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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Yugoslavia

DATE DISTR. 10 August 1951

SUBJECT Cominform Activity and Propaganda Against Yugoslavia

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1. [REDACTED] the nature of current Cominform activity against Yugoslavia and the nature of the propaganda line being employed in the country and peripheral areas as it has been received by him from various informants. While much of the reply received contains overt information, it is believed the following retains some interest because of the informants' accessibility to the opinions and feelings of Yugoslav Party and Government officials.

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a. Propaganda and limited sabotage activities are being conducted into Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste and Yugoslavia itself from Zone A and the Austrian border area. Currently, the Cominformists are attempting to coordinate small individual illegal groups into a single compact and directed organization. [REDACTED] there have been reports of contacts being made with members of the conservative opposition within the country to propose collaboration in anti-Tito activity. Concerning sabotage, [REDACTED] limited sabotage is currently being waged on a wide-scale basis. This consists of ruining machines by "accidental" means in heavy industry plants, absenteeism in factories, quitting jobs, and producing only the absolute minimum required in work output.

b. Recently there has been an increase in intelligence activity by Cominformist groups. It is alleged that activists are being infiltrated at all levels to collect intelligence data and to organize nets among satellite embassy and consulate employees throughout Yugoslavia.

c. The Cominform propaganda line within the country continues to play upon the fears of the population that another war is imminent. In substantiating this allegation the propaganda maintains that the Tito regime in collaboration with Anglo-Americans is rearming for aggressive purposes and the government has assumed secret treaty obligations with the Western powers. The aid being given to the regime is in response to these obligations and the government has lost military, political and economic independence.

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On the positive side it is stated that the struggle for liberation from the Tito regime is continuing and victory is certain. Yugoslavia shortly will return to the family of nations composed of the People's Democracies headed by the Soviet Union. The Cominformists allege to be organized and ready to seize power at the appropriate time.

- d. Concerning methods of distribution of illegal Cominform propaganda within Yugoslavia source reiterated that the known procedures are still being used. These would include the releasing of sealed cans and bottles containing propaganda material into rivers flowing into the country, placing propaganda in mail boxes and under doors, painting slogans on walls and placing pamphlets in train coaches running from satellite areas into Yugoslavia. He added that Yugoslav cargo ships now calling at Trieste are used to secrete propaganda material for dissemination upon return. Couriers from Trieste and Gorizia are also in contact with resistance groups who distribute propaganda material in the mails.

2. [REDACTED] the morale and intentions of the Yugoslav troops, both enlisted men and officers, particularly in the event of satellite attack:

- a. The Yugoslav Army and Party leaders do not believe a satellite or Soviet attack is presently imminent. This feeling is based on the failure of the Korean adventure and the increasing rapprochement between the Yugoslav Government and the United States and Great Britain. The Military Aid Program is also felt to be a factor that is deterring an aggression.

[REDACTED] the opinion that the Yugoslav Army, particularly its Serb elements, is anti-Russian.

- b. The officers' morale is reported to be relatively good. The officer corps was largely selected by Communist Party officials and source reports that a sense of indebtedness exists. The people as well as the Army also believe that United Nations forces will actively assist Yugoslavia in repelling any aggression. This U.N. assistance is an important factor in Army as well as civilian morale.

- c. The morale of the enlisted personnel is reported to be very bad, however. Most come from average peasant families which are hostile to the government. The detachment from Moscow and the change in Yugoslav foreign policy has allegedly had little effect on enlisted morale.

- d. [REDACTED] the Army's ability to resist is doubtful. First, because pro-Cominform officers, though small in number, could partially paralyze the officer corps and their influence would increase in the event of an aggression. Top Army officials are reported to be deeply fearful of the Soviets and possible reprisal should the Cominformists gain control. An "insignificant part of the officer corps" will fight determinedly because they are closely linked with the Tito regime and policies and feel themselves compromised with respect to the Cominform and Yugoslav Nationalist groups. Should the Soviets invite Communist officials in the Yugoslav Army to revolt and fight the regime, promising complete reinstatement and good standing, it is reported that only a few would refuse.

- e. The troops will avoid combat and desert as soon as it is clear that the present regime is no longer in a position to take action against them. They hate the regime and source alleges that the arrival of Soviets will simply mean a change of dictatorship as far as the troops are concerned.

- f. [REDACTED] the Army as a whole lacks any basic ideological tie with the regime and is not prepared ideologically for a severe struggle. Furthermore, the people would not support the Army which would severely cripple its ability to fight even should it so desire.