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25X1X6 Changes in Tito Cells

1. A complete transformation has occurred within the Tito cells in recent days. The muddled thinking and inconsistencies, characteristic of cell activities for months, have been supplanted by the following theses:
 - a. Yugoslavia lives in the center of Europe. It, therefore, must adapt its approach to Socialism in accordance with the circumstances, experience and mentality of its people. That which is possible in the Soviet Union is not suitable for Central Europe and, particularly, not applicable to the Balkans. Tito's Yugoslavia must adhere to a socialism which conforms to the nature and spirit of the Balkans and to its needs. The Soviets advocate a strong central government, while Tito espouses decentralization and autonomy.
 - b. Socialization on the Soviet model is not appropriate for the Yugoslav proletariat. Considerable criticism of and debate over this issue prevails in the cells. Some go so far as to express open doubt that Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism can provide a solution to the problem. The success of the Marshall Plan concretely weakened and shook even the faith of orthodox Marxists that Communism is their only salvation. Anxiety is particularly evident among the Slovenes, and activist lectures continue to prescribe patience, even to the full-fledged Communists.

Effectiveness of Packages

2. There has been a great influx in food and clothing packages from the United States, Canada, Australia and the Free Territory of Trieste to Yugoslavia in recent months. Each package constitutes live concrete propaganda which undermines the foundation of Communist promises, statistics on the progress of the Five Year Plan, production contests and other contrived attractions that bore the people. It marks the failure of state planning to bring any tangible benefits to the individual.
3. Government officials are markedly disturbed about the publicity these packages have received. They dare not take any steps against the practice, however, for it is in full swing and benefits all classes of the population. It is estimated that the spring economic crisis will be overcome solely by

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1A2g

-2-

this friendly aid. Furthermore, this assistance is more effective than government distribution of foreign relief, which usually entails inefficiency, official corruption and favoring of certain elements. Overwhelmed by a plethora of political and economic problems, the regime, itself, cannot risk prohibiting the entry of packages. The distribution of "imperialist gifts" is of intense concern to the Tito cells. Nevertheless, the supporters of such aid are increasing daily.

Current Attitude Toward Western Powers

4. Cell discussions frequently center on the theme of cooperation with the Western Powers. In general the conclusion reached is that, in the current situation, economic collaboration is unavoidably necessary. More significant, however, is that many cell members now advocate political cooperation, to spite the Soviet Union and demonstrate that the Balkan "angels" refuse to forget. This feeling prevails primarily among Serb Communists. Apart from the cells, the general belief is that Tito, sooner or later, will negotiate political agreements with the West. To expedite this, all that is required is that the Cominform become more aggressive and the Western Allies, simultaneously, employ more conciliatory and skillful maneuvers towards Tito.

Attitude Towards Cominformists

5. Foremost on the daily schedule of the Tito cells is the Cominform question. Veritable baiting of Cominformists takes place in some regions. Orthodox Titoists label Cominformists as Yugoslavia's worst enemies and treat them as such. Though they believe they have stopped them, the conjecture remains that the Cominformists have prudently retreated while their ranks continue to grow in the underground.
6. Incidents of sabotage have subsided. The anti-Tito campaign is now directed to the publication of special propaganda outside Yugoslavia. Some of the Tito cells observe this manifestation as possibly a preparation for a surprise attack. Others hold to the opinion that the Soviet Union, for the time being, has deserted the European arena, while concentrating its attention on the East. Furthermore, some believe that it has become evident to the Soviets that a simultaneous cold war offensive on both fronts has been damaging, bringing more harm than good. These same cells conclude that the Soviet Union was overwhelmed by the Atlantic Pact and that the Communist Parties of the West showed themselves completely inept in the face of it.

Cell Reactions

7. Many Tito followers believed that mass demonstrations against the Atlantic Pact would dissuade Italy, at least, from signing, while some counted on France to renege. The battle, they say, is not lost, however, for the Western Communists are reserving their heaviest weapons for the days of the ratification of the Pact. Others entirely have renounced the possibility of the Western Communists still dealing an effective blow in retaliation. Among those said to have given way to despair, is the Kremlin itself. According to the Cominform, Tito is also to blame for this defeat, for Yugoslavia offered only formal newspaper agitation against the Atlantic Pact.
8. It is significant that in the Tito cells economic reconciliation with Italy is recommended enthusiastically. Many look upon Italy as the fateful mediator between Tito and the western world. They excuse Vilfan's obvious anti-Italian position in the UNO on the restoration of Italy's colonies, with the statement that it is too early to open an anti-Soviet course in foreign policy. Further, they add, this momentary anti-Italian stand is merely a move to counter the attacks in antagonistic Italian newspapers on Tito's demands for Carinthia.

9. The question of compromising with "reactionary" countries also inspires debates in the Tito cells. Collaboration is defended with the argument that the worst reactionaries already have been removed. Some cell members have come to realize that they might have to alter their concept of

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1A2g

-3-

present day society. Unsolicited hostility against the Roman Catholic clergy is growing, for Communist extremists still do not believe that any compromise with the Vatican is possible.

Central European Catholic Confederation

10. Word of an underground movement under the direction of the former SLS (Slovene People's Party) has given rise to considerable comment. It is generally held that the SLS adherents have returned to the old "separatism", which brings out of the closet again the theory of a Catholic Central Europe. The initiative for this impossible revival is imputed to the Vatican, and has aroused disesteem for the Church, even in anti-Communist circles. In the main, however, the clericals in Yugoslavia have declared themselves against a vivisection of the country because they feel that only by preserving the national form, can they look forward to full protection of the rights of the Slovene people.
11. Many believe that the Americans, particularly the Catholic elements, also support this separatist effort. It should be mentioned here that reports on the SLS proclamation for a Catholic Central Europe have indicated a considerable lack of unanimity, even among the clericals. The announcement of such propositions are extremely dangerous in these times. The thought generally prevails among Yugoslavs that all anti-Communist movements must work together, based on the concept of an undivided Yugoslavia, for only such a formation can guarantee peace in this part of Europe. A federated Yugoslavia is politically and economically closest to the natural and ethnic conditions of the territory which it embraces.

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