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REPORT

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COUNTRY Rumania

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DATE DISTR. 30 April 1954

SUBJECT Implications in Gheorghe Gheorghiu-DEJ's Resignation as General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party

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REFERENCES:

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PLACE ACQUIRED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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50X1 According to an Associated Press dispatch of 20 April from Vienna, Rumanian Premier Gheorghe Gheorghiu-DEJ made public his resignation as General Secretary of the Communist Party, in a speech before the party Central Committee on 19 April 1954.

- 50X1 1. [redacted] the Rumanian Communist Party has been planning and preparing the means for the annexation of Rumania by the USSR. This move would, of course, be beneficial from the Soviet point of view for the following reasons:
- a. It would give the Soviets the assurance of ownership of Rumanian terrain, and primarily the plains between the Danube and the Carpathian mountains, which represent to USSR strategy a gateway for both offensive and defensive purposes.

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- b. It would also mean the dissolution of a center of population of latin origin which can never be fully assimilated into the Soviet bloc and which, through its national origin, is opposed and has been unsympathetic toward the Slavic countries surrounding Rumania. The Soviets will surely neutralize this situation by deporting Rumanians to the USSR.
2. This political theme (viz., the annexation of Rumania by the USSR) has dominated the thoughts of the Rumanian Communist Party for the past three years. This theme may now become fact. [redacted] the Party thought it most judicial that DEJ renounce his position as General Secretary of the Party and retain the Premiership rather than the converse. As head of the Rumanian government, DEJ can move for a plebiscite for the annexation without directly implicating the Party and in case of failure without, of course, directly compromising the Party.
3. The new change in the Rumanian Communist Party and Government may also be interpreted as a maneuver on DEJ's part to obtain greater freedom of action and greater authority, by not being directly linked with the Party. It is most possible that he is thinking of a coup d'etat, which idea he had originally discussed with TITO in 1947. At that time TITO had returned from the conference in Moscow and visited the Satellite leaders. TITO was warmly received by DEJ, who, because of this meeting, was held in disgrace by the Party for three or four years. DEJ is the only Satellite leader who had friendly relations with TITO and who is still in a position of power. I know that DEJ attempted to introduce his followers in important positions of both government and industry. For example, Xenofon CELENTE was appointed as the Rumanian associate General Director of SOVROMTRANSPORT. CELENTE, a friend of DEJ's, demonstrated his antipathy toward the USSR. His chosen co-workers were not Party members. CELENTE made statements that he would strive and would be able to transform this joint Soviet-Rumanian shipping agency into a purely Rumanian company. He said that he would be able to eliminate USSR participation.
4. This change in Rumania to the new idea of "collective leadership" coincides with Soviet dicta and with Moscow's maneuver last year, when MALENKOV resigned as General Secretary of the Party. Superficially, Rumania's maneuver seems identical to Moscow's. The basic motivations, however, were different. In Moscow it was a maneuver for supremacy of power in the battle between the army and the Party. In Rumania this was a maneuver to facilitate the annexation of Rumania by the USSR without compromising the Party and by possibly using DEJ as the scapegoat. A possibility which must also be considered is that DEJ may be planning defection from the Soviet bloc.

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