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TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No. 633

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FOUO No. 633

CONTENTS PAGE

CONTENTS (Continued) Page

NIGERIA'S GROWING INFLUENCE IN CHAD NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 p 15

[Article by Marc Yared]

[Text] The Kano conference, which ended on 16 March, marked the emergence of a newcomer on the Chadian political scene: Nigeria. Lagos currently holds some high trumps if it wishes to deploy its power on a regional scale.

For a little better than a year, now, Nigeria has been providing discreet but vital support to one of the components of the Chadian rebellion: the MLPT, headed by a former army officer, Mr Aboubakar Abderhamane.

Until just recently dismissed as negiligible, the MPLT nevertheless controls a zone which is very important, both economically and strategically: the approaches to Lake Chad and a slice of Kanem Province. This is where some major petroleum finds were made in the early Sixties, and where the American-owned Conoco company had established its headquarters. This is also the region, lying on the doorstep of the capital at Ndjamena and very close to Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria, which constitutes the heart of the Dark Continent. It lies equidistant from North Africa and Equatorial Africa, from the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea.

At Kano, for the first time, the hitherto ignored MPLT was recognized as a full-fledged party to the negotiations by all delegations.

Score one more for Nigeria: the fact that it was indirectly involved, alongside the MPLT, in the conflict evoked no comment whatever, even though the Chadian government and armed opposition forces have for years been lashing out at intervention on the part of France, Sudan, or Libya. What is a great deal more, Nigeria emerged at Kano for the first time as an unchallenged -- and effective -- arbiter. The Chadian factions will soon fall into the habit of calling on its good offices, and of putting their negotiations under its aegis, whereas until now such talks were held by preference in Khartoum or Tripoli, not to mention Algiers or Libreville.

Lastly and most importantly, by approving the dispatch to Chad of several hundred Nigerian troops to monitor the cease-fire, Lagos has acquired the means, if it should one day choose to use them, to exercise a direct influence over the destinies of its weak neighbor.

Some observers are already worried over the possible developments from this commitment, citing Syria's mediation, followed by intervention, in the Lebanese civil war (1975-1978) to bring both the conservative "Arab-hating" Christians and the progressive "Arab-loving" Muslims to heel. Right now, though, there is no visible grounds for harboring any such suspicions.

The commitment to Chad is, for Nigeria, primarily an internal security operation. The giant of Africa, among whose citizens are almost as many Muslims as non-Muslims (Christians and animists), may legitimately entertain fears as to the contagion of fanaticism.

The presence of a Nigerian force in Chad perhaps also reflects a regional ambition: to contain the "march to the south" of its Libyan rival.

Nigeria, the biggest power on the Dark Continent economically as well as demographically, is determined henceforth to be on the spot wherever the future of Africa is at stake. As far back as 15 years ago, it sent troops into the former Belgian Congo. And it still stands ready to do the same in Angola and in Namibia.

6182
CSO: 4400

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

REACTION TO INCREASED NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN REPORTED

A Fifth Fleet

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 2-15 Apr 79 pp 24-26

[Article by Elie Ramaro]

[Text] The collapse of the Iranian regime and the conclusion of a separate peace between Israel and Egypt are accelerating the imperialist redeployment.

After the "Iranian disaster," the West felt a need to review from top to bottom the question of the defense of its interests against the "northern threat" -- the Soviet Union -- and the "danger" of Arab progressivism: the conclusion of a separate peace between Egypt and Israel bears the mark of this necessity.

It had already been obvious for several months that Israel was setting itself up in this stormy region as "a forward position of the West" in the Middle East, a pillar of the "free world" and an "existential" ally of the United States in the area -- while the others could be only circumstantial allies. (On these grounds, Israel has specialized in providing weapons for the racist regimes in Africa and the fascist governments in Latin America. South Africa, Rhodesia, Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala are among its clients, and its arms industry has never been so healthy. The United States, which is perfectly aware of these dealings, prefers to have Israel take charge of supplying these countries, which are especially compromising.)

In fact, behind these so-called "peace" negotiations, we have been witnessing a competition among Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to see who looks like the best candidate to succeed Iran as the regional "policeman."

Bourgeois Prosperity

Israel resolutely played the card of a community of interests with the West, at the edge of a "barbarous" world subject to resurgences of "fanaticism." President Sadat, who is ready to pay very dearly for a return to capitalist "prosperity," which would benefit mainly the Egyptian bourgeoisie, offered to guarantee the "security" of Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, North Yemen, and Oman (where he has already sent some troops to replace the Iranian units).

At the same time, the American government tried to silence the "grumbling" of Saudi Arabia by providing it on short notice, in mid-March, with two AWACS radar observation systems on aircraft, with the 200 American technicians necessary to make them operate. President Carter also stepped up his arms deliveries to North Yemen, recognizing the "secondary right" of the Saudi leaders against Aden and thus authorizing them to use the American weapons in their possession to bring the socialist regime in South Yemen to its senses. (The United States acted in the same way with respect to Morocco, which obtained the right to use American weapons outside its own territory.)

Moreover, the direct presence of the American fleet has been considerably strengthened in the last few weeks. The aircraft carrier Constellation -- 80 airplanes, 4,000 men in the crew -- was detached from the Seventh Pacific Fleet with four escort ships to "show the United States colors" in the Indian Ocean. It was also decided to increase the number of naval units permanently based in the Gulf. The military agreement signed in September 1978 with the state of Bahrain gives the U. S. Navy Middle East Force the perpetual right to put into the port of Juffayr. Facilities have also been offered to the American forces by the sultan of Oman, who has entrusted his defense to the United States -- now that he can no longer count on the shah's armies.

Several spy satellites and patrols with the Orion reconnaissance aircraft based in Diego Garcia complete this strengthened arrangement,which has made some commentators say that the United States is getting ready to establish a premanent naval force -- the Fifth Fleet -- in the Indian Ocean, in order to defend Western interests there directly.

In this theory, the Diego Garcia atoll would play the full role of pivot and stationary aircraft carrier, for which it was initially designed. This island, which is located exactly in the middle of the Indian Ocean, has been transformed into a modern military base in the last few years, in spite of the protests of many coastal countries and of all the progressive forces in the area. It has a runway for heavy aircraft, advanced electronic equipment, and sheltered anchorages for ships and submarines.

Moreover, the Pentagon relies on its French ally, which still has the largest permanent war fleet in the Indian Ocean, and has solid bases in Djibouti and Reunion. The public visit made by Rear Admiral Samuel Packer, commander of the U. S. Navy Middle East Force, to his counterpart in the Armed Forces of the Southern Indian Ocean (FAZSOI) last August at Saint Denis, Reunion, proves that active cooperation has been established between the two main imperialist fleets in the region. (The strategic role of Reunion is more and more apparent, after the Organization of African Unity recommended its rise to independence. At the beginning of March, the French government assembled there, for the first time, all the French ambassadors to the countries of East Africa and the Indian Ocean, and encouraged them to defend Paris's official positions concerning the island's status with more conviction.)

Seychelles Protest

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 2-15 Apr 79 p 25

[Text] President Didier Ratsiraka had denounced the Western plans, which were of an aggressive nature, after proposing the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and the withdrawal of all naval forces from the region. In its turn, the Seychelles government has just condemned the American decision without reservation. Thus the Seychelles president, France Albert-Rene, sent President Carter a message in which he comes out vigorously against the creation of a military force whose result would be to intensify the struggle for influence in the Indian Ocean and hinder the efforts to make this region a "real peace zone." "To pursue such a policy would only endanger the good relations that exist between the United States and the peaceful peoples in this area of the world."

For its part, the Seychelles radio stated: "We are ready to grant our friendship to all nations. However, as President France Albert-Rene says, we do not want the great powers to come and wash their dirty linen in our waters. That is why we are opposed to the presence of any naval force in our region, especially if it is based in our vicinity."

Clearing the Decks for the French Navy

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 2-15 Apr 79 p 25

[Article by Elie Ramaro]

[Text] The French warships that are standing guard in the Indian Ocean in the name of Western interests are on the alert since the worsening of the situation in Southern Africa, Eritrea, and Iran.

At the Ministry of the Navy on the Place de la Concorde in Paris, senior officers follow day and night, on large screens, the progress of the 16 units that now make up the French squadron in the Indian Ocean: in the chart room, they make telephone calls and send and receive telex messages, and interrogate, on a television console, the computer that concentrates the technical data and performs the calculations.

At any given time, the central computer provides a choice of possible solutions, based on the data stored in its memory.

It also computes the navigation plans for commercial vessels, especially the giant oil tankers that travel from the Gulf to the Cape by passing off South Yemen and, through the Mozambique Canal, between Madagascar and the Comoro Islands.

Similar information is available in the operations rooms of the various French naval commands: CECLANT in Brest (Atlantic squadron), CECMED in Toulon (Mediterranean squadron), COMAR in Djibouti (Northern Indian Ocean), FAZSOI in

Saint-Denis, Reunion (Southern Indian Ocean), and aboard the squadron command ship Charante, a 16,000-ton tanker and supply ship, which has been outfitted to house the headquarters and communication services directed by Rear Admiral Orosco. (Rear Admiral Orosco, who succeeded Rear Admiral Darrieus in November 1978, was born in Maison Carree, Algeria, in 1924. He is a "political" officer: from 1976 to 1978, he was the head of the military cabinet of the French prime minister, who himself was a native of an Indian Ocean country (Reunion).)

The French fleet -- which included as many as 23 vessels and a staff of 4,500 men at the end of 1977, with the presence of the aircraft carrier Foch and its escort in the Indian Ocean -- now numbers an average of 16 to 18 vessels of all sizes, and crews of 2,500 men. The most powerful ship in the squadron is now the missile-launching frigate Duquesne: it has 375 officers and sailors; Masurca, Exocet, and Malafon weapons systems, which are especially aimed at submarines; and a listening system based on 12 radars and sonars, whose results are analyzed by on-board computers.

A Turn-Table

In mid-January, the port of Djibouti simultaneously sheltered the aviso-escort ships Commandant Bourdais and Doudart de Lagree, the squadron escort ship Kersaint, the ultramodern work ship Jules Verne, and the supply ships Champlain and Saintonge, in addition to the flagship and several patrol boats, like the Etoile Polaire, which is permanently assigned to marine surveillance of the strait of Bab el Mandeb, between Aden and the Eritrean coast.

The ships of the fleet often visit the many French possessions in the southwest part of the ocean, especially the scattered islands around Madagascar (Juan de Nova, Europa, Tromelin, Glorieuses) or the southern territories (Amsterdam, Crozet, Kerguelen, Saint Paul) and, of course, Reunion and Mayotte.

But they also make many calls at Mombasa (Kenya) or in the ports of the Gulf emirates -- and sometimes also in the South African ports.

Thus France with its squadron has what Admiral Lannuzel, commander in chief of the navy, has called "the largest fleet in the Indian Ocean."

The admiral, an accomplished politician -- he travels a great deal and, in particular, met with President Sadat on 16 December -- is not unaware of the fact that the time of "fixed bases" overseas is gone. He sees a chance of preserving the West's world-wide influence by establishing ultramodern, practically autonomous fleets, which have a long range and are capable of guaranteeing "order" at the sea and air approaches to the countries that produce raw materials or are big consumers of industrial goods.

8429
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CCCE COMMITMENTS TO AFRICAN, INDIAN OCEAN STATES REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Feb 79 pp 495-498

[Text] The new commitments of the CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation] came close to 1.5 billion French francs in 1978, an increase of 11.4 percent over the previous fiscal year[1]. This variation is attributable to loans made on favorable terms (operations called "first counter") which, with a 19 percent increase in 1 year, have risen to nearly 1 billion francs. The long term commitments at "second counter" terms came to 521 million francs.

Since 1974, commitments have been as follows (listed in millions of francs).

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
First Counter	375	485	659	819	972
Second Counter		170	613	521	521
Total	375	655	1,272	1,340	1,493

Corrected for variations in French export prices, the quadrupling of assistance in the last 4 years is actually a real doubling of "first counter" operations and a real tripling of the total commitments.

Index of Real Growth of Commitments

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
First Counter	100	122	153	173	196
First and Second Counters	100	165	294	282	300

1. For the 1977 fiscal year, see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 24 Feb 78 p 583.

This overall favorable trend corresponds to the intentions of the government officials to give the CCCE a more important role in the distribution of French aid, by giving it the means to increase all of its resources at the same time, including those with good terms.

The growth in commitments has caused, with some slippage in time, the growth of deposits, so that the CCCE's net assets now form a larger portion of all French public assets in the recipient countries.

Trends in Disbursements of the CCCE (in millions of francs)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Deposits	299	359	582	793	991
Repayments	238	230	243	241	231[2]
Net Disbursements	61	129	339	552	760[2]
Share of the Central Fund in public assets in the area affected	2.9%	5.5%	14.2%	18.4%	22.0%[2]

The growth of net disbursements since 1976 has regularly exceeded 200 million francs a year. This should continue. In fact, the growth of operations starting in 1975 should only affect the level of repayments after 1980, because of the "postponements" granted to borrowers, which are generally for 5 years. Furthermore, a new increase in deposits is expected in 1979 because of the increase in commitments remaining to be executed.

"First and second counter" loans remaining to be paid at the end of the year:

At the end of 1974	663 million
" 1975	652 million (including 122 for second counter)
" 1976	1.642 billion (including 569 million for second counter)
" 1977	2.196 billion (including 765 million for second counter)
" 1978	2.686[2] billion (including) 855 million for second counter

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2. Provisional figures; percentage is estimated.

The Recipient Countries

In 1978 the Central Fund was authorized to resume its operations in Guinea, where it still had some important commitments. Its area of activity was also extended to Somalia. So it now includes a total of 27 countries in Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean (Haiti). In 1979, these countries had 113 million inhabitants spread over a very vast land area. This area has especially difficult development problems.

The Central Fund has been able to participate fully in investment programs in countries whose development is most advanced. But it is also trying to favor the poorer countries and since 1976, the share of credits allocated to them, and in particular to the Sahel countries, has been growing continuously.

Among the more advanced countries, the Ivory Coast in 1978 temporarily halted the expansion of its commitments. The same was true of Gabon. But loans to Senegal increased, and some important industrial programs came to maturity in 1978 in Cameroon, considerably increasing the volume of loans to that country.

Millions of francs)	First Counter	Second Counter	Total	From 1977
Cameroon	177.9	272	449.9	191.8
Ivory Coast	187.3	8	195.3	410.5
Senegal	70.6	90	160.6	144.4
Gabon	33.4	40	73.4	160
Totals	469.2	410	879.2[3]	906.7
Share of these countries in loan commitments	48%	79%	59%	68%

The share of these countries was reduced from 68 percent in 1977 to 59 percent. The geographic diversity of the loans has been increased.

In 1978, operations were resumed in Madagascar, with a large volume (137.6 million francs).

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3. This does not include the share of these countries in the loan to ASECNA.

The Central Fund has also continued its efforts in the Sahel, which is still suffering a great deal from drought damage. There it is working to finance high priority projects related to the development of food resources, as well as industrial and infrastructure programs, without which the people's standard of living can not be raised. With this in mind, the Central Fund participated in a mining program designed to maintain Mauritania's foreign resources, and it is also involved in several projects to diversify the Niger and Malian economies.

Aid to Countries of the Sahel* (in millions of francs)

	First Counter	Second Counter	Total
1974	32		32
1975	78		78
1976	169	110	279
1977	185	25	210
1978	232	75	307
1978 includes:			
Mauritania	83.9	75	158.9
Niger	78.9		78.9
Mali	42.3		42.3

*Excluding Senegal. Does not include loans made to ASECNA /Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar/ for the development of airports, which was 10 million "first counter" francs in 1978.

Countries of the Sahel, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, and Chad are classified with Benin, Burundi, the Cape Verde islands, The Central African Empire, the Comoro Islands, Rwanda, and Somalia in the UN's classification of least advanced countries. The funds allocated by the CCCE to these countries have been increasing greatly over the past 3 years; they have risen from an average of 43 million francs in 1974-75 to an average of 252 million since 1976.

Sectors of Intervention

During the last 3 years, the CCCE has directed three-quarters of its aid to directly productive operations. This proportion even reached 82 percent of investments financed jointly with the assistance of other co-financing sources.

However, the Central Fund has not neglected public equipment of an economic nature, such as transportation and telecommunications, which are vital in bringing remote areas out of isolation and in promoting trade.

A) Rural Development

In 1978 a large amount of money was allocated to food programs: 1976: 43 million francs; 1977: 103 million francs; 1978: 156 million francs.

While programs financed in the first 6 months concerned primarily pilot projects to cultivate vegetables, manioc, and plantains in the Ivory Coast and Gabon, those in the second half of the year were mainly for rice cultivation programs, especially in the Sahel area and in Cameroon. The development of irrigated fields on the Senegal river will help thousands of farmers and is part of an irrigation policy which is essential in areas of low or irregular rainfall. These programs should be based more than in the past on the participation of the farmers themselves in all the work and on a light and decentralized administrative structure. In Cameroon, in the upper Noun valley, which is better irrigated and is heavily populated, water control over 2,200 hectares will make it possible to establish 3,000 rice growers there, and will bring rice production areas closer to the areas of consumption.

Distribution by sector of interventions of the Central Fund during 1978 (millions of francs)

	Second half of year	1978	Percentage
Rural development	153.10	357.35	23.9
Mines	150.00	176.00	11.8
Industry - crafts	295.20	301.00	20.1
Electricity	152.495	188.495	12.6
Tourism	26.70	36.10	2.5
Total of productive sectors	777.495	1058.945	70.9
Railroads	7.50	127.50	8.5
Roads - ports - airports	20.31	126.21	8.5
Telecommunications	121.00	121.00	8.1
Social infrastructure		3.00	0.2

Total of public equipment	148.81	377.71	25.3
Total of financial operations	52.901	56.487	3.8
Total	979.206	1493.142	100

An integrated rural development operation in the east of Upper Volta is another type of experiment based on bringing underpopulated areas out of isolation.

In a general way, the rural operations selected in 1978 most often had a promotional aspect. For example, in the second half of the year there were the development of wheat cultivation in Madagascar, associated with the establishment of a grain mill, a pilot agriculture and livestock program in Mauritius, village plantations of rubber trees associated with an industrial rubber tree plantation in the Ivory Coast, a sheep-breeding project in the Ivory Coast, semi-artisanal fishing in Senegal. For all these projects it seems that the possibility of enlarging the program in case of success generally outweighed the risks inherent in this sort of innovation.

In all, 357 million francs were allocated to rural development projects in 1978, in 29 operations.

B) Industrial Development

Four major projects were financed in the second half of the year; these constitute the main aid given during the year. These operations were covered half by the first and half by the second counters as follows (listed in millions of francs).

	First Counter	Second Counter	Total Investments
Guelb el Rhein iron mines in Mauritania	75	75	1943
Petroleum refinery at Victoria, Cameroon		120	1316
Enlargement of ALUCAM plant in Cameroon	50	80	527
Andekaleka hydroelectric power plant in Madagascar	80		558
Other industrial, electrical, and tourist investments	146	76	
Total for 1978	351	351	

The Mauritanian project will use the iron ore resrves of the Guelb mines. Despite their metal content (30 to 40 percent), which is lower than the content of the deposits which have been in production until now near Zouerate, and the corresponding need for enrichment, this program will enable Mauritania to conserve its primary export resource after the present mines are exhausted towards 1990.

The Victoria refinery in Cameroon, simple in its design, will have a capacity of 1,500,000 tons which can be increased to 2,000,000 tons; it will process the new petroleum production from the Kole region.

The enlargement of the ALUCAM aluminum plant in Cameroon from 50,000 tons to 80,000 tons capacity will use the surplus electric power from the Song-Loulou dam, while improving costs through the modernization of the existing facilities. Production should gradually be absorbed primarily by the African market.

The Andekaleka dam in Madagascar, in its first phase, will be equipped with two turbines; this dam is designed for the nation's electricity needs, and could help with its industrial development, especially for the production of ferrochrome.

Among the other projects being financed, on a more modest scale, we can mention two expansions of textile plants in the Ivory Coast and in Niger, a paper bag and wrapping paper plant in Zaire, and the enlargement of paper mills in Madagascar. In the field of electricity, the projects chosen are aimed mainly at increasing production capacity in Cameroon, Mali, Senegal, and Chad.

Finally, the Central Fund, which feels that the economic spinoffs of good business hotels are important, has facilitated an investment of this sort in Niamey.

C) Public Investments

In 1978, these were oriented primarily towards railroads and airports and toward telecommunications. In the second half of the year, major programs were financed in Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, and Niger, as follows (listed in millions of francs).

	Second half of year	1978
Railroads	7.5	127.5
Road transport		24
Ports	18	18
Airports	2.3	84.2
Telecommunications	121	121
Social infrastructure		3
Total	148.8	377.7
(of which these amounts were from the "second counter"	45	80

For the first time, the CCCE took an interest in a national television network in Niger; this will enlarge the scope of activity of educational television.

A loan was made to enlarge the port of Cotonou, which is now saturated. This port plays an essential role in the Beninois economy and also in the economy of Niger, and more recently, has become important for the Nigerian economy. Along with the development of uranium mines, there is expected a sharp upturn in traffic on the Cotonou-Niger axis operated by the OCBN /Benin-Niger Joint Railroad and Transport Organization/.

Three programs for studies of airport development show the CCCE's interest in the possibility of using air freight transport in order to bring these countries out of isolation.

D) Financial Operations

These included a loan of 50 million francs made with the backing of the French government to the Senegal National Development Bank for a government investment program.

Methods of Intervention

In 1978 the CCCE reinforced its promotional role in the preparation of projects, brought increased attention to bear on management and training programs, and pursued a policy of cofinancing, which enabled it to multiply the effects of its actions.

A) Promotion of Projects

After the establishment of a development division in the headquarters of the CCCE, the establishment of PROPARCO

/expansion unknown/, an industrial development company which shares in the capital investment of new enterprises, the project promotion organization was completed by a mechanism established to handle studies.

The procedure to finance studies of projects, established in 1978, has a dual objective. First of all, it should help to solve the problems faced by the developing countries in obtaining aid for preparing projects whose definition is not yet complete, or whose development is not fully ensured. The aid of the CCCE is thus added to the aid traditionally granted for the same purpose by the FAC /Aid and Cooperation Fund/. Also, the financing of studies is a guarantee for the CCCE that it will receive sufficiently well prepared projects and in particular, projects oriented from their start toward meeting essential needs or toward the maximum utilization of local labor and local resources.

Excluding general or sector studies, the procedure implemented is aimed at identified projects which have been approved by the government involved, and whose nature falls within the realm of later financing by the CCCE. It is significant that the first loan made to Guinea was for the study of a dam, a sort of pump-priming loan for larger amounts of financing.

B) Management and Training Aid

The quality of management and especially the quality of the maintenance of the facilities financed is an essential condition of their profitability. This problem arises particularly with rural development organizations, large national electricity production enterprises, railroad systems, and road transport systems.

The CCCE is now financing the training of appropriate personnel and specific actions to organize maintenance services. This aid most often is one of the elements of the project receiving establishment loans. Special funding may also be granted. During the year just past, a special training program was set up for SAED /Delta Development and Operation Company/ employees in Senegal. The Central Fund also helped with the creation, in liaison with professional groups, of specialized institutes using a particular type of teaching methods. In the Ivory Coast, the Bouake agricultural institute in 1978 received a second installment of funds; the CMMI /Industrial Maintenance and Mechanics Center/ of Jacqueville will develop teaching methods to be used in seven other vocational schools.

C) Co-Financing

The Central Fund most often combines with its long-term loans credits from suppliers and medium-term funding, whose repayment terms are eased by generous deferments. The extension of establishment resources is indispensable when large projects are involved for, because of their volume and the risks involved, these often exceed the capacities of the Central Fund alone. The CCCE then intervenes jointly with other bilateral and international aid organizations. The experience it has acquired in 30 years of activity in Africa and its strong local ties with its network of agencies and technical assistance have sometimes enabled it to interest other lenders in vast programs, especially organizations that were established relatively recently.

In 1978, the CCCE in this way participated in a total volume of investments of 8 billion francs, an amount 5.5 times higher than the loans that it made by itself, since in 1978 its share in these co-financed projects was 1.437 billion francs. While the CCCE does appear to be the primary financing source (18 percent), the share of other bilateral aid (15 percent) and of multilateral aid (15 percent) is also essential.

Loans Made by the CCCE in 1978 to the Nations of Africa and the Indian Ocean (in thousands of French francs)

I Productive Sectors	
1) Rural Development	357,350
a) Food crops	155,860
Cameroon: rice cultivation program in the upper Noun valley	18,000
Ivory Coast: manioc cultivation expansion project in the Toumodi region	20,500
Ivory Coast: vegetable cultivation expansion project at Marabadiassa	24,000
Gabon: creation of an industrial plantain farm at N'Toum	24,000
Upper Volta: integrated rural development operation in the east	13,200
Upper Volta: project to develop farmers' garden crops in the center west	1,000

Madagascar: experimental program to develop wheat cultivation in the Antsirabe region	5,000
Mali: rehabilitation of the agricultural area of Baguineda for vegetable and fruit crops	3,100
Mauritius: pilot projects in agriculture and livestock	2,000
Senegal: development of the N'Dombo and Thiago basins	18,560
Senegal: created of irrigated village areas at Matam and conducting of a study of the possibilities of agricultural development of the entire area	26,500
b) Export crops	74,550
Burundi: quinquina plantation project	750
Cameroon: tea planting program at Djuttitsa	10,000
Ivory Coast: establishment of the CEDAR /Arabusta Coffee Research and Development Center/ plant at Soubre	3,600
Ivory Coast: rubber tree planting project (second phase) at Grand Bereby (southwest)	40,600
Ivory Coast: establishment of village rubber tree plantations in the southeast	6,600
Ivory Coast: rubber tree planting program in the southwest (SAPH /African Rubber Plantation Company/)	12,000
Mali: equipment for rural blacksmiths in the cotton-growing area (CMDT)	1,000
c) Livestock	
Ivory Coast: sheep-breeding project in the Toumodi region	12,840
d) Agricultural industries	77,900
Cameroon: construction of a palm oil plant by the SAFACAM	14,400
Madagascar: construction of a mill at Antsirabe	20,000
Mali: rehabilitation of the Baguineda cannery by the SOCAM	2,500
Senegal: construction of a new peanut oil plant at Diourbel (second counter)	40,000
Chad: construction of a cotton gin at Bol by Cotontchad	1,000

e)	Fishing	24,000
	Ivory Coast: purchase of a tuna boat by the SIPAR	13,000
	Ivory Coast: purchase of a tuna boat by the SMBL	10,000
	Senegal: feasibility studies	1,000
f)	Training	12,200
	Ivory Coast: second part of Bouake agricultural institute funding	4,700
	Senegal: SAED training program	7,500
2)	Mines	176,000
	Mauritania: start of production of a new iron ore mine (Guelb el Rhein)	
	First counter	75,000
	Second counter	75,000
	Togo: establishment of a fifth phosphate processing unit by the CTMB (second counter)	26,000
3)	Crafts industries	301,000
	Cameroon: establishment of a petroleum refinery at Victoria by the SONORA (second counter)	120,000
	Cameroon: enlargement of the ALUCAM plant's aluminum production capacity at Edea	
	First counter	50,000
	Second counter	80,000
	Cameroon: development program for small and medium-scale businesses	7,500
	Ivory Coast: enlargement of the African Cycle Factory in Abidjan	2,000
	Ivory Coast: enlargement of the textile complex of the SOCITAS	12,000
	Madagascar: expansion of paper mills of PAPMAD	6,600
	Mali: expansion of the Mamadou Sada Diallo plant at Bamako	3,000
	Niger: modernization of the spinning and weaving facilities of SONITEXTIL	7,100
	Senegal: provision of backing funds for small and medium-scale businesses and for crafts workers	2,000

	Chad: modernization of spinning and weaving shops	800
	Zaire: development of a kraft paper plant (second counter)	10,000
4)	Electricity	188,495
	Cameroon: installation of a fourth generating system at the Song Loulou dam and a second very high voltage line between Song Loulou and Edea (second counter)	20,000
	Ivory Coast: electrical power supply of Korhogo and Dabou	16,000
	Gabon: construction and equipment of transformer station at Bissegue (second counter)	20,000
	Guinea: studies of rebuilding the Grandes Chutes dam	1,295
	Madagascar: construction of Andelaleka hydroelectric power plant	80,000
	Mali: Energie du Mali investment program	25,200
	Senegal: increase in electricity production of Electricite du Senegal	15,000
	Chad: purchase of three generators for Ndjamena and Sahr power plants	10,000
	Chad: technical study of new Ndjamena power plant	1,000
5)	Tourism	36,100
	Gabon: construction of a tourist-class hotel at Port Gentil	9,400
	Niger: construction of an international class hotel at Niamey	25,700
	Togo: construction of a hostel at Fazao	1,000
Total of productive sectors		1,058,945
Including:		
First counter		667,945
Second counter		391,000

II Public Equipment

1)	Transportation	253,710
a)	Railroads	127,500
	Benin: OCBN investment program	20,000
	Cameroon: straightening of railway between Douala and Edea and between Minka and Maloume	14,000
	Cameroon: REGIFERCAM /Cameroonian Railway Administration/ investment program	
	first counter	29,000
	second counter	15,000
	Congo: purchase of passenger cars by ATC /Trans-Congolese Communications Agency/	22,000
	Congo: ATC investment program	20,000
	Mali: modernization of tracks and equipment of the RCFM	7,500
b)	Roads	
	Niger: SNTN investment program	24,000
c)	Ports	
	Benin: enlargement of the autonomous port of Cotonou	18,000
d)	Airports	84,210
	ASECNA: investment program for several airports	40,000
	Gabon: Air Gabon equipment program (second counter)	20,000
	Madagascar: enlargement of airport facilities at Antananarivo	13,000
	Mauritius: geotechnical site study of area intended for construction of Plaine des Roches international airport	1,000
	Mauritius: general study of the island's aviation infrastructure	110
	Mauritania: enlargement of Nouakchott airport	8,900

	Rwanda: study of development of Kigali-Kanombe international airport	1,200
2)	Telecommunications	121,000
	Cameroon: extension of telephone systems of Yaounde, Douala, and Garoua	
	First counter	35,000
	Second counter	37,000
	Ivory Coast: development of the Ivory Coast portion of the Abidjan-Lagos underwater cable by INTELCI	
	First counter	8,000
	Second counter	8,000
	Madagascar: expansion and modernization of telephone system at Antananarivo	13,000
	Niger: project to develop a national television network	20,000
3)	Social infrastructure	3,000
	Seychelles: construction of housing for French technical assistance	3,000
Total of public equipment		377,710
Including:		
First counter		297,710
Second counter		80,000
Total I and II		1,436,655
Including:		
First counter		965,655
Second counter		471,000
III Financial Operations		
1)	Capital participations	6,487.4
	Burundi: increase in capital of the BNDE /National Economic Development Bank/	1,000
	Ivory Coast: increase in capital of the BIDI /Ivorian Bank for Industrial Development/	1,500
	France: increase in capital of international SCET /Central Company for Territorial Equipment/	375

	France: participation in capital of SOFININDEX	1,500
	Morocco: addition to increase in capital of the BNDE /National Economic Development Bank/	2
	Niger: increase in capital of BDN /Niger Development Bank/	2,085.6
	Togo: increase in capital of the BTD /Togo Development Bank/	24.8
2)	Advances	50,000
	Senegal: financing of government investment program by the BNDS /Senegal National Development Bank/ (second counter)	50,000
Total of financial operations		56,487.4
Grand Total (I, II, III)		1,493,142.4
Including:		
First counter		972,142.4
Second counter		521,000

7679
CSO: 4400

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EFFORTS TO DEVELOP EURAFRICAN MINING POLICY DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Mar 79 p 727

[Editorial: "For a Eurafrican Mining Policy"]

[Text] In proposing to the governments of member nations of the European Economic Community in Brussels on 15 March that they offer the community's guarantee for mining investments in Africa (see "Mail from Brussels" heading), the commissioner for development, Mr Claude Cheysson, suggested only one possible solution to a well-known and often deplored problem for which truly appropriate measures have nevertheless not been considered to date: the problem of the low quantity of European mining investments, dangerous for the future, in Africa and more generally in developing countries.

With his usual candor, Mr Cheysson accused the governments of the "Nine" of "a conspiracy of silence" in regard to proposals of the European Commission. No doubt the governments showed keen irritation at the mere idea that the Brussels Commission could suggest a real policy for them in any area. But if Mr Cheysson's accusation is well founded, the negative attitude of the governments would be even more incomprehensible since Europe in general depends to a large extent (about three-fourths) on foreign sources for its supplies of essential ores for its industries. This is particularly the case with France, which has to import about 55 percent of its consumption of ores other than sulfur, potash and fluorine, and must rely on New Caledonia for nickel, whereas its deposits of bauxite will be exhausted in about 15 years.

The United Nations, Mr Cheysson recalls, has estimated the mining investment needs of developing countries at $4 to 5 billion per year. Almost half of these investments, approximately $2.4 billion, should be invested by Europe each year for 10 years if it wants to be assured of a regular supply of ores, according to estimates of the former chairman of the Association of Mining Industries of the United Kingdom, Mr Beville Pain, in a speech delivered in early 1978 at the time of his retirement. The amount which should be devoted to Africa each year can be estimated at some $600 million and perhaps even more.

Commodities Research Unit director Robert Perlman warned in late 1977 that due to lack of massive investments in the mining industry, i' .s possible that prices of metals will rise considerably in the eighties. What has Europe done to cope with this situation? In 1967, investments of European businesses in Africa (not including South Africa and Rhodesia and excluding uranium) represented $3 million. They were zero in 1976 and barely reached $126 million in 1977. Mr Cheysson described this lack as "disastrous." He compared the policy of the United States, which depends on foreign sources for only about 15 percent of its ore supplies, but whose mining investments in the Third World are twice those of the European Economic Community. If the EEC does not quickly rectify this situation, its dependence will continue to increase in the future, whether on ore-producing developed countries such as Canada, the United States and Australia or on multinational companies controlled by American or Japanese capital.

There are two reasons for the drop in mining investments in recent years: the low level of metal prices, which has enabled investors to reap only second-rate profits and, on the other hand, noncommercial risks, i.e., political instability and the fear of excessive increases in taxes or royalties, possibly even leading eventually to actual expropriation.

The European Commission suggests that the governments of the "Nine" take action in two areas.

With regard to prospecting, the EEC could help to establish and finance in ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific countries] "national funds for mining exploration" in which other financing agencies such as Arab funds, for example, could participate. The EEC should also share in financing prospecting by allocating venture capital for this purpose.

With regard to the promotion of production investments, needs are so huge and investments require such a long period of amortization (about 40 years) that Europeans should join forces to make an effort comparable to that of the United States. The European Commission therefore suggests that public financing agencies act as a catalyst for direct investments of European contractors in ACP, that the European Investment Bank increase its participation in mining (and energy) projects and that the EEC offer its own guarantee, in addition to that of national agencies when this is the case, against noncommercial risks.

According to Mr Cheysson, the "Nine" are still not willing to really tackle problems of mining cooperation with ACP. On the other hand, ACP have appeared to be rather favorable to the European Commission's proposals while still maintaining a certain degree of reservation concerning the real intentions of the "Nine"; it would therefore be appropriate to dispel their doubts by clearly affirming that they have no intention of intervening in the internal affairs of ACP with respect to protecting their investments in those countries.

Is it possible that the prospect of an increase in ore prices in future years will cause developing countries with either sizable deposits or mineral wealth to limit their sales or to reject or restrict development of their reserves while waiting for world prices to rise?

Developing countries, and African nations in particular, would make a serious error in judgment if they yielded to that temptation. Their populations would not understand why their governments were turning away the flow of mining investments while the number of jobs needed was increasing every day. Moreover, a certain price level may induce mining companies to seek other sources of supply, as they have already done by channeling a percentage of their investments to Canada and Australia, considered to be politically stable countries. Consumers may find it more profitable to use alternative products. Research on new recovery techniques can also be developed. France currently recycles about 30 percent of its iron and copper consumption. Finally, an increase in prices may make it profitable to exploit ocean nodules such as those of manganese in the Pacific. The failure of negotiations on the Law of the Sea and the United States' threat to grant development rights to their companies obviously show that, for the time being, it is excessive cost prices which have held back the development of ores deposited in the ocean floor, rather than respect for great principles of international solidarity.

For lack of an agreement between Europe and Africa, the latter would continue to be deprived of the economic and social benefits which the existence of its mineral wealth should provide. Their common interest therefore suggests that they should promote, as far as possible, multilateral negotiations--but their successful conclusion does not depend only on them --and encourage the development of new solutions such as partnerships of public or private European and African capital and the conclusion of long-term ore supply contracts. This is also what the Brussels Commission is proposing by setting dependency limits and by restricting Community intervention in countries whose mining companies are linked to European purchasers by long-term contracts.*

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* Cf. MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 16 Mar, p 678: Toward the establishment of a Stabex II for ores.

11915
CSO: 4400

PETROLEUM ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA 1978-1979

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Feb 79 pp 491-93

/Text/ Data relative to petroleum activities in Africa during the past year are far from being totally available. However, temporary estimates have been made in regard to production and significant developments have been ascertained in sectors "downstream" with the result that it is possible to strike a balance and point out the trends which the petroleum industry in Africa must surely follow in the months to come.

Africa: 9.1 Percent of World Production

Petroleum production in Africa in 1978 (excluding that of Egypt, as is generally the case) is said to have been about 277 million tons divided as follows (temporary figures, in millions of tons):

	1978	1977
Libya	95.5	100.1
Algeria	59.0	53.5
Nigeria	95.0	104.28
Gabon	11.0	11.2
Angola	9.5	8.1
Tunisia	4.6	4.3
Congo	1.9	1.84
Zaire	1.2	1.0
Total	277.7	284.32

The tonnage extracted in 1978 ranks about the same in world production as that extracted the previous year--namely, 9.1 percent. Nevertheless, despite the recent entrance of new countries in the cycle of petroleum production, there is reason to be astonished at this drop of 7 million tons from one year to the next. The drop is due to a weakening in Nigeria's exports severely affected by a slowdown in demand during the first half of the year: thus, in a sellers' market Nigerian crude met with strong competition among its usual buyers (United States and countries of northwestern Europe) from crude coming from Alaska, Mexico and the North Sea. The situation righted itself, particularly from September on, with the general resumption of precautionary purchases made in view of the expected price rise which OPEC was to decide at the end of December. Libya's situation was somewhat comparable, although the Libyan Government has seemed to be satisfied with stepped-up production in accordance with its policy of maintaining reserves.

On the other hand, one will note the increase in Algeria's production (8 percent) and that of Angola (9.9 percent), which are in keeping with the requirements for financing the economies of those two countries.

However, it is fitting to add Cameroon to the African countries already producing: Cameroon produced about 600,000 tons from the Kole offshore deposit opened in February.* It is expected that 1.5 million tons will be obtained in 1979. Betika, a new deposit, has just been put into production. Thus, Cameroon will help maintain the growth rate of petroleum production in Africa, and a new producing country will be added--Ghana. In fact, at the end of December the American countries which had discovered the Saltpond deposit 9 miles off the shore of Ghana in 1970 transported a first load of that oil to Texas. But the tonnages obtained will be low, and it is expected that it will be Nigeria that will particularly add to the increase in African production.

As a matter of fact, except for that country (for the portion of the continent located south of the Sahara), the development of production comes up against technical difficulties experienced by most of the recently discovered deposits: whereas in Nigeria the average production cost per barrel is about $1, elsewhere we must count on $8, and even $10 as in the case of the Congolese offshore deposit where the reservoir is deep and releases a rather viscous oil with some difficulty.

Nevertheless, the companies involved are not sparing in their efforts, despite the large sums they must invest. For example, in Gabon, ELF /Eritrean Liberation Front/, associated with Mitsubishi, is developing a deposit discovered in 1974 in the sea at a distance of 75 km south of Cape Lopez; its goal is to start production in June 1980 at an annual rate of 400,000 tons.

In Congo a third offshore deposit, Li Kouela (after those of Emeraude and Loango), will become productive 2 years from now. The operating company, ELF, is hoping for an annual production of 1.4 million tons from 1980 on, which would make it possible almost to double Congo's production. In Zaire production will decline until a secondary-recovery system is installed (which the World Bank will partially finance). Ghana, a new producer in 1979, could become established as an important source if Phillips, Getty and AGIP /Italian Petroleum Enterprise/ consider commercially worthwhile their recent discovery of an oil of good quality, 32 degrees, accompanied by gas, in a deposit known as "South Tana," about 20 miles offshore.

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* The operating company is ELF-SEREPCA /Eritrean Liberation Front-Petroleum Research and Exploitation Company of Cameroon/ with 51 percent.

On the whole, the deposits recently put into production, or which will be, will compensate for any decrease in oil obtained from older deposits. Any increase in production in Libya will depend on the policy of the authorities and also on progress made in equipment projects, such as the laying of the 400 km pipeline from Al Hamada to Zawia (Tripoli).

It is especially thanks to Nigeria that Africa's potential will be further developed in 1979. Discoveries follow one another rather regularly like the one made in September by AGIP-Phillips in the Niger River delta not far from Forcados where 13 productive deposits were found. Having no cause for concern over the state of their hydrocarbon reserves, the Nigerian authorities will be able to take advantage of the rather tense situation of the world market in light crude oils in increasing their annual production in 1979 to 120 million tons or even more.

Angola can also look forward to a good petroleum future. Its production has regained the level it had before independence; but, more important, the Luanda government has drawn up new rules on the game of cooperation with the private companies on the basis of the semifiscal system of "production sharing." Foreign research companies, obliged to work in association with the national company, know that in case of discoveries they will be reimbursed for their expenses as operator and that they will share in part of the production. The CFP /French Petroleum Company/ group has just concluded an agreement of this type which will enable its subsidiary, Total-CAP /Angolan Petroleum Company/, to use the knowledge acquired previously through several drilling campaigns and not lose the benefit of its previous investments.

In reference to the location of hydrocarbon reserves in Africa, emphasis must be given to offshore deposits. In 1978, nearly 60 producing wells were located in the sea, not to mention those of Nigeria all located in the southern part of the country. This confirms the analysis made by geologists on the formation of oil in Africa south of the Sahara. The arrangement is obviously quite different for North Africa, even though exploration in Gabes Gulf has revealed several reservoirs whose exploitation, in some instances, is delayed by the problem of the division of the continental plateau between Tunisia and Libya. For this reason the Libyan Government has opposed the start-up of the offshore deposit, Isis, discovered in 1974 by a subsidiary of the CFP group, with an annual potential of about 1.5 million tons (it was not possible to complete the work establishing the boundary at the east).

It is probable that with the new program of aid to developing countries for their energy requirements, decided at the end of January by the World Bank,* oil and gas production in Africa will progress in future years. The bank has already promised its assistance for production operations where the commercial

* See MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 2 February 1979, p 233

profitability is only moderate (small discoveries in Chad, for example) but sufficient to decrease the energy dependence of the countries in question. This new orientation by the bank, which extends from assistance in defining energy policies to the financing of production and even of certain exploratory projects, will be worth following attentively; in fact, it might in time alter the petroleum trade, dominated up to now by the preponderance of Middle-East production, and place greater emphasis on the function of "industrial cooperation" of oil companies (which does not always suit large international groups).

Natural Gas: Algeria in an Awkward Position

We cannot close a study on African production without mentioning natural gas. As a matter of fact, the situation did not change in 1978. Libya and especially Algeria are the only remaining commercial producers of this kind of hydrocarbons; Algeria has confirmed its position as leader, having increased its production to more than 14 billion cubic meters, or 70 percent more than in 1977. It will develop its production still more in the future, especially when SONATRACH /National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Fuels/ will have arranged export facilities (new liquefaction equipment and piping. In this regard, although there is still uncertainty about the gas pipeline leading to Spain, the installation of the pipeline linking Algeria with Italy via Sicily can go forward in a decisive manner, since its financing has been assured by a loan of $550 million from an Italian consortium to which is added a loan of $210 million from other banks among which Credit Lyonnais ranks first.

However, in the rest of Africa, and especially in Nigeria, the use of natural gas is not yet organized. In this domain, the weaker the industrial risk the more probable the aid from the World Bank. But it is taking a long time for the two interested parties to reach an understanding, and the closing of the American markets to imports of liquid natural gas /GNL/ for price reasons is delaying the carrying out of a project like that currently being discussed among several Nigerian producers (ELF, Shell, BP /British Petroleum/ and AGIP) for the annual export of 16 billion tons of GNL.

Five New Refineries in 1978

Downstream production operations in Africa's petroleum industry did not show any definite developments in 1978. The continent is increasing its dependence on oil as an energy source, each country adapting to the crisis in accordance with its own particular situation. Generally speaking, this crisis situation is serving only to strengthen the policy of the various governments in broadening their control or direct intervention in the refining sector and in the supplying of products.

Five new refineries were started up in Africa in 1978: in Togo (Lome), in Mauritania (Nouadhibou), in Somalia (Mogadiscio), in Congo (Pointe-Noire) and in Nigeria (Warri). They have the common characteristic of being owned by the state and managed by a national company, an indication of the desire to exclude private industry from the refining sector.

Their construction, as elsewhere in Africa, was motivated by the desire to be no longer dependent on foreign sources for the supply of major petroleum products. Their capacity is not always based on the actual or foreseeable needs of their respective domestic market. This is the case with the Nouadhibou, Lome and Pointe-Noire installations, each having an annual capacity of 1 million tons; however, their localization has given their promoters reason to believe that their production would be sufficient for export. The Mogadiscio refinery, with an annual capacity of 500,000 tons, will also need to export. On the other hand, Warri's annual capacity of 5 million tons will not long suffice to satisfy an expanding domestic consumption, even with the aid of the country's first refinery, located on the coast, in Port Harcourt. A new refinery is being built in Kaduna.

Even when the refineries do not totally belong to the state, there is a tendency to increase the public share of the capital. In Ivory Coast, PETROCI /Ivorian Petroleum Company/, a state company, already holds 30 percent of the capital in Ivorian Refining Company. In Senegal, the government is having a study made on its behalf of a new share arrangement in African Refining Company, and in Cameroon, the government has straightaway assured itself of a 66 percent share in National Refining Company (SONARA), which is undertaking the construction of a refinery in Victoria with an annual capacity of 1.5 million tons.

These three countries are continuing to choose a system involving a joint appropriation of refining resources; they are not alone. This juridical status facilitates industrial cooperation with foreign companies whose experience is definitely established and correspondingly decreases the amount of investments required by the state. It is partially responsible for the success of an industrial enterprise like the Vridi refinery in Ivory Coast, which has already doubled its refining capacity (currently 2 million tons) and, within a year, will be equipped with an ultramodern converting facility, a hydrocracking plant, for which bids were solicited in December 1978. The same procedure is being followed in Cameroon for the construction of the Victoria refinery (whose engineering was contracted to Procofrance) with French Petroleum Company, chosen as the "operating company," assuring the development of the project, the control of the work and the like.

In the sector of product manufacture this cooperative system enabled PETROCI, in October 1978, to have no difficulty in starting up Multinational Asphalt Company's plant (280,000 tons per year) of which it is the principal shareholder and operator.

Strengthening of State Control

The legitimate concern of the African governments to assure the dependability of oil supplies led them in 1978 to take various steps to control the sequence of operations involved in the manufacture of their products. An example of this is the decision of the Cameroonian Government, made in September 1978, to limit its imports of products coming from Gabon to 20 percent of its needs (that is, from SOGARA [Gabonese Refining Company] of Port-Gentil). This step, which will make it necessary over the short term to resort to a greater variety of foreign sources, is undoubtedly viewed at Yaounde as a preliminary of the autarchy which the Victoria refinery will bring it.

The efforts undertaken by various governments to standardize the administration of their stocks or develop their capacity seem to be more rational. In Upper Volta, the authorities arrange for a study to be made on the establishment of a community stocking company (December 197^). Cameroon went one step further last year: following a decree issed on 23 December 1977, it signed an agreement establishing the Community Petroleum Storage Company, a joint company between the state, with 40 percent of the holdings, and six distribution companies represented on the market.

Even partial Africanization of the distribution companies is another indication of the desire of various governments to develop national independence in the petroleum sector; this was begun several years ago in a number of countries; but the methods used differ, ranging from the nationalization of the networks for the benefit of a state company (for example, in Congo) to the creation of a joint company (for example, in Uganda), or else to an obligation made to foreign companies to offer a part of their capital to private domestic interests. This is the direction taken by the Lagos government in 1978 which directed distribution companies operating in Nigeria to sell 40 percent of their capital to private interests. But elsewhere, when one wishes to follow this path, one is apt to run into a lack of available private capital incurring delays as in Upper Volta, where an attempt was made to implement a similar measure.

This policy of strengthening administrative control, directly or by eliminating foreign companies, has its justifications. But it does not necessarily result in an improvement in the management of companies and, as a result, in their profitability. From this aspect, the year 1978 was marked by a few disappointments in various countries. For example, the Warri refinery, whose construction was already taking longer than anticipated, was stopped in December, a few months after its start-up, due to technical difficulties. An older refinery, that of Mombasa, in Kenya, experienced a number of stoppages, which forced the government to make an appeal abroad for the import of products which the refinery could no longer furnish. In Sudan, serious disturbances in the forwarding of products from the Port Sudan refinery to the interior caused a shortage of aircraft gasoline and kerosene. The pipeline connecting Zambia with Dar es Salaam is operating badly.

Undoubtedly, the distances to be covered in Africa and its natural and climatic conditions make the exploitation of refineries, fleets of trucks or pipeline distribution more difficult than elsewhere. But the active presence of foreign companies--without compromising the normal control of the authorities on the supply problem--provides for a better scheduling of operations and a strict surveillance of the equipment with immediate assistance through arrangements made to have spare parts immediately available, usually imported. Once more, we should stress the mutual interest of cooperation between the African countries and industrialized nations.

France and African Oil

In this appraisal of the African petroleum year, it is fitting to recall the importance of African oil for the French petroleum industry. First of all, out of a production of 277 million tons nearly 19 million tons went to the subsidiaries of two French groups participating in the exploitation of African deposits; this amounts to nearly one-fifth of the oil necessary to satisfy France's consumption. Moreover, this tonnage represents about 27 percent of the crude oil reverting to French companies as a result of their production activities in France and elsewhere in the world. Lastly, subject to precise information which will be given later by official publications, petroleum of African origin imported into France, whether or not produced by French companies, will have accounted for nearly 15 percent of the supply going to French refineries.

These figures establish the importance of the African continent in the balance and expansion of the French petroleum industry. They also indicate a certain diversification in the provisioning in comparison with the Middle East. It is to be hoped that 1979 will see a confirmation of these two trends.

South Africa is in a completely different position. With the political changes which have occurred in Iran, it finds itself deprived of its principal source of crude oil, but it cannot appeal to the African producing countries to replace that source. Nevertheless, its situation is not as precarious as it might seem: first of all, oil accounts for only 20 percent of the country's energy needs, while it is true that it accounts for 80 percent of its transportation needs. However, very sizable strategic stocks have been accumulated, and this will make it possible for the country to await the start-up of the second plant for the manufacture of petroleum products on the basis of coal. Moreover, the South African authorities would obtain crude oil (paying a surcharge) from other suppliers who will not proclaim such purchases from the housetops. The petroleum asphyxiation of the South African Republic, through lack of petroleum products, will not take place tomorrow despite the vote taken in the UN General Assembly on 24 January 1979 on a resolution asking the Security Council to prepare an obligatory embargo on deliveries of crude oil and petroleum products to South Africa. It is fitting to point out that, although 105 countries voted on the resolution, 6 countries rejected it (among which were France, the United States, the United Kingdom and FRG), 16 abstained and 24 were "absent."

8568
CSO: 4400

CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

BRIEFS

LIBYANS OUSTED, ISLAM SCORED--Charging Libya with having had a hand in fomenting the demonstrations that erupted in Bangui on 20 and 21 January, Emperor Bokassa has ordered a Libyan-owned corporation operating in Central Africa to shut up shop. He has also denounced all agreements signed with Libya. At the same time, the emperor launched a violent verbal attack on Islam, charging it with every known sin of subversion. Further, to save any of his "subjects" from following its "evil example," Bokassa has banned any kind of news report concerning Iran from Bangui Radio's airwaves. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 p 13] 6182

CHAD

KANO DECISIONS 'BEAR SEEDS OF FURTHER CONFLICTS'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2-15 Apr 79 pp 22-23

[Article by Man-Gue]

[Text] With the Malloum-Habré pair out of the way and the establishment of an interim Council of State headed by Goukouni Oueddei, the prevailing mood in Ndjamena is still one of skepticism.

Now it seems that we have a Holy Alliance among the men backing Gen Forest, the troops of the former "rebel Toubou" and those of Goukouni Oueddei, formed to check the armed insurrection in the central and eastern portion of the country against the rule of Hissein Habré, which the Elysée did its best to impose.

And people are wondering about the likelihood of success for the agreements signed at Kano on 16 March 1979.

For the time being, relative calm seems to have replaced the bloody confrontations which had plunged the nation into a climate of all-out civil war. And bloody confrontation seems to be gradually giving way to negotiated agreement. What has happened is, by all indications, that the various possible combinations devised by L. Dallier, the French ambassador to Njamena, have at last shaken down into a kind of equilibrium among the warring factions -- as the 16 March accords would seem to indicate. Those agreements, as we now know, call for a continued cease-fire throughout the entire territory; neutrality on the part of the state radio and demilitarization of the capital; freedom of movement for civilians; establishment of a control commission made up of two representatives from each of the four neighboring countries and from Nigeria, as well as one representative from each of the four Chad factions signing the Kano accords (Félix Malloum, Hissein Habré, Goukouni Oueddei, and Abderhaman Aboubakar).

Under the terms of this agreement, the new government must implement the decision on general amnesty (freeing all political prisoners and prisoners of war); organize the return of Chadian exiles; determine the nation's political future; carry out a sweeping reshuffle of all executive positions and disband all standing armies prior to establishment of a national army. The Kano accord affirms a "determination on the part of one and all to preserve Chad's unity and integrity and their commitment to the reestablishment of peace, security, and confidence at all levels."

Even so, these new arrangements, which supersede the agreements reached last August between Hisseine Habré and Félix Malloum, and which involve the dissolution of the institutions set up at that time (presidency, government, defense committee and national union council) may or may not suffice as a basis for any real hope for the future. Of course, even now, one point in the measures called for has just made headlines. On 23 March, President Félix Malloum and his prime minister, Hissein Habré, resigned, and an interim Council of State made up of eight members representing the four signatory factions to the 16 March accords, and headed by Goukouni Oueddei, has been set up.

Similarly, we also know that at the close of the Kano conference all parties to the conflict -- except for Dr Aba Siddick and Mr Acyl Ahmat, who did not take part -- expressed satisfaction and pledged to implement the measures adopted there to the letter.

It would, however, be premature and more than a little naive to conclude from all this that we are on the way toward a just and lasting peace in Ndjamena. What ensued upon the Malloum-Habré accords last August is of itself grounds for pessimism. And above all, beyond all appearances, we find that the various deals stemming from the 16 March conference in no way challenge the current neocolonial system in Chad. It is clear on the face of the evidence that the primary if not the sole concern of the leading actors on the stage in the Chadian capital is to carve out the lion's share of power, to the detriment of all rival factions. And so we see that the solution that has just been adopted is itself gravid with the seeds of further conflict, particularly in that, in all of this, the aspirations for which the peoples of Chad have been fighting for 13 years, at the cost of untold sacrifice, are completely overlooked.

We are being offered a truly pathetic performance by the men on the political scene in Ndjamena right now. The people of Chad, whom the politicians are trying to divide and set against one another in the name of "badly led ideologies," are once again the prime victims in this new scenario. That makes the problem of organizing the people on just and equitable lines, to ensure the protection of their most fundamental interests, more than ever one of pressing urgency.

In this same line of thought, still another observation must be made. It has to do with the absence from Kano, on 16 March, of political factions associated with the armed insurrection in the central and eastern regions. In view of that absence, it is hard to put much credence in the proclaimed determination of the Party to lay the foundations for broad national reconciliation at the same time it is doing its utmost, out in the field, to complete the military liquidation of all combatants in that zone.

Given that, it is painfully clear that any "ethnic balance" solution for putting a government together which does not allow room for political elements speaking for the central and eastern regions is foredoomed to failure. This is why the announcement of the withdrawal of the interventionist French troops can be greeted only with a great many reservations. It is very clear that, in this situation of endlessly elusive peace, where everything may well explode again, Paris will surely not be so rash as to give up the weapon of the Mirages and the Jaguars without prior assurance that its interests will be protected.

6182
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CHAD

NEW GOVERNMENT'S MAIN PROBLEM: RECONCILE POPULATIONS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 pp 14, 15, 16

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima]

[Text] First promulgated in 1978 at the close of prolonged haggling between the armed forces of the North under Mr Hissein Habré and the High Military Council which had taken over from President Tombalbaye, the "fundamental charter" seems now to belong to history. Only a few hours after the signing of that "separate agreement," those of the protagonists who had refused to have any part of the negotiations rejected the charter outright. In other words, the experiment that has just ended was, in the long run, doomed to failure. Even as they shattered the remnants of the fundamental charter, the clashes which, since 12 February, have set Hissein Habré's men against those of Félix Malloum have cast doubt on the viability of the existing institutions. One might even, in hindsight, call this a good thing in that a broader gamut of the forces involved has gathered around a conference table. The fact that two of the principal adversaries, Goukouni Oueddei, commander of the largest faction in FROLINAT, and Aboubakar Abderhamane, leader of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Chad (MPLT), had decided to cast in their lot with the Malloum-Habré team in an effort to break the deadlock was even then a major step along the path of reconciliation. Even though the tergiversations of the former Ndjamena leaders meant that the start of the meeting was delayed by 3 days, thus creating a lowering climate of doubt and uncertainty, the Nigerian authorities, who had taken the initiative in calling the conference, had reason for pride in having succeeded where the OAU itself had failed. The non-stop negotiations that dragged on for 5 days in the suburban town of Kano, in northern Nigeria, however, were particularly trying for the participants, and the agreement reached between the belligerents seems, for the moment, to be a laborious compromise whose soundness will be demonstrable only when it is put to the test of application.

Unlike the fundamental charter, the Kano accord claims to be global in scope. And so indeed it is, to a degree. It binds not only the four signatories, but also two other FROLINAT factions who hung back on the outskirts of the conference, giving the impression that they would like to go along with it. Dr Abba Siddick sent an envoy to Kano, and Acyl Ahmat seems to be in favor of the conclusions reached there. His one remaining demand is the withdrawal of the French troops. That point, however, is already won, since France, whose role in the course of the recent events here has been controversial to say the least, has finally bowed to the verdict of Kano, where it was conspicuous by its absence after having vainly tried to set up a round table at Ndjamena.

As a matter of fact, the greatest achievement of the Kano accord is the dissolution of the institutions born of the fundamental charter, clearly doomed to extinction after a mere 6 months of existence. The first thing on the agenda now is thus to set up a governmental structure which allows for the new situation which has come into being. In place of two parties making up this coalition government, there will be four, or even six. Its formation will only be rendered more difficult by the degree to which each of the parties will make demands on the basis of the real estate it controls. While the Kano conference succeeded in getting the principle of a cease-fire, the accord ot put together says not a word about control of territory. The suggestion of disarmament of 50 percent of the forces involved in the fighting was not adopted. In the agreement, all armed forces are to withdraw to a distance of at least 100 kilometers from the capital. This means that the government will be able to set up its headquarters there in safety. Holding Ndjamena, however, does not necessarily mean holding Chad. There is already a de facto partition. And it is to be feared that the government, in the final analysis, will be no more than a kind of federal executive in that, initially at least, each party will be counting on the territorial position it has won or on the region of its origin where the populations support it. While it is true that texts are only as good as the men who must apply them, the present delicate balance can be shattered at any moment and the temptation to secession -- following the example of Bangladesh -- may one day prove too strong for those who feel themselves short-changed in the new state of affairs. This, in turn, means that the formation of the new government and the reshuffling the accord calls for in the civil service and in the army would have to be very carefully weighed and measured. The man who heads the executive must be strong enough and enough of a nationalist himself to hold the nation together. It is in this sense that one can truly say that Chad is looking for a heaven-sent man. General Malloum appears already to have bowed out. But his comrades in arms, most of them, like him, from this "good-for-something Chad" which is the south, are standing by to defend their region.

General Djogo and Colonels Djimé and Kamougué are ready to lock arms so as not to be overwhelmed by the noisy arrival on the scene of opposition leaders (whose men right now occupy more than half the country) who might be tempted to demand control of the government.

On the eve of the formation of this new cabinet, there was a lot of talk about Goukouni Oueddeï for prime minister. But whether he or someone else takes over that job, the government that takes office on 23 March will be, to put it bluntly, an interim government. The real problems will begin when the time comes to reconcile the populations, still traumatized by the recent atrocities. Will they follow the political men along the path of wisdom and virtue? That, in truth, is the question that haunts most men's minds, and the question whose solution must be, for the new government -- and above all for its head -- the very top priority.

6182
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CONGO

PCT CONGRESS SEEN AS VICTORY FOR RADICALIZATION MOVEMENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 2-15 Apr 79 pp 21,22

[Article by Ginette Cot: "The Congress at Last!"]

[Text] The forced resignation of President Yhombi Opango is the dawn of a tremendous hope. The Congo Labour Party Congress will be a new kickoff for the radicalization movement decided for at the end of 1975.

Indescribable relief, a renewal of hope and of fighting spirit: these are the prevailing sentiments in the People's Republic of Congo, in the wake of the events of 5 February 1979, and now as, at long last, the 3rd Extraordinary Congress of the Congo Labour Party (PCT), so long awaited, finally begins.

It is all happening as if the country had just experienced a new and genuine liberation, so increasingly intolerable had grown the leaden yoke that weighed on the Congolese people in the years since the assassination of President Marien N'Gouabi on 18 March 1977, and the advent on 4 April of General Yhombi Opango as hed of the Party's military committee.

Today, all the whispered rumors which for months had been pumping increased alarm into the "sidewalk radio" bulleting, all the wrongs, the mistrust, the questions that had been piling up throughout this dangerous period, are out in the open. And the long list of charges filed against the man who claimed to be the successor to Marien N'Gouabi, but whom delusions of grandeur and a savage lust for power and wealth drove into a bottomless pit of intrigue and demagoguery, is still growing.

Here is how the voice of the Congolese Revolution and the daily MWETI confirmed a few of the more scandalously outrageous and significant criminal acts committed by ex-president Yhombi

Opango: the purchase in Libreville of a bed costing 17 million CFA francs; the agreement to buy, out of the national budget, a total of 500 million CFA francs' worth of vehicles: 33 "Passat" automobiles, 45 jeeps, 50 motorcycles, and ten Land Rovers equipped with broadcasting facilities; the embezzlement, for the purpose of corrupting potential allies, of a 400-million-CFA loan granted by Algeria to build a water supply system in the Plateaux region, the start of which project has yet to come about after 8 months -- and for good reason; the construction of several villas for his family's use; the maintenance on his estate in Mpila (a section of Brazzaville from which General Yhombi Opango drove the inhabitants so he could expand his residence) of a zoo whose daily operating costs came to 200,000 CFA francs.

The ousted president is also charged with outright plunder of the treasury funds for his personal use. Whereas the appropriation for political funds was 400 million CFA francs, Gen Yhombi Opango spent 1,500 million for his prestige travels in 1978 alone. In that same year, 200 million CFA francs had already been withdrawn from the coffers of the State even before the budget had been approved.

Fed Up

While he was striving to achieve the standing of a Mobutu, a Bongo, or a Bokassa, Gen Yhombi Opango was leading the nation over the brink of the abyss. The capital of the land of the Three Days of Glory was in danger of turning into a Kinshasa or a Libreville. Corruption was spreading like wildfire, to the point where people today talk of the "manila envelope virus" that infected every level of the ruling circles.

While all this was going on, "far from tapping private capital, as promised, it was the product of the people's toil that was being squandered," as MWETI puts it, official rhetoric had mounted to the heights of paroxysm, and speeches and slogans flew like leaves on the wind.

And at last the people, keenly aware of the flagrant contradiction between words and deeds, and of the deception practiced on them in this travesty of the work and the spirit of President Marien N'Gouabi, were fed up to the teeth. For each one of them life was growing harder with each passing day. To the anarchy that prevailed in prices and the uncertainty of supply deliveries was added galloping inflation.

On 24 January, the Congolese daily reported the dizzying nosedive of purchasing power and the astounding rise in prices. The price of a Primus beer had risen from 100 to 120 CFA francs;

the price of a liter of gasoline from 83 to 125 CFA; of a kilo of sugar from 175 to 300 CFA; the price of a taxi ride or manioc flour had doubled, while some rents had gone up by 2,000 CFA francs in the course of a single year.

Looking at the figures, one can understand why discontent and anger, increasingly in evidence over recent months, both erupted into unbridled rage in the wake of the events of 5 February, as evidenced in the people's attempt to mount an attack on Gen Yhombi Opango's residence.

The process that began on 5 April, when the PCT took over full power from the hands of the Party Military Committee (CMP) to which it had originally entrusted them, and when Col Sassou Nguesso succeeded Gen Yhombi Opango, is also the issue of a long drawn-out struggle, at once semi-clandestine and overt, mounted by the Congolese revolutionary forces, and in which the mass organizations played a crucial rôle. Apparently the leftists on the CMP and the Central Committee of the PCT succeeded very cleverly, without shedding a drop of blood, in outflanking the Yhombe clan's maneuvers, all the while relying on the masses of the people.

Today the people of the Three Days of Glory have once again come out winners in this severe test. They have begun to speak out, and the regional and town congresses, as well as in the mass organization congresses which preceded the Party congress, gave rise to sometimes noisy debates over the thorniest of issues. In addition to the reopening of the trial in connection with the assassination of President Marien N'Gouabi (we know that practically nobody in Brazzaville was ever completely convinced by the official view of N'Guabi's murder. There are still too many points left unclear and contradictory; Ed.), the most dynamic groups -- such as the People's National Army and the youth -- are demanding that Gen Yhombi Opango be brought to trial.

Great Turning-Point

They are also calling for unity among all the forces of the left and for "reintegration of the 22 February and 24 March comrades," and, on the other side, rehabilitation for the PCT and labor union members who were dropped from the rolls in the wake of the March 1976 movement.

In the revolutionary situation which has just developed and in which the trial of strength is taking place in broad daylight, the 3rd Extraordinary Congress -- whose original convocation was prevented by the assassination of President Marien N'Gouabi -- might well mark a great rutning-point and, in so doing, put an end to the policy of hesitancy and compromise which for too long has prevailed in Brazzaville; that is a policy which has unfortunately led a great many progressive Africans into a misunderstanding of the realities of ex-President Opango's policies, in which anti-imperialist positions and "revolutionary" stands were merely cloaks for real political and economic designs and choices.

6182
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CONGO

LEFT WING OF PCT SAID TO HAVE TRIUMPHED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Apr 79 p 15

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "Left Wing Triumphs in Congo. But the more extremist left-wing has not been admitted in political bureau"]

[Text] The triumvirate which took the power after Gen Joachim Yhombi Opango was evicted last February, has now consolidated its position. In this respect, the third extraordinary congress of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) which took place in Brazzaville on 26-31 March did not bring any surprise. Denis Sassou Nguesso, Jean-Pierre Thystère-Tchicaya and Sylvain Goma continue in the functions they already had: the first one was elected president of the party and thus automatically becomes head of the state. The second, the actual number two of the regime, is in charge of education; the third retains the post of prime minister which he has occupied since 1976.

This sanctions the triumph of the left-wing of the PCT. However, the situation should be viewed in perspective. While the party "hard-liners" are the main beneficiaries of the operation, the extremists of this tendency have not been admitted into the "sanctuary" of the revolution, the political bureau. For the time being, the road to power is still not open to the ultras. Thus, Pierre Nze, who had been excluded from the political bureau in 1976 at the time when the campaign for radicalization was launched, is making a strong comeback. The regime's ideological theorist since its formation, the former head of the party school is emerging after a three years' eclipse. "The Congo," he proclaimed in 1974, "is not yet a socialist country. It is preparing for socialism." This is evidence that Pierre Nze has always shown realism. His lucidity contrasted strongly with the uncompromising and dogmatic attitude of revolutionary theorists and intellectuals such as Claude Ernest Ndalla, Ange Diaware or even Ambroise Noumazalaye. His comeback illustrates the desire of the Congolese leaders not to get ahead of schedule in their attempt to return to an orthodox marxist line. This would explain why the road has not been opened for extreme left-wing representatives.

During the past few weeks, Brazzaville has been flooded with hundreds of leaflets which are supposed to reflect the principal demands of the population. While the masses were demanding a return to civilian power, the third congress of the PCT has not been able to solve this problem, and civilians and military men find themselves in equal number in the new political bureau. Such an apportioning is probably necessary at the present stage: the minds are still overheated and the wounds inflicted during the bloody events which followed the murder of Marien Ngouabi have not yet healed. By pushing Yhombi Opango aside, popular demands have, in a way, been half satisfied. The former president, in fact, has been accused of "high treason through his wastefulness, his lifestyle, his disregard for marxism." This is not the first time, however, that the former head of state is accused of having had a lifestyle incompatible with socialist austerity. In fact, while left-wing representatives have often proclaimed that in revolutionary Congo the only possible coup d'etat would be a reactionary one, everybody agrees that "only the manner in which certain citizens practice socialism may be questioned, not socialism itself." What charges will former president Yhombi Opango have to answer when he appears in court ?

The lack of precision of the accusation remains evident. Nevertheless, some ambiguities should be removed. For instance, the people have demanded a new trial for the murderers of Marien Ngouabi. The conclusions of the congress make no mention of this. However, the admission of Mr Yangouma Bokamba in the political bureau is noted: he is general secretary of the Congolese

Trade-Union Confederation, the militant members of which are said to have accelerated the fall of Yhombi Opango by their manifestations. Is he going to take advantage of his present position to demand that justice follow its course for the former president?

The coming weeks will no doubt constitute a veritable test for the future of the Congolese experiment. Since the death of Marien Ngouabi in March 1977, blood has not stopped flowing on the banks of the Congo River. Many have taken the law into their own hands after his murder, although the former president had himself never been a warm proponent of political executions. In March 1972, Major Ngouabi had pardoned a number of individuals accused of having been the initiators of the failed putsch of 22 February, among whom was Ambroise Noumazalaye, former prime minister. To explain his decision, Marien Ngouabi had then merely declared: "The initiators of the putsch will not be physically eliminated, they must live through their mistakes."

Will the new team in power, who say they intend to "continue Ngouabi's work," follow the same reasoning? It will have to keep in memory the following statement of the Congolese Information Agency (ACI), written in 1971 after a conspiracy had almost brought down the regime: "Greater difficulties are awaiting us, and only when confronting them shall we see who is revolutionary and who is not."

9294
CSO: 4400

CONGO

BRIEFS

OPANGO TRIAL--In a resolution addressed on 15 March to their new president, Col Denis Sassou Nguesso, the Congress of the Army and the delegates of the Brazzaville section of the Congo Labour Party demanded that the former head of state, Gen Yhombi Opango, be arrested and tried for "the crime of high treason." They also recommended confiscation of all his property and reintegration into the PCT of all members ousted or suspended by the former president. If Gen Opango goes to trial, it will mark a victory for the hardcore faction led by the present head of state. It might coincide with the reopening of yet another case: the trial of the assassins of President Marien N'Gouabi. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 p 13]
6182

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