

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

DATE DESK 21 Feb. 1952

SUBJECT: North Korean Military Instructions to Front-Line Units

NO. OF PAGES 1

25X1

PLACE ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS. LISTED BELOW

DATE OF INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

RETURN TO CIA LIBRARY 25X1



THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES. WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794 OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED, ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION



25X1 A staff meeting which was to be attended by 12 chiefs of staff of front-line units but to which only seven could come because of transportation difficulties, was held in P'yongyang from 7 to 10 July 1951. At this meeting the North Korean army chief of staff gave the following instructions:

- a. Construct embankment defense positions and make preparations for anti-tank and anti-aircraft operations; these are immediate problems. Establish a counter-intelligence area in each combat zone.
- b. Remove all United Nations guerrillas from areas back of your lines. Reports from the Ministry of Social Security indicate there are about 19,000 United Nations guerrillas operating in four areas, and that many of them are deserters from the North Korean army. Although these guerrillas are not organized as a single unit, their capacity for becoming active suddenly should be borne in mind. Operations which encourage their surrender, rather than mere military expeditions against them, are recommended.
- c. Civilians should not be harmed intentionally or consciously. The good will of the civilian mass population must be retained by the army if any future political campaign by the government is to succeed.
- d. Combat operations using mere weight of numbers should be avoided; employ small-scale attacks on enemy rear echelons instead.
- e. Assist North Korean guerrillas in ROK areas spiritually and materially. Infiltrate agents into hostile lines to secure information.

25X1  Comment. Presumably General NAM IL.

25X1

25X1

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL		DISTRIBUTION	
STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NSRB	
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI	

Document No. 007  
 No Change in Class.   
 Declassified  
 Class. Changed To: TS S C 25X1  
 Auth.: HR 70-2  
 Approved For Release 2006/04/14 : CIA-RDP82-06457R000200180009-0  
 By

INFORMATION REPORT

OR NO

ORJNOY Korea

DATE DISM 26 FEB 52

SUBJECT Dissension between North Korean Factions regarding the Cease-Fire Negotiations

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED

[Redacted box]

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO.

25X1

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

[Redacted box]

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794 OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

[Redacted box]

- 25X1 1. There was dissension in late July in the North Korean government between the Yanan, or pro-Chinese Communist group, and the pro-Soviet group. The former opposed the proposal for the negotiation of a Korean truce while the latter supported the proposal in accordance with instructions from Moscow.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet group supports the proposal on the basis of these arguments: North Korea cannot be independent of Soviet support, cannot risk losing that support, and can seek no aid from other nations of the "democratic" bloc and certainly not from the United Nations. This group also realizes that they can assure their political life only if they have the support of their Soviet friends, and therefore support the truce proposal for selfish reasons if for no other.
2. The Yanan group, which probably mirrors the views of the Chinese Communists themselves, holds to the idea that it is necessary to control all of Korea before the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty, since the greatest threat to the Chinese Communists is the rearmament of the Japanese. The Yanan group maintains it is necessary to secure a firm foothold in Korea, and therefore the present opportunity must be used to avoid heavier casualties in the future. The Yanan group also argues that China is a closer and more practical ally than Soviet Russia, and her assistance and cooperation are more desirable than the alternative of becoming a Soviet satellite. Furthermore, help from the Chinese Communists is also more understanding and more concrete than the Soviets' elaborate but conditional promises: it was not Soviet tanks or trucks which drove the United Nations back from the Yalu, but the skill and experience of the Chinese Communist troops. So long as the southern part of Korea remains in United States hands and so long as the Japanese decision will be affected by United States influence, there is always the possibility that Japan will enter the war after the signing of the peace treaty. The separation of Korea into two parts will not bring a lasting peace, and the success of the truce negotiations means only another period of preparation for war. Another war between the Koreans will occur, and this will invite the mobilization of the Japanese army and Japan's participation in the fight. The Chinese fear that the Japanese army could easily reach the Manchurian border with their experienced troops, and the Chinese losses would be heavier and more serious than they have been up to now. Therefore, runs the Yanan argument, all American influence has to be eliminated from South Korea to prevent an excuse for Japanese intervention: South Korea must be "liberated."

25X1

25X1

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL


STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NSRB	DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI	

Document No. 210  
 To Change In Class.   
 Declassified  
 Class. Changed To: TS S C 25X1  
 Auth. HR 70-2  
 Approved For Release 2006/04/14 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000400580009-0 By 210



3. In this struggle, neither party intends to surrender. While the Yen-an group has great power in the military, having about 70 percent of the divisional commanders in forward areas, the Soviet supporters have more authority to direct the activity of government officials and have used threats against their opponents. While outwardly the Yen-an group has had to give support to the truce proposals, it has been attempting to spread its ideas among military units. Because of this, a shift in military commanders will shortly be carried out by the Soviet group as a preventive measure.<sup>2</sup>

25X1



INFORMATION REPORT ID NO

21 Feb. 1952

SUBJECT North Korean Propaganda on the Progress of the War

NO. OF PAGES 2

25X1

PLACE ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS. LISTED BELOW

DATE OF INFO


25X1

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.



THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794 OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION



- 25X1 1. At a luncheon marking the first anniversary of the Korean war, given during a session of the North Korean army staff conference in P'yongyang 25 June 1951, General NAM IL, North Korean chief of staff, addressed the meeting on the status of the Korean war. NAM first repeated the usual claims that inefficiency and corruption were so prevalent in the ROK army that it had no prospect of improvement, and that its soldiers, being of the people, would come over to the North Koreans at every opportunity. Competition for money and position by the officers, dissension between the officers and men, and the inability of the young officers, the backbone of any army, to put their ideas into effect, NAM claimed, were responsible for falling morale in the ROK army, in contrast to the growing spirit in the Communist armies. He pointed to the frequent changes made in ROK army personnel as proof of confusion, and said that except for United Nations intervention complete victory would have been secured by the North Korean armies without Chinese Communist help. Noting that the real enemy was therefore the United States, NAM ended by saying: "The United States, however, will be obliged to withdraw her troops from Korea. World opinion will force her to take action in the near future. When this move is made, the final victory rests with us and the Korean people. We must unite firmly toward this goal."
- 25X1 2. In a memorandum issued by the Organization Department of the North Korean Labor Central Committee on 10 July 1951 and circulated to the chief of the P'yongyang People's Committee, the following policy lines were among those stressed:
  - a. The United Nations forces in Korea are disgusted with the stupidity and inefficiency shown by the ROK officials.
  - b. When the United Nations influence has disappeared from the ROK, that country will lapse further into a state of corruption, and it will be simple for the North Korean government to surge back into South Korea for the liberation without assistance from the Chinese.
  - 25X1 c. In case a general election in Korea is held under the supervision of the United Nations, the Soviet Union and other democratic (sic) nations will participate in the election and will be able to carry it out properly. Through the single candidate system, the North Korean government will obtain a majority vote; voters in South Korea will cooperate if a free election is

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Document No. 677

No Change in Class.

Declassified

Class. Changed To: TS S C

Auth.: HR 70-2

Date: 8 Sept 78

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2-

assured.

- d. Another six months of hardship must be endured before the final victory.
- e. Fifth column organizations will be strengthened to discover reactionary elements and deserters from the army.
- f. No aged persons or children will be mobilized for labor service. Mobilization will be limited to eligible men and women.
- g. Each city block should study preventive measures to protect against robbery by members of the Chinese Volunteer forces.

25X1

Comment. Most reports indicate that everyone able to work, regardless of age or sex, has been pressed into service by the North Korean army and government; this order may be an attempt to soften that policy.

CONFIDENTIAL

38

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2006/04/14 : CIA-RDP82-00457R010400380009-0

# INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY **Korea**

DATE DISTR. 26 FEB 52

SUBJECT Reasons for the Communists' Selection of Kaesong as Site of the Truce Negotiations

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED 25X1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO.

25X1

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

[Redacted]

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] of the three reasons why the Communists insisted that Kaesong be the site of the truce negotiations, the fact that Communist control of the area would make the defection of any of the Communist negotiations staff difficult was perhaps the most important. Since the defection of even one minor official of the Communists' conference staff would have been a serious security and propaganda loss, all delegations gave great consideration to this problem. The other reasons the Communists insisted on Kaesong were, first, that it was one of the few cities in the ROK held by the Communists and therefore had propaganda value; and, second, that the Communists wanted to be consistent in maintaining the idea that they had initiated the peace proposals and therefore held that their suggestion on the site of the talks should be accepted.

012  
Class. in class.   
Class. changed To: TS S G  
Date: 8 Sept 78  
By: [Redacted] 25X1

25X1 25X1

Approved For Release 2006/04/14 : CIA-RDP82-00457R010400380009-0

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	[Redacted]