of a guarantor. We guarantee the communists that Eurocommunism will provide a governmental solution and we guarantee the DC the respect of economic compatibilities and international alliances.

As in a puzzle or a mosaic devoid of many loose pieces, from these evidences of proof we are trying to put together a reliable image of the PSI and to provide it with real involvement. Four points seem certain to us: 1) a return to the center-left (that is, PSI and DC in the government, the communists in the opposition) is a proposal for which few yearn; 2) the alternative of the left, that is, a PCI-PSI government is set aside: "It is now more a museum-type banner than a battle flag"; 3) differences between Craxi and Signorile concerning administration of the party seem to be

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appearing, but there does not seem to be a true political clash; 4) both want to pull the PSI away from its involvement with a too rigid PCI. Having said this and provided that the PCI does not emerge humbled by the elections, it is foreseeable that DC pressures to keep a government on its feet after the elections will weigh heavily on the socialists. What will the outcome be for the PSI?

If the words are meaningful ("we will in any case guarantee as much stability as it will be possible to guarantee"), it may be presumed that the PSI will not refuse to keep a minority government alive. It may abstain from parliament, but it will impose its conditions. The conditions will concern a governmental formula (for example: a single party government instead of a tripartite party government) and the direction it will take: the interval must serve to cause a new national unity agreement to mature. It may be that the interval will be long: it will be necessary to await the outcome of the DC congress in October and perhaps also the administrative elections of next spring. A hard road is foreseen: "We will have a year of emptiness, with an extreme strain on the political system, but it will not be our fault. We will try to avoid the worst."

The possible predictions stop here. It remains to be seen what forms a national unity agreement will take. What is certain is that the socialists expect a rethinking on the part of the DC but also on the part of the PCI: "The communist congress is not over yet. We are awaiting some answers. Is the opposition a short cut or a long road? Is it a tactical expedient or a new strategy? Is Cossutta right, or is Napolitano right? In truth--says the anonymous pro-Craxi person--the PCI has superimposed two contrasting policies, but it has not found a synthesis. It must find one. Today there is still disorder under the communist sky; we are waiting for the mass of clouds to disperse.

But a doubt worries the socialists: what if the mass of clouds forbodes storms?

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

STUDY SHOWS RISK OF BLACKOUT NEXT WINTER

Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 26 Apr 79 pp 1-2

[Article by Franco Vergnano]

[Text] Milan - Beginning this winter quite a number of areas in central Italy will be under the constant threat of blackout, and the situation is also expected to deteriorate further in 1980 and 1981, when the south of Italy will run the risk of being in the dark for long periods. All of this unless something radical is done to alter the "spontaneous" development of the demand for electric power at the winter peak, i.e. at the time of maximum demand.

The analysis of supply and demand completed during the last few days by the IEFE (Institute of Economy of the Sources of Energy) quantifies the power shortage at the winter peak.

As shown by the table below, with the maximum power transmission capacity for the geographic areas taken into account, the complex ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] system will be faced with a power shortage at the peak equal to about 650 megawatts in 1979, 1,250 megawatts in 1980, and 1,100 megawatts in 1981.

While for this winter the entire negative balance will be concentrated in central Italy, within the next few years the energy shortage will be further aggravated, extending to the south of Italy and to Sardinia.

This will happen on the assumption that the demand for power at the peak develops "spontaneously" and is not subjected to the "corrections" discussed below.

The IEFE study makes a clean sweep once and for all of the various theories, almost always rather unscientific, on probable energy shortages.

Let us try to clarify the question, distinguishing first of all between the short term and the intermediate term and between "peak" power and "base" power.

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Summary of Coverage of Net Power Requirements at
Expected Peak Periods From 1979 to 1981 Inclusive (Source IEFE)

Large Geographic Areas	1979	1980	1981
Northern Italy (Including Tuscany)	Self-Sufficient (+ 100 Mw)	Surplus (+ 400 Mw)	Surplus (+ 2,200 Mw)
Central Italy (Lazio, Umbria, Marche, Abruzzi, and Molise)	Power Shortage at the Peak (- 1,200 Mw)	Power Shortage at the Peak (-1,300 Mw)	Power Shortage at the Peak (-1,400 Mw)
Southern Italy (Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria)	Self-Sufficient (+150 Mw)	Power Shortage at the Peak (-450 Mw)	Power Shortage at the Peak (-1,300 Mw)
Sicily	Surplus (+1,000 Mw)	Surplus (+850 Mw)	Surplus (+ 600 Mw)
Sardinia	Self-Sufficient	Power Shortage at the Peak (-150 Mw)	Power Shortage at the Peak (-300 Mw)
Noncompensable Deficit	-650 Mw	-1,200 Mw	-1,100 Mw

Thus far the excessive ideological polarization with which the problem has been addressed has not permitted matters to be seen clearly, since the argument has raised such a cloud of dust as to create a worrisome state of confusion.

Those who say that there is no immediate prospect of a shortage of electric power in Italy are stating a fact, provided they are referring to the ratio of annual "complex" demand for electrical power to power producible during the entire year with the potential now in operation.

But it must be borne in mind that the consumption curve is very irregular; i.e., it varies considerably by hours of the day and by seasons.

Since the demand is irregular and as a rule electric power cannot be stored, a shortage may arise if the existing productive capacity is not capable of meeting the peak demand; i.e., if it cannot meet the requirements at the hours and during the months when they are highest. In the final analysis, the determining factor in defining the shortage is the productive capacity, or power, disposable from 0900 to 1800 hours on weekdays in the winter, when --as shown by the experience of recent years--the demand for electric power is at its peak.

This being so, it is clear that while in the short term it is possible that chronic electric power deficits may show up at the peak, in case the modalities of demand continue to develop "spontaneously," it does not appear

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possible at the moment to hypothecate an energy "drain" at the "base" of the diagram.

In the intermediate term, on the other hand, unless the programs for fitting out new plants are suddenly blocked, the "peak" deficit will be joined by a shortage of electric power at the base, which is destined to expand rapidly, and then there will be a real and true "electric drain."

We have always emphasized in the past that the "peak" deficit will be inevitable if things are allowed to go as they may, i.e. by their own inertia; it may thus be deduced that it would be possible, by taking suitable measures, to avoid the blackout.

And so we asked the director of IEFÉ, Sergio Vaccà, is there, or is there not such a "peak period shortage"?

"If we consider the short term (1979 to 1981)," came the careful answer, "we can also agree on the conclusion that the occurrence of a shortage at peak periods is not an inexorable event determined by structural and physico-technical factors (productive capacity, transmission capacity, etc.) so much as by political and administrative factors. With a good dose of entrepreneurial initiative and with a few timely decisions, it is possible for ENEL to start up an 'active management' both of electrical power demand and of supply (I am thinking only of collaboration between ENEL and auto manufacturers) which is capable of preventing or limiting the foreseeable shortage."

But on what conditions is it possible to avoid a blackout?

"It is necessary to bear in mind at least three considerations. First of all the outcome will depend on the degree of response of the market, i.e. of the consumers and the auto manufacturers, to the measures taken. In the second place, if the measures were efficacious and the shortage prevented, it must always be borne in mind that this implies a level of public service 'different' from that in effect today, and one that would be carried to the limit of what can be accepted by the economic and social system. Lastly, in case the deficit should increase substantially in the intermediate term (i.e., in the years 1982, 1983, and 1984), it must be borne in mind that a policy of 'active management' of supply and demand will no longer be sufficient, and that it will be necessary to consider measures of real 'forced saving,' i.e. rationing, which at all events would provide a level of service not easy to accept and consequently one that would have rather negative repercussions on the needs of economic and social life."

The IEFÉ study offers a number of options to try to avoid a blackout. The principal ones have to do with the introduction of a serious policy of "load management," agreements with the auto manufacturers, rate manipulation, etc.

But in case the peak period shortage is not avoided, other measures have been considered for meeting the situation in such a way as to reduce the harmful effects.

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In particular, the IEFE experts consider that the management of a deficit situation should involve not only ENEL, but also the responsibility of the public authorities. They therefore suggest providing for the establishment of a "national committee for programming the provision of electric power" at the government level which would be capable of working out an emergency plan.

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