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CIA 430671

SUGGESTED OUTLINE FOR A

3 December 1951

STUDY ON THE SOVIET BLOC MERCHANT FLEET

- A. Composition of Soviet Bloc Merchant Fleet
number vessels, size, age, speed, type
(OIR 5339, Table 2 brought up to date,
detailed breakdown) -- comparison with
previous periods

- B. Shipbuilding Facilities within the Bloc
 - 1. Soviet Bloc shipbuilding - technological
ability, location of facilities, capacity,
bottlenecks, etc.
 - 2. New construction in progress and planned
(OIR 5339 in more detail)
 - 3. Conversion of vessels, usage of old vessels, etc.
 - 4. Shifting of resources -- ability to convert
to greater production of larger size vessels
if imports from West restricted to filling
needs for smaller type, etc.

- C. Construction in West (OIR 5339, Table 2)
 - *1. Extent and nature of Soviet purchases in West;
number, type of vessels, speed, size, usage, etc. -
 - *a. Postwar deliveries (repairs separate)
 - *b. Construction Commitments (under trade
agreements and other arrangements)
 - *c. Contracts placed and work in progress
 - 2. Prices and terms -- for example,
 - a. Soviet willingness to pay high prices
 - b. Indirect methods of procurement
 - c. Priority nature of requests; e.g., has
the Bloc been particularly intransigent in
trade agreement bargaining for ships
 - d. Terms of delivery
 - e. Soviet Bloc supplying of raw materials for
ship construction, etc.

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- D. Soviet bloc imports of marine equipment in the postwar period (from EXCON data for 1950 on), special reference to essential raw materials and equipment not produced in the Soviet bloc.
- E. Integration of Soviet Bloc Fleets (see OIR 5339)
 - 1. Progress in unification of fleets --
Reports of Soviet Bloc shipping companies; Soviet crews operating satellite vessels; transfer of satellite vessels to Soviet flag, etc.
 - 2. Coordination of Soviet Bloc shipping routes, etc.
- F. Routes, Cargoes, Servicing
 - 1. Main routes of Soviet Bloc fleet and types of vessels employed. (Interest here is not in detailed reporting of ship movements, but in definitions of the routes and the types of vessels employed in each, in order to assess the validity of such statements as, "Soviet interest is in small not large vessels, since the former are the type needed for Baltic fleet.")
 - 2. Employment of Soviet Bloc fleet in the Far East ("historical" and present). There have been various reports of a shift in the pattern of this shipping.
 - 3. Servicing of Soviet Bloc vessels in Western ports (fueling, provisions, etc.). Extent of Soviet Bloc dependence on this servicing, with details on the nature and value, as available.
 - 4. Repairing of Soviet bloc vessels in Western ports.
- G. Relative Importance to Soviet Bloc of Sea Transport
 - 1. Importance of sea transport in connection with trade with the West, trade within the Soviet Bloc.
 - 2. Importance of sea transport with respect to particular commodity movement problems, e.g., movement of oil to the Far East.

NOTE: If it is at all feasible to forward, in preliminary version, the analysis of each section as it is completed, it would be greatly appreciated, since this entire problem is under current active consideration.

As a guide in developing and utilizing possible sources of information on this subject, and as assistance to the maritime technicians who will represent the US Government in COCOM discussions, it would also be

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helpful to have an appendix to each section containing: (1) a brief description of the types of material available or utilized in its preparations (e.g., series of periodic ONI reports on ship movements through the Bosphorus, replies to Departmental circular of ...; Lloyds Register, etc.); (2) the type of information which is needed to analyze fully the question, but which is presently unavailable, with comments as to the possibility of developing such information; (3) specific suggestions as to the type of data the US Government could request from Western Governments through COCOM.

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IMPACT ON WESTERN EUROPE OF PROSPECTIVE SHIPPING CONTROLS

The study should deal in separate chapters with the effect of the shipping controls on

- (a) all European COCOM countries (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, Norway and Portugal),
- (b) all other Western European countries which are potential COCOM members, and
- (c) the cumulative effect of these controls on Western Europe as a whole.

Each of these chapters might be subdivided conveniently as follows:

I. Economic Importance of:

A. Sale of vessels,¹ subdivided as to category, tonnage and speed, in particular:

dry cargo, tanker and special vessels,

vessels above 7,000, from 4,000 to 7,000, and below 4,000 GRT,

vessels with up to 12 knots inclusive and more than 12 knots.

1. Earnings (specified as to currency) and their importance to

(a) the yards (both absolute and relative importance, as compared with the total business of the yard, etc.),

(b) the economy in general, and

1. Similar although not identical chapters for:

B. Sale of supplies, stores, etc.

C. Chartering of vessels

D. Shipping to East of (possibly forbidden) goods on vessels of participating countries

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(c) the balance of payments of the country concerned.

2. Importance of construction for the Soviet Bloc from a production and sales point of view:

- (a) Can the Soviet Bloc buyers easily be replaced by other buyers?
- (b) Can the cessation of sales to the East be expected to seriously harm not only the shipbuilding industry, but also allied industries, and to what extent?
- (c) Could such cessation jeopardize the existence of yards or plants with ensuing greater damage than mentioned sub 1?

3. Importance of the Soviet Bloc imports and the consequence if, as a retaliation for the control program, such imports would be stopped partly or entirely, with

breakdown as to goods and quantities, their replaceability from other sources, and the impact on the economy if such replacements

- (a) can take place
- (b) cannot take place

4. Discussion of the prospect that, on the other hand, cutbacks in steel and other materials might

- (a) make the exports to the Soviet Bloc unfeasible anyway or, at any rate,
- (b) make restrictions imposed on such exports more easily explicable to the Eastern countries.

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II. Political Considerations.

The principal European objections to our control program are known. However, for each of the countries concerned, not only the degree to which such objections might be justified should be studied, but also:

- (a) the weight the objections can be expected to have in the minds of the principal opponents, and
- (b) the influence which such opponents or opposing groups can be expected to wield and the probable consequences of their attitudes.

Opposition to the control measures -- usually accompanied by the argument that such measures are neither worthwhile nor feasible anyway -- mainly will come from the following quarters and in each case, naturally, will be seized upon by the Communists.

A. Governments

1. Reluctance to worsen relations with the East -- mostly in order to avoid communist, pacifist or simply anti-American criticism from important political quarters.
2. Fear of being accused of treaty violations. For this purpose both multilateral conventions and bilateral treaties, as of "commerce and navigation" would have to be consulted.
3. Fear of being accused of giving in to US pressure.

B. Business

Individual firms, commercial associations, and Chambers of Commerce principally might point to

1. the direct losses involved in the adoption of the control measures (see above, I),

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2. the fact that firms in non-COCOM countries probably would replace the COCOM-bound firms and that business might be lost permanently to firms which either are not subject to the control measures or which operate in countries where such controls are not being exercised too strictly,
3. bottlenecks and delays in production and shipping which would result from the adoption of the control measures (as, for example, in the case of the shipping manifests, where we intend to change a current shipping practice because it lends itself to control evasion).

C. Labor

It should be investigated whether any and which labor groups might be expected to oppose or even fight the control program for:

1. Economic reasons (loss of employment or wage reduction) and
2. Political reasons (pro-Communism, pacifism, anti-Americanism),

and with what means such fight might be carried out, in particular, whether strikes and/or sabotage are a probability.

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Government-Wide Survey of Economic Research Programs on the Soviet Orbit

General Background

One of the most critical deficiencies of the intelligence community and, indeed, of the entire United States Government, is the lack of any comprehensive understanding of the pattern of all the Government research programs in the field of foreign economic intelligence. The need for a review of these programs and an evaluation of their rationale has been recognized repeatedly by the National Security Council. In outlining CIA's responsibilities in this field (NSCID 15) the NSC directs CIA to:

"Maintain a continuing review of the requirements of the United States Government for foreign economic intelligence relating to the national security, and of the facilities and arrangements available to meet those requirements, making from time to time such recommendations to the National Security Council concerning improvements as may require National Security Council action."

In concurring with the establishment of the Economic Intelligence Committee the entire intelligence community underlined the NSC concern with this problem by directing the EIC, through its terms of reference to:

"Examine continuing programs of fundamental economic research relating to the national security throughout the United States Government and recommend to the IAC for appropriate action allocation of responsibility for specific fields of inquiry where such allocation appears appropriate."

Accordingly, the EIC in its meeting of 16 August 1951 (EIC-M-4) agreed that CIA, through the EIC Secretariat, should initiate a Government-wide survey of economic research programs on the Soviet Bloc.

Purpose and Limitations of the Preliminary Survey — Apologia

In carrying out this assignment the EIC Secretariat held numerous discussions with representatives of the agencies most concerned and attempted to set up a

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standard reporting form which would elicit answers most essential to the survey. However, in view of the nature of the survey, contributions from the various agencies were considerably lacking in uniformity. Descriptions of research programs were given in various forms and in varying degrees of detail. Gaps in intelligence were described differently by different agencies, and in some cases the existence of major research gaps was not noted. However, despite these limitations the Secretariat feels that there is sufficient information available, particularly information submitted on numbers of personnel, to permit broad preliminary evaluations of the research programs on most segments of the economy. To facilitate these evaluations it will be necessary to supplement agency contributions by discussions with key personnel in various agencies, and by some interpolation on the part of the Secretariat. Any major errors that creep into the preliminary survey as a result of this summary treatment can be corrected by the EIC in its review of the individual sector papers.

This initial "broad brush" review will be adequate to highlight major gaps and other critical economic intelligence problems to which the EIC should devote its attention either through existing subcommittees, through the establishment of new subcommittees, or through ad hoc groups composed of representatives from those agencies most familiar with the particular problem. In addition to waving the red flag before the EIC the survey should give the EIC at least a general idea of "who does what" and what their capabilities are for doing it in terms of numbers of professional personnel. Undoubtedly, other extra-dividends will also emerge as the study progresses.

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Research Programs Relating to Agriculture in
the Soviet Bloc

I. Personnel Engaged in Research

The following table indicates the number of professional personnel in the United States Government engaged in research activities in this field:

<u>Department or Agency</u>	<u>Number of Professional Personnel</u>
<u>IAC</u>	
Department of the Army	The equivalent of less than full-time for one analyst
Department of the Air Force	No personnel continuously assigned to research in this field. For certain analyses research studies of other agencies have been used
Department of State	Two analysts on the USSR. The equivalent of less than full-time for one analyst on Eastern Europe
Central Intelligence Agency	Six analysts on Agriculture One on Forestry
<u>Non-IAC</u>	
Department of Agriculture	Four analysts on Agriculture Four on Forestry
Department of Interior	No personnel continuously assigned to research on Agriculture. <u>Ad hoc assignments only.</u> The equivalent of less than full-time for one analyst on Fisheries
Economic Cooperation Administration	No personnel continuously assigned to research on Agriculture for this area. Some research in connection with trade studies

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Total number of professional engaged in research on:

Agriculture	The equivalent of approximately thirteen analysts full-time
Forestry	Five analysts
Fisheries	The equivalent of approximately one analyst full-time

II. Estimate of Deficiencies

The adequacy of United States intelligence as it related to agriculture is measured as follows:

- (1) good information, studies current: signifies that there is sufficient information and that this information has been collated by current studies to permit an appraisal of the importance of a given branch of the Soviet economy to United States security.
- (2) out-of-date information, studies current: signifies that the informational base for existing studies is seriously out-of-date and that present projections involve a widening margin of speculation. The primary need here is for more information.
- (3) all available information not currently analyzed: signifies that all the presently available information has not been exploited by current studies. The primary need is for research.
- (4) scattered information, no current studies: signifies that only limited information is available and that little speculative analysis has been attempted. The need is for both information and/or speculative analysis and new and improved analytic methods.

<u>Agricultural Topic</u>	<u>Adequacy of U.S. Intelligence</u>	<u>Current Projects</u>	<u>Type of Deficiency</u>
<u>Agricultural Resources</u>			
1. Area and soils	Good info Studies current		-

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<u>Agricultural Topic</u>	<u>Adequacy of U.S. Intelligence</u>	<u>Current Projects</u>	<u>Type of Deficiency</u>
2. Agro-climatology	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed	Correlation Crop Yield and Weather	Research
<u>Production Factors</u>			
1. Labor	Scattered info <u>No</u> current studies		Information & spec. analysis
2. Land utilization	Out-of-date info Studies current		Information
3. Farm techniques	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed		Research
4. Mechanization	Fair info Studies current		—
<u>Organization of Agriculture</u>			
1. Land tenure	Good info Studies current	Collectivization in E. Europe	—
2. Procurement & marketing	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed		Research
3. Govt. policies & control	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed		Research
<u>Crop Acreage, Yield and Production</u>			
1. Grains & industrial crops	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed	Grain Production, 1951 and Cotton Production	Research
2. Other food crops	Scattered info <u>No</u> current studies		Information & spec. analysis

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<u>Agricultural Topic</u>	<u>Adequacy of U.S. Intelligence</u>	<u>Current Projects</u>	<u>Type of Deficiency</u>
<u>Livestock & Livestock Products</u>	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed	Livestock numbers & meat production Wool production Wool consumption in USSR	Research
<u>Distribution</u>			
1. Food consumption	Out-of-date info Studies current		Information
2. Utilization of industrial crops	Scattered info <u>No</u> current studies		Information & spec. analysis
3. Reserves & storage facilities	Scattered info <u>No</u> current studies		Information & spec. analysis
4. Intra-Orbit trade	Scattered info <u>No</u> current studies		Information & spec. analysis
5. Foreign trade in agriculture	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed		Research
<u>Agricultural Processing Industries</u>	Scattered info <u>No</u> current studies		Information & spec. analysis
<u>Fisheries</u>	Scattered info <u>No</u> current studies (Except for fishing areas which are adequately known)		Information & spec. analysis
<u>Forests</u>			
1. Resources	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed		---
2. Output by types of products	Scattered info <u>No</u> current studies		Information & spec. analysis
<u>Agricultural Capabilities</u>			
1. Food balance, present & potential	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed		Research
2. Approved For Release <u>Approved for release</u> areas	All available info <u>Not</u> currently analyzed		Research

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III. Critical Deficiencies.

It is obviously impossible for the EIC Secretariat to render intelligent judgments on all of the most critical deficiencies in the numerous fields covered in this survey. It is possible, however, to make a start on this and to establish a framework as a basis for criticism by the EIC and its subcommittees.

It is assumed that the central criterion for selection of "critical" intelligence requirements is the end use. This calls for an examination of the extent to which the intelligence products could ultimately have a bearing on actions or decisions of importance to US security interests. The importance of individual research studies to certain end products of intelligence may, of course, be indirect in that there is a high degree of interdependence among various bits of intelligence and one bit often supports or is derived from others.

The following summary is the Secretariat's selection of some of the most critical deficiencies not currently covered by projects, together with an indication of the end products which such intelligence research might be required to support. This selection is based not only on data in the Work Sheets and in Part II of this paper but on discussions with key personnel in the field.

Critical Deficiencies

(1) Food reserves and storage facilities

Studies Directly Related to US Security Requiring this Intelligence

Economic Capabilities for War

Vulnerability of Rail Transportation to Air Attack

Estimate of the Most Desirable Time of the Year for the USSR to Initiate General War

(2) Agro-climatology

Economic Capabilities for War

Factors Affecting the Internal Stability of Soviet Bloc Nations

Soviet Bloc Grain Surpluses Available for Western Europe

(3) Farm Techniques
(particularly developments in seed varieties)

Studies Related to *Biological* ~~Bacteriological~~ Warfare

(4) Food Consumption

See studies under (1) above.

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IV. Recommendations.

1. It is believed that steps should be taken to increase the number of personnel working in the Department of Agriculture on Soviet Bloc material. If this increase can be affected, the new personnel should be responsive to intelligence requests. In relation to the requirements for intelligence on this subject, the total number of professional personnel is small. This contention is substantiated by the summary on professional personnel in part I of this paper and by the review of intelligence gaps in Part II. Some of these gaps, as indicated in Part III, are critical. If these personnel were placed in the Department of Agriculture, they could draw on the experience and training of literally hundreds of professional analysts in the Department and would have access to a tremendous store of studies and file material on the subject. From a relatively small investment, the intelligence community could increase its research output considerably. At present the Department of Agriculture has the equivalent of only four professional analysts engaged in research on this subject.

2. It is recommended that the EIC representatives review the statement of "Critical Deficiencies" in Part III and submit their criticisms to the Secretariat. An agreed EIC statement on this subject should be transmitted to the Agricultural Subcommittee with a request that it be reviewed and returned to the EIC with a proposed program for filling gaps. If the deficiency stems primarily from a lack of information, the Subcommittee on Requirements and Facilities for Collation should be consulted.

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FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

Work Sheet

Department or Agency	General Description of Research Program	Major Gaps in Knowledge	Research Projects	Personnel Assigned to Research
<p><u>Dept. Air Force</u> <u>Target Research Branch</u></p>	<p>No continuous program, some <u>ad hoc</u> studies, such as vulnerability of crops to biological warfare attack.</p>	<p>Information largely secured from other agencies.</p>	<p>-</p>	<p><u>Atomic Energy and Chemicals Section, Chemicals Unit</u></p> <p>No continuous personnel assignments to research on food.</p>
<p><u>Dept. Army</u> <u>Quartermaster Corp.</u></p>	<p>Research on production, stocks and possible availabilities of Quartermaster materials, including food, in foreign areas where US troops may become engaged.</p>	<p>Essential basic information on this subject is inadequate. Generally very fragmentary and in an unevaluated form.</p>	<p>Program for the Soviet Bloc was not reported.</p>	<p><u>Intelligence Section, Planning Branch, Military Planning Division, Office of the Quartermaster Corp.</u></p> <p>The number of professionals working on this subject was not reported. However, there are only 4 professionals in the entire Section and, in view of the subjects to be covered, Food and Agriculture must occupy one person less than full time.</p>
<p><u>Dept. State</u> <u>OIR</u></p>	<p><u>USSR</u></p> <p>I. <u>Crops</u> (Acreage, Yield, Production)</p> <p>Grain Feed (including pastures) Industrial Others</p> <p>II. <u>Livestock</u></p> <p>Numbers Productivity and Output Feeding Practices</p>	<p>Inadequate Inadequate Inadequate Poor</p> <p>Relatively adequate Inadequate Inadequate</p>	<p>Continuous evaluation with briefs in <u>Soviet Affairs</u> for the topics noted.</p> <p>Continuous evaluation with briefs in <u>Soviet Affairs</u> for the topics noted.</p>	<p><u>Div. Research for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Internal Economic Section</u></p> <p>Two professionals, full time.</p>

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Department or Agency	General Description of Research Program	Major Gaps in Knowledge	Research Projects	Personnel Assigned to Research
Dept. State 028 (Continued)	III. <u>Farm Practices and Land Improvement</u> (Crop rotation, use of selected seed, fertilizer, degree of mechanization and electrification, irrigation and shelter-belt projects)	Inadequate	Continuous evaluation with briefs in <u>Soviet Affairs</u> for the topics noted.	See page 1.
	IV. <u>Production Factors</u> Manpower (Labor force, utilization, productivity) Agricultural Machinery Tractors Combines Other machinery Draft Power (Mechanical and animal) Fertilizers	Inadequate Relatively adequate Barely adequate Inadequate Relatively adequate Relatively adequate Inadequate	
	V. <u>Overall Agricultural Production - Present and Future Trends</u>	Adequate	"	"
	VI. <u>Agricultural Policy and Organization of Agriculture</u>	Adequate	"	"
	VII. <u>The Procurement System</u>	Adequate	"	"
	VIII. <u>Supplies available to the Government (Procurements)</u>	Inadequate	"	"
	IX. <u>Distribution of Kolkhoz Output and Income of Kolkhoz Members</u>	Quite inadequate	"	"
	X. <u>Utilization of Supplies</u>	Quite inadequate	"	"
	XI. <u>Marketing and Consumption</u>	Quite inadequate	"	"
	XII. <u>Foreign Trade in Agricultural Products</u>	Inadequate	"	"
	XIII. <u>Food Processing Industry</u>	Inadequate	"	"

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FOOD AND AGRICULTURE (Page 3)

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Department or Agency	General Description of Research Program	Major Gaps	Research Projects	Personnel Assigned to Research
Dent. State OIR (Continued)	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	This staff does undertake to do basic research in this field and is not prepared to state what the gaps are.		<u>DRS, Eastern European Section.</u> 5 professionals expending less than the equivalent of 1/4 of one man's time.
GIA - ORR	<p><u>General</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Land resources 2. Land use 3. Agro-climatology 4. Government plans and organizations 5. Interdependence of agricultural enterprises and regions <p><u>Crops</u> (Grains, sugar, oil, seeds, cotton and other fibers)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Production, consumption (pattern, civilian and army rations) 2. Stocks, storage and processing <p><u>Livestock</u></p> <p><u>Forestry</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Resources 2. Production by type of products 	<p>Adequate Inadequate Fairly adequate Few studies Few studies</p> <p>Some information but none up-to-date Very little information</p> <p>Very few reliable studies are available. The ones that are available are several years old.</p> <p>Fair information Little information</p>	<p>Weather Crop Correlation Applied to Crop Yield Estimates for European USSR</p> <p>1951 Grain Production in USSR and European Satellite USSR Grain Production for 1950 by Regions Soviet Bloc Trade in Grain USSR Cotton Production Livestock Numbers and Meat Production in the USSR Wool Production and Consumption in the Soviet Bloc.</p> <p>Summary of world Cork Production and Trade, with Particular Emphasis on the Soviet Bloc.</p>	<p><u>Division of Materials - Food and Agricultural Branch</u> 5 professionals full time who distribute their work as follows: <u>General:</u> Equivalent time 1 professional</p> <p><u>Crops:</u> Equivalent time 2 1/2 professionals</p> <p><u>Livestock:</u> Equivalent time 1 1/2 professionals</p> <p><u>Forestry:</u> 1 professional recently employed</p>

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Department or Agency	General Description of Research Program	Major Gaps in Knowledge	Research Projects	Personnel Assigned to Research
CIA - ORR (Continued)	<u>Fisheries</u> 1. Fishing area 2. Catch 3. Equipment and Processing Facilities	Adequate Very few studies Very few studies	None	A full-time professional is to be employed.
<u>Dept. Agriculture,</u> <u>Office of Foreign</u> <u>Agricultural</u> <u>Relations</u> <u>Geographic</u> <u>Coverage</u>	<u>Soviet Orbit Countries</u> 1. Agricultural Production 2. Domestic Consumption 3. Trade in Major Agricultural Commodities 4. Stocks 5. Production Techniques 6. Government Policies Affecting Land Tenure and Ownership 7. Agricultural Potential	No information on domestic consumption or stocks.	Dept. of agriculture Monograph No. 5, A <u>Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture</u> , August 1951. "Collectivization in the Danubian Basin," <u>Foreign Agriculture</u> , October, 1951. NIS responsibility for agriculture. "Yugoslavia's New Farm Marketing Scheme," <u>Foreign Agriculture</u> , August 1951. "Turning of the Screw in Soviet Agriculture," <u>Foreign Affairs</u> , January, 1952. Occasional data on Soviet Orbit countries.	<u>Office of the Chief, Soviet Union and Balkan Section</u> Two professionals full time. <u>Regional Investigations Branch:</u> <u>Western European and North African Section</u> (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria) One professional full time. <u>Far Eastern Section</u> (China, Manchuria, N. Korea) One professional full time.

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Department or Agency	General Description of Research Program	Major Gaps in Knowledge	Research Projects	Personnel Assigned to Research
<u>Dept. Agriculture,</u> <u>CFAR</u> <u>Geographic Coverage</u> <u>(Continued)</u>			"Soviet Agricultural Collectivism in Peace and War," <u>American Economic Review</u> , May, 1951. "Europe's East-West Trade in Food," <u>Foreign Agriculture</u> , April, 1951. "Food Situation in Eastern Europe," 1952. "Background Statistics on Yugoslav Agricultural Production and Trade." "Work on Yugoslav Food Program," 1950-51. "Occasional Notes on Current Production," <u>Foreign Crops and Markets</u> . "An Extensive Review of David Milrany's Book," <u>Marks Against the Peasant Volin in American Political Science Review</u> , December, 1951.	

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Department or Agency	General Description of Research Program	Major Gaps in Knowledge	Research Projects	Personnel Assigned to Research
<p><u>Dept. Agriculture, OFAR (Continued)</u></p> <p><u>Commodity Coverage</u></p> <p><u>Forestry Service</u></p>	<p>1. Cereals 2. Livestock and Livestock Products 3. Fats and Oils 4. Fruits and Vegetables (including sugar) 5. Industrial Crops</p> <p><u>Forest Products</u> Special reports, as required, on the forest resources, forest conditions, timber species, forest products, etc., of foreign countries.</p>	<p>See page 4.</p> <p>Not reported.</p>	<p>Some 96 world summaries dealing with production, stocks, and trade of major commodities are issued annually according to a prearranged schedule.</p> <p>NIS responsibility for forest resources and products.</p>	<p>The equivalent of less than one analyst full time working on commodities of the Soviet Bloc.</p> <p><u>Forestry Service</u> Four professionals working full time on current NIS projects.</p>
<p><u>Dept. Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service</u></p> <p><u>Geological Survey</u></p>	<p>Special reports, as requested, on fish resources in Soviet countries.</p> <p>Special reports, as requested, on agricultural areas and soils.</p>	<p>Not reported. Believed to be adequate on fishing areas but not on fishing facilities and the fish catch.</p>	<p>NIS responsibility for fish resources.</p> <p>None</p>	<p>One professional less than full time.</p> <p>ad hoc staff assignments as required.</p>
<p><u>Economic Cooperation Administration</u></p>	<p>No continuous research program on agriculture for this geographic area. Some special projects in relation to foreign trade.</p>	<p>Not applicable</p>	<p>Studies of western dependence on exports of Certain Soviet Bloc Agricultural Exports.</p>	<p>No personnel continuously assigned to research in this field.</p>

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