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24 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, BR/CR  
 THRU: Chief, Western Branch *out*  
 FROM: Chief, Western Europe Section *in*  
 SUBJECT: Review of Western Europe Section, 1964 - 65

	<u>1964 T/O</u>	<u>1965 T/O</u>	<u>1965 On Board</u>
Professionals:	11	8	8
Intell. Clerk Typists	3	2	2
Intelligence Assistants	0	2	1
Total	14	12	11

With increasing recognition over the past year (Mar 1964-Mar 1965), the Section has functioned primarily as a source of both current and finished biographic political intelligence, responsive to requests from the White House, the Secretary of State, our Embassies abroad, political desk officers in the State Department, the DCI, the DD/I and the DD/P. In some instances the latter has also received material for operational support. Through the Liaison Division/OCR, we have frequently furnished biographic intelligence for other USIB components and non-USIB members of Cabinet rank. In addition, we have provided biographic support to OSI and OBI for various sections of the NIS. Ranging from quick name checks or answers to specific questions through extensive biographic studies on one individual to briefing books for the White House on parties of foreign dignitaries visiting Washington, these services occupy the major portion of the analyst's time and efforts.

Through resignations and transfers within the year the section has reduced its professional staff to the number allowed by the T/O. We still lack one IA, however, and within one month, with the departure of one of our best and most experienced analysts we will be short one professional. Since September 1964 the 20-odd countries for which the Section is responsible have been divided among 7 analysts, each of whom is expected to have or develop the same degree of writing and analytical competence necessary to handle any specific area.

This arrangement, while far from ideal, has so far proven workable with no one analyst being extremely overburdened and backlogs in general are at a minimum. We have not, however, been able to

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accomplish our self-imposed schedule for completing the conversion of all the files to numerical control. In addition, scientific coverage has been cut to the absolute minimum, some areas of political intelligence (i.e. International Communist front organization activities) are not being processed to the optimum degree, and the analysts are not yet entirely free of some clerical-type tasks. In most instances the analysts have no time to review background material or files or clean out deadwood from the files.

Since most of our requests occur on an ad hoc basis, it is, on the whole, not possible to plan ahead or anticipate such projects as briefing books, detailed biographic studies on certain individuals, or a request for brief reports on several individuals at once. Thus, when we are faced with short deadlines, it is frequently necessary to put all analysts to work on a given project regardless of the country involved. Since those projects on which we can make educated guesses, such as reports on UNGA delegates, usually involve all of WE, there are times when everyone must neglect daily work to concentrate on requests or publications of one kind or another. There is some danger that this situation may effect the quality of future products in the Section, since the processing of incoming material into the files as soon as possible is the best insurance of the timeliness and value of our reports. Hopefully, well-trained, efficient IA's will help alleviate this problem in the not-too-distant future.

It is my opinion, however, that to operate efficiently, without lowering the quality of product for which the Section is becoming known, we cannot do with any less people and, in reality, should have at least one more IA and one more clerk.

Under the present T/O we have not been able to keep up our schedule for the Biographic Handbooks, principally because since the Senior Analyst who would normally assume editorial duties must assume a country responsibility and the Section Chief-as editor-becomes a bottleneck in the Handbook production effort. This is particularly true when fitness reports, administrative duties, or other projects of higher priority needing to be edited interfere and the handbook reports must return to the bottom of the pile.

Fortunately, under the present circumstances at least, scientific requests have decreased and except for a minimum coverage of travel to Bloc areas we have no continuing requests which cannot be handled.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OCR/BR

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SUBJECT: Survey - Latin America

	<u>T/O</u>	<u>On Board</u>
Professionals	11	10
Intelligence Assistants	3	1
Intelligence Clerk-Typists	4	4
Total	18	15

Fundamental to an understanding of the nature of the Latin American Section and the duties of its analysts are the following points:


1. The area under consideration is comprised of 22 volatile, independent and unique countries.
2. The Section produces political intelligence; scientific requests are practically non-existent.
3. The Section is primarily in the current intelligence business and to a slightly lesser degree, in the operations support business.
4. The same kind and degree of competence is required and expected at each desk; writing and analytical competence is as necessary on the Haiti desk as on the Brazilian.

During the past year (March 1964-April 1965) the professional manpower situation in the Section can best be described as being in a state of almost continual change. In March 1964 LA consisted of 13 professionals and three clerk-typists. The Section now includes three less professionals, one more clerk-typist and a recently assigned intelligence assistant. No fewer than seven seasoned analysts resigned or transferred during the period under review and were replaced by four analysts now on duty in the Section less than seven months. Obviously many man-hours have been spent training, guiding, advising and encouraging the newly assigned analysts to become independently capable and professionally competent as quickly as possible.

The Section's work pattern therefore has been one of desperately trying to keep up with the day to day work load; unable to concern itself with projects not absolutely essential. In fact, even a rather essential program (Biographic Handbook Program) has had to be postponed or cancelled on several areas because it is foolish to undertake such a project on any area where the analyst has been on duty less than seven months. The Cuban analyst has been bombarded with requests from many sectors to accept projects involving the expenditure of hundreds of man-hours. Some of these requestors have been satisfied, others have had to be satisfied with something less than requested and a few, unfortunately, have not been satisfied at all. Few, if any, of the analysts have had the time to carefully inventory their holdings, e.g., the country background and category files which, partially due to personnel turnover, have grown like Topsy. The

Section has been approached on numerous occasions with the suggestion that we control the travel activities of Latins to Bloc Countries, especially student types. A perfectly legitimate request, particularly in view of the fact that such control is being maintained in some sections where the manpower situation is perhaps less critical. The arrival of the full complement of intelligence assistants will no doubt help free the analysts to perform many important tasks now being neglected.

There is no question about the vitally important role biographic intelligence plays in Latin American affairs. This fact was recently attested to in an editorial which appeared in the New York Times of 15 March, "Latin America has always been a region where personalism plays a great role."



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Chief, Latin America Section