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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

REVISION OF ANNEX NO. 6 TO NSC 114/2

For the information of the IAC there is attached hereto the final version of the redraft of Annex No. 6 to NSC 114/2 as approved by the IAC at its meeting on 14 April 1952. This paper has been transmitted to the NSC.

James Q. Reber  
Secretary

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Draft Annex No. 6

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
 (Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the  
 Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

Foreign Intelligence

1. Insofar as possible the intelligence programs of the intelligence agencies and CIA are tied into the President's over-all program for Fiscal Year 1953, although in many cases indirectly. It should be noted, however, that many of the functions and programs of intelligence must be of a continuing nature quite apart from the specific aspects of any given over-all annual program. Thus the departmental intelligence agencies and CIA, which compose the Federal Intelligence Community, must make certain that the substantive objectives controlling their collection, research, and estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and to others which confront the National Security Council. These activities must be so developed and related that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives. Many intelligence programs have an intimate bearing on one another or are a composite of departmental programs and activities so that the strengthening of our habits and means of collaboration is in a sense a major part of the intelligence program.

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2. As a matter of convenience and means of giving an appraisal of the extent to which intelligence programs may achieve their goals for Fiscal Year 1953 within the resources available the following are analyzed below separately:

- a. National Intelligence Estimates;
- b. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates and intelligence programs for departmental needs;
- c. Current intelligence; and
- d. The collection of intelligence information.

3. National Intelligence Estimates: These Estimates, under the arrangements developed since October 1950, are today the authoritative intelligence opinion of the Government. Through the support of the programs for research and collection discussed below, and with the existing resources employed directly in the estimating program, it is expected that continued improvement in the quality of our National Intelligence Estimates can be expected during the period under discussion.

4. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates: The achievement of the standard of research in support of National Intelligence Estimates, which is our goal, must be viewed in terms of years rather than a limited period such as FY 1953. This achievement is dependent on a sharper definition of the essential research

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required, on new methods of cooperative effort, and in certain cases on increases in staff.

a. Political intelligence research: The political intelligence programs of the Department of State are oriented towards the urgent problems confronting the NSC and the policy makers in the Department, towards research-in-depth into the situations out of which the immediate problems arise, and towards new demands for specialized intelligence products, notably in the psychological warfare field. Adjustments have been made, and will continue to be made, in organization and in priorities with a view to meeting these objectives. However, it remains true that the intelligence production resources of the Department are insufficient to meet urgent and specialized needs and at the same time to maintain the research effort essential in the longer term if intelligence efforts directed at immediate problems are to have a sound basis.

b. Military intelligence as a result of Korea and the threat of hot war is faced with increased demands of an operational nature. At the same time it is faced with responsibilities in support of National Intelligence Estimates. The Military Services will also bear the brunt of the increasing demands of NATO and its commands for tactical and strategic

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intelligence. Despite efforts to rationalize intelligence research activities to meet these demands, the resources presently allocated to these activities will not permit such demands to be met as they should.

c. Economic intelligence: It is expected that the coordinated program which has been launched for the systematic analysis of Soviet and satellite economies will have made considerable progress during this period. It should provide a better, though by no means complete, appraisal of the long-range capabilities of the USSR and should suggest possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing economic vulnerabilities. By the end of FY 1953 the cooperative research in this area under the guidance of the Economic Intelligence Committee should have made satisfactory progress toward defining the major problems, identifying the available and relevant information existing in the Government, developing new methods of research and producing a substantial number of studies which will provide a firm foundation for National Intelligence Estimates and reliable departure points for continuous survey and appraisal of Soviet economic activity. The needs of intelligence support for economic warfare have not yet been clearly defined though it is believed they will be of a magnitude beyond the existing resources of the intelligence community.

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d. Scientific and technical intelligence, to a certain extent like economic intelligence, is a responsibility of the agencies in respect of their individual needs. The intelligence community is seeking to define clearly the areas of responsibility in this field and will develop mutually satisfactory arrangements for pooling of resources requiring joint effort. This planned cooperative attack on vital scientific and technological intelligence problems should result by the end of FY 1953 in considerable improvement. Notable success in these respects has already been achieved in the coordination of atomic energy intelligence.

e. National Intelligence Survey: The production schedule for NIS has been revised during the last year to take into account changed world conditions. It is expected that the goals established for the coming year will be substantially met with the existing resources available for this program. This year's program will be the equivalent of eight complete country national intelligence studies. This will leave approximately 60% of the high priority areas to be completed.

5. Current intelligence programs are of course related to both operational and strategic needs of the departments and the President and are keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to

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provide warning of imminent attack by hostile powers and of situations abroad affecting U. S. security. For purposes of this warning the collaborative efforts of the current intelligence resources of the departments and CIA are brought together through the IAC Watch Committee. It is expected that by the end of FY 1953 the individual and cooperative efforts should be more sensitive in the detection of hostile threats as well as current trends which necessarily have a bearing upon National Estimates and policy matters.

6. Collection: The guidance for those resources devoted to collection activities both overt and covert should be materially improved by virtue of the foregoing programs although the nature of the Soviet society will greatly limit our achievement. Programs are being designed to exploit more effectively existing U. S. governmental and other available sources of overt foreign intelligence information which have hitherto gone unexploited. Although by far the greatest quantity of intelligence information can be collected by overt means, much of the most critical information needed can be obtained, if at all, only by clandestine means. The objective here, because of the difficulty of the target, namely, the Soviet orbit, must be to define clearly the most important targets. United States efforts in clandestine operations are relatively new and the number of personnel trained and qualified as is necessary for successful

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operation is small. Clandestine intelligence, therefore, must be viewed in the long perspective of 15 to 20 years and our objectives for the Fiscal Year 1953 call for the elimination of marginal targets and greater concentration on the significant targets, the building up of operational bases and nets which inevitably require a great deal of time and are frequently faced with setbacks arising from counterespionage activities of the enemy or detection and exposure of our effort. It is recognized, of course, that the military services have urgent tactical intelligence requirements which also require the use of clandestine collection activities. By the end of this period considerable strides will have been made toward isolating the most essential elements of information which must be collected by covert means giving proper attention to priorities. There has been some success in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and satellites by clandestine technological and scientific means. The achievement of greater success in this field is to a great extent dependent on the establishment of arrangements for cooperative concentration of efforts.

7. With respect to the foregoing discussion of U. S. intelligence programs, it should be noted that our intelligence system is confronted by certain limitations which will inevitably result in a margin of uncertainty both in our estimate and in our ability to

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give early warning of attack. These limitations arise from the security consciousness and practices of the Soviet State; the high state of war preparations of the Soviet; their flexibility in making decisions and the speed with which, under their system, such decisions can be implemented. It should be emphasized that the best collective effort of which the United States intelligence community -- or any other -- is capable cannot guarantee adequate advance warning of a surprise attack.

#### Related Activities

8. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned in support of the President's programs will require increasing financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large. However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers for this work. Personnel needs will require increased reliance on Armed Service personnel.

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