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22 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
DD/NFA
DD/CT

SUBJECT : The DCI's Role in Warning and Crisis

1. In response to various requests by the DCI and DDCI, a working group of officers from NFAC and NITC has produced the attached study. At the working group level, the two organizations concur in the study and its recommendations. Inter alia these call for the DCI to appoint the DDCI as his senior overseer for warning and crisis for the Community, supported by an interagency committee and a full-time "Senior Warning Officer."

2. We believe the basic elements of overseer, committee, and senior warning officer are required to support the DCI. While we recommend that the DDCI head this structure, it could equally well be headed by the DCI himself. A decision on who is to head it can only be made by the principals themselves, after which the appropriate level and location of committee and warning officer can be sorted out. The next step, therefore, should be for the addressees of this memorandum to consult among themselves on the basis of our study as to what recommendation should be made to the DCI.

3. A list of working group members is attached.

[Redacted]

Richard Lehman
AD/NFAC/SS

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Attachment

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Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100050003-5

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Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100050003-5

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THE ROLE OF THE DCI
IN WARNING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100050003-5
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The Role of the DCI in Warning and Crisis Management

Contents

	Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	iv
Introduction	iv
Warning	iv
Crisis Management	vii
Conclusion	viii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. BACKGROUND	3
A. Current Intelligence and Warning: Definitions	3
B. The Defense Interest	6
C. The DCI in Crisis	8
D. Collection Tasking in Crisis and Warning	10
E. Criteria for a Warning and Crisis System	13
III. DISCUSSION	15
A. Permanent Management Arrangements	16
The Problem of Accountability	18
An Interagency Committee	21
Staff Support	22
B. Mechanisms for Warning	24
Warning and Current Intelligence: The Need for Challenge Mechanisms	27
Criteria for a Warning System.....	32
C. Special Mechanisms for Strategic Warning	36
The Strategic Warning Staff	36
Changes in the SWS	37
The Need for a "Network"	39

Contents
(Continued)

	Page
D. Arrangements for Support of the DCI in Crisis	41
Role of the Task Force	44
Role of the NIO	47
The Situation Report Problem	47
A National Crisis Reporting Structure ..	51
Miscellaneous	53
E. DCI Arrangements for Collection Tasking in Warning and in Crisis	55
F. The Knotty Problem of Location	57
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS	60
A. Management	61
B. Warning	62
C. Strategic Warning	62
D. Crisis Management	64
E. Collection Tasking	65
ANNEX: History of Warning in the Community	68
CHARTS:	
I. National Organization for Warning: 1954-1974	
II. Examples of Crises	
III. National Organization for Warning: 1975-1978	
IV. National Crisis Reporting Structure: Role of the DCI	
V. Alternate Task Force Locations and Their Merits	
VI. National Organization for Warning: Proposed 1978	
VII. National Organization for Strategic Warning: Proposed 1978	
VIII. National Crisis Reporting Structure: Elements Supporting the DCI	

SECRET

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The prime function for the DCI always has been to provide warning and especially Strategic Warning. Many intelligence elements contribute to this, but the jointly manned Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) and the now vacant position for a Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning are the only national elements clearly responsible for warning. The DCI also has been responsible for supporting the President and NSC in crises, and arrangements have evolved in CIA to do this.

This is the initial report of a joint NFAC/NITC working group that has reexamined warning and crisis management in light of the Intelligence Community reorganization. The group also directed its work toward responding to the House Permanent Select Committee (HPSCI) on Community organization for warning. This report sets a conceptual framework and then makes specific recommendations.

Current intelligence is the reporting of events, explaining their background and significance, and projecting events in the short term. Warning (small-w) is a principal mission of current intelligence and is in certain respects a subdiscipline of it. Strategic Warning (big-W) is even more specialized and focuses on the possibility of conflict with a major adversary.



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Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100050003-5

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discretion, would notify the President and the NSC. The Special Assistant and the SWS were also directed to submit to the DCI and NFIB principals studies and recommendations for improving the community's strategic warning capabilities.

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