Not Fwd file UCOH
State Flyer.
item #1, Journal
1 Feb. 78

OLC
78-0065/B.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Counsel
Washington, D. C. 20505
Telephone [redacted]

1 February 1978

TO: Mr. Alan Platt
U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

Mr. Platt:

In line with our conversation, attached is the material you requested.

STAT [redacted]
Acting Legislative Counsel

Attachments

FORM 6-68 1533 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(40)

MORI/CDF Pages
3-22

Not Furnished
OLC 0065/a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Counsel
Washington, D. C. 20505
Telephone [redacted]

STAT

19 January 1978

TO: Honorable Charles H. Percy
United States Senate
4321 Dirksen Senate Office Building

Dear Senator Percy:

In response to your request, I hope this is helpful.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

[redacted]
Deputy Legislative Counsel

Enclosure

FORM 1533 6-68 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (40)

Jrnl. item

19 Jan 78 Item 17

STAT

SFILLM

OLC #78-0065/1

18 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel
Attn: [redacted] STAT

THROUGH : Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM : Chief, Congressional Support Staff, NFAC

SUBJECT : Reply to Senator Percy

1. Attached is a classified response to Senator Percy's 6 January letter requesting CIA comments on a 1975 article by Melvin Laird. Percy apparently wants this as a background for discussions with a group of Soviet parliamentarians.

2. I believe it does what the Senator wants without taking head-on issue with Laird.

[redacted] STAT

Attachment: a/s

cc: D/NFAC
OLC

SECRET

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 6, 1978

STAT [redacted]

Office of Legislative Liaison
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

STAT Dear [redacted]

When I was in the Soviet Union in 1975 for the U.S. Senate delegation meetings with the Supreme Soviet, Georgi Arbatov and Georgi Zhukov were incensed by the article "Is This Detente" by Mel Laird in the July 1975 issue of Reader's Digest. They were so concerned that they wrote a response which they handed to me.

Enclosed is a copy of the Laird article and the Arbatov-Zhukov response. Before we meet with the Supreme Soviet delegation here on January 22, I would like to have for my information an objective evaluation from the Agency of the six numbered points made by Laird in his article. It could be done on plain paper and I would not attribute any of the information to the Agency.

I would very much appreciate it if I could have this analysis by January 19 when I will be back from Panama. When it is ready, please call Scott Cohen.

All best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Percy
United States Senator

CHP:scp

Reader's Digest

All over the world, the Soviet Union is callously and consistently ignoring agreements with the United States that were designed to reduce tensions. Here is the sobering scorecard

IS THIS DÉTENTE?

BY MELVIN R. LAIRD

OVER THE past several years, the United States has made major concessions and numerous gestures of goodwill to induce the Soviet Union to help defuse world powder kegs that could explode into war. We still hope that such efforts will eventually succeed. Certainly, everyone hopes to avoid renewal of Cold War confrontations. But it would be dangerously foolish to confuse hope with reality. Therefore, I am now persuaded that the American people ought to be told some unpleasant facts about the true status of détente, so that they can intelligently judge the Kremlin's current intentions.

The facts are that, in recent months, the U.S.S.R.—secretly and openly—has repeatedly committed deliberate acts that mock détente and threaten the free world. Let's look at six deeply troubling actions:

1. The U.S.S.R. has violated agreements to limit strategic weapons.

On May 26, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded two important arms agreements. One treaty strictly limits both countries in their future development of anti-ballistic-missile systems. A vital component of any such system is powerful, sophisticated radar that tracks incoming missiles. Article VI of that treaty explicitly forbids testing any radar for ABM use. Yet our government now possesses evidence that the Russians have conducted radar tests specifically forbidden by the treaty. The Russians have not disputed our intelligence, but have insisted that the tests were for "safety or instrumentation" purposes only. The disingenuousness

MELVIN R. LAIRD, former Congressman from Wisconsin (1953-1969) and Secretary of Defense (1969-1973), is The Reader's Digest's Counsellor for National and International Affairs.

ot this reply cannot conceal the fact that the Russians have cheated on the treaty and may be developing an ABM system that would endow them with a significant strategic advantage.

The second accord limits the United States and the Soviet Union to approximately the same number of nuclear delivery systems. Critical to this SALT I agreement was the clear American understanding that neither side would appreciably increase the size of its intercontinental ballistic missiles—for larger missiles could carry more warheads and render the limitation on numbers meaningless. Now reconnaissance and other reliable sources have provided incontrovertible proof that the Soviets have cheated on this understanding. In some 50 silos, they have installed new missiles called the SS19, 50-percent bigger than most of their previous rockets. Deployed in large numbers, the SS19 will give the Soviet Union the capability to destroy our land-based missiles and bombers in a surprise attack. Six years ago, we and the Russians could deliver nuclear warheads of about the same destructive force. Today the Soviets can outfire us in destructive power by two-to-one.

2. The Soviet Union actively assisted North Vietnam in making a shambles of the Paris peace accords and overrunning South Vietnam.

At Paris in January 1973, the North Vietnamese pledged to respect South Vietnam's right to determine its own political future. They pledged not to send more troops and arms into South Vietnam. Both pledges were promptly broken. The Russians, by continuing to supply North Vietnam with offensive war matériel beyond prescribed limitations, played a direct role in the treaty's sabotage. (We sent less matériel to South Vietnam than the treaty allowed, and all of it was demonstrably for defense.)

After the ceasefire, the Russians and Chinese poured into North Vietnam aid conservatively valued at $2.5 billion. Among Soviet shipments: 115 modern tanks and armored vehicles, 300 tactical missiles, 1100 big military trucks. Such equipment was for one purpose only: renewed military attacks in violation of the Paris accords. And when the North's offensive began in the spring of 1974, Soviet tanks spearheaded it.

3. The Soviet Union has reneged on its promise to guarantee unimpeded civilian access to West Berlin.

Ever since the Cold War began with the Berlin blockade in 1948, the Russians have employed stratagem after stratagem to strangle West Berlin economically, isolate it politically and capture it for themselves. In June 1972, we signed a pact with the Russians to ease the situation there. With Britain and France, we agreed to allow the Russians to establish a consulate in West Berlin and, at about the same time, to support United Nations membership for

East Germany. The Soviets in turn pledged to ensure that the flow of people and goods through East Germany to West Berlin would not be obstructed.

However, once the consulate opened and East Germany was in the U.N., the Russians broke their word. From July to October last year, the communists deliberately —and repeatedly—stalled cars and trucks en route through East Germany. The latest treaty notwithstanding, the Russians still seem to look upon West Berlin as a hostage.

4. The Soviet Union is abetting terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the Middle East.

In Syria, East Germany and the Soviet Union itself, communist agents are training hundreds of young Arabs in the techniques of terror. The Russians have supplied to Libya's dictator, Muammar el-Qaddafi, deadly SA-7 heat-seeking missiles that can home in on the jet engines of commercial airliners. Predictably, Qaddafi has turned these portable weapons over to terrorists, allowing some to be shipped in diplomatic pouches. In September 1973, Italian police captured five terrorists armed with SA-7s on an apartment balcony near Rome's airport, poised to shoot down a Boeing 747. But the attempts go on.

And Russia continues to sustain a little-noticed but sinister guerrilla war on the strategic Arabian peninsula. The immediate Soviet target is the Sultanate of Oman, perched on the narrow Strait of Hormuz. Through this strait pass 17 million barrels of petroleum daily, bound for Japan and Western Europe. At camps maintained in neighboring South Yemen, Russians supervise guerrilla training of Omani tribesmen. Armed with Soviet weapons, the tribesmen raid the countryside—their avowed aim (despite almost total lack of support among the people of Oman) being to win a "war of national liberation" in support of Soviet policy. Such control would enable Russia to cut at will half of Western Europe's supply of oil and three fourths of Japan's.

5. In Portugal, the Soviet Union is sponsoring a massive campaign to impose a communist regime subservient to the Kremlin.

The strategic location of Portugal makes it a key member of NATO. In April 1974, a coup ousted Portugal's right-wing dictator, Marcello Caetano, and hope arose that the country might peacefully transform itself into a democracy. However, with the coup, the communists sprang out of hiding as the country's best-organized and richest political party, even though the recent advisory election indicated that they had the backing of only about 13 percent of the people. But they did have the backing of the Soviet Union, which, in the past 12 months, has clandestinely provided them with at least $40 million to pay party workers and hire street demonstrators to intimidate the opposition. With secret Soviet aid, the communist minority has gained control of the national labor

federation and is exploiting the press to spread virulent anti-American propaganda. Opponents to communism are still being purged from key government and military posts, to be replaced by communists and their sympathizers.

Absorption of Portugal into the Soviet empire would expose Spain to subversion, cost NATO indispensable bases in the Azores, open up the Atlantic to Soviet submarines, and fundamentally alter the world balance of power.

6. The Soviet Union has engaged in a relentless effort to attain military supremacy.

In the last six years, the United States has reduced its armed forces by 1.4 million men and women, cut the Army in half and lowered the number of Navy combat ships to the level of the year 1939. In constant dollars, we have slashed our military spending by 34 percent. This year, the defense budget will consume only 5.8 percent of the gross national product—the smallest percentage since 1950.

Yet our disarmament overtures have brought an *increase* in Soviet military allocations. Although the Russian economy has less than half our productive capacity, the Soviets are currently outspending us by 20 to 25 percent in every significant defense category. Their 4.2 million troops now outnumber our forces by more than two-to-one.

Meanwhile, we have granted the Russians long-term unsecured loans at interest rates below what the American home buyer, farmer, businessman or government must pay. And the Soviets continue to seek further credit, technology and other help from us. This adds up to a situation in which we subsidize the U.S.S.R.'s faltering civilian economy so that it can afford to mount an enormous arms buildup. For example, American engineers and money help construct in Russia the world's largest truck factory—and the Kremlin ships trucks to North Vietnam to help crush South Vietnam.

Clearly, we must shed any lingering illusions we may have that détente means the Russians have abandoned their determination to undermine Western democracy and impose their system upon the world. We must communicate to the Russians that the only alternative to *mutual* arms reduction is an American rearmament that would doom them to permanent military inferiority. We must show them that we will no longer tolerate the use of détente as a Russian one-way street.

In forthcoming issues, The Reader's Digest will examine strategic trouble spots and discuss further how to deal with the Russian challenge.

REPRINTED FROM THE JULY 1973 ISSUE OF READER'S DIGEST

WHAT IS DETENTE AFTER ALL?

Those in the Soviet Union who follow the American press are well aware of discussion that has developed in the United States over the concept of detente and its basic problems. We also see differing motives on the part of those who have doubts, who are puzzled by one or another problem, who question this or that event or circumstance. But there are no differing motives. Mr. Laird's recent article in the Reader's Digest "Is This Detente?" is confined to one single point of view in the sense that its author does not like the relaxation of tensions which marked the development of Soviet-American relations in recent years and he is quite frank about it.

We know that Mr. Laird is not alone in taking this stand, though we know that judging from recent public opinion polls, this negative position is not shared by the majority of the American public.

This is why we felt we should respond to his article.

We shall not enumerate the basic points of this article. Let us look into its general idea. The idea is that the U.S.A. allegedly made major concessions to the Soviet Union in the process of detente and received nothing in return. Moreover, it alleges that detente is used by the Soviet Union in a most dishonest way to the detriment of American interests.

We -- and we have all grounds to speak about the Soviet Government's official point of view and of the unanimous conviction of Soviet public opinion -- radically disagree with such an interpretation.

We think that positive changes which have taken place were to the benefit of both sides.

Firstly, they were to the benefit in the sense that we have stepped away from the fatal brink beyond which the nuclear catastrophe could break out.

We have benefited also in the sense that both Americans and we can now concentrate more efforts, attention, and resources on the solution of our own internal problems, which exist in the Soviet Union and in the United States of America.

And our main gain is in the sense that we have embarked on an encouraging road which we are sure may lead us to ever more radical changes in international relations capable of creating reliable guarantees of peace, to put an end to the arms race, to help us use our influence for improving the overall international atmosphere and move on to wide-scale, mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all spheres -- trade, science, technology, culture, etc.

Mr. Laird has formulated six points which in his opinion prove that the Soviet Union has allegedly "repeatedly committed deliberate acts that mock detente and threaten the free world."

With full responsibility we state that all six points are wrong, and are dangerous in that they can mislead the American public. Even if the American side had some doubts about facts cited by Laird (he refers to someone who detected "testing" of new types of radars subject to agreements and the "replacement" of several dozen missiles), there exists a

specially set up body for their clarification, the Permanent Consultative Commission. But it was an official Pentagon spokesman who publicly declared recently that the United States had no claims whatsoever on the Soviet Union's implementation of signed agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments. This was also confirmed recently by the President of the United States at his press conference. Mr. Laird's claims that the Soviet Union had, in violation of agreements, attained "military supremacy" over the United States are in absolute disagreement with reality, and official American data.

The second point of Laird's article accuses the Soviet Union of actively assisting North Vietnam in breaking down the Paris peace accords. Specific mention is made of 115 tanks, 1,100 trucks and other types of Soviet equipment which, according to Laird, were shipped to Vietnam and ensured the military success of the opponents to the Thieu regime. It is our opinion that only the most naive people with no knowledge of the matter can believe that the reason for the defeat of the Thieu regime is these tanks and trucks. Even if we take as correct the figures given by Mr. Laird, then the volume of help given to Vietnam by the Soviet Union and other countries in past years will amount to 2.5 billion dollars, while the United States spent all in all some 130 billion dollars to help Thieu. These are incomparable sums. The Thieu regime was given the possibility to create one of the best equipped armies in the world today. Nevertheless, it was impossible to preserve that regime. It was impossible to save it because it had rotted to the core, and could rely only on a

500,000-strong American army and, as soon as the latter was withdrawn from Vietnam, it was clear to every person with common sense that its days were numbered. A change in the political situationwwithin South Vietnam was envisaged in the Paris peace accords. And if this main stipulation of the Paris agreements has not been carried out, the fault certainly does not rest with the Soviet Union. We think that something different has happened. Following the cease-fire in Vietnam no efforts had been exerted to eliminate the root of the civil war connected precisely with the existence in that country of a corrupt, terrorist regime and it is precisely this that made this result so inevitable.

Laird's assertion with regard to West Berlin is completely inconsistent with reality. It suffices to read a recent statement on this question by such a competent individual as former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Willy Brandt, to see this.

The same should be said about the fourth point of the article about the allegations that the Soviet Union supports terrorism in the Middle East. We are against terrorism. Even ifyyou admit that some terrorists had Soviet weapons, it is not the Soviet Union which is to be blamed. There are plenty of weapons of the most varied origin in this area of the world, including weapons supplied by the United States, France and other countries. These weapons could just as easily have fallen into the hands of terrorists. Laird obviously reads newspapers and he could acquaint

himself with many authoritative statements by the Soviet side published in them, which resolutely condemn terror in all its manifestations.

Mr. Laird's statement about Portugal is really surprising. What has happened in Portugal is in no way the work of "Communist conspirators." This is a legitimate result of the situation in which the country found itself following in the course of the policy of NATO. We have in mind its poverty and economic backwardness, its terrorist fascist regime which enjoyed the support of "western democracies" for the sole reason that it was anti-Communist, as well as hopeless colonial wars which Portugal had waged for so many years — an explosion there was inevitable and neither the Soviet Union nor detente are the causes of it. The allegation that the Soviet Union finances the activity of Portuguese Communists is preposterous and, by the way, it is not original. Such tales about "Soviet gold" had been spread even in the 20's. But they vanished like smoke even then when little was known about the Soviet system. One can presume that they have even less chance now for success.

And, finally, the sixth point that, contrary to the principle of equal security written down in the agreements, the USSR allegedly tries to attain "military superiority" over the United States. This also does not correspond with reality and is based on nothing. The military budget in the Soviet Union is not increasing. In recent years it has been reduced; although on a small scale. We wanted it to be cut further, but this to a great degree depends on the course of detente.

We set aside Laird's speculations about trade and credits due to its insignificant volume and mainly because the development of trade (and in all countries this is based on the provision of credit) is of equal benefit to both sides. Our economy, despite Laird's assertions, is developing quite successfully and we wouldn't advise him, contrary to the facts, to assert the opposite (having also in mind the well known British proverb, which says that "Those who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones").

Our trade with the United States last year amounted to a modest figure of 700 million rubles and the United States was only in the seventh place in volume of trade among other Soviet trade partners of the developed countries of the capitalistic world and was behind not only West Germany and Japan but even Italy and Finland.

We will mention in passing that the defensive might of the Soviet Union Mr. Laird complains about was built up in the condition of almost complete absence of trade with the West. We would like to add also another point. The trade with the Soviet Union is not some kind of charity on the part of the United States. It develops only in areas and to the extent where it is advantageous to Americans since it opens up new jobs, gives the United States a chance to obtain many kinds of essential goods (including goods that the United States considers strategic such as diamonds, titanium, etc.) and also to improve the American balance of payments.

But the concluding part of Laird's article evokes the greatest objections; where he proposes to tell the Russians that the United States should give the U.S.S.R. an ultimatum: either do as Washington wants or the United States will step up the arms race and in this way doom the U.S.S.R. to "military inferiority." We would like to tell Mr. Laird that this is not a new proposal. This is just the road which the United States had followed for many decades. Where it has led is well known -- of course, it brought nothing good to the Soviet Union but it also seriously damaged the United States. It was precisely after the United States began to realize the fruitlessness of the previous course that the shift toward detente began. In which direction does Mr. Laird summon the United States again?

January 1978

MEMORANDUM

1. Under Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty, the parties undertook "not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode."

During the negotiations, agreement could not be reached on the definition of "tested in an ABM mode" for any ABM component. The US on April 7, 1972, made a unilateral statement which, inter alia, stated that we would consider a radar to have been "tested in an ABM mode" if it makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory during the re-entry portion of the trajectory. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

In 1974 the Intelligence Community reported that a Soviet non-ABM radar was being used to track strategic ballistic missiles in flight trajectory. The issue was raised with the Soviets early in 1975, and subsequently this activity stopped and has not been resumed. The Soviets claimed that this activity was for purposes of range safety and not a violation of the Treaty.

Article II of the Interim Agreement states: "The parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types displayed after that time."

While it was clear which existing Soviet missiles were "light" and which were "heavy" at the time the Interim Agreement was signed, the US was unable to obtain Soviet agreement to criteria which clearly delineated a "light" from a "heavy." Consequently, the US delegation made the following unilateral statement on May 26, 1972: "The US delegation regrets that the Soviet delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the US delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The US proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

At the time the agreement was signed, the principal Soviet land-based ICBM systems were the SS-9 and the SS-11. The SS-9 was considered a heavy missile, while the SS-11 was the heaviest light missile on either side. Subsequently the Soviets tested and began deploying the SS-19 which, while less than 50 percent the volume of the SS-9, exceeds the volume of the SS-11 by some 50 percent. Deployment of this system is continuing. The SS-19 does have a significant capability against hardened targets, such as Minuteman silos.

2. The Soviets continued to deliver aid to the North Vietnamese up to the fall of Saigon. They also were willing to meet nearly all of Hanoi's demands with regard to military assistance.

3. The USSR has not reneged on its promise to guarantee unimpeded civilian access to West Berlin. The Soviets have observed the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and recent Soviet commentaries have stressed the importance of continued observance.

Civilian access is under the control of the East Germans as provided under the transit agreement between East and West Germany in 1972. Individual civilians are occasionally detained for brief intervals at East German checkpoints and East German guards have recently interfered with commercial shipments in their search for exfiltrators.

No major East German move that affects the Berlin issue could be undertaken without Soviet permission, but it cannot be assumed that specific individual acts by East German authorities have had Soviet endorsement. It is clear, however, that Moscow does set limits to East German provocations against Allied interests.

4. The Soviet attitude toward terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the Middle East is ambivalent. On the one hand, they disavow terror as a technique and criticize it as an ineffective and counterproductive tool of revolutionary struggle. On the other hand, they indirectly provide support to terrorist groups.

The Soviets have offered military training in the USSR to Arabs belonging to so-called national liberation groups, some of whom subsequently became involved in terrorist organizations. Training on Soviet weapons has been given to members of terrorist groups in Libya, and the Libyans themselves have provided direct assistance to terrorists.

The Soviets have channeled aid to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) through South Yemen since the late 1960s. This assistance reached its peak several years ago and included military and financial assistance as well as training for guerrilla groups. The PFLO's efforts in southern Oman were ended in 1975 and the group has been quiet since that time. Soviet assistance probably sustains the PFLO camp in South Yemen, and another effort to subvert Oman cannot be excluded in the future.

5. In 1975 the strongly pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party did make a determined effort to impose its rule on Portugal. Soviet support was expressed in covert financial aid but--given the modest needs of a communist party operating in a small country--it is doubtful that Soviet aid was as high as $40 million. The evidence suggests, however, that Moscow was in fact torn between the urge to support an ideologically-kindred party and the conviction that a Communist regime in Portugal could not survive the hostility of its neighbors and NATO allies. The Soviets were also sensitive to the damage that a communist coup d'etat in West Europe would do to Soviet relations with the US and major European states without any assurance of compensatory gain. Moscow's reservations were revealed in its repeated attempts to urge a policy of caution on the reckless Portuguese communists, and in its ultimate acquiescence in their defeat in 1976.

6. In recent statements Brezhnev and Soviet commentators have denied that the Soviets are seeking military superiority. The Soviets, however, have steadily improved their war-fighting and war-survival capabilities in recent years.

Detailed information on defense expenditures is not publicly released by the Soviet Union. A single-line entry for "defense" in the published state budget is uninformative

because its scope is not clearly defined and its size appears to be manipulated to suit Soviet political purposes. (Changes in the announced defense figure do not appear to reflect the changes we have observed in the level of military activities.) Our estimate of Soviet ruble expenditures for defense activities is almost three times the announced 1970 figure, grows at an average annual rate of 4 to 5 percent, and accounts for 11 to 13 percent of Soviet GNP.

TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT 13 January 1978

TO:	FROM:
Honorable Charles H. Percy United States Senate 4321 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510	Office of Legislative Counsel Central Intelligence Agency Room 7 D 35 Washington, D.C. 20505

THE DOCUMENTS LISTED HEREON ARE FORWARDED FOR:

	INFORMATION		ACTION	X	RETENTION		LOAN

CONTROL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	SUBJECT *(Unclassified preferred)*	CLASS.
	January 1978	Response to Senator Percy's 6 January letter requesting CIA comments on a 1975 article by Melvin Laird "Is This Detente" (Memorandum- 3 1/2 pages)	SECRE

OLC #8-0005/1

Grnl. item

RECEIPT

SIGNATURE *(acknowledging receipt of above documents)*

DATE OF RECEIPT

RETURN TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM 7 D 35
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FORM 10-76 3772B

1 - WHITE, RETURN COPY
2 - PINK, ADDRESSEE HOLD BACK
3 - CANARY, OLC HOLD BACK