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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY USSR

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1. [redacted] what percentage of the Soviet Army and MVD troops would, [redacted] support the regime in case of future conflict. He stated that it would depend on the type of war. If HITLER's policies were repeated -- embodying slave labor, concentration camps, and mass terrorism -- the Soviet Army would support the local regime despite their dislike for it. [redacted] the local familiar brand of Communism would be preferred to foreign enslavement. However, [redacted] "An army which had a humane program - a program of freedom - that would be another story."

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2. Further, if such an army had as an adjunct some type of emigre government or organization including an all-Russian army, then both Soviet Army and MVD troops would follow it rather than the Soviet government. The army would not have to be large so long as it embraced all Soviet peoples - Russians, Ukrainians, etc.

3. [redacted]

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[redacted] in the corrective labor camps is an army of a strength of up to 15 million. The collective farmers - more than 50% of the population - would, in many places, immediately drive out, fight with, and otherwise harass the heads of their respective collective farms, the Party and Komsomol organizers, (etc)."

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- 50X1 4. [REDACTED]
- 50X1 5. [REDACTED] even now an uprising in the labor camps, for instance, might well bring in the local population and military garrisons on the side of the rebels. When reminded [REDACTED] that this had sometimes happened during the collectivization period without success, [REDACTED] it was impossible to compare those days with the present. The people then did not understand the true nature of collectivization. Before the war, opposition could not be expected, but after the war the people expected all manner of improvements. [REDACTED] "the lot of the collective farmers at the present time cannot be borne under present circumstances." He said that the people could not endure it, and whether it wants to or not, the Soviet government must do something about the situation. 50X1
- 50X1 6. [REDACTED] insisted that the series of price cuts since the war had done little to improve conditions, since they were largely theoretical. Items were not available at any price or were priced beyond reach, regardless of the number of reductions. The average worker's salary was about 400 rubles per month, while a man's suit of good quality cost 1,500-2,000 rubles. [REDACTED] case, despite his comparatively good salary, he could not buy eggs, butter (40 rubles a pound), or meat for his family, because such items were rarely available at any price. 50X1
- 50X1 7. He insisted that in spite of price reductions and all other government efforts, the material status of the people was very low; the overwhelming majority of the population was half-starved. To test reaction, [REDACTED] pointed out an apparent theoretical mathematical purchasing advantage given by price reductions. [REDACTED] shouted "Well, they were hungry and they are still hungry. Suppose they can buy three kilos of bread for the former price of two; they still cannot get enough." He branded the government price-lowering measures as deceit and fantasy (obman i fantaziya). 50X1
- 50X1 8. [REDACTED] that even the low prewar living standard had not been reached. When asked if it was a case of insufficient quantities of consumer goods, he laughed and said, "It wasn't a case of insufficiency, it was a case of non-existence. In many large cities - Leningrad, Kiev, Lvov - one cannot buy meat, butter, sugar, or even kerosene." 50X1
- 50X1 9. [REDACTED] any attempt by the West to sell products of any sort to the Soviet government as stupidity. He believed that MALENKOV was considerably weaker than STALIN and was attempting to consolidate his position by such measures as buying badly needed goods from Western sources. 50X1
- 50X1 10. [REDACTED] never heard of a special MGB medal which was allegedly established in 1950-1952 for activity against "banditism". He said that even if such a medal was proposed it was never issued. 1. He said that acquaintances of his who had been decorated for activities against "banditism" had received regular military decorations such as the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner, etc. 2.

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11. When asked to describe the term "banditism", [redacted] 50X1  
it was the term used to describe the struggle against the will, influence, and violence of the Soviet government, against the Party, and against collectivization. He described such "bandits" as patriots, and made it clear that they were not professional criminals but rather political offenders.

50X1 1. [redacted] Comment: Pictures of the proposed medal were actually published in the Soviet press in 1950-1952.

50X1 2. [redacted]

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