



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



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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION WORKERS GET POST-JOB ATTENTION

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 12 Mar 79 pp 66-67

[Article by Gilles Gaetner: "Worker Redeployment in Chinon"]

[Text] "Here in Chinon everything is fine or at least nothing is wrong." Such statements, unusual to say the least, at the nuclear power plants' construction sites, may seem provocative.

In 2 years, however, the Chinon B (second section of the power plant begun in 1977) work site has had only 5 days of strikes. A record! In contrast, conflicts lasting several weeks are common place at most of the other plants.

The social harmony reigning in Chinon is no doubt related to the decision taken in liaison with the EDF [French Electric Company], the Tours chamber of commerce and the ANPE [National Employment Pact Association] to set up EMIN [New Industries Training School]. Its mission is to prepare for the retraining of the power plant's workers (there are 1,400 of them at the present time) so as to integrate them more successfully with the region's enterprises.

There we have a major innovation for since the start of the nuclear program no one has been concerned over that problem.

Was the bulk of the work finished? The workers packed their bags and left. Professional training? An economic impact on local trade and industry? Hardly any attention was paid to that.

In the final analysis the only ones benefiting from those establishments were the communes which were more than pleased to locate a substantial source of income thanks to the business tax.

This lack of integration with the economic sphere produces a great many disadvantages. The risks of social conflicts have increased among an uprooted population in which the ratio of workers from outside the area subjected to harsh living conditions is usually high. Strikes are frequent, sometimes degenerating into violent action.

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The Chinon area itself had some difficult moments in 1966 and 1977.

The local population, in particular the tradesmen, generally gains from the presence of these human concentrations. It will be all the more receptive to nuclear dissidence if its profits are doomed to disappear as soon as the construction work has been completed.

On the other hand, the recently issued announcement of the possible construction of a third section in Chinon has not appeared to upset a population accustomed to living peaceably in France's "nuclear garden." (In the department of Indre-et-Loire alone there will be five power plants in 10 years.)

In that connection, a comment by the secretary general of the Tours chamber of commerce, Didier Majau is significant.

"For ecologists," he said, "it is the Angers-Tours superhighway that is the main problem in the area."

When the construction of Chinon B was decided upon in 1975, they wished to avoid repeating the errors made 17 years ago. The resorting by the principal employer, the Grand Travaux of Marseille to local manpower was more systematic. The latter now makes up 85 percent of the civil engineering employees at the construction site. The time limit set for construction was better adhered to because of that fact. A sizable advantage in that a single day's delay represents a loss for EDF of 3 million francs in earnings.

In September 1978 a "post-job commission" was set up with the cooperation of the EDF, the Indre-et-Loire prefecture and some elected individuals. It was given the task of studying the problems of the reservoir of workers.

This commission made it possible a few months later to facilitate initiating a more broader operation. Its name: "Racines" ["Roots"--Initiatives to Regionalize a Nuclear Plant's Construction Activities for Employment and Subcontracting].

The main artisan for the operation is the chief of the power plant's planning, Michel Guillot, 42 years of age, an EDF engineer. A expert (he has had experience at several work sites). Despite the prospect of regular transfers in public service, he has been extremely interested in the economic future of an area which he is nevertheless destined to leave in the near future.

The Racines undertaking brings together the various parties concerned over the fall out with respect to employment.

The construction site employers: Grouped within ADESIC [Association of the Chinon Site Employers], their objective is to encourage local employment. Assured of ANPE's support, they are committed to hiring only trainees from the trade school that has just been established.

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Local enterprises: Once they are organized into subcontracting groups, EDF (the prime contractor for the work site) will entrust to them the secondary additional work (sanitary installations, hangars). Potentially, this involves 80,000 to 100,000 work hours.

The school (EMIN) will thus serve as a prop to the RACINES undertaking. Built in record time, it is operational (the first trainees are expected at the end of March). Its financing is provided by the apprenticeship tax, 1.1 percent of ongoing training and the fund of the employment pact.

The school's promoters hope to extend their activity beyond the strict framework of Chinon. The school could become a national training center that would take in trainees from other nuclear plants.

The project is an ambitious one. But it includes the risk of promoting dis-
sidence over what may one day become one of the key places for adapting to the nuclear era. Guillot is aware of that. But he nonetheless believes that one must accept the odds.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CHIRAC INTERVIEWED ON PLANS FOR ECONOMY

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 16 Mar 79 pp 44-47, 66

[Interview with Jacques Chirac, former prime minister]

[Text] The president was on his way to Mexico. The deputies of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] parliamentary group were at a working session in Guadeloupe along with two Gaullist ministers, Alain Peyrefitte and Joel Le Theule, when Jacques Chirac had a communique having the impact of a political bomb issued by his secretariat. Basing his arguments on the gravity of the economic situation and the lack of information, he suggested that "movements and parties join in demanding the convocation of an extraordinary session of the National Assembly." The purpose of that session: The creation of two committees on employment and public information. The opposition hastened to agree to it but at the same time announced its intention to file censure motions by the PSF [French Socialist Party] and the PCF [French Communist Party] up to now separate and with different contents. Jacques Chirac's initiative came at a time when opinion polls were exposing a rather clear-cut drop in the popularity of the president of the Republic and of his prime minister, and when concern over the maintaining of public order in the face of strike violence was spreading to the unions themselves. But to the president of the Republic it seemed, in his own words, to be an episode of "a politico's politics." Before his decision to endeavor to bring about an extraordinary session of parliament, Jacques Chirac in the newspaper LE MONDE, dated Thursday, 1 March, stated that he "disagreed in no uncertain terms" with the government not only on Europe, but also on economic and social policy. On this latter point, which worries the French so much, Jacques Chirac agreed to go further for PARIS MATCH in explaining his plan for economic recovery. Our interview with Jacques Chirac is published on the following pages.

Jacques Chirac Explains His Economic Recovery Plan to PARIS MATCH

[Question] Some people think, and the prime minister said so Monday evening on television, that France was facing a "question of survival."

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[Answer] I am a Gaullist and as such I have never envisaged my country's future in terms of survival, but rather in terms of will: "Indeed, we should find out, as General de Gaulle used to say, whether some great national dream isn't essential to a people so as to support its actions and preserve its cohesiveness."

[Question] On several occasions you have emphasized that one of the most serious ills is the lack of information. Now, the ministers are talking all the time. Is it their technique that is bad? What should they say?

[Answer] There is in fact a public information problem. Public opinion's confusion stems to a large extent from the sudden discovery of a serious economic and social situation whereas official statements were expressing nothing but serene and steady optimism. This optimism specifically allowed hardly any room in the media for divergent assessments. I do not have the habit of complaining but still here is an example: Because the situation has become worse, the criticisms which the RPR and I myself have been making for 2 years have suddenly been discovered. In recent weeks I have neither emphasized nor softened those criticisms; they have merely been illustrated by results which could have been foreseen only too well. But most of the French people were only very vaguely informed of them.

[Question] Do you think, as some deputies of the Left do (Crepeau, for example), that hewing to the present policy is pushing France toward a "revolution?"

Savings Have Been Diverted

[Answer] I thought that those deputies "of the Left" as you call them had opted for revolutionary Marxism, along with the joint program. They should rejoice over the opportunities offered for revolution. For my part, I will confine myself to noting that the failure of the government's policy is giving rise to a dangerous situation from every standpoint. I would not prophesy a revolution, but this situation does worry me.

[Question] If, as you reiterate, the policy must be changed, people have to be changed. Is that exactly what we are to understand?

[Answer] There has to be a policy change, yes. People changed, perhaps, to the extent that this is necessary in order to alter policy. In any case, I do not think it is merely a matter for the leaders. A true economic policy, such as I conceive of it, in a democracy requires the understanding, adherence and cooperation of the country as a whole.

[Question] You suggest giving a new impetus to investments. Two questions: If in the public sector, in what immediately productive activity and with what funds? If in the private sector, with what means of inducement.

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[Answer] Even without resorting to some budgetary deficit, it is possible first to reduce administrative wastefulness, which is quite considerable, then unproductive expenditures so as to develop productive investments that are factors in reducing unemployment. For example, one hears that there are too many beds in numerous hospitals, that medical actions are multiplied without any good reason and even to the point of harming patients, that the French are risking their health by taking too many remedies, that Social Security at everyone's expense is financing an absenteeism costing the economy the equivalent of a sizable part of its petroleum bill.

On the other hand and in particular, private investment represents a vast potential that has up to now been discouraged. The French like to save. Now, everything goes on as though one wanted to divert these savings from productive investments, and especially from industrial ventures. They have sought refuge in real estate whose costs they have caused to rise excessively, in the ownership of gold, jewels, works of art, etc... They have also sought refuge in Switzerland or elsewhere. In a sense they were not mistaken since any investment of this kind has proven as a general rule to be far more profitable than purchasing shares in French enterprises. If this disastrous course were reversed, we would have an enormous amount of capital for renewing our production apparatus.

[Question] But according to Barre any impetus to the economy is necessarily inflationary.

Paralyzing Petty Annoyances

[Answer] The economy's growth rate is not related to the inflation rate. Some countries, such as Great Britain, have experienced slight growth but a heavy rate of inflation. That is France's situation today. Other countries have experienced a greater growth rate with reduced inflation. At the present time, the problem is that of exporting enough and to have adequate production in order to do so. It is not possible to improve the productivity of French enterprises without a parallel promotion of investments and real growth. So everything must be done in order that France may have increased growth. So investments and the creation of enterprises must be encouraged.

[Question] You said specifically--on the subject of the economy--that a stand contrary to that of the government must be taken. What does that mean?

[Answer] I said that it would be "almost" enough to take a course that was the opposite of the present orientation in order to get onto the right path. I will try to explain this more clearly. Everyone is agreed in recognizing that the French economy must be transformed, be readapted, so as to remain competitive and to survive. On the basis of that general established fact, it is evident that:

1. The government has only very slightly loosened the yoke of the regulations hampering enterprises.

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2. It counts on the virtues of competitiveness to condemn ill-adapted activities.

3. It is counting on that same competitiveness to inspire enterprises spontaneously with a general strategy for our future.

One can in fact begin with those three points to establish the necessity of freedom and planning.

First, the need for freedom. Question any head of an enterprise, whether small, medium or large, and ask him if he feels he is rid of the obstacles, formalities and paper work that are not just useless but also positively damaging to economic efficiency. The construction industry recently pointed out--one example among 1,000--that these regulations, formalities and delays, which are totally useless, add up to 10 to 15 percent of housing costs. Ask the artisans of our towns and of our countryside, as I have often done, why they do not hire an extra worker or two since work is available. They will tell you that they want to avoid additional social insurance and fiscal costs, the petty annoyances of labor inspection and various other kinds of difficulties.

If one adds that the framework for credit still continues to exist, I think that on this point the cause has been determined. Official liberalism, to start with, has not even restored any real freedom to enterprises to re-adjust.

Second point. These still paralyzed enterprises are told: Well, if you are incapable of adapting yourselves--even to brutal competition from which the Common Market does not protect you--you fall into the category we wittily call the "lame ducks." You can just perish. The result will be a more healthy economy.

Nonetheless, enterprises naturally endeavor not to perish. Their personnel hang on desperately, occupy work sites if necessary, secure the support of public opinion, and the government itself often ends up being moved and grants some support which more or less amounts to emergency temporary assistance. So improvements are not achieved or else poorly or very slowly. Finally, third point, the positive strategy of transformation, innovation and development is not formulated either or in any event is only being done very slowly, very incompletely, without the country's adherence or participation, hence without any mobilizing effect and without any enthusiasm.

That is the way it is because no industrial group is sufficiently large to devise it on its own to the fullest extent and because in any event too many factors depend on the state (orientation of public investments and on those of the national sector, taxation, aid grants, credit, etc.). Hence we are going into the battle without a battle plan. A great deal of luck would be needed to win under those circumstances.

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[Question] You want to go back to planning, to a voluntarist policy. To a more energetic management of the economy by the administration's technicians. It is the opposite of the economists' present tendencies. To which school exactly do you belong?

[Answer] But I do not want "a more energetic management of the economy by the administration's technicians." Not at all. The plan I want is a political decision which in a democracy should derive from the nation itself and from its representatives. A decision which must be established through concerted planning by the economic and social officials who will also be involved in its implementation.

The paralyzing bureaucracy, which I have just condemned, in recent years had specifically fed on the abandoning of all democratic planning, on any plan guiding our economy. So we have come to the point of having neither economic freedom nor planning, whereas I am a partisan of both. I am not concerned over knowing whether this thinking is in style among economists. Intellectual styles disappear just as others do. Professors who would go only by Keynes repudiate him probably before rediscovering him. I leave their disputes to the schools and do not claim kinship with any of them. But we have tested our theses in discussions with professors of political economy who are very knowledgeable and they did not emerge from them weakened. On the contrary, we have had the benefit of technical assistance whose value I would be ungrateful not to mention.

[Question] Some think that your program was quite largely inspired by Debre's theses. Is that right?

[Answer] Let us understand each other. Sometimes I say "my criticism," "my ideas," for convenience in talking. They are mine but also to a very large extent it amounts to a collective doctrine. Innumerable people have participated in working it out. In particular Michel Debre who with his own eloquence and sensitivity has also often been the interpreter of what we were all more or less thinking and he has often been among the first to denounce the ills we are noting today.

[Question] Barre has just denounced what he termed "false ideas" (by implication, those of the RPR). According to the prime minister (it was on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the REVUE DES DEUX MONDES), the idea according to which "the economy must not be sacrificed for the currency" is a mistaken idea. According to him, of the countries which have overcome their economic difficulties, the best are the nations with a "good currency", Federal Germany for example.

[Answer] Germany's situation is the opposite of what Barre claims. In reality, Germany has a good currency because it has a good economy. The proof of that is that every time Germany has re-evaluated the mark it has been obliged and forced to do so because of the "excessively good" results of its economic policy. The prime minister is mistaken when he considers that

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by maintaining the franc at an artificially high level, the French economy will be more healthy. It is the reverse that is true. If within the framework of the European monetary system France pegged the franc to the evolution of the mark, it would mean deflation, unemployment and a foreign trade deficit.

It is the German economy which makes it possible for the mark to be strong. It is not by aligning the franc on the mark that the French economy will be strong. If the French economy becomes modernized so as to be competitive, and if consequently it invests sufficiently, it will in the end have a healthy currency. In other words, a stringent monetary policy will not be sufficient to resolve France's economic problems. There must be a good economic policy making a strong growth rate and full employment possible; a good currency will emerge into the bargain.

[Question] According to the prime minister, another false idea is to say that protectionism guarantees employment.

A Vitiating Game

[Answer] To protect its employment France must stop playing the vitiating game of savage competitiveness.

France is in a state of legitimate economic defense in at least two situations:

1. In the industrial manpower sectors outvied by countries only slightly developed where wages and social insurance contributions are abnormally low. In this case, protective measures must be applied at the European level and these countries would not have any reprisals to take against us for they enjoy an exceptional situation: Only the European countries, among them France, are playing the game of totally free trade.

2. Some developed countries are not playing the competitive game. These are the United States and Japan. When the United States retains the mechanisms for protecting its chemical industry, such as the "American Selling Price," it is the one committing aggression against free international trade. If France and its European partners were to set up similar practices, it would be a completely normal counterpart to the American protective mechanism.

[Question] You say "the struggle against unemployment... would undergo certain bold tax reductions." Can you be more explicit?

[Answer] Let us talk of the current situation. What should not be done is seen clearly and, in contrast, what must be done.

Let us talk of the most usual, unproductive investment without any risks: You become the owner of your home. The collectivity helps you with it by deducting the interest on the loan, but let us skip over that advantage. What is more significant is that your capital supplies you with what amounts

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to revenue in the form of the rent you do not have to pay. And that this revenue, represented by the rental value of your housing, is not subjected to the individual income tax.

If instead of buying an apartment you bought shares, your income would be taxed on the basis of the tax on business profits; then, back in your hands, to increasing taxes in accordance with the well known steps. In short, in the first case (owner of your home) the revenue from your capital is not taxed. In the second case (as a tenant but a shareholder), three-quarters of the corresponding revenue from the same capital is chopped off. The practical conclusion: You have no interest in being a shareholder.

Many corrective measures could be envisaged and since tax laws are rapidly becoming very complicated, I will not go into detail. I have nevertheless proposed a very simple measure which would be extremely effective and which would not even greatly reduce the state's resources: Putting the proprietor and the tenant of the above example on the same footing, reducing the taxes on both until they are equivalent to a moderate rent, and beyond that, tax them both similarly. In other words, up to 1 and one-half million or 2 million centimes a year, the revenue represented either by the rental value of your home if you own it, or by the dividends from your shares if you opt to invest your savings in industry, that revenue will be tax free in both cases. In addition to the economic advantage, it is obviously fair.

[Question] You say in your LE MONDE interview that the government is a victim of its infatuation (from the Latin "fatuus," meaning foolish), you allude to a quasi-monarchical state of the government, the sour reply you get talks of a "politico's policy." Don't these exchanges of dramatic retorts distress the French who would prefer to see everyone united so as to get away from the storm?

[Answer] You are correct in referring to a storm. Even so we have only talked here of the economic and social situation, of our internal difficulties. But the increasing dangers should also be apparent in the international sphere.

As to what you denounce as an "exchange of dramatic retorts" between politicians, I call your attention to the responsibility incumbent upon you too, upon you journalists and commentators. It is natural that you should seek to spice up your accounts, hence to give a personal touch to the discussions and perhaps make the dialogue more dramatic than it actually is. Nonetheless, you must help the French to develop for themselves serious views on problems that are serious--and the qualifier "serious" is doubtless no longer strong enough.

Whatever the etymology of the word infatuation may be, it is nevertheless an error to isolate oneself in self-satisfaction for it engenders blind optimism.

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I did not seek a polemical effect in tirelessly denouncing this error publicly with others for 2 years because all of the French are interested in it, but also in numerous private communications seeking a dramatic effect all the less since they have remained known solely to those they were addressed to.

Who is dramatizing by speaking of sudden criticism or again by stigmatizing as aggression the request to convoke parliament? As though a meeting of parliament within the framework of its constitutional attributes and with a view to becoming more thoroughly informed consists of aggression against anyone at all. As though the best contribution parliament could make to the government consisted in remaining on vacation.

Contradictorily, I am also reproached for not backing a motion of censure which would cause a political crisis whose outcome no one knows. We have to be more serious.

Let everyone join together in facing the storm, you say. It would of course be desirable, but what would such a union be worth in an atmosphere of inertia or of a false maneuver.

Peoples do not have as their first duty leaving everything up to their leaders and allowing themselves to be led.

In a democracy at least the principal decisions are up to them.

The French must reflect, put aside illusions and ideologies, judge for themselves and then apply their will.

Otherwise salvation will not come to them from the politicians, I regret to say so, nor from any individuals united or disunited. The first task of politicians is to tell the truth, always, even if it evokes unpleasant reactions and even too soon: Especially in the face of the dangers which will not wait forever for a national will to be created, one capable of standing up to them.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF CONGRESS PROPOSALS REFLECT CHANGES IN COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 19 Feb 79 p 33

[Article by Irene Allier: "The PCF: A Report on Deficiencies"]

[Text] Up to now Marx and Engels, Lenin and Jaures had sufficed it. The PCF [French Communist Party] did not claim to descend from a large family even if it boasted of a superior lineage. Now the 23rd congress is going to change all that. All of a sudden, the PCF is multiplying its grafts on its genealogical tree and is putting its roots down into a past to which hitherto it took exception. Not only is it claiming to be the heir of all "popular struggles," "lay and democratic ideals" from the 1789 revolution to the Paris Commune, "the first proletarian state in the world," but, get ready for a shock, it is also "integrating," if only "in a critical way," "the Utopian and libertarian" themes, even anarchic trade unionism and "the aspirations of Christians for justice and solidarity." In other words, are Robespierre and Cabet*, Proudhon and Bakunin (Marx's enemies), Varlin,** and Pelloutier,*** Marc Sangnier and Georges Marchais, part of the struggle?

Well, yes, if one is to go by the preamble to the plan for reforming the statutes which, together with the other preparatory documents for this congress (of next 9 to 13 May), the PCF is submitting for its 700,000 members to discuss. The shift does not stop there: Not only is the dictatorship of the proletariat totally disappearing as was anticipated, replaced by a "peaceful, democratic, majority and pluralist" path to socialism, but the traditional reference to Marxism-Leninism is in turn being wholly engulfed. The idea of "scientific socialism" is being substituted for it,

*Etienne Cabet (1788-1836), author of "Voyage en Icarie," which strongly endorses a pacifist and utopian communism.

**Eugene Varin, a bookbinder, secretary of the First International, a hero of the Paris Commune, shot by those of Versailles.

***Fernand Pelloutier (1867-1901), a trade unionist who came around to libertarian ideas. He contributed to a rapprochement between the anarchical and trade union movements.

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doubtless regarded as more "open," in that though Marx and Engels were its founders, the PCF points out that it was developed not only by Lenin, which goes without saying, but also "by other leaders and theoreticians of the labor movement." No details.

A Laughable Satisfaction

Other doctrinal revisions in the forefront: Adherence to materialism is no longer a required condition for admission to the PCF (so one may be good in practice without conforming ideologically, which takes the wind out of Marxism's sails) and finally "the expression of the divergences" with the socialist countries is officially included in the PCF's statutes: henceforth it is an integral part of the support it provides the international communist movement! If one adds to that that self-management is making a spectacular appearance among the statutory objectives, one will concede that something seems to be going on in the PCF.

Unfortunately, what is going on in it attests far more to a will to take up the Left's whole political space and the ongoing identity crisis of a party that wants at one and the same time to be "avant-garde" and "of the masses," "revolutionary" and "governmental," than favoring a real renewal, a clear-cut choice of strategy and true democratization. After the breakup of the Left, the electoral defeat, the PCF crisis which last spring was bringing back into question the tactic followed and democratic centralism, one expected of the 23rd congress concrete answers and the spelling out of political prospects. They came: It was a refusal and politically an official report on deficiencies.

Concerning democratic centralism, the dissidents will have only meager satisfaction. What about the ongoing public debate? Outside times congresses are held it will only be opened in the party's tribunes at the discretion of the central committee. Are individual candidacies for the party's leadership bodies authorized from now on? No doubt. But in the final analysis, it is specifically a leadership body--or the congress--which will determine their validity. A laughable satisfaction for those who claimed to know more about the way in which their leaders are elected: From now on they will be told by how many votes! And it is not because the party's secretariat--which often passed for the PCF's real leadership--sees its role reduced to "current matters" (doubters to the advantage of the political bureau) that the PCF's decision-making process will become more democratic or more easy to understand.

Actually, however, that was not the goal being sought. And the proposed political solution that the PCF leadership will submit to the congress reveals all too clearly why: Obviously there was no agreement at the summit either as to the nature of the party whose development was desired nor as to its strategy, nor as to the outlook for its future. For lack of a synthesis, or even of a compromise, everything is going on as though everyone's

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arguments had been strung together at the risk of thereby revealing that the PCF, which no longer knows just what it is does not know either what it wants nor where it is going. The range of its doctrinal tolerance is a poor cover for the shrinking of its prospects, the careful broadening of its vocabulary does not conceal the vagueness of its objectives.

Shot Bolts

Two examples: Union of the Left and the attitude with respect to the socialist countries. In the first instance, they declare first that they are loyal to union of the Left, an "irrevocable choice," because there is no alternate strategy containing the hope of power and because they haven't said they were renouncing power. But then they deny themselves the means for union: They are rediscovering--for the first time in 10 years--that the very "nature of the Socialist Party, and not just the present state of affairs, consigned it to collaborating with the Right. Among the socialist countries, the same juxtaposition of contradictory ingredients: They are not firing one shot "at the crimes of horror" of Stalinism. But since the evolution of the ratio of international forces "is a master card for France's democratic road to socialism," there is no question of breaking with the USSR, let alone making a few thrusts. The socialist countries' balance sheet, whatever "the divergences" may be, will thus be positive from the over-all standpoint. The discussion previously envisaged by the PCF leadership itself, on the occasion of the publication of the book "We and the USSR," as to the nature of the Eastern European regimes, is therefore closed.

In other words, unable to provide a alternate strategy other than that of union of the Left (which they do not want as long as the Left has not recovered its balance to their advantage), the communists are shooting the bolts as a precaution. Obviously, and until the day they are able to make reasonable calculations as to themselves, they will have no other concern than taking care of the patrimony and attempting to have their capital in militants and voters bear fruit by struggling. For that matter, in the final analysis, the political situation is not rushing them. Without suffering from it may more than from the union which was gradually eroding their substance they can take up their old table-thumping function and devote themselves to the workers' interests as an opposition without prospects but relaxed.

The dissidents? They will have the recourse of speaking for a different party and for another policy. But where? In the open tribunes of the party's press? That remains to be seen. They will try. Somewhere else. in any event. Plans for meetings, colloquies are in the air. This week, a book including 12 addresses made at the Vitry seminar set up on 9 and 10 Decmeber 1978 by the PCF leadership, which at that time was seeking to

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bring its intellectuals back into line, is to be published by Maspero. They did not obey. But they have no illusions as to their influence over a party which could not listen to them without suddenly realizing that they are operating in a void.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF OPPONENTS SEEN BEGINNING TO ORGANIZE

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 26 Feb 79 p 33

[Editorial by Bernard Guetta: "PCF: The Dissidents are Organizing"]

[Text] Georges Marchais is apparently unworried. Hasn't he just carried off a great success by winning over to PC ranks for the European election the recognized defender of the Languedocian communists, Emmanuel Maffre-Baugé, the president of the Regional Department of Agriculture for Languedoc-Roussillon and a sworn opponent of Common Market expansion? Let us be exact. The success will restore some votes to the communist party as long as the former president of the Federation of Table Wine Producers does not personally take part in discussions of the party's political options.

However, with the 23rd congress two months away, dissention is rising again in the PCF ranks. In fact, the intellectuals who revolved last spring are organizing and planning regular meetings. The best known among them, historian Jean Elleinstein, is preparing to drop a bombshell with a caustic film about Trotsky's last struggles against rising Stalinism. It will be shown on "Dossiers de l'ecran" [Television Documentaries] on 6 March (unless after the strike).

Until now the dissidents were satisfied to either make their complaints known in the bourgeois press or to draw up futile petitions addressed to their party. This Saturday, 24 February, they will take a further step. They are inviting their friends, those who have already spoken, and those who are still silent, to compare in a room reserved for 100 people, their reflections and criticisms of their party's positions on foreign policy. This is the agenda: the "positive overall balance sheet" that PC attributes to the regimes in the East; and dissidence in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and GDR, with two sample cases as illustration. The first is that of Rudolph Bahrs, East German Communist, out and out Marxist, in prison for having advocated in his book "The Alternative" the "true" communism as opposed to "actual" communism. The second case

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is that of Jaroslav Sabata, former director of the Czech PC, signer of "Charter 77," and arrested for having participated in a meeting with Polish KOR [Workers Defense Committee] dissidents. His son, remember, came last November to solicit the support of all the parties in favor of his father. PCF refused to receive him. But there are many other subjects on the menu of the challenging intellectuals: Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Chinese affair. This means that within the "framework of work and reflection" which they are trying to create, there will be a great deal to do. There should also be regular meetings and at the close of their first assembly, the intellectuals should launch an appeal for those who share their positions to join them.

Historic Reality

Divisive Efforts? Tending away from the constitution? Doubtless, PC will accuse them of it. But for the challengers, this time, the hour of devotion to party discipline seems to have come. To be convinced, it suffices to read the last series of articles published by Jean Elleinstein in LE MONDE.

Rarely even by a noncommunist, has Georges Marchais' policy been so harshly attacked. The proposed resolutions for the 23rd congress? "Two steps backward" compared to the 22nd congress. The "positive overall balance sheet" of the communist countries? "A completely false picture of soviet reality." The defeat of the Left? "The truth is that PCF leadership believed the 'common program' was going to allow it to develop its influence; but, contrary to its predictions, it was the socialist party that profited from unionist currents." The economic crisis? "We must have the courage to tell the workers the truth and to take the necessary steps to economic recovery." The relations between PCF and USSR? "PCF is not disentangled from the bonds of privilege with USSR." The suppression of the Leninist reference? "There should be an explanation of what is changing, why it is being changed, and what is going to replace it." Finally, the internal democracy? "Most of today's party rules are inherited from the Stalin era."

Who can say it better? Elleinstein again, with the film he made with Yves Ciampi for "Dossiers de l'ecran" based on his latest book "Stalin and Trotsky." The work is fiction, but historical fact is scrupulously followed and the television viewers, communist or not, are going to discover, thanks to PCF member and one of the most popular television programs, that there was a time when the clash of ideas was the rule in the bolshevik party, that the rise of monolithism finally rang the knell for the hopes that had rested on the Russian revolution, and that from 1925 the original bolsheviks saw with horror the growth of the poisoned fruits of their heroism and idealism. This debate on "Dossiers de l'ecran" will possibly make more noise than the debates of the 23rd congress.

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FRANCE

BARRE REPLIES TO JOURNALISTS' QUESTIONS

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 24 Feb 79, pp 94-95

Text On Tuesday 20 February, Raymond Barre was the guest of honor at a breakfast given by L'EXPRESS at the Intercontinental Hotel in Paris. Addressing 320 company managers, journalists, union leaders, writers, politicians, and political scientists, the head of government for 2 hours answered questions from the audience. We would like to present here the most salient points in his remarks. Following this summary of the essential topics of his economic policy by the premier, L'EXPRESS decided to open a debate in its columns on this policy. It is often attacked but those who attack it generally do not answer the following two questions: 1. Is there, under current national and international circumstances, a possibility for a policy that would be basically different from the one pursued by Raymond Barre--and, if yes, what is it? 2. If not, what means do we have, within the framework of the present policy, to reduce unemployment in short-range terms and in a lasting manner? Raymond Aron will open the debate next week by answering the first of these two questions.

Economic Policy

"I have no intention of either hardening or softening the economic policy which is now being carried out. The main outlines have been determined: defend France's foreign trade balance and its currency; through the support of all, achieve moderation in wage increases; support economic activity; finally, take all measures necessary in order to adapt the French economy to new worldwide conditions and do so with the support of everyone; moreover, do this through a social policy and a regional policy aimed at reducing the cost of changes and permitting a more harmonious distribution of activities throughout national territory.

Jobs

"This is not an independent variable. This is an economic and social variable which depends a lot on other factors. In other words, it depends on the strength of the enterprises which in turn depends on the capacity of the enterprises to pay wages, to produce, to sell, and to make profits so as to be able to invest. If not, what are we going to do? We create artificial jobs. In order, in the future, to have a satisfactory job situation, to have sound jobs and lasting jobs, we must first of all restore the economy; we must then make sure that our industry will be adapted to the modern conditions of the world and that it will be competitive.

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Monetary and Agricultural Europe

"The basis of stability is a convergent effort by various countries involved in order to master the divergences of evolution and especially to make evolutions less disparate in terms of price. But we need one restriction here and monetary constraint is such a restriction which we cannot do without. We must not fall into the trap of deification of money; but we must admit that it is necessary not to consider money as a pure means, as a pure instrument which one can manipulate.

"When we accepted the Industrial Common Market, we opened our markets to a German industry which was more powerful than ours. Our French industry benefited from competition but we paid the bill from that viewpoint. Since we have an agriculture which is in the midst of transformation, common agricultural policy was one form of sharing the burden, within the Community, between Germany and France. Today we come back to monetary stability and we, for our part, support a little bit of the burden resting on the mark since the upward pressures, being exerted upon the mark, will be spread out over a larger number of currencies, including the French currency. We accept it because it is in our interest and in that of the Community; but we ask Germany to take into account the fact that the existence of compensatory amounts is an excessive advantage--not to say an improper advantage--which German farmers are benefiting from.

Aid for Investments in Crisis Regions

"Regarding the establishment of these enterprises, we will see to it that these will be enterprises that permit us to hope for lasting employment. We do not want artificial operations. We do not want a sprinkling of loans, making it possible to create activities, for 3 or 4 years which then suddenly fail. We want the industrial fabric of North, of Lorraine, of the areas along the Loire or the region of Marseille-La Ciotat to be able to have businesses with a future.

Investments in France

"We must ask ourselves whether the conditions for realistic investment, for effective investment have really been met. It was hardly conceivable, over the past 2 years, that investments in France could be particularly lively. We had to begin by restoring a general economic situation and a particular economic situation involving the enterprises so that investments could develop on a solid foundation. What good are all the incentives we provide for investments if those investments are artificial? That may look good but the end result often is the importing of capital goods, and inability of our domestic industry to respond to the incentives given and, finally, a very modest improvement in the situation compared to the considerable resources committed. I am convinced that the enterprises that were able to do so did invest in France and abroad. I believe that their investments were, to a great extent, rationalization and productivity investments. And they were

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perfectly correct--because it is their future which they are safeguarding. And, along with their future, they are also protecting the future of jobs in the branches in question. We may hope that, once the financial situation of the enterprises has been restored, once the rationalization of the activity of these enterprises has been assured, the time will be ripe for a resumption of major investments and, consequently, a resumption of the up-swing.

Enterprise Competitiveness

"I do not believe that everything that has been said about the low level of competitiveness of French industry is true. There are branches which are in bad shape on that score but there is a major portion of French industry, at least 80%, in my opinion, which is capable of coping with international competition. How can it handle that? First of all, by gaining control of production costs. We find that, in countries such as Switzerland or Germany, production cost control can be achieved all the more easily if one has a strong currency with which to pay for indispensable imports of energy and raw materials. The government, for its part, has launched a policy which will be further stepped up and which involves the development of innovation and technology. Finally, the enterprises must make a major effort in order to find and improve their places on the big export markets and they must pursue an effective commercial and industrial investment policy abroad.

International Competition

"We must safeguard competition within an overall concept: the orderly growth of trade. Right now, there is competition between developed countries but there is also competition coming from a certain number of developing countries. And the category of developing countries must be differentiated. I believe that it would be scandalous to close the market to countries which are beginning to become industrialized and I similarly believe that there are countries which have already achieved their economic takeoff, which are already industrialized, and which benefit from advantages which they no longer need. Besides, we cannot--even in dealing with developing countries that deserve our aid--accept just any kind of product influx.

"It is true that the government's policy has been pictured as a policy of abandoning the country to the multinational, Eurocratic forces which threaten the country's activity. If we begin by putting our own affairs in order and by properly managing the enterprises, many of these negative aspects would disappear."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DETAILS OF PCF INTERNAL DISPUTE PROVIDED

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 24 Feb 79, pp 92-93

Interview with Alain Tête and Michel Barak by Jacques Roure and Jean-Louis Eyssartel: "Challenge resumed in Communist Party: 'Gap Between Leadership's Words and Deeds . . .'"

Text Just 2-1/2 months away from the 23rd Congress, the challenge within the Communist Party is resuming its spring-time vigor. On Tuesday, 20 February, one week after the publication of the preparatory texts in L'HUMANITE, Jean Elleinstein, in LE MONDE, launched a severe criticism of the policy conducted for the past 10 years by the party's leadership. Never before had a member of the PC Communist Party gone as far, especially in hurling a personal challenge at Georges Marchais. Why all this haste since, officially, a discussion forum is to be started on 1 March in L'HUMANITE? Because the disputants are convinced that the PC leadership was quite determined to prevent the most virulent ones among them to express themselves. And that applies especially to Jean Elleinstein, the best-known among them. "It would even be better," he says, "abruptly to bring about a faceoff rather than to allow the debate to wind down into banalities." This desire to bear witness is shared by a majority of the challengers. They know that the space reserved to them in the L'HUMANITE forum will be measured in half-lines. "This is going to be a romp, a lark," commented a Communist journalist who was personally affected by the party's press being brought to heel. The challengers thus decided to go public in order to make their contribution to the Congress--with Seuil publishers, under the management of Antoine Spire, a supporter of Elleinstein, the former managing editor of the PC's Editions sociales publishers; with Maspero, where Gérard Molina and Yves Vargas, disciples of Althusser, have just recently put out a collection with a first group of militant witness statements: "Watch out, one party can hide another." The new weekly publication MAINTENANT, likewise inspired by Elleinstein and representatives of other left-wing tendencies, will be a vehicle for challenge as of 12 March. Michel Barak, a militant in the Jacques-Duclos cell in Aix-en-Provence, was one of the pioneers of dissidence. He was the sparkplug behind the "Appeal of the 300," which later on became the appeal of the 1,500 and, on 29 May, in L'EXPRESS, he replied to charges of "fractionism" made against him by the party in mid-January, he analyzes the documents of the 23rd Congress for L'EXPRESS.

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Question: What is your judgment of the preparatory texts for the 23rd Communist Party Congress?

Michel Barak: I find them misleading. Here is the first deception: I find no self-criticism there, no serious analysis as to the underlying reasons for the failure of the Union of the Left in March 1978. The only one blamed by the PC leadership is the PS /Socialist Party/. It is true that our partner has responsibilities but these are not exclusive. The prospects for union which the party recommended--without apparently putting much stock in them--first of all are not credible anyway. How can one then put together an alliance with "Social Democrats" who are likened to "reactionary forces?" After getting too much unity at the top, without worrying about the grass-roots, the party's leadership swung around the other way; it now wants unity at the base without having anything to do with the top. I do not believe that this is the best way to give the country a political perspective. Especially so since we did not properly respond to the following issue: because the PC was not strong enough to maintain unity, we could not get anywhere with the rest of the effort either. Now, the party leadership refuses to go into this debate.

The second disappointment involves the generally positive judgment about the socialist countries. This brings us to the very limit of the acceptable. Talking about the superiority of the soviet "new system" when everybody knows only too well what goes on in the USSR or in Czechoslovakia--well, that is not serious talk. Regarding the kind of socialism we want, that socialism over there is absolutely repulsive. It is shocking to realize that the Central Committee adopted this position unanimously.

Alain Tête: I would go even further than Michel. I believe that this text reveals a hardening on the part of the leadership. It abandons the freedom of tone which it had displayed toward the USSR. How could one propose, for France, a socialism that defends liberties and, at the same time, how could one assert that the Soviet system is "generally positive?" The attacks on liberties in the USSR are mentioned as simple accidents. This bad faith is entirely insupportable.

M. Barak: Especially so since our party's Stalinist practices experienced a stupefying resurgence last spring during the campaign unleashed against the dissidents--and our party certainly was not affected to the same degree as the communist parties that are in power.

Question: Were you satisfied with the text regarding democracy within the party?

M. Barak: We will see how this works out in practice. But the amendments seemed very limited to me. Here are two examples: the texts say that, henceforth, we can have more candidates than positions for which people can run in the elections to the party's leadership bodies. And, after a secret vote, the result would be released to the delegates. These are measures

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of elementary democracy which will make all democrats smile. Nevertheless, this is some progress! Last autumn, Gaston Plissonnier, without smiling, explained that the high point of democracy resided precisely in the fact that there should be no more candidates than we have offices to run for. And I remember that, at Aix-en-Provence, during a "town meeting," about a year and a half ago, they refused to announce the results of the voting after one hour of discussion.

But, basically, nothing has changed. Internal democracy is still hobbled; let me talk now about the cooptation of the leaders. Of course, this procedure does not show up anywhere in the charter but it remains a reality in the system. The Congress obviously votes by secret ballot. But it only reveals the decisions worked out at the top. This is a kind of democratic tinkering with a procedure that is not democratic at all. When, in the course of what Congress, did the rank and file ever propose any candidates? Never, never. To be really democratic, you do not just write the word "democratic" in every line of every speech. I am a Marxist. I do not believe in the Coué method.

Question: Georges Marchais asserts that his party, in certain areas, is experiencing "some delays."

M. Barak: Yes, he is talking about the delay brought about in 1956 by Maurice Thorez but he never tries to analyze this sort of thing. Now, since 1952, how many party leaders and militants have been slandered before being kicked out or barred after full-fledged trials? And did not the party leadership promise Charles Tillon that these trials would be reviewed before March 1978? That was not done! Why? It would seem to be high time to see that justice is done to him without waiting any longer. I say that, so long as this is not done, the French road of socialism to liberty will not be credible.

Question: But that moves us further away from the 23rd Congress.

M. Barak: On the contrary. It is our leaders who, today, invoke "reason of state" in order to stop any discussion. And they commit the party upon roads that take us far afield from Marxism. When I read all those nationalist references in the preparatory texts of the Congress, I fear that this will only reawaken in public opinion a jingoist spirit, in other words, chauvinism. I know that Europe is dominated by the trusts and that social democracy loyally manages capitalism. But the thing that worries me is our convergences with the authoritarian right, represented by the RER /Rally for the Republic/. It would be better to have constructive discussions with our Italian and Spanish comrades who include the European factor in their strategy while being fully familiar with the dangers springing from that Europe.

Question: Does not the severity of your criticism constitute a direct challenge to the party leadership?

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M. Barak: L'EXPRESS asked me that question last May. And I replied: "probably." That caused much ink to flow. After thinking about it deeply, I regret nothing. And I find that there is always a wide gap between the words and the deeds of our leaders. Just look at what is happening in the party's publishing houses and book stores. The layoffs were decided according to practices worthy of big business, without any coordination and against the advice of the CGT /General Confederation of Labor/ unions at those enterprises. Labor union liberties are not even respected by the leaders of a party that preaches self-management. And it is the personnel who suffers the consequences of management mistakes by officials who keep holding on to their jobs. I declare that this confronts me with a problem of confidence.

A. Tête: I do not think that changing the men at the head of the party would bring about any major modifications. The higher you get in the hierarchy, the more rigorous is cooptation. The Central Committee constitutes an extraordinary breeding ground for officials who know how to take the place of one person or another without party policy being changed one iota.

Question: What remains of the critique movement which you launched in the spring with the Appeal of the 300?

M. Barak: I am going to give you my opinion, which means that I am only speaking for myself, because I am only a spokesman or a leader of a faction, just as I was last April and May. I believe that the appeal brought down a number of taboos. Hereafter, the communists will express themselves freely-- something which we are now doing in talking to you. Not to attack their party but because the affairs of the PC concern all Frenchmen. This is a new, irreversible fact of life.

A. Tête: I am more pessimistic. I believe that the leadership has managed to isolate the challenge movement. This is expressed today by a tremendous discouragement among the militants and not only among those who, like we, came out with a challenge in the spring. Some people remain in the party although their spirit is dead. Many are waiting for the Congress before they make their decisions. Others have already left it.

Question: Like you.

A. Tête: Yes, in mid-January. I no longer had any hope. Reading the preparatory texts proved to me that I was right.

Question: Michel Barak, your criticisms leave little room for hope. Why did you stick with the party?

M. Barak: Undoubtedly because I still feel that I am a communist, completely.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

PCF DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL--The PCF plans to appoint, at its upcoming congress, a deputy secretary-general of the party. Charles Fiterman is reportedly most likely to be chosen. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 23 Mar 79 p 55]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

ARMED FORCES PROMOTIONAL LAWS EXAMINED

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 23 Feb 79 pp 20-29

[Text] Billions in salvoes--army, navy and air force are spending 7 trillion lire to buy new weapons. What are they buying? Who decides on the purchases? And especially, will they help to defend the country better?

The political scene has stunk for years, and its latest eruptions afflict also the crisis of government in progress. Yet the Lockheed scandal concerns only the purchase of 15 Hercules C-130's--that is, a minimal part of Italian armament. How many other Lockheed cases are hidden in the huge defense purchases? And even without suspecting corruption and bad faith, who decides, and on the basis of what criteria, whether Italian defense needs more missiles or cannons, and what missiles and what cannons?

According to Falco Accame, who is responsible for defense problems for the Socialist Party, several of the decisions taken in recent years to increase the power of the Italian armed forces are, in this respect, disputable and disturbing: "Equipping ourselves with Tornado-Mrca airplanes, with a large number of Leopard tanks, with the through-deck cruiser or a helicopter-carrier, reveals the admitted ambition to make Italy a small military power with offensive capacity in the Mediterranean area." Who has taken these decisions? "I have little faith in parliament's capacity for control in the defense sector," Accame says further, "because the politicians are afraid to concern themselves with these problems. Thus the military do as they like, buy what they want, without there being any coordination among the three armed forces: army, navy and air force.

It is certainly true that political interest in the problems of security in Italy is scarce. From the parliamentary records it emerges that almost none of the deputies and senators who are on the defense committee--except for a few exceptions, such as the socialist Accame, formerly a high navy official, or the left-wing independent Nino Pasti, a former general--takes much interest in analysis of the strategic choices which are a presupposition for purchases of weapons. Yet just to maintain its armed forces, Italy will

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spend 5,119.15 billion lire in 1979 (7.06 percent of the federal budget, more than 14 billion per day). And these are expenditures limited to conventional weaponry, because Italy does not have an autonomous nuclear arsenal, even though nuclear weapons are installed in Italy. [See section entitled "With the Trigger in Washington"].

Is this a small amount, as maintained by Minister of Defense Attilio Ruffini, who, speaking in the chamber in the debate on the budget for his ministry, described the draft budget for 1979 as one for "mere survival?" Or is the PDUP [Proletarian Unity Party] deputy Eliseo Milani right when he says that the defense budget--calculated on the basis of the gross national product and not on the basis of the federal budget--is, rather, increasing every year, in compliance with the wishes of NATO, which in 1977 asked its partners to increase their defense expenditures by 3 percent each year? Or, indeed, is the writer Carlo Cassola right when he says that it is not necessary to spend even one lira for weapons, in view of the fact that in case of war, Italy would have a reduced warmaking capacity anyway?

Without doubt, it emerges from some data that the state of health of the Italian armed forces is not of the best. One example out of many possible ones: the level of training of the troops. In his 12 months of draft service, a soldier manages to fire only 120 rifle rounds, if he belongs to a combat unit. Otherwise, only 48. An Italian cannon fires only 25 training shots in a year, as against the 90 fired by a French or West German cannon, 120 by an English cannon, or 112 by a Belgian one. Finally--still in annual terms--a tank fires 36 training rounds in Italy, as against 95 in France, 110 in West Germany, 114 in England and 60 in Belgium. In order for soldiers, cannons and tanks to shoot, in order for planes to fly and ships to sail--for military training, in a word--131 billion lire, equal to 2.56 percent of the military budget, will be spent in Italy in 1979. A figure which the experts consider very low--certainly far below what other countries spend: "Armed forces which do not train," Defense Minister Ruffini acknowledged in parliament, "do not have a reason for being and constitute only a waste of resources." Add to this the aggravation that keeping soldiers insufficiently occupied is also considered one of the causes of the spread of drug abuse: 258 cases verified in 1977 as against 69 in 1973.

To get out of this situation, to modernize the armed forces and make them more efficient in 1979, the Italian parliament has decided to launch a multi-year plan with a total expenditure, at 1978 prices, of more than 7 trillion lire earmarked for purchases of new weapons: new airplanes, new ships, new tanks, new cannons and new helicopters.

How will this money be spent? Will it really help? To answer these questions, IL MONDO went to the Institute of International Affairs (IAI), the only independent research center which follows in depth the problems of defense in Italy. Chaired by Altiero Spinelli, who for years was a commissioner in the EEC and who is now an independent left-wing deputy, and directed by Cesare Merlini, one of the Italians on the Trilateral Commission,

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the IAI collaborates closely with the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, and it is the Italian correspondent of SIPRI, an international institute in Stockholm which is the world's most authoritative voice on the problems of weapons control. This is the IAI analysis.

Military Spending

The estimated appropriations assigned to the Ministry of Defense in 1978 total 4,314 billion lire, as against 3,531 billion in 1977, for an increase of 22.2 percent, considerably higher than the rate of inflation. Excluding the expenditures for public safety (carabinieri) and other minor expenses, the appropriations effectively spent for national defense can be considered: 2,920 billion in 1977 and 3,578 billion in 1978, for an increase of 22.5 percent.

Within these figures, the most massive increases are under the heading of purchase of goods and services, which went from 1,678 billion lire in 1977 to 2,174 billion in the following year; the percentage difference is 29.5 percent. If these data are further analyzed to define the financial load for purchase of weapons, the results are as follows: 999 billion in 1977 and 1,347 billion in 1978--an increase of 34.8 percent. This relates to the fact that in 1978 came the first substantial appropriations connected with the three promotional laws for modernization of the armed forces.

With the approval, in the first half of 1977, of the promotional laws for the air force and the army, the legislative framework which will regulate the expenditures for modernization of the armed forces until 1986 was completed. In contrast with the navy law, which establishes the amounts of expenditure year by year, the two new laws are flexible: after an initial amount of 35 billion for 1977, annual appropriations of 100 billion for the air force and 120 billion for the army are planned in the period 1978-1986; these appropriations may be increased in relation to the state of fulfillment of the programs, eventual cost increases due to inflationary effects, and increases for raw materials and the cost of labor.

The effects of this legislated flexibility have already been felt: on the basis of the estimated budgets, the air force expenditures financed by the promotional law should be 168 billion and 293 billion (instead of 100 billion) in 1978 and 1979; for 1979, the expenditures for the army and the navy should rise, respectively, to 200 billion and 295 billion (from the initial base of 120 and 155 billion). At 1978 prices, the total load for the three laws together (initially, 3,070 billion) has already arrived at 5,450 billion (at 7,000 billion if, as is very probable, the navy law is refinanced).

In fact, all this poses a serious problem of political control. The modernization laws, as contrived, guaranteed the integral fulfillment of the programs established, independently of the costs. This appears acceptable if

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government and parliament take a direct part in the progressive carrying-out of the programs approved and are in a position to have a major voice in the basic decisions. On the other hand, while the "military-industrial" apparatus has been strengthening and organizing itself in recent years, the instruments, capacity and will for control by the political power appear insufficient; paradoxically, this is due also to archaic residual features of the military structure, and in particular, to the low transparency of a framework traditionally divided by sectors, a framework in which it is difficult to bring together elements of unitary management and interbranch vision.

Army: The programs covered by the promotional law forecast a total outlay of 1,985 billion lire. In the sector of "wheeled, tracked and armored transport, combat and auxiliary equipment," the programs financed by the law are the following: (1) purchase of 120 Leopard tanks; (2) purchase of auxiliary tanks with the same body as the Leopard (68 relief tanks, 64 bridge-layers and 28 sappers); (3) purchase of 300 armored troop transport vehicles of the Vvc-1 type; (4) purchase of 3,800 2-ton trucks; (5) development of the Vcc-80, a new tracked and armored transport and combat vehicle; (6) purchase of devices for night vision and firing. All this equipment will be delivered in the period between 1979 and 1984.

As regards "artillery, artillery support, munitions and equipment," the law will permit purchase of 164 155-mm towed cannons of the Fh-70 type, jointly manufactured by West Germany, Great Britain and Italy. The cannons will have a range of about 24 kilometers, greater than that of the present artillery of the same caliber. This also involves replacement of the battlefield acquisition, target and surveillance radars; 30 will be purchased.

For building up antiaircraft defense, which for years has been considered a priority need, 40 mobile missile systems of the "Mei" type will be purchased, to be used against planes penetrating at low altitude, and portable missiles not yet specified. In addition, modernization of 120 40/70 antiaircraft cannons is said to be planned; however, this program is not definite and could be replaced.

Considerable uncertainty subsists in another especially important sector, antitank defense, which in future could be centered on systems of short range (up to 1 kilometer), medium range (up to 2 kilometers), long range (up to 3 kilometers), and very long range (up to 4-5 kilometers; normally, these are missiles launched by helicopters). Actually, there are doubts about the readiness and availability in the early 1980's of two systems of Italian manufacture: the FOLGORE [Thunderbolt], a recoilless cannon designed for distances of less than 700 meters, and the SPARVIERO [Sparrowhawk], a missile which has a range of about 3 kilometers. For this reason, the choice could go to foreign missiles, such as the Franco-German MILAN (for the medium distances) and the American DRAGON (for the shorter distances). It seems certain, though, that antitank helicopters armed

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with American TOW missiles (which the army already has) will be purchased; in the coming years, some 60 helicopters of this type (Agusta A-109 and after 1981, Agusta A-129) should be bought.

The promotional law for the army covers also "supplying of radio stations and telecommunications equipment." In the 2-year period 1977-1978, 2,900 new radio stations, vehicular and portable, have already been bought. Starting in 1980, appropriations for purchase of high-frequency and long-range radio stations and new telecommunications equipment are planned. The products are of various types: radio links, telephonic multiplex equipment, automatic telephone exchanges, electronic teletypewriters, remote-control and direct-dialing equipment, etc. The last heading is "equipment for management operation automation." In this field, deliveries of mini-data processors have already begun.

On the whole, it is a modernization program which goes in the direction both of purchasing equipment to integrate and complete the existing equipment (such as the Leopard tanks); to provide the army with weapons and equipment in line with technological progress and the new use concepts (in all the modern armies, increasingly intensive mechanization of infantry, providing speed, protection and flexibility of use, is taking place); and to fill in gaps (antiaircraft and antitank weapons) which are increasingly obvious with the improvement in airplane characteristics and the improvement in the technical characteristics of armored equipment.

Naturally, such modernization would make no sense if it were not accompanied by the possibility of achieving an effective military instrument through adequate training and equally adequate levels of support. Otherwise, it would be more suitable to create an instrument of smaller dimensions, corresponding better to the country's economic and financial reality but possessing high efficiency and operational capacity--capable, that is, of representing an effective deterrent.

Air Force: The programs financed by the air force law are four. The most important is the one for the multipurpose Panavia-Tornado airplane (manufactured jointly with West Germany and Great Britain), which is progressing normally. The first airplanes will go into service in 1980, replacing the F-104G's. The 100 Tornados coming to Italy by the time the program is completed (1988) will be used as follows: 12 for training, in a two-seater version; 54 in the "first line" group; and 34 as reserves, to replace losses and to permit overhaul cycles.

The other three supply programs are the following: (1) 100 Mb-339 training jets, built by Macchi; (2) antiaircraft missile systems of the SPADA [Sword] type, for defense of the most important bases; (3) 30 sighting, altitude and identification radars, which will become operative by 1986.

The air force law is perhaps the one which has caused the most argument in the past, mainly because the Tornado airplane was considered an offensive

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plane. In view of the state of completion of the project, which by now is past the point of no return, objections of this kind are now rare. But the concerns about the cost increases (owing in part, in the case of the Tornado, to the devaluation of the lira in relation to the German mark) are still current.

At the beginning of 1975, the total cost for carrying out the programs provided for by the law was 1,265 billion lire; this cost rose to 1,745 billion by the middle of 1976, to 2,170 billion at the beginning of 1977 and 2,533 billion a year later.

A certain number of air force programs, old and new ones, prove to be covered by funds outside the promotional law. Among these are the furnishing of 44 G-222 transport planes and 20 Hh-3F rescue helicopters, improvement of the avionics of the F-104S, purchase of SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles of the new generation, and the expenditures for the AWACS airborne warning and control system. The most significant project which will be developed with ordinary financing has the abbreviation Am-x. This is a new tactical support plane which will replace the G-91R's and the G-91Y's in the 1980's. It will in all probability be an entirely Italian product (but with the engines built under foreign license). In any case, any idea of joint production with West Germany and Great Britain, per the example of the Tornado and the Fh-70 cannon, seems out of the picture. Instead, there has been talk of a possible agreement with Sweden.

The same commentary as made for the army as a military instrument is valid for the air force also. Planes which reach the limits of their technical and operational life are replaced. Given the increase in air defense capacities, the missions of attack planes have become more difficult and exacting; it is attempted to obviate this with, on the one hand, greater sophistication permitting high speed at the lowest altitudes and all-weather operations, and on the other hand, with more complex equipment systems, especially for electronic warfare. This is a tendency which raises the total costs well beyond the already high price of an airplane pure and simple. The purchase of the Tornado would make no sense if one were constrained to use it as an attack plane of the 1960's--that is, without equipping it with systems, and especially armament, suitable for its mission (area bombs, antirunway bombs, laser-guided, electro-optically guided, or infrared-guided bombs).

Navy: It is very probable that the navy law will be amended in such a way as to make it financially flexible. This would make it possible not only to refinance the "reduced" program (1 helicopter-carrying cruiser, 6 anti-submarine frigates, 2 submarines, 6 missile-launching hydrofoils, 1 fleet supply ship, 1 rescue-salvage ship, 4 minesweepers and 27 Ab-212 anti-submarine helicopters), for which 1,000 billion lire is no longer sufficient, but also to consider again the possibility of building all the ships originally planned.

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In such a case, two missile-launching chasers, two more frigates of the "Maestrale" [Northwest Wind] class, six minesweepers, one transport ship for amphibious operations and nine Ab-212 helicopters would join the fleet around the mid-1980's.

The added cost, including the "technical-operational improvements" and "completion of the equipment on board," would total 1,158 billion lire, at 1979 prices. With the 386 billion in price revisions, the navy law thus refinanced would come to cost 2,544 billion.

Meanwhile, the delivery times are being outlined with greater precision. As regards the plan for construction financed by the ordinary budgets, the frigate "Lupo" [Wolf] became operational in the autumn of 1977, and a year later, the frigate "Sagittario" [Sagittarius] and the submarine "Sauro" [Roan]; in 1978, the submarine "Faccia di Cossato" and the frigate "Perseo" [Perseus] were launched. Among the ships planned by the promotional law, the keel of the frigate "Maestrale" was laid at the beginning of 1978 (the six units of this class will be delivered between 1980 and 1983), while the six hydrofoils will go into service in the 3-year period 1979-1981.

Nevertheless, reasons for indecision are not lacking, both as regards the decision to build the helicopter-carrier cruiser and because the navy law and the ordinary budgets do not seem to give the necessary emphasis to the auxiliary ships. In fact, construction of only one squadron supply ship, the "Vesuvio," is scheduled; it will join the "Stromboli," which went into service in 1975. A factor such as this could have a negative influence on the fleet's operational capacity.

Interbranch Strategy

The dizzying pace of technological progress which brings weapons systems rapidly to technical-operational obsolescence, and equally, the dizzying rise in their costs, and the proper limits placed on the financial resources which it is possible to devote to defense projects, in the face of more urgent social necessities, impose difficult choices.

But it is difficult, from analysis of the three promotional laws, to understand what unitary strategic design governed the important decisions taken in past years. Thus it is difficult to establish whether the means chosen are the right ones or not. For sure, there has been no decision taken in the political arena to which to refer and to use as a standard for checking the choices made.

It is indeed the responsibility of the politicians to establish the framework of political reference which the military should abide by for defining the military instrument. Only if such a clear frame of reference exists is it possible to evaluate the cost and effectiveness of the individual technical proposals, to make choices, to reduce or expand the budget, in a

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reasoned way, with awareness of the risks run and calculation of the benefits which can be derived from them. In the absence of such a framework, the entire process fades into the indefinite. The more general the objectives of defense policy are, the more it becomes impossible to evaluate the correctness of expenditure. There are no solely "technical" criteria: was it necessary to buy the famous Hercules planes which are being argued about in the constitutional court today? Is it necessary to build the new Italian "through-deck cruiser? Is it advisable to maintain the present budget division which favors the expenditures for the army? It is impossible to reply in a complete way: one can determine whether a specific plane or ship or cannon or something else is technically valid, whether it carries out properly the tasks for which it was designed; but no one today outside the defense apparatus is in a position to evaluate whether it is right for the Italian armed forces to have spent all that money to carry out that task in that manner. The only way to know, and hence to have a proper debate on defense expenditures, is by precise determination of what it is desired to defend, how, why and within what limits, with what priorities. But unfortunately, the Italian political class has so far hidden behind the convenient screen of NATO decision, general and imprecise, refusing to debate that which it was its task to decide.

Italy has thus become essentially a "forward base" of NATO (and in particular, of the American forces), limiting its interest (and hence the major portion of its budget) to defense of the northeast sector--that is, Friuli and the Veneto, where more than one-third of Italian war power is concentrated. As the strategic situation in the Mediterranean changed and the necessity of a more active European role in the alliance became more pressing, Italy did not conduct any debate on these decisions and tried to continue as in the good old times. Thus was created a void, which had necessarily been filled directly by the military administration, but lacking sufficient political cover, lacking a frame of reference and thus actually prevented from making more courageous choices. In the absence of political decisions, bureaucratic routine naturally prevails. Therefore, the predominant strategic posture seems in fact to remain for the future too the one hinged on defense of the borders with the east. The military establishment, which has little propensity to basic discussion of military questions and is dissatisfied at not receiving precise political directives which might have aided it in its choices, has in any case contented itself with managing the funds assigned to defense in a form substantially free of parliamentary control.

There are at least two negative results. The first is that we are still witnessing a distribution of the defense budget in accordance with a priority (first the army, then the air force, then the navy) which is no longer consonant with the altered geostrategic importance of the Mediterranean area.

The second is that a unitary, interbranch vision of military programming is still lacking, and one has the impression that each armed force is proceeding along its own line of evolution and modernization, without any coordination with the others. But it is no longer possible for the three branches to

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proceed along this road without their programs being evaluated and approved in function of the overall military instrument which it is desired to achieve and without adoption of strict criteria for verifying cost-effectiveness.

The reform of the armed forces initiated has certainly streamlined several services, but it has not changed the basic criteria of subdivision of the budget and of strategic orientation. It is a "technical" reform, with all the limits of political deficiency already pointed out. The new means which Italy is acquiring are therefore making technically more modern an instrument which is "old" in its political-strategic principles. Once again, there is concentration on effectiveness by sector, without finding the overall effectiveness of Italian defense as a whole. It is therefore necessary to re-think, in new terms, the military instruments which Italy needs, considering the profound changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic context of the Mediterranean area, fitting the distribution of defense resources to them.

According to the IAI, it would be advisable to concentrate in the future on a military instrument of reduced dimensions but fully effective and capable of pursuing the essential objectives of the country's military policy. In this context, the political class should act to give direction, to coordinate and control, and the final decision is up to it. While responsibility for finding answers, on the technical level, goes to the military--no longer answers to the individual requirements of each armed force, but to the more articulated requirements of the military instrument as a whole, with unitary programming for army, navy and air force.

With the Trigger in Washington

In Italy there are about 1,000 nuclear warheads. Some of them are assigned to use by the Italian armed forces, according to the NATO agreements. Some of them are stationed on Italian territory, but controlled exclusively by the American troops. Finally, some of them equip the American Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean. But here, in detail, is the situation.

Nuclear Weapons Assigned to the Italian Armed Forces

According to a study by the Stockholm International Institute for Peace (SIPRI), the nuclear weapons assigned to the Italian armed forces as of mid-1976 were: 126 155-millimeter howitzers; 12 203-mm howitzers; 18 Honest John ground-to-ground missiles; 6 Lance ground-to-ground missiles; and 72 F-104 fighter-bombers. From 1976 to today, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies of London, the Honest Johns have been withdrawn, while according to SIPRI, there are eight Lance missiles today, not five. As for the fighter-bombers, in reality only two groups of the F-104 type are designated in Italy for using nuclear bombs, and thus their number is more realistically about 30-36. If one takes into account the fact that in general, the nuclear warheads stored in Italy for these weapons are one for each missile, two for each fighter-bomber, and three for each howitzer, one arrives at about 500. Keeping also in mind the fact that other Italian

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carriers of single tactical nuclear warheads are certainly the 96 Nike Hercules anti-aircraft missiles, and probably the antisubmarine planes (25), one arrives at a total of more than 600 nuclear warheads, which the Italians would have to use with the "double key" system; for the use of such weapons, authorization by the president of the United States and approval by the Italian Government are necessary simultaneously.

Finally, again according to SIPRI, there are also in Italy, as well as in West Germany, Greece and Turkey, nuclear demolition mines, the total number of which--still according to SIPRI--should be about 300.

American Nuclear Weapons in Italy

There is less information about the nuclear weapons controlled directly by the Americans but stationed in Italy. The number of American airplanes based in Italy and equipped with nuclear weapons is known (including those belonging to the Sixth Fleet): about 20 fighter-bombers based at Aviano, in Friuli, which belong to the 40th Tactical Group of the U.S. Air Force; about 60 attack planes on board two aircraft carriers and about 30 anti-submarine planes on board the same aircraft carriers stationed at Sigonella, near Catania. Less well-known, though, is how many nuclear weapons are at the disposal of the surface ships of the Sixth Fleet, which has its logistical base at Naples, and the hunter-killer submarines, a support ship for which is stationed at Maddalena.

According to an estimate by an American source, the tactical nuclear warheads on board the American fleets in the Atlantic (the Second) and in the Mediterranean (the Sixth) total about a thousand. Knowing the sizes of the fleets (5 aircraft carriers and 60 surface ships in the Second; 2 aircraft carriers and 15 surface ships in the Sixth), one can deduce that there are about 300 tactical nuclear weapons available to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

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The Cost of Defense





<u>Year</u>	<u>% of National Budget²</u>	<u>% of Public Expenditure⁴</u>	<u>% of Gross National Product</u>	
			<u>A⁴</u>	<u>B⁵</u>
1974	9.17	--	2.9	2.9
1975	8.07	9.7	2.6	2.8
1976	7.77	8.6	2.5	2.6
1977	7.49	8.9	2.4	--
1978	7.06	7.9 ¹	--	--
1979	7.03 ³	--	--	--





Key:

1. The figures furnished refer to the ordinary defense budget. It should be kept in mind, for example, that the promotional laws for the armed forces, launched in 1977, provide for expenditures (which have already started, from 1978) not considered in the ordinary budget.
2. The increase in public expenditure of a current nature in recent years shows defense expenditures constantly decreasing, even in the presence of constant appropriations. In addition, from 1975 on, the expenditures for military pensions have been removed from the defense budget.
3. Forecast.
4. Source: MILITARY BALANCE.
5. Source: SIPRI, Stockholm.

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The Italian Armed Forces Today





(1) ESERCITO (2) effettivi 240 mila (esclusi carabinieri)	
<p>(3) 1 divisione corazzata 3 divisioni meccanizzate 1 brigata meccanizzata 6 brigate motorizzate 6 brigate alpine 1 brigata paracadutisti 2 battaglioni anfibi</p> 	 <p>Obici e cannoni semoventi da 165, 175 e 203 mm. (6) Obici e cannoni da 105, 155 e 203 mm. Missili anticarro e Tows</p>
<p>(4) brigata con missili terra-terra e Lance 4 battaglioni antiserei con missili e Hawk</p> <p>Cerri armati: 700 M-47, 200 M-60 e 600 e Leopard 4.000 cerri trasporto truppe del tipo M-113</p> 	<p>Aviazione (7) dell'esercito</p>  <p>Elicotteri: 60 AB-47; 140 AB 204/205 (8) 40 AB-206; 20 CH-47 150 aerei leggeri</p>
<p>(9) Carabinieri (effettivi 90 mila) reggimento corazzato con M-47 e M-113 1 battaglione paracadutisti</p>	

MARINA (11) (12) effettivi 42 mila	
<p>(13) 6 sommergibili d'attacco (14) 4 sommergibili hunter-killers (antisommergibili)</p>  <p>(15) 3 incrociatori lanciamissili con elicotteri (16) 4 caccia lanciamissili (17) 4 caccia (di cui 1 adibito a nave scuola e sede comando) (18) 10 fregate (19) 12 corvette</p>  <p>(20) 1 aliscafo lanciamissili (21) 4 motocannoniere (22) 5 motosiluranti d) (23) 34 dragamine (di cui 4 di altura 20 costiere e 10 litoranei)</p>	<p>(24) nave rifornitrice (25) navi trasporto truppe e materiali (26) navi da sbarco</p>  <p>(27) Più di 150 navi ausiliarie e minori (mototrasporti costiere; mezzi da sbarco; hover-craft; moto officine costiere; navi esperienze, idrografiche, cisterna, posareti, salvataggio, scuola, rimorchiatori.) (28) 2 battaglioni di fanteria marina (29) Aviazione della Marina Elicotteri: (30) 24 SH-3D; 30 AB-204/212</p> 

[Table and key continued on following page]

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[Table continued]

AVIAZIONE ^{De} (31)		effettivi 70 mila (32) (circa 300 aerei da combattimento)	
(3) gruppo di cacciabombardieri con F-104 G		(4) gruppo di aerei da trasporto con G-130 H	
(4) gruppi di cacciabombardieri con F-104 B		(4) 2 gruppi di aerei da trasporto con G-119	
(5) 2 gruppi di cacciabombardieri con G-91 Y		(4) 3 gruppi di missili antiaerei a Nike-Hercules	
(6) 3 gruppi di intercettori con F-104 B		(4) 4 Aerei da addestramento: SF-260; P-166; MB-326; G-91T; TF-104G	
(7) 3 gruppi di cacciabombardieri leggeri e ricognitori con G-91R		(4) 5 gruppi di ricognitori con RF-104G e F-104G	
(8) 2 gruppi di ricognitori marittimi con Breguet e Atlantica		(4) 1 gruppo di ricognitori marittimi con S-2 e Trackers	
(9) 1 gruppo di ricognitori marittimi con S-2 e Trackers			

Key:

1. Army. (a)
2. Personnel: 240,000 (not including carabinieri).
3. 1 armored division
3 mechanized divisions
1 mechanized brigade
5 motorized brigades
5 Alpine brigades
1 parachute brigade
2 amphibious battalions
4. 1 brigade with Lance ground-to-ground missiles
4 antiaircraft battalions with Hawk missiles
5. Tanks: 700 M-47's, 200 M-60's and 500 Leopards
4,000 troop-transport trucks of the M-113 type
6. Self-propelled howitzers and cannons of 155, 175 and 203 mm
Howitzers and cannons of 105, 155 and 203 mm
TOW antitank missiles

[Key continued on following page]

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[Key continued]

7. Army air force
8. Helicopters: 60 AB-47's; 140 AB-204/205's;
140 AB-206's; 20 CH-47's
150 light planes
9. Carabinieri (personnel: 90,000)
10. 1 armored regiment with M-47's and M-113's
1 parachute battalion
11. Navy
12. Personnel: 42,000
13. 5 attack submarines
14. 4 hunter-killer submarines (antisubmarine)
15. 3 missile-launching cruisers with helicopters
16. 4 missile-launching chasers
17. 4 chasers (including 1 for use as training ship and headquarters)
18. 10 frigates
19. 12 corvettes
20. 1 missile-launching hydrofoil
21. 4 gunboats
22. 5 torpedo boats (d)
23. 34 minesweepers (including 4 for high seas, 20 offshore and
10 coastal)
24. 1 supply ship
25. 2 troop and material transport ships
26. 2 landing ships
27. More than 150 auxiliary and minor ships (coastal transport ships;
landing craft; hovercraft; coastal shop ships; test ships;
hydrographic ships, tankers, netlayers, salvage ships, training
ships, towboats)
28. 2 battalions of marines
29. Navy air force
30. Helicopters: 24 Sh-3D's; 30 AB-204/212's
31. Air Force (b, c)
32. Personnel: 70,000 (about 300 combat planes)
33. 1 fighter-bomber group with F-104G's
34. 3 fighter-bomber groups with F-104S's
35. 2 fighter-bomber groups with G-91Y's
36. 6 interceptor groups with F-104S's
37. 3 light fighter-bomber and reconnaissance plane groups with G-91R's
38. 3 reconnaissance plane groups with RF-104G's and F-104G's
39. 2 maritime reconnaissance groups with Breguet Atlantics
40. 1 maritime reconnaissance group with S-2 Trackers
41. 1 transport plane group with G-100H's
42. 2 transport plane groups with G-119's
43. 8 Nike-Hercules antiaircraft missile groups
44. Training planes: SF-260; P-166; MB-326; G-91T; TF-104G
45. Helicopters: 65 AB-47G/J's; 40 AB-204B's

[Key continued on following page]

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[Key continued]

- (a) All the forces are "assigned" to NATO, except the brigades deployed in central southern Italy.
- (b) The air defense forces (interceptors, antiaircraft missiles and radar networks) are "under NATO command"; all the other forces are "assigned" to NATO, except one G-91R group, the transport planes and the training planes.
- (c) The combat groups are composed of 12-18 airplanes, and the transport groups, of 14-16 planes. Each group has several additional planes (about 20 percent, in reserve for overhaul work), which make possible a continuous process of changeover. The figure of 300 combat planes includes maritime reconnaissance planes but not these additional planes.
- (d) Three of them are equipped for incursion and frogman actions.

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