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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 6/79)



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INTERNATIONAL

ARTICLE EXAMINES BACKGROUND OF SALT-II TALKS

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 3, 1979 signed to press 5 Mar 79 pp 70-86

[Article by Rostislav Georgiyevich Tumkovskiy, senior researcher, Institute of the United States and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences, specialist in the field of U.S. military policy: "Soviet-American Talks on the Limitation of Strategic Arms." Passages in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) became possible only thanks to the quarter-century struggle of the Soviet Union to strengthen its security and that of its allies, during the strategic nuclear arms race unleashed against it by US ruling circles. The main trend in this struggle was overcoming the stubborn US desire to achieve decisive nuclear superiority in order to by force solve to its advantage the fundamental contradiction of the contemporary epoch--the contradiction between socialism and capitalism.

Multilateral talks on disarmament within UN frameworks preceded bilateral Soviet-American talks. On 19 June 1946 at the UN Atomic Commission the USSR put forth a draft international convention on complete and unconditional prohibition of the production and employment of atomic weapons. The draft convention had as its foundation recognition of the principle of equality and equal security of all signatories. However, during discussion of the Soviet proposal in the Atomic Commission, the US succeeded in diverting it and instead proposed the so-called Baruch Plan, which was directed towards strengthening the American nuclear monopoly. It did not envision any specific nuclear disarmament measures. Its authors considered disarmament as a matter for the distant future. Naturally, the "Baruch Plan" was rejected by the Soviet Union. Thus were noted two opposing approaches to the problem of nuclear disarmament: the Soviet approach directed towards achievement of equality and equal security for all states, and the American approach designed to insure US military superiority. During further disarmament talks the United States repeatedly put forth "initiatives," which however invariably contained attempts to achieve unilateral military superiority to the detriment of the USSR.

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This problem attracted the close attention of Soviet scholars.¹ Examined in this article is the contemporary stage of Soviet-American talks on the limitation of strategic arms.

/1. American propaganda and the realities of the arms race./ In response to questions from the German Social Democrat Party weekly VORWAERTS, CPSU General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev underscored that "the arms race developed on the principle of 'action-reaction': the West put forth the challenge, the Soviet Union had to accept it. So it was during the entire period from the first atomic bomb to the present day. And, the beginning of each new spiral in the arms race is invariably accompanied by a new wave of wailing about the 'Soviet threat'.² The U.S.A. was invariably the initiator in this race. Forced to consider world public opinion, U.S. leaders in order to justify their regular militaristic steps invariably turned to the false thesis of the "Soviet threat," striving to shift the responsibility for the arms race to the Soviet Union. First the USSR is said to have "threatening" intentions, and then the necessity is expressed to develop arms for their "neutralization."

Each successive round in the arms race was justified in this manner. In the mid-1950's, to provide a "basis" for a spurt in nuclear-capable aircraft, the U.S.A. announced that the Americans supposedly lagged behind the USSR in strategic aviation ("the bomber gap"). For the purpose of overcoming this lag first the H. Truman administration and then the D. Eisenhower administration began unprecedented programs to build strategic bombers and accumulate nuclear and thermonuclear bombs. The U.S.A. simultaneously began a broad program of construction of air bases for strategic bombers on the territories of allied states near USSR borders.³ The role of main striking force fell to strategic aviation. Masked by the thesis of the "bomber gap," in the 1950's the U.S.A. brought the number of bombers to almost 2,000.⁴

In the late 1950's and early 1960's Pentagon leaders, preparing a new round in the arms race--the nuclear missile round--again put forth assertions about the "Soviet threat." This time they linked it with a so-called "missile gap" with the USSR. U.S. Secretary of Defense N. McElroy announced in 1959 that the Soviet Union was capable in a short time of creating large intercontinental ballistic missile forces (up to 1,500 units in 1963) and of significantly overtaking the United States.⁵ McElroy's successor R. McNamara by 1962 had already called the thesis of the "missile gap" a myth. Nonetheless, under its cover, the J. Kennedy administration deployed the nuclear missile component of its strategic forces--intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and ballistic missiles on missile-equipped submarines (SLBM).

Nor is the modern stage in the arms race an exception. Placing a "base" beneath the program of deploying missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (RGCh) [MIRV], Washington began to assert that the Soviet Union possessed the capability of conducting limited nuclear war against the U.S.A.⁶ Because of this the task was assigned so that the U.S.A. would possess the same capability. This, in particular, also served as a pretext for a new stage in the arms race. L. I. Brezhnev in a conversation with leading American political

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figure A. Harriman expressed the Soviet position on limited nuclear war. Information on this conversation presented the American leader's words "that L. I. Brezhnev categorically disagreed with the theories being developed by someone in the U.S.A. of so-called 'limited' nuclear war. The Soviet leader emphasized Harriman, thinks that it is a big mistake to talk about the permissibility of 'limited' nuclear war. One must add to this the exclusion of any type of nuclear war whatsoever."

The main goal which the U.S.A. pursued in initiating new spirals of the arms race was the desire by American ruling circles to achieve military-technical and strategic superiority over the USSR.

The Soviet Union's imperative actions in the area of creating and deploying new strategic weapon systems undoubtedly had a reciprocal nature. L. I. Brezhnev specially underscored this aspect of the problem: "Those circles in the U.S.A. and in the countries allied with it, which are against detente, strive to spur on the arms race, and are now trying to shift the responsibility for this race on the Soviet Union. This is a clear distortion of reality. . . Generally-known facts show that the arms race and competition in creation of the most dangerous types of mass destruction weapons were forced upon us. We did not initiate creation of atomic bombs, submarines with strategic missiles, cluster warheads, and many others."⁸

J. F. Dulles once wrote: "Such rapid assimilation by the Soviets of atomic bomb production is truly a gigantic success for the Soviet Union and the end of the U.S. nuclear monopoly will exert such a far-reaching influence on the world situation that it is now difficult to imagine. . . Ending our monopoly, the Soviet Union in so doing radically changed the strategic situation in its favor. The capability of the United States to drop nuclear bombs on Russia has been neutralized to a significant degree by the latter's capability to drop nuclear bombs on the United States and Western Europe."⁹ Having lost nuclear weapon monopoly, the U.S.A. relied upon thermonuclear weapons. However, the Soviet Union solved this problem ahead of the U.S.A. The USSR tested the world's first thermonuclear charge on 12 August 1953. Evaluating the military and political consequences of this fact for the U.S.A., the then American Secretary of the Air Force T. Finletter wrote: "The hydrogen bomb has changed the entire situation." "In this instance," he continued, "the security of our nation has been affected in a different way than was the case with the appearance of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb in 1945-1954 was not a mortal threat for the United States. For four years of these nine we alone possessed the atomic bomb. During the remaining five years the Russians did not have a sufficient quantity of these bombs to destroy the United States. Now in a short time the Russians will have a sufficient number of hydrogen bombs so that a small portion will be capable of destroying the United States."¹⁰

In the 1950's the USSR built its intercontinental bombers in response to the sharp growth in the number of U.S. strategic bombers. Evaluating the consequences of the Soviet response, H. Kissinger wrote in 1957: "Creation in the Soviet Union of intercontinental bombers capable of flying enormous distances and returning to their bases, along with the increase in the Soviet reserves of nuclear weapons, was the cause of the fundamental change in the strategic balance of forces in the postwar period."¹¹

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The USSR responded to the nuclear missile round of the arms race initiated in the 1960's by the U.S.A. by strengthening of its own nuclear missile potential. In early 1963 U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara was forced to admit that the Soviet Union's reciprocal measures to increase its defense capability do not give the U.S.A. the capability through a preemptive nuclear missile strike to destroy Soviet strategic forces and escape the corresponding response from the USSR.¹² This conclusion has not lost its significance even today. Is it possible to overestimate its military-political significance? the strategic might of the USSR deters imperialist nuclear aggression. "We have created strategic forces, which are a reliable means of deterring any aggressor," L. I. Brezhnev pointed out. "And, we will respond with the requisite increase in military power which guarantees our defense to any new attempts from any quarter to insure military superiority over the USSR. We can take no other course."¹³

It is evident from the American evaluations presented above that, thanks to the timely and decisive reciprocal measures of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. practically speaking has been unable to achieve nuclear superiority over the USSR that would give it the capability of unleashing nuclear war without catastrophic consequences for itself. The temporary lead in elaboration and deployment of new strategic weapon systems only gave visibility to that superiority which the U.S.A. has on every occasion strived to use for the purposes of conducting a "from a position of strength" policy.

This very failure in attempts to achieve nuclear missile superiority forced American military and political leaders to formally recognize the already long established strategic nuclear parity of the USSR and U.S.A. President R. Nixon in 1971 was forced to note that the Soviet Union had changed from a position of lagging behind in the field of strategic weapons "to a position analogous to that of the U.S.A."¹⁴ The parity was characterized by the following indicators: both the USSR and U.S.A. have a strategic triad (ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bombers), while the balance of these components within the strategic forces of the two sides does not coincide quantitatively. Recognition by the American side of the state of Soviet-American nuclear parity was the necessary political prerequisite for Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation.

/2. Soviet-American agreements on strategic arms limitation./ Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks began in Helsinki on 17 November 1969. Two and a half years later, on 26 May 1972, L. I. Brezhnev and R. Nixon in Moscow signed the first Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreements: the Treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

It is known that creation of nuclear missiles directed attention to development of ABM. Research and development (NIOKR) in the ABM area began in the U.S.A. in the mid-1950's practically simultaneously with the beginning of work on ICBMs. In September 1967 McNamara announced the decision by President L. Johnson to build a limited territorial ABM system named Sentinel. Its first elements were to protect the 25 most important cities in the U.S.A. and the second to protect up to 52 cities. The U.S.A. ABM buildup created new prerequisites for a strategic offensive arms race. The Nixon Administration which replaced the Johnson

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government reexamined the decision about building the Sentinel system due to its low combat effectiveness and strategic inadvisability.¹⁵

The agreement between the USSR and the U.S.A. with respect to a mutual limitation on ABM systems was reflected in the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in paragraph 2, Art. I, which states that "each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense." As an exception the Parties were allowed only to have two regions each protected by an ABM system, each with a radius of 150 km: one with the nation's capital as the center and one in the area where ICBM silos are located.¹⁶ The Parties also pledged not to modernize ABM launchers for the purpose of increasing their combat effectiveness and simultaneously undertook not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which were sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based, i.e., those differing in design from the already existing system. A very important element of the Treaty was the agreement on national technical means of verification.¹⁷ It provided assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. Pledges were made not to interfere with the national technical means of verification and not to conceal verification targets (Art. XII). The ABM Treaty does not have a time limit. A consultative commission consisting of representatives of the Parties, which must examine progress in its implementation every five years, was created to monitor implementation. Having signed this Treaty, the USSR and U.S.A. ruled out an arms race in the area of strategic defensive weapons systems, and in so doing eliminated one of the incentives for an arms race in the area of strategic offensive weapons systems.

The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed for a five-year period. It placed limitations on the missile components of the strategic forces. The Parties undertook not to start construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers after 1 July 1972. In addition, they undertook not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time. As to the underwater strategic force component, an agreement was reached to limit SLBM launchers and modern ballistic submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of the Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines (Art. III). In other words, the Parties agreed to allow each to build new ballistic missile submarines in a specific manner for each Party, but given the condition that an equal number of old submarine or ICBM launchers which became operational prior to 1964 is dismantled. This was a freeze of the quantitative level of ICBM launchers and ballistic missiles on ballistic missile submarines. National technical means of verification monitor compliance with the Interim Agreement as well as with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (Art. V).¹⁸

In essence, signing of the Interim Agreement signified the recognition by the American side of the defeat of the basic policy of the U.S.A. in the arms race

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unleashed by it against the Soviet Union calculated to achieve a decisive quantitative superiority over the USSR in the sphere of strategic delivery vehicles. In addition, it affirmed the effectiveness of the USSR's reciprocal measures to strengthen its defense and deter imperialist nuclear aggression. The political significance of this victory of the Soviet Union in the arms race unleashed against it can hardly be overevaluated.

As opposed to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Interim Agreement will not contain provisions prohibiting modernization of strategic offensive weapon systems. This circumstance is a direct result of the desire by the American side to "combine" diametrically-opposed political policies--continuation of the qualitative strategic arms race with negotiations about their limitation. Soon after the start of the strategic arms limitation talks, in March 1970, the Nixon Administration announced the decision to reequip a large portion of the ICBM and SLBM force with new missile systems--Minuteman-3 and Poseidon (respectively) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV)¹⁹ vice those with single warheads. Testing of the new missiles was completed in 1969. This decision was the first act in a new qualitative round of the arms race. On its heels was the announcement concerning stepping up development of new strategic weapon systems: the Trident SLBM²⁰, the B-1 heavy supersonic strategic bomber, and cruise missiles.

The American military and political leadership, besides the usual references to the "Soviet threat," cited that the development and deployment of the new strategic weapons systems would supposedly serve the interests of "limiting" the arms race. Responding to questions from members of Congress relative to the Moscow agreements of 1972, Kissinger stated: "In our opinion, we must continue accomplishment of those strategic programs which are permitted under the agreement, and scientific research and development in spheres which are encompassed by the agreement. . . (having in mind the Interim Agreement--R.T.). Our experience shows that the program being accomplished will not serve as an obstacle for the agreement but, on the contrary, might speed up its achievement." And further: "it is considered that our power, if you will, will give them (the USSR--R.T.) an additional incentive to conduct the talks."²¹ This approach to the talks received a special name in the U.S.A.--"bargaining chips." It is not difficult to see that this concept contradicts the principle of equality and equal security.

All initiatives by the U.S.A. in developing new models of strategic weapons were calculated to provide specific military and political advantages. It is natural that the Soviet Union was forced to take the requisite reciprocal measures to strengthen its own defense potential. The example of the deployment of missile systems gives convincing evidence of this. The Nixon Administration's decision in 1970 on this question was another attempt by the American side to achieve unilateral military advantages. But, this only impeded preparation of a new strategic arms limitation agreement. Soviet responses led to the fact that the U.S.A. was forced in 1974 to make an agreement in Vladivostok with the USSR on establishment of identical numerical levels for this type of system.²² Senator G. McGovern, evaluating the results of their deployment, announced at the Senate Armed Services Committee: "In 1969 we were ahead in MIRV technology. During that period there were proposals to delay testing and deployment of missiles with warheads of this type until conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. But the Pentagon did not want to

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hear this. We tested and deployed MIRV'd missiles and achieved a temporary advantage relative to the Soviet Union. At the present time the Soviet Union is deploying its MIRV'd missiles and apparently in a short time we will find ourselves in a worse position as compared to that in which we would have found ourselves if deployment of MIRV'd missile systems had been avoided by both sides. The identical people who insisted that we unilaterally deploy MIRV'd missile systems are now complaining that the Soviet Union has a throw weight advantage and that Soviet MIRV's are more dangerous to us than ours are to them."²³

In 1972 Moscow agreements, like the Vladivostok agreements of 1974, noted the defeat of the American strategic arms race policy. The reciprocal actions of the USSR destroyed all attempts by the U.S.A. to achieve nuclear superiority and to employ it in the interests of its imperialistic policy. However, due to the fact that the military and political leadership of the U.S.A. has moved the arms race to the qualitative sphere, these agreements had not stopped the latter.

/3. Soviet-American talks on development of a second agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT-2)./ In accordance with Art. VII of the Interim Agreement, the USSR and the U.S.A. undertook "to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms." Experience in talks at the first stage and the evident contradiction in the approach by the American side to the strategic arms limitation problem caused the necessity for preliminary development of a coordinated decision concerning the basic principles of the talks. In 1973 during the visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the U.S.A. the Basic Principles of Negotiations on Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons were signed. The U.S.A. and USSR undertook to make "serious efforts to work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more complete measures of limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing it in 1974." Here "the Parties will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the USSR and the U.S.A." It was also pointed out that "limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons can apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement," that these limitations "must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means," and the question of modernization and replacement of strategic offensive weapons must be solved in compliance with the conditions to be formulated in agreements to be concluded.²⁴ Thus, the agreement on basic principles of negotiations was directed against possible future attempts to insure unilateral military advantages in skirting a future strategic arms limitation agreement.

A working visit between CC CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President G. Ford was held near Vladivostok on 23-24 November 1974. During the meeting an agreement on the main content of the SALT-2 agreement was achieved. A joint Soviet-American announcement stated: "The new agreement, being based upon the principles of equality and equal security, will include the following limitations: a) both Parties will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles; b) both Parties will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple

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independently targetable reentry vehicles."²⁵ Precisely, the agreement included the following restrictions: a) each Party will have the right to have in total within its strategic forces no more than 2,400 nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. Included in this total are ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers, i.e., envisioned is a restriction on all three strategic force components; b) within the stated limits each Party received the right to have 1,320 ballistic missiles with MIRVs. ICBMs and SLBMs can be included in this limit.²⁶

L. I. Brezhnev and G. Ford came to the conclusion that there were favorable prospects to conclude the development of the new agreement in 1975.²⁷ This decision, as is known, was not fulfilled. The American administration violated its pledges. Here it employed an approach analogous to that used during deployment of missile systems with MIRVs. The U.S. Defense Department announced an intention to complete the development and then to deploy a new weapons system--strategic cruise missiles.²⁸

Guided by the Vladivostok agreement on limiting nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, the Soviet Union at the SALT talks put forth a completely logical proposal--to include strategic cruise missiles in this limit which would make it possible even given the availability of U.S. cruise missiles to conclude a new agreement on strategic arms limitation. But, it was this very circumstance that did not suit the American side. Its representatives began to assert that the limit established in Vladivostok for nuclear weapons delivery vehicles included only ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy strategic bombers, but not cruise missiles. This approach opened a channel for a completely unrestricted arms race in a new area.²⁹ And, this contradicted both the very idea of limiting strategic arms, as well as the principle of equality and equal security. Therefore, it was rejected by the USSR as being unacceptable.

It became clear to the broad international society that the U.S.A. had violated the Vladivostok agreement and it was their fault that development of a new agreement was being delayed. In order to ameliorate the unpleasant impression, the Ford Administration "modified" its position. The U.S.A. expressed the willingness to conclude an agreement with the USSR on limitation of its cruise missiles in exchange for a limitation on the deployment of the Soviet bomber referred to as Backfire in the West. But, this American proposal compared non-equivalent weapons systems. The fact of the matter is that the point of the strategic arms limitation talks is the limitation of strategic weapons systems. The Backfire is not such a system (the Backfire has a flight radius of 2,200 km and therefore cannot reach the territory of the U.S.A.).³⁰ As concerns cruise missiles, it is an entirely different matter: their flight range is 2,500 km; these missiles, according to plans published in the U.S.A., are to be placed aboard B-52 heavy strategic bombers, on submarines, and on the territory of U.S. allies. These aircraft and submarines are capable of taking the cruise missiles to a launch area from which they can destroy targets on the territory of the USSR. The same thing will take place when cruise missiles are deployed on the territories of the allies of the U.S.A. in NATO and other aggressive blocs.

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L. I. Brezhnev repeatedly explained to Ford, in particular during the meeting in Helsinki, and then to President J. Carter that the Backfire case involves a medium range bomber, not a strategic bomber.³¹ Nonetheless, the American side continued to insist on its proposal. A loud propaganda campaign, the tone set by members of the Congress, was unleashed in the U.S.A. in support of this position. Congressmen demanded that Backfire be included in the nuclear weapons delivery vehicle limit agreed to in Vladivostok, but that cruise missiles not be included in this limit.³² As a result, the Ford Administration broke the Vladivostok agreement about concluding a second SALT agreement by 1975, sacrificing it to the supporters of the continuation of the arms race. After defeat in the 1976 elections Ford expressed regret that he had not signed this agreement. The same time he in fact recognized that the obstacles created by his administration had an artificial, premeditated nature.

U.S. Defense Secretary H. Brown and Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Z. Brzezinski, with the participation of Senator H. Jackson, led the development of the Carter Administration's position at the SALT talks. Proposals which they developed were taken by Secretary of State C. Vance to Moscow at the end of March 1977. During his talks with L. I. Brezhnev and A. A. Gromyko, he put forth two proposals to limit strategic arms: a "comprehensive," and an alternative "limited" proposal. At first glance the "comprehensive" proposal went even "farther" than the Vladivostok agreement. It proposed a reduction in the total levels of nuclear weapon delivery systems established in Vladivostok from 2,400 to 2,000-1,800 units, as well as a reduction in the level of MIRV'd missiles from 1,320 to 1,200-1,100 units. But, a requirement was put forth here that realization of the new conditions must be accompanied in the USSR by a reduction by a factor of two in the number of missiles which in the U.S.A. are called "too heavy" or "much too effective."³³

The attention paid by the American side to the specific type of Soviet missiles is far from accidental. These are the very ones that were the response to the American initiative to begin a qualitative arms race. This circumstance was emphasized in the report at the Conference of the Socialist International on Disarmament (Helsinki, April 1978) by B. N. Ponomarev, CC CPSU Secretary and CC CPSU Politburo candidate member. "In the early 1970's," he stated, "Washington made the decision to build MIRV'd missiles, which increased by several times the number of American nuclear warheads. And these Soviet missiles which are now causing a racket in the West again were the response to the next spiral in the arms race caused by the U.S.A."³⁴

Consequently, beneath the externally-respectable pretext of a general reduction in the levels of strategic forces, the new United States proposal hid an attempt by the American side to impede the reciprocal measures by the Soviet Union to strengthen its security and preserve for the U.S.A. the advantage in the number of nuclear warheads guaranteed delivery to targets.

It was proposed in the "comprehensive" proposal to include in the draft agreement prohibition against development of new weapons systems. However, actually it envisioned prohibition against development of new weapons systems which, according to American data, are supposedly being developed in the USSR and did not envision any restrictions on such weapons systems being developed in the U.S.A. (strategic

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cruise missiles, the Trident SLBM, and others). According to evaluations by several western specialists, the Carter proposals led to an almost complete halt in the Soviet programs of strategic force modernization, leaving the corresponding American programs untouched. Thus, the "comprehensive" proposal contradicted the principle of equality and equal security of the Parties.

Formulated in the "limited" proposal was the idea of signing an agreement on limiting the number of ballistic missiles and strategic bombers, but the question of cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber was put aside.³⁵ This proposal, firstly, repeated the Ford Administration's position which refused to include cruise missiles in the Vladivostok agreement; secondly, it admitted the artificial nature of the connection propounded by the American side between American cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber; thirdly, it gave visibility to a concession by the American side, which was ready not to examine this connection if the USSR agreed to unlimited deployment of cruise missiles in the U.S.A. Consequently, the "limited" proposal insured that the United States had a free hand in the arms race due to the cruise missiles.

The unacceptability of both American proposals was evident. Therefore, they were rejected by the Soviet side.

One overall trait shows through the activities of the Ford and Carter administrations--in a unilateral manner they revised previously-achieved agreements on strategic arms limitation. The Ford Administration revised its pledges at the Vladivostok agreement, and, in essence, backed away from the basic principles of negotiations on further limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The Carter Administration completely conducted itself as if these agreements did not exist. All these activities introduced instability in Soviet-American relations and in no way facilitated trust and respect for American pledges and confidence in the viability of agreements signed by the U.S.A.

Opposite the American policy was the Soviet policy directed toward firm compliance with pledges previously made. During the talks with Vance, it was pointed out from the Soviet side that a new agreement on strategic arms limitation must be developed on the foundation already laid at Vladivostok. A. A. Gromyko underscored this at a 31 March 1977 press conference after the talks began: "We want the edifice built in Vladivostok with such difficulty and on which so many intellectual and other resources were spent to not only be retained, but that the matter be brought to a close and that a new agreement be concluded between the USSR and U.S.A. on strategic arms limitation."³⁶

Intense efforts on the part of the USSR were required in order to move the strategic arms limitation talks off dead center. A shift was noted only after A. A. Gromyko met President Carter in Washington on 22 September 1977. In talks which followed thanks to the constructive approach by the Soviet delegation agreement was reached on a number of questions, primarily concerning strategic cruise missiles. The Parties agreed that cruise missiles with a flight range of 600-2,500 km would be subjected to limitation along with other strategic weapon systems such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. Here the Parties undertook that only B-52 heavy strategic bombers could be equipped in the U.S.A. with air-ground cruise missiles. It was simultaneously agreed to equate them

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to strategic missiles with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles and to include them in the limit established for such delivery vehicles. Air-ground cruise missiles with a flight range in excess of 2,500 km were completely prohibited. As concerns cruise missiles with a flight range in excess of 600 meters intended for deployment on land and aboard maritime vessels and submarines, it was agreed to prohibit their testing and deployment initially for a three-year period. The deferment was intended to give the Parties additional time to work out a final solution.³⁷ These agreements opened up prospects for signing a new strategic arms limitation agreement.

However, when there was success at the talks, criticism was unleashed by the ruling circles in the United States about progress in the talks and the positions of the Parties on several problems and overall. The "information leak" about the talks beginning in October 1977 became the source for such criticism.

In connection with the strategic arms limitation talks the Carter Administration had much greater cooperation with the Congress than had previous administrations. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee headed by Senator J. Sparkman and the Arms Control Subcommittee headed by Senator H. Jackson systematically and in detail were kept informed about progress in the talks. The consideration here was that the Congress would have to ratify the new agreement.³⁸ According to American press information, the subcommittee headed by Jackson, as well as responsible government figures, were the source of the "information leak."

Among the many "critical" speeches connected with the strategic arms limitation talks, two main trends can be discerned: supporters of the first hope "to adjust" the agreement in order to provide the United States unilateral military advantages, and the supporters of the second speculate about the "Soviet threat." The former especially stubbornly speak out against limitations on cruise missiles, asserting that this is an unjustified "concession" to the Soviet Union. They add for the United States the right to place these missiles not only on the number of heavy bombers agreed to by the participants in the talks, but also on any other aircraft, including heavy transports.³⁹ Such an approach would open the way to an unlimited and practically uncontrollable increase in the number of cruise missiles. At the same time, it is proposed not to extend limitations on land-based and sea-based cruise missiles. The idea here is to have the prospect of deploying the former on submarines in maritime areas adjacent to the territory of the USSR and the latter on the territory of countries allied with the United States, primarily the NATO countries, also close to the Soviet borders. Also envisioned is the capability when the three-year protocol runs out of transferring cruise missiles to third countries in circumvention of the strategic arms limitation agreement.⁴⁰ All of these "corrections" in the final analysis have the goal of undermining the principles of equality and equal security of the Parties and simultaneously complicating and destroying preparations for a new agreement on limitation of strategic arms.

Those who support the concept of the "Soviet threat" assert that, during the talks, the United States made too many concessions to the USSR. They also put forth the thesis that the Soviet Union had violated earlier agreements on the limitation of strategic arms. In a report at the IX session of the USSR Supreme Soviet

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A. A. Gromyko noted with respect to similar statements: "Both in the Soviet Union and in the United States it is recognized that both Parties are complying with all provisions of the agreement on the limitation of both defensive and offensive strategic arms. The standing consultative commission made up of representatives of the USSR and the United States, convening specially to monitor progress in compliance by both Parties of pledges made, found not a single fact of violation of these agreements. . . Only unscrupulous and irresponsible cry babies could permit themselves to accuse the USSR of nonfulfillment of pledges in the agreement with the United States referred to above. And, this is being done with a clear goal--to hinder the talks, especially on further measures with respect to limitation on strategic arms and to inflict harm on Soviet-American relations."⁴¹

The problem of strategic arms modernization also attracted the close attention of SALT critics. As is known, the Soviet Union, basing itself on the principle of equality and equal security and taking into consideration the American position, proposed while the three-year protocol was in force the Parties undertake to prohibit new ICBMs and SLBMs with MIRVs. The American delegation proposed during the life of the protocol to prohibit only all types of land-based ICBMs, both with MIRVs as well as without them.⁴² The goal of this U.S. proposal is: to halt accomplishment of the Soviet programs to modernize strategic forces and to retain a free hand in realization of American modernization programs such as the new Trident SLBM system with Trident-1 missiles, cruise missiles, and mobile ICBMs. It is not difficult to see that before us is a renovated version of the "comprehensive" variant rejected by the Soviet Union. The broad propaganda campaign "of criticism" of the strategic arms limitation agreement being developed, in the opinion of those who are spurring the campaign on, was designed to create an atmosphere of mistrust towards it and towards the USSR in American public opinion, and in the Congress and, in the final analysis, to hinder or wreck its ratification by the Senate. Supporters of "corrections" to the agreement are attempting to use this threat to pressure the Soviet Union.

Supporters of the agreement in the United States express an entirely different point of view. Thus, the following appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES on 17 November 1977 in an article by military observer R. Burt: The main argument in support of the new agreement is that, although it may not be ideal, it is much better than no agreement at all. In Burt's opinion "a fear of uncontrolled competition in the field of arms and the danger of a serious breakdown in American-Soviet relations can exert a decisive effect and tip the scales to the advantage of the government," having insured ratification of the agreement. H. Scoville, arms control specialist and former scientific consultant to the U.S. Defense Department, CIA, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, speaking in support of the agreement, stated: "I submit that if it is not ratified then this will be the greatest catastrophe for our security, as well as for our pocketbook."⁴³ The propagandistic campaign of criticizing SALT and the agreement worked out during the talks could not but complicate achievement of an agreement between the United States and the USSR. Concerning information leaks about progress in the talks and about the positions of the Parties organized by opponents of detente in the Congress, the then head of the American delegation at the talks P. Warnke said that such a leak plays into the hands of the opponents of the new agreement.⁴⁴

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Agreement opponents are trying "to link" the talks and the possibility of their signing with other political problems that have no relation whatsoever to them and to use this "linkage" as a means of pressuring the Soviet Union (in particular, Z. Brzezinski uses this tack). But those in the United States who realistically look at things understand the potentially dangerous consequences of such an approach for SALT. For example, on 8 March 1978 a NEW YORK TIMES editorial stated: "This tactic does not provide results, but could destroy the fragile framework of control over arms." The policy of "linkage" undoubtedly impedes improvement in Soviet-American relations and conclusion of a new strategic arms limitation agreement.

The broad and malicious propaganda campaign surrounding SALT is a new phenomenon in United States political life in comparison to debates surrounding the 1972 Moscow agreements. Its purpose is to exert pressure on the USSR position by threatening to wreck ratification of the agreement, as well as to justify the delay in the talks themselves. The organized association of opponents of the policy of peaceful coexistence, and in particular strategic arms limitation agreements as well, is another new phenomenon in United States political life. The Committee on the Present Danger, made up of a number of reactionary anti-Soviet leaning U.S. political, military, and public figures, was set up in 1976. The Committee unleashed a broad campaign of criticism of the strategic arms limitation agreements being prepared. The Coalition for Peace with Strength appeared in 1978. It consisted of congressmen known for their conservative views. This coalition also included such reactionaries as Senators B. Goldwater and R. Helms, as well as R. Reagan, R. Dole, and others. The American military elite is widely represented in the "coalition": secretaries of the Navy and Air Force W. Mitteldorf and T. Reed, former JCS chairmen Adm T. Moorer and Gen L. Lemnitzer, former DIA director Gen Graham, former chief of USAF Intelligence Gen Keegan, and others. Collective members making up the "coalition" included such reactionary groups as the American Conservative Union, the American Security Council, Association of Former Intelligence Officers, Council for the Struggle Against Communist Aggression, and "Organizations" of outcasts and traitors set up by the CIA. J. Fisher, one of the co-chairmen of the "coalition," described the political platform of his organization at a press conference in the Congress: rejection of the principle of equality in relations with the Soviet Union and insuring overall military and technical superiority over the USSR, intensification of subversive activities by American special services, rejection of any agreements on arms control if they place in jeopardy U.S. "national security" (it goes without saying how "coalition" members define the latter), and the struggle against communism throughout the world.⁴⁵

Participating in igniting the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign also are leaders of the present U.S. administration. In his speech at Wake Forest University on 17 March 1978 Carter accused the Soviet Union of supposedly "demonstrating an evil (!) inclination to employ its military might and to interfere in local conflicts." The President spoke of a "important reevaluation" of United States military strategy. It followed from his speech that the present administration intends to shift the center of gravity in foreign policy from the previously-announced course of insuring national security through negotiations, limiting the arms race, and intensification of detente to a policy of threats and applying

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pressure. The President underscored that he will not deviate from taking measures towards full-scale development and deployment of new strategic weapons systems.⁴⁶

The Soviet Union continues to carry on the steadfast struggle for deterring the arms race and signing with the United States mutually-acceptable agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The final months of 1978 were marked by a number of high-level Soviet-American meetings: on 30 September 1978 A. A. Gromyko discussed the problem of preparing the SALT-2 agreement in Washington with J. Carter and L. I. Brezhnev received C. Vance in the Kremlin on 23 October 1978. During this meeting the main attention was devoted to questions concerning the signing of the SALT-2 agreement between the USSR and the United States. The Parties noted the constructive and positive nature of the talks which occurred in Moscow and announced their determination to exert all efforts and bring this important matter to a close. Talks between A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance took place in Geneva on 22-23 December 1978. Main attention in these talks was devoted to an examination of questions concerning the limitation of strategic offensive arms on the plane of completing preparations for the new agreement in the shortest possible time. Achieved here was agreement or a rapprochement in the positions of the Parties on a number of basic questions where disagreements remained. Determination was expressed by both Parties to come to an agreement on the remaining questions through normal channels between Moscow and Washington.

The positive results of the meeting were noted in the announcement made by Vance upon returning to Washington. "We recognize that agreement on strategic arms limitation without delay has important significance for peace. We however--the U.S. Secretary of State underscored-- are not tied into any kind of deadline."⁴⁷ During a number of press conferences and television interviews conducted by Carter in January 1979, he repeatedly expressed the conviction that a SALT-2 agreement would soon be concluded. The European participants in the conference held in early January 1979 in Guadalupe between U.S. President Carter, French President V. Giscard d'Estaing, British Prime Minister J. Callaghan, and FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt emphasized the importance of the policy of detente and the necessity to sign a new SALT agreement. FRG Chancellor Schmidt and British Prime Minister J. Callaghan made a direct appeal to the U.S. Senate to ratify as rapidly as possible the Soviet-American SALT-2 agreement as soon as it is signed. Public opinion polls in the United States show that 75-80 percent of Americans support signing the SALT-2 agreement.

However, the Carter Administration's policy continues to be contradictory: it attempts to combine two opposite processes--the limitation of strategic offensive arms and continuance of the arms race. This was clearly demonstrated during the U.S. President's State of the Union speech at a joint session of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. Carter announced that almost all problems at the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks had already been solved, but, at the same time, without foundation he asserted that achievement of an agreement "reliable and deserving of confidence" somehow depends upon the USSR position.⁴⁸ The President with this announcement cast a shadow on the policy of the Soviet Union at SALT and, in essence, supported those opponents of the agreement who assert that the USSR supposedly hardened its position

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at the talks and seeks an excuse for postponing signing of the agreement. The falsity of such assertions was so evident that literally three days later at a press conference in Washington Carter was forced to announce that "the Soviet Union is conducting the talks conscientiously. . .The Soviet Union has not hardened its position in the last month or two. Its position, just like ours, is sufficiently rigid. We are conducting very difficult talks and are achieving continued progress."⁴⁹

In the State of the Union speech mentioned above Carter called upon the Congress to approve the draft federal budget he presented for fiscal year 1980 which calls for unheard of military expenditures--138.2 billion dollars. It is evident from the President's speech that the United States as usual gives priority to the arms race in comparison to measures to limit it. This is reflected in the stepped-up development of new strategic weapons systems such as the MX ICBM, the Trident SLBM system, cruise missiles, and so on. In addition, the Pentagon levied the requirement to deploy American MRBMs on the territories of the NATO countries in Western Europe. Thus, what we have is an attempt by the United States to "supplement" the race in the sphere of intercontinental strategic weapons systems with a race in the sphere of strategic regional nuclear missile systems.

The possibility of completing Soviet-American talks to develop the SALT-2 agreement elicited a sharp escalation in the activities of treaty opponents in the United States. They created approximately 70 "public" organizations possessing large financial assets. These "societies" began a broad campaign against the new agreement, striving to "change the minds" of those Americans (and they are the majority) supporting the agreement. The selection of "arguments" of the SALT-2 opponents does not sparkle with originality. The first of these is the false myth concerning the "Soviet threat" maliciously propagandized at all political levels in the United States. The second no less false argument was put forth by a special group in the House Armed Services Committee. It affirms without furnishing proof in its report that a new agreement "might provide the Soviet Union with strategic superiority."⁵⁰ The third argument is continuing attempts to "link" the SALT-2 agreement with other questions that do not pertain to it. Speaking before journalists Senator R. Schweiker announced that "linkage" of the agreement on limitation of strategic offensive arms with other questions of USSR foreign and domestic policy is "a key problem."⁵¹ A group of senators at a conference of members of the Republican Party holding elected office held at the end of January 1979 proposed "to link" the SALT-2 agreement with the condition of the United States Armed Forces (!), with achievement of an agreement at the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in central Europe, with "compliance" by the Soviet Union with the Helsinki Act, and with new guarantees of verifying compliance with the SALT-2 agreement. Only two of the 26 senators at the conference voted against the "linkage" policy. It follows from American press reports that a difficult situation characterized by the intention of certain circles to torpedo the SALT-2 agreement existed in the Senate of the United States. This presages a difficult battle in the Senate on the question of ratification of the SALT agreement.

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The desire by American reactionary circles to play the "China card" against the Soviet Union can also be used by them to build additional obstacles in the path of concluding the SALT-2 agreement. British Foreign Minister D. Owen pointed this out at a press conference after conclusion of talks with U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance in early February 1979. Owen called upon the United States not to build its relations with China to the detriment of the Soviet Union. He noted that this could lead to a breakdown in the SALT talks. "In my opinion," Owen stated, "this would be absolute stupidity."⁵²

Speeches by the opponents of the SALT-2 agreement forced its supporters in the United States to apply a more organized character to their activities. In early 1979 they created an organization called Americans for SALT. It included influential representatives from U.S. political, religious, business, scientific, and cultural circles. Its co-chairmen are former U.S. Defense Secretary C. Clifford, former Senator and permanent U.S. Representative to the UN H. C. Lodge, former permanent U.S. Representative to the UN C. Yost, and others. The organization supports strategic arms limitation. It considers one of its main tasks to be exposing the falsehood concerning the "Soviet threat," concerning the fact that a future SALT agreement would somehow give advantages to the USSR and so forth. In the announcement on setting up the Americans for SALT, its leaders laid down its position relative to ratification of the agreement being prepared: "Ratification of the SALT-2 agreement is of primary significance for the security and interests of the American people. It will establish limits on the development of new weapons systems. Signing and ratification of this agreement are a decisive step forward towards more complete control of nuclear weapons."⁵³

Thus, a new political phenomenon exists in the United States--organizational demarcation of strategic arms limitation agreement proponents and opponents. Famous American scientist and University of California professor F. Neal writes with alarm about the "Carter Administration's inertia in the face of the offensive by opponents of the strategic arms limitation agreement."⁵⁴ The administration not only does not speak actively in defense of the strategic arms limitation agreement, but it also simultaneously continues to take a broad circle of measures to build up arms, including plans to deploy neutron weapons and MRBMs in Western Europe and to raise the military budgets of the United States and its NATO allies.

In a speech at a preelection meeting of the voters in the Bauman Voting District of Moscow on 2 March 1979, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that the new Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, if it is signed, ratified, and implemented, "is not in any way detrimental to the security of the Soviet Union--nor by the way, to the security of the United States. Overall it. . .will be advantageous to both countries."⁵⁵

It is fully evident that the soonest possible conclusion and ratification by both Parties of the SALT-2 agreement would facilitate strengthening the policy of detente and smoothing of Soviet-American relations. This problem is fully solvable given that U.S. leaders possess political wisdom and attention to insuring peace throughout the world.

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FOOTNOTE

1. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR" [History of USSR Foreign Policy]. Vol 2. 1945-1975, Moscow, 1976; see also V. Khaytsman, "SSSR i problema razoruzheniya" [The USSR and the Problem of Disarmament]. 1945-1959. Moscow, 1970; L. Ya. Cherkasov. "Strategiya mira" [Peace Strategy]. Moscow, 1972; A. Ye. Yefremov. "Yadernoye razoruzheniye" [Nuclear Disarmament]. Moscow, 1976.
2. KOMMUNIST, 1978, No 8, p 11.
3. At the same time, H. Kissinger writes, "We even looked upon our military alliances mainly from the point of view of the possibility of acquiring the air bases we needed at their expense." H. Kissinger. "Yadernoye oruzhiye i vneshnyaya politika" [Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy]. Moscow, 1959.
4. "The Superpowers in Multinuclear World". Toronto, 1974, pp 276-279.
5. "U.S. Congress, Senat [sic] Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Aeronautical and Space Joint Hearings Missile and Space Activities, 86th Congress, 1st Ses.". 1959, pp 25-26.
6. R. Nixon. "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's." April 1973, p 182.
7. PRAVDA, 21 Sep 76.
8. L. I. Brezhnev. "Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course]. Vol 5, Moscow, 1976, p 81.
9. J. F. Dulles. "War or Peace?" New York, 1957, p 151.
10. T. Finletter. "Sila i politika" [Force and Politics]. Moscow, 1956, pp 312-313.
11. H. Kissinger. Ibid, p 158.
12. "Department Defense Appropriations [sic] for 1964. Pt 1. Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations [sic]. House of Representatives". Washington, 1963, p 341.
13. L. I. Brezhnev. "Leninskim kursom". Vol 2, Moscow, 1973, p 541.
14. R. Nixon. "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's" 25 Feb 71.
15. See "ABM". New York, 1969, p 255.
16. "Sovetskaya programma mira v deystvii" [Soviet Peace Program in Action]. Moscow, 1972, p 19. In 1974 during the Nixon visit to the Soviet Union the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile

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Systems was signed. In accordance with the Protocol, the Soviet Union undertook not to deploy ABM systems or its components within an ICBM silo area, and the United States undertook not to deploy an ABM system in an area centered on the capital. See "Dokumenty i materialy tret'yey sovetsko-amerikanskoy vstrechi na vysshem urovne" [Documents and Materials of the Third Soviet-American Summit Meeting]. Moscow, 1974, pp 55-56.

17. They include artificial earth satellites equipped with photo and radio technical verification systems, ground-based radar stations, and so on.
18. "Sovetskaya programma mira v deystvii," pp 25-27. The Interim Agreement placed no limitations whatever on strategic bombers.
19. According to U.S. Defense Department official reports, 550 previous Minuteman-1 missiles were replaced by Minuteman-3, and Poseidon missiles have been installed on 31 of the 41 ballistic missile submarines. ("Annual Defense Department Report," FY 1976 and 1977, pp 11-32).
20. In accordance with data published in the American press, Trident ballistic missile submarines will have a displacement of 18,700 tons (greater by a factor of two than the contemporary American ballistic missile submarines equipped with 16 Poseidon missiles each) and will carry 24 Trident-1 MIRV'd missiles. ("Annual Defense Department Report", FY 1975, pp 51, 52, 57).
21. "Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services. United States Senate, 92 Congress, 2nd Sess," 20 Jun. . .25 Jul 1972, pp 125, 135.
22. "Dokumenty i materialy sovetsko-amerikanskoy vstrechi vo Vladivostoke." [Documents and Materials of the Soviet-American Meeting in Vladivostok]. Moscow, 1974, p 20. [hereafter "Vladivostok"]
23. "The Congressional Record, Senate," 13 Apr 76, pp S5615, 5616.
24. "Vizit Leonida Il'icha Brezhneva v Soyedinennyye Shtaty Ameriki." [Visit of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev to the United States of America]. Moscow, 1973, pp 68-144.
25. "Vladivostok," p 20.
26. IZVESTIYA, 1 Apr 77.
27. "Vladivostok," p 20.
28. Cruise missile--a pilotless aircraft carrying a nuclear or conventional warhead and equipped with an automatic control and target guidance system. This system insures that the missiles flies according to its assigned program, "detects" the target, and strikes it. Based on data published in the American press, the program for building cruise missiles envisions development of three strategic variants--the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile intended to be placed on multipurpose nuclear submarines (the

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missile can be launched while submerged via the torpedo tubes); the second--an air-launched cruise missile to be carried by B-52 heavy strategic bombers; and the third--a land-based cruise missile intended for launch from mobile launchers. The launch weight of the sea-launched variant is 1,300-1,500 kg and that of the air-launched version is 900-1,000 kg. ("Annual Defense Department Report." FY 1976 and 1977, pp 11-39).

29. The American press published information concerning the Pentagon's intention to deploy many thousands of cruise missiles. (see THE NEW YORK TIMES, 3 October 75).
30. PRAVDA, 14 Apr 77.
31. Ibid, 1 Apr 77.
32. "The Congressional Record," 28 Oct 75, p E5630.
33. IZVESTIYA, 1 Apr 77.
34. Ibid, 25 Apr 78.
35. Ibid, 1 Apr 77.
36. Ibid.
37. See "Zadacha ogranicheniya strategicheskikh vooruzheniy: perspectiva i problemy" [The Task of Limiting Strategic Arms: Perspective and Problems]. PRAVDA, 11 Feb 78.
38. Based on a law concerning arms control and disarmament the government undertook to obtain the concurrence of Congress for adoption of any measures which would limit the military potential of the United States.
39. PRAVDA, 11 Feb 78.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid, 7 Aug 78.
42. Ibid, 11 Feb 78.
43. WASHINGTON POST, 11 Nov 77.
44. PRAVDA, 27 Nov 77.
45. IZVESTIYA, 10 Aug 78.
46. PRAVDA, 19 Mar 78.
47. Ibid, 26 Dec 78.

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48. Ibid, 25 Jan 79.

49. Ibid, 28 Jan 79.

50. Ibid, 6 Jan 79.

51. IZVESTIYA, 26 Jan 79.

52. Ibid, 5 Feb 79.

53. Ibid, 22 Jan 79.

54. PRAVDA, 4 Feb 79.

55. Ibid, 3 Mar 79.

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NATIONAL

KURDISH POPULATION OF USSR DESCRIBED

Moscow NARODY KAVKAZA II in Russian Vol 2, 1962 pp 602-616

[Article by Gardanova, B.A.: "The Kurds"]

[Text] General Information

Most Kurds (Kurmandzh is their own name for themselves) live outside the USSR, in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. A small number of Kurds have settled in Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to approximate data, the total number of Kurds living in foreign countries amounts to about 8 million persons.⁸⁹

In the Soviet Union there are 59,000 Kurds (1959 census). They live in the Armenian (26,000), Georgian (16,000), and Azerbaijan SSR's, as well as in the Kazakh, Kirghiz, Turkmen and Uzbek SSR's. In the Armenian SSR most of the Kurds live in the Aparanskiy, Talinskiy and Echmiadzinskiy rayons. In addition, there are Kurdish settlements in the Idzhevanskiy, Sevanskiy, Basagrecharskiy, Artikskiy, Abovyanskiy, Ashtarakskiy, Oktembryanskiy and Vedinskiy rayons. In the Azerbaijan SSR the Kurds have settled in the Lachinskiy, Kel'badzharskiy, Kubatlinskiy and Zangelanskiy rayons. In the Georgian SSR the Kurds comprise a mainly urban population. There are more than 43,000 Kurds living in the Caucasus.

The Kurdish language belongs to the northwestern group of Iranian languages, and is divided into a number of dialects. The Trans-Caucasian Kurds speak the Kurmandzhi dialect; in Armenia they also speak Armenian, and in Georgia they also speak Georgian; in Azerbaijan the young people speak primarily in the Azerbaijan language, while the older generation is bilingual. Many Kurds, especially in the cities, know Russian.

The Kurds of the Trans-Caucasus belonged either to the Sunni Moslems (in Armenia), the Shiite Moslems (in Azerbaijan) or the Yezids (in Armenia and Georgia). The religious differences were reflected in the daily life, customs and culture of these groups of the Kurdish people. At the present time, when most Soviet Kurds have moved away from religion, the terms Moslem Kurds and Yezid Kurds are used in an ethnographic sense.

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The date of the Kurds' first appearance in the Caucasus has not been precisely established. According to literary sources the existence here of the Kurdish Sheddadidov dynasty was well known; the dynasty ruled in the Caucasus in the 10th-12th centuries in the area which included the territory between Kara and Araks, with residences in Gyandzh and Dvina.

A significant number of the Kurds settled in the Trans-Caucasian area after leaving Kurdistan, the primary area of their habitation, after the Trans-Caucasian area was annexed to Russia.

Those rayons of Azerbaijan which have the largest Kurdish populations bordered on Iranian territory in the beginning of the 19th century, (the present-day Zangelanskiy Rayon), and the Lachinskiy Rayon, which became one of the main centers of Kurdish settlement in Azerbaijan in the 1820's. In 1923 the Kurdistan Uyezd was formed in Azerbaijan, with its center in Lachin. Some clan associations of Moslem Kurds moved from Azerbaijan to Armenia, specifically into the Basargechanskiy and Artashatskiy rayons.

The territory of Eastern Armenia was occupied mostly by Yezid Kurds, who had moved here mainly from Turkey, where they were subjected to religious persecution. The main wave of Kurdish immigration to Armenia took place during the Crimean War of 1853-1856 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. A significant number of Kurds moved to Armenia from Turkey during the First World War.

A majority of the Kurds who now live in Georgia are descended from people who arrived here during the First World War, either directly from Turkey or from Turkey to Georgia by way of Armenia. They moved from Armenia to Georgia in search of work, settling in cities, primarily Tbilisi.

Principal Occupations

Before the Great October Socialist Revolution the Trans-Caucasian Kurds led for the most part a seminomadic or nomadic way of life. As a rule, every tribe had definite routes for its encampments with the herds. In the spring they moved up to the mountain pastures, and with the coming of autumn the herds were moved down to lower areas. They raised mainly small cattle, cows, draught cattle and horses. In addition to their cattle-raising, land cultivation played an important role in their economic activities. They raised wheat, barley and other crops. The land was worked with primitive tools: an iron or wooden spade, a wooden plow with an iron blade and a hoe. The land parcels and the pastures belonged either to the tsarist government or to private owners. For example, in the settlement of Zilanla in the Zangezurskiy Uyezd of Yelizavetpol'skaya Gubernya, the land was the property of Gasan-beg and Ismail-beg, Kurdish large landowners.

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After the establishment of Soviet authority, the Kurdish people were freed from the exploitation of feudal lords. The land was given to the working people for their use. The seminomadic and nomadic life rapidly gave way to a settled life.

The artels, or cooperative associations of peasants which were created in the twenties for land use purposes, the credit societies, the mutual aid committees, groups of poor peasants, etc. all contributed to the transition of the Kurdish peasantry to a settled way of life. Through these agricultural organizations the working Kurds acquired seeds, draught animals, and agricultural tools.

The collectivization of agriculture had enormous significance in the life of the Kurdish peasantry. At present there are both Kurdish kolkhoz's (for example, the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin, the Kurdskiy Pamp Kolkhoz and the Gondakhsaz in the Aparanskiy Rayon of the Armenian SSR; the Kolkhoz imeni Suleymanov in the Talinskiy Rayon of the Armenian SSR), as well as mixed kolkhoz's, where the Kurds work along side representatives of other peoples from the Trans-Caucasian republics (for example, the Kolkhoz imeni En'gels in the Kel'badzharskiy Rayon of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Lyusaber Kolkhoz in the Echmiadzinskiy Rayon of the Armenian SSR and others).

Great success has been achieved in the mechanization of most agricultural work. The tractor, combine, sower, mower, thresher and other machines have taken hold in the Kurdish village. Modern agricultural equipment is penetrating even into the high mountain areas of Trans-Caucasia. For example, an area as remote and mountainous as the Lachinskiy Rayon in the Azerbaijan SSR is using the DT-54 diesel tractor, threshers, etc. Kurds have been trained as skilled machine operators. The economy of the Kurds who live in the mountain rayons of Armenia and Azerbaijan is dominated by cattle-raising--both small and large types of cattle are bred. Agriculture plays the primary role in the piedmont and lowland areas. These areas include parts of the Kubatlianskiy and Zangelanskiy rayons of the Azerbaijan SSR, where cotton- and rice-growing are the economic basis of the kolkhoz's. The agricultural areas include the Echmiadzinskiy and Oktemberyanskiy rayons of the Armenian SSR, where the Kurdish population is engaged in viticulture and field-crop cultivation.

In the past, truck gardening was almost unknown to the Kurds. The growing of vegetables was hampered by religious prohibitions (for the Yezids) and by the nomadic or seminomadic way of life led by the Kurdish population. But now gardening plays an important role in Kurdish kolkhoz's. In the piedmont areas of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in certain mountain collectives of Armenia the Kurds have started to grow potatoes.

In the past, the Kurds did not fertilize the soil. A good crop was related to the will of divine forces and spirits. Fertilizers are now commonly used on the kolkhoz fields and private plots.

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In the area of animal husbandry, the transition to the raising of merinos and pedigree cows had great significance because their productivity is higher than that of local species. The average annual yield from a cow of the local breed is 1,200-2,000 liters; a pedigree cow gives 2,500-3,000 l of milk per year. The fat content of the milk has also increased, as has the amount of meat produced. Before, the Trans-Caucasian Kurds considered it a sin to process milk by machines. This superstition has now been overcome. The kolkhoz's use separators and other equipment to process the milk. The milk is turned over to dairy plants, and in exchange, the kolkhoz's receive cheese and butter, which are distributed to kolkhoz members according to their work-days.

Silage is prepared to last the cattle over the winter; the silage is stored in pits which are dug near the cowsheds. Despite the fact that the Kurds had raised cattle for centuries, they had no notion of silage. Silage was something new for the Kurdish village.

The kolkhoz's also raise bees, poultry and sometimes pigs.⁹⁰ For some of the kolkhoz members bee-keeping is a new occupation. For example, the residents of the Akko settlement of the Talinskiy Rayon in the Armenian SSR have been keeping bees only since 1950.

The best Kurdish kolkhoz members among those who raise animals as well as those who grow crops have been awarded government prizes for excellent work. Those honored in this way include a significant number of women, such as V. Guseynova, who was awarded the Order of Lenin for a high cotton yield and Ch. Gasanova, who was made a Hero of Socialist Labor, and others.

Some of the Trans-Caucasian Kurds are engaged in industry. The percentage is particularly great among the Kurds of Georgia, who live, as was already noted, for the most part in cities.

Carpet Weaving

Carpet weaving and the production of woolen goods are the most highly developed of the crafts practiced by the Kurds. Carpet making has occupied an important place in the economic life of the Kurds for a long time. According to ancient Kurdish customs, every young girl had to master the art of producing carpets and woolen goods before her marriage.

Kurdish carpets and carpet goods are divided into pile carpets, non-pile carpets, felt and woolen goods with carpet designs (purses, bags, stockings, women's woolen belts, etc.). Depending on the method of production, the quality of the wool, the size and ornamentation, there are various names for the carpets ("amani," "dzhardzhem," "zili," etc.). The designs of traditional Kurdish carpets have, in addition to purely geometric elements, motifs which reflect the life of the Kurds, their religious rites and the elements of nature which surround them. The depiction of the sun is

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particularly characteristic of the carpets made by the Yezid Kurds, and it is probably related to the worship of the sun; the spirit of land cultivation, Malake Taus, is often portrayed in the form of a bird. The portrayal of horns, which are found on many Kurdish carpets, obviously reflects the cattle-raising in which they have traditionally engaged.

At the present time the designs of Kurdish carpets are beginning to contain new motifs, which reflect the socialist way of life, as well as motifs borrowed from neighboring peoples.

Villages and Dwellings

The external appearance of the Kurdish village is changing from day to day. New construction based on standard plans for well-built homes with all the amenities is taking place in nearly all Kurdish villages of Trans-Caucasia. These include many two-story buildings. The new structures can be seen in many villages of the Lachinskiy, Kubatliński, Kel'badzharskiy rayons of the Azerbaijan SSR (Minkend, Verkhneye Mollu, Karakishish, Agdzhakend, Orudzhlu and others), and in the Aparanskiy, Talinskiy and Basargecharskiy rayons of the Armenian SSR (Alagez, Dzhardzharis, Akko, Kayabash and others), but the old Kurdish dwellings still remain in some villages. The old Kurdish home, made of clay or stone, consists of several areas: the rooms in which bread is baked, and people eat and sleep ("mala tandurekhani"); a storeroom for food products ("kilar"); a sheep-fold ("gom"); a stable and cow-shed for cattle ("tavla"). The doors of all these areas open onto a general corridor, which is called a "sevdar." In the old Kurdish home as found in Armenia, one of the main areas was a room for male guests, the "oda,"⁹¹ The oda was usually located next to the stable. One entire wall separated the oda from the living quarters, and another wall, lower than human height, adjoined the stable. Along both sides of the oda earthen plank beds about .5 m in height were built, and they were covered with carpets.

A wooden panel door led into the house, and it served as the common entrance for both people and cattle.

When the location of the house made it possible, the Yezid Kurds would have the entrance door facing East, which was clearly a vestige of the sun cult. In the homes of Moslem Kurds the entrance door would face Southwest, toward Mecca and Medina.

As a rule, the homes did not have windows. Instead of windows, openings were made in the center of the dome-shaped roof. This opening served as both a window and a smoke outlet. The ceiling rested on both the walls and on wooden posts which were put up inside the living portion of the house.

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The houses had no furniture. During the day the bedding was piled into a mound on the wooden plank beds, the "ster,"⁹² which were usually located against the wall, opposite to the entrance.

Utensils, consisting of clay and copper jugs, trays, bowls, mortars and hand mills made of stone, were arranged on the floor. A wooden butter churn was attached to the posts which supported the ceiling; this was in the hallway, and in the living part of the house a homemade cradle was attached to the posts. The house was lighted by oil lamps. The family ate and slept on the floor.

The interior of a present-day Kurdish home presents a greatly changed appearance. Even in the remotest villages Kurdish homes have become urban-type dwellings: store-bought dishes, beds, chairs, tables, radios and electric lights--are all part of the present-day furnishings of the Kurdish dwelling.

When the Kurds led a mostly nomadic or seminomadic way of life, the most common type of dwelling was the tent, the "kon" or "chadyr." Several rows of long wooden poles driven into the ground served as the foundation for the tent. The upper ends of the poles were fixed with ropes to the pegs driven into the ground. Home-spun woolen material (in black, as a rule) was stretched over the poles, covering the entire skeleton of the tent, except for the entrance way and the lower part, at approximately 0.5 m from the level of the ground. This space was covered with rush screens woven with bright woolen threads. The size of the tent depended on the number of poles in every row. Families of prosperous Kurds had several tents: the master of the family lived in one, his family lived in another, and the third was used to store food and other products. A poor peasant with many children lived in a small tent, frequently sharing it with cattle.

At present the Trans-Caucasian Kurds no longer use the tent as a permanent dwelling. In some very hot areas the Kurds will pitch a tent in the summer as a temporary dwelling that is light and cool. In the hot areas of the Kubatlinskiy and Zangebanskiy rayons of Azerbaijan the Kurds, like the Azerbaijanis, build a temporary summer platform, where the family spends the night.

The ancient types of dwellings are gradually disappearing. The old dwelling, where it remains, is used for nonresidential purposes--as a storage area, a hen house, etc.

Previously every Kurd tried to build his house near those of his relatives. The weakening of consanguinous ties has led to the disappearance of this custom. In the villages the blocks of homes belonging to members of the same families have started to gradually disappear. The kolkhoz members build their homes in those parts of the countryside where there are parcels of land free and suitable for gardens.

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The new Kurdish homes have a square or rectangular plan. The walls of the houses are made primarily of stone, and where it is scarce, adobe is used. In Armenia and Azerbaijan the roofs of Kurdish structures are similar to those used on Armenian and Azerbaijani homes. Inside, the new home, as a rule, consists of an entrance hall, beyond which there are one-three large contiguous rooms.

The Kurdish settlements have electricity and radio service, as well as postal and telephone communications. In the settlements numerous buildings have been erected for administrative, cultural-educational and economic purposes: village soviets, schools, clubs, libraries, post offices, hospitals, bath houses, electric power plants, farms, workshops, garages, etc.

The architecture of the fraternal Caucasian peoples exerts a large influence on the Kurdish villages of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Clothing

Women's clothing is the most stable element of all aspects of the material culture of the Trans-Caucasian Kurds, and it is also the one which has been retained most fully up to the present time.

The national dress of the women consists of wide trousers ("khaval'kras"), shirt ("kras"), vest ("elak"), skirt ("tuman," "navdera"), apron ("shalek," "doshtuk"), oversleeves ("davzang"), woolen belt ("bane peshte"), head-dress ("kofi," "fino" or silk head scarves), woolen stockings ("gora").

The "khaval'kras" are very wide, cotton trousers, gathered at the waist and the ankles onto a knitted woolen cord. In accordance with religious traditions, the Yezid Kurds wore only white trousers, while the Moslems wore colored ones. Now the trousers are worn only by older women.

The "kras" is an undershirt made of colored cotton or coarse calico, shaped liked a tunic, very wide with long, wide sleeves and a round open collar. It is worn outside the trousers.

The "elak" is a sleeveless jacket made of thick one-color material (broadcloth, velvet or linen). The shoulders and front of the vest are edged with silk braid or ribbon. Previously, the elak was decorated with mother-of-pearl buttons, coins and even shells.

The Kurdish women of Armenia wear a velvet or broadcloth jacket ("kotvi") with long sleeves. The jacket is cut low at the bustline to show the decorations sewn on the elak.⁹³ The Kurdish women of Azerbaijan wear an ordinary cotton blouse, but with long sleeves and a closed collar.

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The "tuman" is a skirt, which is sewn from material (cotton, satin or silk) which is usually multi-colored or, less frequently, a solid color; it is a gathered skirt which is worn over the trousers. The bottom of the skirt is trimmed with braid or ribbon which is not sewn onto the very edge of the hem, but a little bit above it. Moslem Kurdish women wear the tuman.

The "navdera" skirt is typically worn by the Yezid women. It is made of the same materials as the tuman. The navdera consists of two separate panels which are gathered into pleats. One panel is worn in front and the other in back. They are fastened together with string either around the waist or on the sides. Before, up to ten of these skirts were worn one on top of the other. Now only two or three are worn.

On top of the navdera is worn an apron, which is called a "shalek" in Armenia and Georgia or a "doshtuk" in Azerbaijan. It consists of three or four strips of satin or silk, which differ in color but are identical in length and width. The apron is tied at the waist with a knitted woolen cord.

An older Kurdish woman in Armenia and Georgia wraps a woolen scarf ("pesht"), rectangular or triangular in shape, around her waist on top of the skirts and the apron. The scarves can be either multi-colored or solid color. They are traditionally worn only by married women. The pesht is held in place by a tightly tied, knitted wool belt, the "bane peshte," which is 2-2,5 m long. In contrast with the pesht, this belt is a required part of the dress for both married women and unmarried girls. Brightly colored belts with decorations usually totemic in nature are preferred. Today the bane peshte is worn mainly by middle-aged and old women.

Oversleeves made of light colorful material are worn over the sleeves of the jacket, the kotvi. The oversleeves are fastened at the wrist with braid or lace.

The female head-dresses can be divided into the head-dresses for young girls and those for women. The first category includes multi-colored silk scarves and a felt hat like a fez, ("fino").

The scarves are for everyday wear, and in Azerbaijan they are also worn on holidays.

The fino was worn in Armenia and Georgia as the head-dress for festive occasions. A silk scarf was wrapped around the forehead like a turban. Various decorations were worn on the fino. At the present time this form of head-dress is rarely encountered.

The "kofi," the head-dress of married women is found in Georgia and Armenia. It consists of a wood or plywood frame, round in shape, which

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is decorated on the outside with brightly-colored cloth, to which coins are attached. Scarves which are either white or colored are tied around the head above the kofi in such a way that only the part decorated with the coins is visible. The Moslem women wore a kofi with a high crown, while the Yezid women wore one with a low crown. At the present time the kofi is worn only on holidays.

On their legs the women wear handmade knitted stockings, the "gora," which are made mostly of white wool, and which are decorated with black or multi-colored designs. In the past leather shoes (store-bought or homemade) without heels ("sol") or with heels ("kondara," "dzhzma") were worn. But this kind of footwear was accessible only to well-to-do women. Women from poor families wore homemade leather slippers, "charekh." The charekh are hardly ever seen now; store-bought city shoes are now worn everywhere.

The national dress of the women generally displays a range of the most vivid colors: red, yellow, green, blue, orange, etc. The main difference between the clothing worn by the Kurdish women for everyday and for dress occasions is the quality of the material.

The numerous decorations are a feature of the national dress of the Trans-Caucasian Kurdish women. They are a required part of certain elements of the female costume (for example, the coins on the head-dress). These decorations can be grouped according to the parts of the body: decorations for the head, ears, nose, neck, chest, waist, hands and legs,

The decorations for the head include the "bardzhenik" and "kole zera." The "polek" and "kotyk" are worn only on holidays.

The bardzhenik is a narrow ribbon or band of velvet which is worn on the forehead and tied at the nape of the neck. Vertical rows of threads strung with beads hang down to the chin to the right and left of the ribbon. Every front thread is shorter than a back thread (five to seven of them are usually worn on each side). The brighter the color of the ribbon and the beads, the richer and more valuable the decoration is considered to be. Formerly coins were sewn onto the ends of the beaded threads.

The kole zera is a ribbon or band of dark-colored velvet which goes around the entire forehead. Ancient coins are attached to the ribbon in two or three rows in front. The kole zera is fastened to the head by pieces of braid which are sewn to the edges of the ribbon.

The polek has copper, silver or gold goins which are used to decorate the kofi. The kotyk is a tassel made of silk threads, and it is sewn to the kofi on the right side.

All of these decorations are worn by the Kurdish women of Armenia and Georgia.

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Earrings, "goar," are commonly worn by all Kurdish women.

Previously the Kurdish women of the Trans-Caucasus wore a nose decoration, "karagil," a silver or gold disc, which was put through the nostril. This decoration has now gone out of use everywhere.

Beads--"mori," "karbar," "mrdzhan"--are common decorations worn around the neck. All beads, regardless of size, color, shape and quality, with the exception of coral and amber, are called mori; karbar is only for amber beads and mrdzhan is only for coral beads. Formerly, silver or gold discs were put on a string and worn around the neck; this was a very common form of jewelry. Now this form of decoration is worn only on holidays (Armenia and Georgia).

Of the decorations worn on the chest the most characteristic are the "sadaf" and "fakht." The first of these consists of the mother-of-pearl buttons which are sewn onto the front of the vest. The second consists of beautifully matched silver or gold coins and it is a form of adornment worn by the Kurdish women of Georgia and Armenia on holidays.

The hand decorations include store-bought items which are common everywhere, "gostilyak," a ring and "bazen," a bracelet.

The foot decoration ("khrkhal") is a silver bracelet, worn around the ankle. It was usually worn at night as protection against evil spirits. The khrkhal is not worn now.

In the category of decorations worn at the waist on holidays, there is the leather belt ("kambar"), trimmed with silver or coins; it is especially common now among the Kurdish women of Azerbaijan.

The national dress for men has almost completely gone out of use, and the Kurdish men of the Trans-Caucasus wear conventional European clothing. In the past the Kurdish dress for men consisted of a white calico shirt, "kras," which came down to the knees; wide home-spun wool trousers, "shal," a woolen "arkhalekh" and "chokhi." The Kurd wore around his waist a belt ("pest," "kambar") from which hung a dagger. On the head they wore either a conventional Caucasian fur cap, or several colored scarves, wound around a felt cap, a "kolos." On the feet they wore wool and handmade socks, "gora," and leather sandals, "charekh,"

Family and Marriage

The transition to socialist life led to the disintegration of the large family, "mala mazen," which the Kurds maintained even during the period immediately preceding the revolution. The large family gave way to the small family, "mala bechuk." But there are still families in which brothers live together with their wives and children; but the number of such families is gradually decreasing.

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Under socialism a sharp turning point occurred in the economic foundation of the Kurdish family and in the consciousness and cultural level of its members. Proceeding rapidly is the process of elimination of the survivals of patriarchal customs, religious stagnation and family despotism. Qualitatively new features arose in the relations among adult members of the Kurdish family, and these features have exerted a beneficial influence on the formation of the younger generation.

The position of the Kurdish woman has changed fundamentally under Soviet authority. She has received equal rights with men in society and in the family. A young girl now marries on the basis of her own choice. Certain practices have been eliminated such as polygamy, marriage between minors and the collection of "kalana," the bride price, etc.

Also disappearing is endogamy, which at one time had very strong roots among the Trans-Caucasian Kurds. There are frequent instances of marriage between Kurds and Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani women.

Marriage and other rites have changed substantially, and this is reflected primarily in the dying out of customs related to religious beliefs. There is still a form of matchmaking in use, "arekeren," (literally "to say yes"); formerly, the parents' consent to the daughter was given in the presence of a member of the clergy (a mullah or a sheikh), whose presence was considered essential, and this ceremony still takes place now, but without a member of clergy present. The betrothal ceremony, "daznygari, nishandanin," began with the sheikh joining together the thumbs of the two fathers. Addressing the father of the bride-to-be, the sheikh would ask: "Do you give consent for your daughter by the will of God to marry this man?" The father of the groom-to-be was then asked the same question of the sheikh; The sheikh would then put the ring on the girl's finger and say "Bembarak pirozba." ("Congratulations. Be happy.") Then the feasting would begin. The remnants of this rite can be seen in some villages even now. An engagement ring is put on the fourth finger of the girl's right hand as a sign of betrothal, but this is no longer done by a member of the clergy; it is usually some highly respected person of the village who pronounces the "Bembarak pirozba."

In accordance with the new custom, the parents of the young man give the bride-to-be a gold watch on the day of betrothal, and then the merry-making begins. The health of the betrothed and their parents are toasted, and music is made on the zourna and the drum; there is singing and dancing. Azerbaijani, Armenian, Georgian, Russian and other songs are sung in addition to the Kurdish ones. Between the day of betrothal and the wedding, the dowry is prepared, the "dzhekhez," which is, as in the past, the personal property of the bride. Among the Kurds the modern dowry usually consists of bed linens, blankets, expensive cloth, knitted items, and furniture, in contrast with the dowry of ancient times, which was based on a set number of domestic animals: sheep, horses and bulls.⁹⁴ In olden times the wedding was set for five months

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after the betrothal. This time period has now been reduced. Something new has appeared in Soviet times--guests are invited to the wedding, and formal invitations are sent out. Today the bride is dressed and adorned for her wedding without any rites. She does not use antimony to emphasize her eyes; her hair and nails are not dyed with henna. In the past, the groom's chest was decorated with a triangular talisman, "nvisht," which was drawn by a mullah or sheikh. They believed that the nvisht possessed magical power to ward off evil spirits. A red silk scarf was tied around the groom's neck. Now the groom comes to the wedding in city dress. The bride, however, is dressed in the ancient national costume, only instead of the five-seven dresses, which were worn one on top of each other, she wears two or three dresses.

The guests invited to the wedding from other villages stay with relatives of the groom. The wedding is held both in the groom's home and in a large building (most frequently the rural club), to which the entire community of the village will be invited.

Before the bride is brought to the home of the groom, her relatives, according to tradition, show the relatives of the bride and groom and everyone present her dowry. If people like the dowry, they say "Mashalla" (Wonderful, bravo!).

After the community inspection of the dowry, they prepare the bride to be led out of her father's home. The groom and his father, mother, the sponsor and relatives come for the bride. The bride's parents, or if she has none, her closest relatives and witnesses go to the registry office (or to the village soviet). In some families the bride is taken to the home of her sponsor, "sardauati," after the marriage is registered. She remains in his home for a few hours and only then is she taken to the groom's home. In other families the bride returns to her own home for a while.

Previously, the bride rode from her sponsor's home to the home of her new husband on a horse, accompanied by a group of riders who perform movements that give the impression of dancing on horseback, "dzhridlisten" (literally "a dance while galloping"). Today the newly-married bride is taken to her husband's home by car or a wedding carriage. In accordance with this change there has been a change in the expressions used: instead of "buksiarkeren," (to put the bride on a horse), a new word, has come into use, "bukberen," (to drive away with the bride). Another custom which has disappeared was based on the protection which the bride's brothers offered here against enemies and evil spirits.

On the wedding day a melody is played on the zourna and the daf (drum) in front of the groom's home. The guests begin to gather at the call of the drum. A round dance, "govand" is started to the accompaniment of the music or of singing. Taking hold of each other by the little finger, the elbow, the waist or the shoulder, they form a row or a circle and dance.

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The sargovand, or leader of the dance, moves out in front. He waves a kerchief in the air in time to the music or singing. The bride and groom also join the dancers. Previously, the groom was supposed to hide somewhere for a while, even to leave the village. The Kurdish people explained this custom by saying that the groom was supposedly ashamed to sit in view of the elders during the wedding. But now the groom does not leave the nuptial home. The groom and bride are seated next to each other at the wedding table in the place of honor. This is a new phenomenon for the Kurdish wedding. The elders are the first to raise their glasses and drink to the health of the bride and groom: "Ashka du gola" (To the health of two flowers). Those present offer toasts in honor of the young people and wish them health, a happy life and a fruitful union ("garak be bar ba"). Then they drink to the health of the parents of the bride and groom and then in turn to all those present in order of age and distinction. With every toast there is a suggestion to sing or dance in honor of those who are being toasted.

In former times only the zourna and the drum were played at the wedding, as was the custom with all the Trans-Caucasian peoples.⁹⁶ Now the tambourine and other Caucasian musical instruments are played.

After the wedding begins the "sachu," the call to provide the young people with gifts, and the announcement of who is giving what. The current custom of the sachu differs from the former version by virtue of what is given. Previously, domestic animals, primarily sheep, were given during the sachu, and now it is such things as a sewing machine, a watch, lengths of material, footwear and other objects. Everything given during the sachu belongs to the home of the groom and is not considered the property of the bride alone, as was true in olden times.

Several months after the wedding tradition calls for the ceremony of "zey," the return of the young wife to her father's home. Having spent about a month with her parents, she returns to her husband with the many presents given to her at this time. They are called "shkart." The shkart continues to be considered the personal property of the wife. Previously, the shkart consisted exclusively of domestic animals, the offspring of which were also considered to be the property of the wife. Now it is mainly objects which are given.

Of the prenuptial, nuptial and postnuptial customs, everything that was related to religious belief is gradually disappearing, and the same is true of the customs associated with birth. Despite the vestiges of some outdated customs, the practices of cradle betrothal, abduction, escape and a check on a girl's chastity ("markeren"), as well as many others, have largely disappeared.

According to customary rights among the Trans-Caucasian Kurds, a widow did not have the right to inherit. Her husband's property went to his relatives through the father's line. Only the dowry was considered

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to be her property. Today the parents, children and each of the spouses in the Kurdish family have identical rights of inheritance. Just as children have the right to inherit after their parents' death, a wife has the right to inherit her husband's property after his death. As a result of this, a new expression has sprung up among the Kurds, "zhena miratkhor," woman heir. This expression sounds very strange to old Kurdish men, some of whom, when talking about the right of a woman to inherit, mutter sceptically, "Shukhule den'yaeya" (Such are the affairs of the world).

The number of Soviet Kurdish people who adhere to Islam or the Yezid religion is growing less and less. Other vestiges of religion are also receding into the past--the worship of various forces and phenomena of nature, the custom of sacrificing a sheep at holy springs ("kania zymzymi"), and at places of worship during pilgrimages ("ziyarat"), etc.

Health Care

Before the establishment of Soviet authority in Trans-Caucasia, health care among the Kurds was in a deplorable state: there were no medical establishments in the areas where the Kurds lived. Witch doctors, mullahs, and sheikhs served as doctors, who treated people not so much with folk remedies, as with spells, incantations, prayers and exorcism of the evil spirits from the body of the patient. They resorted to various magical means. For example, after a baby was born a rifle was shot off near the mother. If a woman in childbirth lost consciousness, they brought a neighing horse to her. A patient lying in a fever would be beaten with "divine" twigs.. All this was done to drive away the evil spirits, which were considered the cause of the disease.

In Soviet times, hospitals, maternity homes, pharmacies and first aid stations have been opened in Kurdish villages. Prophylactic measures are carried out systematically to combat infectious diseases. Their own medical personnel have been trained.

Culture

The culture of the Kurdish people has flourished in Soviet times. A Kurdish written language was created on the basis of the Russian alphabet, and the symbols for those phonemes which the Russian alphabet lacks were taken from the Latin alphabet. Political, artistic and scientific literature is published in the Kurdish language. A Kurdish newspaper, PIA TAZE (New Path) is published in Yerevan.

One of the first steps on the way to the creation of Kurdish literature was the collection and publication of the oral poetic work of the Kurds ("Kurdish Folklore," Yerevan, 1936). In 1937, a collection of verse in Kurdish by Museib Akhundov was published in Baku. The Kurdish writers Arab Shamilov, Adzhiye Dzhmdî, Dzhasme Dzhaliil and others have played an important role in the creation of Kurdish literature. In recent

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years a number of new works by Kurdish prose writers and poets has been published in the Kurdish, Russian, Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani languages. A Kurdish section has been established within the Union of Writers of Armenia.

The Soviet Kurds are developing the best traditions of their many centuries of creative work by the people. This includes oral poetry of the Kurds, their songs and dances. Romantic tales about such Kurdish heroes as Mama Zina, Zambil'frosh, Siaband and Khadzhezhar, etc. are becoming well known.

Kurdish folk singers perform both old and contemporary songs. Choir singing is becoming established along with solo singing as part of the modern Kurdish folklore tradition. There is a song, for example, which they sing about the Komsomol, "The May Song," and there are others.

Kurdish dancing, in contrast with Kurdish singing, was based mostly on round dances or group dances with both men and women participating. Solo dances have now joined these older traditional dance forms. Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian dances are also performed. The best folk dancers are brought together in amateur groups and ensembles. At the initiative of the Kurdish intelligentsia a Kurdish song and dance ensemble was created in Tbilisi in 1956; it went on to receive the diploma, secondary grade, at the republic festival in Georgia. In 1957 an ensemble to perform Kurdish songs and dances was formed in Yerevan.

Before the revolution one could count on one's fingers the number of Kurds who were literate, and there were no literate Kurdish women at all. Only boys attended the few schools that did exist, and these were mainly children of feudal lords and the clergy.

At the present education has become universal. In rayons which have a predominantly Kurdish population, the Kurdish language is taught along with other subjects. The schools employ more than 100 Kurdish teachers who have higher and secondary education. The school children--under the direction of their teachers--organize reports and plays for the people of their villages. The Komsomol organizations in the school are conducting an active campaign against outdated customs and against the vestiges of superstition. The local cultural and educational institutions (clubs, libraries, etc.) are carrying out a great deal of work among the Kurdish population.

A Kurdish intelligentsia has been created and is growing rapidly. Kurdish young people attend VUZ's and tekhnikums in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi and other cities. There are Kurdish agronomists, engineers, physicians, scientists, etc. The Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences has established a Kurdish group as part of the Sector for Eastern Studies. The Leningrad Department of the Institute of Asian Peoples, which comes under the USSR Academy of Sciences, has a Kurdish Study Center. Kurdish scholars have achieved serious success in the study of the history, ethnography, culture and language of their people.

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FOOTNOTES

89. For information on foreign Kurds, see the volume "Narody Peredney Azii" [Peoples of the Gateway to Asia], Moscow, 1957.
90. Many Kurds do not eat pork for reasons of custom. For example, the kol-khoz of the Malyy Dzhamuslki village in the Aparanskiy Rayon of the Armenian SSR raises pigs, but the peasants do not eat the meat; they hand it over as part of their obligations to the state.
91. Compare with the Armenian "oda." It is typical that the oda was built only by the Kurds of Armenia. The Kurds of Azerbaijan did not know about the oda.
92. The Azerbaijani Kurds call these plank beds "Penmala."
93. The "elak" is frequently worn on top of the "kotvi."
94. A cow was not supposed to be given as part of the dowry in order to avoid having two females leave the home.
95. Compare with the Armenian "gyond," and "govynd." This term serves as the name of a type of collective folk dances, as well as of the formation itself and of the entire chain of dancers.
96. The "zurna" and the "daf" were musical instruments used for signal and ceremonial purposes.

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