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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. The aims of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia can be divided into two categories: the general program, common to all Communist Parties, and the so-called "action program." There is no need to touch on the first, which is fully explained in "classical" Communist literature. The action program, tailored to the specific country, specified objectives to be attained within a given period. The objectives of the Czech Communist Party were:
 - (a) Fulfillment of the revised five year plan which meant increasing production in heavy industry and agriculture; this also included:
 - (1) Arming the nation. There were extensive building programs for war production. In addition there were plans to reorganize armed forces according to the Soviet example down to the smallest detail, and to organize a monumental training program for the great majority of the non-military people including men, women, and even children.
 - (2) Tightening-up and improvement of the Communist Party itself. This was to be accomplished by indoctrinating the people and by the liquidation of the enemy class. This phase of the program included detailed programs dealing with de-bureaucratization of the Party apparatus; elimination of all unreliable and unenthusiastic elements as well as those who were not sufficiently blinded; education of not only the members of the Party but all except those class enemies of Marxism-Leninism; elimination of the influence of all churches (in ideological re-education the Catholic Church is believed weakest, whereas the Protestant Union of Czech Brothers is the strongest ideological enemy together with the National Czechoslovak church); acceleration of agricultural collectivization. But most important was the destruction of the large land owners and certain intellectual groups excepting science and related fields.

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Each part of this program was prepared in great detail by departments of the CP, and the effect of such programs was felt in the daily life of the nation.

2. As for achievement, [redacted] the Czech Communists were partially successful as far as fulfilling the revised five year plan, that they were successful in arming the country, but that they did not reach their goal as far as improving the Party machinery was concerned. More specifically, until serious difficulties arose in the Summer of 1951, the increase in heavy industry was the greatest success of the CP. As far as increasing the standard of living, the five year plan was a failure; this was partly due to the revision of the five year plan in 1950 and 1951 which called for a sharp increase in the production of armament at the expense of consumer goods. In my opinion, however, the mismanagement and incapability of the system should be blamed for the difficulties, and also for the sharp decline in the standard of living. The speed of collectivization caused the serious food situation. Many Czech economists think that voluntary cooperatives would solve the problem of uneconomical production of small individual farm units, but everyone believed that collectivization was the result of an order from Moscow. The only achievement of the Communist Party approved by most Czechs was the solution of the German problem which was accomplished by simply moving three million Germans out of the country. It is generally believed that it was only under the pressure of the Communist Party of the USSR that this plan was successfully carried out. In addition, the Communists achieved some success in indoctrinating the youth; this could become a very serious threat in a few years, especially if the standard of living should improve because of better organization of the economic system.
3. The greatest strength of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia was in its organization which led, supervised, and controlled almost every aspect of the daily life of the country, and in its leaders, who were absolutely incorruptible, willing to make any and all sacrifices, and fanatically faithful. The controls of the Party, fitting together like wheels of a very complicated but accurate machine, enabled the Party to forge ahead even though the majority of the people were opposed. Communist Party leaders did their duty without regard to their personal well-being or feelings; they did not hesitate to use terror or merciless methods against anyone who tried to weaken the Party program, even when this involved sacrifices on the part of themselves, their families, or their friends. I don't mean to imply that the Party bosses didn't live in relative luxury compared to the masses.
4. The great weakness of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia in my opinion was that, except for some of the youth, the nation as a whole remained unaffected by Communist propaganda and was united in hatred of Communism. The weakest link in the Party was the mass of ordinary members and minor officials who were opposed to Communism. The situation illustrates the fact that mental cruelty and slavery were more powerful than material matters. Here again, a certain proportion of the youth were exceptions. Another weakness of the CP was the wide gulf which separated the leaders of the Party from the masses. [redacted] the Party bosses had no idea of the true feelings of the people. They were aware of the economic difficulties and other serious problems but they had no comprehension of the mental attitude of the majority of the nation. The system did not permit the leaders to see the true picture.

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5. Outside the Communist Party there was no support for the regime and even within the Party the opposition was very strong. Opposition against the CP was synonymous to opposition to the government; to the average Czech they were one and the same. [redacted] many Czech refugees have overestimated the strength or even the existence of organized opposition. There were desperate actions by individuals but [redacted] doubt that there are even now any large organized groups. [redacted] at least 90% of the production failures were caused by other factors, such as mismanagement, incapability, and, last but not least, to a certain extent by passive resistance, which could not be termed actual sabotage. The majority of the Czechs were anti-Communist and therefore it is difficult to say which class is more opposed to the regime. [redacted] the farmers composed the strongest anti-Communist element; [redacted] not the agricultural workers or large land owners (since World War I there have been very few large land owners) but the independent farmers who owned and tilled the majority of the land. Even the smallest farmers hated collectivization and the Communist regime. Next strongest in opposition to the Communists were the intelligentsia. [redacted] this group was lost to Communism even before 1948 when it was the intelligentsia which was Communism's most powerful supporter. [redacted] it is true that a great percentage of the workers were against the regime; some thought that the working class was the most reactionary element in Czechoslovakia but [redacted] if the economic situation improved, the workers would again support the regime. But the intelligentsia would never again trust the Communists even if the economic situation were greatly improved; the mental slavery was far worse for them than the material shortages. The class struggle still went on in the CSR; classes had been suppressed but not obliterated. Only part of the working class supported the regime; that part was made up primarily of those in higher positions, the "workers' cadre", in all branches of government, security forces, army, and naturally, the Party apparatus.

6. [redacted] the Czechoslovak Communist Party had some 2,200,000 members in the Summer of 1951. At that time the CP membership was again opened for new recruits. The membership of the Party had been closed in 1949, but in June or July 1951 the membership was again opened. There was a new regulation at that time; to be accepted for membership, a person had to rank high in achievement, ie, shock-worker, Stakhanovite fulfilling his norms more than 100% or a young person from the Czechoslovak Youth Organization. Only exceptional persons out of these categories could be accepted by the CP. Each basic CP organization was to look for such individuals in its district, and after closely examining them the board of the organization had to approach them with the offer of membership. For workers this involved a candidacy of one year; for others, this period was two years. In some cases the period to be served as a candidate could be shortened. It was only after the 1948 coup, that a person was required to become a candidate before he could be admitted to membership. The duties of a candidate were the same as those required of a member; the candidate, however, had only an advisory vote which was not counted. Communist Party membership cards were not reviewed. The desitkar, at the beginning of each month, gave each member a membership stamp. All cards expired not later than January 1951; for 1951-54, new cards were issued.

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7. It is difficult to estimate the number of Czech CP members who were hard core, dependable members, [redacted] after closely observing the various Party organizations, [redacted] the really hard core members were very few; [redacted] less than 20% of the total Party membership. Even fewer in number were the absolute fanatics, who were willing at any time to give their lives at the order of the Party; these fanatics could actually only be found among those employees high in the Party or important government officials. There was an extreme shortage of hard core CP members for appointments abroad and to leading positions within Czechoslovakia. This was particularly true of the positions abroad where the members were not under continuous control. [redacted] difficulty of the cadre departments in 1951 to find not only able (in this respect the situation would not have been so bad) but really trusted Party members for assignment to the foreign service. Dozens of Party members, already carefully selected by the application of very strict regulations, had to be rejected before a single one could be found who could be trusted as immune against "being spoiled by Western ideology". Such people were "secured" by the Party by sending them abroad without their families. [redacted] most hard core CP members were concentrated in the security forces. A much larger percentage of the membership of the Czech Communist Party consisted of members, more or less apathetic to the Party, who were influenced very easily by material well-being. At least half of the membership of the Communist Party was opposed to Communism; they were desperately unhappy and hated the regime. In 1946, in the last free election in the CSR, more than 40% of all voters voted for the CP, and [redacted] the percentage was even higher in 1948. Many people joined the Party after having been lured by the Communist promises, plans for the future, etc. From 1945-1948, the policy of the CP and its entire set-up and position in Czechoslovakia were completely different from the activities of the Party [redacted] or for that matter, from Communist Parties in other countries. More and more Czechoslovakia was becoming like the USSR and the people hated it.

8.

[redacted] There was no exact evidence as to how deep the roots of the Sling-Svermova factionalism went. The different points of view of Gottwald and Slansky involved methods and could not actually be considered factionalism. There were no visible traces of a movement such as Titoism. The disputes between Gottwald and Slansky concerned merely methods of economy, not Soviet domination or the extent to which it had spread. Good observers felt when the Sling-Svermova plot was announced that the great majority of the population would have gone along with the plotters had there been open uprising. This majority would include those who were not Party members and knew nothing of Party problems; they would simply join anyone in opposing the regime. It would not matter that the uprising would result in just another form of Communism. It would be sufficient that it was an uprising against the present regime.

9. In general the purges in Czechoslovakia have followed the pattern outlined in the Communist teaching about the class struggle. The aim of the purge was to destroy the "typical capitalist" elements immediately. Other elements were to be left alone as long as they were useful. The power was to be concentrated in a certain part of the worker class, among those who were formerly underprivileged

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(the true proletariat). The purges within the Party itself were to clean out the unreliable elements, those elements which had performed certain services but were expected to deviate in the future when the going was tough. [redacted] purges the same mismanagement and incapability that characterized the government of the country. Many were purged for no reason whatsoever; their disappearance served no purpose. The first purges might have been designed to strengthen the hard core of the CP, but more and more they served to decrease the membership of the hard core of the Party not only by reducing the number of members but by tearing the blinders from the eyes of other members. By use of purges, the CP was able to cleanse the government, Party, and economic organizations of unreliable or even dangerous elements, thus concentrating even more power in the hands of a few hard core Party members. In addition purges served to spread fear among the Party and non-Party masses which helped to reduce sabotage, organized active opposition, etc.

10. [redacted] there was no difference in the organizational setup of the Czech Communist Party from that described in many Party booklets and periodicals, ie "Funkcionar", which were sold freely. [redacted]

(a) Committees for National Economy (Narodohospodarska komise - NHK) These committees were in operation at the central, regional, and district secretariats of the CP until late 1949 or early 1950 when they were dissolved and partly replaced by PFO (Prumysl, Peneznictvi, Obchod - Industry, Finance, Commerce) Departments. The head of the central NHK was L Frejka. Other leading members and fulltime employees included Dr Goldman, Dr Otakar Pohl (in charge of coal and chemical industries, later domestic and foreign transportation) and Dr J Jancik (formerly Jung). Dr Otakar Pohl went with Frejka to the office of the President, and later, in 1950, became General Director of the State Bank, the only bank in the CSR. About 30-35, married, intelligent and very well educated, Pohl was considered a passive individual. Many doubted that he would be able to command the vast organization of the State Bank. Dr J Jancik, who had been responsible for appointments to the higher positions in the national economic setup was relegated to a minor position in the Slovak Regional government in Bratislava. [redacted]

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(b) Each organization (secretariat) from the district organization up included a special committee (composed of the most trusted members) called KSK (Komise Stranicke kontroly - Committee of Party Control). It was the duty of this committee to examine, clarify, and settle all complaints of a Party member against another Party member. The KSK of the Central Secretariat was a very powerful committee; there was no appeal from its decisions. This committee was headed by a woman, Ing Jarmila Taussigova [redacted]

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[redacted] It is thought that she played an important part in obtaining the actual information concerning the Sling-Svermova preparations to overthrow the regime.

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(c) The CP organization in Czechoslovakia had only the "desitkar" (leader of ten members). There were no "tricitkari" or "stovkari" (leaders of thirty or one hundred members). In brief, the duties of a desitkar were to collect dues, distribute Party publications, distribute invitations for Party meetings, and tighten relations between the board of the local organization and the individual members. Tricitkari had similar duties, not for ten but for thirty members, and not in the CP but in the ROH (Czech United Trade Unions).

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(d) All the basic Communist organizational units included a member of the SNB (National Security Forces) who had to attend the meetings of the organization and serve as an "advisor" to the organizations on matters of national security. These persons were also charged with collecting from Party members in the organization the following information about non-Party members in the region: living conditions, behavior, activities, opinions expressed in public but especially those expressed in private conversations. But according to an order issued early in 1951 the members of the security forces (STB, SNB) and all military personnel were excluded from membership in the basic Party organization where they lived, and belonged only to their "Utvarove organisace" (Units organizations). Until the order was published, such individuals were members of the basic Party organizations where they resided and took part in their activities.

(e) The so-called "cadre trustees", who had been in charge of gathering information about individuals in their region, were abolished in 1950 as far as the basic local organizations were concerned. Cadre departments were retained from the district organizations up.

(f) The basic local Party organizations were considerably strengthened by the fact that they were very often asked for opinions and information on individuals (Party members and non-Party members). For example, when a student wished to enter the university, the local Party organization was asked for a report on him. In addition to their boards or presidiums, the local Party organizations appointed other officials to keep an eye on such groups as parents organizations at the schools in the neighborhood, and the "voluntary brigades"; they were particularly interested in the organization of such groups and participation of the people.

50X1 (g) [redacted] the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party met weekly on Friday, the inner secretariat daily, the Central Committee met twice or three times a year; these meetings of the Central Committee included other leading Party officials who had been invited.

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11. [redacted] do not think that the Czech CP had its own intelligence or espionage network, but all such activities were directed by the Ministry of National Security which had its own channels. There were members of the Party who served as agents of the Security Ministry in the CP organizations, but [redacted] doubt very much that the Party organizations were used directly.

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