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**30 MARCH 1979**

**PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY**

**1 OF 1**

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
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TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN  
(FOUO 10/79)  
PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY



ASIA



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ANALYSES FOCUS ON PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY

Foreign Ministry Falls to Peking

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Nov 78 pp 166-187

[Article by Yutaka Kobayashi: "China Draws Japan Into 'Anti-USSR Axis' Through Conclusion of Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty; Option of Foreign Service Officers Should Be Reviewed"]

[Text] Foreword

"Dissatisfaction on the part of both parties makes for good negotiations." So goes an often quoted comment among diplomats concerning diplomatic negotiations. The allusion describes the theme that independent nations involved in a negotiation mutually recognize that impossibility of bending the other party to its own will.

Over the past 6 years, the conclusion of a Japan-China peace and friendship treaty has been a major item on the agenda of Japan's foreign relations and has proved to be a real problem child. Now that it has been signed, Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda and the executive office staff of the Foreign Ministry are praising themselves that the conduct of "the event was worthy of almost perfect marks." If that is so, then according to the wisdom of foreign relations officers quoted above, one has to suspect that the Japan-China treaty negotiation could not have been one favorable to Japan.

In reopening the negotiations, Prime Minister Fukuda made the conclusion of the treaty "provisional to conditions satisfactory to both parties."

In reviewing the long drawn out negotiations between Japan and China, Japan's diplomacy cannot be said to have really earned the jubilant cries of "Oh, well done! Well done!" As a matter of fact, we can't see any meritorious accomplishment on the part of the foreign office at all. Without evaluating the contents of the peace and friendship treaty itself, we ask why was it necessary to conclude the treaty. What was the reasoning for the conditions stipulated and what were the basic procedural concepts

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of discussions which would meet those conditions? What did those who are the recognized diplomatic pros in the foreign ministry think of them and what were their concerns and how were the final decisions made?

Leaving out what the private thoughts of individuals may have been or are, when foreign office discussions and responses are traced one cannot but feel complete amazement at the fuzziness of Japanese diplomacy.

Confronted with the situation in the Middle East, Sino-Soviet hostilities, localized warfare in Asia and Africa, concerns over the monetary situation, inflation, trade wars and countless other problems, the world is in a turmoil and Japan certainly is not outside it all. In the midst of this storm of interrelated problems in the international seas, we are proposing that we hoist a sail of "autonomous diplomacy"! Do we believe that our foreign office is capable of assuming the role of a pilot to navigate through these troubled waters?

We wish to evaluate this in this paper with constant reference to the proceedings of the Japan-China peace and friendship pact negotiations.

Foreign Minister Sonoda Angered

It happened at a turning point in the peace and friendship negotiations....

Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda gave a sound tongue lashing to ambassador to Peking Shoji Sato and the administrative level negotiators at the Visitors' Hall in Peking. The incident about to be described took place on 9 August after two meetings with Foreign Minister Huang Hua of China during which there was a basic affirmation that a political agreement on the treaty could be reached. The discussion had proceeded to a point where Ambassador Sato and Foreign Affairs Vice Minister Han Nianlong were to work on the wording of the treaty text.

It was at this point that Sonoda stated that the Chinese had in their possession the provisions of Japan's maximum concessions pertaining to the crux of the negotiations, "anti-hegemony--articles relating to third parties." This had been prepared by Japan prior to participating in the Peking negotiations.

Sonoda's strategy was not only to hold off on offering this proposal but to keep it completely secret and to use it as his trump card only if the negotiations appeared to be on the brink of collapsing. When it was learned that the Chinese had prior knowledge of the nature of this trump card it is not surprising that the Foreign Minister became enraged. Anyone would have been.

"When climbing to the top of a tree," Sonoda cried, "one shouldn't overlook looking down to be sure of a safe descent route." But the damage had been done.

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However, some at the working level defend Ambassador Sato on the grounds that exposure of our hand reinforced credibility in the minds of the Chinese and therefore did not have a negative effect.

The actual developments were as follows: On the 10th at the last meeting of the working level negotiations, the Chinese chose to accept the terms which Japan had thought to be most favorable to it and not the last ditch terms which was to be used as a final concession. Article 2 of the accepted proposal states that "neither Japan nor China will seek hegemony over any area in Asia or the Pacific... or in any other area and both will oppose any other country or group of countries attempting to establish such hegemonic authority." Aside from this article, Article 4 states: "This treaty is not to affect the position of the signatories' relations with third countries." These provisions are contained in the treaty now in being.

But what was the thinking behind these provisions and what was the route of decision making? The fact is that the other party, China, came up with them so it was responsible for our being able to save our skins. It was truly a case of falling into it and coming out smelling like a rose. To have achieved the desired result where even the final trump card was known to the other party could hardly be thought of as a [triumph in the art of] negotiation.

The following scene also unfolded:

Soon after reaching an agreement to conclude the Japan-China treaty, Sonoda and the negotiating party in Peking celebrated the event with the ministry headquarters people at Kasumigaseki, Tokyo, by telephone; Sonoda who is highly emotional, told the listeners with jubilation overflowing since "Japan-China" was the culmination of practically all of his efforts since assuming the post of foreign minister, "it came about," he told Vice Minister Keisuke Arita at the other end of the phone line, "because you people did such a good backup job!" Ambassador Sato was nearby but his expression strangely did not reflect Sonoda's excitement.

Untroubled Easy Sailing

Ambassador Sato did pick up the telephone instrument and perfunctorily expressed words of celebration and in a low voice added: "It probably couldn't have been brought about if you hadn't been the vice minister." It's doubtful that his low keyed attitude could be blamed entirely on fatigue from his long middleman role in China.

We do not bring up this episode with the intent of focusing the problem points of the Japan-China negotiations on Ambassador Sato alone. Without making an issue of it, we merely wish to show how these negotiations were concluded without the foreign office being in a state of total mobilization, without having a singleness of intent and without a consensus of judgment or action.



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The Japan-China negotiations constantly traveled down a sunny road. This was probably the last big role for Ambassador Sato who is a career diplomat of 40 years and who had even held down the post of vice minister. What happened to this ambassador?

Foreign Minister Sonoda and Ambassador Sato were destined to clash at some point over some issue. Since assuming the post of foreign minister in November last year, Sonoda had made the matter of concluding the Japan-China Treaty his number one priority. As the contact man for the foreign office, Sato had the task of determining the possibility of reopening the negotiation in Peking and Sonoda frequently expressed dissatisfaction with Sato's actions.

The source of the friction could not be limited to differences in posture of the two toward the peace and friendship treaty nor to their positions; it may be said that it was rooted in such complexities as the dissimilarities of their upbringing and nature, even to differences in their outlook on life.

Even if some foreign officers other than Sato had been ambassador in Peking from last fall through this year, probably none could have measured up to the requirements of Sonoda, whose vision was completely monopolized by progress being made toward a Japan-China Treaty. It is likely that Sonoda had never experienced the travail of the career officer who constantly kept a letter of resignation in his inside pocket and who had to lay aside his personal convictions to climb the ladder rung by rung without ever being able to fly his own pennant and who always had to keep a retreat route open to make a quick getaway when needed; Sonoda had probably never had to come face to face with the need for avoiding trouble and of circumventing controversy until he assumed the foreign minister's chair. Then when he did, there was Sato who stood out like a sore thumb, easily picked out from the stereotypes who surrounded him.

Ambassador Sato and the "Nishiyama Incident"

Fundamentally, Sonoda and the elites of the Foreign Ministry were too far apart.

Like former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, Sonoda has little in the way of an educational background, is an activist with a military background who doesn't know when to stop. Depending on animal instinct, he rose from the tough school of youth group leader in Amakusa. In the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] he apprenticed himself to the late Ichiro Kono and using the politician's glibness and high spirits, slithered around the party and became one of the activists responsible for the founding of the Fukuda regime, which led to his being able to grab first the post of chief cabinet secretary and then the chair of foreign minister. Contrast that background with the man who trod the academic society's elite course of First Higher School, Tokyo University; then bureau chief, vice minister, and ambassador

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to the major countries of world. How such a man differed from bureaucrats whose primary aim was to avoid making mistakes need not be belabored here.

Sato is exemplary of the Kasumigaseki [Foreign Ministry] elite. He was educated at First Middle, First Higher and Tokyo University before entering the ministry. He played baseball while in school but fell 2 years behind his classmates due to illness. His distinguished look added to Sato's experience and outlook on life; he won a reputation for a "big figure" and climbed the ladder as a hopeful in the treaty field.

Practically all of the major post-war settlements such as the basic Japan-Korea treaty, return of Ogasawara agreement and the restoration of Okinawa agreement came under the purview of the treaties bureau and Sato's was the responsible hand in dealing with them. About the only instance in which he was tested in a negative way was the "Nishiyama Incident" which involved him to the extent of being questioned about his responsibility in a matter of breach of security.

When that incident surfaced, Sato was the chief of the secretariat and had responsibility over keeping all papers in order. The then foreign minister, Fukuda, demoted Sato together with Takeshi Yasukawa, deputy foreign minister for foreign affairs (later ambassador to the U.S.), and had to eat cold rice for awhile before being appointed to the post of ambassador to Spain. For this flaw in his career, appointment to the post of vice minister for which had been a major candidate, was put in jeopardy. When Miki formed his cabinet, the current vice minister Arita was held back and Sato came all the way back to be appointed as vice minister to succeed Togo, who is currently ambassador to the U.S.

Sato's strength is said to lie in his sense of balance and stability. Those who have served directly under him say that "He is a superior whose lead one can follow with confidence." With open minded forcefulness, he tamed the office of vice minister. But it would be difficult to find in him an image of a diplomat who flew his own pennant and pressed his officers forward in the field of foreign affairs.

Ambassadorship to China--this was apparently not a post he particularly wanted. Although Sato himself was reluctant to accept it, he was talked into it by the Fukuda cabinet which, having decided on a policy of attaching major importance to China, was determined to get an "ambassador of great stature" for the post. As vice minister, Sato had been exposed to the matter of the Japan-China peace and friendship treaty but he was not particularly in sympathy with it and felt that, "From the Japanese side, a rush to enter into that tie is not merited."

Assumption of "Foreign Element" Sonoda to Foreign Minister Post

Onto this scene came the appointment of Sonoda as Foreign Minister, an avowed advocate of concluding the Japan-China treaty. This came as a "calamity" not only to Sato but to the Foreign Ministry as a whole.

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Traditionally, the Foreign Ministry has been led by pros in diplomacy at its helm. Ever since the country was opened up the post has been held by men who were thoroughly familiar with the Foreign Ministry and who were the greatest authorities in the field of diplomacy such as Munemitsu Mutsu, Jutaro Komura, Hironori Hirota, Kijuro Shidehara, Shigenori Togo, Shigeru Yoshida among other illustrious personages in the history of Japanese diplomacy. But since the post war period when it had to deal temporarily only with MacArthur's occupation force's headquarters (GHQ) with the formation of the Kishi cabinet in 1957 when businessman Aichiro Fujiyama was appointed to the post of foreign minister, "amateurs" have held the post.

Actually, the post of foreign minister in recent times has been held by bureaucratic politicians whose overriding policy has been to avoid controversy. Etsusaburo Shiina, Takeo Fukuda, Masayoshi Ohira, Toshio Kimura, Kiichi Miyazaki, Ichiro Hatoyama--none is a foreign service pro but all were picked on the basis of their administrative toughness and professionalism. The exceptions are only Takeo Miki and Zentaro Kosaka who are elites with good educational backgrounds, completely unlike the crude politician Sonoda.

In other words, Sonoda was a complete "foreign element" when he lurched his way into the hot-house cultivated elitist atmosphere of the foreign office.

Sonoda's assumption of duties was a major point in the progress toward the conclusion of the Japan-China pact which had been under consideration ever since the normalization of Japan-China relations in 1972. In the Fukuda cabinet shuffle last fall, Sonoda's eyes were on being retained as chief cabinet secretary but when that wish was not realized, he gambled his political future on concluding a Japan-China treaty.

Sonoda has been a self-proclaimed pro-China hand for 20-some years and he was a sort of a fish out of water in the Fukuda faction, the majority of which, including the "Taka" [Hawk] faction group headed by former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, was pro-Taiwan. Hopes for an early conclusion of a treaty by the Japan-China extremists clustered around the Tanaka and Ohira factions including Susumu Nikaido, Masumi Ezaki, Zenko Suzuki and others who became bedfellows in the "get Miki" movement were given a boost when Sonoda assumed the [foreign minister's] chair and Sonoda himself was all for fulfilling their anticipations.

During the year that he was Chief Cabinet Secretary, Sonoda played the role of cabinet spokesman to the fullest to blast the Foreign Ministry under the former incumbent Hatoyama for its ineffectiveness in handling such matters as the Japan-Soviet fisheries problem. On assuming the post himself, he assembled ministry personnel and opened his address to them in the following manner:

"You people undoubtedly think that the enemy has come into your midst...." Taking the offensive in this manner to gain control of a covertly antagonistic group of ministry officers was typically Sonoda. Sonoda then

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proceeded to put into practice the old adage that the man who is the biggest nuisance as an adversary becomes the most reliable as an ally.

Less than a month after Sonoda assumed the ministership, Ambassador Sato returned home from Peking on a temporary visit and reported that "Chinese sentiment is not negative" to reopening negotiations for a peace and friendship treaty. Needless to say Sonoda's spirits soared.

But Prime Minister Fukuda was cautious. He refrained from giving Sato any clear signs; he instructed that contacts be limited to those of an unofficial nature and only give indications that "there is an interest." Sonoda quickly realized that with such meagre encouragement, Sato, who is not prone to be venturesome, would make no move. He decided that the only way to get Fukuda to get the lead out of his bottom and put some motion into the Foreign Ministry would be for he himself to take the initiative and pile up some accomplished facts. In line with this thinking, he put together a story that he would make a "January visit to China" early in the new year.

On 6 January Fukuda denied the story branding it as "nonsense." "The minister is in too much of a rush," he said. "No such schedule has been set up."

It is needless to say that with Fukuda's strongly worded denial, Vice-Minister Arita and the senior officers of the foreign office who had been unhappy about Sonoda's solo performance, received, this time, [a blow to their pride] and the denial blew the New Year's spirit.

Lack of Cohesive Leadership

The shock impact on the foreign minister of the prime minister's "nonsense" statement was great. While taking the critical diplomatic view of "What does this do to the image of the government of Japan in the eyes of foreign countries?" the foreign office crowd learned from it that Fukuda had not reached a point of "decision" yet and that there was, importantly, an extremely delicate relation between Fukuda and Sonoda.

First of all, Fukuda is an anti-communist. And he had the bitter experience of seeing the U.S. and China close the gap between themselves over his head while he was foreign minister during the latter part of the Sato regime. His attempt to salvage something out of that debacle by fishing for a normalization of relations between Japan and China had fallen on deaf ears. As salt ground into his wounds, he was beaten in his bid to seize political power as Sato's successor by the forces of Tanaka, Ohira and Miki who had become united over the Japan-China issue. When one realizes how China had jinxed him, one can see why there were points of differences between him and Sonoda who was solely motivated by concluding a Japan-China treaty.

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Officials in the Foreign Ministry felt secure with Fukuda because his track record showed him to be one who did not force issues. But as the prime minister put more distance between himself and Sonoda and displayed an inclination to take things into his own hands, they became uneasy over the possibility that he would drop his support of their proposals and procedural plans. It may be a little unfair to blame the lack of unity of purpose on the self-serving nature of the Foreign Ministry officials but they, caught between the cautious Fukuda and the eager Sonoda, had to conduct their business on an ad hoc basis and be completely dependent on the whims of the time. This structure which lacked a basic principle from which to act but which reacted to whatever event occurred was the structure in effect until shortly before the treaty was concluded.

"If I pull, he will follow behind but he will not take the initiative and lead the way..." Sonoda voiced this criticism frequently to his foreign service officials always hinting that Sato in the field was the subject of his jibe.

The first of the discussions between Sato and Han Nianlong were held on 24 February. The crux of this session was to determine whether Japan could be kept from being drawn into an anti-USSR provision of "a unified front against the USSR," even by conceding to "anti-hegemony" clauses.

No progress was made and Sonoda displayed some dissatisfaction with Sato's "indecisive penetration."

On 4 March while the National People's Representative Convention was in progress, the second Sato-Han discussions took place. No meaningful progress was made at this session either. Sato who felt that the prime minister's residence and the foreign office were somewhat out of step with each other, turned the baton over to headquarters, saying "Ammunition at hand has been exhausted; it is now up to Tokyo."

This snapped Sonoda's tolerance. He showed his irritation not only at Fukuda but at his rival Chief Cabinet Secretary Shintaro Abe and his cohort Yoshiro Mori and others connected with the official residence for their viewing the Japan-China event too relaxedly. Referring to the progress of the Peking discussions, Sonoda chided: "So brother Sato's a big shot?" He began to openly push for working level negotiations. The fact that Ambassador Sato had previously been given the post of vice minister by Miki and because Sonoda was a ringleader of the "get Miki" movement is thought to be behind the delicate relations between Sonoda and Sato.

In mid-March, to parallel the visit of Chief Secretary Yano's group of the Koemi Party to China, Sonoda dispatched Takeshi Tajima, China Bureau Chief, to Peking, ostensibly to keep the field abreast of the atmosphere in Tokyo to facilitate coordinated action between headquarters and the embassy in Peking.

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Regardless of the intent of the administrative bureau, Sonoda was aiming at something else. Three months after having returned to his post from a visit to the home office at year's end, Sato in Peking seemed to be uncertain as to whether "the home government intended to pursue the project sincerely and whether the differences between the prime minister and foreign minister were in the zone of concern." Sonoda rebuffed him: "Those are not your concern; expedite arrangements for discussion by your foreign minister on his visit to China even if such discussions include the anti-hegemony issue."

Attractiveness and Distrust of "Out-of-Norm" Foreign Minister

From the viewpoint of Foreign Ministry officials, was Sonoda a completely uninvited guest at Kasumigaseki? Not really. In discussions with foreign ministers of various countries he displayed masterful tactics and rhetorics learned in coping with parliament and in the election circuits.

He rode into Moscow in January and gave a straightforward accounting of Japan's position at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Japan and the USSR. When Gromyko tabled a "Good Neighbor Cooperation Treaty Proposal," Sonoda countered by tabling Japan's "Peace Treaty Proposal." In the past when Japan's foreign minister met with the USSR, he would be so completely overwhelmed that he wasn't given a chance to fully express his intent. Not so with Sonoda; he fearlessly said what needed to be said and got his points across and all in all was given good marks for his efforts.

Masuro Takashima, deputy vice minister for foreign affairs who accompanied Sonoda, commented: "He plays the diplomat's role on stage very well with a well prepared scenario and with correct understanding of the situation." It is reported that Sonoda has brought life and action to the service and has even given a lift to the slumping art of diplomacy.

The image of the foreign minister since the time of Ichiro Hatoyama who was nicknamed "the Accountant" has not been a proud one, having been those of Foreign Ministry bureaucratic upbringing if they had been nurtured in the Foreign Ministry or bureaucratic politicians. Those who didn't have some special skills such as Kiichi Miyazawa with languages and keen sense didn't have charisma or other qualities sought in foreign service officers.

The uncertainties and doubts the foreign service officers felt in not knowing where Sonoda was going or how he intended to get there seemed to have a complementary effect between him and themselves.

Though we have become somewhat sidetracked, the fact that Sonoda kept active "while leaving the engine idling at high speed" probably lead to getting the reopening of Japan-China negotiations back on track.

Did the Foreign Ministry really want to conclude a Japan-China peace and friendship treaty? If the question were put to foreign service officials who viewed it from the standpoint of foreign relations, the answer was "no."

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Japan-China "a Domestic Problem"

Why? Primarily because they could find no reason for making a Japan-China treaty a must. Some were of the opinion based on analyses made by the Foreign Ministry, that relations between Japan and China could be developed with stability without a formal peace and friendship treaty; some had deep down feelings that since China was primarily motivated by promoting its "four modernizations," it was asking too much of Japan to get into a feverish pitch over the signing of the treaty.

Furthermore, the USSR related diplomacy was giving them enough headaches without the addition of the "hegemony" bit. That was the single biggest factor which contributed to the ministry's lack of enthusiasm. Consequently, until the direction of the political flow had become overwhelmingly evident and the administrative bureau of the Foreign Ministry had been shoved into a point of no return, there had been no coordinated and concerted effort by Vice Minister Keisuke Arita, Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Masuro Takashima, Director General of the Asian Affairs Bureau Yosuke Nakae, and Ambassador Shoji Sato in the field to explain the situation and guide the politicians toward the establishment of a government policy leading to a sound basis for a treaty.

If Japan-China relations needed to be spotlighted [in isolation], a joint statement would suffice to bring about closer relations. Those who were for this approach argued that, "Japan-China is, in reality, a Japan-Japan problem" meaning that political factions which were extremely pro-Chinese and those which were pro-Taiwan and/or pro-USSR were so strongly at odds with each other that they canceled each other out.

It had been generally accepted that the great majority supported the view that, "since there's no overriding need for it, no crash diplomatic action to conclude a treaty is required." Here, again, it is evident that those in charge of foreign affairs involving China in the Foreign Ministry did not have a firm hand on the reins.

As already pointed out, neither the activists nor the conservatives who were sandwiched between the prime minister who is a master political tactician and the foreign minister, could do anything but aimlessly float around, their fates in the hands of time and place.

Watching the lack of direction being given to the Japan-China treaty problem, Director General Ohira commented bitterly: "What do you expect when the foreign office fails to make frequent visits to explain matters and advise the prime minister?"

There is an inclination to believe that concluding the treaty was on the agenda as a political item even during the days of the Tanaka and Miki cabinets.

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Be that as it may, the Foreign Ministry seems to have chosen 1978 at random and without making any analysis on such fundamental issues as how a Japan-China treaty would affect our position in the overall relations with the U.S. and the USSR, whether a Japan-China treaty was essential to relations between Japan and China, nor making any attempt to explain the issues to the people. Putting it bluntly, Kasumigaseki took up the matter of coming forth with a settlement as if it were just another homework assignment in an atmosphere of lackadaisical purposelessness.

Private Comments of Foreign Service Officials

At the reopening of the regular session of the Diet, Prime Minister Fukuda said as part of his statement on policy: "[The treaty] will be concluded in a manner satisfactory to both parties; the time for reopening negotiations is approaching." These words were spoken while his heated "nonsense" statement hadn't been given a chance to cool off and it departed from the draft which had been prepared by the Foreign Ministry which was much more moderate in tone.

Fukuda who felt that a more vigorous posture had to be displayed for domestic political purposes, was not satisfied with the drafted proposal and ordered that "a text containing stronger nuances be prepared." Then taking up a pencil himself composed the text quoted above.

"The prime minister," said some foreign service officials sarcastically, "knows that there's nothing concrete in the mill and is only trying to show that there is." But that was the extent of their protest. As on cue, Sonoda's statement on foreign relations pertaining to Japan-China, was identical to Fukuda's line.

When the opposition party voiced support for a "positive posture" Sonoda immediately raised his voice by several decibels.

Of course, during the question period the answers given by the embarrassed foreign service officers exposed the fact that the China Bureau had prepared answers on the assumption that the questions would pertain to what was to have been the central theme: "After all, concluding a treaty isn't an overwhelmingly essential matter." But this obviously embarrassing impasse failed to stop Sonoda from making his endorsement speech, even though in private, the confused foreign service officers muttered that "There isn't anything more stupid than for one party in a negotiation to try to rush things through."

This kind of spineless fear of expressing one's own opinion openly could be seen in various quarters right up to the time of the signing in August.

Limits of Kasumigaseki Diplomacy

Kasumigaseki does not have its foreign affairs policy on a consensus arrived at from discussions brought up from lower levels. A mechanism exists



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for the respective sections of the various bureaus to draft proposals but in reality the number of persons who have any authority to make policy decisions is limited to a very few executive officials.

This situation does not allow for the much needed policy decision making process in which all of the concerned members of the managerial segments get together and hash out all interbureau problems. Such a process is particularly essential in this international society of increasing interdependence when coping with problems involving the U.S., China, the USSR, or more broadly, Asia, Europe, or the Middle East. The regular semi-weekly chief's meetings usually consist of perfunctory reading of reports from each of the divisions during which even the old pros who have had 20 or 30 years of experience in the foreign affairs field ever volunteered to express his convictions on any subject.

Nicholson in his famous book "Diplomacy" writes that the characteristic of a foreign service officer is one who is unmoved by things or events, who does not make decisions lightly, and who can coolly see a thing or event in isolation. But we feel certain that he did not imply that foreign affairs people should not have convictions and the enthusiasm to act on them.

In the case of the Japan-China peace and friendship treaty only a small handful of officials were in any way concerned with the planning phase. They were besides Sonoda, Arita and Takashima, Nakae and on occasions Deputy Vice Minister for Administration Toshio Yamazaki (and until January, the current ambassador to Mexico, Nobuo Matsunaga) and to them could be added Treaties Bureau Chief Seichi Omori. Possibly, the prime minister's private secretary Ko Kowada who had been assigned to the prime minister's residence from the Foreign Ministry could be included in this group since he was the pipeline to the official residence.

In reality, this group could be squeezed down to Arita, Takashima and Nakae, and until a certain time, Matsunaga.

Vice Minister Keisuke Arita who was the senior member of the 3,300 foreign service officers at home and abroad, was nicknamed "Fierce Face" within the ministry because he was apt to flush in anger and bawl out even bureau chiefs when something displeased him. But being a man of such strong emotions, did he have bold imaginative ideas or have the courage to confront and persuade Sonoda, Fukuda, or the leaders of the LDP to move foreign affairs issues? No, he did not.

On the contrary, his image was that of an able official who concerns himself with details. He had a solid background: Tokyo University graduate, fifth son of the later Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita and he had smoothly sailed through a sunny career including North America Division Chief, Minister to the USSR, European and Oceanic Bureau chief, and ambassador to Iran. What were his thoughts during the progress of the current treaty

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negotiations and what were his deep-seated convictions concerning the treaty? What did he think should be the direction in which Japan-China relations should develop? What were Arita's true thoughts on the rumored differences between the official residence and the foreign office or on the confused policy issues or on the matter of mainline revisions? How did he try to put across his convictions in such matters? In trying to pin down these points to paint his portrait, we can come up with only a very vague image of the man.

The Man Who Was Called "a Legal Criminal"

The man who is given credit for being more influential in a certain context in policy making than Arita was Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Masuro Takashima. He was chief of the treaties bureau at the time of Japan-China normalization in 1972. Later he became the chief of the Asia bureau and was involved in such matters as the airlines agreement. It has now become partly legendary but it is said that the late Chou En-lai called him a "legal bandit" and added, "we would certainly like to have just one official like him on our side!" As a foreign service official, he is exceptional and has gained the respect and faith of both the ins and outs and within the LDP, of the liberals and conservatives alike.

It is related as a true story that once when Vice Minister Arita was reporting on the Japan-China treaty to Fukuda at the official residence, Arita was asked, "Incidentally, what's Takashima's judgment on this?" Sonoda was well aware of the high points given Takashima in the party and in early spring, even before the foreign minister's China visit had been scheduled, publicly announced that, "When I go to Peking I'm taking Takashima with me."

In the conduct of diplomatic relations with China, Takashima strongly advocated that a bold protest be made against China's habit of ignoring normal diplomatic channels and resorting to actions and words aimed at Japan's internal affairs. He insisted that such a step be taken to force some rethinking on the part of China but the vice minister designate was at that time in between floors with respect to responsibility over political matters so we don't know whether the advice bore any fruit or not.

Viewing the negotiations in isolation, we suspect that Takashima's aims were only half fulfilled. He is a man who was graduated from Tokyo University and was detained by the USSR for 2 years after the war ended.

Asia Bureau Chief Yosuke Nakae, unlike Arita and Takashima who were of the faction which entered the ministry during the war, did not come into it until after the war. He is a Kyoto University graduate and within the ministry was active in the theater. Even now, he is an intellectual who writes scenarios under the penname of Tamotsu Kasumi. At the time of Japan-China normalization, he was councillor under Asia Bureau Chief Takashima and accompanied Vice President Shiina of the LDP on a visit

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to Taiwan. For over 6 years after that he held responsible posts in Asian affairs, first as deputy chief, then as chief of the Asia Bureau. During that period he participated in such major issues as the Japan-South Korea continental shelf and conclusion of the Japan-China treaty. He will probably be assigned an overseas ambassadorship sometime during the year.

Taking care of administrative matters and fielding parliament's questions are classed as being among the most difficult of tasks. But Nakae is the model of efficiency as a bureaucratic officer, always keeping his cool and even during the Japan-China treaty hassle, managed to never get caught out on the limb. At the expense of sounding repetitious, even these officials never took issues involved in the Japan-China negotiations into their own hands; they drifted with the constantly changing direction of the current, never initiating action and reacting only when forced to do so. At one time after it had become clear that the Japan-China treaty was to be concluded, it seemed like the foreign office was duty bound to persuade Fukuda to accept the fait accompli and send Sonoda to China to make an early settlement. But it was not in such as Arita and Nakae to make a move.

The Turnabout of Prime Minister Fukuda

Prime Minister Fukuda who had continued to harass the foreign service officers by asking, "Where lies the truth and sincere intent?" showed the first signs of raising his heavy posterior in favor of reopening negotiations during the latter half of March. Paradoxically, it was shortly after the visit to China by the Yano group, facetiously referred to as the Foreign Ministry "using the opposition to give the Chinese a first class shake down." The Yano group forwarded to the government the usual Teng Xiaoping explanation of China's four modernizations and "nothing more than anti-hegemony; it is illogical to assume that that is aimed at any given entity." The foreign service officers chorused that there was "nothing new" and that the whole thing was "within the realm of amateurish diplomacy."

Fukuda, however, began to show signs of moving toward reopening the negotiations and meeting between Fukuda and the leaders of the Foreign Ministry--Sonoda, Abe, Arita, and others--was set for 22 March.

With good humor restored and spiritedly declaring that "I'm going to get some clear instructions," Sonoda rode into the Foreign Ministry's official hall in Iigura with a proposed text of the treaty drafted by the administrative bureau.

The focal point of the discussion was the handling of "hegemony" and "third country" and Fukuda acting "just like an accountant," asked for details to be assured that the wording would not point to anti-Sovietism. He kept stressing the fact that "I'm not going down unconditionally" and in his cautiousness, he failed to give direct instructions to reopen negotiations.

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That evening, Director General Ohira said: "This would be a good time for the foreign minister to visit China." But the salvo fired in support of Sonoda failed to obtain any results.

In spite of these negative developments, Fukuda made a move. On 25 March, he invited the conservative--with respect to Japan-China--elements of the LDP including the leader Kokichi Nadao and Dietmen Kingo Machimura, Kazuro Tamaoki, Masayuki Fujio to his private residence for an informal discussion. "If we leave the Japan-China treaty matter," Fukuda told them, "just hanging in mid-air, we'll be vulnerable to being pushed around by both China and the USSR. And domestically, we'll be giving ammunition to the opposition parties." He followed up by persuading them to concur in reopening negotiations.

Nadao and company were privately well aware that Fukuda would come out for reopening the negotiations since the Japan-China issue was one which had political implications. They requested, however, that the matter be considered carefully in view of the fact that on 5 April it would be 3 years since the death of the late President Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan would be coming out of mourning on that day; that it was essential that the USSR be kept from becoming antagonistic, considerations for the issue of territorial claims over the Senkaku Islands, and the existence of the China-USSR alliance agreement.

The conservatives led by Hiro Kichi Nadao based their criticism on "a lack of historical comprehension of the thing called Japan-China normalization." At the bottom of this criticism was the charge that at the time of the normalization, the foreign office had no pipeline into Taiwan and no firm intelligence or estimates on Taiwan or how it would react; that the Foreign Ministry's intelligence and analyses concerning Japan-U.S. and Japan-USSR relations were totally unreliable. Moreover, they suspected that, "If Sonoda were to visit China, he would swallow China's proposition in toto." The last point was also a statement of "no confidence" in the foreign service officers' ability to prevent Sonoda from operating singlehandedly.

About this time, a paper entitled, "Progress of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty Issue" was produced by the administrative bureau of the Foreign Ministry at the request of Masayuki Fujio and others and it tended to further the controversy.

Ripple Effects from Tajima Papers

The paper whose authorship was attributed to China Section Chief Takashi Tajima analyzed the situation should the treaty be pigeon-holed, unsigned, in the following manner: 1) The credibility gap by China for Japan would be widened; 2) The USSR would use it to apply further pressure on Japan; 3) Stability of Japan's foreign service would be shaken to the point of unbalancing it; as a consequence of the reduced scope of Japan's foreign

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relations (compared to the situation in which Japan concludes the treaty), the stability of Japan-Taiwan relations would be, "paradoxically, maintained and even enhanced as a spin-off effect." The paper's conclusion is to the effect that, "the consensus of the arguments pro and con is to the effect that [non-conclusion of the treaty] would give the impression that Japan dances to the tune played by the USSR."

The pro-Taiwan and pro-USSR factions criticized the paper on the grounds that the conclusions were based on faulty or shaky premises and these protests lead to forcing the paper being made public. Although some empathy for Tajima was expressed within the ministry--"it was used by the opposition merely for the sake of opposition"--it was criticized for having "inadequate supporting evidence."

The incident succeeded in exposing the weakness of the Foreign Ministry as an instrument which is supposed to be founded on the doctrine that "diplomacy is the extension of domestic politics." The consequences of issuing the paper which was supposed to be a philosophical discussion, pointed up the fact that the Foreign Ministry was directionless and that there lacked a mutual confidence between the ministry and the politicians and that the ministry's capability to make an estimate of the political atmosphere was inadequate.

On 27 March, with the LDP's intraparty reorganization well on its way to completion, a government party in power conference was convened. At the meeting a paper entitled, "A Request Regarding the Five Duties of the Party" outlining the basic posture of the government was submitted by Fukuda and Sonoda. The paper advised that: "To give Japan-China relations a firm and stable foundation would be in consonance with the current status of the international society and would solidify Japan's diplomatic standing in it," and urged that "an unbiased view be taken of guarding our national interests."

About this time, the often heard rumor was to the effect that "Fukuda has solidified his decision to reopen negotiations but is not thinking of concluding a treaty as yet." At this government-party conference, Yasuhiro Nakasone, chairman of the LDP executive council, assuming the role of representative of those advocating the separation of reopening negotiations from concluding the treaty, said: "To reopen negotiations is a good thing. But the matter of the foreign minister visiting China is something else. At the time that such a step is contemplated we desire that the party's approval be sought." Because the statement was made by Nakasone, the only man who had constantly expressed coolness toward the issue of reopening negotiations, Sonoda flared up and retorted sharply: "How to proceed with the negotiations is the Foreign Ministry's business isn't it? Diplomacy can't be conducted if we have to stop at every turn to consult with the party. I'm sure you would feel that same way if you were the foreign minister!"

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To the physically big statured Sonoda, Fukuda said soothingly, "Well, I guess you have a point," and with reservations, it was agreed that the party would proceed with preparations on the basis of a "reopening."

Sonoda and Nakasono both served their apprenticeship under Ichiro Kono and had competed with each other for favorable positions. On the death of Kono, the unreconcilable two split the faction in half. The cleavage was deep and until the treaty was signed, they were constantly at each other's throats.

Subsequently, Fukuda who was seen as the man who would put order back into the party, stepped back to a vantage point from which he could watch Ohira handle the task. At a joint meeting of the foreign service oversight committee and the foreign service committee, Sonoda made an appearance and became the one target of a rain of arrows, such as:

"Forego concluding the treaty until the China-USSR friendly alliance pact which is antagonistic to Japan is abrogated"; "Don't get drawn into becoming the first line for an anti-USSR front by the anti-hegemony provision"; "Clarify the territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands."

Confronted with these jibes, Sonoda had to give up his plan to visit Peking before the Japan-U.S. summit (3 May). And complaints spilled over to include Fukuda.

The Foreign Ministry should have become a combat arena but one could not say that the conservative elements or the liberals of the party were overburdened with requests for vigorous support from the foreign service officers. The atmosphere in the ministry was one of quiet isolation. As far as the politicians were concerned, since the matter was a foreign relations issue "which doesn't produce votes," no preparations were made to do battle nor did they lobby very hard in either direction to influence political clans.

#### The Senkaku Islands Incident Shock

During a time when the Foreign Ministry was laying low in the hopes that it wouldn't be overly affected by the confusion caused by the LDP's intra-party reorganization, a Chinese fishing fleet caused an incident on 12 April by violating the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands. Needless to say this put a crimp in the sentiment for reopening [negotiations] which had been on the rise since the latter part of March. Was it a deliberate incursion? Accidental? If it was a planned incursion, was it tied in with the peace and friendship treaty? Or was it limited to a claim of territorial rights? There was a dearth of intelligence and analytic findings were totally lacking.

There was, however, an abundance of guesses and rumors: "The Chinese have downgraded the Fukuda cabinet's credibility and have decided to take a tough stance"; "The Chinese are responding by applying pressure against

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the hard line taken by the Seirankai and other conservatives who are insisting that the issue of territorial rights over the Senkakus be clarified"; "It is a demonstration by some tough elements in the outlying districts against the central government's weak-kneed attitude toward Japan."

On-site investigations indicated that the ships of the offending fishing fleet were registered in various parts of China which tended to eliminate the "accidental incursion" theory. Almost simultaneously, Vice Minister Keng Biao who was meeting with Representative Hideo Den of the Shaminren [Social Democratic League] announced on the 15th that the incident was "completely accidental" and had no connection with the peace and friendship treaty negotiations. On the issue of reopening negotiations, he took the opportunity to state: "We are not making any new conditions and the anti-hegemony provision is not pointed at any specific entity." Since reopening the negotiations with Sato and Han as the central figures was imminent, the statement was undoubtedly made to give assurance that the anti-hegemony provision was not aimed at a specific country, namely the USSR, as an inducement to Japan which had been expressing considerable concern over that issue.

While China was using such means to accelerate the proceedings, Japanese opinion was still divided. Sonoda, of course, was rushing around trying to get the negotiations going while Arita, Takashima, Nakae and others in the Foreign Ministry insisted on a calmer approach. "Since there can't be an easy settlement of the territory issue," they argued, "it would be wiser not to get ahead of ourselves by charging into the reopening of negotiations things." Therefore, when on 21 April Deputy Chief of the Asia Bureau Wan Xiaoyun told Minister (at the time) Donowaki in Peking that, "The incident was unintended and will be treated when discussing the broad question of Japan-China relations," the opportunity was seized to attempt to make a "diplomatic settlement" of the incident.

But Fukuda and Abe resisted ringing down the curtain too precipitously. In an atmosphere where the domestic reaction was bound to be: "That would be a real hegemony principle action!" Fukuda could not be blamed for being reluctant to settle the matter on the diplomatic fiction that the incident was an "accidental occurrence," without going through normal diplomatic procedures. Finally, a temporary settlement was reached on 10 May, after the Japan-U.S. summit, between Sato and Han who agreed to reaffirm the joint agreement reached in 1972 that neither party would touch on the subject of territorial rights over Senkaku.

Inadequate Intelligence Pipelines

This incident clearly pointed up the inadequacy of intelligence available to the Foreign Ministry through foreign service channels and the lack of pipelines which frequently play decisive roles.

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The undercover struggle of Deng and the opposition faction when some fragmentary information was made available to some Dietmen in the form of Taiwan intelligence, Hong Kong intelligence, and even South Korea intelligence.

On 21 April, the same day that the Minister Donowaki-Wang discussions were being conducted, a passenger liner of Korea Air Lines which was carrying many Japanese passengers, strayed into USSR territorial air space. Our military intelligence did learn of the incident but we could not but be envious of the wealth of U.S. sources of intelligence which not only found out where the liner had landed but was able to get the incident which involved the USSR, South Korea and Japan, settled expeditiously.

Sonoda did not completely depend on the Foreign Ministry for intelligence. He had his own pipeline: For Japan-China related matters, he used people involved with the Kokubosoku [Japan International Trade Promotion Association] (Aichiro Fujiyama, chairman) to make contact with Liao Chengzhi and others who supplied him with information. Several legislators whose interests were not confined to domestic matters had established their own sources of information since the foreign office's intelligence was inadequate and belated. Recently, several LDP Dietmen initiated a move to establish Japan-U.S. and Japan-Europe intelligence pipelines at the legislature level as a result of their being criticized for being unable to accomplish no more than a rubber-necking tourist could on their trips abroad. The incident points up the lack of confidence in intelligence collection activities of our official installations overseas.

The foreign office consists of a staff of 1,500 at headquarters and 1,800 in overseas offices numbering 158. These figures are comparable to Italy and Belgium which have much smaller populations and economic and financial interests. In view of vastly increased administrative requirements in the diplomatic establishment, adjustments in personnel and budgetary requirements are justified. Protests to the effect that Sonoda "is making no effort to recruit well qualified people and to increase effectiveness in the field," points up the need for better quality rather than greater quantity. Of the 40 staff officers in the embassy in Peking which is at the very front line of negotiations with China, it is surprising to learn that only a very few are Chinese linguists. The usual excuse is that their counterparts in the Japanese section of the Chinese foreign office with which the bulk of business is conducted, are knowledgeable in Japanese. That seems like a very lame excuse.

Backstage During Negotiation Proceedings

The Senkaku Islands incident blocked an opportunity to reopen negotiations but the atmosphere improved after the 3 May summit between U.S. and Japan due, primarily, to a notable change in Fukuda's attitude. On the 20th, Narita International Airport was opened and on the following day, in spite of its being a Sunday, Fukuda invited Sonoda and Abe to his private residence. He was in high spirits and said: "The opening of Narita airport



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is a great event which has taken 10 years to accomplish; the Japan-South Korea continental shelf agreement has been 6 years in the making; the Japan-China treaty could not be accomplished in the times of either Tanaka or Miki." He talked as if the matter was already an accomplished fact, taking Sonoda by complete surprise.

That was the turning point and though a delay occurred due to Han Nianlong's illness and subsequent period of recuperation, the negotiations at an administrative level were reopened on 21 July. But the question is what lead Fukuda to make the decision? Fukuda had been saying that the Japan-U.S. conference was the most important single item on the agenda for the first half of 1978 and the conservative element around him had been insisting that Japan-China came "only after Japan-U.S. had been taken care of." It could be that having undertaken the Japan-U.S. item successfully, he was encouraged to take on this project. Coincidentally, the opening of Narita airport fell on the same day as the inaugural ceremonies for Taiwan's new president Chiang Ching-kuo. In March, Chiang had been elected president; 5 April was the third anniversary of Chiang Kai-shek's passing. Agriculture Minister Nakagawa and the pro-Taiwan members of the diet had been saying that, "The prime minister won't announce any decisions until all the ceremonial events in Taiwan have been carried out." That may have had something to do with the timing, too.

In retrospect, the whole procedure could be termed as being typically Fukuda but up to the point where he actually made a move, the Foreign Ministry had not been aware of his real intent.

There were some foreign service officers like Yosuke Nakae who weren't taken by surprise: "From the time he assumed the post of prime minister," he said, "Mr Fukuda had his mind made up to conclude the treaty. The only hold-up had been to prepare the domestic political atmosphere so that the event could take place in an orderly manner. There wasn't much point in risking turmoil by rushing into it." That may be so but a prime minister who is the final authority in decisions involving foreign countries, cannot be excused for failing to divulge his predetermined intent to at least his foreign minister.

It should be noted, however, that Fukuda's keeping his innermost convictions to himself, prevented Sonoda from making a cheap visit to China and credited him with a display of leadership--in reverse. For Japan which lacked useful strategic intelligence, one could be lead to believe that his tactics turned out to be a weapon in the issue involving China even if it was only a manifestation of Fukuda's nature to dispose of administrative matters at hand one by one in an orderly manner.

"Deng, Ching, Kang" Negotiations

Conversely, [the route taken by Fukuda] pointed up the lack of any diplomatic strategy at Kasumigaseki and of any program leading to reading China's hand. For example, over 7 months elapsed from the time Sonoda began talking

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about visiting China until he actually flew into Peking. During the interim, Sonoda's wishful thinking was reflected in his countless announcements such as "China visit during latter part of January"; "February visit to China"; "Over the head visit to China in March"; "China visit: 10 to 15 April"; "China visit prior to summit conference of developed countries." Although this keeping the auxiliary engine (himself) running until the main engine (Fukuda) catches was a prime Sonoda strategy, it can't be given many points in diplomatic negotiations. Not only the timing but the purpose of the foreign minister's visit to China changed constantly according to the explanations given by Sonoda and the administrative office of the Foreign Ministry.

Then there was the matter of erroneously estimating Han Nianlong, Sonoda's counterpart in his proposed China discussions. The Foreign Ministry had been viewing him as merely a protocol officer; the Chinese counterpart, thought the Foreign Ministry, had to be one who could discuss matters at a high political level or no important issues could be settled. Kasumigaseki's estimate of Han Nianlong was that he was an inflexible and tough foreign service officer."

Vice Minister Han's illness forced a change in the scheduling giving some of Japan's more capable foreign service officers to adjust their estimate of him. A review of his role in issues pertaining to Japan made it clear that he was indeed a very competent foreign service officer. With this revised estimate, it was decided that the administrative level discussions be expedited by curtailing them to one or two meetings and to schedule the foreign minister's visit to China for about the 26th or 27th. A Japan Airlines plane was quietly chartered to carry out this program.

But when confronted with reality, the scenario had to be completely rewritten. Around 1974 when the initial steps in the Japan-China peace and friendship treaty were taken by Vice Minister Togo and Chinese Ambassador Chin, Han's name was tied in with the other two and the proceedings were derisively dubbed the "Ton (Togo)-Chin (Ambassador Chin)-Kan (Han) Negotiations." [Pun refers to a state confusion] Han now made no secret of the fact that he himself wanted to complete the treaty. As an opening gambit, he bluntly tabled China's basic position on "anti-hegemony" and "third party."

Japan's position had been, "First, the problem issues have to be put in order," and with regard to the hegemony problem, "if we carelessly get drawn into this issue too deeply, we will find ourselves on a submerged reef even before the foreign minister arrives."

Since Han had to commute to the meetings from his hospital bed, they were usually convened at 3:00 or 3:30 pm (China time) and each meeting with a long rest period included, lasted only at most 2 hours or so. The atmosphere under such circumstances, was not conducive to smoothly bringing up political issues. Finally, even the foreign office had to revise its

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estimate of Han's influence, realizing that he had direct lines to Liao Chengzhi and even to Deng Xiaoping and could speak with authority equal to even Huang's. Under this revised estimate of the man, the foreign office had to put its thinking on an entirely new track.

Sonoda and Arita had been thinking in terms of having Nakae return home temporarily when the administrative level discussions had borne enough results for the foreign minister to make his China visit as a means of persuading Fukuda to make a decision. But much as the early introduction of political issues was desired, it was estimated that if they were introduced prematurely, unfavorable results would be obtained. Sonoda, of course, was champing at the bit and Sato and Nakae in Peking felt at a loss as to what to do.

On 27 July, when the 5th meeting was to take place, Ambassador Sato requested guidance as to whether Nakae should return to Japan but Sonoda wouldn't affirm the trip. He reasoned: "In the heat of a battle, a commanding officer can't be recalled; he comes home only after he has spent his arrows and broken his sword or has settled the issue to the point where the situation can be turned over to headquarters for final resolution. The judgment as to which category your situation fits must be made in the field."

While the headquarters complained that "insufficient aggressiveness" was being displayed in the negotiations, July came to an end and the 8th meeting took place on 1 August. The summer heat in Peking was exceptional but to Sonoda and Arita and other foreign service officers who had to burn the midnight oil night after night awaiting official communiques during Tokyo's unusual heatwave, this was indeed a "long hot summer."

Frustrated by the lack of any cue for him to go on stage, Sonoda expressed his impatience: "I am getting a feeling that the demarkation line between administrative and political discussions is fading." Knowing how Sonoda was prone to show his emotions, Arita and Takashima tried to make an opening wedge for the "Minister to go on stage." They began to think in terms of breaking off the administrative discussions at a suitable point and to make preparations for him to go to China during the first part of August.

Signs for 8 August Good

For the Japanese conferees, the timing of the changeover to political discussions without antagonizing or hurting the feelings of Han who had professed his desire to see the whole thing through, was the source of headaches. When during a discussion session Sato touched on the potentials of convening "political talks" Han snapped back that "after all I am also a politician and "I am prepared to participate in them" which made matters even more difficult.

On the 5th, Chief of Asia Bureau Nakae finally made the trip home. The Foreign Ministry had had a meeting of the minds on "foreign minister visits

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China on the 8th." Although it was a case of the earlier the better, the calendar signs were not good for the 7th and were for "Great Peace" for the 8th.

During the evening of the 6th, the leadership consisting of Sonoda, Arita, Takashima and Nakae from the Foreign Ministry and Abe and Mori of the official residence staff met with Prime Minister Fukuda at a hotel in Hakone where he was taking a rest. The Foreign Ministry group, particularly Sonoda, was uneasy because they knew that Fukuda hadn't been very favorable to Nakae's coming home.

But Fukuda's first move was to ask Sonoda to meet with him alone and opened the meeting with, "When are you leaving?" This one question took all the wind out of Sonoda's sail; he had been all set to dramatically announce that, "I am willing to sacrifice my post to carry out plenipotentiary responsibilities."

At the meeting of the entire group, after Nakae had made his report, Arita explained that the 8th was chosen because "8-8-78 was 'suehirogari,' a harbinger of good things." [In Japanese character, 8 is shaped like 'suehiro,' a fan.] The group had a good laugh over this. Sonoda was overcome with gratitude to Arita who was first of all a diplomat, for his affectionate reference to "harbinger of good things." The party then returned to Tokyo and by the time it had arrived at the Foreign Ministry, a message from the Chinese, "Welcome to China," had already arrived. Sonoda's eyes were filled with tears of joy.

Thus the fulfillment of his great wish--Sonoda visit to China; signing of the treaty. As icing on the cake, it was reported by the Japanese that, "The Chinese made great concessions." The Foreign Ministry consensus included in which were the opinions of Arita, Takashima, Nakae, and even Tajima, was that China's basic position on "anti-hegemony" was pushed aside and wordings most desired by the Japanese in the treaty's Article II on anti-hegemony and Article IV on the third party issue had been adopted.

Although it had been preordained that the negotiations had to culminate in "both parties being satisfied," Sonoda proudly announced that [the treaty] "cleared up the whole thing including the trunk, the shape of the branches, even to the fullness of the foliage." But was the state of conclusion all it was purported to be and could we allow ourselves to be so optimistic?

It is true that during the final stages of the negotiations, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, Foreign Minister Huang Hua and other Chinese leaders failed to show much vigor. But couldn't that have been because the Chinese had already fully achieved its goal? In the final accounting of the Japan-China negotiations, won't we find that we had been entrapped?

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Final Accounting of Treaty's Debits and Credits

Right off the top, it must be pointed out that the overall accounting has not been correctly portrayed. These negotiations got started with preliminary talks between the two Vice Foreign Ministers Fumiko Togo and Han Nianlong who had come to Japan to sign the maritime agreement. Four years elapsed since then.

In the beginning, Japan never dreamed that the course of navigation would be such a hazardous one; Japan's only purpose for it was the promotion of peace in general, never once thinking that the theme of the negotiations would draw us into the whirlpool of Sino-USSR confrontations. The Chinese had no intention of entering into a window-dressing type of treaty which was neither toxic or medicinal; they were in pursuit of forming a "Unified Anti-USSR Front" and with that foremost in its mind, it wanted to include the anti-hegemony language into the treaty.

Admittedly, there were variances in peripheral circumstances but the difference was between a country whose concept considered the effects on world politics and a "country of political midgets." During the spring of 1975 when the hegemony issue surfaced, the Kremlin became agitated and initiated attacks against the Japan-China treaty. With China reacting strongly to this, the cleavage within Japan among the pro-Chinese, pro-Soviets, treaty hawks and treaty doves deepened markedly.

In April of that year draft proposals of the peace and friendship treaty were exchanged between Japan and China. There were some decisive differences in the basic positions since the Japanese proposal made no reference to the hegemony issue.

The then foreign minister, Miyazawa, and the administrative bureau of the Foreign Ministry explained: "We had no objection to tie in an anti-hegemony stand into a joint statement which clarified the recognition of the then existing world situation and our political posture. But we could not agree to commit the signatory nations to a position which could become untenable in a changed world situation."

Even during Diet hearings, there was no sign of retreating a single step from this stand in this issue. But when the treaty negotiations became stalled, the issue at stake was softened from the original adamancy to arguments over whether anti-hegemony 1) was a general principle; and, 2) would be acceptable as long as it did not commit either party to act jointly. The inconclusive argument over these provisions forced the negotiations to be broken off.

Japan's "Big Concession"

1976 was a year of violent changes for China: Premier Zhou's passing; the Tian An Men incident; Chairman Mao's death; the banishment of "the

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gang of four." On the other side, Japan was in a stormy turmoil over the Lockheed incident and the "Get Miki" movement. Neither party was in any position to take up treaty negotiations. But then the Fukuda government took hold and the Hua Guofeng regime began to take shape and the atmosphere became conducive to thinking about reopening negotiations. From China's viewpoint, the domestic posture had to be re-established and the world's respect it had during the Mao-Zhou era had to be regained to prevent an opening through which the USSR could slip in. The conclusion of a Japan-China treaty could be seen as a step in that direction.

At this point the prime minister made public his stand with his "Clarification of the text of the anti-hegemony article" (General session of the lower house on 3 February 1977). This knocked out the assumption that the starting point of the negotiations would be a hot debate on whether to include the anti-hegemony issue or not and signified a giant concession on the part of Japan.

Regardless of the objective viewpoint on the matter, subjectively, the pendulum had swung from "equidistant from the USSR and China" to strengthened political ties with China. Having made that basic decision, the problem of how to express the anti-hegemony issue and how to handle the third party matter became mere subsidiary problems.

A certain Foreign Ministry leader said at a meeting this spring: "There was no need for Japan to have opposed the inclusion of the anti-hegemony issue even at the time of the Miki cabinet; conversely, every effort should have been made for its inclusion." The statement made the listener wonder if his ears had heard the words correctly. By abandoning the line which it had been following and by contradicting itself to suit the situation, the Foreign Ministry lost all claims for credibility and for having had any basic policy or plan.

Sonoda's action at the reopened negotiations staged in Peking were very flamboyant. He lived up to his reputation for being "a killer at the initial meeting" [a masterful speaker]. "A good treaty," he said, "must be brought to fruition because I cannot return to Japan with my tail between my legs; the only alternative for me would be to disembowel myself in Peking." He spoke in a voice drenched in emotion. This was the scene that got rave notices in the papers which reported that Sonoda had the Chinese female interpreter in tears with sympathy.

It is probably true that Sonoda expounded Japan's stand "very boldly, frankly, and without mincing words" (Takashima's quote). In the final analysis, however, wasn't his act put on in fulfillment of a stage set up by the Chinese? Whether so or not, Sonoda on his return to Japan braggingly described his meetings with Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng wherever he happened to go. He even described how he--to overcome a feeling of restraint while meeting with Deng--stood up and spat into the spittoon located near the chairman's feet when he met with Hua. Maybe

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this was typically Sonoda's aggressive dramatics. But from the viewpoint of Hua and Deng who were looking at Japan-China relations and particularly the effect of the peace and friendship treaty on the big strategy involving the confrontation with the USSR and its own modernization plan, the dramatics could very well have seemed like a child playing games.

In any event, which was the side that made points by concluding the treaty? And what were the demerits?

Putting aside a critique of the proceedings, it would be impossible to discuss all of the pros and cons, the gains and losses here. What can be said, however, is that "This firms the relation between Japan and China" type of congratulatory addresses are premature. It is true that such aims of the treaty as mutual equality are on the positive side and should be made to bear an abundance of fruit but whether the goals are kept alive or are killed depends on how the two countries proceed from this starting point.

For instance, what about the China-USSR Friendship Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty which must affect the Japan-China treaty? That treaty in which Japan is "viewed as an enemy country" was concluded by the People's Republic of China under the leadership of Mao Zedong in 1950, or in the year after the People's Republic was formed. The existence of that instrument was one of the reasons for the formation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (the former "security") during the following year while in the cold war environment.

It was not so long ago that both China and the USSR denounced the Japan-U.S. security pact as being an "incursion of U.S. imperialism into Asia," and was the first step in "the revival of Japanese militarism." But as the China-USSR confrontation deepened the cleavage between the two, the U.S. and China began to close the gap between themselves and following the normalization of Japan-China relations, China began to preach not only the importance but the essentiality of the "Japan-U.S. axis" for the maintenance of security. Simultaneously, Chinese leaders began to proclaim that the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty, "Existed in name but was dead in substance." Next April, China will face the fork in the road and a decision will have to be made whether to extend or rescind it. Rescinding it has been made public as a condition for concluding the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty. So "eternity" now has a history of under 30 years because of changes wrought!

It serves as a reminder that international relations are living things and treaties which are signed in a flurry of happy celebrations can sometimes become a mere scrap of paper in a graveyard. Maybe this is a good time to remind ourselves that the only two friendship treaties signed by Japan prior to the Japan-China treaty--"Japan-Ethiopia Friendship Treaty" and "Japan-Cambodia Friendship Treaty"--have long since become defunct and that the participating countries hardly remember that they had ever existed and also that both of the other parties have undergone revolutions which have left them in a muddled, confused state.

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The question as to which party was more desirous of concluding the treaty is gradually becoming clear; the one that needed it was China and it was China which expedited it. Externally, China's top priority project is, "unification of an anti-USSR front" and domestically it is the "four modernizations." We get the impression that Deng is maneuvering toward achieving these goals without care as to how his actions may appear to the outside.

The main thrust has shifted from "Survival through self effort" to "learn from the experiences of the advanced nations" and under those terms and with eyes focused on 20 or 30 years in the future, China is seeking economic development with the support of Japan, U.S., and Europe. It is natural that Japan should become the central pillar in this program because not only is it closest geographically but has shown miraculous economic and technological growth in the 30 years since the end of the war.

The conclusion of a long term Japan-China trade arrangement which will form the backbone of Japan-China relations, will become a reality next spring. Preparations to implement the program under which Chinese crude oil will be imported for Japanese exports of manufactured goods and technology is being put on track.

The Chinese aim to speed up the tempo of its economic build-up meshes ideally with Japan's efforts to find a way for economic stability while changing over to a low growth era. In mid-September, during his visit to China, Minister of International Trade and Industry [MITI] Komoto agreed on a framework for doubling the trade volume and extended the time limit by 5 years, to 1990 from 1985. There is report to the effect that Deng, during his meeting with Sonoda on 15 August, surprised the latter by stating: "In behalf of modernization and development, China will not reject the possibility of altering its conceptual structure."

Even without the peace and friendship treaty, the relationship between the two countries undoubtedly would have developed in an effective manner. Unlike the relationship among Japan, U.S., and Europe, where frictions are notable, between Japan and China there should be a mutually complementary economy for the foreseeable future. On this basis alone, it is probable that there would be a naturally intermingled economic flow between the two neighboring countries.

China was obviously chasing two rabbits: Stabilization of Japan-China relations and the expansion of the anti-USSR front. The truth of the matter seems to be that the Chinese can be smug in the knowledge that they now have both rabbits in the bag.

Deng, with reference to the Soviet's opposition to the peace and friendship, denounced the USSR: "That's because they fear the anti-hegemony principle. The treaty puts a crimp in its expansion policy and puts them in an unfavorable position to launch a sudden aggressive war. In this



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light, the treaty (Japan-China) is not merely a two-country issue but has major worldwide ramifications."

The Japan treaty is the first treaty signed by China in 13 years and under the "Three World Concept" it is the first to be signed with the second world in its 49-year history and it seems permissible to think that additional importance can be attached to it in that it is the first treaty which contains reference to anti-hegemony.

The National Peoples Representative Convention held in March drew up a "New Constitution, 1978." Its cornerstone is the concept of anti-USSR. In implementation of that doctrine, vigorous activity has been directed at Africa, Europe, and Asia. These actions can be seen as part of an effort to roll back the USSR's taking advantage of China's break with Albania and separation from Vietnam. In May, presidential adviser Brzezinski who is known for his tough attitude toward the USSR, while on a tour of China said at the welcome banquet given by Foreign Minister Huang Hua, that he sympathized with and approved "China's decision on anti-hegemony." And he added: "A strong and stable China benefits the U.S. and China can benefit from a mighty and self-confident U.S. which has worldwide concerns."

In response, Foreign Minister Huang vigorously denounced "social imperialism (USSR)." Although there was no definitive progress toward normalization, the mutuality of benefits and losses of the two countries' strategy involving the USSR were bluntly expressed.

Sonoda queried Brzezinski who stopped off in Japan on his return trip from China, of the U.S. policy pertaining to the USSR and Brzezinski's personal views of the USSR. To justify his inquisitiveness, Sonoda explained: "There is a difference between U.S.' USSR policy which has worldwide implications and Japan's which revolve around local issues but unless we are familiar with the U.S. point of view, Japan's policy with reference to the USSR cannot be made firm."

Brzezinski's trip to the Far East revealed, like it or not, that the Japan-China treaty had an effect even within the framework of the dynamic U.S.-China world strategy. Was it just a distortion of fact that Japanese diplomacy which lacks any firm strategy appeared to be a flower of the poppy? Japan doesn't have the strength to intervene in or interfere with any power plays of the U.S., China, or the USSR and needless to say, it could not even attempt to hold the reins of China-Soviet relations. But leaving objective intentions aside, shouldn't Japan's Foreign Ministry proceed with a foreign relations program without blinders to block out the sight of turbulent seas swirling around the periphery of the Japan-China treaty?

Without dragging in a country such as Vietnam which expresses concern over the formation of a "Japan-U.S.-China alliance," the majority which has evaluated the side effects of the peace and friendship treaty and who feel

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that Japan got most of what it asked for--even such thinking people see in it "Japan-U.S.-China trade cooperation" as the ultimate net result.

Two days after the Japan-China treaty was signed, Chairman Hua Guofeng departed on a tour of three of the USSR's neighboring countries, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran. It was obvious that it was a positive approach to USSR neighbors after the establishment of firm footing gained through the peace and friendship treaty. Instead of insisting that the treaty "affects only two countries, Japan and China," can't the Foreign Ministry straightforwardly state that "it has international ramifications"?

The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR of the U.S. states that the Japan-China treaty is the instrument which pushed Japan into an "anti-USSR axis"; the French paper FIGARO says that the conclusion of that treaty is "without question a great success story for Chinese diplomacy"; the TIMES of the U.K. heard, "shouts of delight in China." Closing one's ears and eyes to such truths and trying to get by with rationalizations cannot but result in deceiving our people.

Is There a Future for Foreign Service Officers?

Possibly we have judged the current treaty conclusion proceedings too harshly. But the fact is that in the entire course of negotiations, it is difficult to find even a single imprint of a foreign service officer's handiwork. Under the parliamentary system of government, the Foreign Ministry is the specified organ which is charged with the responsibility for carrying out foreign policies as determined by the political party cabinet. The U.S. Department of State has for some time, branded Japan's as "a do nothing diplomacy" and in fact, that criticism should be applied not only to the foreign service officers but to the political figures above them such as the prime minister and the foreign minister.

To be able to maintain continuity through changes in political leaderships and reorganizations, the broadest possible source of intelligence and a facility to select the best possible intelligence should be made available to the Foreign Ministry so that credibility abroad can be sustained. That is the function of the Foreign Ministry and only the foreign service officers can fulfill the role. For that purpose, they must not only have the capability to satisfactorily explain Japan's position abroad but be given the machinery and power to clarify its intentions to the people to merit their confidence.

Last summer Prime Minister Fukuda toured ASEAN and proclaimed "The Three Southeast Asia Principles." (Manila proclamation) Commenting on this, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Mansfield said: "This is the first diplomatic initiative assumed by Japan since the war's end." He went on to say, "1978 will mark the year that Japan made preparations to step onto the stage of world politics."

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Undoubtedly there are rules of protocol and a country which is enviously in the black economically is burdened with fears of reprisals; but Japan's diplomacy can no longer just drift along with the tide and atmosphere of its periphery. Japan as one of the greats in economics is becoming the center of ever growing requests for economic and technological assistance from the outside world and the opportunities for making contributions are on the increase for the foreseeable future. If Kasumigaseki were capable of coping with such requests we would indeed be happy but in its current state, we cannot cleanse ourselves of deep misgivings.

"The Three Evils" of Foreign Service

The days we could dream about getting results if all goes well have long gone. A Japan standing firmly with Japan-U.S. in the background, with Japan-China and Japan-EC as its legs, with diplomatic relations with the Middle East and ASEAN as its arms--that is how Sonoda says he envisions Japan's diplomacy. But does the current foreign service have a foreign relations plan for Japan, so poor in natural resources, to live and grow into the 80's? A West German journalist made the following observation: "Options cannot be in limitless supply in foreign relations but the Japanese seem to be under the impression that they are." It is true that the international environment, the internal strength, and the domestic situation all contribute to making the options to choose from very narrow in scope.

Diplomacy is founded on compromise. Foreign service officers are apt to complain that, "although conditions which surround diplomacy cannot be divided into black and white, (the people, the media, and the politicians) are too impatient in their demand for final settlements." Since it is normal for dissatisfaction to be expressed whenever a goodly portion of one's demands are not accepted, maybe the Foreign Ministry is doomed to be under constant criticism.

It is for that very reason that we look for foreign service officers to have the power of persuasion over the people and to make efforts to get the people's support for those things which are in their interest.

Sonoda frequently makes reference to what he calls "The Three Evils of Foreign Service Officers" and he characterizes them as being "hateful toward the USSR, do whatever the U.S. tells them to and to South Korea they are mean and sneaky." Such generalizations probably aren't limited to the USSR, U.S., and South Korea; the foreign service officer who falls back on reminiscing about the old country which is a thing of the past or indulges in self-serving actions has no place in this era of people's diplomacy.

Foreign service officers are generally categorized as being unskilled at coping with parliament or at getting along with politicians. But if "diplomacy is the extension of domestic politics," how can a foreign service officer conduct his diplomatic duties in isolation of political

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parties, politicians, and the legislative body? In recent years, the Foreign Ministry is finally getting around to thinking about intraministerial improvements and has set up an organ named the "Capability Enhancement Office" in an effort to improve its image. On assuming the post of vice foreign minister a decade or so ago, Takezo Shimoda (formerly a supreme court judge) said, "I would like to solidify domestic politics and diplomacy. One can't be in foreign service without being familiar with his country's politics and people's thinking." Based on that concept, the structural reinforcement now being contemplated can be faulted only with being rather belated.

There has long been many among foreign service officers who have advocated restructuring the Foreign Ministry and pointing out specific deficiencies in posture and policies of its personnel. The points have been argued at some length in the past so we will not belabor them here.

The late Hachiro Arita, father of the current vice minister, spearheaded a group of foreign service officers in the Taisho era in forming the "Gaimusho Kakushin Doshikai" [Society to Makeover the Foreign Ministry]. It raised its voice in behalf of 1) Open the Foreign Ministry to the general public to allow the influx of qualified personnel from the outside as a means of building for the future; 2) Fulfill the aim of strengthening its foundation by offering more language training and deepen the understanding of international situations; 3) Fulfill the need for intelligence and propaganda activities and make it capable of coping with changing international situations and obtain budgetary requirements (Appropriations) to achieve these goals.

Aren't those aims and concepts as applicable today as they were when they were voiced? The only difference is that currently there aren't any foreign service officers qualified to even participate in such a movement.

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Defense Agency Discards Kurisu

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Nov 78 pp 196-211

[Article by Sakae Kashiwagi: "Analyzing Organizational Impotency Even With Constitutional Amendment Enabling Action in Emergency"]

[Text] Ununified Double Structure

Triggered by the resignation of Chairman Kurisu of the Joint Staff Council, there has recently been a wealth of conversation pieces involving the defense agency and the self defense force: Legislative measures to cope with an emergency; direct retaliation to surprise attacks; low level flight of maritime self defense force aircraft; a crash in populated area. Having experienced these various "incidents" we began to wonder what the status of the defense agency and self defense force is. We couldn't help

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but wonder whether they were beginning to show arrogance and laxness in discipline.

The self defense force has a history of 28 years since it was founded in August 1950 as the national police reserve force. It has been 24 years since the defense agency was founded. In both instances, they are in their third decade and we decided to make an investigation with emphasis on the status in general and the concepts under which they operate.

The defense agency's predecessor, police reserves, was founded by drawing together personnel from other elements but its nucleus was persons having had Home Ministry and police background because this was not to be a military force but a police reserve force.

The first reserve force commandant was Keikichi Masuhara (currently a representative in the upper house) who was then governor of Kagawa prefecture the selection of which had been changed from bureaucratic selection to open election. As governor, he had gone to Tokyo to present a concept paper on a Combined Shikoku Development Plan. While on this mission he was tapped to become the first commandant. Keizo Hayashi (currently president of Japan Red Cross) was named chief inspector (currently called chief of ground staff office). So practically all of the leaders had Home Ministry backgrounds and this trend has continued. A listing of administrative deputy chiefs--Muneo Toga, Hisashi Imai, Yoza Kato, Yoshio Mitsuwa, Rin Utsumi, Yutaka Shimada, Takuya Kubo, Ko Maruyama (current administrative vice chief)--shows that they all have had Home Ministry, police backgrounds.

Leaders in uniform were, in the beginning, Home Ministry people but from about 1954, former army and navy men began to assume the posts and since then, with one or two exceptions, they have all had military background. Traditionally, former military people and the police have been at odds and friction between the uniformed personnel and the internal bureaucracy can be traced to these scar tissues.

The hold that the bureaucracy had on the main structure of the police is apparently becoming shaky; in 1974, Kazumasa Tashiro became the first vice chief to have had a Finance Ministry background and vice chief Maruyama's successor is scheduled to be Akira Watari (currently chief of defense facilities agency) also with a Finance Ministry background. Toru Hara (currently chief of the bureau of accounts) also a Finance Ministry man, will probably become a vice chief via the post of defense bureau chief.

Some comments are being made to the effect that "it should reach the time when people nurtured in the defense agency can take over the leadership." But there is still 5 or 6 years before those whose careers have been limited to the defense agency to mature sufficiently to assume the near top posts. There are a number of reasons for this: Recruiting key management candidates (through promotion examinations) from within the

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defense agency did not get underway until Japan fiscal year [JFY] 1955; moreover, there were only from two to possibly five or six qualified candidates selected to take the examination with, on occasions, only one candidate successfully passing it. The top position held by anyone who has come up through this route is now a defense councillor (between a bureau and section chief in the pecking order). Of those who were recruited in this manner before 1961 are now section chiefs and those prior to 1964 are section chiefs of auxiliary organs. For these persons to reach the posts of bureau chief or vice chiefs will take 5 or 6 more years. That is reason number one.

Among those who are categorized as having been nurtured in the defense agency, there are those who first served in other ministries or agencies. Of these people, some are already serving in such key posts as chief of procurement headquarters and as defense bureau chiefs. But there is little chance that they will achieve the status of vice chief.

The bureaucracy within the defense agency is structured to have the Finance Ministry delegate to it, its chief of bureau of accounts, MITI its facilities bureau chief, the Foreign Ministry its councillor for international affairs, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare its bureau of medicine chief. In these bureaus, most of the section chiefs are also on loan from those various ministries. It can be seen that the civilian contingent in this structure, is a loose conglomerate and since most of those who are serving at the agency still have strings which tie them to their parent organization, it is difficult to get an honest, independent consensus with the agency.

The nature of the main stream of those in uniform is also undergoing changes; looking at the educational background of the self defense force's managerial class and dividing them into highest educational level completed--college, junior college, higher school [prep] (including the former undergraduate professional schools), middle school [high school], former military academies, and defense college--in 1968 the proportions were: college, 23.1 percent; junior college, 11.5 percent; higher school, 25.6 percent; middle school, 15.2 percent; former military academies, 11 percent; Defense College, 13.6 percent. The breakdown in JFY 77 was college, 23.4 percent; junior college, 4.8 percent; higher school, 33.6 percent; middle school, 15.8 percent; former military academies, 2.2 percent; Defense College, 20.3 percent.

Notable in these figures is the drop to a mere 2.2 percent from 11 percent for those who had graduated from the former military academies and the increase in Defense College graduates from 13.6 to 20.3 percent. Initial graduates from the Defense College have now reached the rank of field grade and it will not be long before they will be up for general grade selection. In other words, the majority of self defense force officers are shifting from former academy men to Defense College graduates and in another 4 or 5 years the last vestige of former academy men will have vanished.

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How do these disappearing "senior" officers view the current crop of self defense officers? With regard to the relations between the uniformed and the bureaucratic civilians in the agency, a certain former senior officer says, "The uniformed groups is an 'oppressed race!'" He further comments: "In my day, we fought with our bureaucratic civilian compatriots but with it there was an underlying friendship between us. Things seem to be different now. There seems to be a gradual diminution of that deep-rooted friendship. In the old days there were occasions when a bureaucrat would come to the staff office to study for a year or two before returning to his post. This doesn't happen any more so the opportunity to establish friendships at that level has been lessened. Moreover, we in uniform used to believe that we were in the driver's seat as specialists which gave us confidence in ourselves. Recently, the officers are young and since they become attached to staff work and exposed to budgets and defense plans, they become administrative officers. They don't have that military bearing--and I refer to that in its favorable aspect--that they used to have."

Old time civilians' reactions affirmed these comments. "The uniformed people we dealt with in the old days were all people with combat experience. They were people who were well aware that they must not reveal any of the unsavory traits attributed to the old military and we mutually respected our restraints. So though we may have had our confrontations and differences at work, we were able to get along well socially as individuals. Although there is contact between civilians and uniformed persons now, differences in fundamental social concepts have made easy relations between them more difficult. I suppose it is just another sign of the times."

In recent times, one often hears that, "The defense agency has lost its sense of dedication." If it has, one of the reasons for it is the fact that enthusiasm generated by the task of shaping the new self defense force and defense agency gradually waned as most of the construction work was completed and those efforts were converted to the less exciting daily maintenance and operation duties. We wonder if this apparently weakening sense of dedication is taking its toll in esprit de corps. The situation is similar to the difference between the exciting phase of laying tracks for a new railroad line and the routine of running trains on them when that phase is completed. In mentioning this analogy, one is reminded that there seems to have been an unusually high incidence of mishaps on the super express lines recently; when one realizes that the self defense force and defense agency has only one goal--that of being prepared for the completely unexpected event--we can understand how easily it could fall victim to boredom of passing what must seem like an interminable number of uneventful days. It is an eventuality we do not like to contemplate.

Salariedmen: Army

Is the self defense force a military organization? This has been an issue which has been argued pro and con ever since it was formed. The traditional tone of the LDP government on this issue is as follows: "The self

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defense force has the duty of coping with an invasion by a foreign country. If such an entity is a military force, then the self defense force is a military force. But Chapter II, Article 9 of the constitution stipulates that it cannot engage the nation in combat without authorization. So though it is an instrument of self defense, it does not have the authority to exercise that capability. It is not given the authority of court martial nor does it have special military laws given to ordinary military entities. In this aspect at least, it differs from the usual military entity."

We do not intend here to rehash the rather pointless arguments as to whether the self defense force is a military entity or not. According to the government's definition, the self defense force is an extraordinary military entity. But in the general sense, it could be viewed as a military force. If it is an extraordinary military entity it is not because it doesn't have court martial rights; we would agree to its being an unusual military force if it were to be defined as being a salaryman army.

The joyride flight taken by the maritime self defense force plane during the night of 7 September illustrates the "salarymen force" aspect. On an impulse, the 27 year old 1st lieutenant who was at the controls decided to take a look at Tokyo. No doubt the beauty of Tokyo's night lights and, being a baseball fan, seeing the ballparks from the air thrilled him and the two other crew members. We can well understand his feelings--something like the salaryman who takes a break to go to the movies or to a sports arena. But we can't have the self defense force emulating a simple salaried clerk. Why? Because in this specific incident, the flight was being made without running lights with the inherent danger of crashing and because it was done in clear violation of training orders. In the old days, the aircraft commander would undoubtedly have been subjected to a trial by a military court. In this incident, however, he was arrested for violating the laws of air navigation; within the unit to which he was attached, he was suspended from his duties for 35 days and the commander and others in responsible positions were either reprimanded or received warnings. The penalties meted out were fairly severe for these days.

There was an earlier incident: A pilot while on a training flight suddenly felt an urge to make a flying visit to his home town and ended up crashing. Although such incidents which occasionally occur do not really earn the self defense force the label of "salarymen force" in themselves, they do contribute to it. The self defense force differs from the military of old in both nature and scope; it makes no incursions into politics and is a force which exists for the sole purpose of being prepared for a hostile invasion.

In about 1964, the then chief of the defense agency ordered that all self defense force personnel be in uniform when commuting to or from his duty station. All those in the staff office who were division chiefs or above were provided limousine transportation to commute and they were in uniform.



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Their subordinates, however, had to travel by bus or streetcar and they habitually wore civilian clothes and changed into uniform on arrival at their offices and changed back to civilian clothes to make the trip home.

"To maintain the pride of being a self defense officer even while commuting," it was ordered, "wear the uniform while in transit." The order was respected while he was in office but after his departure, the commuters gradually resumed wearing civvies until today almost all have gone back to wearing regular street clothes.

When queried, a self defense man replied: "In the rain, if we are in uniform, we can only wear a raincoat and may not use an umbrella. People around us don't like it when we get on a crowded public transportation vehicle all wet." We get the impression that the arrogance displayed by the old military men on street cars is missing and we must admit that we favor the restraints shown by the current defense people. In West Germany, the slogan for military personnel is "civilians in uniform" with the implication that they are civilians before they don their uniforms and that they have the basic rights of freedom to meet, to form groups, and of speech that all citizens have even while serving in the military. We would like to have this principle of their being a citizen first applied to the members of our self defense force too.

The pay scale for Self Defense Force [SDF] officers is a level above the pay for general government employees for the reason that danger is inherent to the occupation. General grade officers are paid 354,000 to 788,000 yen a month; field grade from 258,000 to 361,000; and the classical "flowers" or company grade from 135,000 to 271,000. The bureau chiefs in the bureaucracy receives from 276,000 to 420,000 per month so though his treatment and privileges equate to those of the general grade officer, his actual pay equates to the general officer candidate grade. From this it can be seen that the uniform is given some favorable considerations.

The director general of the Defense Agency has traditionally ordered that, "The SDF will be strong in spirit" but Director General Kanemaru went a step further and directed, "Be an SDF that instills fear." It is not clear what an SDF which is feared describes but it is a fact that the SDF--generally labeled "the salaryman force"--has not even reached the point of being combat ready. Some years ago, a seagoing tanker named the Yuyo Maru went aground and it was decided that it would be towed out to sea and sunk by torpedoes. Then it was found that no direct line torpedoes were available at Yokosuka and the target practice had to be postponed until the appropriate weapons were delivered to the scene all the way from Kure!

A similar situation exists with the Air SDF's air-to-air missiles. There may be some merit to the explanation that, "Those situations exist only because it is peacetime; should an incident occur, we will assume an immediate reaction posture." But the point of the issue is not in facilities and hardware but in the training and spirit of readiness in normal times.

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There is ample evidence to endorse the suspicion that the salaryman attitude has so permeated the force that it will be ineffective in time of need.

We had an opportunity to observe a SAC test at Guam. An observation plane from Tachikawa flew into Anderson airbase on Guam without warning and disgorged inspectors of general grades who scattered to pilots' briefing rooms and other key posts to conduct tests on the spot. All pilots who failed to pass the tests were ordered home.

In comparison, the SDF's inspections are mere formalities and almost ceremonial in nature. Inspection notices are issued in advance giving ample time to prepare for it; in most instances only prearranged locations are inspected. Director General Sadanori Yamanaka once made a surprise inspection by automobile and was soundly criticized by the uniformed officers on the grounds that "it wasn't nice to have the director general come on a tour without warning." Has the force become accustomed to being a salaryman army?

Big Ship, Big Gun Principle

It is a well known fact that the big ship, big gun advocates were in the majority in the pre-war era. It is also generally accepted that that led to the construction of the world's largest 69,000 ton Yamato and Musashi which were armed with 55-cm guns.

The postwar Maritime SDF does not, of course, have either big ships or big guns; its biggest vessel is the 4700 ton Haruna-class equipped with 5-inch guns. We cannot guarantee, however, that there is no trend toward the big ship, big gun principle. The Maritime SDF once programmed an 8,000 ton helicopter equipped escort vessel but it was scrapped in favor of building two 4,000 ton helicopter equipped escort vessels on the grounds that damage could disperse more broadly where there were two vessels instead of one.

The Air SDF will shortly be armed with 100 F-15's classed as the best and most modern of jet fighters at a cost of 7.5 billion yen each. Appropriation for E2C early warning aircraft has also been requested. In comparison with the first jet fighters obtained by the Air SDF at 110 million per plane, the cost of the F-15 has increased 68-fold!

We can understand the uniformed element's desire to procure the best available in the world's arsenal of weapons so that the defense posture can be maintained most effectively. But the constitution stipulates that our defense potentials must be kept to the essential minimum and the LDP government has held defense costs to under 1 percent of the gross national product. A broad interpretation of security guarantees, it should not be essential that we have the best and the most expensive weapons in the world in our arsenal.

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Recently, relative to the security guarantees issue, the concept of crisis management has been attracting attention. The salient points of crisis management are: 1) Crisis prevention measures; 2) Emergency measures to cope with a crisis should one arise; 3) Measures to cope with a situation which has no easy solution. Insofar as they pertain to Japan, we wonder whether we shouldn't concentrate on "crises prevention measures" as the means of assuring our security.

Magic Words

The mechanism with which the independent action of the military is kept under wraps and politics given authority over military affairs is civilian control. At the time the SDF was created, the Japanese could not swallow the concept of the U.S. type civilian control and Colonel Kowalsky of the GHQ wrote that he had a hard time selling it to Director General Masuhara and his subordinates.

We are under the impression that the "American style civilian control" is not completely understood even in its home grounds, the U.S. In 1949 a big reorganization of the national defense establishment was undertaken. At that time Ferdinand Eberstaadt who participated in a managerial capacity in the national defense committee of the Hoover Commission, said in a speech at the Naval Academy at a later date, "Civilian control is a sort of a mythical expression.... Nobody knows what it means." It is ironic that he who had made the greatest effort in establishing civilian control throughout all of the military structure and was the one person more than any other who should have known the definition of civilian control, was the one who made that admission. It is not unreasonable, therefore, that its meaning eluded those who were involved at the time the SDF was founded. We cannot say that even today its meaning is fully understood in Japan.

Although the expression, civilian control, is tossed around freely as if everybody knew what it meant, it is yet to be firmly defined. In a paper authored by Lincoln and Jordan who were instructors at the Military Academy at West Point in the U.S., it was stated that, "all people bow their heads in respect (to civilian control) but it is a holy cow that has never been clearly defined." The following premises that were set forth by Louis Smith in his "The Strength of American Democracy" are, however, accepted by most scholars:

- 1) The head of the state is a civilian and represents the majority of the people; he is responsible to the people and may be unseated through existing legal or political channels;
- 2) The commander of the military forces who is a professional military man, is under the command of a civilian politician;
- 3) Military related organs and hence operations conducted by military personnel are under the direction of authorized civilians who will coordinate military related plans at all stages; the civilians so authorized shall be members of the responsible executive branch;

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4) The representatives elected by the people (members of Congress) shall determine the state of war, the allocation of funds to achieve military objectives (appropriations), human resources required and general measures to be taken under emergency situations and maintain specific and general control over those who are to be held responsible for implementation (legislative control);

5) The judiciary is in a position to authorize the military to assume responsibility for the protection of an individual's basic rights guaranteed him under the democracy (judiciary control).

The basis for civilian control as described by Louis Smith is being fulfilled by law in Japan at the present time. Chapter V of Article 66 of the constitution states: "The prime minister and other ministers of state must be civilians." And the authority for supreme commander of the SDF rests in the prime minister representing the cabinet (Article 7 of Self Defense Force Regulations) and that the prime minister is a civilian. The defense agency is subordinate to the cabinet and its chief commands the SDF under the direction of the prime minister (Article 8 of SDF Regulations). The director general of the Defense Agency is a minister of the national government and is a civilian.

Additionally, the following assures functions to be under civilian control:

The office of Parliamentary Vice Minister of the Defense Agency is filled by a member of the Diet and is a civilian. His major duty is to keep the director general advised on political matters; the post of the agency's administrative vice minister is assigned to a civilian official of the defense agency; he is responsible for administrative matters of the Defense Agency and is in an advisory capacity to assist the director-general's command authority over the SDF.

The offices of Counsellor and of the Internal Bureaus are under civilian control and even those who are outside of the agency but have duties pertaining to it such as the National Defense Council and the Finance Ministry which has a check on budgetary matters, all come under civilian control.

In the final analysis, however, the ultimate in civilian control is the Diet which is the organ which controls the make-up of the cabinet. To legislate on defense matters and defense appropriations, it has the authority of oversight and decision making. It also controls the cabinet in establishing basic defense policies.

In such diverse ways, the SDF is under civilian control in both theory and law. Effective implementation, however, is the issue.

There have been occasional incidents where civilian control has been violated. The most recent of these was the statement made by former Chairman

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of Joint Staff Council Kurisu: "In the event of a surprise attack," said Kurisu, "the SDF may take actions which supercede the law." On the grounds that this infringed on the civilian control issue, the Chairman was relieved of his duties. Other examples of violations include the Mitsuya Plan issue of 1965; evacuation of the Tachikawa issue of 1972; the issue involving the transporting of material to Okinawa which arose in the same year; and the matter of assuming prior rights to appropriations for the Fourth Defense Plan.

Reviewing this series of incidents having pertinence to nonconformity with civilian control, most were taken up by the Diet and could be used as evidence that civilian control is functioning effectively. They do point up doubt as to whether it is being effectively applied by the director general of the Defense Agency within his agency and whether the prime minister is executing the authority given him in a proper manner.

Tenure of Director General of Defense Agency

There could be several reasons for the failure of the director general of the Defense Agency to fully implement the control. One is that his tenure in office is too short for him to fully grasp the concept. We believe that this point is well taken.

Counting from Keikichi Masuhara (who was then given the title of Chief of the Police Reserve Force) in 1950 when the present SDF was founded, the current incumbent, Shin Kanemaru, is the 34th director general. In other words, there have been 34 chiefs in 28 years, making the average time in office of about 9 and a half months. This is an astounding figure.

When a new man takes office, the vice ministers and various bureau chiefs brief him on their respective duties. Of course, this is normal procedure in not only the Defense Agency but in all governmental ministries and agencies. But these briefings preempt the entire day for about a month. Even then, there is no way that all he should know about the agency can be crammed into the newcomers head in that period of time, particularly if he has had no experience or knowledge of matters pertaining to the Defense Agency. With this in mind, the briefers try to give him a broad brush picture at first and get into more details at a later date. The briefing elements are apt to consume considerable time since they are anxious to give as much information about their functions as possible.

Specialized language or jargon is inherent in matters pertaining to the military or defense. This cause for the ordinary person to say, "I just can't understand military matters" is frequently due to this language barrier. When Naoki Nishimura became director general, he heard the expression MAP frequently in the briefings. He had assumed that the briefers were referring to maps of a geographical nature and it wasn't until considerable time had elapsed that he was made aware of the fact that it referred to the U.S.'s military assistance plan!

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When such things are taken into consideration, the amount of time the new man devotes to studying becomes a factor. Of all those who have held the post, Sadanori Yamanaka probably put in more time studying than any other. Not only was he a diligent student at the office but he devoted much of his time at home trying to absorb defense regulations and other reference material making it possible for him to master the basic knowledge in a comparatively short period.

The later Director General Sensuke Fujieda remains in our memory as a person who grasped the business in a short time to the point where he could ably respond to questions at Diet hearings. Handing him the subject material for a hearing was sufficient for him to bone up on it and do an admirable job to an assemblage which was attended by few if any persons from the electorate. He was, to his office, an "excellent student boss."

Most, however, took a long time to learn their job and at hearings the usual response was "I haven't been on the job very long and will have a government's expert on the subject respond to you." There have been occasions when important matters were under discussion, an exasperated opposition member would protest that, "We can't permit a situation in which the cognizant minister is unable to have answers!"

Among the 34 who have held the post, there have been some repeaters. Keikichi Masuhara served three times and Naoki Nishimura and Naosumi Ezaki have each served twice. But repetitive service does not necessarily make the person a veteran; Keikichi Nishimura had to resign over the incident involving the collision of an All Japan Airlines plane and an SDF aircraft and he was guilty of making a misstatement; Naoki Nishimura had to step down because of a foot-in-mouth incident.

It normally takes about a year for a person to learn the rudiments of the duties of the director general. Needless to say, 9 and a half months is much too short a term even from learning only the concept of civilian control. A 3 year term should be the minimum. It is reported that former Prime Minister Tanaka envisioned the nurturing experienced director generals by forming a pool of two or three men with good potentials and have them assume the post of a rotating basis. This may be a way to fulfill the need for experience but wouldn't the application of the U.S. system in which a civilian is assigned to the post for a period of 4 or 5 years be a daring but good alternative plan?

Intra-Agency Internship

Civilian control is enhanced by those who assist the director general including the administrative vice minister and the bureau chiefs of the Defense Agency, the chiefs of staff of ground, maritime, and air SDFs, the chairman of joint staff council and others. On reviewing the various deficiencies of the past, a number of them can be traced to the areas listed above.

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We have already mentioned that the offices and bureaus in the Defense Agency frequently have overlapping or duplicative functions. Many of those who come to the Agency from the police or other ministries and agencies, step right into bureau chief posts. Possibly these people could learn the functions of their new jobs if given 2 or 3 years but in experience, they cannot compete with the career men in the Agency. Any person who is to assume the post of administrative vice minister should be moved up from the Agency's Defense Bureau because the area of that bureau's cognizance includes the following making it the most important one in the Agency: 1) Matters pertaining to the basics and adjustments of defense and protection; 2) Matters pertaining to the basic movements of the SDF; 3) Matters pertaining to the basic structure, complement, organization, equipment, and disposition of the ground, maritime, and air SDF's; 4) Matters pertaining to the procurement and collation of reference and intelligence materials; 5) Matters pertaining to the basics of training of the SDF.

Responsibility for such major functions as the procurement of both domestic and foreign military intelligence and SDF planning and training is concentrated in that bureau. Familiarity with most of the essentials of the Defense Agency therefore becomes inherent to the function of the chief of the Defense Bureau. We cannot but feel that a person who tries to function as the administrative vice minister without having been chief of the Defense Bureau will lack confidence in this major area at least.

Another misgiving we harbor is in the educational and nurturing aspect of the managerial personnel. The executive class people are shown respect because they are assigned considerable responsibilities and authorities. Upon graduating from college, they had to pass upper grade examinations and, if picked up by the Defense Agency, spend a year's internship. During this period of internship, they were assigned bookkeeping and reference material collection tasks--literally, a period of on-the-job training--but once they had completed this term of servitude, they were assigned to a working post. For example, in the Defense Section of the Defense Bureau, one may be paired with a senior member to supervise one of the ground, maritime or air subsections. His duties will include checking and collating plans and appropriations drafted by the responsible staff office. The person who prepared the drafts is usually a person of more experience who is probably a first or second field grade officer. This officer will ask the new man to come to his desk where the subject at hand will be explained to him so it must be said that the greenhorn is being handed considerable authority right from the start.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that this procedure which has been in effect since the inception of the Defense Agency, arouses a certain degree of antagonism in the civilian toward the uniformed men. But how can this pattern be revised? In other ministries and agencies, even the key executives in the National Railways for instance, started out as ticket sellers and train conductors for the reason that the future executive should be familiar with the work-a-day man's problems.

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We are of the opinion that this practice should be applied to the Defense Agency. We believe that the executive candidate should start his career with a year or two's experience in the defense forces or in the staff offices as part of his nurturing process.

Until about 1965, night watches in the Defense Agency offices were assumed solely by uniformed personnel. But because there was a feeling that the civilians should be trained to cope with all problems on a 24-hour basis two young career men were assigned those watches on a rotating basis. This, too, should be looked on as part of the careermen's education.

Reformation of National Defense Council

The National Defense Council plays a major role in effecting civilian control because when the prime minister is confronted with a need to obtain a consensus of the people, there are many important cases in which the National Defense Council's compliance becomes essential.

The National Defense Council is composed of the prime minister, the foreign minister, finance minister, director general of defense agency, and the director general of the economic planning agency. We have referred to the importance of the National Defense Council several times but we cannot state that it has fulfilled its role to maximum effectiveness. We say this because for one thing, it has met on an average of only two or three times a year. Though we realize that the members carry a heavy schedule making it difficult for them to find the time, but conversely, it would seem to indicate that they do not attach the merited priority to those meetings.

Unfortunately, the Council seems to limit itself to approving measures introduced by the prime minister and concerns itself almost exclusively to matters pertaining to the Defense Agency. The Council should be a body which addresses itself to broad issues and to coordinating various security measures rather than confine itself to Defense Agency related matters.

The National Defense Council has an administrative bureau in which counsellors from the various ministries serve in subordination to the bureau's chief. They are there for the purpose of adjusting differences which arise among the ministries and agencies. Though that is the nominal function, in reality, their duties seem to be limited to acting as channels through which information from their parent ministry is requested and procured. The counsellors do not seem to exercise their authority to effect any adjustments or changes in their parent ministries.

Should the National Defense Council be restructured and if so, how? The majority opinion indicated that it should be molded in the shape of the U.S.'s National Security Council. The majority opinion prevailed and starting with the U.S. style civilian control concept, Japan has copied the U.S. in the formation of the compact National Defense Council.



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In about 1953 the Kaishin Party took on the Security Agency--the forerunner of the Defense Agency--which was controlled by the former Home Ministry, and advocated the establishment of something akin to the U.S.'s National Security Council which includes people with civilian background. It is reported that the behind the scene supporter of this concept was the Hattori group composed of men of the old army and headed by Colonel Hattori. The Liberal Party, though claiming that there was no real need for any kind of an organization, did not object to the formation of a small compact unit. In the original National Defense Council plan, the group was to include some knowledgeable persons from civilian ranks. This portion of the proposal was deleted by an amendment in the Diet. Since then there have been several attempts made by members of the Democratic Socialist Party and others, to include civilians but they have been argued down on the grounds of security risks and for the reason that the Cabinet should be held responsible for national policy.

The National Security Council in the U.S. operates under the National Security Act as amended in 1947 and in 1949. Its regular members are the president, vice president, the secretary of state and the secretary of defense. As advisors to those four, the director of central intelligence and the chief of the joint chiefs of staff attend as assigned members and the aide to the president (currently Brzezinski) and the presidential secretary (currently David Marlin) also participate.

The National Security Council assists the president to coordinate domestic, foreign, and military policies for smooth implementation of military and other executive functions to guarantee national security. More definitively, it has the following duties as directed by the president:

- 1) Evaluates and estimates the current military strength--both overt and covert--of the U.S. to assist or warn the president on objectives, official international arrangements, and of risks and changes involved.
- 2) Analyze national security policy matters which may pertain commonly to more than one of the various departments and agencies and advise the president of the overlapping factors.
- 3) Report to or advise the president on his special request or even without his request on items deemed appropriate.

Compared to our National Defense Council, the structure of the National Security Council is considerably larger. It is composed of nearly 90 professionals (our defense council has about a dozen) and its duties (divided in five groups such as Europe, Asia, etc.) are broken down into plans analysis, programming and administration. It has two standing committees, the committee on policy (composed of secretaries of departments and chaired alternately by the secretaries of state and defense) and the committee on special situations (chaired by Brzezinski and has control of emergency situations and intelligence functions). There are, additionally, subcommittees which are composed of six department under secretaries.

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Recently, the National Security Council was instrumental in putting its efforts to a paper called the PRM No 10 which has drawn worldwide attention. It contains an analysis of the military balance between the East and the West and of their respective strategies. This paper—a portion of which was leaked to the press—was discussed by the Council and activated as a "Presidential Order."

The real power in the National Security Council appears to be Presidential Adviser Brzezinski. He is not an official Council member but in his capacity as presidential adviser and also as chairman of the special committee, he is acting as an overall control officer. Brzezinski is the first person to see the president every morning; Brzezinski's office in the west wing of the executive office building is just across the hall from the president's office.

The efficient and effective functioning of the U.S. National Security Council is attributable to the support it can call on from a pool of experts not only in government but from the academic, business and other areas in the civilian environment. It is reported that a reorganization and restructuring of the Japanese National Defense Council is under consideration. Although we do not need one of the scope of the U.S., there is undoubtedly much that we could draw on from it, particularly from the standpoint of concept.

Immature Defense Concept

In analyzing the Defense Agency, personnel is, of course, an important factor for consideration. The highest priority, however, must be given to the question of what type of a defense plan should be conceived and what would be the appropriate scope of the structure to implement it. There has, of course, already been a mountain of papers written and published on these subjects. What we can say at this point is that if the provisions of our current peace constitution are to be adhered to, we must think in terms of defining the minimum defense muscle required to assure those provisions not only in terms of military needs but on a much broader scope including natural resources, energy, and foreign relations. This type of broad thinking for security is finally catching on as being essential but has not yet been implemented as a national policy concept.

Up to now, the Defense Agency has proposed five defense plans and they have been implemented after being approved by the government. These have been the First Defense Plan (embracing 3 years, JFY 1958-1960); Second Defense Plan (spanning 5 years, JFY 1962-1966); Third Defense Plan (for the 5 years, JFY 1967-1971); [Fourth Defense Plan (for the 5 years, JFY 1972-1976); and the major defense plan (which was launched in JFY 1977). The first plan covered a 3-year span and the subsequent second, third, and fourth were for 5 years each but the practice of putting a time limit on the plans was abandoned with the one which went into effect

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in JFY 1977 in favor of a formula for drawing up plans on an annual [fiscal year] basis. The new program was implemented because cost of goods inflation and increase in pay scales made it impossible to adhere to programs drawn up several years in advance. Planning, therefore, was changed over to a fiscal year basis. It is an adaptation of the system in effect in the national defense budgeting in the U.S. called the rolling budget system or the PPBS (Planning, Programming, Budget System).

Up to now, the defense plans were generally known by their sobriquet: "military hardware shopping list." It must be admitted that one could find little in the portions made public, on concepts on how to cope with what situation. Exceptions could be found in the statement in the Second Defense Plan which included a statement to the effect that, "To cope with localized wars with conventional weapons"; and the use of the expression, "repel" for the first time in the Third Defense Plan in the passage which read, "have on hand defense powers to effectively repel an invasion." The Fourth Defense Plan included a statement to the effect that, "The goal is to have the capability to most effectively and most efficiently cope in an event of an invasion with conventional weapons on a localized warfare scale." This is approximately the same in intent though using different words as that contained in the Second Defense Plan.

The main thrust of defense planning underwent a complete change in style in JFY 77 with the advent of the "Basic Defense Power Concept." Cynics quipped as to whether "there could be a defense concept without any basis," but the explanation in over simplification, is that the new concept is to maintain a basic structure for defense adequate only for peacetime (such as for normal patrol and reaction, structural bases for command, communication, transportation, rescue work, supply and guard duty) which could form the foundation for growth as needed.

Even the concept of coping with invasion has undergone a change: Whereas it had been merely to resist threats in our peripheral areas, the thinking now is based on a division between intent and capability on the concept of "precluding threats based on deterrence." Implementation of the new concept will be based along the following thinking:

"There is no change in the conclusion that intents can change easily but are difficult to discern. The vastness of global influence and the gravity of the results, however, act as inherent brakes against the making of freewheeling changes in intent. Resistance to change is, furthermore, in direct proportion to its scope.

"Under this concept, the threat of our defense structure should not be calculated solely on the basis of capability of coping with all emergencies but that its peacetime structure be well balanced without having any vulnerable spots in its deployment so that peacetime watch can be adequately maintained. Instead of trying to fulfill the traditionally expressed goal of "coping with localized warfare with conventional weapons" but build a

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capability of predetermining the site, purpose, and duration of the localized conflict and have a structure capable of coping within those confines.

"The most difficult to be forewarned are these minor incursions; they are those which require no large scale preparation but are perpetrated as surprise attacks and are over in a very short period of time. The main thrust of our thinking is to be prepared for just this type of event at all times." (from Defense White Paper, "Defense of Japan" of July 1978)

Though this explanation pertaining to this type of threat is put in more understandable language than previously, since the fact remains that it is exceedingly difficult to uncover the other party's intent before the fact, the traditional method of maintaining a capability to cope with the unexpected at any time and any place must also be a built-in factor.

There is no doubt that the thing called the basic defense structure concept is an offspring of "Defense Strength in Peacetime" by Takuya Kubo (former Chief of Defense Bureau, vice minister for administration of the Defense Agency, and currently the chief of administration of the national defense council). The paper was probably prepared to quell the uneasiness expressed by opposition party members as well as some of our people to the effect that, "just how far must Japan's defense capabilities be increased?" and to show the extent required in peacetime. There is ample evidence that much effort went into its preparation but regrettably there are some faults in the logic employed.

Because of the several provisions stemming from Article 9 of our constitution, our defense cannot contain weapons such as the ICBM which could have a deterrent factor. Ours is a military structure unique in the world in that it is strictly limited in function to defense of homeland. Because it is unique in function, a unique operational philosophy must be found.

The Kubo concept did not find approval among the uniformed men; their reasoning was the intimidation is the foundation on which all countries build defense structures and where it is impossible to foretell a potential antagonist's intent [the concept of a purely defensive structure is not feasible.]

The servicemen's disaffection was put in words when former Chief of Joint Staff Kurisu stated that in the event of a surprise attack, "the SDF should take supra-legal action." This could signal the servicemen's breaking away from the frustrating "oppressed race" state which they have been enduring.

**Coordinated Self Defense Concept**

The concept which the servicemen have been nurturing is beginning to take solid shape. The Defense Agency with the Joint Staff Council taking the

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lead, prepared two papers: a "Coordinated Estimate of the Situation" (on a fiscal year and medium range bases) and a "Coordinated Defense Plan" (on a fiscal year, medium range, and long range bases). The former is as the title suggests, an analysis of the military situation in the countries which are peripheral to Japan, and the Coordinated Defense Plan is that plan which would be implemented in an emergency situation (under which defense and maintenance of stability actions are ordered).

Since both of these papers are given top secret classification and are not available to any except some specified persons in the Defense Agency, the contents are not known. We imagine, however, that actions to be taken subsequent to the outbreak of an emergency situation (D-day) are delineated in considerable detail. Needless to say, the actions would be based on the premise that there was an incident. This situation is the crux of the argument for legalizing immediate action in the event of an incident.

Of the various duties assigned to the Maritime SDF, the major function is antisubmarine warfare (ASW); should an incident be perpetrated, one can imagine that the antagonist would undertake a blockade of our harbors and bays and peripheral seas with mines requiring that our transport fleets be escorted and protected and all merchant vessels' movements be put under regulated control.

The Air SDF would, in an emergency, have to undertake control of air navigation and the Ground SDF assume responsibility for overland transportation and communication. It is not difficult to assume that plans for these functions are contained in the classified documents.

Should an emergency arise, the actions of the three SDF's would be coordinated under an operational concept to be implemented by the Coordinated Defense Plan.

Viewing it from that standpoint, it would seem that in the event of a hostile incident, the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDFs would carry out their operations smoothly. But we don't think that that is necessarily so for the following reason: The Maritime SDF believes that should defense on the high seas be broken, it is finished and in the same way, the Air arm thinks that it's all over for it if air defense breaks down; the Ground SDF covertly thinks that the responsibility for firming up the final defense is its.

It is not implied that the three SDFs harbor antagonism toward each other as was the case between the old army and navy. But it seems that tradition has found a way of being nurtured and there are signs of walls growing up around the respective services. In this respect, because the air arm came into being after the war and was built around former army and navy men, it displays a much more open and cooperative attitude toward the Maritime and Ground SDFs.

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In the past, because of deficient capability, the Air SDF could not support naval warfare from the air but currently, the fighter planes which are being designed to attack ground targets, are being used for training to support vessels at sea. But now the old argument that "an air arm for the navy is essential" is again finding voice.

When consideration was first given to developing air-to-ground missiles, it is reported that the air people suggested to the sea arm that, "Since a new weapon is being designed why shouldn't we think about developing one which could be used against targets at sea?" The report adds that the suggestion got a cool reception.

There is no assurance that interservice walls like those won't grow higher in the future. The plan we propose is to unify the Ground, Maritime and Air SDFs into a single entity.

A dozen or so years ago, Canada unified the three services into one force; it was forcibly accomplished by the young 42 year old minister of defense who fired the top military officer who opposed it. Same colored uniforms--khaki even in winter--were ordered worn by all services. The unified force was divided by function; for example, the Task Force Commander controlled the ground task force, defense against air attacks were placed under the air defense command and so on. There were several bugs in the new organizational structure in the beginning but it is reported that Canada now has a stable, unified military force.

When the ground-to-air Nike missile procurement program was introduced, the Defense Agency was confronted with a stiff jurisdictional squabble between the ground and air SDFs. The Ground SDF insisted that the missile should be put under its jurisdiction on the grounds that the army exercised that right in the U.S. The Air SDF countered with the argument that ground based though they were, the air arm could operate them more efficiently and effectively as part of its responsibility for air defense. The director general of the Agency who had the unenviable task of making a decision, gave some thought to dividing the Nikes between the ground and air arms but apparently the argument put up by the Air SDF prevailed since the missiles were finally assigned to it.

The Air Transport Group which had control over the C-1 transports and was responsible for the movement of men and materiel was placed under the jurisdiction of the Air SDF. Since it was under the sole control of the air arm, things did not move smoothly when the Ground SDF needed transportation. To overcome this defect, some Ground SDF officers were assigned to the Air Transport Group to oversee its requirements. This odd personnel arrangement did not work out satisfactorily and those ground officers who had been loaned to the air group were returned to their old nesting grounds.

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Whither Goes the Defense Agency?

To fell these growing walls and unify the three SDFs is not as yet out of the realm of possibility. We believe that such a unification would also contribute to the more effective utilization of the defense budget.

Up to now, defense planning and budget estimating was done separately by the various staff offices and then submitted to the Internal Bureau. The Internal Bureau coordinated them and whittled them down to fit a given framework. This system would work satisfactorily if the given framework was sufficiently large but it seldom is. With a small frame to work with, even some of the major mainstay proposals had to be, on occasion, shaved down to a point where its capability to support became questionable. Under such circumstances items of lower priority to a given service component were deleted completely. Let us assume that a Maritime SDF's request for appropriations for landing crafts (LST's) were given a comparatively low priority by the Maritime SDF and therefore was dropped completely from budgetary consideration. To the Ground SDF, however, these landing craft could be an essential factor; most of the tanks are deployed in Hokkaido and should an incident arise in the western part of the country, transportation by sea would become the main factor in mobility.

Admittedly, if those low priority items which had been deleted by the various staff offices could be restored during the coordination phase at the Internal Bureau level, the problem would be solved. But the fact of the matter is that the Internal Bureau has neither the capability nor the manpower to prepare a well coordinated budget or defense plan. In the case of the U.S., the civilian body in the Defense Department has both the capability and the personnel to accomplish those coordinations on its own. Given those factors, we could start thinking idealistically in terms of civilian control; but in the case of Japan, all we can do at the current stage is to think of how the system could be improved with what we have.

We hope that the above gives a broad brush description of the current status of the Defense Agency and the SDFs and the problems inherent to them. This is a time when the concept of reaction defense is being rekindled and when much thought is being given to the defense function and establishment. The next 2 or 3 years could be crucial to the future fate of Japan. Needless to say, that which will seal the fate is public opinion but we cannot help but harbor a sense of uneasiness if we allow the currently impotent Defense Agency to continue on its aimless meandering course.

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