

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

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TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA				
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O				
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC		X (Attn: Betty)		
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
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SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks: Per your request, attached is Item 7 from the 20 September Director's Daily Journal.

D/Executive Secretary
21 Sept 78

Date

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP81M00980R001700670004-3
 Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
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4	DD/NFA	X (Attn: NIO/EA-P)			
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12	Compt				
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Remarks:

D/ [Redacted]
 19 Sept 78
 Date

637 (4-78)

Automated Suspense! 27 Sept 78

Item # 7
78-5361

19 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for East
Asia and the Pacific

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on Warning in Korea (WINK) Study
Final Report

REFERENCE: Your memo dtd 12 September 1978, same subject
(ER 78-9913/2)

1. I read your memorandum on the WINK study and proposed letter to General Tighe. I am concerned in a number of respects:

a. To begin with, I don't see the virtue of postponing all effort on I&W in Korea while we try to sort out the North Korean force level. I've had the distinct impression there wasn't much effort being made in the CIA in that regard, and therefore our analysts are not tied up with that. Clearly, we have to sort that out quickly and I would appreciate an early status report on where we stand. I don't want to wait until it is all finished and delivered before I get back into that one again.

b. At the NFIB which approved the commencement of the WINK study, I raised some serious questions, particularly as to whether the North Koreans were likely to attempt a surprise attack. I don't know what they did about those objections but assume they just forgot them. I would appreciate knowing.

c. Having read just the short version provided here, I am confused about the study itself and its measures of effectiveness. The basic graphs that are shown indicate

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
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the probability of war starting at given times under these scenarios. I gather that these are simply the objectives estimates of various analysts. What I am interested in with regard to warning in Korea (and Europe) is what indicators we should be watching to let us know if there is going to be a war. I am much less interested in subjective evaluations about how high that probability is at given days after tension commences. I am interested in whether we are looking at the right things. In short, we should have a matrix of hundreds of indicators which we check every day, week, month, etc., as appropriate. What I am looking for is a Community discussion which would prioritize those indicators so we are really looking at the right ones. I am not certain from this brief version that this study is pointed in the right direction.


d. Your point that we need to crank in the political-economic indicators is extremely valid, and we want to get going in that direction quickly. Clearly, that cannot be done in a study under DoD. General Tighe indicates that he is proceeding with another study effort in this direction. There is no reason necessarily to discourage that, but at some point we have got to expand it to include the political-military indicators. Among other things, we don't want to get caught short again with a substantial increase in North Korean armed forces without our having any indication of it for maybe ten years. What are the indicators that would let us know if they decide to make a substantially greater commitment to their armed forces?

2. Overall I may be missing some point, but I don't really understand why a revised estimate on the size of the North Korean forces is going to be so critical to the way they might start a war. I seriously doubt that it would be critical as to the warning indicators that I think are the important thing for us to focus our attention on. I would like to see you as the NIO begin to lead the Community in a direction that will help us find long-term and short-term indicators.

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STANSFIELD TURNER



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