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Miguel Aroche Parra, Secretary General of the State
 Committee of Guerrero
 Alejandro Martinez Camberos
 Juan Bravo Baquero

3. Shortly after the expulsion of the above Party members, it was announced that the position of Secretary of Organization left vacant by Priciliano Almaguer would be filled by Jorge Fernandez Anaya.
4. As the expulsions from the Mexican Communist Party during the month of March became more numerous the split within the ranks of the Party grew wider and wider. On 31 March 1948 Alberto Lumbreras and Carlos Sanchez Cardenas held a meeting open to all members of the Party to present their criticisms of the leaders and the policies of the Party. This meeting was attended by approximately 130 members and Sanchez Cardenas and Lumbreras emphasized the inefficiency and corruptness of Dionisio Encina and his group and their policy of subservience to government and reactionary forces. In addition to accusing the Party leadership of inefficiency and failure to follow a course which would strengthen and build up the PCM regardless of Mexican politics and regardless of immediate advantages, Sanchez Cardenas criticized the Party's deference to, and support of, Vicente Lombardo Tolendano and his Partido Popular. They announced that their group would in the future publish a bi-monthly periodical entitled El Machete, the first issue of which was to appear on 7 April 1948. Lumbreras and Sanchez Cardenas strongly advocated the holding of a national plenary session of the Party to which their objections to the present Party leadership could be presented and at which a majority of the Party members could then decide whether or not to continue with its present leadership. Early in April 1948 the expelled members of the Party, headed by Sanchez Cardenas, organized themselves into a group known as the Comite Reivindicador del Partido Comunista Mexicano. Its leadership was composed of the following:

President:	Alberto Lumbreras
Secretary General:	Carlos Sanchez Cardenas
Secretaries:	Priciliano Almaguer
	Juan Gonzalez
	Jesus Bernal
	Hipolito Cardenas
	Alejandro Martinez Camberos
	Miguel Aroche Parra
	Dolores Bravo
	Alvaro Nee Barra Zenil
	Maril Gil
Under Secretaries:	Manuel Serna
	Julio Segoviano

5. The Comite Reivindicador published its first edition of El Machete on 15 April 1948. As was to be expected, this small two-page newspaper ranted on at great length in criticism of the leadership of the PCM accusing it of inefficiency and dishonesty. On this same date, 15 April 1948, the PCM published its own version of El Machete, distributing a newspaper larger in size than that of the Comite Reivindicador but bearing exactly the same title. The PCM proper rushed this edition to print in order to protect the title El Machete which in years past was the first newspaper ever published by the Mexican Communist Party. The PCM then proceeded to accuse the Comite Reivindicador of plagiarism of the registered title of its periodical.

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6. The Comite Reivindicador continued throughout the summer attempting to recruit new members and for this purpose several of its leaders traveled throughout almost all the States of the Republic. In spite of their claims, it is felt that the Comite had little real success in their recruiting campaign. In August of 1948 the Comite joined with the Accion Socialista Unificada (ASU) and enlisted Valentin Campa and Hernan Laborde on their side. As the result of this unification and unquestionably because of contributions from the ASU, the discontinued Comite publication, El Machete, again appeared but under the new name of Noviembre. In this edition Valentin Campa's name appeared as the Director. However, only several editions of Noviembre were published, and viewing the activities of the Comite Reivindicador over the entire year, it can only be concluded that its prospects of surviving and prospering in the future are very slight indeed. It is interesting to note, however, that the Comite Reivindicador closely followed the accepted Communist line and emphasized that its quarrel was not with Communism but with the leadership of the PCM.
7. As early as 19 May 1948 the leaders of the PCM showed great apprehension as to whether or not the Party would be able to fulfill the official requirements laid down for registration of a political party in Mexico. For this reason a registration assembly was scheduled for 30 May 1948 and specific quotas for recruitment and for financial contributions were assigned to each individual cell. The Party leaders resorted to every means in their power to stimulate attendance at the registration assembly in order that the required number of registrants could be obtained before the official deadline which was 1 June 1948. If compliance with registration laws was not accomplished on that day, the Party would be precluded from participating in the elections for congressmen to take place in July 1949 and would also be precluded from any other formal participation in Mexican political life.
8. On 6 June 1948 the official registration for the Federal District of the Communist Party was held in Mexico City. The registration continued before a notary public throughout the entire day and the Party claimed to have registered approximately 1500 persons. However, reliable sources have advised that at the most the Party did not register more than 1000 individuals and that even this figure could not be considered accurate since many individuals registered several times under different names. The painters, David Alfaro Siqueiros and Diego Rivera, contributed to the occasion by short speeches and at the moment that Rivera signed his application for readmission into the ranks of the Party this fact was announced over a loud speaker to the cheers of those present. At the same time that the registration was being held in the Federal District, similar registrations were being held in each of the various States of the Republic. Several of the leaders of the Party, including Fernando G. Cortes and David Alfaro Siqueiros, were dispatched from Party Headquarters to the various State meetings in order to stimulate interest and to register as many members as possible in each State.
9. On 30 June 1948 the National Registration Assembly of the Party was held in Mexico City. As the result of this registration, the PCM claimed to have registered 36,000 members throughout the Republic with the following numbers in each State:

<u>State</u>	<u>Number</u>
<u>Oaxaca</u>	<u>7518</u>
<u>Chiapas</u>	<u>3095</u>

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State	Number
Coahuila	2145
Sinaloa	1890
Nuevo Leon	1540
Jalisco	1495
Durango	1379
Federal District	1345
Guerrero	1308
Yucatan	1305
Veracruz	1193
Queretaro	1127
Tamaulipas	1107
San Luis Potosi	1080
Zacatecas	1077
Tlaxcala	1076
Hidalgo	1075
Sonora	1057
Campeche	1045
Aguascalientes	1039
Michoacan	1025
Morelos	1023
Huanajuato	1008

The above statistics are certainly false since it is known that the registration figures were padded and that there was considerable illegal registration.

10. As is generally true with Communist organizations, many meetings were held in Mexico during 1948 by all levels of the Party from the Political Bureau and Central Committee down to the weekly cell meeting. However, perhaps the most important meetings held were the meeting in commemoration of the 24th anniversary of LENIN's death in January 1948, the Federal District meeting in July 1948, the meeting in celebration of the 29th anniversary of the Party held in September, and the 5th Ordinary Federal District Congress held in December. At those meetings which are open to the Party in general, the attendance is usually not very great and usually averages under 100 spectators. The most noteworthy factor in connection with official party meetings held in Mexico during the past year was the frequent and prominent attendance of Communists from other countries in Latin America. Some of the most well-known of these visitors were: Blas Roca, Juan Marinello and Ladislao Carbajal of Cuba; Roberto Moreno of Brazil, Salvador Ocampo of Chile, Celso Nicolas Solano of Panama and Manuel Mora Valverde of Costa Rica. Those individuals did not attend the meetings simply as observers or guests, but actively participated in discussions and plans for the future. Marinello and Roca of Cuba particularly exercised a strong influence on the PCM which was certainly in need of guidance and inspiration. It is believed that one of the primary purposes of Marinello's visit to Mexico was an attempt to rejuvenate the Party, to lay down the future Party line and to draw up a work plan. In celebration of the 29th anniversary of the PCM in addition to other foreign delegates to the Mexican meeting, an American delegate named Max Weiss took an active and prominent part in the proceedings.
11. A most important purge within the ranks of the Party leaders occurred on 8 December 1948 when at a meeting of the Central Committee, Blas Manrique was removed from office as Secretary General of the Federal District Committee, as Director of La Voz de Mexico and as a member of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. He was not expelled from the Party, however, and had not been at the time of this writing. The expulsion of Manrique was a very important event in the Mexican Communist Party since

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he had been one of the most militant and capable leaders during the past several years. He was expelled on the grounds that he was lacking in discipline and was no longer trustworthy. Some of the suspicion leveled against him was based on the fact that his wife, Miriam Misky de Manrique, is an American citizen. Manrique's position as Director of La Voz de Mexico was filled by Manuel Terrazas, formerly leader of Communist youth and a fast rising star in the Mexican Communist Party ranks.

12. The Party line for purposes of propaganda, discussion and speeches was without exception exactly what would be expected from any Communist Party in the Western Hemisphere. As regards national internal affairs of Mexico, the corruption and dishonesty in the present government, the high cost of living, the low salaries of labor, and the inadequate living conditions were continually the subjects of propaganda. Efforts of the United States and Mexico to reach an agreement with regard to petroleum matters were labeled as direct intervention in Mexican internal affairs by the United States capitalists. Mexico had allowed herself to be dominated by the United States in connection with the campaign to eradicate the hoof and mouth disease and in its participation in the Havana and Bogota conferences. Internationally the loudest outcry of the Party was aimed against United States imperialism and domination of Mexican industry and economic life. Marshal Tito was, of course, entirely in the wrong in his refusal to abide by the instructions of the Cominform. The Greek people were being forced against their will by Britain and the United States to accept a form of government for which they had no desire. The successes of the Chinese troops were heralded as a victory of the democratic peoples and as the first indications of failure of the Marshall Plan.
13. During the early part of February 1948, an effort was made by the Party leaders to stimulate the educational program which had been undertaken on several previous occasions but which had died through lack of interest of the Party members. Alberto Lumbreras and Blas Manrique were the leaders of this new effort to stimulate this program but again the scheduled course of lecturers and discussion groups continued for only a few months and then ceased because of lack of attendance by the pupils, and often because of the failure of the lecturers to make an appearance. The general apathy of the majority of the members of the PCM is reflected in this failure of the educational program.
14. Throughout the year 1948 one of the PCM's greatest worries has been its lack of operating funds. At every meeting without fail the Party leaders urged the members to be more prompt and conscientious in the payment of dues and in making contributions. However, the average Party member falls into such a low income bracket that it is easy to understand why the Party had so much difficulty in raising enough money even to continue in operation. The only way in which it managed to keep its head above water at all was through the funds raised by means of raffles, dances and other similar enterprises. One of the best indications of the Party's dire financial straits is perhaps the intermittent publication of its would-be official weekly La Voz de Mexico. An examination of the copies which appeared during the past year indicates that only 17 editions in all were printed and that in one instance a period of ten and one-half weeks elapsed before sufficient funds were raised to finance the next edition. There were other lapses of ten and eight weeks. This interrupted appearance of the Party's newspaper is considered indicative of the status of the Party finances, for there is no doubt but that Party leaders consider the continuous and regular publication of the Party newspaper as one of the most important activities of the Party.

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15. At the end of 1948 the following individuals composed the leadership of the Mexican Communist Party:

The Political Bureau

Dionisio Encina
 Jorge Fernandez Anaya
 Fernando G. Cortes
 Manuel Terrazas
 Estela Jimenez Esponda

Jesus Lazcano
 Reyes Fuentes Garcia
 Encarnacion Perez
 Abel Cabrera

The Central Committee

Dionisio Encina
 Jorge Fernandez Anaya
 Manuel Terrazas
 Jesus Lazcano
 Encarnacion Perez
 Fernando G. Cortes
 Abel Cabrera
 Estela Jimenez Esponda

Secretary General
 Secretary of Organization
 Secretary of Youth Affairs
 Secretary of Propaganda
 Secretary of Finance
 Secretary of Rural and Workers Affairs

Secretary General of the National Block of Revolutionary Women, and Secretary of Women's Affairs (Secretaria Femenil)

Reyes Fuentes Garcia
 Sotero Valdez
 Alberto Martinez
 Ignacio F. Rodriguez
 Jose Montejano
 Heriberto Saucedo
 Gregorio Molina
 Graciano G. Benitez
 Juan Pablo Zains
 Encarnacio Valdez
 Heron Velazquez
 David Serrano
 Daniel Esquivel
 J. Gonzalo Bernal
 Eligio Ramirez
 Amelia Villalta
 Miguel Castillo
 Martin Guerra
 Josefina Leon

Sec'y General, State Committee, Jalisco
 " " " " , Tamaulipas
 " " " " , Guanajuato
 " " " " , Sinaloa
 " " " " , Michoacan
 " " " " , Coahuila
 " " " " , Chiapas
 " " " " , Oaxaca

Alternates:

Raymundo Verdesosa

Sec'y General, State Committee, Baja California Norte

Antonio Medina

Esther Chapa

David Alfaro Siqueiros

16. The Confederacion de Jovenes Mexicanos (CJM), a group of youths consisting mostly of students of Communist affiliation, is a member of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. The President of this Confederation is Manuel Popoca Estrada and the organization has established a permanent office within the offices of the Mexican Communist Party at Calle Atenas #56.

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17. During the Continental Youth Congress sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth in Mexico City on 30 April 1948, the CJM acted as host to the representatives from the other countries as well as actively participating in the Congress itself. Salvador H. Gamiz Fernandez, Secretary General of the CJM, was the Mexican delegate to the WFDY Congress. Manuel Popoca, CJM president, was honorary president of this Congress and delivered the opening address of welcome.
18. On the evening of 9 July 1948 an anti-United States demonstration was staged in front of the American Embassy in protest against the arrival in Mexico of United States Army planes to take part in a search for a lost airplane carrying members of the Joint Mexican American Commission for the eradication of the hoof and mouth disease. Much of the organizing of the student groups participating in this demonstration was done by members of the CJM. This demonstration was of no appreciable consequence but nevertheless served as a vehicle for the Communists to stimulate anti-American feeling.
19. Subsequent to the holding of the Continental Youth Congress, a minority group of the CJM which objected to the strongly leftist character of the CJM that was forcefully brought out by its participation in the Congress, publicly proclaimed its intention to break away from the CJM and to hold a counter-Congress of Democratic Youth. This Congress would presumably attract the rightist youth of Mexico. Unfortunately, however, the counter-Congress was of little importance and the dissident group is completely lacking in leadership and in financial resources. It is expected, therefore, that this movement will be unable to hinder the progress or development of the CJM.
20. A general appraisal of the Party's activities during 1948 definitely leads to the conclusion that the Party lost ground during the past year and at the present time is weaker in political influence, in numbers, and in organization than it was at the beginning of 1948. The reasons for this weakening and decline of the Party are not difficult to understand. First of all there were two important schisms within the ranks of Party leaders and, of course, a most serious blow to the Party's prestige was its failure to be registered as an official Party by the Mexican government in spite of the fact that three other minority parties were given official recognition. The Aleman Government has certainly not encouraged or assisted the Party in any way and in certain instances has hindered Party activities by jailing certain of its leaders prior to a proposed demonstration or meeting. The prospects of the Mexican Communist Party exercising an important influence in Mexican political life during the next year appear most slight unless some drastic change occurs in the Party make-up which cannot be foreseen at this time.

B. Foreign Communist Party Officials in Mexico During 1948

21. During the year 1948 there was an appreciable increase in the activities and influence of leading foreign Communists in Mexico. The most important foreign Communists to visit Mexico during the year were Blas Roca, Juan Marinello, and Ladislao Carbajal of Cuba; Roberto Morena of Brazil; Salvador Ocampo Pastene of Chile; Celso Nicolas Solano of Panama; and Manuel Mora Valverde of Costa Rica.

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22. From the information available it is clear that Juan Marinello and Blas Roca, President and Secretary General respectively of the Partido Socialista Popular (Communist Party) of Cuba, came to Mexico City for the purpose of imparting to the leaders of the Mexican Communist Party the plan to be followed in the reorganization and rejuvenation of the Party. During a series of conferences which took place in the latter part of September and the first week in October 1948, they apprised the following Party leaders of the propaganda line to be followed in their respective countries with regard to major international issues:

Celso Nicolas Solano, Secretary General of the Partido del Pueblo (Communist Party) of Panama;

Salvador Carpio, Secretary of Organization of the Communist Party of El Salvador;

Roberto Mayorga, formerly a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Argentina;

Manuel Mora Valverde, Secretary General of the Partido Vanguardia Popular (Communist Party) of Costa Rica;

Dionisio Encina, Secretary General of the Mexican Communist Party.

23. During the early part of September Marinello, accompanied by the Mexican Communist fellow traveler, Narciso Bassols, called on former President Lazaro Cardenas and delivered a letter from certain Cuban intellectuals. In this letter Cardenas was requested to convoke a congress in favor of peace which would be attended by intellectuals and liberals from the Latin American republics. Later Cardenas agreed to take a leading part in the congress, which is tentatively scheduled to take place in Mexico City in March 1949 and is known as the "Conferencia Americana pro Paz y Democracia."
24. Marinello and Roca departed for Havana in the early part of October 1948. In November Dionisio Encina went to Havana to attend the Congress of the Partido Socialista Popular. Here again he was in contact with Marinello and Roca and received further instructions from them. He returned to Mexico City in the latter part of November, and during the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Mexican Communist Party which took place in Mexico City from 4 through 10 December the instructions previously received from the Cuban leaders were passed on to the members of the Central Committee.
25. Present at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the PCM was Ladislao Carbajal, a leader of the Communist Party of Cuba, who arrived in Mexico during the early part of December 1948. His mission was to assist the local Party in carrying out the instructions previously received. The instructions, emanating originally from Marinello and Roca and made known to Mexican Communist Party leaders during the Plenary Session of the Mexican Communist Party were implemented during the Fifth Ordinary Congress of the Federal District Committee held in Mexico City from 17 through 19 December 1948 and were placed in the form of resolutions on the basis of which the activities of the Party will be directed during the current year. Carbajal is in Mexico at the present time.

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26. Of perhaps more far-reaching importance was the directive to all Latin American Communist Parties which was drawn up during this period on instructions from Marinello. The directive, as it applied to the Mexican Communist Party, called for the formation of espionage groups composed of trusted Party members who were to supply complete information regarding the activities of any groups opposed to the Communist Party.
27. Roberto Morena, a leading member of the Communist Party of Brazil and a member of the Central Committee of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de la America Latina (CTAL), arrived in Mexico on 23 March 1948 to attend the Third Congress of the CTAL. It was during this Congress that the idea of promoting a Communist dominated "pro-peace" conference in Mexico City originated, and when Morena departed from Mexico on 20 August 1948 he embarked upon a tour of certain Latin American countries to organize in each country a local committee which would select delegates to the conference. In preparing the groundwork for the "pro-peace" conference Morena has been more active than any other Communist Party leader, and it is believed that he has been assigned this as his primary task.
28. Salvador Ocampo Pastene, a leading Chilean Communist and member of the Central Committee of the CTAL, is primarily occupied at the present time working on behalf of the CTAL and Vicente Lombardo Toledano. This is substantiated by the fact that, when he arrived in Bogota, Colombia, from Venezuela in January 1948, he had in his possession an outline of the labor and political movements of Mexico and a CTAL memorandum concerning the then current labor situation in Mexico. In addition, when he was in Mexico City in the summer of 1948, he spent a large part of his time at the CTAL offices and was a prominent participant in all CTAL meetings.
29. Galso Nicolas Solano, Secretary General of the Partido del Pueblo (Communist Party) of Panama, arrived in Mexico City from Balboa on 23 September. The ostensible purpose of Solano's visit was to give a series of lectures at the Universidad Obrera on the subject of the problems of Panama. Although it is known that Solano did deliver one lecture at the Universidad Obrera on 7 October, it is believed that this served only to obscure his real purpose in coming to Mexico City. It is believed that Solano's real object was to confer with Vicente Lombardo Toledano with regard to the labor situation in Panama. This belief is substantiated to some extent by the fact that while in Mexico City he visited the offices of the CTAL on at least five occasions. With one exception these visits lasted for more than two hours, and on one of the visits he was accompanied by Dionisio Encina, Secretary General of the Mexican Communist Party.
30. During Solano's visit to Mexico City he went almost every day to the headquarters of the Mexican Communist Party, where he was in conference with the leaders of the Party. It is known that on four occasions he visited in the home of the Costa Rican Communist refugee, Manuel Mora Valverde. Solano departed on 9 October for Balboa.
31. Manuel Mora Valverde, Secretary General of the Partido Vanguardia Popular (Communist Party) of Costa Rica, arrived in Mexico City on 3 May 1948.

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Although a leading Communist from this area, it is not believed that Manuel Lora has taken an important part in Communist Party activities; it is believed that his presence in Mexico can be attributed primarily to the fact that he was expelled from Costa Rica as a result of the successful revolution brought about by Jose Figueres. It has been reliably reported that as soon as the political situation in Costa Rica permits it he will return to San Jose.

C. Spanish Communist Party in Mexico

32. The main activities of the Spanish Communist Party during 1948 consisted in the promulgation of "peace propaganda," encouragement of labor agitation, and active participation in furthering Mexican leftist organizations. The main impression they have given is that their activity has become increasingly less, and in their communications with the Party headquarters in Paris it is possible to observe a growing frustration and querulousness as a consequence.
33. During the year 1948 the financial resources of the Party underwent a considerable decline which resulted in greater delays in the appearance of the Party organ, Espana Popular. However, they were able to retain at least a tri-monthly publication rate. In this periodical the main subject matter was always confined to encouraging anti-Franco propaganda and giving publicity to the political "crimes" of the Franco government against Communist agents apprehended by the Security Police. A noisy campaign to solicit funds for the aid of these Communist guerrillas resulted in the sum of 58,769 pesos, according to one source. From another, however, it was learned that the Party directorate in Paris was dissatisfied with the amount of money received by the campaign in Mexico.
34. In the international field, the Spanish Communists followed the traditional line and took advantage of every opportunity to play on anti-American sentiment and encourage all Mexican organizations which are attempting to thwart designs to bring the United States and Mexico into closer economic activity, particularly with respect to the all-important problem of petroleum. The impression is left that in this regard the Spanish Communist Party acts as a cheer leader, lustily urging the others on in the fight against American imperialism.
35. Probably the most interesting single activity was their system of reporting to France on a more or less monthly basis, discussing developments in Mexican political, social and economic life. These reports demonstrated a definite communications service between Mexico City and Paris, and several of them indicate that they were written in response to specific information requests from Party officials in France. They also reflected the directive given the Party by Juan Marinello, discussed in paragraph 26. On the other hand, these information letters disclose that the authors (usually Felipe Arconada and Ricardo Castellote) are far from objective in their observations and often leap to erroneous conclusions through incomplete information. These reports usually elaborate the success of local leftist groups as well as the role played in their success by the local Spanish Communists.
36. Another aspect of the Communist program during the year was that of frenzied attempts to counteract a stream of pro-Franco propaganda which appeared in the rightist Mexican press. The Franco regime had sent innumerable envoys during the year to Mexico, attempting to intensify commercial and cultural

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relations between the two countries. The local Spanish Communists' efforts were not notably successful, and their indignation reached one of its high points when a Franco envoy, one Jose Gallostra, Spanish Ambassador to Bolivia, was able to cause the disaffection of Adolfo Alvarez-Buylla y de Lozana, Counsellor of the Spanish Republican Embassy in Mexico City and a career diplomat who has served the Republican Government ever since its formation.

37. Another main vehicle for the propaganda activity, besides Espana Popular, was the Communist front organization, the Federacion de Organismos de Ayuda a la Republica Espanola (FOARE). During the year, this agency held several auctions, public lectures, demonstrations, etc., to propagandize the Republican cause and the guerrilla warfare in Spain, and to obtain money for remittance to Europe to subsidize and increase these anti-Franco activities. However, the tempo of the activity has been on a steady decline since the beginning of 1948 and the end of the year saw the FOARE in a nearly bankrupt condition. Reports on the activities of the FOARE dealt mainly with their efforts to increase membership and stimulate their financial resources.

D. Lombardo Toledano and International Communist Activities

38. Communist activities in Mexico during the year 1948 did achieve some measure of success which deserves careful study and attention. Significantly enough, however, these successes were not within any of the organized Communist political units, but were the results of activities of that larger and more important group which should be characterized as neo-Communist. Their activity is being included under this review of Communist developments because from the point of view of American continental interests their political objectives, propaganda line and operational techniques are identical with those of publicly known Communist units. In this group it is necessary to review the activities of certain prominent leftist labor leaders, certain labor unions, youth groups and the leftist party, the Partido Popular. The recognized leader of this group is, of course, Vicente Lombardo Toledano. His activities, with their attendant successes and failures, are probably the most important from the point of view of this review.
39. After more than two years of preliminary organization, Lombardo realized his desire of forming an independent Marxist political party which would have the role of "friendly" opposition to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), with its main task being that of constantly furthering the aims of the Revolution of 1910. Thus, on 31 August 1948 the Ministry of the Interior recognized the newly created Partido Popular as a legal, national political entity. On 20 June 1948 the National Assembly of the proposed party met in the Federal District and drew up the party program and elected the National Committees. A review of these names made it apparent immediately that the control of the Partido Popular was firmly in the hands of well known Mexican leftists, although several rightist politicians were also included for the sake of window dressing.
40. Its activities during the year have been noisy and, like the Communist parties, its members have taken advantage of every opportunity to further their propaganda line. Besides organizing their own state meetings, an active youth section, known as the Juventud Popular, has been created, tours have been undertaken by many of the leading figures of the National

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Committee and the party has completed plans for entering candidates in the coming congressional elections. The party line continues to be that of pointing out government errors, failures to carry on a revolutionary social and economic policy, and an uncompromising opposition to the aims of the United States foreign policy. In short, because of its relatively greater importance and strength than its Communist brothers, it has been far more successful in keeping the Kremlin line in the public eye and has certainly aroused a far greater amount of anti-American sentiment, which on several occasions during the year reached considerable proportions owing to political events. This was particularly noticeable during the "braceros" incident, the devaluation of the peso, the "aftosa plane crash" incident, and reports of petroleum conversations. It has also been an active propaganda force for international, Communist-sponsored meetings, such as the Congress of Intellectuals held in Poland, the several Youth Congresses, including the one held in Mexico, and the proposed Congress in Favor of Peace to be held in Mexico in 1949.

41. Another success of Lombardo Toledano during the year was the holding of the Third Congress of the CTAL in March of 1948 in Mexico City. As reported at that time*, a large number of Latin American Communists attended and succeeded in dominating the proceedings. In fact, 50 per cent of all attending delegates, fraternal delegates and observers were known or suspected Communists. Of the actual delegates, 63 per cent were of this category. The decisions reached during the meetings held at this time have since been implemented in various ways throughout Latin America. Perhaps the most important one from the point of view of American strategic interest was the decision to convoke a Latin American petroleum conference, which will be discussed below.
42. The Congress served also as an opportunity for these Communists and their sympathetic fellow labor leaders to hold a continental meeting wherein many long-standing problems and questions could be discussed and resolved. It also served as a staff meeting to devise propaganda procedure particularly aimed at enrolling Latin American labor in its ranks and to provide the broad outline for internal labor policy for each attending national federation. These decisions were slanted to include the Communist line of creating a "peace front," as well as aggressive opposition to war-mongering and imperialism which were preventing the forward march of the Latin American working classes.
43. More importantly, certain resolutions were passed which were to provide the different national syndicates with bases for complaint against foreign economic activities in their countries, and which were to prove to be occasions for labor agitation. The most important of these affected the petroleum industry. In many ways, the Third Congress of the CTAL was a highlight in the activity of Communists and their sympathizers for the year 1948. It is not believed that at any other period in the year were so many important and influential Communists of the hemisphere gathered together in one meeting for consultations and discussions.
44. Another important international meeting which was sponsored and arranged by the CTAL was the First Congress of Latin American petroleum Workers, which was held in Tampico, Mexico, in the latter part of September 1948. As in the case of the CTAL Congress, this congress of Petroleum Workers

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brought to Mexico many leading Communists from the countries concerned; that is, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico. Although the idea of holding such a continental meeting of petroleum workers dated from the Second Congress of the CTAL held in 1944, it was not until 1948 that it could be realized.

45. In many respects the Petroleum Congress was an example of the application to the petroleum industry of broad policy outline which was determined during the course of the CTAL Congress held earlier in the same year. While the CTAL Congress urged labor to unite in the fight for peace and deny aid to the war-mongering, imperialist powers, and other like generalities, the Tampico Congress penetrated to a definite program of action with respect to what is perhaps the most strategically important raw material industry in Latin America.
46. To summarize briefly, the Congress drew up a program of action which included:
- a. A call for standardization of working conditions, to include standardizing wages in terms of purchasing power, company benefits (such as hospitalization, retirement, pensions).
 - b. Abolition of discrimination between foreign (usually skilled) labor and local (usually unskilled) labor. This discrimination was to be abolished particularly in the field of salaries and living conditions.
 - c. Agitation for curtailment of export of "national wealth" and increase in its internal utilization. (In these discussions the Congress became illogically nationalistic to the point of ignoring possibilities of the internal consumption, as well as the purchasing power represented by the export of "national wealth.")
 - d. Agitation designed to bring about expropriation of all oil resources in the countries represented at the Congress.
47. Besides these resolutions, the delegates at the Congress - or, more specifically, selected delegates - attended certain secret sessions at which certain supplementary and additional resolutions were taken. These included:
- a. The attempt to create a Continental Federation of Petroleum Workers.
 - b. A commitment to "sell" the idea of oil expropriation - with Venezuela as No. 1 priority - in their respective countries.
 - c. To oppose Latin American support of any war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
 - d. To draw up a plan, as applicable to each country, to instigate sabotage in the last resort to prevent large-scale use of the petroleum resources of Latin America by the United States.
 - e. To wage a ceaseless propaganda war within their respective spheres of influence along the lines established by the CTAL Congress, namely, that of a pro-peace movement and the economic development of Latin America.

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48. The fact that this Congress was attended by many of the most important Communists within Latin American petroleum unions gives added importance to the decisions cited above. From one point of view, this Congress may be said to be aimed more dangerously at the United States than any other international meeting held in the Western Hemisphere during the year 1948. This allegation is based on the realization that the entire proceedings were directed toward the end of depriving the United States of important petroleum resources within the Hemisphere.
49. It might also be said that, in certain instances, attending delegates could not in great measure be considered spokesmen for petroleum syndicates in their countries. But, on the other hand, it must also be realized that should they control only a handful of disciplined followers, they are in a position to threaten United States interests in these countries. Sabotage is never a policy which envisages wholesale public participation for its success.
50. Another result of the Third Congress of the CTAL was the Latin American Youth Congress, sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), held in Mexico City at the end of April 1948. Through the various CTAL entities and affiliated youth groups, the Youth Congress was attended by delegates from eleven countries within the Hemisphere, as well as delegates from France, Spain, and Yugoslavia. In every instance the dominating element of the different delegations was composed of Communist Youth groups.
51. While preceded by noisy propaganda, the Congress itself made little impression within Mexico, and certainly did not succeed in organizing large groups of Mexican youth for affiliation with the WFDY. The youthful delegates proved themselves apt imitators of the Communist propaganda line, and repeated the usual charges against Anglo-American imperialist designs.
52. Its one important result within Mexico was to provide the basis for the formation of the Juventud Popular, adjunct of the Partido Popular, whose activities are described above. This Communist front youth group is probably more widely representative of Mexican youth than its predecessor, the Confederacion de Jovenes Mexicanos (CJM).

E. Labor

53. In the field of Mexican labor activities, Lombardo and his followers suffered some defeats and, in a small measure, succeeded in regaining what they had lost.
54. Lombardo was expelled by the very organization that he had created, the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), which left him in the embarrassing position of being a labor leader with no organized labor group supporting him. He immediately set about to repair this situation, and in order to achieve some measure of success, he approached some of his former enemies such as Luis Gomez Z. and Valentin Campa of the Railroad Workers Union, which was organized independently from the CTM. He also contacted the other independent industrial unions, namely the Miners, Petroleum Workers and Electricians Unions. He attempted to

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convince them that these many fragments of organized labor could, if they chose, join their forces, presumably under his leadership, in order to create a new labor federation in opposition to the CTM. He also guaranteed that he would be able to bring about many defections from the CTM and these groups would also be incorporated into the proposed new federation.

55. The first step forward was the signing of a "solidarity pact" at the end of January 1948, between the Miners, Petroleum and Railroad Workers Unions. This pact was a very loose form of association, and merely compromised its signers to mutual support. The next step was to bring pressure to bear on the Electricians Union, but they failed completely in their efforts to associate this important syndicate, probably because of the independently ambitious character of its Secretary General, Juan Rivera Rojas. However, as the year progressed it became apparent that the other three syndicates had been committed to at least the attempt to organize the new federation. In the middle of the year several talks were held between leaders of the separate factions, as well as with Lombardo, Narciso Bassols and Enrique Ramirez y Ramirez. The conflicting ambitions of these leaders prevented an early agreement.
56. Lombardo's contribution was the formation of the Alianza de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico, a relatively insignificant organization containing mainly coffee and sugar cane workers, controlled by Vidal Diaz Munoz, a close associate of Lombardo's. A few other state syndicates resigned their allegiance to the CTM and pledged support to the Alianza, but in terms of numbers of workers enrolled in the organization, these events were of minor importance.
57. The proposed new labor federation would be controlled by very leftist labor leaders. The views of Lombardo are well known; Luis Gomez Z. is considered a leftist and a puppet, to some extent, of Valentin Campa, former Communist official; Bulalio Ibanez, of the Petroleum Workers Union, is a left wing radical; Agustin Guzman, of the Miners Union, is considered sympathetic to Communism; and Vidal Diaz Munoz is an out-and-out Lombardista. The real importance of this proposed labor federation lies in the industries which would then be controlled by these leftists. While the CTM is organized on a shop basis, much as is the AFofL, these syndicates are organized on industry-wide bases, much in the fashion of the CIO. These three syndicates could paralyze Mexican economic life if, in strong unity, they chose to do so.
58. The plans for this union were interrupted by the crystallization of a hostile attitude on the part of the Mexican government. Working through devious channels, the government was able to suborn the recently elected Secretary General of the Railroad Workers Union, Jesus Diaz de Leon, who promptly charged Gomez Z. with misappropriation of union funds. The charge was followed by the seizure of the syndicate's headquarters by followers of Diaz de Leon. This took place in early October. A few days following the charges, Gomez Z. was arrested by the Federal Police, formally charged with embezzlement, and placed in prison pending trial. At approximately the same time, the economic chaos which was prevailing in the nationalized railroads of Mexico prompted the government to draw up a new working contract, under which the Railroad Workers Union lost control of the running of the railroads and many of the other gains which they had made in the years since the Revolution. These signs were clearly understood by the labor leaders in question, and by the end of the year no further progress had been made in the formation of a new federation which would control these vital Mexican industries.

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59. To complete the labor picture, it might be noted that, although there were several important strikes in the beginning of the year and in the early spring, as the year wore on labor, although restive, remained fairly quiet despite loud Communist urging that their interests were not being considered and they should unite to force government measures to control the rising cost of living, to begin a program of adequate housing, etc. The Mexican Communist Party in particular has styled itself the defender of labor, and in the early days of the strikes its members participated in the picketing, distributed handbills, and served coffee and sandwiches to strikers. These efforts met with completely negative results, and the Mexican laborers continued to rely on their present leaders and syndicates to handle these problems for them.
60. In the realm of miscellaneous comment, it should be noted that such front and leftist organizations as the Accion Socialista Unificada (ASU) and the Union Democratica Centroamericana were not at all active. The ASU's only noteworthy activity was in joining forces with the dissident group of the Mexican Communist Party headed by Carlos Sanchez Cardenas, in an effort to weaken the status of the leaders of the Party with whom the ASU is in complete disagreement.
61. In all of the Central American activities noted in Mexico during the year, particularly those with respect to revolutionary plotting and arms smuggling, there was no indication of any important Communist complicity.
62. Within the Mexican government itself, Communism remains a very weak force and is found mainly in the Secretaria de Educacion and other educational groups led by Gaudencio Poraza, an ardent pro-Soviet and Communist. There were several isolated protests on the part of small groups of teachers which complained that many of the textbooks currently used (which, incidentally, were drawn up mainly during the Cardenas regime) are Communist in bias and harmful to Mexican teaching. However, despite the little publicity these protests received, nothing has been done to eradicate glowing references to State Socialism which are found in some of these texts.

F. Soviet and Satellite Diplomatic Missions

63. Soviet Embassy. The past year witnessed an unusually large turnover among officials and employees accredited to the Soviet diplomatic mission in Mexico; many of the wives and almost all of the children of these officials and employees were transferred to Russia. The reason for the recalling of the officers and employees is not known. It is believed, however, that the children were sent to Russia in order that they might attend school in their native country, but the possibility also exists that the Soviet government felt that their official representatives abroad would be much less likely to defect if their immediate family was living in Russia.
64. There is set forth below a list of the persons who departed, together with their port of departure, date of departure, and method of travel:
- Ivan Amarian, Second Secretary, with his wife, Mariya, and two minor children, Tatyana and Mikhail, departed on or about 15 February by train for Laredo, Texas, and New York City to embark for Russia.

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Viktor M. Glotov, Attache, with his wife, Klavdiya Glotova, departed on or about 10 April by train for Laredo, Texas, and New York City to embark for Russia.

65. The following persons departed at the port of Coatzacoalcos, Mexico, on 8 June aboard the Marshal Govorov en route to Russia:

Sergei G. Iabzin, Third Secretary, with his wife, Lyubov, and two minor children, Tatyana and Olga.

Laryete Trusova (wife of Col. Aleksandr V. Trusov, Military Attache) and minor daughter, Zoya.

Anastasiya Zubareva (wife of Lt. Col. Ivan A. Zubarev, Asst. Military Attache) and minor daughters Tatyana, Yelena, Lidiya and Nataliya.

Mikhail Ivanovich Antipov, employee, and his wife, Maryana Antipova.

Anatoli Kuznetsov (probably the minor son of Ivan V. Kuznetsov, Attache).

Lidiya Chervakova, probably the teacher of children at the Soviet Embassy.

Jeanette Lutsik (probably the daughter of Petr Aleksandrovich Lutsik, employee.)

Svetlana Ryzhkov, also spelled Ryzhkova (probably daughter of Aleksandr Ryzhkov, employee).

66. The following persons departed on the ship DMITRI DONSKOY from Progreso, Mexico, on 21 July en route to Russia:

Feodor Sergeevich Puskov, employee, and his wife, Antoniya Puskova, and two minor children, Fama and Olga.

Tamara Efimenko (daughter of Feodor F. Efimenko, employee).

Ekaterina Ivanova Maksimova (wife of Pavel Mikhailovich Maksimov, employee) and two minor children, Galina and Yuri.

67. The following persons departed on 3 August at the port of Tampico aboard the MARSHAL USEAKOV en route to Odessa:

Nataliya Vasilyevna Zvetkova (wife of Grigori Zvetkov, employee) and her two minor children.

K. Vasilyevna Shurupova (wife of Vasili Sergeevich Shurupov, Third Secretary) and her two minor children.

A. Fedorovna Pankratova (wife of Pankratov, clerk) and her two minor daughters and minor son.

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68. Yuri S. Sokolov, Commercial Attache, departed on 11 September aboard the MARSHAL GOVOROV at the port of Progreso en route to Russia. His wife, Nina Sokolova, and minor child, Konstantin, departed aboard the ADMIRAL USHAKOV during the latter part of December at the port of Progreso en route to Russia.
69. The following persons departed on 15 September aboard the MARSHAL GOVOROV at the port of Coatzacoalcos en route to Russia:
- Lt. Col. Ivan A. Zubarev, Assistant Military Attache,
Mariya Ilyukina, Translator.
70. As of the date of this writing the following is the list of Russian diplomats duly accredited to the Mexican Foreign Office:
- Aleksandr N. Kapustin, Ambassador
Aleksandr V. Trusov, Military Attache (Colonel)
Feodor V. Brenov, Asst. Military Attache (Lt. Colonel)
Serafim V. Dunin, Third Secretary
Vasili S. Shurupov, Third Secretary
Ivan V. Kuznetsov, Attache
Georgi E. Balan, Asst. Military Attache (Captain)
71. The Instituto de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso, which was founded in May 1944 at the suggestion and with the financial backing of the former Soviet Ambassador, Constantin Omansky, continues to be the most valuable medium for propaganda for the Soviet Embassy. With the assistance of such leading Mexican Communists and sympathizers as Luis Chaves Orozco, Jose Mancisidor, Victor Manuel Villasenor, Diego Rivera, David Alfaro Siqueiros, et al, the Instituto is active in promoting exhibits of the works of Mexican or Russian painters and lectures by well known artists on such subjects as "Lenin in Art." In addition, almost every month the Instituto purchases books and magazines, particularly the weekly Tiempo, for forwarding to the VOKS office in the Soviet Union.
72. Cultura Sovietica, the monthly magazine of the Instituto under the direction of Luis Cordova, is devoted almost entirely to articles written by Russians on the arts, science, industry and agriculture of the Soviet Union. This magazine is well done and is well received by Mexican leftist intellectuals.
73. It is believed that during the year 1948 the activities sponsored by the Instituto declined somewhat. This was partly due to the fact that in the early part of the year Luis Chavez Orozco, President of the Instituto, was in bad health and therefore not active in its behalf. It was also due to the fact that Victor Manuel Villasenor, Secretary General of the Board of Directors of the Instituto, was devoting his time to the affairs of the Partido Popular.
74. The Polish Legation. The Polish Legation in Mexico City was the most active of the diplomatic missions representing the Eastern European countries, and from a public point of view was even more active than the Soviet Embassy itself.

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75. Because of the character and personality of the Minister, Jan Drohojowski, the Polish diplomatic mission was very prominent in all social and cultural events which took place in Mexico City. Such activity was, indeed, the essence of the mission of the Polish Legation in the opinion of the Minister, who felt that constant cultural and propaganda activity would bring about the most effective advancement of Polish interests in Mexico.
76. However, Josef Welker, First Secretary, differed with this conception and it was known that in his opinion the Legation should become an active force in furthering the leftist political interest of Mexican parties, labor unions, associations, and publications. Following the visit to Mexico of Stefan Wierbowski, Secretary General of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Welker's position soon appeared to be strengthened. Later reports indicated that he had assumed ascendancy over the Minister in questions of policy and held complete independence with respect to his own activities within the Legation. It is fair, then, to assume that the activities of the Polish Legation as the year terminated reflected more the views held by Welker than by Drohojowski concerning the mission of that Legation.
77. In this connection, it can be stated that positive evidence is at hand that there was frequent contact between the Polish Legation and officials of the Partido Popular. The Press Attache, Wikinski, also has developed close association with those newspapers which are or tend to be anti-American in their editorial policy. He has been able to prepare material for publication almost at will. Wikinski's success in maintaining a high degree of publicity on the economic, political and social progress of the "new Poland" in sections of the Mexico City press has been unequalled by any other Eastern European press representative.
78. Although there is a relatively small and unorganized Polish colony in Mexico, and virtually a complete absence of commercial relations, the Legation has spent a fairly sizeable amount of money and time on the preparation of reports which are designed to encourage at least commercial interchange, although no evidence of any success was developed during the year.
79. It should be added that because of the social gregariousness of the Drohojowskis, they were able to achieve a high degree of acceptability in the cultural and intellectual strata of Mexican society, which is to a large extent dominated by members with very strong leftist tendencies.
80. The Czechoslovakian Legation. During the course of the year 1948 there were several important changes among the officers of the Czechoslovakian Legation. Following the Communist coup d'etat in Prague, in March 1948, the Minister, Vaclav Laska, and the Commercial Attache, Jan Trebicky, resigned their respective posts in early April, declared themselves political exiles, and requested sanctuary from the Ministry of the Interior. They were immediately granted permission to remain in Mexico and much favorable publicity was given them by the rightist press. Oldrich Kaiser, who replaced Laska as Minister, arrived in July 1948. He was accompanied by his wife, who is the daughter of Czech Prime Minister Antonin Zapotocky and is an ardent Communist.

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81. Bruno Pitha, who held the title of Secretary and later Charge d'Affaires, is now assigned to the Czechoslovakian Legation in Rio de Janeiro. According to a very reliable source, Pitha is an ardent Communist, and one of his tasks in Rio will be to report on the activities of the Czechoslovakian Minister there. Pitha was replaced in the fall of 1948 by Huzen Syrovatka.
82. Norbert Fryd, who served as Cultural Attache at the Czechoslovakian Legation until his departure on 3 September 1948, is now attached to the Czechoslovakian Consulate General in New York City. Fryd has been described as an intelligent and well-educated person who is not a convinced Communist. It is reported that he has no desire to return to Czechoslovakia.
83. The officials of the Czechoslovakian Legation have been relatively inactive during the last year. Minister Kaiser has engaged in very few official acts except to appear in the name of his government in several of the Latin American republics at presidential inaugurations. He is attempting to cultivate the Soviet Ambassador, Aleksandr N. Kapustin.
84. The only other activity indulged in is of a propagandistic character. The present officials have been engaged in a losing battle to maintain the Asociacion Checoslovaco-Mexicana, but late in the year this association was formally closed. However, they still maintain a press relations service supplying Czechoslovakian news to the Mexican radio station, "Radio Continental." The material for this service is received directly from the Ministry of Information in Prague via open airmail.
85. After the departure of Norbert Fryd, an obvious decline in the quality and quantity of Czechoslovakian propaganda was noted.
86. The Yugoslav Embassy. The only important development within the Yugoslav Embassy in Mexico City during 1948 was the departure on 26 September of Hinko Raspor, Counselor of the Embassy, and the arrival of Srecko Silovic, Yugoslav Minister. Before Raspor's departure, he supervised the publication of the monthly information bulletin, Yugoslavia. This was a poor imitation of the propaganda bulletins prepared by the Soviet and Polish missions. It appeared infrequently and has since suffered a complete demise.
87. Since the departure of Raspor, the activities of the Yugoslav Embassy have decreased to a point where there is almost nothing of interest to be covered. It is unquestionably the least effective and least active of the satellite diplomatic missions. The present isolated position of Yugoslavia vis-a-vis the Cominform and the satellite countries may account for the complete lack of activity at the present time.
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88. From the above, it is immediately apparent that the Mexican Communist Party as such is not the most important facet of Communism within Mexico. Rather it serves largely as a sounding board for the local distribution of Communist propaganda. Owing to the peculiarities in Mexican politics which have resulted from the still-developing Revolution with its

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continued promises of social fulfillment, the Party still fails to attract any appreciable number of adherents from among the large masses who live in squalid poverty.

89. However, the relatively weak status of the Party does not prevent the achievement of some of its goals. By this it is meant that the Party benefits from other and larger forces within Mexico which are willing and able to serve the Communist cause in pursuit of their own goals. Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Lulalio Ibanez, Luis Gomez Z., Vidal Diaz Munoz, Narciso Bassols and many others are able to further the Communist cause by setting up for themselves identical goals in many spheres of activity. The fact that these labor and political leaders are not members of the Party adds to their abilities to promulgate these aims as purely Mexican and patriotic in character. With this advantage, they convert many more people to the program advocated by the Party than does the Party itself. The net result, particularly in the international realm, is that there are a considerable number of people in Mexico who are, wittingly or unwittingly, accepting the Moscow line.
90. A study of the material contained in this report and the attached appendix leaves no doubt that, at least during 1948, Mexico was the scene of the most important Communist meetings in Latin America. Three of these meetings were attended by European delegates as well as representatives from many Latin American countries. At one of them in particular - the Tampico Congress - decisions were reached which are definitely a threat to the strategic interests of the United States. All of them provided an opportunity for the meeting of leading Latin American Communists for mutual consultation and discussion, as well as proclaiming the Communist line.
91. Although the government of Miguel Aleman has not been friendly or helpful to the Communist Party, it has allowed important figures such as Juan Marinello, Salvador Ocampo and Roberto Morena to operate freely and openly in Mexico. As long as the government continues its policy of allowing these Communists to use Mexico as a locale for their gatherings and machinations, then Mexico will continue to retain its present status as a leading Communist tactical area in the Western Hemisphere.

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