

INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT Survey of Communist Subversive Activities Throughout Far East

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
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GENERAL

Communist Subversive Policy

1. Communist strategy in the Far East remains unchanged; the Cominform journal, which has devoted much of its attention to Europe during the last quarter of 1950, has carried no articles which might be interpreted as containing significantly changed ideological or practical guidance. The colonial and dependent territories of the Far East are to be liberated from foreign imperialist rule whether that rule be exercised directly or through nominally independent puppets. Rebels in Indochina, the Philippines, and Malaya are lauded for their achievements and exhorted to continue their rebellions. China herself has invaded Korea and Tibet and it seems likely that, in addition to continuing, and probably increasing, assistance to the Viet Minh, China will give material aid to the Burma Communist Party (BCP), whose insurrection will probably collapse, without such aid.
2. There is no indication that any other Communist Party is receiving or is about to receive aid that might enable it to organize a revolt, nor that any Party is well enough equipped or sufficiently strong in numbers to launch an insurrection independently. Their tasks are still to win popular support by propaganda and agitation within the law, or else covertly, and to form broad fronts embracing all those who oppose foreign imperialism and its agents on any count. The mobilizing of support for the World Peace Congress continues to be an important task.

Direction and Coordination of Communist Activity in the Far East.

3. Reports have continued to refer to an "International Cominform" or a "Far East Cominform" with directive authority over national Communist Parties.

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Certain of the reports affirm that a "Central Communist Intelligence Agency" exists in the Far East either within or outside the "Far East Cominform". While some reports contain much circumstantial detail, it has not been possible to verify the existence of any such bodies nor to confirm that any identifiable individual is engaged in the task imputed to him. Many of the allegations are most probably fabricated from mercenary or political motives by persons with no knowledge of the functions of the European Cominform, in so far as these are known, and are confused by the varied ways in which the Chinese characters denoting the organizations may be rendered in English.

4. It is, however, likely that Communist activities in the Far East, where major military operations and more than one insurrection are in progress, are centrally coordinated. Whether such coordination is by a permanent body with representatives from the various Far East Communist Parties resembling the Comintern more than the Cominform, or by agreement between Chinese and Russian representatives, is unknown. There has been no indication of what consultation, if any, has taken place between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU(B)) before guidance articles dealing with the Far East have appeared in the Cominform journal or in Soviet or Chinese Party papers or in all three. There has perhaps been a tendency to assume without conclusive information that the Cominform journal has been the platform for the exposition of the arbitrary views of the CPSU(B). While it seems certain that the CPSU(B) has endorsed all articles of major significance, little is known, however, about the discussions which precede the appearance of important articles containing ideological or practical advice. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that when these concern the Far East, there has been consultation with the CCP and that due regard has been paid to its views.
5. However Communist policy in the Far East is framed, there can be no doubt of the complete outward unanimity and mutual trust of the CCP and the CPSU(B). There has been no sign of dissension between them nor of reluctance within the CCP to accept the CPSU(B) as the leader of the forces of international Communism, with itself as the champion of Communism in the Far East. This joint leadership has been reflected in the prominence given in organs of Communist propaganda to the formation and activities in the countries of the Far East of bi-national friendship societies in which Russia and China are the beneficiaries. The fact that Eastern European students are to study in China suggests that there is no mistrust of China's ideological reliability.

#### The Role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

6. There can be no question that Communist China is playing the dominant role in the execution of Communist strategy in the Far East. Preoccupation with problems of internal reconstruction has not prevented the invasion of Korea and Tibet. It is Communist China which is aiding the Viet Minh and is likely to give assistance to the MCP. It is the CCP which gives fraternal guidance to the other Communist Parties of the Far East. It is the CCP which bears the main burden of representing the Far East in the central councils of the World Federation of Trade Unions and the other international front organizations and which is the main servant of these organizations in the Far East.
7. There has been no sign of serious disagreement among the leaders of the CCP. In China, Party "cleansing" is drawing to a close, and vigorous action is being taken to extirpate disloyal and uncooperative elements. Much effort is still directed to rallying Overseas Chinese throughout the Far East to support the Chinese People's Government (CPG); the CCP's satellite parties, of whom the burden of this effort falls, remain under the domination of the CCP.

#### Summary of the Position in Territories other than China.

8. Hong Kong. Chinese Communists in Hong Kong have made no attempt to challenge the Government. Their influence over organized labor has continued to decline.

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but they have had some success in renewed attempts to penetrate education. The unexplained departure of prominent labor leaders may prelude an effort to stir an industrial unrest. More stringent security measures are not thought to be directed against the contingency of supporting an armed invasion but to be primarily a defensive precaution. The taking-over of Nationalist assets has been completed; it was followed by the departure from the Colony of the CPG/CCP official who had had charge. Another Communist personality of higher rank is believed to have left Hong Kong about the end of November 1950 or early in December 1950 and there are signs that he does not intend to return.

9. Malaya and Singapore. Pandit operations in the Federation of Malaya increased in number in October and November 1950, but declined in December 1950. Provided the MCP does not receive external aid, Government countermeasures should take increasing effect. In Singapore, Police action has deprived the Party of its chief leader and silenced certain organs of Communist propaganda.
10. Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. There are indications that Chinese successes in Korea are stimulating the Overseas Chinese into more active sympathy with the CPG.
11. India. There has been little change in the areas where organized Communist violence is taking place. The Communist Party of India (CPI) has not yet resolved its differences over policy and there has, therefore, been a lack of central direction. It seems probable that the differences will be resolved early in 1951, when the Party will be able to attempt the formation of a broad anti-Government front.
12. Pakistan. Communists in Pakistan who look to India for direction have suffered like the CPI from its internal schisms. It is not likely that they will constitute a serious security threat in the near future.
13. Burma. The Burma Communist Party (BCP), failing to increase its strength and military effectiveness, is trying to enlist within the People's Democratic Front (PDF) the cooperation of other rebellious elements. It has met with some success but it is not thought that this will endure; the ability of the BCP to continue its insurrection appears to depend on the arrival of aid from China. The Burma Government and sections of the population have been antagonized by Chinese activities in Burma.
14. Indochina. It seems probable that the Communist Party of Indochina (PCI) has dismantled much of its formal organization but that the nucleus of leadership remains intact and functions as such. Cooperation between China and the Viet Minh is increasing.
15. Thailand. The Thai Communist Party (SCP) appears to be winning the support of influential Thai left-wing professional persons. International developments will determine its success in extending its influence.
16. Indonesia. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has made progress in absorbing or discrediting its opponents, a prelude to the formation of a United Front which it will be able to control. There is no indication that the PKI intends or is at present able to organize armed rebellion. The new Chinese Embassy appears to have restricted its relations with the PKI to a propaganda service.
17. Japan. Government countermeasures have deprived the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) of revenue and propaganda vehicles. The disagreements among its leaders continue. Unless Government policy is softened, it is unlikely to regain its old position of influence. Apart from the JCP's having accepted ideological guidance and help in propaganda from the CCP, nothing is known of JCP/CCP relations.

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18. The Philippines. There has been no important change. The armed HMB revolt has little prospect of success, unaided, despite the Government's incapacity to take effective action against it.
19. Tibet. It is not known what organized Communist activity has taken place in Tibet. The Chinese conquest of the territory will permit attempts to win over Mongolians in Indian frontier provinces.
20. Taiwan. After KMT repressive measures, there is probably no organized Communist activity in Taiwan.

The World Front Organizations and the Far East.

21. The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). China has taken the main part in representing the Far East in the central councils of the WFTU and its Trade Union Internationals. A Chinese representative has been assigned to represent WFTU at meetings organized by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East to be held in Pakistan.
22. The Asia and Australasian Trade Union Liaison Bureau (AATULB) of WFTU. It is now clear that the AATULB is operating, although information is too fragmentary to permit a clear definition of its duties. It is kept informed by WFTU of central activity involving labor in the Far East and is itself in touch with national trade union centers in the Far East. In addition to the executive members of the Bureau, representing China, the Soviet Union, Australia and India, of whom although D.S. Vaidya was nominated early in 1950 as India's representative, only the Australian, Ernest Thornton's, presence in Peiping is confirmed, labor representatives from Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam are in Peiping.
23. The World Peace Congress. Although China provided by far the largest delegation and received most publicity, several representatives from Far East countries were delegated to attend the Sheffield-Warsaw Congress. Communist propaganda has paid considerable attention to the formation of peace committees and the obtaining of signatures in the Far East to the peace appeal.
24. The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF). The prominence of China has again been emphasized. It was the All China Federation of Democratic Women which was charged with representing WIDF at the Indonesian Women's Congress.
25. The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). A large delegation from WFDY, led by its Secretary General, toured China in September-October 1950. After their return to their own countries, its members have acted as propagandists for China.
26. The International Union of Students (IUS). Recent information shows conclusively that the IUS and the All Burma Students Union have been partially successful in efforts making from 1949 to enable Burmese students to travel covertly to Prague to take up scholarships and to establish a secret channel of communication. It may be that there has been similar action in respect to other territories in the Far East.
27. Future Trends. An article entitled "For Peace, Democracy and Socialism" in the last issue of 1950 of the Cominform journal defined in language of aggressive confidence Communist intentions in the Far East. Insurrections are to continue with the Soviet Union as leader of the forces of Communism and China as leader in the Far East. The article continues as follows:

"The 20th Century is the century of Lenin and Stalin; it will be the century of the victory of Communism over accursed capitalism...The struggle of the peoples for peace is headed by the country of victorious Socialism - the Soviet Union...Indissoluble friendship

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and singleness of purpose strengthen the mighty alliance of the Soviet Union and China, the pillar of peace and security in the Far East. The peoples of the colonial and dependent countries are continuing their tireless struggle for freedom and national independence. They are winning victories in Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia, and in the Philippines. They are looking forward with confidence to 1961 - the year of further struggle against imperialism and of fresh victories for the just cause."

28. There is little truth in the assertion that the peoples of Viet Nam, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines are winning victories single-handed. Except in Viet Nam, where aid from China has been an important factor, there is little likelihood of the Communists overthrowing the established Governments. In Burma, the RCP seems unlikely to be able to prolong its rebellion without substantial aid from China; and elsewhere in the Far East no Communist Party appears to be able to challenge the Government with armed force. Future events clearly depend on the actions of the Chinese State.

Factors militating against the Spread of Communism.

29. The long-term and largely inponderable factors, already reviewed in past papers, do not require recapitulation.
30. It appears likely that the splits in the CPI and the JCP will be healed and that in Indonesia the PKI will eventually establish its ascendancy.
31. The expansion of the activities of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in the Far East seems likely to be a counterpoise to the operations of WFTU.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP)

Constitutional Position.

1. There has been no change in the constitutional position of the Party.

Strength.

2. No figures for Party membership are available since 1 July 1950, when a total of over five million was claimed by the Hsin Hua News Agency. The Party "cleansing" has probably caused some decrease.
3. The Party's hold on the Central People's Government (CPG) remains as firm as ever. Trusted members of the Central Committee occupy key posts, and the satellite parties and groups in the coalition must content themselves with minor offices or be surrounded by Communists who ensure that there is no deviation from the Common Program.

External Policy.

4. The CCP's fidelity to the international "party line" shows no sign of wavering, nor is there any indication that the CCP is dissatisfied with its role as second-in-command to the Soviet Union of the forces of international Communism and as acknowledged leader in the Far East. In September 1950, the Cominform Journal reminded China of the debt owed to the Soviet Army. Shortly after this article appeared, CHU Te, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Communist Army, hastened to acknowledge the debt in an article which was also published in For a Lasting Peace. The anniversaries of the establishment of the CPG on 1 October 1950 and of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association on 5 October 1950 provided MAO Tse-tung, CHOU En-lai, LIU Shao-chi and other top-ranking CCP leaders with an opportunity to stress the solidarity of the two peoples and of the world peace camp, and to extol the Soviet Union as China's "great and excellent teacher and friend".

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5. In its policy toward the countries of Southeast Asia, where China has special interests which might possibly lead to friction, the CCP has closely followed the Moscow line. Following the Cominform Journal's editorial on "The Struggle of the Peoples of Southeast Asia", the CCP propaganda machine took up the cry in early October. The Peiping radio and newspapers denounced British imperialist policy in Malaya, dismissed Burma's independence as fictitious, eulogized the Viet Minh forces, and observed that the Indonesians continued to "struggle unceasingly for independence". The growth of the liberation movement in Southeast Asia was attributed to the awakening of national consciousness under the stimulus of the historic victories of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. It was pointed out that the CCP has provided the pattern for successful revolution under the guidance of the Communist Parties.
6. The CCP's right to advise the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has not been challenged by opposing factions within the JCP. SHIHO Eturo, Chairman of the Central Directorate of the JCP, publicly expressed his appreciation of the CCP's advice and urged all members of the JCP to gauge their actions by it. China's growing prestige in Japanese Communist circles was also reflected by the JCP's increased attention to CCP literature; attempts are being made in Japan to produce a new volume of the selected works of MAO Tse-tung, with official Chinese cooperation. The Communist Party of India (CPI), which was instructed by the Cominform to apply the lessons of the Chinese Revolution to its own situation, has been so rent by internal dissension, that little has been done to implement this advice, but it is the method of practical application, and not the validity of the CCP's example which is now under debate.
7. The most important development in CCP external relations during the quarter was, however, not connected with Japan or India but with the territories on China's frontiers. In addition to China's armed intervention in Tibet and Korea, her aid to the Viet Minh increased; the South China Sub-Bureau of the CCP is believed to have sent representatives to work with the Viet Minh. The question of CCP aid for the Burma Communist Party (BCP), which has been under negotiation for some months, also appears to have been resolved. The BCP leaders who returned to Burma in late November 1950 reported that, following discussions with MAO Tse-tung and KAO Kang, supplies of arms would begin to arrive in Burma by late January or early February, 1951. At the same time, the new CPB Embassy in Rangoon has shown little consideration for the susceptibilities of the Thakin NU Government. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to note that internal reconstruction, economic problems, and the scale of hostilities in Korea have not prevented the CCP from taking practical steps to assist the "national liberation forces" so strongly advocated by I U Shao-chi in November 1949.

#### Internal Policy.

8. Occasional reports are still received of discension in the higher ranks of the Party and of the existence of "Chinese" and "International cliques. In the absence of any confirmation of these reports or of any visible repercussions, it is wiser to conclude that Party solidarity is unaffected.
9. The Party "cleansing" appears to be drawing to a close, except in those regions which were temporarily exempted for economic reasons. No final report has yet appeared but although it appears that the purge produced no high-level liquidations, it is almost certain that purification has been achieved by a reduction in membership. The retooling of the "working-style of Party Cadres" must also be nearing completion.
10. Following the "Counter-Espionage Month" decreed in September by the South China Military and Political Commission, numerous reports have been received of a tightening of security measures, particularly in Kwangtung Province where

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CPC officials were forbidden to visit Hong Kong or Macao except on official business and then only with the permission of the Public Security Bureau. Reports have also been received of an intensification of counter-espionage measures in the Ministry of Heavy Industry. Throughout the quarter, CPC propagandists devoted considerable time and space to accusations of American and RT espionage and the arrest of alleged agents. Other measures to combat counter-revolutionary activity included action by the Public Security Bureau against the Taoists in North West China, anti-bandit campaigns in Jehol and Fukien, the suppression of "lawless landlords" accused of sabotaging land reform, and touring security exhibitions designed to increase public alertness. A directive issued by the East China Bureau of the CPC called for the completion of land reform by April 1951 in view of the "intensification of subversive activity by counter-revolutionary elements."

Policy towards Overseas Chinese.

11. Propaganda directed towards the achievement of unity among the Overseas Chinese, the establishment of a Democratic Front, and support of the mother-country, has been the principal feature of CPC policy toward Chinese abroad. These themes have been repeated constantly in broadcast speeches, and a special newspaper now being published in Canton under the guidance of the United Front Department and dedicated to the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia is designed for the same purpose.
12. Overseas students continue to return in large numbers to China for higher education, and the Southern University in Canton proposes to open a special Overseas Chinese Department.
13. The Overseas Chinese Friendly Associations in the main South China ports have been forging closer links with the various racial groups abroad and have been very active in the reception and settlement of repatriates and students. It is chiefly through these Associations that recent anti-British propaganda protesting the treatment of Chinese in Malaya has been channelled.

Review of Events from 1 October 1950.

14. The last quarter of 1950 opened with the National Day celebrations which began on 1 October. CHOU En-lai delivered a lengthy report to the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, dealing with the international situation and the consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship. Practically all the CPC and satellite party leaders delivered speeches, of political rather than security interest.
15. The delegation of the World Federation of Democratic Youth which arrived in Peiping at the end of September, toured China and left for Europe on 20 October with a group of 42 Chinese youth leaders visiting the USSR as guests of the Consol. On 29 October, KUO Mo-jo, Vice-Premier of the CPC Administrative Council, left at the head of a strong delegation to attend the World Peace Congress, and LIU Ning-yi led a delegation to Great Britain to attend the anniversary meeting of the Britain-China Friendship Association. The All China Federation of Labor was represented at the Maritime and Port Workers' Trade Union International Conference in Warsaw.
16. Throughout the period, the China Committee to Defend World Peace and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association were particularly active. The former Committee merged with the "China People's Campaign Committee against American Aggression," and by the end of October it was announced that 195,000,000 people in China had signed the Stockholm appeal. The general line that the defense of world peace was inseparable from opposition to American aggression dominated all peace propaganda. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, which celebrated its first anniversary in October, claimed to have 3,000,000 members and 4,700 branches.

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17. Other CCP organizations which are increasing their membership include the China New Democratic Youth League (CNDYL), which in April 1949 had a total of 190,000 members and now claims to have 3,000,000. The CNDYL, which corresponds to the Comsomol, also has a junior branch, the Young Pioneers, with a membership of 1,500,000. These organizations are distinct from the mass front organizations for youth and students, the All China Federation of Democratic Youth and the All China Students Federation. These activities of the CNDYL and the Young Pioneers include study of Soviet life, customs and techniques, and of the biographies of MAO and Stalin.

#### The Satellite Parties.

18. The satellites of the CCP cannot claim to have any policy other than that of the Chinese Communists, although in certain overseas Chinese communities they have a proselytizing role on behalf of the CPC for which they provide a facade of democracy. During the last week of November and early December, the Democracy Promotion Association (DPA), the China Democratic League (CDL), the KMT Revolutionary Committee and other satellite groups convened a series of conferences in Peiping to discuss the current situation and "problems of work". They did little more than endorse the policy of the CCP and the Government.

#### Future Trends.

19. It is increasingly evident that the CCP is prepared to run considerable risks and to divert resources from the major problems of internal reconstruction in order to afford direct assistance to the "national liberation forces" headed by fraternal Communist Parties in neighboring countries. The situation in Indochina and Burma cannot be interpreted as posing a threat to China's security comparable with that which they profess to see in the United Nations' action in Korea. There is no disharmony between the CCP policy of creating a Communist bloc in Southeast Asia in furtherance of international Communist strategy, and the ambition of the CPC to reclaim territory which they, like their predecessors, regard as China irredenta. In addition, no conflict is at present evident between the policies of USSR and China. No internal dissension or deviation from the international line is therefore likely to develop under present conditions.
20. If the CCP's promise of arms for the Burma Communist Party is implemented, the Party will have intervened directly to secure the success of armed Communist-led revolts in three neighboring territories. It would be ingenious to suppose that similar aid will not in due course be given to the Thai and Malayan Communist Parties, particularly as these Parties are overwhelmingly Chinese in composition. Meanwhile, winning over overseas Chinese communities will be methodically carried out on every front, with the satellite groups which are not so obstetrically labelled "Communist", playing an important role. When the process of seduction is sufficiently advanced, the CCP will be able to employ the overseas Chinese to lead or to support indigenous Communist revolutions designed finally to break the "chain of imperialism" at its weakest links. Such a program is sufficiently flexible to be capable of adaptation should anti-Communist resistance stiffen.
21. The decision to aid the BCP is in some ways the most serious decision the CCP has taken since its advent to power. Intervention in Korea, aid to the Viet Minh, and the invasion of Tibet can all be explained, however speciously, as missions of liberation. Material aid to a revolt against an independent nationalist government with which China has entered into diplomatic relations will be less easily explained to countries such as India and Indonesia. It is therefore possible that special precautions will be taken to keep the assistance secret as long as possible.
22. Internally, it appears unlikely that the Party will accelerate its progress towards the second stage of the revolution - the creation of a Socialist

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society and a dictatorship of the proletariat. The anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, first stage of New Democracy is adequate for the present purposes of both CCP and Soviet policy.

23. It appears probable that the Party will take advantage of the present strained international situation to intensify action against all counter-revolutionary elements.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE CCP IN HONG KONG

1. There has been no change in the constitutional position of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong; it has never functioned openly as a party and has therefore never been declared illegal.

#### Strength.

2. It is not possible to give an accurate assessment of the numerical strength of the CCP in Hong Kong. One source of doubtful reliability has estimated the membership at 40,000, but this probably includes members and supporters. A guide to the likely membership figures may be found in the membership of the unions affiliated to the CCP-controlled Federation of Trade Unions (FTU). It is reliably estimated that this does not exceed 18,000 although the FTU claims 45,000; it is evident from recent events that many of the 18,000 are only lukewarm supporters of the FTU. It is improbable that the CCP in Hong Kong has more than 20,000 members.

#### Policy.

3. Although the CCP has never functioned openly as a party in Hong Kong, it is only in the last three months that strict security measures have been enforced within the Party. In the months immediately following the Communist occupation of Kwangtung, the CCP in Hong Kong tended to believe that it would be able to function at least semi-overtly. As a result, the activities of many CCP leaders became well enough known to the authorities for several to be deported. These deportations have had a two-fold effect; a check has been imposed on CCP efforts to extend its influence and in particular, to control labor and education, and it has drawn the conclusion that it must be more circumspect in its activities.
4. The security measures planned and partially put into effect in recent months have appeared also to be a precaution against the Party's having to go underground completely. There is no indication that the CCP in Hong Kong expects early Chinese military action against the Colony which it would be required to support by fomenting civil disturbances. Its increased security awareness appears rather to reflect an apprehension that, in the event of an extension of the Korean hostilities, Hong Kong would be used as a base for Anglo-American offensive operations against South China, accompanied by vigorous repressive measures against local Communists.

#### Review of Events from 1 October 1950.

5. The period opened with a trade union conference called by the All Kwangtung Provincial Federation of Labor Preparatory Committee in Canton. This ten-day meeting with 300 delegates from Hong Kong, Macao, and Kwangtung ended on 1 October. The Colony's importance was emphasized by the election of four former Hong Kong labor leaders to a presidium of 26. Two of these four were at one time chairmen of unions affiliated to the FTU. Whatever action was decided on at this conference, it had no apparent effect on Hong Kong labor.

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6. The principal feature of the period has been the continued weakening of the influence of the FTU, a decline which started in February, 1950, after the abortive tramways strike, and continued during the summer. In the three months under review, its position has again deteriorated. Right-wing splinter unions have appeared among six unions which previously acknowledged FTU leadership; typical of left-wing concern is that expressed by the executive of the Royal Naval Dockyard Workers Union over their membership out of 5,000 eligible workers of only 1,600 of whom they admitted that only 400 were paying dues.
  7. During December at least 36 trade union personalities, all from unions affiliated to the FTU, left the Colony. They included seventeen important and prominent officials. All left secretly and in great haste, without applying for leave from their employers, and unaccompanied by their families. It is not thought that such a large number of senior officials would have left the Colony within a few days of each other without direct orders. The manner in which they left has meant the loss of their jobs and their certain compromise in official eyes. The reasons for their departure are unknown, but it appears that they may return to the Colony with the intention of fomenting industrial unrest.
  8. An abundant supply of labor in Hong Kong and poor conditions in neighboring China have militated against FTU success in much the same way as a shortage of schools has permitted an extension of CCP influence in education. The CCP has consolidated its position in schools. It does not appear to have made any serious attempt to renegette Government-controlled schools. The inadequacy of these, however, for the large number of children requiring education has led to the improvisation of both day and night schools, many of which have started under CCP-inspiration and control. A Government request that all children in the Colony unable to obtain any education, public or private, should register produced 21,000 registrations.
  9. The CPG has almost completed the task begun a year ago of taking over Nationalist assets in Hong Kong. Many of the resources and staff of the organizations have been transferred from Hong Kong and the Hong Kong offices closed. At least one important CCP/CPG official, who was charged with supervising the taking-over is known to have left the Colony in December. It is probable that his chief, the most important known Chinese Communist in Hong Kong, also departed in late November or early December. The US embargo on strategic materials and the taking over of Nationalist assets have considerably reduced the value of Hong Kong as a commercial entrepot for the CCP/CPG. It remains valuable as an entry and exit point for propaganda, overseas Chinese, and couriers.
- Future Trends.
10. The internal security precautions now in force in the Party may be an exclusively defensive measure prompted by the uncertainties of the international situation. They may, however, be a prelude to offensive clandestine activity designed either to intensify the difficulties of the Government in economic matters or to coincide with an armed attack on the Colony. They will certainly make investigation of the Party's organization and activities more difficult.

BURMA COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP)Constitutional Position.

1. The constitutional position of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) or White Flag Communists remains unchanged.

Strength.

2. Reliable information suggests that the strict Party membership is considerably less than was previously estimated, being little more than one thousand.

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The main areas of influence of the BCP are Central Burma, (raker, South Pegu, and North Menthawaddy districts. Attempts being made to increase the strength of the People's Democratic Front (PDF) by offering acceptable terms of collaboration to other insurgent groups are meeting with some success. It is doubtful, however, whether this will be long-lived. There is no new information concerning the strength of the Party's subordinate organizations.

3. The total armed strength at the disposal of the BCP is now reported to be about 10,000 in all Burma. Most of this is in the People's Army of Burma of the BCP-led PDF, which is being reorganized into four divisions, each division having two brigades, each brigade three battalions, and each battalion three companies of 125 men. One division has been formed, the 2nd Division in Upper Burma is nearing completion, and the 3rd and 4th Divisions are still in the initial stages of mobilization.

#### Policy.

4. At a Central Committee meeting held in September 1960, the BCP reformulated its policy regarding the PDF and invited the collaboration of all other insurgent groups and "leftists" in overt political organizations, provided they subscribed to any one of the following three points:
  - a. Opposition to Anglo-American Imperialism,
  - b. The fight against the Thakin NW Government,
  - c. Land reform

It is thought that this step was taken not only because of the increasing weakness of the insurgent camp but also so that Thakin THAN TUN on his imminent visit to Peiping might be able to present MAO Tse-tung with a picture of a broad-based United Front led by the BCP.

5. There is reason to believe that Thakin THAN TUN returned from Peiping at the end of November, bringing with him a promise of arms from China, and three Chinese Liaison Officers who are now attached to the BCP to determine, so it is stated, the nature of the aid required; it may be that their main task is to report on the efficiency and influence of the BCP before MAO Tse-tung finally commits himself. However, MAO undertook to assist in the training of BCP cadres, the first detachment of which is already said to be in Paoshan (Western Yunnan).
6. The group which earlier expressed doubts about the wisdom of accepting aid from China has voiced no open objection to this latest development, but their former doubts persist. This group, including three members of the Central Executive Committee, comprises 25 percent to 30 percent of the Party's leaders.

#### Review of Events from 1 October 1960.

7. Sabotage and ambush operations have steadily diminished during the period and a redistribution of forces is in progress. This apparently is designed to concentrate the armed strength of the BCP in the Yarethin-Pyinnma areas and to the north, leaving only a skeleton organization in Lower Burma. This, it appears, is to facilitate training and reorganization in preparation for aid from China, and also the dispatch of cadres for training in Yunnan.
8. The Party's main effort has been to strengthen the PDF through numerous negotiations at district level to secure agreement for collaboration with other insurgent groups. Negotiations with the CP(B), which aim ultimately at fusing the two parties, have been in progress at the highest level; the BCP's first objective is to secure the collaboration of the Red Flags and

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the question of a merger is therefore being approached with considerable caution. The greatest success has been obtained in the Insein and Khartha-waddy districts where "People's United Commissions" have been established with two representatives each from the BCP, the Red Flags, the People's Volunteer Organization, and the Karen National Defense Organization.

9. In September 1950, another World Peace Congress (Burma) (not to be confused with that sponsored by the Trades Union Congress (Burma)) was established in insurgent areas under the auspices of the PDF. A signature campaign has begun.

The Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party (BWPP).

10. In December the extremist wing of the Burma Socialist Party (BSP) which had been increasingly outspoken in its support for the Soviet Union and its satellites broke away to form the Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party, its leaders comprising nearly all the officials of the BSP's trade union and peasant organizations. This party is self-described as Communist in all but name and is mobilizing opposition to the BSP and the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. In its manifesto the Party emphasizes its determination to work democratically and within the law, but there is a veiled hint that it will resort to other means, should present democratic rights be restricted or withdrawn.

Overseas Chinese.

11. Close relations have now been established between the new CPC Embassy and the principal members of the CDL(B), and there can be no doubt that the latter organization is the main vehicle through which the CPC is trying to extend its influence over the Chinese community in Burma. The unification of this community is obviously one of the main targets of the Embassy, but considerable opposition is being encountered from the KMT factions, who, though no longer pro-CHIANG Kai-shek, are anti-Communist. [REDACTED] has estimated that 45 percent of the Chinese community in Burma accept the new regime in China, 50 percent are actively opposed to it). There have been several instances of CDL members being beaten up by alleged KMT gangs. These are being used as a lever in an attempt by the CDL(B) to persuade Burmese authorities to take action against the KMT as a whole; in a recent telegram, CDL Headquarters in Peiping was strongly critical of the Burmese Government's failure to protect Chinese nationals.

12. The policy pursued by the CPC Embassy towards the Burmese Government appears distinctly aggressive; Burmese religious susceptibilities have been insulted, the Prime Minister and Government attacked, and the BCP given open encouragement in official Chinese text books introduced into local schools. Members of the Embassy are also said to have had fairly frequent dealings with leaders of the new Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party and possibly to have influenced its formation. This, however, has not been confirmed.
13. Notice was received too late for a representative of CDL(B) to attend the 6th General Executive Conference of the CDL held in Peiping in November, but the decisions reached at this conference have been published openly and any specific directives can be transmitted via the Chinese Embassy.
14. The most notable CDL(B) activity during the past three months was the prosecution, by means of its front organizations, of an anti-American propaganda campaign, which included the boycotting of American goods and films.

Future Trends.

15. The BCP must continue its efforts to strengthen the PDF on the broadest possible basis. Where it secures initial collaboration it will undoubtedly attempt to gain acceptance of BCP policy and recognition of BCP leadership.

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It is therefore unlikely that the BCP will retain for any length of time the support of other insurgent groups, and it is significant that in the last eight months over 7,000 insurgents have surrendered to Government, though only two or three hundred of these were BCP followers. The arrival of aid from China which would enable the BCP to re-assert its influence by force of arms is thus becoming indispensable if the Party is to continue in effective insurrection.

16. The formation of the BWPP has brought into the open those potentially subversive elements which have long existed within the Government camp. If they secure any considerable popular support the Party can be expected to stand by its pledge of not resorting to violence, but there are signs that some of those who first joined the new Party with enthusiasm are now having second thoughts, and a few have already returned to the BSP. Should the BWPP leaders who have now "burned their boats" find themselves without support, it is probable that they will go underground to join the BSP's PDF. Such a development, however, would not add significantly to the strength of the insurgents. The BSP itself, rid of these unreliable elements, is likely to give former support to anti-Communist measures.
17. In several ways, of which the school text books are but one instance, the new Chinese regime has succeeded in offending the Burmese Government and this has led to a stiffening in the Burmese attitude. There is no sign so far, however, that a solution has been found to controlling the Chinese community and the security threat it represents.

#### THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (CPI)

##### Constitutional Position.

1. The last quarter of 1960 saw the lifting of the ban on the Party in Madras State. Party secretiveness, however, continues. The death during December of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Minister for Home Affairs, has removed a strong hand and a staunch opponent of Communism, but the succession of Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, former Governor-General and Chief Minister of Madras, is not believed to foreshadow any change of Government policy towards the CPI.

##### Strength.

2. There does not appear to have been any significant change in Party strength. No important detained Communists have been released during the period. Arrests in West Bengal have considerably weakened the Party in that State.

##### Policy.

3. Confusion over policy in the Party hierarchy continues. Strenuous effort is being made to resolve it before the Third Party Congress, which probably will take place early in 1961. The Second Party Congress took place in November 1948 and was attended, among other, by delegates from Yugoslavia. There has been a recent tendency in Party circles to recall this fact and to attribute to the influence of the Yugoslav counsellors deviationist heresies which are considered to have since infected the Party. At the same time there has been no dearth of heart-searching and self-criticism within the Party itself and the Central Committee, which has issued a circular setting out the reasons which necessitate a Third Party Congress, has invited the expression of rival points of view. A lengthy thesis has been submitted jointly by S.A. Dange, Ajay Ghosh, and S.V. Ghate, attacking the policy pursued by the present Central Committee, which in turn has given rise to a counter-attack from S.V. Parulekar, a member of the Central Committee representing Maharashtra. Dange is understood to favor the replacement of Rajeshwar Rao as General Secretary by Ajay Ghosh.

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and to have been canvassing to this end. More recently, an attempt has been made to obtain guidance from the Cominform, which has requested R. Palne Dutt, the Indian head of the International Department of the British Communist Party, to prepare an article for publication in the Cominform journal.

Review of Events from 1 October 1950.

4. There has been little change in the situation in areas where organized Communist violence is taking place. The Telengana resistance movement continues to pin down substantial security forces, and although there are encouraging signs of reviving public confidence and of increasing difficulties on the Communist side, it seems clear that the restoration of normal conditions in Hyderabad State is not yet in sight. The situation in the Andhra districts of Madras State, on the other hand, is quieter. In the Hill states of Tripura and Manipur, bad communications impose a severe handicap on the movement of security forces. No significant activity has been reported from the urban areas.
5. Since the termination of the Bombay textile strike, in which the Communist-dominated AITUC played only a minor part, there has been little activity among labor.
6. Events in the Far East have had no apparent effect on the CPI except to evoke a propaganda campaign against the US and the United Nations, accompanied by justification of the action of Communist China.

Future Trends.

7. It is impossible to forecast future developments until Party policy has been determined.

CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION

1. The Pakistan authorities continue to take firm action against the Communists when occasion demands, but they have not found it necessary to declare any organization illegal.

Strength.

2. The Pakistan Communist Party Central Secretariat in Lahore has come into prominence, but it is not thought that it has under its control an organized Party. No estimate of membership is possible.
3. A new party, the Azad Pakistan Party, has been formed by certain prominent fellow travellers and has issued a manifesto advocating the abolition of big estates and the nationalization of foreign-owned businesses. Its strength is unknown.

Policy.

4. The confusion and discord which have so seriously divided the CPI leaders have deprived Communists in Pakistan of any authoritative guidance from India. This must be expected to continue until some degree of unity is again achieved in the CPI. Central direction of Communist activity in Pakistan is probably exercised through Sajjad Zaheer (West Punjab) and Man Sen (East Bengal) who are both members of the Central Committee of the CPI.

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5. Late in October, the Pakistan Communist Party Central Secretariat published a program for an independent, prosperous and democratic Pakistan. This included demands that Pakistan should leave the British Commonwealth, dissociate itself from the Sterling Area, dismiss all British civil and military officials and establish friendly relations with the USSR and China.

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6. The party has openly declared that it will contest the Punjab elections and has instructed members to support the Azad Pakistan Party in those areas where there is no Communist candidate.
7. The Soviet Embassy continues to cultivate left-wing contacts and has been associated with one or two exhibitions, one of which described the life of Muslims in the Soviet Union. Similar exhibitions are planned for various towns to foster the belief that Communism and Islam are compatible.

Future Trends.

8. It is believed probable that Pakistan Communists will be guided mainly by the CPI, and therefore no clear trends will be discernible until the CPI has put its house in order.

MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP)Constitutional Position.

1. There has been no change in the constitutional position of the MCP and armed rebellion continues.

Strength.

2. Although arrests and casualties undoubtedly will have slightly reduced the effectiveness of lower operational formations the leadership, both political and military, with a few notable exceptions, remains intact.

Policy.

3. There has been no change in the ultimate aim of the MCP to create a Malayan People's Republic under Communist control. There has been no indication of any revision of the MCP's immediate plans to continue its acts of terrorism and to improve the efficiency and expand the membership of the Party, its civil ancillary organizations, and its armed forces.

Review of Events from 1 October 1950.The Federation of Malaya.

4. The MCP has shown itself capable of mounting even greater effort; during October and November, the number of MCP-inspired incidents reached an unprecedented peak. December has seen a reduction in bandit activity, although it still surpasses the achievements of the early part of the year and the preparation of major incidents remains disquietingly high. Ambushes of Security Forces, which figure increasingly in bandit operations, have met with considerable success.
5. Targets have been better chosen and operational execution tends to show improved direction, which is probably attributable to decentralization and the consequent better leadership at lower levels. Most operations have been carried out by small groups, which has had the effect of keeping the Security Forces dispersed.
6. MCP activity among labor groups has continued. It has succeeded in establishing a measure of control over workers in the rubber and tin industries in certain areas, and secret trade unions have been formed in South Selangor and Negri Sembilan.
7. There has been no improvement in the apathetic attitude of the majority of the population.

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Singapore.

8. In Singapore, the Police have arrested several important Party executives, one of whom was Secretary of the Town Committee and the link with the South Malaya Bureau in Johore. These arrests, together with the Government closure of the Singapore Chinese newspaper Man Chiao Jit Pao on 21 September, and later the dissolution of the Mayfair Dramatic and Musical Society, have not only dealt a severe blow to the MCP itself, but also to the pro-Communist propaganda machine controlled by sympathizers of the CPG in Singapore. Similar action was taken in the Federation of Malaya against the Penang Modern Daily News.
9. Sporadic attacks, including the burning of taxis and buses, have continued but, whereas in the earlier part of the year the MCP attempted, and in some cases succeeded in, acts of serious industrial sabotage, it is now concentrating on extending its influence among students and using them in minor operations. Members of the Students' Anti-British League carry out many such operations in Singapore and include participants believed to be as young as twelve; girl students are being used as accomplices. It is especially among school and university students and teachers that Communist penetration in Singapore has been successful.
10. The rioting from 11 to 13 December over the Dutch child, Maria (Madra) Hertogh, presented the MCP with an excellent opportunity. Deprived of some of its leaders by earlier arrests, it was unprepared and achieved little more than the distribution of posters, only a few of which, calling for Asian unity against the British, had been specially prepared.

Future Trends.

11. Both in the Federation of Malaya and in Singapore, the MCP may seek to exploit the racial and religious antagonism aggravated by the Hertogh case in the following ways:
- By substantially increasing its propaganda designed to unite all races against British imperialism.
  - By using its Malay members and sympathizers to stir up racial and religious hatred and in particular to undermine the loyalty of the Police and Armed Forces.
  - By using any future disturbances as cover for terrorist activity.

The Federation of Malaya.

12. Small armed groups will continue their acts of violence. Many operations will be directed to seizing arms and equipment. Shortages of arms and communication difficulties may remain limiting factors in the MCP's operational campaigns, and Government counter-measures should become increasingly effective. Events in Korea must have bolstered MCP morale and perhaps explain the continuing reluctance of the civil population to cooperate with the authorities.
13. There is still no evidence that the MCP is receiving external assistance. Information which is still unclear indicates that an organization exists to arrange illegal movements between Malaya and China. There has also been a small movement of MCP members to, and possibly from, Sumatra. There is no indication that this traffic is such as to influence the situation substantially.

Singapore.

14. The MCP in Singapore may have difficulty in replacing its arrested leaders and renewing its links with the Federation. It seems unlikely that the pattern of its activity will change; uncoordinated acts of violence will continue.

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NORTH BORNEO, SARAWAK AND BRUNAI

There have been no developments of note. Overseas Chinese left-wing elements have been quiescent, but there are indications that the recent Chinese Communist victories in Korea will encourage a revival of their activities and an increase in the number of CPC sympathizers.

PHILIPPINE COMMUNIST PARTY (PKP)Constitutional Position.

1. There has been no change in the constitutional position of the PKP, which is still engaged, under the aegis of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Forces) or HMB, in armed revolt against the Government.

Strength.

2. The influence the PKP exerted during its overt existence (pre-1950), mainly through the trade unions, particularly the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), a WFTU affiliate, has dwindled almost to nothing and the Party's strength is now measurable only in terms of the HMB. Although the Party has succeeded in attracting non-Communist elements, particularly peasants, into the HMB's ranks, it remains the driving and controlling force behind the movement and its leaders occupy the senior posts in the HMB command.
3. The HMB is believed by reliable observers to number not more than 10,000 effectives, armed with light infantry weapons.
4. There are no signs that the strength of HMB has increased during the period, and its guerrilla operations are reported to have been on a smaller scale than earlier in the year.

Policy.

5. The PKP still aims to overthrow the Government by armed action.

Review of Events from 1 October 1950.

6. There have been no reports of large-scale guerrilla activities during the period. Captured HMB documents suggested that the HMB intended to launch operations varying in scale from major disturbances in Manila to raids on outlying villages or installations during October and November, but these do not appear to have materialized.

Future Trends.

7. The PKP will undoubtedly continue its armed opposition to the Government under the banner of the HMB. The present situation, in which the Government is proving incapable of taking effective military and political measures against the HMB, is likely to be substantially altered only if the US increases and controls the flow of material and technical assistance and advice to the Philippines.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDOCHINA (PCI)Constitutional Position.

1. There has been no change in the constitutional position of the PCI in Indochina.

Strength.

2. Since Ho Chi Minh announced the dissolution of the PCI, doubts have prevailed about the genuineness of the dissolution and its effect, if it was genuine.

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Uncertainty continues; there has been no information in the three months under review to show that the PCI exists as a Communist Party of conventional structure with the normal machinery of administration. Although Travle attributed a message from Indochina on the anniversary of the October Revolution to the PCI, the decision that the Party should emerge publicly as the leader of the rebellion has not been carried out in the Viet Minh. The annual anniversary tributes by the Ho Chi Minh radio to the PCI here made reference only to its past achievements and do not suggest that it continues to exist.

3. It seems not improbable that the formal CPI structure has in fact been dismantled. The Indochinese Communist leaders who hold key positions within the Viet Minh-Lien Viet front, while outwardly independent, could covertly discharge the functions of a Party Central Committee and Politburo. The Viet Minh-Lien Viet front is as satisfactory an instrument as a large Communist Party for the manipulation of the rank and file and could be converted by purging into a reliable and orthodox Communist Party. Recruitment to the front is easier than to a Communist Party since it permits the broadcast rallying of all elements opposed to "French imperialism", including Catholics who might be reluctant to cooperate with professed Communists.
4. Even if it has ceased to exist, the former leaders of the PCI are in effective control of the Viet Minh state although important Ministries, including Foreign Affairs and the Interior, are still held by non-Communists, and Roman Catholics retain prominent positions in the state, presumably in order to revive the waning support of members of their faith.

#### Policy.

5. The policy of the Indochinese Communists remains the eviction of the French and their "puppets" from Indochina.

#### Review of Events from 1 October 1950.

6. The Viet Minh front organizations have been active, and great efforts have been made to ensure the success of the Stockholm Peace appeal. Viet Minh delegates attended the Peace Congress at Sheffield and at Warsaw, and also the conference of the International Union of Journalists at Helsinki. The usual messages of solidarity have been exchanged with other front organizations and with the Governments of the USSR and European satellite countries, notably Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania and Albania.
7. Relations with China seem to have been put on a more formal basis by the recent appointment of a Viet Minh representative in Peiping. It has also been reported that Ho is to send a representative to India to try to counteract the influence of Nguyen Duy Phan's mission.

#### Future Trends.

8. The campaign against illiteracy and the redistribution of land at present is being carried out in Viet Minh territory and may win support and permit the conditioning of a large section of the population in whom the seeds of Communism should take root and grow vigorously. So long as the French continue to be so much in evidence in Viet Nam, and so long as Bao Dai's Government is not completely independent, it must be expected that the Communists will not only be able to control an ignorant peasantry, to whom they may appear to be benefactors, but that they will also retain the active and willing support of other sections of the population who believe that Viet Nam Nationalist aspirations will be achieved only under the leadership of Ho.

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Overseas Chinese.

9. Membership of the various overseas Chinese groups in northwest and particularly in south central Viet Nam has increased. Figures published for this area in December 1950 give the membership of the Youth League as 1,300, the Women's Association 1,500, a newly established Workers' Association as 300, the Teachers' Association as over 200, and an unidentified "Vanguard Group" as 300.
10. Propaganda courses have been run by the Women's Association and Youth League in collaboration, and the latter has sent propaganda groups to tour the countryside explaining the principles and policy of New China to the people. The chief propaganda themes have been support for the CPC and aid to Viet Minh in its struggle for liberation, and, most recently, protests against French atrocities against the Chinese in Indochina.

THAI COMMUNIST PARTYConstitutional Position.

1. Though the Communist Party of Thailand is still legal, the Government is now considering the possibility of outlawing it.
2. The Police have already taken action against Communist suspects in certain areas, notably in southern Thailand. As a result of this hardening of the Government's attitude, the Party is likely to become increasingly secretive and to tighten its security precautions.

Strength.

3. There is still no reliable information about the numerical strength of the Party, but the latest guess puts it in the region of 40,000. It appears to be firmly in control of the Central Labor Union and of at least two newspapers. Furthermore, it probably exercises an increasing influence over a number of Thai left-wing politicians, lawyers, and journalists, through whom it is able to influence a section of the press. In this it has undoubtedly been assisted by the widespread fear among the opposition of being involved in a war between China and the Western Democracies, in which Thailand, by adhering to Marshal Phibun's present policy, might not be on the winning side.
4. Nevertheless, though the Party may be having some success in extending its influence over a section of the opposition, its membership is still overwhelmingly Chinese, and its policy may well be directed from China, where some of its most important leaders still are. The Party undoubtedly maintains a close liaison both with the CCP as well as with its own senior members in China. Moreover, it is reported to be sending students to China, where they will receive a Communist education and presumably some will be trained as future Party leaders.

Policy.

5. A manifesto appeared in the Communist newspaper Kakachon in October and was reported in the Cominform journal and on the Moscow, Peiping, and Viet Minh radios. It called for the "getting up of a national democratic united front against the American imperialists and their fascist lackeys", and declared that the recent military and economic agreements with the Americans "constituted a great national danger since their aim is to turn Thailand into a military base for American aggression in Asia".

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6. The Peace Committee for Thailand claims to have secured 56,000 signatures for the Stockholm Appeal. Though it is probable that many people signed in the belief that the appeal was organized by the United Nations, it is hardly credible that certain cabinet ministers and higher civil servants who also signed, and some of whom have since withdrawn their signatures, were also ignorant of the appeal's origin. It would be unduly optimistic to think that the majority of those who signed were mere Communist dupes, and it is not impossible that many of them are supporters of the pro-Communist left-wing group led by Than Chablauchit, whose name figured prominently in the list of signatures.
7. There is no reliable information about cooperation between the Thai Communist Party and the Viet Minh organization in Thailand, though it has been reported that members of the Party have been sent to Viet Minh territory to receive military training there.

Future Trends.

8. The strength and influence of the Thai Communist Party will depend on events in China and Southeast Asia. If the prestige and power of China and the Viet Minh increase, opposition to Marshal Phibun's regime may grow, and extreme elements will either throw in their lot with the Party, or more probably will work with it to bring about the downfall of the Government. In this way the Party, though small in size, will be able to exert a powerful influence in Thai politics.

INDONESIAConstitutional Position

1. The Constitutional position of the Communist Parties in Indonesia has not been affected by the recent change in the Indonesian Government's attitude. They remain legal throughout Indonesia, and there they continue to be represented in the Provisional Parliament.

Subversive Communist Organizations.

2. There are in Indonesia two main Communist Parties, the orthodox Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the anti-Stalinist Partai Buruh, both hostile to one another, at least one minor Party (the PKI Merah), and a large number of nominally independent organizations subject to varying degrees of Communist control. In addition, a considerable number of personalities, most of them with an anti-Dutch, revolutionary background, who are not members of a Communist Party or Communist-controlled organization, can be regarded as potential fellow-travellers, although some belong to moderate left-wing or even center parties.

Strength.

3. No accurate statistics of membership are available for the various Communist Parties and organizations. The threat to Indonesian security which they represent is considerably lessened by the personal and doctrinal rivalries of the various Communists and near-Communists, and by the consequent lack of cohesion and unity among the various organizations and parties to which they belong.
4. It should be stressed, however, that the PKI, which is now the most powerful and active body, has met with notable successes in its efforts to assimilate and discredit its rivals. Although the process will be a gradual one, it may lead to the extinction of all other Communist groups and the emergence of the

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PKI as the sole Indonesian Communist Party. A serious alteration in the balance of power between the PKI and the parties of the center and right, at the expense of the latter, would result. The PKI is being considerably helped by the fact that, whereas its rivals tend mainly to concentrate on Java, its own organization covers both Java and Sumatra in equal strength, and it now has control of all organized Communist activity in Sumatra.

#### Policy.

5. It is the present policy of the PKI to build up its strength and organization, under the cloak of legality, with the ultimate aim of being able at the earliest moment to overthrow the Indonesian Government. Its methods are propaganda and agitation directed to recruitment and overt and covert penetration, particularly of labor. There are no indications at present that the Party intends to abandon a policy which is outwardly legal and respectable in favor of armed action.

#### Review of Events from 1 October 1950.

6. The main events during the period, both internal and external, have centered around the PKI and have emphasized its growing strength and its progress in eliminating its rivals. In October, it absorbed the Partai Baruk Indonesia, a small left-wing party with five representatives in Parliament. The Party has had considerable success in developing the Indonesian Peace Movement, which is now firmly under its control, and which, in addition to having branches in the larger Indonesian cities, has established contact with the World Peace Congress. It has fortified its dominant position within SOBSI, the largest of the Indonesian trade union federations.

#### External Links.

7. The PKI is in Soviet eyes the official Indonesian Communist Party, and as such received assistance as a member of the international Communist movement. A SOBSI delegation has spent a year in Peiping with the Asian and Australasian Trade Union Liaison Bureau and one member of the delegation has remained there. Indonesian students are studying in Eastern Europe.

#### Future Trends.

8. Unless called upon to do so by changes in the international situation the PKI is unlikely to abandon its present policy of building up under the cloak of respectability its strength and organization and eliminating its rival Communist factions.
9. It is impossible to make any forecast of the time it will take the PKI to achieve this, but unless there are significant changes in the internal situation in Indonesia, such as a radical change in Government policy towards the Communists or a failure by the Government to maintain its authority, it is unlikely that the PKI will be able to launch effective guerrilla operations during the next six months.

#### The Chinese in Indonesia.

10. There is no evidence that the Chinese in Indonesia belong to any of the Indonesian Communist Parties, although a number of prominent Chinese belong to PKI-sponsored organizations. It seems likely that the recently established Overseas Chinese Association for Promoting the Unity of the Chinese Community, previously known as the Overseas Chinese Committee for the Furtherance of Overseas relations between the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of Indonesia Governments, will be the focal point for the activities of Chinese sympathetic to the CPC. It has the backing of the Chinese Embassy.

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11. The CPG is anxious to open consulates throughout Indonesia as early as possible and preliminary visits have been made by members of the Embassy to Sumatra and Bangka. The Indonesian Government is aware of the danger these consulates would present and, possibly in an effort to postpone their establishment, has decreed that none shall be opened until the registration of all Chinese in Indonesia is carried out.
12. Chinese press propaganda material is supplied by the Embassy to the PKI party paper, but there is no indication of any closer connections between the Embassy and the PKI.

JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY (JCP)Constitutional Position.

1. Although repressive measures by the Japanese Government against the JCP have continued, there has been no alteration in the constitutional position of the Party, which remains technically a legal organization. The Attorney General announced in mid-November that the Japanese Government had no intention of declaring the Party illegal, but there are indications that this attitude may be reversed.

Strength.

2. With the hard core of its leaders underground and split into two mutually hostile factions, the JCP is no longer a coherent political force. It has been unable to afford any effective assistance to the North Koreans. Registered membership has declined still further from the summer total of 92,000; no reliable statistics are available.

Policy.

3. The Party has endeavored, so far without success, to end its internal schism in accordance with the fraternal guidance it had already received. Neither of the factions has been disowned by Moscow, and both are reliably reported to be manoeuvring for a general reunification of the Party.

Review of Events from 1 October 1950.

4. Only one of the nine Party leaders who went underground in June (KASUGA Shoichi, a member of the Central Committee) has so far been arrested.
5. The main aims of Party propaganda have been to embarrass the Government, to oppose the surge of Communists in industry and in the Government service, and to prevent the formation of the National Police Reserve.
6. Government restriction of JCP activities, and in particular the suppression of certain newspapers and periodicals, have reduced Party revenue and the JCP is believed to be in serious financial difficulties.
7. Riots among the Korean population in Kobe on 27 November were inspired by the JCP.

Future Trends.

8. The JCP will continue its efforts to reunify the Party and to halt the present disintegration.
9. The Party is unlikely to make appreciable progress towards regaining the influential position it held before June 1950, particularly among organized labor, unless the Japanese Government modifies its present policy towards it.

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TIBETConstitutional Position.

1. Information on Communism in Tibet is extremely meager. The existence of a Tibetan Communist Party separate from the CCP is believed to be most improbable, but numbers of Tibetan, Sino-Tibetan, and Chinese Communists in the areas controlled by the Lhasa Government (i.e. Tibet proper and Western Sikkang) are active on behalf of the CCP. Nothing is known of the way in which these Communists are organized or of their position under Tibetan law. A Tibetan Revolutionary Party was proscribed in 1948 by the Tibetan Government, but it is believed there is no conclusive evidence linking this movement with Communism.

Strength.

2. No estimate can be made of the number of Communists in Tibet.

Review of Events from 1 October 1950.

3. THE CPG is committed to the subjugation of the whole of Tibet and is endeavoring to effect this by military action and other means. Chinese armed forces have been deployed against Tibet from the north and the east since October, and a considerable volume of Communist propaganda has been poured into Tibet from Peiping, from Sikkang, and from Szechuan.
4. It may be presumed that the activities of CCP elements in Tibet have been limited to the immediate tasks of cooperating with the Chinese military and political authorities. Chinese propaganda claimed as early as July that one of the three great monasteries of Lhasa had not only agreed to exchange representatives with Communist China, but that the delegates from China had already arrived in the Tibetan capital. Indian Press reports in November stated that the nucleus of a pro-Chinese Government had been assembled in Lhasa under the leadership of SAIVONG LAMA, described as a senior monk-official; this group was reported to favor the acknowledgement of Chinese suzerainty and the acceptance of Communist programs of land reform. None of these reports can be confirmed.
5. On 24 November, the establishment of a Tibetan Autonomous Region of Sikkang was proclaimed and a Government Council elected for the whole territory, including that portion east of the Yangtze which Lhasa lays claim to and has hitherto administered as one of her provinces (Kham). This was done by the Southwest China Bureau of the CCP through the Southwest China Military and Political Affairs Commission, which convened a meeting of 270 communal representatives (Tibetans, Chinese, Muslims, and tribal groups) to form a "Sikkang People's Conference of All Circles". A Sino-Tibetan who is a member of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs of the CPG and who had clearly been groomed by the Chinese for such an appointment was made Chairman of the new Government Council.

Future Trends.

6. It is probable that China will virtually control all Tibet before the end of 1951, and that the Tibetan Autonomous Region of Sikkang will be extended to include the whole country. It is likely that a Sub-Bureau of the Southwest Bureau of the CCP will be established in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and that its efforts will be directed toward consolidating the position of the Party in Tibet, to bringing under its influence the aboriginal tribes of Upper Assam, to the political penetration of Bhutan from the east and northwest, and generally to attracting to Communism the peoples who constitute India's "Mongolian fringe."

TAIWAN

1. It is doubtful whether there is any organized CCP formation after the effective operations against Communists carried out by the KMT during 1950 and the

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continuance of stringent anti-Communist precautions. Even before these operations, the CCP did not consider its organization in Taiwan adequate, very little attention had been given to Party work before October 1949, when the CPC decided to attack Taiwan as soon as possible, and subsequently sent active workers from the mainland to establish intelligence and subversive groups.

2. The principal objective of the CCP-CPC is to ensure the cooperation of the local population and the desertion of KMT forces during the invasion. Their main efforts are devoted to this and to espionage. There is little sign of cooperation by the Taiwanese, but, in view of the high-level penetration of KMT Government and military circles already achieved by the CCP, a defection by important KMT personalities at the crucial moment is quite possible.
3. The Taiwan People's Democratic Self-Governing League, which is composed mainly of Taiwanese Communists and had its headquarters in Peiping, is chiefly responsible for Communist propaganda. The League appears to have forward bases in both Hong Kong and Tokyo.