

INFORMATION REPORT

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
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1. The unification of the South Korean Labor Party and the North Korean Labor Party as the Korean Labor Party in 1948 was directed by the Soviet Communist Party, whose instructions were relayed to the North Korean premier, KIM Il-song, and the secretary of the North Korean Labor Party, HO Ka-i, by Soviet Ambassador Terenti Shtykov in the summer of 1948. It was the established procedure that instructions from the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Politburo were passed to the North Korean Labor Party in this manner, and from the Politburo of the North Korean Labor Party to the NKLP Central Committee. From there the measures would go down to the provincial, city, county, and district committees, from where they would be distributed as instructions or procedures in branch and cell meetings, without amendment.
2. In each case, it was understood that the lower organization was not to make changes in the principles or the instructions handed down by the upper body, but could discuss freely the means of carrying out the resolution. Generally the upper body would indicate the background of the resolution, the tactics it deemed necessary to carry it out, what the task assigned signified in relation to international and domestic issues, and the date the task was to be completed or the policy put into effect. The superior body also usually indicated the man in the lower organization responsible for seeing that the task was carried out successfully, and another who was charged with the responsibility of investigating the procedures and means employed. If completion of the task were delayed or the problem handled ineffectively, the person responsible was subject to disciplinary action.
3. The orders for the unification of the two parties were similarly implemented. The first meeting concerned with the problem was held early in the summer of 1948, with only the top-ranking members of both parties present. Representatives of the Politburo of the NKLP included KIM Il-song, HO Ka-i, and KIM Ch'ae'k of the Soviet faction, and KIM Tu-pong and CH'OE Chang-ik of the Yenan faction. PAK Hon-yong and HO Non represented the SKLP. KIM Il-song and HO Ka-i, however, actually directed the meeting and the writing of the draft agreement on unification, in accordance with the instructions received from Shtykov, and were able to retain the initiative in succeeding meetings. The move for unification was at first

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kept secret from the rank and file of both parties and other minor parties which followed the Labor Party line.

4. Each group was responsible thereafter for pushing the draft agreement through the central committees of the two parties, which was quickly accomplished in mid-1948.
5. The final meeting, which determined the details of the unification, was held in the conference room of NKLP headquarters in Pyongyang in August 1948, and was attended by about 200 members of the NKLP and 100 representatives of the SKLP.² Topics for discussion included the following:
 - a. International and domestic circumstances making necessary the unification of the two parties.
 - b. Significance of the unification.
 - c. Procedures to be employed in implementing the unification.
 - d. Preliminary draft on the organization of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the new Korean Labor Party.

The consideration of no other matters was permitted, and the conference in effect merely adopted the decisions previously agreed upon by the Politburo members, led by KIM IL-song and HO Ka-i, and selected the members of the Central Committee in accordance with the Politburo choices.

6. The first formal meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party was also held at the conference. The same procedure was followed since the committee discussed only the matters already approved by the Politburo members and selected for the Politburo posts those members already approved. They included:

KIM IL-song, HO Ka-i, and KIM Ch'aek of the Soviet faction.

KIM Tu-pong and CH'OE Chang-ik of the Yenan faction.

PAK Hŏn-yong and HŐ Hŏn, of the SKLP, members of the Nationalist faction.
7. Organizational changes which followed this formal unification of the two parties on the surface seemed to give an imposing number of high party and governmental positions to SKLP leaders. The actual result of the unification, however, was to place the South Koreans under the control of the North Korean leaders and increase the latter's direct influence in South Korea itself. SKLP leaders did not dare to voice openly their opposition to North Korean policies in party committee meetings, even at the highest levels.
8. An NKLP encroachment on what the SKLP faction deemed their province was the organization prior to 1948 of a "Southern Operations" section of the NKLP. Part of the functions of the section was to play the role of a liaison office for Labor Party members in South Korea who had been purged or had drifted away from the party. Most of the members of this office were South Koreans who had fled north, but the direction of the activity was in the hands of NKLP members. Further, after the first North Korean occupation of Seoul, the section set up a branch office in the city to handle the work of converting South Korean middle-of-the-roads and liberals to Communism, although SKLP members previously had been carrying on this work. This was opposed without success by former members of the SKLP, and although the section was disbanded shortly after they publicly announced unification of the party in July 1950, their failure to be heeded previously in the matter irritated the SKLP faction.

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9. In spite of the union, repeatedly the NKLP leaders showed their unwillingness to place faith or responsibility in the SKLP members. After the election of 10 May 1950 in South Korea, in which the South Korean Communists were notably unsuccessful, many SKLP leaders fled to North Korea during the months of May and June. Though many had held important positions in the party in South Korea, in North Korea they were assigned to the Kongdong Political School or the Sadang Staff School (the Academy of Political Science and World Economics) for more intensive indoctrination in Communist theory and training in party organization, in which most were believed deficient. A second important reason was the desire to have an opportunity to observe the South Koreans and check their political reliability.
10. North Korean dominance was also demonstrated by the lack of real power held by many South Koreans who had been appointed to high governmental offices. KIM O-song (金 永昌), formerly chief of the Propaganda Bureau of the SKLP, was given the post of Vice-Minister of Culture and Propaganda in the North Korean government. The other vice-minister, HO Ka-i (succeded in June 1949 by another Soviet-Korean, T'AE Song-su (太 成洙), who held a similar power), actually determined policy in the Ministry, to the exclusion of even the minister herself, HO Chong-suk (洪 鍾淑). HO Ka-i and later T'AE were in charge of all the key bureaus such as propaganda, culture, translation, and planning, while KIM O-song handled only the publication, film, and southern areas bureaus.
11. Another example of how the North Korean party leaders overshadowed their South Korean colleagues because of both superior ability and political astuteness was seen in the fate of HO Song-t'aek (洪 成澤) and his group of North and South Korean Party organizers sent to South Korea after the early successes of the North Korean Army. Their mission was the reorganization of all People's Committees in South Korean areas then held by the North Korean Army. CH'A To-sun (車 道孫), vice-chief of the Korean Labor Party Culture and Propaganda Bureau and a loyal follower of HO Ka-i, was HO Song-t'aek's deputy in the task, and the Soviet faction's representative in this operation. The majority of the chairmen of the re-constituted People's Committees were South Koreans, in which case the vice-chairmen were usually North Koreans. However, because of their better training and greater experience in party organization, the latter carried out their duties more efficiently than did the South Koreans, who had generally worked relatively alone in underground activities. Thus the NKLP officers, whether chairmen of subordinates, gradually drew to themselves the power of making important policy decisions in the committees. This created discontent and aroused opposition among the South Koreans, who believed the decisions in many cases were arbitrary and made without the advice of South Koreans who presumably were more familiar with the problems of the locality.
12. These conflicts were reflected on even the highest levels of the party organization, where HO Song-t'aek and CH'A supported their own groups against each other. CH'A reported the dispute directly to HO Ka-i, with the result that HO Song-t'aek was expelled from the party for alleged favoritism toward the SKLP point of view in his conduct of these operations.

25X1A 1. [redacted] Comment. Reported as the "Korean Labor Party" or the "Korean Central Labor Party" in [redacted]

25X1A 2. [redacted] Comment. According to another report, unification of the party took place in Pyongyang in February 1950, and the Politburo members there listed include additionally PAK Il-u, Minister of Internal Affairs, and YI Sung-yup (SILP), later head of the Seoul People's Committee, while KIM Tu-pong is omitted and named as chairman of the Supreme People's Committee. This view and a list of the Central Committee members are found in [redacted]. Support 25X1A

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for the present account, however, is found in the fact that in September 1948 there were personnel changes in nearly all high North Korean government posts. Radio Pyongyang announced on 6 September 1948 the formation of a "new government." South Korean leaders appointed to important posts included PAK Hon-yong, Vice-Premier and Minister of Finance; HO Song-t'aek, Minister of Labor; PAK Nam-un (白南雲), Minister of Education, and YI Sung-yup, Minister of Justice.

3. [REDACTED] Comment. HO Chong-suk is the wife of CH'OE Chang-ik, North Korean Minister of Finance, and the daughter of HO Han, president of KIM Il-song University.

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4. [REDACTED] Comment. HO Ka-i claimed he rather than PAK Hon-yong, SKLP leader, had the power to dispatch political organizers to South Korea, on the grounds that previous SKLP failures lost them prestige in South Korea and indicated a lack of ability. It is possible that HO permitted HO Song-t'aek to carry on this activity since CH'A was in a position to observe and report. HO was previously reported expelled from the party 23 December 1950 on charges of failure to arrange cooperation between the southern and northern factions of the party and failure to handle guerrillas effectively, the latter being his principal task. These views are noted in [REDACTED]

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