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JPRS L/8466

18 May 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 29/79)

WEST

EUROPE

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CONFLICTING NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS INFLUENCE ELECTIONS

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 26 Apr 79 p 1

[Editorial by Alberto Cavallari: "The European Horizon Might Still Become Brighter"]

[Text] The European electoral campaign is off to a start, but it is not clear whether optimism or pessimism is in order. The HERALD TRIBUNE points out that Europe is taking a back seat in Italy, England, and Luxemburg, where the people are mobilized for a national vote. But in France the European vote is a matter of internal politics, an opportunity to create new relationships between the Gaullist and the Giscard forces, perhaps to prepare for early elections. In spite of the commitment of big names on the lists, especially in Holland, Denmark, and Germany, and regardless of how much the laborites, themselves, have transformed their traditional anti-Europeanism into a policy of "criticism and reform of the EEC" [European Economic Community], there are grounds for saying that the pessimists are right when they lament a lost opportunity, or one that might be lost.

Of course a high EEC official predicts that "the second European elections will be more interesting because the first will have educated public opinion." Along with this prudent attribution of pedagogical values to a vote that should be "historic," there is a fear of poor participation, or of a referendum upset. What will happen if, out of 280 million EEC inhabitants, only a minority goes to the polls? Also, the equivocal fight has a negative effect on the functions of the parliament, itself. Italy, Germany, and the Benelux hope that its role will be more active, that it will have greater power, and that it will serve as the motive force for greater integration. But France (in addition to England) opposes the statements of Schmidt or of Brandt that are so favorable to evolution. One may legitimately suspect that the European vote will not serve to cancel the present "pharmacist's Europeanism"--that is, "just enough" Europeanism.

There are of course internal questions to cause France to change its English-type positions. President Giscard seems to have given up all hope

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of reconciliation with Chirac, and cannot afford to lost the votes of the Gaullists who favor him, or who do not favor his rival, in an election that is not taking place with a majority system. The absence of two coalitions promises a sort of repetition of the most recent legislative elections, and proportional representation constitutes a risk for presidential candidates. Thus, Europe loses in Giscard (who is obliged not to depart too much from Gaullist positions) one of its most enthusiastic propagandists. As in the case of Chancellor Ferrer, he preaches for Europe "but with prudence."

Finally one must not forget the low tide reached by the so-called "Euro-Left." The break with the socialists brought French communism to super-Gaullist positions. Marchais's speeches contain recurring, continuous appeals against a Europe that is described as pro-German," and the vote is exploited as an occasion for a counteroffensive against the social-democracies "that are headed by Chancellor Schmidt's Bosches." One then wonders what will happen to the masses that are led to the vote as if the European parliament were a Marne? Nor should the crisis of Europeanism as a whole be underestimated, however much the Italian communists do not share the French positions. The conclusions of the Rome meeting, even though in favor of a pluri-national power, have rekindled neutralist nostalgias. And then, many Spanish communists look upon Wehner's Germany and the "dialectics of reunification" as a positive factor in a different Europe. Thus one must exclude that positive, unconditional wave from the left, for a Europe that was believed possible by many at the Madrid summit.

One must therefore say that the Europeans have little luck and that conditions regarding the vote are not the best. The least that can happen (as Reston says) is that there will be very "troubled" elections because of the simultaneous vote, and because of a vote that is distorted by internal questions: with a weak European "signal" in Rome and in Paris. But if matters remain thus, there are still significant reasons to insist on the value of these elections. After all, it is the first time that Europeans can act together in making a political choice with non-national aims; and also it is the first time that all the people can make a concerted action to integrate in a Europe that until today has been purely "Eurocratic." However devoid of easy prospects, the Europeanists have an important battle to fight.

From the point of view of integration, in fact, the election of parliament represents a decidedly new fact. One might minimize its significance and say that the parliament will not have much authority and that the array of "confederalists" is too strong to change things. But the fact remains that no true integration can begin if (as Duverger says) "interdependencies are not established among the members of a society." A people's parliament, elected by direct vote, the source of first real interdependence, is the only

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road to a discontinuance of European involution. Otherwise Europe will continue to be what it has been up to now: a freetrader toy.

Decisive also is the role of the renewed parliament, fully legitimate, with respect to sweeping away the mists that have thickened over the future of Europe. In 1972 the Summit of The Nine in Paris launched the famed "European Union," to be established by 1980. But no one knows what this "Union" means. The formula has remained indefinite, as in the case of the "Community." The EEC institutions, the council of ministers and a committee, were charged with coming up with a study of it by 1975, but the result has not been very striking. One gathers that the union is everything and nothing. Then it was understood that perhaps it is one of Montesquieu's parodies ("Europe is no more than a nation composed of many nations"). Thus only parliament remains the credible institution to tell the truth or to profess to do so: at least concerning "what we are not and what we do not want."

Thus there are two valid reasons for insisting on the pro-European battle--perhaps with pessimism, knowing that success is not near at hand and that the conditions surrounding the fight have never been so unfavorable. But perhaps Ambassador Ducci is right. In his opinion, the Europeanists should do as Wellington's soldiers did at Waterloo. "They were so stupid that they could not acknowledge defeat; and so they were able to win."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ZAIRE TERMINATES ROCKET LAUNCH SITE CONTRACT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Apr 79 pp 28-29

[Article by Francois Soudan: "OTRAG Is Leaving"]

[Text] The vast Manono Plateau lies in the northeastern corner of Zaire's Shaba Province. Some 40,000 persons live in this region between the Lualaba River and the village of Kamelie on the shore of Lake Tanganyika. For them, the cessation of OTRAG's activities and the departure of a handful of white technicians will probably have little effect on the fixed tenor of their ways. OTRAG is leaving. So what?

Orbital Transport und Raketen AG, OTRAG, is a rather small German firm whose president, Lutz Kayser, a specialist in aeronautical engineering, is not lacking in ambition. His goal is to make money by using his ingenuity and resourcefulness. His special "niche" is space. He is engaged in building, launching, and placing in orbit small observation satellites whose launch vehicles will burn liquid propellants, the fuel used by the famous V-1 and V-2 rockets built by the Germans late in World War II. He is developing a sort of "poor man's" satellite one that Third World countries, organized into consortiums, will be able to obtain for peaceful applications. This satellite market also interests both NASA and the European Space Agency.

Like Kurt Debus, the chairman of OTRAG's board of directors, and OTRAG's projects manager Richard Gompertz, Lutz Kayser is a veteran of Peenemunde, the German V-1 and V-2 rocket research and development center. All three men were subsequently "rehabilitated" by NASA. All three formerly worked at the Kennedy Space Center. When NASA began to feel the pinch of tight budgets in the early 1960's, these men no doubt felt they had better things to do than "coast along" at NASA. So they decided to form their own business. Four banks, attracted by the prospects and also swayed by Kayser's persuasive glibness, lent them the money. But they still had to find a range for their launcher tests. They set their sights on Zaire, on its vast nearly uninhabited expanses, and thought of the severe economic problems plaguing that country. On 26 March 1976, they concluded an agreement with the Zairian authorities. They were granted a 24-year lease, extending to the year 2000, on 160,000 square kilometers of bushland bordered on the south by the Zambian

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frontier, the east by Lake Tanganyika, the north by the boundaries of Kivu Province, and the west by the Lualaba River. In exchange for this immense firing range OTRAG agreed to pay the Zairian Government 37.5 million dollars per year plus a percentage of the revenue earned by the company on each launch vehicle sold and a 20 percent discount on the first "Zairian" satellite.

Things went smoothly for OTRAG in 1976. It established a subsidiary, OTRAG S. A. [Limited], at Vaduz in the Principality of Liechtenstein, a tax paradise for a firm that is seemingly not entirely above suspicion in such matters. All funds destined for Zaire were funneled through OTRAG S.A. which also handled and routed all equipment and technicians sent to the Kapani-Toko Plateau. The parent company also installed a short-lived branch office, OTRAG-France, on Avenue Foch in Paris. Its manager was a rather strange individual hiding under the alias of Georges de Bierre. He is alleged to have been connected with the OAS [Secret Army Organization] during the Algerian War. The first rocket, christened Billigrakete, was launched on 17 May 1977 in the presence of H. D. Genscher [FRG's foreign minister]. It was a partial success: the vehicle reached an altitude of 10 kilometers before it started tumbling. Same story for the second test. In early June, with President Mobutu and a German television crew present, it was sheer disaster: a few seconds after launch, the rocket crashed along the shores of the Luvua River. OTRAG executives then decided to postpone regular production some 2 years, in other words, not before 1981.


Both the CIA and the German BND were aware of OTRAG's dealings as early as late 1975. But a third "partner" also had wind of the OTRAG-Zaire contract, namely the Soviet KGB. The Soviet leadership is known to be very sensitive to anything closely or remotely relevant to the possible rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany, sensitive to such a point that in early 1977 the Kremlin decided to place two "spy" satellites—Cosmos 922 and Cosmos 932—in orbit over southern Africa. These satellites made four passes over the Manono Plateau—4, 23, 24 and 25 July 1977—and carefully photographed OTRAG installations. During their flights, they also photographed South Africa's nuclear test site in the Kalahari Dryland. Did the Soviets really believe OTRAG was a front for the nuclearization of the FRG? Or did they want to deliberately magnify an issue the ins and outs of which were fully known to them? Whatever the reason, in late July they "leaked" the details of the contract.

The East Germans are obviously the most offensive in their criticism. The GDR charges that OTRAG enables the FRG to circumvent the post-World War II Potsdam Agreement and the Treaties of Paris and Brussels that prohibit the FRG from producing long-range rockets. During preparations in March 1978 for the second Shaba war, Angolan authorities were patently alarmed by the OTRAG rockets they believed were targeted on Luanda. Hence they insisted that one of the priority objectives of the "Katanganese gendarmes" had to be the OTRAG installations. This plan failed, however, and OTRAG resumed its inconclusive test launches.

In Bonn, as well as in Kinshasa authorities seemed to have decided to terminate OTRAG's activities because these were becoming more and more of a nuisance. Zaire, who thought it had made a good business deal, found itself the center of a controversy it could have definitely done without. Moreover, one of the indispensable conditions of reconciliation with Angola was the dismantling of OTRAG. As for the Federal Republic of Germany, it wanted to settle this ticklish problem once and for all because it was jeopardizing its relations with the East.

The Zairian tests were suspended in August 1978. Then in December, the decision was made: Zaire was unilaterally canceling the contract. To the immense satisfaction of the FRG and the GDR (with whom Kinshasa reestablished relations in January 1979).

As for OTRAG, it is now practically bankrupt. Its last hope was that Brazil would authorize it to establish its launch and test facilities in that country. It was learned in early April, however, that in the wake of Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Brasilia, General Figueiredo had decided not to favorably consider OTRAG's proposals.



The Manono Plateau in the northeastern part of Zaire's Shaba Province. An immense firing range.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BOURGES SPEECH CITES CONTRIBUTION OF MILITARY POLICY

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Apr 79 pp 7-8

[Speech given by Yvon Bourges, Minister of Defense, to the Committee on French Influence, on 15 March 1979]

[Text] Ladies and Gentlemen, at its creation your committee gave itself the mission of contributing to the expansion and support of the French presence in the world according to the possibilities that the international situation offered at the beginning of this century. Circumstances have changed considerably since then, but the reasons for our country's influence, its thoughts and acts, remain. More than any other country, France has a mission, a unique and exemplary role to play in the world. This is apparent in the words of Thomas Jefferson: "France is the second country of all men."

What is the basis of a nation's influence? Its origins are as much emotional as rational. We are dealing here with a concept that is beyond our capacity to measure, beyond our ability to contemplate. Nevertheless, we confront circumstances which compel us to recognize the existence of this opinion and which guide us, more or less consciously, toward a concept which betokens one people or another.

Lengthy thought is not required: at the mere mention of a name, ideas and images arise. A nation's influence depends, first of all, on that which its name evokes, on all that is directly associated with it. Next comes rational analysis which adds or retracts, corroborates or rectifies.

Memory influences all human thought. In the idea that we make for ourselves of a nation--or, better stated, in the formation of that idea--the past plays a considerable part. The influence of a country depends first of all on its history. It is obvious that the army has often been an instrument of birth, and always an instrument of survival, of a nation. Arms have marked borders and insured independence. The army is the privileged guardian of these memories, not for its own use, but for that of the nation.

However, I have no intention of relegating the influence of our country to to the past. What has been left to us by those who have lived in this land is part of our heritage and has a great deal to do with the image of our country. We are responsible for this heritage. If, indeed, we have the obligation to preserve it, we also have the duty to enrich it, as much as we can. To consider the past only as an inheritance which must be safeguarded, is to take the risk of watching it lose its substance and brilliance, in our hands and through our own fault.

In today's world the prestige, reputation and authority of a nation rests on reality, on what it brings to the world, on the role which it is able to play there. This depends on the quality of its influence: the universality of its culture, the genius of its scholars, the abilities of its technicians, but also on the state's capability to act within the core of the international community. That is to say rather broadly, it depends on the possibility of asserting itself, in terms of its convictions and interests, without being at all dependent. To this end, a military policy which assures the nation of freedom of choice and of appropriate security is necessary. As General de Gaulle wrote, the army is one of three mechanisms of a country's policy which he explained thus: "Diplomacy explains it, the army supports it, the police protect it." Therefore, it is true that one cannot speak of the influence of France without stating first that it is a free nation.

This is precisely why our national defense policy is based on the possession of nuclear armaments which, by dissuading potential aggressors, is the only way to guarantee the fact of our independence in today's world. Combined with conventional military forces to support it and to protect us against insidious forms of change or direct confrontations, nuclear armaments give France the means to play the role it ought to and which is expressed by our diplomacy. This is visible in recent events with respect to our international commitments and to the relations we maintain with those countries closest to us in friendship and in culture.

But our army is not simply a support for our diplomatic policy, it also expresses, when necessary, the fellowship of our people with underprivileged or suffering peoples. The participation of our military doctors and nurses in the care of women, men and children of underdeveloped countries, the devotion of the men and women who, at the core of our field hospitals, helped the victims of catastrophes in Gabon, in Peru, in Jordan, in Nicaragua and in the Comoros, is proof of that fellowship. Even the technical assistance given to certain armies fighting for their country's freedom has contributed and is contributing to a network of cooperation which has been created across continents. These are the unquestionable attainments which constitute, in the hearts and spirits of many men, a precious testimony of France's fellowship.

The circumstances which bring us together, like the convictions we share, make it unnecessary for me to insist further on the importance attached to the influence of France nor on the part our army has played in this. The French army is today worthy of its historical image: testimony to the nation's desire to survive, guardian of traditions maintained over the generations, training ground for discipline and for independence. It derives a large part of its power from the merit of those who serve in it and from the duties we accord it. In these difficult times the state will do its duty to the army. But, because we live in a democracy, it is important that a growing number of our countrymen are made aware of the fact that in such a dangerous universe French influence and the very existence of the nation itself is in question if France is not known to be committed to insure its own security and its independence and to be responsible for its own presence in the world. All of us must act. Those who have some influence on public opinion must devote their efforts to this end. Ladies and Gentlemen, you are among those who will willingly contribute. Permit me to congratulate you and to thank you.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

IRAQ-BOUND REACTORS' SABOTAGE RECOUNTED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 16 Apr 79 pp 42-45

[Article by Josette Alia, Patrice Lestrohan, and Rene Backmann: "Nuclear Affairs--The Sabotage of Toulon"]

[Text] The job had been done too well--the signature of the "ecologists" fooled no one. Josette Alia, Rene Backmann, and Patrice Lestrohan made an investigation on the destruction, by an "unidentified" intelligence agency, of the reactors earmarked for Iraq. This was an operation which suited many people.

The armored trucks were ready. The security escort had received its instructions: Departure would be by road, the night of 8 to 9 April 1979, as discreetly as possible. For the entire operation was "top secret." What was involved was to transport from La Seyne-sur-Mer in Var Department [France] to Baghdad, Iraq, two nuclear reactors dubbed with the code designation of "Tamuz I" and "Tamuz II" ordered by Iraq from France to November 1975 and which had just been completed.

In the nuclear hangar of the Naval and Industrial Construction Projects of the Mediterranean Company at La Seyne-sur-Mer the atmosphere in the previous 8 days had been euphoric: The workers were completing the placement under plastic covers of the nuclear components, the elements which were to make up the "core" of the reactor. The technicians were getting ready to leave for Iraq where they were to oversee the assembly of the core block slated to be sunk in a pit 11 meters deep. The manager of the Naval and Industrial Construction Projects of the Mediterranean Company was a happy boar: During this recession period he had tried to convert his operations to nuclear construction and he seemed to have succeeded well in this: Two "Tamuz" reactors were being shipped to Iraq and orders from Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany were in the process of being filled in the large nuclear hangar, one which had cost 900 million French centimes, designed to resist earthquakes and a pressure of 300 tons per square meter, completely pressurized, its temperature constant at 22 degree Centigrade, where the technicians

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worked in white gloves. In the evening of 5 April the last worker had carefully closed the grooved, hermetically sealed, gates. Only 72 hours were left. Everything would be ready in time.

It was 0300 hours in the courtyard of the workyard. It was completely dark without moonlight. One could discern vaguely three large identical hangers painted in the same blue, white, and orange colors. The roof had the same white paint. Which was the nuclear hangar? It was easy to get close: The shipyard, immense in size, straddles the port of La Seyne, arms of the sea reach between the hangars and the drydocks, ships are tied up at the piers—these could serve as so many screens and shelters for visitors arriving from the sea. On land the only protection was a roughstone wall 1.90 meters high without barbed wire or broken glass fragments at the top, interrupted in spots by simple chicken wire grill. Beyond one could make out in the shadow a stack of enormous metal parts, an ideal cover for intruders. To be sure, watchmen made their rounds, but only at intervals, almost in token manner. "In 13 years there have been no incidents in our workplace," the manager said.

The Right Key

But precisely on that night something was up. Three men, three shadows, climbed the wall, crossed the open space, and made their way directly to the nuclear hangar. Its glass-covered openings were 4 meters from the ground. How would the intruders enter? Through the door very simply. They took out keys, opened the gate, entered, disconnecting the alarm signal right away. There they were in the hangar. It was dark inside. Nearly all the pieces of the "Tamuz" reactors were already wrapped. They bore four sets of figures indicating the nature of the alloy, the characteristics of fusion, welding or machine-finishing, and a designation number.

Next to the "Iraqi" parts stood other equipment—gear for the loading of nuclear fuel for a Belgian power station, a removable plug slated for the storage casks of irradiated rods of the German Kalkar power station in the Rhineland. Some of these were also wrapped, others not. Everything looked the same. A cat would have been unable to recognize its kittens. However, the three men knew perfectly well what they had to do. Quickly, they made their way to the "Iraqi" elements—and only those. They selected eight of them—the eight most important ones, the most sensitive ones, those which would have made up what is known as the "beehive," that is, metal elements in which uranium plates would be sunk and which would make up the "core" of the nuclear reactor.

In the dark the three shadows unhesitatingly produced eight "hollow charges" made up of "super destructive" explosives—military materiel which is the best available to destroy, say, the armor on tanks. The intruders placed these charges on the reactor parts, then they installed a system for delayed ignition by condensation. This was a very sophisticated, effective, precise device enabling the intruders to leave quietly the same way as they had come.

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It was a little after 0300 hours when a formidable explosion shook the hangar. The eight charges blew up and the bomb squad later found the 9-volt batteries which had supplied power to the condensers. The Iraqi reactors--and they alone--were 60 percent destroyed. A piece of equipment destined for Germany was hit by fragments--accidentally, it seems.

Toulon's criminal police opened an investigation. But right from the start it was the agents of the DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance]--the French counterespionage agency--who really took charge of the case since what was involved, the head of the prefect's personal staff noted, was "sensitive" nuclear equipment.

In fact, no one believed that the incident represented a routine attempt by ecologists even when an unknown group claimed credit for it later in Paris with almost too humanitarian a profession of faith. "The job was too well planned, too well executed, too precise," a senior official noted. "These men were experts in two ways: They were experts in nuclear equipment and experts in explosives. They left nothing to chance. They selected good targets and only those. Additionally, they must have enjoyed significant help from accomplices inside as well as outside. They blended completely into the night after fulfilling their mission, which very obviously was a political one. Does this not remind you of anything?"

Yes, naturally, the story of the torpedo boats of Cherbourg* is the talk of everyone. The Toulon job suggested the same degree of preparation, the same observance of minutiae, the same speed of execution, the same political goal. It was indeed a case of espionage. And what when one raises the banal question: Who profited from the attack? One obtains the same answer from nearly every source: Israel.

Indeed, these Iraqi "Tamuz" reactors are the replica of the French reactors of Saclay--"Osiris" and "Isis"--which have been in operation for several years now at that research center. And it is indeed on this score--as elements of a nuclear research center--that Iraq purchased in 1976 a copy of "Osiris" redesignated as "Osiraq" for the occasion. But this type of reactor, strictly for peaceful uses, has one particular characteristic: It needs highly enriched 93 percent uranium which, on its part, is directly suitable for military purposes.

With 5 or 6 kilograms 93 percent uranium it is possible--at little cost as India has done for example--to produce a large atomic bomb, not very sophisticated, not very maneuverable, but in the last analysis as deadly as any other.

From then on it was possible to wonder: What was Iraq's real interest in this agreement? Was it really "Osiris" described in the "Bilingual Yearbook

*Shanghaied in front of the very eyes of the French navy by Israeli secret agents and sailors on 24 December 1969.

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of the French Nuclear Industry" (page 19) as "having a maximum generating capacity of 70 megawatts . . . whose very high performance is suitable only for a very ambitious nuclear development program"? Or was it more prosaically the fuel—this highly enriched uranium, so difficult to secure on the market? For the Israelis there was no problem: Iraq purchased this nuclear equipment from France only to be able some day or other to produce "its own" bomb. The proof is that the Iraqis requested—and France agreed to sell—four consignments at the same time, that is, 65 kilograms of enriched uranium—enough to produce a sizable number of bombs within a period which Israeli experts estimate to be between 5 and 6 years. This is a prospect which Israel does not relish nor can accept and against which the Israeli Government has often warned France. Since its diplomatic representations had remained ineffectual, it can be that the Mossad (Israeli intelligence agency) resorted to more direct methods.

Twofold Role of Experts

"Who, we? No, we had nothing to do with it," the Israelis say. "Apparently, 2 years will be necessary to rebuild the destroyed reactors. Obviously, this delay suits us. But we are not the only ones who gain by it. . . ."

That is true. One has to go back in time a little, to 1974, to understand the whole story. Jacques Chirac, French prime minister at that time, returned from a trip to Baghdad in December of that year. He had brought back, he said then, "fabulous contracts." Iraq is France's second largest oil supplier after Saudi Arabia. But France had nothing to sell to Iraq to pay for such oil (whose price had just been increased). This did not matter, for the French Prime Minister was to act as a traveling salesman. Furthermore, on the way, he made friends with Husayn Saddam, Iraqi vice president—who was also the country's strong man—so much so that Chirac invited Saddam to pay an official visit to France a year later.

It was now September 1975. Husayn Saddam's welcome in France was ostentatious. French-Iraqi relations were good. "Iraq will become our leading trading partner," it was being said in the French Prime Minister's office. On a beautiful weekend Jacques Chirac and Husayn Saddam visited the Provence region, stayed at Baux, ate the famous fresh-caught red snappers and stuffed pigeons, and chatted in the fields which had the pleasant smell of lavender. Yet, these were working holidays inasmuch as Husayn Saddam visited the Cadarache facilities which were close by. He seemed to be more sensitive to nuclear reactors than stuffed pigeons.

The Saddam had his own idea. As in the case of all the other Arab countries before him, Husayn Saddam wanted Iraq to purchase nuclear power stations from France—for civilian use, naturally. Now, France had just abandoned its old graphite-gas setup for a new one with pressurized water. And it was precisely a graphite-gas system which the Arabs wanted with the obvious afterthought of one day extracting plutonium from it. President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing started out against such proliferation, but Jacques Chirac had an idea. "I

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offer you something much better than a graphite-gas power station," he told Husayn Saddam. "I offer you a nuclear research center such as ours at Saclay." Husayn Saddam was quick on the uptake. The French-Iraqi nuclear agreement was signed as early as November 1975. But it was made public only much later, on 18 June 1976. For in the meantime some embarrassing details had to be taken care of.

First, there was a small legal problem: Theoretically, according to Article 53 of the French Constitution, such an agreement made between two governments had to be ratified by the French parliament "if it involves public finances." Would the French parliament approve? Nothing was less certain. It was thus decided that no financial commitment would be included in the agreement which was thus published--without previous public discussion--in the form of a decree. It would then be possible to answer all the questions from indiscreet newsmen by retorting that only a "commercial agreement" was involved. Who was to be the builder? Technicatome, an affiliate of the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission--France]. Who would be designers? The AEC experts working at Saclay, naturally.

Sticky Cases

But then came the second problem. From the start a "working unit" began to study "Osiraq" at Saclay. One fine day the project manager appeared, his face white, holding a letter in hand. The letter had been written by the Iraqi authority in charge which mentioned that it was prepared to sign an order, "on condition that no person of Jewish race or Jewish religion would be employed on this project" There was disbelief and consternation. The interdiction involved some researchers, who protested. A complaint was even sent to the CGT [French General Confederation of Labor] which, a little later, proposed the text of an ambiguous protest, condemning at the same time any racial discrimination as well as Israeli imperialism. By means of promotions and "voluntary retirements," an "Aryan" work team was finally put together. There was a feeling of relief: The agreement was finally promulgated by decree in June 1976.

Naturally, the agreement provided every guarantee relating to the use of the fuel: The facilities were not to be used for military purposes but were to be placed under the control of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. But Article 1 of the agreement stipulated that France was to supply, in addition to the equipment, "special fissionable fuel" to drive the reactors. And that was where the shoe pinched. For after the departure of Jacques Chirac as prime minister at the end of the summer of 1976, Valery Giscard d'Estaing changed his policy on nuclear sales. On 11 October 1976, through an official communique, France openly supported the United States positions on nonproliferation: Agreements were to be examined case by case and France would accept international control over irradiated fuels. Two sticky cases remained on the table: The Iraqi agreement and the agreement for the supply of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Both were already signed. Logically, they had to be denounced. But the breaking of agreements is too expensive. An attempt would thus be made to practice evasion.

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The Pakistanis, occupied with their domestic problems, allowed things to drag on and negotiations with Paris, even if they took a turn for the worse, were still not broken off. On their part the Iraqis were more impatient. They wanted their "Osiraq." The French-Iraqi controversy became worse and erupted into a scandal when Iraqi "diplomats" killed a French policeman in the heart of Paris in a clash among Arabs on 31 July 1978. This was followed by a reconciliation and Taha Nuhi-al-Din Ma'ruf, vice president of the Iraqi Republic, arrived all smiles in Paris on 9 January 1979 with his question all ready to be popped: "When will 'Osiraq' be delivered?" Jean-Francois Deniau, French minister of foreign trade, was in the process of negotiating with Iraq the supply of 5 million additional tons of oil and obtained same the following month when he visited Baghdad. During those uncertain times because of the Iranian crisis these small gifts (for which high prices are paid) were not to be turned down. And then, as a French oil expert bitterly noted: "In order to buy oil, our only real counterpart is still arms." France was thus to deliver "Osiraq." The scheduled date was to be 9 April 1979. On 5 April "Osiraq" was blown up at La Seyne-sur-Mer. Everything had to be done over from scratch. The expected delay was 2 years.

This was a gift for Israel. For after the signing of its peace treaty with Egypt Israel has figured things out: This peace, frail as it is, is not assured under the best of circumstances for more than 5 years. If, within that time, the Palestinian problem is not solved, it is almost certain that President Anwar al-Sadat will be ousted and that war will start again. Who would then be the major enemy of Israel? Iraq. Egypt, with its weapons which are half Soviet (and aging) and half American (not yet assimilated by the armed forces), would not be operational. Jordan is only a launching pad for terrorists. Syria would undoubtedly still be involved in the Lebanese mire which has immobilized 30,000 of its troops, with the fear of seeing the Maronite Christians, armed and equipped, attack Syria on its western flank.

There remains Iraq, the only "serious" country in the eyes of the Israeli military, who are worried especially on account of two factors: Iraq has 1,000 tank transport vehicles and 1,500 troop carriers available. This means that the 220,000 men and the 1,900 Iraqi tanks could reach the Jawlan [Golan] Heights in 48 hours. If, additionally, Husayn Saddam should have an atomic bomb available at that time, the balance of forces in the Middle East runs the risk of being completely upset. Furthermore, the head of Israeli military intelligence, Shlomo Gazit, has just admitted it publicly: The danger for Israel as far as Iraq is concerned is indeed nuclear. In the long run Israel cannot prevent this from happening. But perhaps it was worth sending three men to La Seyne-sur-Mer to delay this eventuality by 2 years.

While Waiting for "Caramel"

But what is not known, or little of it, is that this postponement changes everything. Since 1977 Valery Giscard d'Estaing has been actively promoting

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the French research effort to discover a "clean" atom—a fuel that would be nonproliferating, that could not be used for military purposes, which would make it possible for France to honor the agreements it signed without breaking international commitments already undertaken. Now, such a fuel is available. It has just been perfected: What is reportedly involved is enriched uranium (at 7 percent) whose code name is now "Caramel." "Caramel" is the ideal solution. If "Osiraq" could be sold operating no longer with 93 percent uranium but with "Caramel" all the obstacles would be lifted. The United States would be pleased, France would project a good image, its signed agreements would be kept, and the Iraqis would pay for the equipment they received since the agreement only calls for a research center.

Unfortunately, "Caramel" is not completely viable as of now. Recent tests made it possible to operate the "Isis" reactor with "Caramel." But "Osiris" and especially "Osiraq" are unknowns in this respect. Some additional time would still be required—6 months, a year perhaps. Now, if "Osiraq" had been delivered within the projected deadlines, that is, in April 1979, it is obvious that the shipment of fuel should normally have followed. Today the only fuel possible is still that enriched uranium which some do not wish to export. In contrast, in 2 years many things will have changed. The three saboteurs of La Seyne-sur-Mer, even if they are unaware of it, have perhaps helped Israel—but they have also removed a very sharp pebble from the shoe of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

PSA'S ROJAS INTERVIEWED, PERSONAL ATTITUDES EXPLORED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Apr 79 pp 29, 31, 32

[Interview with the head of the Socialist Party of Andalusia (PSA), Alejandro Rojas Marcos, by Santiago Sanchez Traver]

[Text] A native-born Andalusian gentleman, "although I do not play the role," 38 years of age, married, separated on friendly terms, and with four children, he shouts "Long live Andalusia" whenever he gets the chance, as, for example, when he took his seat for the first time in the Cortes.

He was born and still lives on Conde Ibarra Street in Seville. His surname is deeply rooted in the zones of Moron de la Frontera and Marchena, where it is well-known because of the large tracts of land owned by his father and relatives.

The holder of a law degree, after spending 10 years with the Jesuits he ran a farm at the age of 16 and a cement factory at 24. By the time he was 30, he was already a "liberated man" belonging to a group called "Political Commitment of Andalusia."

With proper qualifications, he became a councilman in the family third in the Franco-run City Council of Seville, from which he resigned after a year, and a candidate for representative in the Cortes. Detained on several occasions, he was sentenced to 3 years in exile in Ecija for saying that "Franco had usurped the legitimate established power."

After the general passed away, he created the PSA, which 4 years later, this past 1 March, was to win him a deputy's seat representing Cadiz, while shocking political circles with its "Andalusian nationalism."

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CAMBIO 16's Santiago Sanchez Traver spoke with him on the eve of the post-election agreements for the Andalusian municipalities.

CAMBIO 16: What is Rojas Marcos in Seville?

Alejandro Rojas Marcos: Well, a member of a family of Seville landowners, with various pieces of property and with a strong monarchic tradition. One of my five great uncles, Manuel Rojas Marcos, was vice president of the Congress of Deputies and founded CORREO DE ANDALUCIA and the Catholic League Party. Another one, Jose Rojas Marcos, was a military man and an aide-de-camp of Prince Don Carlos.

C16: Alejandro Rojas Marcos did not get to be an advocate of the monarchy?

AR: At home we all were. Every Thursday we would go to our grandparents' house to eat and said an Our Father for the king, for Santiago, for Spain and for Franco. But, when I was a young boy I did not believe in a traditional monarchy but in a restoration of King Juan's monarchy as the only way out of the dictatorship. The influential men of the time, such as Tierno Galvan and Jimenez de Parga, believed the same thing.

C16: What is a young Andalusian gentleman?

AR: He is a prototype for whom a role in life has been prepared even before he emerges from his mother's womb, all the way from the money that he has to earn, the woman whom he has to marry and the way he has to bring up his children, to the political interests that he has to defend, in short, his choice of class.

C16: Is Alejandro Rojas Marcos a young Andalusian gentleman?

AR: I consider myself a young, native-born Andalusian gentleman, but I do not play the role, because shortly after emerging from my mother's womb I shattered the roles that they had prepared for me and sought my own role. I married the girl I wanted to marry, I'm bringing up my children the way I want to, and I have decided on my own choice of class. I have not made a choice in the sense of a choice of someone but based on my own interests as a man, because I have opted for the interests of the lower classes on my own account and I am struggling for a society in which all men are going to be happier.

C16: One would think that a young Andalusian gentleman does not have to work...

AR: I have always worked, ever since I was a student, because my father wanted us to fend for ourselves. At age 16 I ran a small farm, which

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did not belong to the family, for which I was paid 150 pesetas a month. Shortly thereafter, in partnership with the foreman of the farm, we began to buy cows, which we paid for with drafts of 1,500 pesetas a month. Among other people, I bought from Felipe Gonzalez's father, and that's when I met Felipe. When later bought a van and eventually distributed 2,000 liters a day of milk in Seville. The foreman of the farm was a man named Antonio Hidalgo and he was my chauffeur during the recent campaign.

C16: Did you continue working after this brief business venture?

AR: After I finished my studies I worked in Madrid under Professor Mariano Aguilar Navarro while I studied some politics and philosophy. I kept out of the family's businesses until 3 years later, when I joined Andaluza de Cementos to head the workers' organization. My family did not, moreover, own this company; it had more power in it than shares, less than 10 percent. Families like Soto Ybarra, Sanchez Ibarguen, Pablo Romero, etc, were involved in it...

C16: This Andalusian company had a crisis, and there were firings, changes, etc...and then it was sold, as far as I know, to a foreign holding company...

AR: I left in 1970, and the company crisis began in 1973. Among other things, I organized the first workers' assembly of the company's four work centers. It was held in Moron, and I presided at the assembly. The four employees' councils elected me chairman of the employees' council, and the company itself removed me. The Civil Guard was kept in its barracks for the duration of the assembly. That's when the problems began, until my involvement in politics became completely incompatible with my post, and I had to leave. I couldn't find work in Seville, and they offered me a post in a Madrid consulting firm. I accepted on the condition that I would not leave Seville, and so I went to work on Mondays and returned to my city on Thursdays.

C16: So you were free from that point on to get into politics. But when did the call to political life hit you?

AR: I always had one. I was already somewhat active when I was going to the university. During the fourth year I was detained in Oviedo because we were trying to get delegates elected and the university participation funds distributed. They nabbed me along with Diego Mir, Joaquin Caballero and Rafael Candau; they took us to General Directorate of Security (DGS) and released us.

When I completed my studies I went looking for people to set up a different sort of political group, with a certain degree of regional awareness. In 1965 I hooked up with Diego de los Santos, Luis Urumuela, Juan Carlos

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Aguilar...and we had a series of informal meetings until the group Political Commitment was created. Representing it, I attended the first democratic boards at the Cossio house in 1968 and 1969. The PCE [Spanish Communist Party], the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], our group and a number of independents were present at them at that time.

C16: After that, we know about how Political Commitment became the Socialist Alliance of Andalusia and then the PSA. Within this social context how can you explain your loss of class consciousness?

AR: I think that during my youth there were three decisive factors in this loss of class consciousness. The first was when my mother sent me to London at age 15 to learn English. That was a major shock, because here the official religion was that the workers had no rights whatsoever, and the comparison was inevitable. Another factor was my work, my trips to towns to get animals for the farm, my contacts with cowhands. And lastly, when I was in college, I took some courses for the training of HOAC [Workers Brotherhood of Catholic Action] leaders. There I met people who are worker militants today, and we would go around giving talks, one student and one worker. These were three milestones that shocked me with a reality that was quite different from the one that surrounded me before.

C16: This loss of class consciousness was to cause more than a few family traumas...

AR: It was very difficult, especially at the beginning. You have to keep in mind that my father spent 2 years in jail under sentence of death and that they brought him before the firing squad twice. The trauma could be compared to what I would suffer if one of my children became a fascist.

C16: People say that that's not the case, that Rojas Marcos's children (the oldest is 12) promise not to talk about politics when they go to stay with their grandparents at the ancestral home in Santander during the summer. Isn't that right?

AR: Yes; they are certainly politicized and very aware. They remember about the jail, the exile...and I've taken the trouble to explain it all to them. Naturally, everything clashes with their environment—their grandparents, their cousins; it's easier for the children of a worker.

C16: And what about the rest of the family?

AR: It was difficult for all of them at the beginning, with people talking and all that. They later came to respect me and today they find it hard not to vote for me. My three brothers and their wives have

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given me major support and have always identified with me and with what the party represents. My wife Isabel is a key element in all this. We began going out 22 years ago, and I read in some newspaper that I owe three-fourths of what I have accomplished in politics to her. It's true.

C16: We were at the outset of your political life. There was a period when you were involved in the politics of the Franco era, as a councilman and a candidate for Cortes representative...

AR: I was already part of the group, and we decided to take advantage of the elections for councilmen to gain some experience. We didn't expect to win anything, but the call came. I think that people voted for Rojas Marcos without knowing who I was. The official who administered me the oath during the first process proceedings asked me whether I was related to the Rojas Marcos who had been elected councilman. When I told him that that was me, he replied that he thought that he had voted for a gentleman like my father or grandfather, not a Red and a traitor. I joined the City Council in 1967 and left a year later. At each plenary session I brought up a specific issue during the requests and questions period. This annoyed Utrera Molina, who asked Mayor Felix Moreno to require councilmen to give written notice of what they were going to talk about. In light of this, I quit. Later on, we thought it would be a good idea if I ran for deputy, but I withdrew from the election. On another occasion we ran Diego de los Santos.

C16: But at one time you supposedly had some tempting offers from the Franco regime...

AR: I could have gotten wherever I wanted to under Franco, both in politics and in business. I was presented to Franco as the youngest councilman in Spain at the age of 25. With my family name and all that, I had no lack of offers.

C16: But in contrast, you had problems with the Franco regime...

AR: Yes. My first trial in the Court of Public Order (TOP) was for a lecture in Seville in 1968 on human rights. I was eventually acquitted, but as a result of the second trial I was exiled from Seville. During my exile I lived at the Astigi Inn in Ecija, and one time the police surrounded it when Democratic Junta was holding a meeting, and it was every man for himself.

C16: Within this political movement, when did you come to a nationalist awareness, when did you come across Blas Infante (an Andalusian nationalist ideologist)?

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AR: We had a regional awareness from the very beginning and we wanted to form a group with this trait. We came across Blas Infante along the way. We did not spring from him; we came across him. And we began with a youthful Blas Infante who was perhaps somewhat sloppy in his writings but who later became the mature, revolutionary Blas Infante.

C16: Do you have to be an articulate gentleman to work for Andalucia?

AR: No. Blas Infante was not a young gentleman; he was a notary, a professional who felt that concern. I am a young gentleman, but there have been articulate young gentlemen throughout the history of left-wing movements, because such young gentlemen have the benefits of culture, and then one of them eventually goes away and becomes alienated.

C16: Aside from Blas Infante, what impresses Alejandro Rojas Marcos? What does he like?

AR: Everything that Marcuse has written has had a profound impact on me, and also Lenin's "What To Do." I like to read biographies, and I would point in particular to Napoleon's and Virginia Wolfe's, which I am reading now. I like all kinds of music and I like to dance to the point of exhaustion. Sports too, and I've played many varieties, all of them badly.

C16: Is politics a sport too?

AR: To some people it becomes a competition or a horse race, but I see it as the defense of interests and a struggle for them.

C16: A struggle against someone, against the PSOE, the PCE...?

AR: I understand why our appearance in the political arena rubbed them the wrong way, because a left-wing force other than them was not supposed to emerge. That's why, in one way or another they have wanted to absorb us, but we've never been in danger of that, neither when we had contacts with the PSOE nor when we entered into an alliance with the PCE for the municipal elections. That alliance was a tactical move that we both needed. We, because we were exhausted and needed a prop, and they, because they were trying to absorb us. Once the circumstances that brought the alliance about disappeared, it broke up. But our relations have always been good, with great mutual respect.

C16: But not with the PSOE...

AR: I have known them since the democratic boards, which Alfonso Fernandez sat on, and I would say that from the very outset until today

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their attitude towards us has been marked by a complete absence of a sense of humor. First they said that we were part of "Christian Democracy," then the PCE, then the UCD [Democratic Center Union] or they called us "abertzales." I hope that one day our two parties come face to face and smile at each other, at the very least, because we recognize that the PSOE is the socialist chance for government power, but they have to recognize that we are the Andalusian option, which is nationalist and socialist.

C16: What happened to the PSA on 15 June 1977?

AR: That day, that night, I thought that it was time for the politics of truth, the time to show whether we were looking out for the interests of a people or looking for positions. The next day I got in my car and went all over Andalusia for 15 days, explaining to all of our party members that nothing had happened and that in politics you have to know how to lose.

C16: In January of this year Rojas Marcos became the lone leader of the PSA.

AR: That's just a story about me becoming the lone leader. We felt that for election purposes we should draw up a list, and it just so happened that I got to go first. It could have just as well been my two comrades, and perhaps it would have been better. And so, we decided that Cadiz would be our best bet.

C16: Then came 1 March and victory, although some people say that the Andalusian vote is one of feelings, not ideology.

AR: I felt the same thing on 1 March as I did on 4 December 1977. I felt that what we believed in was finally coming to the fore. It is an honor for us when people say that the Andalusian vote is based on feelings. That means that we were able to secure that vote from the soul of the Andalusian people, that we have set into motion the greatest thing that a man has.

C16: People also said that it was at the expense of the UCD, which provided economic support for the campaign.

AR: In general they did not say that. It was Alfonso Guerra and the PSOE that began saying that. Our accounts are open to any members who want to see them, and we have nothing but debts. We still have debts with the advertising agencies since 15 June, because no one wanted to work with us anymore.

C16: In that case, we should mention that you suddenly secured loans from the Banco Popular, the Banco de Andalucia...

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AR: Yes, we got loans, but unlike the other parties, we were asked for personal guarantees. More than 100 members are underwriting the loans, one fellow putting up his apartment, another his car. Logically, however, we no longer needed personal guarantees for the municipal elections.

C16: After the municipal elections your party became the arbitrator in many cities. Will they get any left-wing mayors?

AR: The mayors there have to be from the left, and our candidates are there for the people to vote for. Like all political parties, we have to negotiate and we are willing to do so, with our strength and our votes. It is blackmail to say that we have to give our votes to the left, because we're left-wing ourselves...We do not throw away our votes; we negotiate with them.

C16: And what if you ever fail to keep your word with your voters?

AR: We're just beginning to ride the crest of the wave. We're looking to go further, and we'll get a lot further. We might make mistakes, but the Andalusian nationalist movement is under way; the groundwork has been laid. It's fantastic to hear Carrillo, Felipe or Raventos talk about Andalusia during the first session of Congress.

C16: Let's make this hypothesis: if Blas Infante had been a deputy in Congress at the session of Suarez's investiture, how would he have voted?

AR: In exchange for the formation of a congressional group to assure that Andalusia would have a voice in the Cortes, he would have voted in favor. No one understands this better than he does, inasmuch as he tried to do this on two occasions.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

MILITARY MODERNIZATION EFFORT DISCUSSED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Apr 79 pp 45, 46

[Text] Although the navy's expansion plans call for the construction of 16 nuclear-powered submarines, in the short run Spain cannot be expected to acquire a single one of these units. "The fact is," Navy sources told CAMBIO 16, "this is luxury that so far only four countries have been able to afford: France, the United States, England and Russia."

It is, however, almost certain that the country will have its first nuclear-powered apparatus by 1985, the same sources asserted. This would be the French-made atomic submarine SNA-72, the first one of which, earmarked for the French Navy, will not roll off the assembly line until 1981.

"Therefore," reliable sources told this magazine, "we would logically have to wait a few more years to see the results before submitting an option to build them here under license."

In any case, Spain would thus become the first country to have atomic-powered submarines not equipped with strategic arms, in other words, missiles with nuclear warheads, "because it is unthinkable," the Ministry of Defense told CAMBIO 16, "that France, England or the United States would sell us nuclear weapons."

Moreover, the experts that this magazine consulted agreed that Spain lacked the technological and economic capability to build missiles that could carry atomic weapons. "Even though over the next few years we could build our own atomic bomb," military sources told this publication, "we would be at merely a World War II level. The U.S. nuclear missile development program took another 10 years and required several billion dollars in investment."

Translated into pesetas, this would mean that we would have to invest the entire state budget for at least 10 years in nuclear research in order to build a missile that could carry an atomic warhead and deliver it to the desired target, the sources added.

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So then, what is an SNA-72 submarine doing in a country like this one?

"It's not a ridiculous luxury," the Navy told CAMBIO 16. "In the case of a war with the countries of North Africa, for example, nuclear submarines would be the most effective weapons to prevent an invasion by sea and to defend the strait."

Better Than Nothing

Naturally, everything is not all that rosy. The French SNA-72 atomic submarine, on which the Spanish Navy has pinned all its hopes, can carry only 14 torpedoes, compared to the 24 of the non-nuclear "Agosta" subs that are now being built in Spain under French license and that are regarded as the highest rung of the ladder below the atomic-powered models. Spanish military circles do not consider its top speed of 25 knots exceptional either. Nevertheless, the same circles note, "it's better than nothing."

Another item is the U.S.-made supersonic jet that the Air Force is prepared to acquire. In less than 1 minute, the F-18, which McDonnell-Douglas will begin building in 1981, can climb to 18,000 meters and in less than 5 can intercept any enemy plane approaching the Spanish coast, starting, of course, from the military base closest to the site of the danger.

Its firepower is terrifying. The F-18's, which are equipped with a miniature on-board computer, can pinpoint and attack eight different targets at the same time.

Keeping Mechanics Happy

Even the mechanics should feel happy about having a plane like theirs, McDonnell-Douglas notes. The engines can be mounted and dismounted in less than 20 minutes. Therefore, with replacement engines, this plane requires less maintenance than any other.

Such sophistication costs money, and the Spanish Air Force is going to have to be on a bread and water diet for a long time if it wants to outfit itself with these modern devices.

The 144 units, or 8 squadrons, of this model that Spain wants to buy from the United States (not 72, as has been reported) are going to cost us an arm and a leg: almost 200 billion pesetas, our largest single arms purchase ever.

The last friendship and cooperation treaty between the two countries mentioned 72 of these planes, although at the time the Air Force Ministry wanted to buy the older F-16's instead of the F-18's.

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A few months ago, however, the Air Force made the decision to replace, starting in 1982, the "worn-out" U.S. Phantoms, almost all of them veterans of the Vietnam War, the Mirage III's, which performed so well for the Israelis during the Six Day War, and the old F-5's that were built in Spain under U.S. license.

"So," an Air Force colonel told CAMBIO 16, "we had to buy a new plane or boost our order from the United States. The decision will almost certainly be to acquire another 72 F-18's."

The F-18's are not all that the Air Force will be getting, of course. Four Orion P-3 reconnaissance and submarine detection aircraft will soon be joining the two that are now operating out of the Jerez military base. Nevertheless, military circles feel that there are not enough of these planes at present to cover the 5,289 kilometers of Spain's coasts, including the Canary Islands.

The Army, the most traditional branch of the Spanish Armed Forces, will be flipping a coin as to whether or not it should buy 288 British-made Shir Iran battle tanks.

These tanks, which are an improved version of the British Chieftain, were part of an enormous order of battle tanks that the Shah of Iran had placed with Her Imperial Majesty. However, since what the Shah does, the Ayatollah undoes, the British have had to keep their tanks and are trying to sell them to Madrid at bargain prices.

The Defense Ministry is seemingly interested in getting them under those terms, even though some 300 AMX-30 tanks have been built over the last few years in Seville under French license.

These combat tanks have been widely criticized, however, before leaving the factories for various mechanical problems, especially for having an out-of-phase and far from powerful motor, and for not being anything special as a weapon either.

"By buying the Chieftains," the Defense Ministry says, "the Army would be removing the thorn in its side that the AMX-30's represent. Even though the Chieftains are no great shakes as combat equipment either, their low cost would justify their purchase."

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

NEW PLANES FOR IBERIA—Iberia will invest 100 billion pesetas before 1981 to update its fleet. Among the new planes that will enter service over the next 24 months are 6 jumbo jets, 10 Boeing 727's, 3 D-10's and 5 Aviocars. The company's budget also includes 14 airbuses, which will reportedly be delivered starting in 1982. [Text]
[Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Apr 79 p 5] 8743

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