Approved For Release 1999/09/27: CIA-RDP82-00457R007400610003 25X1/ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. INFORMATION REPORT CD NO. China/USSR/Korea COUNTRY DATE DISTR. 10 April 1951 Sino-Soviet Decisions Concerning Morean Conflict SUBJECT NO, OF PAGES 25X1A NO. OF ENCLS. PLACE. ACQUIRED 25X1A DATE OF SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. THE COCKETTEN CONTRACT SHEPSTRATION APPLICIANT WE NATIONAL DEPENDENCE OF THE CAPTIONAL DEPENDENCE OF THE CAPTION OF THE CAPTIO THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 25X1X SOURCE Results of the latest Sino-Soviet conference in Peiping are as follows: The Chinese and Morean Communists will not stop the Morean conflict, regardless of peace moves by the United Nations (UN). The Soviets are responsible for the supplying of large quantities of munitions necessary to maintain the struggle. The Soviets will form an international volunteer army including Soviets and other Europeans as reserves, with the stipulation that they will not leave Chinese territory in order to avoid international incidents.

- The Soviets are responsible for the construction of defense fortifications on the Sino-Korean border, the South China coast and in the Northwest and Southwest.
- d. The Soviets will send troops to China for defense of the Korean border. If UN troops cross the border the Soviet troops will engage them. If, on the contrary, the UN troops are pushed out of Korea, the Soviets will strike Japan.
- The Chinese Communists will train a reserve of 5,000,000 men against a third world war. Two million will be trained within six months to replace Morcan casualties. All will be Soviet-equipped.
- f. According to a military agreement, the Soviets and Chinese will coordinate all action. In Asia the Chinese will be responsible, and will supply the mampower while the Soviets give the material. In Europe the Soviets will carry on by themselves. Thus tension will be maintained throughout the world by the Communist front.
- g. At present the top strategy is to absorb as many Americans as possible 25X1Ain lorea by continued pressure or threat.

and all referenced reports. It would Comment. See appear doubtful that informant had access to detailed information on high-level Sino-Soviet decisions, and this would appear to be largely derived from rumors started by widespread speculation on future Sino-Soviet moves in Korea,

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