

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030050-2

1 UP 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8347

22 March 1979


TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No. 626



AFRICA



U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET		1. Report No. JPRS L/8347	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, FOUO No. 626			5. Report Date 22 March 1979	
7. Author(s)			6.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
			11. Contract/Grant No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
			14.	
15. Supplementary Notes				
16. Abstracts The report contains information from African and specialized West European publications and radio on political, economic, and sociological developments.				
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors				
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-African Aff.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ghana	<input type="checkbox"/> Rwanda	
Sociology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Angola	<input type="checkbox"/> Guinea	<input type="checkbox"/> Sao Tome and Principe	
Economics	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Benin	<input type="checkbox"/> Guinea-Bissau	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Senegal	
Culture (Social Sciences)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Botswana	<input type="checkbox"/> Ivory Coast	<input type="checkbox"/> Seychelles	
Technological	<input type="checkbox"/> Burundi	<input type="checkbox"/> Kenya	<input type="checkbox"/> Sierra Leone	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cameroon	<input type="checkbox"/> Lesotho	<input type="checkbox"/> Somalia	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Cape Verde	<input type="checkbox"/> Liberia	<input type="checkbox"/> South Africa	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central African Empire	<input type="checkbox"/> Madagascar	<input type="checkbox"/> Swaziland	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chad	<input type="checkbox"/> Malawi	<input type="checkbox"/> Tanzania	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Comoro Islands	<input type="checkbox"/> Mali	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Togo	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Congo	<input type="checkbox"/> Mauritius	<input type="checkbox"/> Uganda	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Djibouti	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mozambique	<input type="checkbox"/> Upper Volta	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Equatorial Guinea	<input type="checkbox"/> Namibia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Zaire	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Ethiopia	<input type="checkbox"/> Niger	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Zambia	
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gabon	<input type="checkbox"/> Nigeria		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gambia	<input type="checkbox"/> Reunion		
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rhodesia		
17c. COSATI Field/Group 02, 5D, 5C, 5K				
18. Availability Statement FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Limited Number of Copies Available From JPRS			19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 58
			20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price

FORM NTIS-35 (REV. 3-72)

THIS FORM MAY BE REPRODUCED

USCOMM-DC 14852-P72

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8347

22 March 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

FOUO No. 626

CONTENTS		PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS		
Briefs		
Senegal-Guinea-Bissau Dispute Adjudication		1
ANGOLA		
UNITA: MPLA Will Be Compelled To Negotiate (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Jan 79).....		2
Benguela Railroad Claims and Counter-Claims Reported (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Jan 79).....		4
Briefs		
Alleged UNITA Supporters		5
Portuguese Prisoners' Release		5
UNITA on the Offensive		5
GDR Port Equipment		5
BENIN		
Kerekou Calls for Revolutionary Unity (Mathieu Kerekou Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 19 Feb 79)..		6
BOTSWANA		
Briefs		
FRG Petroleum Storage Loan		11
CAMEROON		
Circumspection Characterizes Attitude Toward Oil (Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Feb 79).....		12
Cameroon, France Issue Joint Communique (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Feb 79).....		16

- a - [III - NE & A - 122 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE	
Immense Rift Between Bokassa, People Claimed (Mariam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 5-18 Feb 79).....	20
Briefs	
BNCD's Activities	22
CHAD	
Reporter Witnesses Battle Between Malloum, Habre Troops (Noel Ngouo Ngabissio; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Feb 79).....	23
CONGO	
Sassou Nguesso's Presidency Seen as Victory for Left (Mariam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 19 Feb-4 Mar 79).....	27
GABON	
New Faces in Government May Assist in Austerity Program (Sory Serinde Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Feb 79).....	29
PDG Extraordinary Congress Results Reviewed (Sory Serinde Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Feb 79).....	32
GAMBIA	
Nation Undergoing 'Serious Economic, Social Difficulties' (Sam Essono; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 19 Feb-4 Mar 79).....	34
GHANA	
Briefs	
Clinker Import Licenses	37
MOZAMBIQUE	
Briefs	
GDR Agricultural Equipment Training	38
RHODESIA	
Muzorewa Defends Position in Autobiography (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Feb 79).....	39

-b-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
SENEGAL	
Senghor Seen as Able To Cope With Opposition (Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Jan 79).....	41
TOGO	
Five-Year Plan Reviewed, Future Augurs Well (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Feb 79).....	45
Phosphate Sector Temporarily Hurt, Future Plans Outlined (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Feb 79).....	47
ZAIRE	
Belgium, United States 'Convinced Mobutu Regime at Last Gasp' (Fode Amadou; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 19 Feb-4 Mar 79).....	49
Conditions Not Viewed as Improving by 1980 (A. Fall; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 5-18 Feb 79).....	51
Briefs	
Foreign Investments Reexamined	53
ZAMBIA	
New Cabinet Formed To Control Political Turmoil (Cherif Rachid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 5-18 Feb 79).....	54

-c-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

SENEGAL-GUINEA-BISSAU DISPUTE ADJUDICATION--During a recent debate before the National Assembly, the Senegalese minister of foreign affairs, Moustapha Niasse, officially confirmed that Senegal and Guinea-Bissau would submit their disagreement over their maritime frontier to The Hague International Court. Answering a concerned question over the delay taken by the offshore oil exploitation, off the coast of Casamance, the minister declared that one of the main reasons for this delay was the frontier dispute. Four unsuccessful meetings--the last held last 3 July--between delegations from the two countries were called in an attempt to settle the issue. The different positions of the two countries are a legacy from the colonial past. Guinea-Bissau is using a layout resulting from the 1885 international agreements, signed by France and Portugal, as a basis for the delineation of its waters. On the other hand, Senegal is using a 1960 exchange of letters between France and Portugal, bearing on a modification of the layout. Bissau disputes the legal validity of these letters, pointing out that they did not lead to the publication of a legal text by Portugal. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p.135] 6857 .

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

UNITA: MPLA WILL BE COMPELLED TO NEGOTIATE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p 154

[Text] Jonas Savimbi, leader of the opposition movement National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), indicated in Dakar in an interview granted the liberal Portuguese weekly TEMPO, that this movement was present in 11 of the 16 provinces of Angola and it even had administrative infrastructures in five of them. More precisely, according to Savimbi, UNITA has control over the Cuando-Cubango, Moxico, Bie, Huambo and Cunene regions and "excellent prospects" are shaping up in the Huila and Cuanza-Nord regions.

According to the Angolan rebel, it means that UNITA would control over 3 million people, a fact which enabled him to conduct the successful sabotage operations which were recently mentioned in Sa da Bandeira, Lobito and Benguel. Jonas Savimbi added that his movement had 8,000 militiamen in addition to 12,000 trained and equipped men.

He said that increased foreign support was available to UNITA in Africa as well as from parts of the West which "has now become aware of the ground it is constantly losing in Africa to Soviet strategy." Savimbi assessed that his movement could also take advantage of the "anti-Russian activity" of the People's Republic of China.

Concerning the attitude of the United States, the rebel leaders think that Washington could "reconsider its overall strategy" under pressure from Western Europe which "is constantly reminding the United States that it is slowly relinquishing its role as leader of the western world." Savimbi feels the recent Guadeloupe Summit Conference can be explained in that context.

The UNITA leader believes that, in general, observers interpreted erroneously Agostinho Neto's recent reshuffling of the MPLA machine, by presenting it as a sign of a more open attitude toward the West.

According to Savimbi, Neto dismissed Lopo do Nascimento because he "was beginning to assume too much importance not only within the party, but also before the world." He added: "Agostinho Neto tried to make believe it involved the dismissal of more radical elements, but it is not true. I know from a trustworthy source that, prior to that event, he had gone secretly to Moscow."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In conclusion, Jonas Savimbi asserted that MPLA "could not escape meeting with UNITA. There are men within MPLA who admit that, sooner or later, it will be compelled to negotiate with us and the sooner the better." According to the rebel leader, this problem would be the subject of debates within MPLA.

COPYRIGHT: René Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979

6857
GSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

BENGUELA RAILROAD CLAIMS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p 155

[Text] Benguela Railroad: "Paralyzed," According to UNITA

In a communiqué dated 6 January and received in Paris on the 9th, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) declared that the Benguela railroad continued to be "systematically paralyzed by its military activities."

The communiqué specified that "Although it had promised world opinion to reopen this path of communication to international traffic, Agostinho Neto knew he did not control the Benguela railroad."

Drawing up an account of UNITA's "military activities" for December 1978, the communiqué stated that a railroad bridge, one train and 1,126 meters of tracks had been destroyed.

The communiqué pointed out that, during the same period, "184 enemies were killed, over 200 wounded and 35--three officers among them--made prisoners," while "important material" had been recuperated.

Finally, the UNITA communiqué assessed "The Cuban presence in Angola to approximately 28,000 men, now further strengthened by East Germans."

"In Operation," According to Angolan Authorities

The communiqué of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) published in Paris and reporting a state of total paralysis for the Benguela railroad, was categorically denied on the same day in Brussels by José Luis de Almeida, ambassador of Angola to Belgium and France.

"It is another caper from this movement," declared the ambassador who is also surprised that "Contrarily to the assurances given by the French government, Paris continues to be the European capital from which such communiqués emanate."

COPYRIGHT: René Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979

6857
CSO: 4400

4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

ALLEGED UNITA SUPPORTERS--According to Angolan governmental sources, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA is still benefiting from the support of the French Secret Services, the American CIA, certain circles close to the Italian Christian Democracy, Senegal and Zairian opponents who, bitter over the Neto-Mobutu reconciliation, have taken refuge in Brussels. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 942, 24 Jan 79 p 26] 6857

PORTUGUESE PRISONERS' RELEASE--Seven Portuguese, prisoners of the Angolan rebel movement UNITA, will be released in the near future, following contact made with Jonas Savimbi by a group of liberal Portuguese personalities. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p 154] 6857

UNITA ON THE OFFENSIVE--A large number of Angolan refugees have arrived in Namibia following further battles between the MPLA-Labor Party and the rebel forces of the UNITA. South African television reports that the refugees, the majority of whom crossed the frontier at Kovango, said that the battles in the southern part of Angola were extremely violent. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 467] 5157

GDR PORT EQUIPMENT--Experts from the East German Kranbau Eberswalde firm are currently installing modern handling equipment at Angolan ports, involving 14 cranes imported from the German Democratic Republic, which will make it possible initially to increase the loading and unloading capacities in Luanda, Lobito and Mocamedes by 30 percent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 467] 5157

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BENIN

KEREKOU CALLS FOR REVOLUTIONARY UNITY

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 19 Feb 79 pp 39-41

[Interview with President Mathieu Kerekou by Simon Malley: "African Revolutionary Countries Must Organize a Joint Strategy"]

[Text] The purpose of the attempts by imperialism and its vassals to destabilize progressive governments is to regain recently independent countries.

Yes, the Benin revolution does cause fear. Yes, the imperialist countries and the African puppet governments which they control from a distance fear that it will gradually contaminate the entire continent. Yes, the attack that was launched on 16 January 1977 by the mercenaries who were led by Bob Denard is only one episode in the battle (today limited, but perhaps generalized tomorrow) that the West is waging in order to regain recently independent countries and in order to safeguard their financial interests.

Yes, the colonial powers, alas, find among their vassals, as in the case of Gabon and Morocco, accomplices to help them in their nasty job. President Mathieu Kerekou knows this, and makes no secret of it, but, far from lessening his desire to defend the revolution at any cost, that threat only strengthens it. Let's listen to him.

[Kerekou] "You asked me about the status of relations between Benin and Gabon. Well, I should like to tell you immediately that, contrary to what the Western reactionary press is trying to have one believe, relations between our two countries are not in any way conditioned by any personal rivalry between President Omar Bernard Bongo and myself. It is quite a different thing. Everyone knows, in fact, that Bongo and Hassan II, chiefs of state who are closely tied to Western imperialism, are the ones who inspired and financed the mercenaries that treacherously attacked us on 16 January 1977. We know this with certainty thanks to the damning evidence in documents that mercenaries, in their headlong retreat, left behind in the field. Do not forget that Bob Denard is Bongo's lifetime technical adviser and that he is responsible for ensuring Bongo's personal safety.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

You see, my journalist friend, facts are relentless and speak for themselves. Our people have always profoundly believed in African unity. They therefore feel at home everywhere in Africa. That is why a great many people from Benin settled in Gabon in order to cooperate with their Gabonese brothers in the building of this country. But when Bonzo's role in the January 1977 aggression was made known, the latter brutally expelled all our fellow countrymen."

[Malley] "Yet Guinean President Sekou Touré offered to be a mediator in order to try to find a peaceful solution to the conflict."

[Kerekou] "We have always been, and we still are, ready to settle through fair negotiation any conflict that sets us against a brother country. We have moreover given proof of this by sending a delegation to Conakry, where an interministerial conference, sponsored by the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and presided over by President Sekou Toure, was to take place. Well, it was not possible to hold that conference because Bongo, who was hostile to our revolution, did not send a delegation."

[Malley] "What about Morocco? Do you think that it is because of the courageous attitude that you took in the Saharan affair that it financed and armed the mercenaries that attacked you?"

[Kerekou] "No doubt. Revolutionary Benin since 1976 has recognized, supported, and encouraged the POLISARIO. Our position has always been very clear with respect to the struggle of people who want to obtain independence and national sovereignty. Now, historically, the Saharan people have their own identity. They therefore have a right to independence, and no man, king or president, has the right to oppose this. For us, the Saharan question cannot be settled by amalgamation with any other country, and the Saharan people, in taking up arms, have furthermore proved that they were capable of assuring their independence. It is therefore absurd and shocking for two member countries of the OAU to challenge this right."

In supporting the just struggle of the people of the SDRA [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic], we have merely exercised our internationalist principles. We, ourselves, have suffered too greatly from colonialism and neocolonialism not to understand and support the Saharans in their struggle. And no doubt our attitude did incite the despotic Moroccan government to participate in a plot that was hatched against us."

[Malley] "In your speeches, you have often spoken at length of the role played by France in that plot and in many others that tended to destabilize the new progressive governments that were constituted in various African countries. What is your opinion today and what are your relations with Paris?"

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Mathieu Kerekou did not hesitate. In spite of France's recent attempts to establish good relations with Cotonou and even though in the past it had recalled its ambassador, who very certainly was involved in the January 1977 attack, he clings to hope for the future.

[Malley] "We clearly said this on 30 November 1972 in our platform speech concerning reconstruction and national independence: Benin's relations with all foreign countries are based on the principles of nonalignment, of equality, and of mutual respect of all nations for the sovereignty of all others. The January 1977 aggression for a time seriously impaired our relations with Paris. But, as a consequence of the solemn commitments made by the new ambassador of France when he handed us his credentials on 15 December 1978, we hope that relations will improve in the forthcoming months."

Mathieu Kerekou then went on to the problems that concern Africa as a whole. He did not hesitate to speak of the crises that are upsetting the continent and the outcome of which, if favorable--which he does not doubt--will establish stability and peace throughout the continent. With regard to the conflict between Tanzania and Uganda, started by Amin Dada's aggression against the national territory of President Nyerere's country, he said:

"This maneuver was manifestly provoked by an imperialism with its back to the wall, whose objective was to rout the forces of the two countries, especially those of Tanzania, which is part of the first line of southern Africa's front and firmly supports all people who are struggling for their independence in that region of the continent. That action is particularly detestable because it tends to weaken Tanzania at a time when the South African racists and their Zimbabwean proteges are becoming increasingly threatening. We observe the UN Charter, which requires member countries to scrupulously respect the borders inherited from colonialism. Everything must be done to thwart the imperialist game, which tries to divide in order to rule. Thus we openly support, and we will always support, those to fight for their freedom in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Western Sahara, Palestine, or anywhere else. Freedom and independence cannot be bestowed: they must be won, with weapons, by all those who are still oppressed by colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism.

If you speak to me of the tragedy that is taking place in the Horn of Africa, where a fratricidal conflict opposes Ethiopia to Somalia, I will answer that we hope to see these two countries settle their present differences and find an equitable solution, which would be of great benefit not only to them but to all of Africa. We are ready to help them to resolve the problems which set them against each other. But, I repeat, a principle governs us here, as elsewhere: respect for the borders inherited from colonialism."

8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Malley] "A little while ago you spoke of the Palestinian people. What do you think of the efforts in behalf of a separate peace between Egypt and Israel?"

[Kerekou] "In our opinion, any real peace in the Near East must first take into account the Palestinians and their right to independence. Not to do this means to deny the existence of the Palestinian people who, during years of struggle, have given so much tangible proof of their very real existence and their determination. Not to do this is also to shamelessly disregard the resolutions of the UN and of the OAU, organizations to which some countries belong, but which, in spite of belonging, constantly and shamelessly violate the rights of people. Under the present circumstances, a separate peace between Egypt and Israel would make sense only if it makes it possible to settle the essential question, that of the right of the Palestinians to have a country that is truly theirs."

Then President Kerekou broached the subject of Benin's domestic policy, which is still one of his major preoccupations. He spoke of it with the same enthusiasm as do all the leaders of the progressive countries of the Third World, who understand that foreign policy and domestic policy closely overlap each other and that especially without ideological training of the masses, the building of a just and progressive society will always remain uncertain.

[Kerekou] "The adoption of the Fundamental Law and of the First Three-Year Plan, on 26 August 1977," he said with spirit, "has made it possible for Benin to set up, with full sovereignty, the revolutionary institutions that serve it, and will serve it, as instruments to carry out a truly revolutionary action in all domains. The first phase was accomplished on 26 October 1972. We are now in the second, during which we must establish a people's democracy. Thanks to the Fundamental Law, the working masses for the first time will be able to freely and effectively participate in a people's government, with the objective of accomplishing urgent tasks which are incumbent on us: to produce, build, and ensure the defense of the country and of the revolution.

The objective of all these tasks is the absolute liquidation of colonialism and of its aftermath. It is a question of changing our society, which is still neocolonialist, into a socialist society. By means of the 30 May 1978 law, which institutes the voting card, the central committee of our party has opened the way. And if certain people fear our revolution so much, as was shown by the January 1977 aggression, it means that imperialism, aided by its puppets and its mercenaries, is looking for something in return and wants, at any cost, to protect its threatened interests."

Escorting us out, Mathieu Kerekou elaborated this idea with a profound conviction: in Africa and in the Third World in general, imperialism is carrying out a global strategy that aims to regain the countries that recently acquired independence and to gain control their immense riches.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Kerekou] "In order to accomplish this," said Mathieu Kerekou, "the Western countries are trying to destabilize the newly set up progressive governments. They recruit mercenaries, send commandos, and even prepare large military expeditions on the same scale as the bloody operations of the 19th century. That is why we must not only organize our defense but also, and perhaps especially, maintain continuing relations with our friends and our allies, in order to organize resistance with them to our mutual enemies."

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BOTSWANA

BRIEFS

FRG PETROLEUM STORAGE LOAN--Early in January, a spokesman for the Ministry of Commerce announced in Gaborone that Botswana had received a West German loan of 3.4 million dollars for the purpose of building two oil storage facilities. The spokesman specified that "This project was intended to cope with an eventual oil crisis in the country following an embargo on oil earmarked for South Africa." One of the storage facilities will be built in Gaborone and the other in Francistown. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p 154] 6857

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CAMEROON

CIRCUMSPECTION CHARACTERIZES ATTITUDE TOWARD OIL

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 944, 7 Feb 79 pp 68, 69

[Article by Francois Soudan: "After Oil Gives Out"]

[Text] Yaounde has repainted its seven hills in festive colors. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the second French president, after Georges Pompidou in 1971, to tread on the soil of independent Cameroon, undoubtedly has not come to the heart of Africa, from 8 to 10 February, to talk about matters that businessmen straighten up very well without him. But there is one subject, perhaps, that he will bring up with Ahmadou Ahidjo between official dinners and the rustling rows of paper flags: that new gift of life to Cameroon that goes under the name of oil.

Forbidden Subject

"Oh yes, oil!" a high Cameroon official said to us, smiling. "It is true that we have a little, but I beg of you, don't talk too much about it." In the image of the person of its president, Cameroon is a country that is often discreet and sometimes secretive. The same halo of mystery surrounds this forbidden topic today, which seems to have become black gold, just as it veiled the armed disturbances yesterday that were tearing the country apart and just as it will undoubtedly tone down tomorrow the tensions that Ahmadou Ahidjo's succession will not fail to cause.

Nevertheless, Cameroon is an oil-producing country. It is true that the contrary would have been astonishing. Aside from some kind of "geological scandal," we do not see why that country, tucked away at the end of the Gulf of Guinea, surrounded by neighbors with oil in varying amounts, like Nigeria, Gabon or Congo, would not also have a few offshore platforms battered by the waves.

Prospecting, which started in 1951, while Cameroon was still a territory under French protection, and which was abandoned several times and resumed several times, led, in 1976, to the discovery of a deposit at the mouth of the Rey River, not far from the Nigerian border, Kole.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This discovery has been surrounded by the greatest discretion. No champagne and no startling speech. Silence. The only official information published to date in this connection mentioned the presence of a modest, almost negligible deposit. ELF (Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France) SEREPCA (Cameroon subsidiary of ELF Aquitaine), which had obtained rights to exploit this deposit in association with PECTEN (a Shell subsidiary), was just as reserved. To such a degree that a World Bank report, dated April 1978, estimated that Cameroon's oil production would not exceed 700,000 metric tons a year in 1982 (by way of comparison, Congo produces a little over 2 million metric tons a year and Gabon, 1.5 million).

Silence

It was noted very quickly, however, that not less than 10 oil companies were engaged in prospecting and search activities in Cameroon. At the beginning of 1978, it was learned that two new deposits had just been discovered at the mouth of the Rey River -- Ekoundo-Sud and Betika-Marine -- and good possibilities had been discovered farther south, between the island of Fernando Poo and Victoria, and off Kribi. At the end of 1978, production of the Kole deposit (the only one being exploited) already amounted to 800,000 metric tons in 12 months and, contradicting its first forecasts, a second World Bank report, confidential, dated in November, estimated that Cameroon's oil reserves -- just like the reserves of Ivory Coast -- were "sizable."

No Boom

Between the few drops of black gold about which oil "forecasters" talked 2 years earlier and the future boom predicted here and there, no one, from Douala to Yaounde, knows any longer what to believe. One thing seems certain, nevertheless: Cameroon will never be Nigeria. It is true that estimating a country's oil reserves has as much tightrope walking as it has exact science in it, but it would seem exaggerated, at least, to place Cameroon's offshore potential at over 100 million metric tons. Moreover, this figure is generally the one put forth at present by international experts.

With regard to onshore prospecting, it has only just begun in the north, not far from the border with Chad, where the Norwegian NORMINOIL company is studying possible extensions of the Kaneur deposit, located on the other side of Logone. Therefore, no boom in the Nigerian manner, but certainty of meeting its own needs -- a refinery with a capacity of 3 million metric tons a year is under construction at Victoria, financed by the PROCO-France company, a subsidiary of the American Universal Oil Products company -- and the possibility of becoming a small exporter one day, in the image of its neighbor, Congo. That is all and already that is not bad.

Therefore, in view of these reasonably optimistic prospects, what explanation is there for the fact that the authorities express themselves so reservedly as soon as the word oil is mentioned? Oil revenue included in the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1978-1979 budget amounts to close to 5 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs, paid in dollars by ELF and PECTEN. Even though manna from heaven is not exactly involved, the results are appreciable for a first year of exploitation and on a single deposit (the Kole deposit). We do not see why the Cameroon Government would abstain from imitating its Ivory Coast opposite number, which announced, in 1977, the "good news" to its countrymen, with a little emphasis and much certitude.

Of course, President Ahidjo cannot be reproached for being prudent in the matter, all the more so since false hopes are expensive. But there are other reasons for this discretion in that mosaic country with a sizable English-speaking minority.

In fact, uncontrolled utilization of oil and its resources runs the risk of aggravating some of the actual or potential splits that weave Cameroon's daily web. The very location of the Rey River deposit, near Nigeria's indecisive sea frontier, may very well lead, in the long run, to one of those many, complicated water boundary disputes for example, like the ones setting Senegal against Guinea-Bissau, or Tunisia against Libya.


Regional Imbalances

But there is something more serious: the mere possibility of a timid oil boom runs the risk of intensifying still more the constant flow of rural migration toward the outskirts of cities in the southwest. The Douala agglomeration, where thousands of huts and overpopulated poverty shantytowns are piled up, already has over a million inhabitants. Indigestion -- or explosion -- may not be far off.

Moreover, and unless there is a strict distribution of receipts, the oil boom will profit only southwestern Cameroon. That southwest, already richer and with a higher rate of school attendance than other parts of the country. That southwest where the enterprising Bamileke middle class prevails, at times accused of controlling all of Cameroon's commercial channels. Cameroon's unity, built on blood and tears, would then run the risk of being challenged once more by means of an intensification of regional imbalances.

The barrels of Rey River oil are not powder kegs, however. In that country, which, over the years, has been successively described as "capitalist," "African socialist," then "planned liberal," many undoubtedly would like to know what prospects are offered by the oil discoveries and especially how these new resources will be used and distributed. But the silence of the Yaounde authorities conceals, perhaps, a certain amount of confusion in view of the complexity of this encumbering gift.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



The only deposit being exploited is the Kole deposit, in the Rey River (heavy-printed derrick). Off Douala and Kribi, two more deposits not yet exploited (light-printed derricks).

Key: 1. area; 2. density; 3. capital; 4. cities; 5. less than; 6. more than; 7. asphalted roads; 8. other roads and trails; 9. railroad; 10. planned railroad; 11. international airport; 12. other airports and main aiffields; 13. Chad; 14. Central African [Empire]; 15. Equatorial Guinea; 16. Gulf of Guinea; 17. Rey River

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

10,042
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CAMEROON

CAMEROON, FRANCE ISSUE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 431

[Text] Garoua, 10 February 1979--On the invitation of the president of the United Republic of Cameroon and Mrs Ahmadou Ahidjo, the president of the French republic and Mrs Valery Giscard d'Estaing paid an official visit to Cameroon from 8 to 10 February 1979. Accompanied by President Ahmadou Ahidjo, they visited the towns of Douala, Yaounde and Garoua. Throughout their stay, they were given a particularly friendly welcome by the people of Cameroon.

This visit, of major political importance, enabled the two parties to strengthen still further the feelings of very deep friendship and high esteem which have long linked them. In an atmosphere characterized by cordial calm and confidence, reflecting the quality of the relations maintained between the two countries, the chiefs of state held several talks to discuss bilateral questions and current international problems. The same atmosphere characterized the talks between the two delegations, made up as follows:

Representing France: Minister of Cooperation Robert Galley, Minister for Universities Alice Saunier-Seite, Minister of Transports Joel Le Theule, Secretary of State to the Minister of Industry Jean-Pierre Prouteau, Assistant Secretary-General to the Presidency of the Republic Francois Polge de Combret, and Hubert Dubois, the French ambassador in Cameroon.

Representing Cameroon: Secretary-General at Presidency of the United Republic of Cameroon Samuel Eboua, Minister in Charge of Missions at Presidency Francois Sengat-Kuo, Director of Civil Cabinet of the President of the Republic Philemon Beb A Don, Minister in Charge of Missions at Presidency Abdoulaye Yadji, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Keutcha, Minister of Economy and Plan Youssoufa Daouda, Minister of National Education Ndam Njoya, Minister of Social Affairs Delphine Tsanga, Minister of Transports John Nkengong Monie, General Representative for Tourism Aminou Oumarou, Special Adviser to the President of the Republic Eteki Mboumoua, and Salomon Bakoto, Cameroonian ambassador to France.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The two statesmen took up various social, cultural and economic aspects of French-Cameroonian cooperation. On this occasion, they expressed mutual satisfaction with the multiplicity and quality of the cooperative relations existing between the two countries. They expressed the view that these relations should continue to develop without interruption in order to adapt to the needs and the potential of Cameroon itself, as well as the means put to use by France. Within this perspective, they discussed the main subjects which should be taken up at the meeting of the High French-Cameroonian Commission which will be held next March. On this occasion, apart from the work of this commission, the negotiations pertaining to maritime transport will be pursued.

In the economic cooperation sector, the two chiefs of state noted that the interests of each of the parties should be balanced and reciprocal.

Special interest was again expressed by France in certain development projects in Cameroon, and in particular that nation agreed to take the proposed route link between Yaounde and Douala under consideration. The means of participation in this financing of an international nature by France will be agreed upon by the two countries.

The two chiefs of state noted the expansion of trade exchange between the two nations with satisfaction, and stressed the desirability of encouraging its development. They expressed concern about the need to absorb the imbalance in this trade, believing in this connection that the implementation of a certain number of industrial development projects should allow the transformation of Cameroonian economic structures such as to reduce the existing disparity further.

In order to respond to the priority goals of Cameroon in the training sector, France will step up its aid efforts, in particular in the fields of higher education, research and technical training.

In the same spirit of mutual understanding, the two chiefs of state voiced their agreement on the need to see to it that the exchange agreement which sets forth the conditions for stays by their respective nationals in the other country is implemented in a spirit of goodwill and humanity. To this end, it was agreed that a work group will meet as soon as possible.

In the international sector, the two chiefs of state noted the similarity of principles guiding and directing their approach to international problems, and they agreed to pursue their fruitful joint efforts in the interests of peace. In this connection, they stressed the need for respect of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. The primary role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and international security was reaffirmed, as was the need to ensure that the spirit of dialog and joint action prevails within it.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Where relations between Europe and Africa are concerned, the two chiefs of state expressed their desire to contribute to their development and consolidation in a spirit of solidarity, with respect for the sovereignty of the partners and the safeguarding of their interests. In this connection, they expressed their desire to encourage the pursuit of the North-South dialog by various means, and to see the negotiations with a view to the agreement linking African, Caribbean and Pacific nations with the European Economic Community lead to positive results in the fields of trade, financial, industrial and scientific cooperation and the transfer of technology.

The two chiefs of state voiced their desire that the various discussions pursued within the framework of the UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] and the Conference on International Economic Cooperation lead to equitable solutions allowing absorption of the imbalance remaining in international economic trade, guaranteeing the countries in the process of development the means for sustained economic growth. Special stress was placed on the need to persuade the industrialized countries to agree to make an exceptional effort through new means to promote the development of Africa.

In this connection, President Ahmadou Ahidjo expressed his appreciation for the special and consistent interest President Valery Giscard d'Estaing has devoted to Africa and its development, as well as to aid to the Third World and the establishment of a new international economic order. The president of the United Republic of Cameroon also praised the dynamic and far-seeing action pursued by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing as the leader of France, within Europe and in the concert of nations.

The two chiefs of state expressed regret that peace has still not been re-established in the Near East, despite the recent undertakings with a view to a negotiated solution, and they stressed the need for reaching an overall solution, which alone can lead to a just and durable peace in the region.

The situation in Africa was also the subject of profound analysis. The two chiefs of state reasserted the inalienable right of the peoples of Africa to independence. They reiterated their condemnation of the policy of Apartheid and stressed the need to achieve a settlement facilitating access to equal rights for the African majority in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. In addition, they reconfirmed their support of the efforts undertaken to this end by the international community.

The two chiefs of state stressed once again the right of African nations to govern their affairs themselves, to determine their own destiny within a freely chosen framework, in solidarity and agreement, safe from any desire for foreign domination and intervention. They expressed the hope that the conciliation efforts undertaken under the aegis of the OAU to find a solution to the conflicts rending Africa will be crowned with success.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The president of the French republic took the opportunity offered by his visit to Cameroon to issue a solemn appeal to all Africans involved in the conflicts which have multiplied on the continent in the course of recent years to agree to put an end to fratricidal struggles, embarking upon negotiations which should make it possible to find just and enduring solutions. The president of the United Republic of Cameroon joined in this appeal, stressing that the re-establishment of peace is a prerequisite to the development and progress of the African peoples.

The president of the French republic paid homage to the wisdom and realism of President Ahmadou Ahidjo's policy. He praised his leading role in the consolidation of national unity and his contribution in the work of peace and agreement among the states and nations.

His Excellency the President of the French Republic and Mrs Giscard d'Estaing expressed to His Excellency the President of the United Republic of Cameroon and Mrs Ahmadou Ahidjo, as well as the people of Cameroon and its government, their extreme gratitude for the very warm and friendly welcome given them in the course of their stay. They voiced their hopes for the prosperity, happiness and lasting friendship between the peoples of France and Cameroon.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979

5157
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

IMMENSE RIFT BETWEEN BOKASSA, PEOPLE CLAIMED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5-18 Feb 79 p 18

[Article by Mariam Sysle]

[Text] Neither the emperor's police, nor Zaire's army will succeed in keeping the people in indefinite slavery.

One year after the coronation parody, Bokassa's "imperial" regime has been hit head-on. Indeed, the bloody events which just occurred in Bangui prove the deep dissatisfaction and widespread weariness overtaking this country, as a result of a dictatorial regime whose failure is evident.

A new, obviously ridiculous, whim of the emperor of Berengo, was enough to kindle the fire. He had decided to impose uniforms on schoolchildren and students, so as "to distinguish them from non-schooled children who are often bandits." Thus, showing the deep contempt he feels toward his people, Bokassa had in fact thought of a new way to pressure parents and replenish his coffers. Outraged by this measure, high school and university students revolted on 18 January, supported by many residents of Bangui. For 3 days, despite a savage repression, demonstrators attacked everything which was part of the hated regime. This was an open explosion of bitterness, humiliation and resentment that had accumulated for 12 years.

The conditions suited for a popular uprising have been present for a long time in the Central African Empire. Only through a dreaded police system of surveillance, accusation and detention, has the usurper of Bangui been able to continue his reign and fatten his fortune.

For the large majority of the people, the situation has become even worse during the past months. Daily necessities are becoming scarcer and prices are climbing very fast. In 1 year, to take but one example, sugar prices have tripled and meat prices quadrupled. In this country filled with misery, pressured and abandoned, there is only a single island of opulence: Berengo, where Bokassa has established his fiefdom where nothing is lacking, from plantations and herds to stores, movie theaters, factories and schools.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Not only were the artificial creation of the empire and the coronation ceremony felt as a cruel humiliation by the Central African people, but this tragi-comedy was also an occasion to increase the personal taxes. Thus, Bokassa found a new subterfuge: he has made businesses and enterprises --already generally in financial difficulty--pay their taxes for 1979 and 1980 in advance. Similarly, through another trick, he has had public enterprises paying for government employee salaries since August.

Bokassa's Isolation

It is almost unnecessary to say that the anger even reaches into the relatively privileged strata, such as government employees and teachers, who have waited in vain for their wages for several months, and into the army, which has been considered "suspicious," as a result of the January event. Isolated in his Berengo palace, which has been turned into a veritable fortress and surrounded by crooks helping him to loot the country, the emperor lives with the fear of plots, coup d'etats, and popular uprising. Bangui's dictator used his friend Mobutu's soldiers, with their sinister reputation, to stop popular insurrection. Zaire's mercenaries used mortar shells and victims number in the hundreds.

This ferocious repression can only widen even more the large gap which separates the former French army corporal from his people. Giscard's France, financial and political support of Bokassa--which gave him a part of its territory to install in important military base--might be more prudent in the future.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

CSO: 4400
8924

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

BRIEFS

BNCD'S ACTIVITIES--Somewhat behind schedule, the Central African National Deposit Bank (BNCD) has published a report on its activities during the 1977 fiscal year. The BNCD is the third largest bank in the territory. On 31 December 1977, the volume of its customers' deposits (demand and term deposits) amounted to 1.8 billion CFA francs, an increase of 26.5 percent over the end of 1976. Growth was particularly noticeable in the area of private accounts (at the end of 1977, the bank had 4,516 accounts, compared with 3,311 a year previously). Compared with other local commercial banks, the BNCD represented 20 percent of all deposits made. At the end of the fiscal year, liabilities (bills in case, advances, credits, guarantees and securities) amounted to 4.8 billion CFA francs, an increase of 95 percent over the end of 1976. Out of this total, yearly credits amounted to 2.9 billion (+ 37.6 percent), while standing deficits came to .9 billion (+ 77.1 percent) and guarantees and backing represented .4 billion (+ 341 percent). The BNCD's aid to the economy amounted to 36 percent of the commitments of the three commercial banks. After the hiring of personnel for the Bambari agency, the BNCD had a total of 88 officials and employees at the end of 1977. The trading account showed a favorable trend: Gross proceeds rose by 39.7 percent and expenses rose by 8.3 percent, with an allowance of 77 million CFA francs being made for supplies. Trading results totaled 154.8 million CFA francs, compared with 38.5 million for the 1976 fiscal year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Jan 79 pp 89-90] 11,464

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

REPORTER WITNESSES BATTLE BETWEEN MALLOUM, HABRE TROOPS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Feb 79 pp 23-24

[Article by Noel Ngouo Ngabissio: "It All Began With an Incident at a High School"]

[Text] It all began with an incident at the Ndjamena general high school on Monday, 12 February.

In answer to the convocation of the political-military committee for security and surveillance announced by the president of the republic on Saturday, 10 February, the supporters of Prime Minister Hissein Habre began to distribute a pamphlet calling for a general strike, in the education and trade sectors among others, on Monday, 12 February.

On Monday, as a precaution against possible trouble, Chadian National Army troops were posted as of 0600 hours along the approaches to educational establishments. The population, on awakening, believed there was a coup d'etat. Toward 0700 hours, Mr Hissein Habre's car was spotted near the home of the minister of national education, not far from the Felix Eboue high school, which in turn is a few hundred meters from the residence of the prime minister, heavily guarded by his men. Apparently, the strike order was not being heeded. But the pro-northern students contributed to distribute the flyers.

Classes proceeded as usual until about 1000 hours, when a scuffle broke out among the students. Mr Gilbert, a teacher on cooperative loan from France, who died in an accident on Thursday, 15 February, was present. He described the scene to me. "I had just finished my class and was chatting with another teacher. A fight started. Then the ANT [Chadian National Army] soldiers came to separate the students. They may have beaten one student. The others fought to prevent their putting him in the police wagon. The police, in order to discourage the resistance by the youths, fired in the air and made as if to set up a 75-millimeter gun on a tripod."

It was then that Hissein Habre's guard appeared on the run and fired at the ANT detachment. The students had time to scatter. But two passers-by were killed.

23

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It was 1030 hours. The regular army, alerted, arrived with its heavy weapons. A witness says that after these first incidents, the prime minister went to the RNT (Chadian National Radio Broadcasting) station to deliver an address. The radio authorities, after consulting the presidency, refused to put him on the air. A half-hour later, the broadcasting station was to be burned.

Alerted by gunfire while near the Farcha industrial sector, I proceeded rapidly toward the combat zone near the city hall. I was chatting with my colleague from the AFP and photographers when two DC-4s of the seven the Chadian army has attacked the residence of the prime minister. It was noon.

Battle at the Hospital

Toward 1300 hours, the hospital battle began. It was launched by Hissein Habre's supporters, who tried to block the policemen who were taking some wounded policemen there. The battle raged for an hour. Rockets, machine guns, automatic weapons. Toward 1500 hours all was quiet.

Despite the police barrage, I managed to get to the site. I counted about 20 dead, including 5 or 6 civilians. I saw an intact rocket which, by some fantastic luck, did not explode despite the fire which broke out nearby. Three vehicles had been burned, an ambulance was in flames, and a whole side of the premises was destroyed. The APF office opposite was struck by a rocket which fell in the midst of the director's office. The town hall was also struck. A customs van with five disfigured bodies lay on its side.

The battle moved toward the African quarter, Kilimat, near the main command post of Mr Habre's supporters. There was the noise of 75- and 90-millimeter guns, rockets, etc, particularly toward the home of the minister of interior, one of Habre's close friends. Toward 1900 hours, a DC-4 launched 16 rockets at Mr Hissein Habre's presumed command post. From my hotel, located between the presidency of the republic, which had become a veritable entrenched camp patrolled by soldiers armed with Soviet-made light automatic machine guns, and the 13 April barracks, on the other side, I could clearly hear the noise of the rockets.

Moderation

Rumors began to fly about the "disappearance" of Hissein Habre. Had he taken refuge in the Sudanese embassy? Was he dead? The matter would be settled for all shortly. But it was noted that the police, the elite troops commanded by Lt Col Wadal A. Kamoughe, had not attacked. Thus in the eyes of the regular army, the situation did not seem especially to require it. Some military leaders close to Malloum wanted energetic and rapid action, but Malloum urged moderation.

For three weeks, the intelligence services had been warning that Hissein Habre was concentrating weapons and partisans in the African quarter of Ndjamena.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It seemed that Malloum preferred to let Hissein strike first. On Tuesday, 13 February, he criticized one of the army commanders, Lt Col Placide Adoum Ngamarou, for ordering the air attack on the prime minister's residence. This officer, vexed, was to be arrested on the afternoon of Thursday, 15 February, in Waza, Cameroon, 140 kilometers from the frontier, practically under my nose, for I had left Chad that day in order to try to make contact with JEUNE AFRIQUE.

On Tuesday, the battles resumed for fair. An effort by Habre's forces to seize the 13 April barracks during the night had failed, but they succeeded in taking and destroying the telecommunications station Monday night. Ndjamea no longer had any telephone or Telex links with the outer world. Two automatic 7.65 rifle bullets were fired through my room, number 33, at the Grand Hotel.

There was to be a certain lull during the day. But there was talk of battles with machetes and bows and arrows in the neighborhoods where most of the residents are Gorane (Habre's tribe) and Choa Arabs--Kilimat, the mosque area, etc. The neighborhoods with a Mbai or Sara majority--Moursal, Chagoua and Paris-Congo, were calm.

Hissein Habre's chief of staff had regrouped the partisans in a secret command post in the Saint-Martin basin. As of Wednesday, 14 February, his forces were able to mount a new attack on the police barracks and the 13 April camp. They were repelled. But the advantage then seemed to swing back to Habre's troops. Toward 1330 hours, rumors about Malloum's "capitulation" were circulating. Only Kamoughe was fighting on, it was said.

Evacuation

However, the people seemed surprised by this capitulation. The presidency is not far from the zone staked out by the French troops near the French embassy. It was not in danger of falling. In addition, there was speculation about the attitude of Malloum, who had not ordered the Chadian troops based at the 27 April camp in Farcha into action.

Beginning on Wednesday noon, almost all the French and other foreigners were evacuated to the Franco-Chadian base at the Adji-Kosseï camp in Farcha (2,000 to 3,000 French soldiers). The French community suffered only a single casualty--a pilot in the French cooperation program, who was accidentally shot in his own doorway while returning from Sahr where he had gone in search of DC-4 reinforcements. The next day there was a second victim, also accidental, a Mr Gilbert.

The seven "individual" French pilots in the Chadian army had been sent out of Chad "so as to avoid any threat to the French community as a whole," according to the embassy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Cease-Fire

An implicit cease-fire was in effect as of 15 February. That day, only a few bursts of machine-gun fire violated the truce.

Malloum resolutely played the game of pacification, on the advice of the French General Forest and certain African chiefs of state. During this time, Habre's troops adopted guerrilla tactics, sending several commando units against the police stations and barracks. Which suggested a certain advantage in the field for Habre.

I left Ndjamena on Saturday, 17 February, when the situation was politically confused but stabilized from a military point of view. The disagreements within the ANT command and the hesitation were serious hindrances to Malloum's troops.

But no one "won" in the field. On the other hand, there were heavy losses: for Chad and its citizens, 1,000 to 2,000 dead, substantial damage, and infrastructures destroyed. Chad lost 10 years in a few days.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

5157
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONGO

SASSOU NGUESSO'S PRESIDENCY SEEN AS VICTORY FOR LEFT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 19 Feb- 4 Mar 79 p 30

[Article by Mariam Sysle: "The Clearing"]

[Text] The crisis triggered by last year's assassination of President Marien Ngouabi at last seems to have ended.

Events of extreme importance have just taken place in Brazzaville. The CMP (Party Military Committee)--which had held full power since the assassination of President Ngouabi on 18 March 1977--returned this power to the hands of the PCT (Congolese Labor Party) Central Committee. The chief of state, Gen Yhomby Opango, who had also been chairman of the CMP and of the cabinet, resigned. He was replaced at the head of the state by Denis Sassou Nguesso who had been deputy chairman of the CMP and defense minister. Finally, a special party congress was scheduled for 26 March and a directory of four members, under the leadership of Thisthere Tchicaya, permanent Central Committee secretary, was appointed to prepare this meeting.

These upheavals are certainly not the result of an alleged palace revolution--as a certain segment of the press, which is more interested in sensational news than careful analysis, is trying to have everyone believe. On the contrary, these upsets are the outcome of a bitter and prolonged struggle between two political lines.

What Was At Stake

To understand what was at stake, we must go back to the assassination of President Ngouabi. The brutal and tragic disappearance of the chief of state had created a vacuum full of danger, in a context marked by political and economic plots, hatched by the imperialist powers and, domestically, by the counterrevolutionary forces. The important thing therefore was to stop these immediate threats as quickly as possible, to face them under the best conditions of effectiveness.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Under these conditions, the PCT Central Committee "until further orders" entrusted full power to an 11-member military committee. In the spirit of the majority of the Central Committee members and, more generally speaking, the militants, there was no question of an abdication by the party and its leading role; this was merely a question of constituting an exceptional structure in response to a situation which itself was exceptional.

Now--and this is the first split that manifested itself within the CMP-- this exceptional situation tended to perpetuate itself. A certain number of leaders went along with the idea of putting the party and its organizations on all echelons to sleep and suppressing the people's powers which had been instituted in 1974. The decisions were made at the summit without having been submitted for discussion among the rank and file. This produced profound uneasiness among the militants and a demobilization which could not in any way help overcome the redoubtable problems which the country had to face.

In effect, the foreign and domestic plots--the economic quasi-boycott, the failure of the attempts on the life of Denis Sassou Nguesso, etc.-- continued without effective countermeasures being taken. The economic situation kept getting worse, bringing financial difficulties to the point where civil service salaries were paid after considerable delay while prices on daily necessities skyrocketed.

The Weight of the Younger Generation

Popular discontent was further stirred up by the diversion of public funds for prestige purposes as well as the inactivity of the commission charged with investigating ill-gotten gains.

A second split developed on the way as to how to tackle these problems. In view of imperialist pressure, the right-wing tendency recommended a policy of concessions and, on the domestic scene, measures the least of which one might say were in no way suitable for restoring the situation. The left-wing tendency--supported and pushed by the mass organizations, especially the young people--on the contrary demanded that the country embark on an offensive policy of radicalization, such as it had been suggested by the national conference held in October 1976.

The summoning, during the weeks to come, of a special congress, charged with thoroughly looking into these problems and appointing the men charged with carrying out the decisions--not just the regular congress announced on 1 January by Gen Yhomby Opango, limited only to economic problems--constitutes a victory for this tendency, just as did the accession of Denis Sassou Nguesso to the presidency of the republic.

A victory which, according to all evidence, is in line with the expectation of the people of the "Three Glories."

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

5058

28

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GABON

NEW FACES IN GOVERNMENT MAY ASSIST IN AUSTERITY PROGRAM

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 946, 21 Feb 79 pp 36-37

[Article by Sory Serinde Diallo: "New Faces"]

[Excerpts] The congress of the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) which was held in Libreville from 24 to 29 January marked a relative democratization of political life in Gabon (see our issue No 944). It also revealed President Omar Bongo's intention of partially replacing his team for implementing the austerity policy the economic situation in the country makes necessary.

But this democracy is still taking stumbling steps. Certain members of the Central Committee still occupy seats on it as a function of their posts (presidents of specialized bodies of the party, the National Assembly, Supreme Court, the ministers of economy and finances and national defense) or their duties.

The prime minister automatically is a member of the Political Bureau, the members of which are in fact chosen from the Central Committee by the secretary-general. The founder of the party, El Hadj Omar Bongo, the president of the republic who calls himself "the great comrade," remains secretary-general by right. That having been said, the main restriction on democratization remains the single-party system. The PDG continues to monopolize political life and the second congress endorsed its primacy over other institutions, governmental and administrative.

The congress in Libreville was marked by the resumption of party control by President Bongo, to whom the members of the Central Committee, some of whom are elected by the people, swore an oath of fidelity and loyalty. If indeed such a man as Henri Minko, who has been a member of the Political Bureau for about a dozen years, was retained, the choice of the new members was characterized by the spectacular departure of Dr Eloi Rahandi Chambrier --a departure some rightly or wrongly linked with the August 1978 affair involving citizens of Benin--and the striking incorporation of such young technocrats as Jean-Francois Ntoutoume, minister in charge of coordination

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of economic and financial affairs at the presidency; Etienne Moussirou, minister of commerce and industrial development; Mamadou Diop, customs director for the past dozen or so years; Jules Ogoulinguede, an eminent jurist; and Julien Mpuho, a personal adviser to the chief of state known for his discretion and courtesy.

These personnel changes, to be followed by a ministerial reorganization and diplomatic changes, seem to be the result of the chief of state's desire to appoint new men for a new policy.

"Democratic and concentrated progressivism" is the new ideology which will replace "directed and planned liberalism." This is the Gabonese path of development. It differs from capitalism, socialism and all the other economic doctrines insofar as it "gives development priority over growth and gives social progress priority over consumption." Its goal is to make the nation the master of its own economy, by protecting certain professions against foreign competition, by facilitating access for citizens to credit and business ownership, by creating small businessmen. But it will involve no nationalization. In a period of economic recession, it is clearly a question of reducing the very important role of foreigners in business somewhat.

Before the country can put this new economic policy into use, it must emerge from the serious financial crisis it is currently experiencing.

The state launched a number of major work projects and had to go heavily into debt to finance these investments. The debt came to 507 billion CFA francs as of 31 December 1978 (as compared, it is true, to 576 billion a year earlier). In the year just past, 147 billion CFA francs (more than 51 percent of the export income, more than 65 percent of the budget) went to cover the debt service.

To avoid bankruptcy, Gabon was forced, under pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in particular, to put into operation, at the beginning of 1978, an austerity plan which overall is yielding good results.

This led the state to reduce its rate of advance. Public expenditures fell from 296 billion CFA francs in 1977 to 167 billion in 1978. The hiring of public employees was suspended, except for young people completing their schooling. The Gabonese Cellulose Company (SOGACEL) and cattle ranch projects were postponed for lack of funds. Construction on the trans-Gabonese railroad will continue, but at a slower rate than planned. The expenditures to be made on this railroad line this year come to 23 billion CFA francs, as compared to a little more than 40 billion for the preceding years. The investment total in 1979 is in principle to be limited to 82 billion 300 million CFA francs as compared to 87 billion in 1978. Where prices are concerned, inflation was reduced to 11 percent in 1978 from 14 percent in 1977.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Better mastery of production costs (wages, energy) will make it possible to find a cure for the emaciation of the Gabonese economy. Then it will be possible to put the new economic policy into practice with some chance of success.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

5157

CSO: 4400

31

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GABON

PDG EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS RESULTS REVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 944, 7 Feb 79 pp 22, 23

[Article by Sory Serinde Diallo: "'Limited Democracy' in Libreville"]

[Text] The second extraordinary congress of the sole party in power, the PDG [Gabonese Democratic Party], completed its work on Monday 29 January before over 300 delegates.

For 6 days, the members of the congress, at times wearing uniforms bearing the effigy of El Hadj Omar Bongo, chief of state and secretary general of the party, examined the many draft resolutions submitted by the Political Bureau. The preceding congress, which was also the first one organized since the establishment of the PDG, in 1968, was held at the beginning of 1973.

"Concerted democratic progressionism" was proclaimed the PDG's ideology. The objective of this doctrine is "the people's well-being," by means of controlling the country's natural resources (oil, minerals, wood) and "participation by everyone in the common task of work and dialog."

The congress was an opportunity to introduce a limited dose of democracy into the party's operation. Thus, the rank-and-file members had the possibility of having more names than the actual number of members of the Central Committee appear on the lists of candidates for that body.

Each candidate could be elected only by the delegates from his district of origin. That was for the purpose of taking the pulse of the popularity (or unpopularity) of a given candidate.

Some high officials, some members of Parliament, had the disagreeable surprise of not being elected by their fellow countrymen. That was true of Martin Magnana, governor of Ogooue-Lolo, Joseph Ickamba, deputy mayor of Koulamoutou, or Dominique Boungouere, principal private secretary to the chief of state. Some people are already saying that these unlucky candidates will not be long in losing their administrative post. At any rate,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

this is probably a logical consequence. Party members would find it hard to understand that it would be otherwise after their verdict.

Cabinet Reshuffle

The congress also decided to forbid henceforth plurality of posts. And the government was invited to take the necessary steps. At present, a number of high-level state officials and even some ministers hold several posts as director general of companies or of public services. Under these conditions, it should not be amazing to hear the radio give out the following refrain all day long: "Corruption is a snake. Money earned dishonestly is a venom."

A cabinet reshuffle will undoubtedly be the first consequence of this congress. It will involve, perhaps, the reduction of a government team that is too numerous (25 ministers and 9 secretaries of state), as well the dismissal of those who are suspected of incompetency in their administration.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

10,042
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GAMBIA

NATION UNDERGOING 'SERIOUS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL DIFFICULTIES'

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 19 Feb - 4 Mar 79 pp 42, 43

[Article by Sam Essono: "Democracy--To Do What?"]

[Text] Being Country of "Roots"--Not Enough

Banjul, 15 minutes by plane from Dakar, at first sight looks like a provincial capital with an unchanged colonial air. This impression is especially strong downtown, along Wellington Street, which leads to the port, or along Cameroon Street and Buckle Avenue, the section with most of the embassies and banks.

Not far from there, close to the crafts and notions market, the headquarters of the old British administration, which, after independence, became the State House, remains intact.

A fief of the Wolof of Gambia, but a town controlled by a heavily Westernized local bourgeoisie, the Akous, Banjul has for several years been really swamped with tourists. The Swedes, the first to be interested in the coast of Gambia, grabbed about 10 kilometers of beach where they put up hotels and bathing facilities which are filled up the year round.

After this Scandinavian tourism came the Afro-Americans, ever since 1977. For the latter, as a matter of fact, Gambia has become a kind of pilgrimage place ever since "Roots" was published by the Black American novelist Alex Haley who, as we know, said that he had discovered his origins in the small Gambian village of Djouffoure and told of the forced voyage of his presumed ancestor, Kunta Kinte, to the Americas. Thus, 6,000 persons crossed the Atlantic during the year "Roots" was published. This was a tremendous windfall for Gambia which had just been devastated by the drought. This influx of tourists produced foreign exchange earnings and helped gain a hearing for the SOS launched by the Gambian government toward the international community.

But the beneficial effect of this "invasion" turned out to be very limited. The arrival of these foreigners with a purchasing power that was way out of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

proportion to that of the local citizens was bound to trigger a real speculative frenzy.

According to one member of the Gambian Labour Union, a union founded in 1928, Gambia and Banjul, in particular, today are experiencing serious problems. "In less than 3 years," he declared, "in spite of the existence of a consultative committee on wages and a subcommittee on price controls, the workers no longer manage to make ends meet. Prices have tripled in record time and they keep going up, while wage adjustments are far from keeping up with the situation."

In effect, Banjul has joined quite a few African capitals in terms of the cost of living; without risk of being wrong, one might even say that the Gambian citizens today get very little advantage out of the free port that was established in the city.

Moreover, phenomena of an entirely new character in the country--embezzlement of public funds, corruption, and delinquency--have made their appearance. The emotions caused among public opinion by the recent scandal involving the embezzlement of aid destined for the drought victims in particular persuaded the chief justice of the Supreme Court to demand severe penalties for the guilty individuals, especially the "white-collar criminals."

It was thus a Gambia beset by serious economic and social difficulties which, on 18 February, celebrated the 14th anniversary of its independence. This is an independence which, it was believed at the beginning of the sixties, would be followed by association with Senegal, into which Gambian territory finds itself wedged.

But we know that, in 1965, the Gambians preferred to go it alone, first of all as independent member of the Commonwealth and then, following 24 April 1970, with the proclamation of the Republic.

One of the characteristic features of this country is its system of bourgeois democracy inherited from colonial times, which the Gambians are very proud of. Summarizing this sentiment, President Dawda Kairaba Jawara declared on the eve of the April 1977 legislative election: "If there are African countries that can boast of having petroleum, then Gambia can boast of having democracy." Indeed, judging by the number of political formations that were able to establish themselves since independence, but whose existence is, to tell the truth, often rather ephemeral, Gambia remains one of the rare African countries that never put an end to the multiparty system. However, since 1962, political life has been entirely dominated by the PPP (Progressive People's Party) of Sir Dawda Jawara. This has been more true than ever before since the 1977 elections which gave the PPP 27 seats out of 35 and after the oldest Gambian organization, the United Party, joined the government party (following the death of its leader, Mr Forster).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

De Facto Two-Party System

Moreover, with the disappearance of the National Liberation Party--which had been created in 1975 by Master Teyacine Seck--Gambia presently in fact does have a two-party system. Facing the party in power, we have as a matter of fact only the NCP (National Convention Party) which has five seats in parliament. In spite of the very personal attacks by its leader, Mr Sheriff Moustapha Dibba, against the chief of state, the fact that the NCP is recruiting followers especially among the Mandingue tribe, hardly gets it a nationwide audience. Moreover, personality clashes are the outstanding feature of the political debate in Banjul and the personality of Mr Dibba certainly does not really lend itself to that sort of thing.

He is as a matter of fact being approached for having tried to camouflage the "Butu scandal"--a smuggling affair in which his brother was implicated at the time when, prior to his expulsion from the PPP, he was vice president of the republic. It is true that this situation still incites Mr Dibba into denouncing the corruption existing within the party in power. This is especially so since political life has, since last December, been dominated by the sensational disclosures coming from a high civil servant. They concern a diversion of gifts and food intended for the drought victims--something which allegedly was done by government personalities. This scandal--in which several aides of the president of the republic are implicated--persuaded Mr Jawara to get rid of three of his ministers while the administration's secretary-general preferred to take off.

But the denunciation of corruption is far from enough when it comes to putting a government program together. As for the party in power, one might ask oneself whether--through its policy oriented toward the free-enterprise system--it has not above all become a refuge for certain unscrupulous businessmen-politicians.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

5058
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GHANA

BRIEFS

CLINKER IMPORT LICENSES--The government of Ghana has decided to grant licenses for the import of Clinker in the amount of 40 million cedis this year, i.e. 6 million more than last year. However, with the devaluation of the local currency, and if other cheaper sources of supply are not found, this amount will not even cover purchase of the equivalent volume. This statement was made by Col B. K. Ahlijah, commissioner for industries, who emphasized the low level of stocks currently on hand. They totaled about 30,000 tons last 15 January, 6,000 of which are exclusively allocated for the building of the Kpong hydroelectric power plant. At a consumption rate of 4,000 tons per week, the commissioner said, the 24,000 remaining tons would be exhausted by 25 February. The two cement plants are operating at only 25 percent of their capacity, due to lack of raw materials. The situation is thus extremely critical, but Ghana has already experienced similar ones, which is the reason it is relying heavily for construction on the use of clay deposits and encouraging the construction of brick kilns. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 452] 5157

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

GDR AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT TRAINING--Within the framework of a national program with a view to specializing enterprises, the Machine Distribution (DIMA) company, the management of which the state has taken over, was recently placed under the jurisdiction of the Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture. It is to be nationalized within this year and will then, under the name MECANAGRO, concern itself solely with technical assistance for farm equipment. With a view to expanding the company on the national level, plans now call for the establishment of three regional centers (Maputo, Beira and Nampula) and the establishment of provincial branches for small and large repairs. Draft bylaws are being written. They were to have been completed by last 31 December, but amendments decided upon on the higher level led to certain changes in the text which could not therefore be finished in the scheduled time. Intensive training courses have been organized for personnel. Cadres will be trained in East Germany, and a group of six persons will leave for that country next May. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 467] 5157

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RHODESIA

MUZOREWA DEFENDS POSITION IN AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Feb 79 p 47

[Review by Mohamed Maiga of the book "Rise Up and Walk: An Autobiography" by Abel Muzorewa, Evans Brothers Limited, London and Ibadan, 1978]

[Text] The style, in which self-satisfaction contends with mysticism, is somewhat embarrassing. From the very beginning, Monsignor Abel Muzorewa emphasizes for us the fact that all his life, he has had not only to struggle, but above all to hesitate between two worlds. If not between life and death.

Thus when little Abel (who is of royal descent on both his father's and his mother's side) was born in Old Umfali on 14 April 1925, he was premature. He owed his life only to the skill of a Swedish nun, Sister Ellen Bjorklund. Then, chronically ill, a hospital patient in a bush clinic, he survived thanks to the empirical knowledge of his sekuru (maternal uncle), the healer Mafarachisi.

Next came the first years of his education: a cunning mixture of traditional African culture and the white schools conducted by the missionaries.

From then on, the future Methodist prelate would live divided between a devout family group in the city and the unforgettable love of a grandmother who had remained in the country. Finally, the opposite influences of his fetishist uncle and his church would become clear.

All this does not represent an unusual background in this southern Africa, formed by Christianity but bound to the traditional values. That is why, out of this book that is swarming with detail and not without humor, we shall mention only the "revelations" concerning the intrigues, personal rivalries, and dirty tricks which have constantly marked the struggle of the black nationalists. His observations are especially interesting because Abel Muzorewa is the last of all the Zimbabwe leaders to arrive on the political scene: in 1970, after theological studies in the United States and after being named in 1968 as a bishop of the United Methodist Church of Rhodesia.

His intellectual honesty cannot be questioned. But when he accuses Mr Joshua Nkomo, his pet aversion and original rival, of having sabotaged the struggle of the Zimbabwe people since 1975 in order to be in a better position to lead

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

it, he is remarkably quiet concerning the methods of his own staff (Muzorewa had no political training until the creation of his United African National Council -- UANC -- in 1977). Didn't his men maneuver to exclude Nkomo's men from the leadership of the important agencies of the Zimbabwe Liberation Council, the external counterpart of the African National Council (ANC)? Similarly, he tends to forget that it was at the suggestion of this same Nkomo that he attained the presidency of the ANC in 1974; the ANC was trying to be a broader nationalist front, until it broke up 2 years later.

"Muz" is no more convincing when he explains what must be called an about-face: rallying to Ian Smith after an infatuation with armed struggle. He says, in short, that he was forced to do this by the ambiguous attitude of the front-line countries -- especially Zambia, whose president, Kenneth Kaunda, is not dear to him and which welcomes Nkomo's troops. These countries simultaneously encouraged armed struggle and negotiation with the white government. According to Muzorewa, this could not last. So he had to choose, or be accused of confusion. The truth is that he was doomed to lose at that "game," for want of armed soldiers. In the end, one cannot help seeing in this autobiography a plea for the "internal agreement" that Muzorewa signed with Ian Smith on 3 March 1978 -- with the intention, among other things, of keeping out of power the Patriotic Front, one of whose two presidents is the very same Joshua Nkomo.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

8429
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

SENGHOR SEEN AS ABLE TO COPE WITH OPPOSITION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Jan 79 pp 32-34

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] If it is true that democracy dies for lack of debates and discussions, it must be believed that, as far as this point is concerned, the experiment initiated in Senegal has no need of life insurance. For the past few months, the debate between those in power and the opposition has been experiencing such dimension and such vitality that it no longer leaves anyone indifferent. The press, whose development is reflecting and accompanying this new policy, is widely echoing the debate.

A day no longer passes without a newspaper, either governmental or of the legal (or clandestine) opposition, publishing the contribution of a political personality or an independent intellectual. From the official daily LE SOLEIL to the TAXAW, organ of Sheikh Anta Diop's National Democratic Rally [RND], through ANDE SOPI, of former Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, and LE DEMOCRATE, organ of Maitre Abdoulaye Wade's Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), a review of the Senegalese press presents an unusual sight for the mind accustomed to the African journalistic landscape. It must also be completed by reading independent newspapers like LE POLITICIEN, a satirical organ, and PROMOTION, whose harsh criticism caused, of late, serious problems for its young and "relaxed" editor, Boubacar Biop.

No One Spared

All Senegalese political personalities, cadres and well-known intellectuals are participating in the debate. Attacks, counter-attacks, replies and other restatements thus accumulate into interminable columns in the newspapers. At the same time, each one is now subjected to the surveillance of the press and must take it into account. The smallest public or private statements, activities or actions by anyone are watched, reported, and submitted to criticism. Accuser or accused, no one is spared, from the head of state to the chairman of the National Assembly, through the ministers, opposition leaders, heads of central services, bank directors and other prominent businessmen.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

What is the root of the debate in progress in Senegal? Beside the increase in prices, distribution of income, abuses of power, themes which are invariably found in the mouth and in the writings of members of the opposition from all countries of the world, two subjects dominate the Senegalese political scene in particular: the multi-party system and national independence. The first directly results in the problem of Senegalese democracy. For-- and at first sight this can be surprising--the opposition believes that the democracy practiced in Senegal is not only "inadequate" but also "illusory." Consequently, the opposition condemns, in unison, the multi-party system as it now functions: a system which, since the December 1978 constitutional revision, limits the number of legal political parties in authority to four and which determines for each party a proper ideological current from which it cannot deviate under penalty of suspension: conservative, liberal, socialist and Marxist.

Upper Volta Model

All opposition leaders will invariably tell us that this limitation is not only "absurd" but also "arbitrary" and, consequently, unacceptable. Nevertheless, among one and all, the positions involve differences of opinion. Thus, Maitre Abdoulaye Wade is in agreement with President Senghor in believing that the non-limitation of parties would result in a proliferation which is needless and even detrimental to democracy. However, he considers "unacceptable" the constitutional procedure tending to confine the parties into pre-established ideological corsets. The leader of the PDS would, on the whole, favor the Upper Voltan Model which limits political parties to three, but allows all those which are established to freely offer themselves to universal suffrage at the outset. And it is the first three, those which have obtained the most votes, which are legalized; the others being destined to disappear or to merge with the legal organizations.

On the other hand, Sheikh Anta Dipp and Mamadou Dia are advocates of a full-scale multi-party system. The former has been fighting for 2 years for the recognition of his party, the RND. Moreover, this is not the first time that the eminent Egyptologist has been at variance with the authorities. In the past, he created the coalition of the Senegalese masses, then the Senegalese National Front, which were dissolved respectively in 1962 and 1966. For all that, he is not discouraged. On the contrary, "We intend to inscribe our action within the framework of the republic's law," he told us.

But the leader of the RND explains: "Senghor refuses to recognize our party under the fallacious pretext that we have not clearly defined our political personality, our social plan." In a peremptory tone, he protests against this attitude on the part of "someone who, in other respects, denies the existence of social classes in Africa." While claiming to be refraining from boasting, Sheikh Anta defies President Senghor to admit him into the legal democratic game: "Since the chief of state affirms that we are only

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

a handful of intellectuals, let him authorize us to present ourselves before universal suffrage. And the world will see." While waiting, he protests most vehemently against "those who call the RND a clandestine party." The RND is, according to him, an actual party which is fighting for its recognition, and which has nothing to hide."

As for the former prime minister, Mamadou Dia, he is even more categorical when he condemns the multi-party system established by President Senghor. Pretending to forget the suspension measures which he took not so very long ago against certain parties and opposition movements, today he declares himself an advocate of "full-scale pluralism". Until 1963 (he was arrested and imprisoned in 1962), he says without wincing, there was in Senegal a de facto and de jure pluralism.

And he affirms: "There is no danger in returning to full-scale pluralism in Senegal. If there is danger, it is more from the arbitrariness which prevents parties from being freely established than from their proliferation."

Convergences

In foreign policy, the critics proved to be even more virulent. The PDS does not go without condemning the government's positions on Angola and the Sahara. Maitre Abdoulaye Wade, moreover, is multiplying his diplomatic missions to capitals where President Senghor's policy is on the black list: Algiers, Tripoli, etc. The leftist opposition is going still further. In the name of national independence, it denounces "all the unequal so-called cooperation or assistance agreements," in particular those passed with France. It is committed, in the possibility of acceding to power one day, to abolishing the foreign bases established in Senegal, and to preventing any possibility of the national territory being used by foreign troops. The allusion to the French Jaguars stationed in Senegal which, a few months ago, were flattening the POLISARIO's columns is clear. However, most of these agreements were signed by Mamdou Dia's own hand. But that was in 1960, he said in his defense.

On these questions, as on others concerning domestic policy, convergences of opinion among the different opposition groups are numerous. Could they serve them as a platform, if not as a basis for agreement? Mamadou Dia is convinced of it. Especially since, in November 1978, he founded the COSU (Coordination of United Senegalese Opposition). "A truly dynamic unity was launched," he told us. In reality, it is only in its infancy. A long road remains to be traveled in order to attain unity.

The Carrot and the Stick

Not only did the RND not respond to the former prime minister's invitation, but also the clandestine African Independence Party (PAI) was reluctant to back the COSU's manifesto. Not to mention that the PDS, as well as Mahjout

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Diop's legal PAI, were both excluded from the conclave. "We only invited the parties and organizations not forming part of the constitutional system required and created by Senghor," Mamadou Dia indicated to us. Under these conditions, the Socialist Party in power seems to have beautiful days ahead of it. Moreover, it does not waste any opportunity to play on the inconsistencies of its adversaries, while in turn dangling a carrot and wielding a stick. That was how not long ago it announced, one after the other, the legalization of a fourth party, the Republican Party of Maitre Boubacar Gueye, and the promulgation of laws severely punishing "seditious associations." Among others, it concerns, of course, Mamadou Dia's COSU. Likewise, a series of laws is being prepared aiming at strictly regulating the press. There, also, the opposition knows what it is all about.

A true pursuit race between the power and the opposition now seems to be involved. The leaders are striving to contain their adversaries' impulses within the framework which they have chosen, but Dia and Sheikh Anta do not want this framework. Moreover, they ignore all the injunctions in order to organize themselves and act as if they were entitled to it.

An Effective Weapon

Then what means are left to President Senghor to make them listen to reason? "Let him arrest us if he wants", they reply in unison.

Between the laissez-faire which, obviously, is irritating it more and more and the prison to which it seems to be averse, will the power be able to find the effective weapon which its backers demand? For the 35 years during which he has dominated the Senegalese political scene, President Senghor has proved that he has more than one trick in his bag.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

9181
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TOGO

FIVE-YEAR PLAN REVIEWED, FUTURE AUGURS WELL

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 944, 7 Feb 79 p 47

[Text] Togo has obtained more loans than it wanted, in order to carry its third 5-year plan (1976-1980) to successful conclusion. It had estimated 97.7 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs for the first 2 years. Loans received have exceeded 129 billion. That was more than the country could absorb. Only 78.9 billion were used.

Growth

The lesson drawn at Lome is clear. Togo's policy enjoys an excellent reputation abroad as well as at home. But there is a certain degree of deficiency when it is a question of implementing the scheduled projects. Having said that, the total investment volume is increasing at an amazing speed. From 40 billion CFA francs for the first 5-year plan (1966-1970) to 76 billion for the second plan (1971-1975), it is going to reach or even exceed 250 billion for the third plan.

As a result of this development effort, growth of the gross domestic product was particularly rapid in 1976 and 1977: 11.1 percent on the average at current prices and 8.8 percent at constant prices, that is to say greater than the forecasts and than the performance of most African countries.

Development has been especially rapid with regard to the communications infrastructure, urban and tourist equipment (37 percent of projects carried out with regard to the objectives of the plan), as well as in industry, handicrafts and trade (35 percent). On the other hand, there has been a serious delay in the implementation of projects pertaining to administrative equipment (15.4 percent), rural development (15 percent), employment and projects of a social-cultural nature (11 percent).

The slowness of rural development has worried President Gnassingbe Eyadema very much. For over a year now, he has been trying to make the country aware of this problem on the topic of the "green revolution." Steps were

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

were taken to hasten application of the agriculture-landed property reform and several awareness seminars were arranged for that purpose. In order to give vigor to the "green revolution," the financial means of the National Agricultural Credit Bank (CNCA) were increased. An increase in the number of hydroagricultural projects by means of better water control, development of agroindustries on the basis of local resources, establishment of regional food products offices (ORPV) and "vertical" companies like TOGOFRUIT, TOGOGRAIN, Togolese Fisheries and many others.

Austerity

On reaching the middle of the plan, at the end of 1978, stock was taken and it had to be admitted that a certain danger, pointed out by the World Bank, was threatening. Investments underwent too fast and high a rate. If this trend persists, indebtedness may give rise to some problems. But the critical threshold has not been crossed and the government, in order not to accentuate these difficulties, is thinking about restraining certain investments, rectifying various projects, reducing the foreign debt to acceptable limits. All the same, the state has never been "at the edge of the abyss" or "in suspension of payments." It still has excellent friends all over the world in the fields of politics and finance.

Moreover, the government has gone over from theory to acts by establishing a 1979 budget less ambitious than anticipated, balanced at 62.6 billion CFA francs, an increase of barely 3.3 percent in comparison with the 1978 budget. And without new tax burdens. Forty-seven billion (+3.8 percent) are allocated for operating expenses and 15.6 billion for investments. This budget will be characterized not only by austerity, but also by a stricter control of expenditures.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

10,042
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TOGO

PHOSPHATE SECTOR TEMPORARILY HURT, FUTURE PLANS OUTLINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 944, 7 Feb 79 pp 54, 55

[Text] Phosphates are still the country's main mineral resource and its primary source of foreign exchange. Togo ranks sixth among the world's phosphate producers, at a respectable distance, it is true, from the three giants, the United States, the Soviet Union and Morocco. It belongs to the second squad together with China, Tunisia, Senegal, Jordan and South Africa.

But this resource is being seriously disturbed by the drop in prices and especially by the depreciation of the dollar in comparison with other currencies. With 2.5 million metric tons exported, phosphates brought in 34.5 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs, in 1974. In the following year, tonnage declined to 1.1 million metric tons for 17.4 billion CFA francs. More seriously, tonnage increased in 1976 (1.9 million metric tons) while its value continued to decline (13 billion CFA francs). In 1977 and 1978, tonnage continued to rise: 3 million metric tons in 1977 and 2.8 million in 1978. But prices stabilized at a level 50 percent lower than the 1974 and 1975 prices, when phosphates were sold at over \$70 a metric ton.

Doubtful Maneuvers

About 20 kilometers separate the Akoupame deposit from the ocean. The mineral, which is transported by railroad for 27 kilometers, is processed at the Kpeme industrial center, 35 kilometers east of Lome. Then it reaches a loading wharf on a conveyor belt. Mining began in 1961 (700,000 metric tons). Production doubled in 1965, tripled in 1973, quadrupled in 1977. The main customers are France and the Netherlands. Between 1961 and 1974, the Benin Mining Company made large profits from phosphates, but the Togolese State, at that time a very small shareholder, derived little profit from them.

As the result of doubtful maneuvers, the company was nationalized on 4 February 1974. Under the new acronym of CTMB [Togolese Benin Mines Company],

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

controlled by the state from then on, it enabled Togo to have a favorable balance of trade starting in that very same year, 1974. That was also the year of the great price rise. But fertilizer consumers made some savings. Prices and purchases decreased.

Beyond the Year 2000

While waiting for the end of the crisis, Togo is not giving up the game and is working at developing a processing industry for its phosphates. Four and a half billion CFA francs have been allocated for the establishment of a fifth production line in the Kpeme plant. A good part of this investment (3.1 billion CFA francs) comes from a pool of Arab banks and the rest from the French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation.

Production, which employs over 2,000 workers at present, may thus be increased to 4 million metric tons as early as 1980.

This effort belies the rumors according to which the Akoupame deposit is said to be almost depleted. Sizable discoveries have been made, moreover, and the government is planning the construction of a phosphated fertilizer plant, in the medium term.

Togolese phosphates will continue to be mined beyond the year 2000.

Togo even wants to enter the international fertilizer market. It is planning to build a phosphated fertilizer complex using raw material from the Kpeme region.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

10,042
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAIRE

BELGIUM, UNITED STATES 'CONVINCED MOBUTU REGIME AT LAST GASP'

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 19 Feb - 4 Mar 79 p 43

[Article by Fode Amadou: "A State of Semi-Insurrection?"]

[Text] Several Western captials are convinced that the Mobutu regime is on its last legs.

It was in reality the American press which sounded the alarm. Several correspondents from big New York and Washington newspapers in recent weeks wrote several articles stating that an explosive situation prevailed at Kinshasa, that the people are starving, that there is practically nothing left to be gotten on the markets in the capital, that corruption among members of the Mobutu family keeps spreading, and that most of the Zairian provinces no longer obey the central authority,

In other words, the American embassy, whose diplomats often serve as "authorized" sources for journalists from the United States, thus tried either to exert strong pressure on Mobutu or to prepare Western opinion for the inevitable downfall of the bloody Zairian dictator.

This was followed immediately by Mobutu's appeal to Brussels, Paris, and Rabat: "Zaire is once again threatened by red 'subversion,'" Mobutu telephoned his Belgian and French friends. "We need a new demonstration of your support in order to deter our adversaries. Help me." That was on Monday, 5 February.

The Belgian government did not hesitate for an instant. It looked for an excuse, a pretext. Thus, 24 hours later, the paracommandos, stationed at Flawinne (Namur), south of Brussels, were alerted, while the ministry of foreign affairs confirmed that they would be stationed at the Kitona Military Base, near Kinshasa, in the northwestern part of Zaire, "by virtue of the bilateral military cooperation agreement calling for the training of the Zairian armed forces." While Brussels is talking in terms of 300 paratroopers, foreign diplomats stationed in Kinshasa are talking about 1,000 and perhaps even more.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Belgian press in general did not share nor believe the statements from government circles. Several editorial writers talked about an "imminent expulsion" in the country while others talked about the arrival of the Belgian paratroopers to protect and, if necessary, to guarantee the evacuation of 30,000 Europeans from Zaire.

And the correspondent of the WASHINGTON POST at Kinshasa reported, in a lengthy analysis of the Zairian situation, that the people is in a state of semi-insurrection: "Nothing is working any more in this country. Neither politics, nor the economy, nor finances, nor education, nor public health. The experts from the IMF are desperate." And an AFP [French Press Agency] dispatch dated Brussels, 8 February, quotes a Belgian traveler returning from Kinshasa, according to whom "the Zairian capital is still on the brink of disaster. Everything seems to be disorganized."

As for Elysee [Palace], its position remains reserved for the moment. There is no question of dispatching French troops to Zaire, according to Mr Pierre Hunt, its spokesman. But the fact remains that Mr. Simonet, the head of Belgian diplomacy, kept his French counterpart informed as to Brussels' decision and that the latter replied: "President Giscard is not in any way thinking of sending forces to Zaire."

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

5058
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAIRE

CONDITIONS NOT VIEWED AS IMPROVING BY 1980

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5-18 Feb 1979 p 21

[Article by A. Fall: "Operation 'Smile'"]

[Text] The dictator has promised that by 1980 Zaire's people will smile again. But can one live on hope?

After a stay in Brussels where he owns a house and has many friends, on 15 January General Mobutu visited his "pal" Giscard d'Estaing in Paris. The French chief of state, who some weeks ago had publicly deplored the fact that Occidentals have not managed to overcome their reluctance to help financially a regime on constant probation, promised to double France's contribution (which will reach Fr 35 million) to the "recovery plan" for Zaire's economy, which is being called, simple, the "Mobutu plan."

This support from the French government, which has not faltered since Shaba's first war in 1977, is appreciated by a regime entirely in submission to large capitalistic countries. International Monetary Fund experts are already working in Kinshasa, where they have teamed with high government employees in charge of the country's economy and finance.

Wishing to obtain the promised funds as soon as possible, General Mobutu initiated a new devaluation of the zaire, the national monetary unit, at the beginning of January. The zaire has thus lost, in less than 2 months, around 100 percent of its value. Thus, he satisfied one principal condition laid down by occidental countries, which should take definite positions regarding their financial aid in March during meetings in Washington and Brussels.

Zaire's chief of state also wants it to look as if he is putting some order into an administration which does not have a reputation for being orderly. With the new government established in January he reduced the number of ministries to 20, notably creating a super-Ministry of Economy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

National Capitalists

With his usual affinity for words and the spectacular he asserted that "the year 1979 would be the year of choice between government or commerce for all of Zaire's managers." Mobutu's decree would attempt, according to the Zairian Press Agency, "to stop a trend observed for several years, in which high officials have mingled unlawful business activities with their administrative functions."

But it is difficult to imagine how this presidential injunction could by itself end a state of affairs which is the pillar of Zaire's economy. Besides, to deprive the only genuine national capitalists of all or part of their financial or real-estate interests, would speed up a "dezairization," by creating more opportunities for foreign investors. Is this what is desired in Kinshasa?

Much more will be needed to see "Zaire's people smile again," despite general Mobutu's promises for 1980.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

8924

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS REEXAMINED--Numerous enterprises under the multi-nationals are in the process of reexamining their investment programs in Zaire following the explosive tension prevailing in several Zairian cities. People in Kinshasa are wondering whether the Japanese consortium, which has just signed a contract for the construction of an 802-meter suspension bridge over the Zaire River, near Matadi, with a price tag of \$170 million, might not postpone the date at which work is to be started. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 19 Feb - 4 Mar 79 p 46] 5058

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAMBIA

NEW CABINET FORMED TO CONTROL POLITICAL TURMOIL

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5-18 Feb 79 pp 20, 21

[Article by Cherif Rachid]

[Text] A new government to insure control of a political class in turmoil.

Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia's chief of state, devoted weeks following his re-election in December to a takeover of the government and the United National Independence Party (UNIP).

In 1978 he had already silenced those accusing him of "encouraging capitalism while condemning it" and those--like Simon Kapwepwe, onetime candidate for the presidency--who were in favor of a return to economic liberalism and of negotiation at all costs with Zambia's neighbors, including Rhodesia.

Zambia's president needed elbow-room in political matters so that he could invite foreign capital into the country, negotiate an aid agreement with the all-powerful International Monetary Fund and in order to reopen borders with Rhodesia for trade. These initiatives antagonized the party's left wing and worried leaders of the Patriotic Front, of which one wing--the ZAPU led by Joshua Nkomo--has its headquarters in Zambia.

Recent incidents have demonstrated the tension created by some of these measures. At the end of December, for the first time since independence young Zambians attacked foreigners, particularly Europeans, in the streets of the capital. In addition, after several raids in immigration circles last year, which concluded with the expulsion of several hundred "undesirables," on 10 January Zambia's police arrested a dozen guerrillas from the ZAPU who were accused of participating in violence against villagers east of Lusaka.

Lusaka's Supreme Court insulted the chief of state in 1978 by invalidating the sentence condemning a former parliament member and Livingstone's former mayor to death who had been accused of attempting to overthrow the regime by force 2 years ago. A young Zambian army officer, Cap Francis Zyambo,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

was also tried on 10 January because "he spoke in favor of a military coup" and because he said such things as, "Let the army take over the government in Zambia and you will see changes."

To take control of a political class in turmoil, President Kaunda chose to reinforce the staff of the single party: Mainza Chona, released from duty as prime minister was appointed to this post. Moreover, Kenneth Kaunda accused South Africa and Rhodesia of supporting Zambian dissidents in order to "sabotage and destroy the country," distinguishing between those of his political opponents who have a constitutional right and those who aim at destroying the regime.

The new cabinet formed in January further demonstrates this takeover by the president and the party's leading team (in charge of "keeping in touch with the masses"). However, it is possible to wonder about the efficacy of this "double government" and about the conflicts of interests and tensions that will undoubtedly arise.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie

8924
CSO: 4400

END