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
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

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Date: 27 March 1977 By: 027 U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY



FLD 747

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP INTELLIGENCE REPORT

COUNTRY Greece

DATE: 25X1A6a

INFO. [Redacted]

SUBJECT The Democratic Liberation Army

DIST. 26 February 1947


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ORIGIN [Redacted]

SUPPLEMENT [Redacted]

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A meeting of Kapetanios was held [Redacted] at which Kapetanios Lessanias, Commander GHQ Northern Greece, gave the following account of the present organization of the Andarte movement in Northern Greece:-

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1. Arms and Ammunition.

No reliable figures for arms and ammunition were available. The majority of the arms were of German make and had been captured in Yugoslavia. Others were hidden after the Varkiza Agreement. Of the remainder, many had been captured during recent months from the Greek government forces. Recent operations had caused an acute shortage of mortar shells, hand grenades and small arms ammunition, which would present a major consideration when planning attacks. Although efforts were now being made to bring fresh supplies from Albania, the route across the snow-covered Pindos mountains was so difficult that it made the transport of large quantities of ammunition almost impossible. In all areas, however, a supply was held for purposes of defense.

2. Sabotage.

Attached to each Group of Bands was a sabotage unit consisting of fifteen technicians who worked under cover of the Andartes. If operations were continued on the present scale, supplies of sabotage equipment, such as explosives and mines, would only last until the end of December.

3. Civil Administration.

As soon as a village was "liberated", a People's Committee was formed and also a Party Committee of EAM, the latter being made up of KKE and AKE members. The Party Committee instructed the People's Security (LA) and the National Civil Guard (EP). The latter were always recruited from outside the area in which they were to function.

4. Food.

The food situation was extremely difficult. Although food stocks captured in villages had provided a surplus of meat, supplies of wheat might not last beyond the end of December. There was also a shortage of olive oil. This difficult situation was due to the fact that the supply service, in addition to its normal function, had had to feed all the villagers in the "liberated" areas. In order to reduce the dangerous food shortages, both the Central Committee of KKE and the Regional Committee of Macedonia and Thrace were endeavoring to buy wheat through-

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merchants known to the Party. To overcome the difficulty of transport, it had been arranged that consignments should be sent in trucks along the Salonica - Kozani and Salonica + Florina roads. At prearranged points the trucks would be held up by armed men and the wheat removed. The drivers of the trucks would be unaware of this plan so that it would have the appearance of spontaneous action. Money for such purchases would be obtained by levying taxes in the "liberated" areas.

5. Intentions.

Lassanis had received instructions from Athens on 2 December in answer to a message he had sent emphasizing the present weakness of the Andartes. These were to the effect that his present policy should be to conserve the strength of his forces until 10 February 1947, the date fixed for the signing of the peace treaties. He was to endeavour to maintain his positions and to avoid any large scale engagements with Government forces which might lower the morale of his troops. To boost their morale, the Andartes should be given to understand that, "with the assistance of the democratic armed forces of the neighbouring states, Greece would soon be freed from Fascism and the British occupation." The instructions from Athens had also drawn attention to the possibility that a coalition Government might soon be formed which would call on the Andartes to lay down their arms. All Andartes would be warned to reject such an appeal as its acceptance would lead to the defeat of their cause.

6. Andarte Strength.

The strength of the Democratic Liberation Army in Northern Greece was 1,916 men and 136 women, of whom 2,549 men and 95 women were in Western Macedonia and 1,767 men and 41 women in Central Macedonia.

7. N.O.F. Strength.

Lassanis had no official figures of NOF strength chiefly because frequent changes occurred. It was believed however, that the most reliable estimate of the total strength of NOF forces was 3,300 men.

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