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INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Nicaragua

DATE DISTR. 19 JUL 50


SUBJECT Post-Election Activities in Nicaragua

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NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. 25X1X



1. [REDACTED] Anastasio Somoza and the Liberal Party gained a majority of the votes cast on 21 May 1950. However, conditions were such that an honest and fair election was impossible. An atmosphere of terror had been built up during the preceding weeks, and it required courage as well as an independent income to cast a vote against Somoza or even to say anything favorable concerning his opponent. The Guardia Nacional maintained fairly good order on election day, but instances were noted where Conservative supporters were stripped of their banners and treated rather roughly by Liberals, with the open encouragement of Guardia soldiers. It was considered unwise for anyone to take Somoza propaganda off the walls of their own homes. The last, and probably most effective, stratagem devised by the Somocistas was a small card stating that the holder had voted for Somoza and signed by the poll attendant. These cards, dubbed "La Magnifica" by the people, were given to the voter after he put his cross in the Liberal column. They are now being sold at varying quotations.

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2. The final results announced on 28 May were as follows: Liberal Votes 153,297; Conservative Votes 49,401; Total 202,698. [REDACTED] this total is padded considerably, and that the total number of voters probably did not exceed 100,000. Many Liberal supporters voted two or more times and there was a great deal of abstention on the part of Conservatives. Truck loads of men were brought into Managua to build up the Liberal lines at the polls and thereby impress diplomats and visiting correspondents.

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
3. [REDACTED] no serious opposition activities are planned at this time by the Conservatives. The Party is split and demoralized. After several heated meetings the Junta Directiva of the Party agreed to abide by the pact and enter the government as an opposition group. However, in a manifesto the Conservatives protested that the election was a fraud. The faction which opposed the pact in the first place plans to lie low for a time before making any plans.

4. Following his election Somoza made many changes in the cabinet and the diplomatic and consular corps. Of importance are the naming of Col. Anastasio Somoza, Jr. as Chief of Staff, replacing Col. Francisco Gaitan, and the sending of Col. Carlos Eddy Monterrey to New York City as Consul. Gaitan has been made Minister of War, but his influence in the Guardia will very likely be less than formerly. Monterrey had been head of the Air Force.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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5. [REDACTED] Major Garcia had said that his own transfer to New Orleans as Nicaraguan Consul, and the naming of Colonel Carlos Eddy Monterrey L. as Consul in New York were not routine changes, as had been reported in the press. It is alleged that General Somoza had been informed that Monterrey and Garcia had discussed the necessity of overthrowing Somoza, owing to their belief that Somoza's assumption of the presidency again was going to displease the other American governments, particularly the United States. Garcia is supposed to have told General Somoza that he could not live on the salary paid, to which Somoza is said to have replied that he was sorry, but that Garcia could always resign. [REDACTED] many restrictions had been placed on Garcia for the sole purpose of forcing his resignation. 25X1X
6. According to Garcia, General Somoza was anxious to keep these incidents from being known, therefore, he did not discharge the two officials, but transferred them to posts outside the country as the first step in getting rid of them. Garcia never admitted to his brother-in-law that he and Monterrey had actually discussed the overthrowing of the Somoza regime; instead he insisted that the report was invented by their enemies in the Guardia, particularly Colonel Francisco Gaitan, now Minister of War.

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