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
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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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I. A Survey of the Strength of Nationalists and Communists in Java

West Java

1. Bantam Residency: More than half of the Residency is still Republican. There are a few intellectual leaders, the troops are poorly supplied and Moslem influence is strong.
2. Batavia Residency: Besides the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), there is the strong Peoples Army of Batavia which is under the influence of Tan Malaka. Chairul Saleh is a representative of Tan Malaka's in this Residency.
3. Buitenzorg Residency: Most of the Republican troops are in the southern sector. Many of the officers of these troops are intellectuals. The troops are well armed.
4. Priangan Residency: Most of the TNI officers are former students. The TNI has many unorganized members of the Tentara Peladjaran (Student Army) handling civil administration in the country. The Darul Islam is active in the eastern sector under Kartasuwirjo, whose chief of staff is Kamran. They have a full battalion, but the troops are poorly disciplined and it is rumored that they have already been infiltrated with Communism. Gradually the Darul Islam is retreating eastward because of the TNI attacks.
5. Cheribon Residency: There are a few intellectual leaders here. The TNI is fighting against the Dutch. The Darul Islam has a battalion of active troops.

Central Java

6. Pekalongan Residency: There are a few educated leaders. Guerrilla units have retreated to the mountains. There are several units of former Hisbullahs in the Residency.

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7. Banjumas Residency: The leaders are old Republican officials who are still in the interior. The TNI is resisting Dutch occupation. Members of the Tentera Peladjaran have considerable influence on the TNI. There is some activity on the part of Darul Islam troops in Madjenang.
8. Semarang Residency: This Residency is practically under Dutch control. There are unconfirmed reports that Communists are engaged in illegal activity in the City of Semarang.
9. Diapara-Rembang Residency: The TNI is disorganized here and the Residency is not patrolled by the Dutch. Communists are the undisputed masters here. In Wirosari there is a Communist unit, consisting of about one and a half armed battalions under Lt. Col. Sudiarto. He gets moral support from Communist leaders such as Sumarsono.
10. Kedu Residency: Students organized in fighting units are active in areas south of Purworedjo and southwest of Magelang. They have about 300 commando troops and about one battalion of ordinary combat troops. There are many educated TNI officers in this Residency. There has been no Communist activity observed in this area, but well known Communist leaders such as Ir. Sakirman, former commander of the Peoples Army, are in the Tentera Nasional Indonesia.
11. Jogjakarta: Most of the Communist leaders have settled in this area, mainly in the southwest and southeast sectors. Their military leaders include Lt. Col. Martono, Capt. Latif and Djokosujono. Their policy leaders include TAN Ling Djie, Wikana, Dr. Madjid, Trugito and many others. Their exact whereabouts is unknown at present. Communist units are operating mostly in platoons and sections. Their objective is to increase their strength by increasing their military equipment and by enlarging their influence. After the van Royen-Rum Agreement has been implemented the Tentera Peladjaran is to remain in these backlands and develop nationalism in an effort to neutralize the Communists.
12. Surakarta: The Tentera Peladjaran has one battalion of commando troops and several companies of auxiliary combat troops here. The civil and military administration is partially in the hands of students. Almost the entire TNI in this area, important officers of which are Lt. Col. Suadi, and Lt. Col. Slamet Rijadi, has been infiltrated by Communists. It may be possible to neutralize these forces by skill and tact backed by force; however, at present force is lacking. Northwest of Surakarta there is a completely Communist area under Setiadjit. Possibly Surakarta will become the stronghold of Communism with centers in the north and south. The extremist Barisan Banteng is also in this area.

East Java

13. In East Java there are few intellectuals among the troops, which are well organized and disciplined. They are not an easy prey for direct Communist propaganda and infiltration, but they are easily influenced by extreme or radical ideas and are unconsciously adopting the Communist pattern. The influence of Tan Malaka's followers is increasing.
14. Madiun Residency: Armed units here were crushed during the Muso revolt. There are now only small TNI units in the south, which are aided by armed Moslem groups. There are small Communist bands operating throughout the Residency. Student units are concentrated in the eastern part of the Residency.
15. Bodjonegoro Residency: There is unimportant sporadic Communist activity throughout this area. Republican officials are still in the mountains in the southern part of the Residency.

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16. Surabaya Residency: In the environs of the City of Surabaya there are a few small units of Sutomo's Barisan Pembontakan Republik Indonesia (BPRI). The TNI operates in the Modjokerto area. There are about 300 student commando troops which are active. There is no Communist activity.
17. Kediri Residency: This is a stronghold of extremist TNI units. Blitar and environs is the center of student activity in East Java. They are relatively well armed and receive considerable support from the people.
18. Malang Residency. The TNI in the north has been infiltrated by followers of Tan Malaka. Sabaruddin is the battalion commander in this area. The Republican administration in the southern sector of this Residency is in the hands of student units.
19. Besuki Residency: The TNI is organized in small units with a few intellectual leaders. The Masjumi's influence in this area is strong.

II. Indirect Support for Communists

20. There are two types of groups in Indonesia which, while they do not receive orders from Moscow, indirectly support Communist tactics. One type comprises the fanatic religious groups such as the Darul Islam. They condemn anyone who opposes them -- both the Dutch and the TNI. They have little influence among the intelligentsia and have to suppress the people in order to maintain their authority. This results in disorder and discontentment and thus enables the Communists to gain a foothold.
21. The other type of group which indirectly supports Communist tactics includes the extreme nationalist followers of Tan Malaka. They demand that negotiations with the Dutch be carried on as between two equal independent nations, that Dutch troops first leave Indonesia, and that there be no recognition of the transfer of power until the first two demands have been fulfilled. Emotional nationalists are influenced by these demands. Also Tan Malaka's followers are encouraging discontent concerning the situation caused by Dutch troops. Tan's greatest influence is in some sections of East Java and primarily in the Batavia area. Here they have partially achieved their aim. They are far more dangerous than the Darul Islam. The quickest way to eliminate Tan Malaka's groups is through intellectual infiltration rather than by frontal attack.

III. Summary

The summary was prepared by source and represents his interpretation of the present situation.

22. The Dutch have caused deep discontent among the people by using fascist methods when they could have used other means. This has strengthened the Communists and aided in the destruction of nationalism.
23. Most Communist leaders admit the Communists have made mistakes. It is difficult to say whether the mistakes were due to the Kremlin or to local leaders. The leaders all agree that the greatest error was the Muso revolt. Their greatest weakness has been their inability to create disorder in the areas held by the Republic prior to the Renville Agreement and to create a strong Communist party. Setiadjit's order to destroy estates was carried out effectively, but at present their entire pre-Muso organization has been almost completely broken up by the Republic. However, the Communists have profited from their experiences and know how to work among the people. The next time they organize it will be on a more scientific basis.

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24. TAN Ling Djie, Wikana and others are mainly intellectual Communists. Djokosujono is a product of Australian Communism.
25. The Communist potential should not be underestimated because there is a danger that the nationalists may be exhausted by their efforts to survive. In this interim period the Communists and extreme nationalists plan to make a strong effort to organize the people in areas which are not controlled by either the Dutch or the Republic. By the time a final agreement is reached by the Dutch and the Republic it is possible that the Communists will have established strong positions as the Peoples Army has succeeded in doing in the Batavia area since the Renville Agreement. The Communists are consolidating and it is unlikely that they will clash with Dutch troops. They are saving their ammunition and buying more arms on the black market.
26. Communist agitators are active in the TNI wherever discontent appears. Discontent has been caused by two factors: a. the entire command has been crushed by the Dutch, which has given rise to the formation of small units; b. the troops lose confidence in their commanders. The latter is the largest factor. Small units often branch out and become bandit units which are open to Communist infiltration.
27. The intellectuals are nearly always supported as leaders by the masses. In the Djapara-Rembang area the intellectuals sided with the Dutch and as a result the masses lost faith in them. At this point Communism took over.
28. The problem now is to save areas which are showing signs of disintegration and to revive healthy nationalism.

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