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Section

CONTROL

U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

COUNTRY

Greece

DATE:

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SUBJECT

Directives of the Politburo of KKE

INFO. DIST.

30 October 1946

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PAGES

SUPPLEMENT

ORIGIN 25X1X6

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

It is reported that the following directives were issued by the Politburo of EEE on 23 and 24 September 1946.

1. Internal situation:

This was developing on the lines predicted. There was now a state of civil war which grew in intensity every day. Government terrorism had expanded throughout the country. Arrests, deportations and executions were common daily occurrences. It was, therefore, natural that the people should have reacted so strongly. The new military operations would make the situation worse. Misery and want were beginning to creep into the areas where these military operations were taking place. Work had practically ceased and the areas in question were cut off from the rest of the country. Refugees were beginning to overcrowd the towns in Macedonia and Thessaly. Campaigns (strikes) to relieve the people from their present distress were therefore necessary. The monarcho-fascist Government would probably oppose these campaigns. But as the people would be fighting for their daily bread and their independence, the Government's efforts would be of no avail.

2. As the Party did not wish this chaotic situation to continue, it was prepared to come to terms with its opponents provided "future collaboration was undertaken on equal terms with equal rights and privileges". The Party would then do all in its power to help reestablish law and order.

NOTE:

"Equal terms with equal rights and privileges" means acceptance of the following conditions:

General amnesty, disbandment of all paramilitary organizations, an all-Party Government, new elections and another plebiscite.

If these conditions were accepted, the Party might well call off the Andarte campaign.

If this last appeal remained unanswered, it would then be a fight to death.

The people would not give up their arms and armed resistance would be
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intensified. The present military operations would fail for the same reasons as before.

8. KOA, in the meantime, would not cease to be on the alert. The City Committee would see that "Achtides" were properly organized to resist any kind of attack whether it came from Government forces or from paramilitary organizations. The Politburo insisted once again that all members should be armed and that automatic weapons, grenades and mines should be bought for the Decharchies of the OA's.

4. The King's arrival:

The Politburo had information to the effect that an attempt on the King's life might be staged by the monarchists on the day of his arrival to enable the Government to outlaw the Party. The Party was therefore covering itself by passing the information over to the Police. And members would, in the meantime, take all necessary security measures to avoid precautionary arrests. They were also instructed not to attend any of the manifestations connected with the King's return.

6. EAM Congress:

The Central Committee of EAM would continue its efforts to obtain official sanction so that the EAM Congress could meet, if possible, legally. Representatives from provincial EAM organizations were, in the meanwhile, instructed to postpone their departure for Athens until fresh instructions were issued.

6. The left-wing press:

Circulation was decreasing rapidly and "Neos Dromos" - the official AME weekly - had been obliged to cease publication. This was due to State terrorism. The situation should be remedied. KOA was instructed to see that each one of its members bought "Risospastis", which was only selling about 17,000 to 18,000 copies daily, yet KOA had more than 20,000 members and at least double that number of followers and sympathiners.

7. The cost of living:

This was rising. UNRRA goods were being sold at twice the price the Government had fixed some time ago. Foodstuffs and articles of prime necessity were becoming extremely expensive. The people's organizations were to react strongly against the State and other black marketeers. Protests should be presented to the Ministry of Supply and to UNRRA. The dismissed Central Committee of the Greek Federation of Labor and dismissed committees of the Workers' Center of Athens would submit the workers' latest financial demands in order to meet the increased cost of living. The workers should obtain a 75% increase as well as food. The Central Committees of Athens and Piraeus unemployed should also apply for free UNRRA supplies for the unemployed.

NOTE: It is independently reported that a Committee of unemployed KOP seamen met on 25 September in Piracus to discuss the decision taken by the Government to step the unemployment bonus. If the Government did not reverse its decision, it was decided that unemployed seamen would hold demonstrations outside the Ministry of Mercantile Marine. Protests would also be sent to Foreign Seamen's organizations and to the International Transport Federation,

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