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INFORMATION REPORT

4 August 1948

COUNTRY Netherlands East Indies
SUBJECT An Estimate of the Political Situation
in the Indonesian Republic 25X1A

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1. The Dutch-Indonesian negotiations will break down. The Indonesian Republic would prefer to have the question settled in the United Nations. The Dutch, once they get the United States of Indonesia (USI) set up, plan to ignore the Republic and robably the UN. It seems likely that they will claim that the disagreement is not between the Dutch and the Indonesians, but between two groups of Indonesians, and therefore is a civil matter and not within the scope of the UN.

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2. The Republic is having administrative difficulties. Hatta will probably take Sjarifoedin back in the Cabinet. The latter has become the quasi-stooge of (Maroeto) Daroesman and of Alimin. Sjahrir does not trust him. [redacted] Comment. [redacted] opinion that Setiadjit is now the leading Indonesian Comanist and that Sjarifoedin is his tool.)

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3. Sjahrir is discouraged and seems to think that the Republic is in a hopeless situation. Although Sjahrir is being urged to take an official position in the Republic, [redacted] it is unlikely that he will.

[redacted] Sjahrir is becoming more and more disgusted with the isolationist policy of the Jogjakarta leaders.

Sjahrir has sent most of his promising younger followers abroad, among them being Soedarpo, Soedjamoko and Loebis.

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[redacted] does not believe that the Dutch will resort to military action. [redacted] such action would be unnecessary as the Dutch could leave that to the USI when it is set up, or could merely ignore the Republic.

[redacted] the most advantageous solution for the Republic is to join the USI and then to exert all its efforts on making it an independent government. Leaders sympathetic to the Republic are now dominating the puppet governments set up under the aegis of the Dutch in West Java and in East Indonesia and [redacted] the Republic could likewise become a forceful power in the USI.

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[redacted] Comment. [redacted] was pessimistic about the Republic's prospects in Java, but optimistic about its prospects in Sumatra. [redacted] stated that both Sjahrir and Hatta felt that the "battle for Java" had been lost, but that the Republic could survive in Sumatra.)

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