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To 27 November 1951

1. Czechoslovak former Deputy Prime Minister Rudolf Slansky, Bedrich Geminder, who was known as a Moscow agent, Gustav Bares, known as the ideologist of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and Jiri Hendrych, Party youth leader, were arrested on direct orders from the Kremlin and will be tried as enemies of the state. The arrests have caused a sensation in Party circles. The Slansky case is particularly embarrassing in view of his prominence at the Prague celebration of July 1951, his much celebrated fiftieth birthday, his recent promotion to the post of Deputy Prime Minister and his more recent publicized contribution to Communist literature.
2. The Kremlin is asking why Slansky was promoted instead of being dismissed at the time when his deviation was first publicized. President Klement Gottwald now appears to be to blame. On 6 December 1951 either Gottwald or Prime Minister Antonin Zapotocky will make an official announcement concerning Slansky, probably to whitewash the Gottwald group and assure the USSR of the fulfillment of its expectations from Czechoslovakia. (1) Liquidation on orders from the Kremlin of such "Moscow men" as Bedrich Geminder is explained on the basis of the Moscow agents' antagonism of the Czech population and their failure to convert Czechoslovakia to a Soviet arsenal. It is reasoned that the armament program must go on and that a purge was needed to conciliate Czech nationalist Communists who claimed that they were better qualified to conduct the armament program than was the Moscow faction of the Party. (2)

To 3 December 1951

3. Josef Frank, a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Secretariat, and Jarmilla Taussig, who belonged to the Communist Party Control Staff and was known as the discoverer of the Svermova conspiracy, have been arrested. It is now clear that Gottwald personally received the order to conduct the Slansky purge from Soviet Ambassador to Prague Anatol Lavrentiev. Contrary to the usual procedure Minister of National Security Ladislav Kopriva requested Gottwald's concurrence for the entire series of arrests

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which were made in connection with the purge, possibly indicating that Kopriva is not secure in his position.(3)

4. There are three possible counts on which Slansky may be tried: Titoism, Zionism, and activity for the West. He will be condemned to death on the last mentioned count. The Slansky purge means that the role of the Czechoslovak Communist Party will be reduced to the fields of workers' morale and increased production. Economic planning and industrial management will be supervised by the Czechoslovak government under Moscow orders relayed to Gottwald and Zapotocky by Lavrentiev. Temporary leaders of the Party Secretariat will be Vaclav David and Josef Novotny, both former District Party Secretaries. The positions of Geminder, Bares and Hendrych will remain open for some time. Deputy Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger is one of the few high-ranking Communists to survive the present purge. Deputy Prime Minister General Ludvig Svoboda was dropped from the Cabinet in September 1951. At present he is still sitting in his office but gets no work.
5. By 1 January 1952 the USSR will control all Czech industrial production and will place the emphasis on armaments. Gottwald's Soviet advisers have already changed plans without consulting the Czechs; for example, this was done when production of the Poldi Steel Works in Kladno was switched to an emphasis on military output. In military production the Czechs have been ordered to concentrate on jet fighter aircraft and anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. It is believed that tank and artillery deliveries will continue but at a lower level than was expected.(4)
6. Czech officials hold the following views:
The USSR does not want war but is convinced that for internal reasons (sic) the United States must attack it. U.S. armament and its assembling (sic) of allies indicate the inevitability of war. The United States will not be ready before late 1952 or 1953. In the meantime the Soviet Union must strengthen its military defenses and its ties with the Satellites, and will forego certain military advantages by agreeing to a unified Germany, ostensibly a parliamentary democracy, but will undermine the new state economically and politically and thus temporarily cancel the German military potential. The war may begin with a Western attack on the Czechoslovak-Bavarian frontier.

To 18 December 1951

7. Czechoslovak Minister of Information Vaclav Kopecky may be in trouble. Kopecky's personal representative Hina was discharged from the Ministry, and Hora, allegedly a high-ranking StB official, was arrested. Gustav Bares is reported to have been released from prison. As a result of the Slansky purge, Mikhail Silin, former Soviet Ambassador to Prague, was disciplined; Troloff (sic) of the Czechoslovak section of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Judin (sic), a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and an acquaintance of Slansky, were arrested.(5)

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- (1) [REDACTED] Comment: Gottwald did make a speech on 6 December denouncing Slansky as a Titoist who was caught trying to flee to the West.

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- (2) [REDACTED] Comment: The nationalist group led by Gottwald and Zapotocky will suffer the same fate as Slansky if they fail to produce satisfactorily for the USSR. It is believed that the secondary stage of the Slansky purge will remove Czech Ambassador to the USSR Karel Kreibich and Party Cadre Chief Bruno Koehler. Koehler is vulnerable because of his failure to spot the Slansky conspiracy. [REDACTED] Comment: It is believed that Koehler was recently arrested; however, the probable reason was that he was a supporter of Slansky.)

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- 25X1X
- (3) **Comment:** Kopriva may be removed for his failure as chief of the Personnel Section of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to spot the Slansky group's activities.
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- (4) **Comment:** The USSR already controls virtually all Czech production as a result of its advisory commissions which have been placed in the more important government offices and industrial management offices. It seems improbable that Czechoslovakia will be ordered to concentrate on jet fighter aircraft in view of its apparently very low production capacity for this type of armament at this time. Czechoslovakia's production capacity in the field of armored vehicles, artillery and ammunition, on the other hand, is considerable.
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- (5) **Comment:** M.D. Frolov, believed to be the individual referred to in this report, was Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Prague as of August 1949. A Pavel Alexandrovich Yudin was Minister of the Building Industry in the USSR in 1950; a P. F. Yudin was a member of the Soviet diplomatic staff in the United States. No Judin is known to hold a high position in the Soviet government or Communist Party.

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