

12 May 1978

II-C-2

Arrangements for Warning

1. We proceed from the assumption that the current arrangements for warning have been judged insufficient but that all the necessary analytical ingredients are in place. They have just not been properly energized. A separate group, as small as possible, is needed to serve as a lightning rod to focus the attention of the NFAC and the intelligence community as a whole on developments that might adversely affect US security. To provide the necessary leadership we would retain the position of Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning, but broaden his responsibilities to include all warning and change his title correspondingly. He would report to the DCI through the DDCI.
2. A new high-level Warning Control Group headed by the DDCI would be created consisting of top officials from State (INR), DIA and NSA. This group would meet at the call of the DDCI to discuss matters brought to his attention by the Special Assistant or by any senior official in the community, in particular the responsible NIO.
3. The Special Assistant for Warning would have two deputies; one would deal with military matters. He would have a staff of approximately 10 people (Staff A) located in the current Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) space in the Pentagon, adjacent to the NMIC. This staff would have responsibility for warning of the deployment of military forces anywhere in the world that could ultimately adversely affect the security of the US. (This would be an extension of the charter of the SWS to include coverage of military movements by non-Communist countries as well as Communist.)
4. A second deputy would also have a staff of approximately 10 people (Staff B) located in space adjacent to the CIA Operations Center. This staff would have the responsibility for warning of any non-military developments throughout the world that have the

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potential of adversely affecting US security interests. The personnel of this staff, as in the case of the military staff, would be drawn from the various components of the intelligence community. (The Department of State (INR) and the Office of Naval Intelligence currently do not participate in manning the SWS. It would be imperative that they participate in the new staffs.) The Chief of Staff A would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Chief of Production, DIA. The Chief of Staff B would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Director, NFAC.

5. The two staffs would provide the second look to the first look now taken by the various operations centers around town as well as by the desk analysts in the various NFIB offices. The staffs would be expected to prod existing NFIB offices and to challenge thinking within those offices rather than to do extensive original reporting. In no case would the line elements' responsibility for warning be transferred to the new staffs. The two staffs would function in parallel with the line units in order to provide insurance that proper warning is indeed conveyed. The two staffs would obviously have to work in close tandem using the most efficient conferencing techniques at hand.

6. The new staffs would report directly to the Special Assistant for Warning who in turn would relay concerns to the DDCI and when feasible to the Warning Control Group.

7. When apprised of a potential problem area by the Special Assistant for Warning, the DDCI (with or without the participation of the Steering Group) may, as he sees fit, direct the responsible NIO or analytic element to prepare an evaluation of the situation. This procedure, in some cases, could lead to an alert memorandum to the DCI with the recommendation that he forward it to the President.

8. The dissemination of an alert memorandum would also be directed downward into the community with whatever sanitization required. At the same time or even prior to completion of the report, collection tasking would be initiated through whatever procedures the NITC would have in being by that time.

9. There, obviously, are several other options which could be pursued. One would be to include the whole warning mission (big W and small w) within the framework of a greatly expanded SWS located at the Pentagon; another would be to create a national intelligence officer for warning; a third would be the establishment of a 24-hour national warning center either at CIA, DIA, State or NSA; a fourth would be the continuation of our present procedures with the SWS responsible for large W and each NIO responsible for his particular share of the small w.

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10. The above proposal is suggested as one least disruptive to the intelligence community yet one involving all components in the warning process without loss of influence or face. At the same time it establishes a focus on warning problems at the highest level within the community. This type of warning mechanism would have the potential for earning the respect of the policy-makers and the cooperation of analytical elements of the community.

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