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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

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COUNTRY China/Korea

DATE DISTR. 6 Nov. 1950

SUBJECT Opinion of Nationalist Official on Chinese Communist Entry into Korean Conflict

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
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1. The real intentions of the Chinese Communists regarding North Korea are difficult to determine. The action so far has been directed by either Peiping or Moscow. The possibilities are as follows:
  - a. If Peiping decided to intervene, the Communists probably intend only a defensive action to protect electric power supplies for Manchuria, and may plan to hold only a narrow buffer area. Because of the Communist economic situation and air vulnerability, however, entering the war on their own initiative seems unlikely.
  - b. If Moscow ordered Chinese participation, probably the Soviets gave some assurance that intervention was part of Soviet overall strategy and follows the Indochina cold war pattern. Since Chinese units are not used under their own identification and aid so far is parallel to the Indochina arrangement, apparently the Communists will continue semi-overt cold war tactics. This may include an attempt to drive United Nations (UN) forces back to the 38th Parallel.
  - c. If the Soviets are ready to strike in Europe, intervention in North Korea may initiate World War III.
2. At present the Chinese Communist policy of military support without official entry into conflict and of all aid to Korea and Indochina short of a declaration of war appears most profitable and likely to continue until an actual world war begins.
3. Both the Chinese Communists and Nationalists consider the Tibetan matter internal only. Communist forces committed are small but sufficient to occupy all Tibet. The invasion may be an indication that the Communists are expecting a world war and are preparing to protect their west flank and assume a good position for an invasion of India, if the strategic situation permits.
4. Possibilities in Korea are as follows:
  - a. Limited semi-overt Chinese Communist aid

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- b. Extensive aid within a cold war framework, gradually intensifying to induce the commitment of more UN forces in the Far East, followed by a Soviet strike in Europe, opening a world war.

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