

File 872

25X1A

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY China/Hong Kong/Korea

DATE DISTR. 9 Nov. 1950

SUBJECT Reversal of Chinese Communist Policy on Intervention in Korea

NO. OF PAGES 1

25X1A

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

RETURN TO CIA LIBRARY

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

25X1C DATE OF 25X1D [REDACTED]

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.



1. The Chinese Communists in Hong Kong were amazed and confused at the decision to intervene in Korea. As late as 6 November 1950, HUANG Tso-mei, Hong Kong head of the New China News Agency, stated that he did not believe that the Chinese Communists would intervene in Korea, and that it would be a mistake for them to do so since their efforts should be concentrated to help Viet Minh. On 3 November 1950 the Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao received a directive from the ministry of Information of the Chinese Communist government, dated in Peiping on 26 October 1950, stating that the paper should use a minimum of propaganda in printing international news and articles, and should avoid offending the Western powers.
2. The decision to intervene represented a reversal of the policy previously decided upon, and was made very recently. It was the result of the fear, which the Soviets have played upon, that the United States would invade Manchuria, and of the fact that the Soviets had persuaded the Chinese Communists that they would not be admitted to the United Nations. Another aspect of Communist thinking is reflected by CHU Teh's recent statement: "We must fight the aggressors sometime; better fight them outside China."*
3. It was originally decided that CHOU En-lai would represent Communist China at the session before the United Nations. This decision was reversed by the Politburo on the grounds that it would involve a loss of face, since the Chinese Communist government had no chance of admission to the United Nations.**
4. The Chinese Communists would probably accept political settlement of the Korean situation, should the United Nations forces be withdrawn south of the 38th parallel, and have left the door open to negotiation by keeping their intervention on a volunteer basis. They may be willing to deal with the United Nations Committee for Korea.*

This document is hereby regarded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1953 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Chiefs of Staff, the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force.

* [REDACTED] Comment. These paragraphs appear to represent the interpretation which Source makes of the situation.

** [REDACTED] Comment. [REDACTED] reported CHOU En-lai to be in Moscow.

25X1A

25X1A 25X1A

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION SECRET

STATE	#	x	NAVY	#	x	NSRB			DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	#	x	AIR	#	x	FBI			

Document No. [REDACTED]

No Change in Class.

Declassified

Class. Changed To: TS S C

Auth: HR 70-2

Date: 2-2-88 By: [REDACTED]

ARCHIVAL RECORD
Return to Archives & Records Center
Immediately After Use

BY CABLE

118242

4109