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DCI Briefing Notes

RHODESIA

- I. Elections. Mid-April. Case-Javits determination.

- II. GOR making all out effort for big show. Will be portrayed as compliance with western terms for black rule and will lobby hard for recognition and lifting sanctions. Preparations extensive.
 - A. Police and military leaves cancelled and reservists called up. Military force of 75,000.
 - B. Assisted by about 10,000 ex-guerrillas and local recruits of black coleaders Muzorewa and Sithole.
 - C. ZAPU and ZANU committed to disruption. 10,000 guerrillas inside. Thousands more before election. Intimidate voters stage incidents. Rhodesians likely strike again at bases in Mozambique and Zambia.
 - D. Whites, vote 10 April; blacks vote during a 5 day period after 12 April. Security forces rotated from one military district to another to provide maximum security.

- III. Rhodesians hope for 60% turnout. Pressure. Say is valid if only 20% of blacks vote. Will directly elect 72 blacks and 20 whites; 8 whites indirectly. Separate districts and rolls for white and black members.
 - A. Most likely victor is Muzorewa. Should win more than 1/2 of 72 black seats. Sithole has lost ground. Less than 1/3 of votes.
 - B. Despite results, Whites will control military, police, judiciary and civil service. Smith's Rhodesian Front Party is unopposed. Uncertain what role Smith will play.
 - C. Most whites not enthused but saying Let's try it. In January emigration reduced to about 1,000/mo.

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- IV. Election will not end war, nor will government win widespread recognition. Question is will accession of black government, albeit one with limited powers, alter the power balance.
- A. By itself answer is no. But election can't be looked at as an isolated event. Must be viewed as part of complex equation.
- Deepening Mugabe-Nkomo rift.
 - Dissention in ZIPRA ranks. Nkomo political decline.
 - Hardening South African attitude. Throwing weight behind int. settlement
 - Growing western support for internal settlement. US Congress and Thatcher.
- V. These factors account for growing confidence by white Rhodesians. Risk is that it will also harden their attitude and reduce chances of a political deal among blacks that could lead toward an eventual solution.
- VI. Muzorewa will move to strengthen relations with whites, establish control in countryside, and induce defections from ZAPU and ZANU. Will probably also try to split Patriotic Front even further.
- A. A Shona-based alliance between Muzorewa's party and Mugabe's ZANU. About 75% of blacks are Shona. Has already approached Mugabe about joining government.
- B. Muzorews and Nkomo could cut a deal. While different tribes, white resistance to Nkomo alliance less than Mugabe.
- C. Many obstacles to both these deals; biggest impulse comes from mutual fear by Mugabe and Nkomo that other will cut a deal first.
- D. Neither of above alignments would tip balance sufficiently to end fighting, but could change complexion of war from one of equilibrium with prospect of growing strength on guerrilla side to one of momentum for internal solution.

VII. Election will create hard choices for the External Players.

- A. Front line states will continue to support guerrillas, but intensification of fighting could force Kaunda and Machel to accept open-ended commitment to Soviet and Cuban presence. Don't want. They also face prospects of supporting rivals in civil war. Thus, must support a deal under appropriate circumstances.
- B. Soviets presently backing Nkomo. Risk alienating Nyerere and Machel who also want Mugabe supported. If Nkomo cuts a deal with Muzorewa they have to choose between ZAPU and white allies or to shift to ZANU. If support both groups they retain credentials with Front Line states, buy risk becoming involved in civil war.

VIII. Even larger dilemma faces US and UK:

- A. Western recognition and the lifting of economic sanctions would:
 1. Strengthen the position of the new government. There would be greater white resolve to support the black-led government and more willingness among whites in the military to defend it. Government could attract significant number of defectors from guerrilla forces.
 2. Improve the chances of stemming Rhodesia's economic decline. Worldwide demand is increasing for many goods produced by the Rhodesians such as copper, chrome, and gold.
 3. Provoke a serious erosion in the "special relationship" that the US has fostered with black African leaders -- particularly Nyerere, Kaunda, and Obasanjo. They would conclude that the Anglo-American Plan for Rhodesia was dead and would come under increased pressure to seek a military solution in Rhodesia.
 4. If the US and the UK pushed for the inclusion of ZANU and ZAPU in the new government, this might appease some of the African leaders. A call for the adoption of a new constitution providing for a quicker transition to black majority rule and approved by all Rhodesians -- not just the whites -- also might dispell some of the anger. This option, however, still would risk a major escalation of Soviet and Cuban involvement on the side of whatever guerrilla group is excluded from the government.

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- B. If West opts against recognition and lifting sanctions and continues to press negotiated settlement involving all parties to the dispute:
 - 1. The internal government's ability to take hold would be weakened. Emigration probably would increase. White extremist attitudes gain currency and last ditch military stand becomes only alternative. Deals between blacks more unlikely.
 - 2. The Front line states and Nigeria would continue to support the Anglo-American efforts toward a political settlement. They would regard the election merely as one step in a process that eventually will involve the guerrillas in a negotiated settlement.
 - 3. But Soviet and Cuban involvement with the guerrilla forces and in the host states would still increase.

IX. In sum:

- A. Everybody confident now -- Whites, ZAPU, ZANU. Pre-election struggle will provide test of military strength. Elections could shift center of gravity slightly away from guerrillas if Whites maintain security.
- B. Once in power, Muzorewa is likely to make overtures to either Mugabe or Nkomo, but we doubt at this point that the white leaders will show sufficient flexibility to allow Muzorewa to cut a deal attractive enough to bring either guerrilla leader into the internal settlement. He may, however, be able to induce significant defections. A successful all parties conference or agreement to hold UN supervised elections are not in the cards.
- C. Short-term prospects are for a continuing stalemate, particularly if South Africa opts to commit its resources in support of the new government of national unity.
- D. Over the long run, time probably is on the side of the guerrilla forces. The continuing struggle will provide expanding opportunities for the Soviets and the Cubans and prove costly for the West. Even if whites collapse after prolonged struggle, we anticipate turmoil as blacks compete for power.

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RHODESIA: ELECTION TIMETABLE

- 10 April White Rhodesians vote for at least 4 of 20 directly-elected white members of the House of Assembly.
- 17-21 April White and black Rhodesians vote for the 72 black members of the House. Hours for the fixed polling stations are from 7 to 7. Hours for the mobile polling stations are from 7 to 3.
- 18 April The white Rhodesian Front Party caucuses to select at least 16 nominees for the 8 indirectly-elected white seats in House.
- 23 April Counting of votes for 72 black and 20 white seats begins.
- 26 April Whites meet, if necessary, in an electoral college to pare down list of white nominees for indirectly elected seats to 16.
- 27 April Electoral results announced by this date.
- 7 May The newly elected black and white House members elect 8 white members to House, bringing the total House membership to 100.
- 15 May Nominations for 10 black and 10 white Senators are solicited by nomination court.
- 17 May Council of Chiefs elect 5 Shona and 5 Ndebele chiefs to the Senate.
- 23 May White House members elect 10 whites to the Senate; black House members elect 10 blacks to the Senate.
- * Parliament is dissolved.
- * The new parliament is formed and the Speakers of the House and the Senate are elected.

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
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- * Parliament puts forward nominations and elects a "non-executive" President.
- * President appoints a Prime Minister and a cabinet acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.

* *Date not set.*

RHODESIAN PARTY SYMBOLS


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United African National Council
President, Bishop Abel Muzorewa



Zimbabwe African National
Union - Sithole
President, Rev. Ndabaningi
Sithole



Zimbabwe United People's Organization
President, Chief Jeremiah Chirau



United National Federal Party
President, Chief Kayisa Mdiweni

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RHODESIA

Problems of corruption, fraud, and statistical manipulation:

Given the importance of the election to the internal government and the unstable security situation in many rural areas, some electoral irregularities can be expected. We doubt, however, that there will be any large scale falsification of the results.

- The election will be supervised by a serious and competent group of civil servants who are said to be doing what they can to preserve the fairness of the vote.
- Nevertheless, government pressure to produce a large turnout and particularly voter intimidation by the black parties and their auxiliary forces which are already taking place, are in themselves irregularities. Others, such as the counterfeiting of the ballots and the busing of supporters to different voting districts, could also take place, but probably on a limited scale.
- Each voter's hand will be dipped in a colorless liquid that will remain detectable under a machine for one to two weeks. This will not prevent electoral officials from looking the other way if it benefits their party to do so, but monitoring procedures will probably be strict enough to avoid widespread abuse.

RHODESIA

International Recognition of New Rhodesian Government

To our knowledge, no state is planning--or even seriously considering--recognizing the new Rhodesian government to be elected later this month.

--Some states, such as South Africa, Malawi, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Zaire, might decide to establish diplomatic relations if and when the new government demonstrates a capability to govern and looks like it might survive.

--Many of these states, and others such as Botswana and Zambia, will continue to trade with the Rhodesians.

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Rhodesia: Economic Situation and Outlook

I. The economy, a source of strength to the government of Prime Minister Ian Smith during most of the period since independence, has deteriorated in the past three years.

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A. The contraction in national output that began in 1975 shows no signs of halting.

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1. Reduction in output in the last three years has been around 15 percent.

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2. Real GNP decline in 1978 probably equalled 1977's seven percent rate.

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3. GNP will undoubtedly continue to slide in 1979.

B. The economic slump largely reflects:

1. increasing burden of defense -- defense spending has nearly tripled in the last three years,

2. erosion of the middle class market by white emigration,

3. waning business confidence due to persistent guerrilla activity and highly uncertain political prospects, and

4. weak international demand for Rhodesian products, in part related to economic sanctions.

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II. How the blacks come to power and how they treat white economic interests will, of course, have a decisive influence on the country's future and will determine whether the economy suffers a precipitous decline or whether a turnaround can be achieved.

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A. A worst-case scenario would involve the departure of most Rhodesian whites accompanied by large-scale civil war.

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1. This would create chaotic economic conditions similar to those of post-independent Angola and Mozambique.

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2. Whichever guerrilla faction emerged as the winner of the civil war probably would adopt disruptive economic socialization policies, particularly in farming areas once reserved for whites.

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B. From an economic point of view, the best path to black majority rule would be along the lines of the Kenya model in which enough whites remain to assure a stable economic environment.

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1. A smooth transition accompanied by quick improvement in the country's security situation and international standing would probably reverse the economy's decline; even then they will need large amounts of financial assistance.

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Rhodesia: Enforcement of Sanctions

I. Weak international demand for Rhodesian raw materials, in part because of economic sanctions, has contributed to Rhodesia's economic decline since 1974. [redacted]

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A. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the impact of economic sanctions was mitigated by strong world demand and by the willingness of South Africa and Portugal to facilitate the flow of Rhodesian goods. [redacted]

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B. As world demand slumped in the aftermath of the 1973/74 oil price hikes, the sanctions probably caused Rhodesia to suffer disproportionately. [redacted]

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1. Rhodesian mining output dropped 8 percent during 1974-78 as many firms in developed countries turned to alternative suppliers of chromium, nickel, copper, tin, and asbestos. [redacted]

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2. Chromium exports also were hard hit by:
a. the loss of the lucrative US market, which accounted for 25 percent of chrome sales prior to the March 1977 repeal of the Byrd Amendment, and

b. a new metallurgical process (argon-oxygen decarburization, or AOD) which reduced the cost competitiveness of high-grade Rhodesian ores in the production of stainless steel. 25X1

II. Sanctions enforcement is far from airtight: willing to pay profitable fees to South African, Swiss, and other middlemen, Rhodesia apparently still 25X1

has little trouble in selling and shipping exports.
A. South African businesses, which have substantial investment in Rhodesia, undoubtedly provide the principal conduits for Rhodesian trade. 25X1

B. All overseas Rhodesian trade is transported over road or rail connections with South Africa. 25X1

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III. The current strengthening trend in international markets should result in increased demand for some of Rhodesia's minerals. 25X1

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A. US stainless steel producers reportedly have exceeded their AOD capacity and are turning to older electric furnaces that require high-grade ferrochrome produced from ores that are available principally from Rhodesia and USSR.

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B. Copper prices are up about 60 percent over last year's average price to about \$1 per pound.

C. Record gold prices (\$240-\$250 a troy ounce) have pushed earnings from gold exports to well over \$100 million a year.

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IV. Despite the sanctions, Rhodesia continues to get adequate petroleum supplies.

A. Rhodesia meets its requirements either by purchasing products from South African refineries or by importing from third countries through South African ports.

B. The increases in international oil prices since the Iranian political crisis have spurred Salisbury to raise retail gasoline prices by almost 30 percent to over \$1.30 a US gallon; Rhodesia already has gasoline rationing.

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Zambia: Food Situation and Dependence
on Rhodesian Rail Outlet

I. Zambia has been hard hit by the drought in
Southern Africa. []

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A. The government -- perhaps optimistically --
is predicting that this year's maize harvest
will equal only one-half of annual domestic
consumption. []

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B. To cover the shortfall of this dietary staple,
Zambia expects to import 350,000-400,000
metric tons. []

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1. This will place added financial strains on
Zambia, which is already short of foreign
exchange. []

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2. Possible suppliers of maize include:

a. South Africa. Facing a poor
harvest itself, South Africa has
turned down a Zambian bid for white
maize, which is preferred for human
consumption, but has offered yellow
maize. []

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b. Rhodesia. Although harvests will be
down this year, Salisbury probably
would not refuse a Zambian request.
For political reasons Zambia would
ask Rhodesian assistance only as a
last resort. []

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c. Kenya. Harvests are good and Nairobi may be able to supply some of Zambia's needs. []

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d. The EEC, Mexico, and the US. Some Western diplomats have expressed the opinion that Zambia will wait until the food situation reaches "disaster proportions" and appeal to Western governments for emergency relief. []

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II. Of landlocked Zambia's four export/import routes, the Rhodesian rail outlet to efficiently run South African ports is the most expeditious. []

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A. The Tazara (Tanzam) railroad to Tanzania is plagued by inefficiency, derailments, strikes, and backlogs. []

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B. The "Great East Road," a rail and road route to Mozambique, is limited by congested ports and slow turnaround times. []

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C. The Benguela railroad to Angola has been closed since 1975. []

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III. Closure of the Rhodesian route would cause a sharp drop in Zambian copper exports and would reduce its ability to import food. []

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A. The Rhodesian route is targetted to handle 1,000 tons of copper exports per day. []

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B. Now used principally to handle imports of fertilizer and coal, the route would be needed to handle grain imports from outside Africa.

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IV. Because of its importance, Zambia is concerned that:

A. Rhodesia may close the route to bring economic pressure on Lusaka.

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B. Rhodesian guerrillas (mainly ZAPU) may interdict the line.

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23 March 1979

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES
DURING THE APRIL ELECTION

Army

Regulars	6,000	
Active Duty Reservists	<u>12,000</u>	
Total Army		18,000

Air Force

1,500

Police and Paramilitary

Regular Police	8,000	
Reserve Police	35,000	
Guard Force	6,000	
Paramilitary Guard Units	5,000	
Dad's Army (50-59 year olds mobilized for security duty during the election)	<u>1,000</u>	
Total Police and Paramilitary		55,000

Auxiliaries

Loyal to Sithole	2,000	
Loyal to Muzorewa	<u>8,000</u>	
Total Auxiliaries		<u>10,000</u>

TOTAL FORCES		84,500
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30 March 1979

RHODESIAN EQUIPMENT INVENTORY
(as of 30 March 1979)Ground Forces

Tanks	none
Armored vehicles (Ratels, Elands, Ferret)	60
Artillery (25 pounders, 5.5 inch guns)	24
Anti-aircraft artillery	none
Surface-to-air missiles	none

Air Forces

Bombers (Canberra)	4-5
Fighters	
Hunter	10
Vampire	11
Counter-insurgency	
O-2	14
SF-260	12
Trainers (SF-260)	12-22
Transports	
DC-3	12
Islander	6
Helicopters	
AB-205	8-11
Alouette II/III	42

30 March 1979

GUERRILLA EQUIPMENT INVENTORIES

ZAPU

- SA-7 surface-to-air missile
- 60mm mortars
- 82mm mortars
- 122mm manportable, single-tube rockets
- B-10 82mm recoilless rifles
- RPG-2/7 anti-tank weapons
- 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine guns
- a variety of Soviet small arms
- may have some light field artillery pieces

ZANU

- may have a few SA-7 surface-to-air missiles
- 60mm mortars
- 82mm mortars
- 120mm mortars (a few)
- 122mm manportable, single-tube rockets
- B-10 82mm recoilless rifles
- PRG-2/7 anti-tank weapons
- 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine guns
- a variety of Communist-bloc small arms

23 March 1979

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION
AS OF MID-MARCH

In Rhodesia 2,000

Other Trained

Hq, Staff, Training	2,500
Support Camps	2,800
In Botswana	200
Holding Camps	<u>7,000</u>

Total 12,500

Under Training

In Zambia	7,500
Mulungushi - 5,500	
From Angola- 2,000	
In Ethiopia	500-1,000
In Angola	2,000
Elsewhere	<u>1,000</u>

Total 11,000

Available for Training

In Zambia	8,000
In Botswana	<u>9,000</u>

Total 17,000

TOTAL 42,500

23 March 1979

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION
AS OF MID-MARCH

<u>In Rhodesia</u>		8,000
<u>Other Trained Personnel</u>		7,000
<u>Under Training</u>		
Tanzania	3,000	
Libya	500	
Ethiopia & elsewhere	<u>2,500</u>	
Total		6,000
Available for Training		<u>10,000</u>
	TOTAL	31,000

2 April 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: South African Arms Potentially Available for Rhodesia

I. South Africa has the strongest military force in sub-Saharan Africa and a wide variety of modern weapons and military equipment.

A. We estimate the army equipment inventory includes the following:

<u>280 tanks</u>	<u>2,000 other armored combat vehicles</u>
160 Centurions	1,200 Eland armored cars
100 Shermans	230 Ferret scout cars
20 comets	280 Saracen APCs
	100 Ratels armored vehicles
	200 light personnel carriers
<u>200 artillery pieces</u>	<u>mortars</u>
48 Sexton 25 pounders	unk 81 mm mortars
132 25-pounder howitzers	423 3-inch mortars
25 3.5 inch guns	unk 60 mm mortars
<u>antitank weapons</u>	<u>100 air defense artillery</u>
unk 3.5 inch rocket launchers	16 3.7 inch ADA
unk Entac missiles	24 40 mm Bofors
unk SS-11 missiles	60 35 mm Oerlikons

B. We estimate the Air Force inventory includes the following:

<u>5 light bombers</u>	<u>32 all-weather fighters</u>
5 Canberras	16 Mirage III

This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Strategic Research. Queries and comments may be addressed to

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51 fighter-bombers

30 Mirage F1
16 Mirage III
5 Buccaneer

25 reconnaissance

7 Mirage III
18 Piaggio

76 transports

43 C-47s
9 Transalls
7 C-130s
17 others

53 transport helicopters

39 Pumas
14 Super Frelon

385 trainers

229 Impalas
126 T-6s
30 others

94 utility helicopters

90 Alouette IIIs
4 Alouette IIs

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NIO WORKING PAPER FOR PRC

11 April 1979

SOUTH AFRICA-US Relations

1. The short puff of South African good will toward the US that followed Secretary Vance's visit to Pretoria last fall appears to have vanished and the South African government is reverting to the anti-American posturing that marked the 1977 parliamentary election campaign.

--Prime Minister Botha believes that South Africa was deceived in the development of the UN Secretary General's report on Namibia and the government is currently making public attacks on US UN Ambassador McHenry. The South Africans probably genuinely feel they have been diddled, but they also may find that adopting this attitude is a convenient excuse for further stalling on the Namibian negotiations.

--The anti-US pronouncements may also be part of internal political maneuvering by Prime Minister Botha's government to heal the party rifts caused by the revelations of the Information Department scandal. The onus would be off the government to some extent if the underhanded dealings of South Africa in the US could be justified as necessary evils to combat a hostile United States.

--Some of the rekindled animosity may also stem from South Africa's successful management of its current oil crisis. The long dreaded specter of sanctions may seem less frightening now that the country is actually coping with the effects of a massive oil cutoff.

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2. The South African government is reviving the Southern African regional cooperation policies of both the Verwoerd and Vorster eras. The Prime Minister talks of non-alignment and a "wall of steel" (presumably South African military might) around a group of states that is to include Rhodesia and Namibia. In readjusting its foreign policy, South Africa is again making clear to the outside world that it is pivotal to progress in the area.

3. While publicly rejecting the West, South Africans still hanker for Western acceptance and they have not given up hope of being taken back into the fold. In this context they view the prospect of the election of a conservative government in the UK as working to their advantage. They continue to feel that, despite what they perceive as negative results in much of their dealings with the US government, South Africa has a wide sympathetic audience in the United States whose opinions are not reflected in current US policy.

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NIO WORKING PAPER FOR PRC

11 April 1979

SOUTH AFRICA: Policy Toward Rhodesia

1. South Africa's basic aim in Rhodesia is to encourage the establishment of a stable, peaceful majority-ruled government that will gain international acceptance and will cooperate--rather than merely coexist--with South Africa, particularly with respect to Pretoria's overall design for an eventual Southern African regional economic and military alliance.

--South Africa will at least continue, and probably increase, its economic and military support to Rhodesia through the period of the elections and the establishment of the Government of National Unity in the hope that the GNU will take hold and gain some form of international acceptance that will end sanctions, brighten the economic outlook, and bolster white morale enough to keep the white infrastructure intact.

2. Pretoria has successfully played a waiting game in its long dealings with Rhodesian independence machinations. Having come this far, the South Africans may not necessarily see the GNU as the final independence government in Rhodesia.

--An "all parties settlement" that would include the Patriotic Front and thus stop the guerrilla warfare would be more in South Africa's best interests. The risk of increased Soviet and Cuban intervention would also be decreased.

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--South Africa could view the coming election and the establishment of the GNU as steps in an ongoing process to secure a permanently workable government in Rhodesia, particularly if the process continued to ensure white tenure.

3.. Pretoria does not appear to have formulated any plans toward Rhodesia in the event of a GNU collapse, beyond those to evacuate whites if law and order breaks down.

--For now South Africa feels that the GNU is the best bet in working toward stability in Rhodesia, and it would see no advantage in weakening the new government's chances of survival.

--Although South Africa will not give immediate diplomatic recognition to the GNU, it will not withdraw the South African support that will be needed to keep the new Rhodesian government afloat.

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DCI PRC Briefing

9 April 1979

I. Is a Muzorewa-Mugabe Alliance in the Cards?

A. Probably not, at least over the short term.

--Bishop Muzorewa would prefer to see ZANU's leaders return to Rhodesia and participate in the political process under the terms of the new constitution. Muzorewa's recent feelers to ZANU probably have been motivated less by a desire to seek an alliance than to draw Mugabe's support among the Shonas to himself.

--The Bishop is playing the divide-and-conquer tactics that have characterized Rhodesian politics since the days of Cecil Rhodes and that have been practised so ably by Ian Smith. These tactics are based on the premise that you destroy your opponent by undercutting his support rather than by directly confronting him.

B. From Mugabe's standpoint, the April election will not change anything--except the political positions of the players with whom a settlement will ultimately have to be reached.

--Mugabe will not be interested in participating in the post-election political process because he rejects the legitimacy of the constitution on which it will be based.

--So long as time seems to be working on the side of his guerrillas, Mugabe will see no need to make an accommodation with the new government.

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--Mugabe will probably stick to this position unless the new government not only takes hold but also is able to attract large numbers of ZANU guerrillas to its side.

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DCI PRC Briefing

9 April 1979

I. How Would Nyerere Respond to a Muzorewa-Mugabe Deal?

- A. Although Nyerere is currently well-disposed toward the U.S. Government because of its role as intermediary with Kenya during the Uganda conflict, he is not likely to agree to an American proposal encouraging a Muzorewa-Mugabe alliance.
- In his eyes that would legitimize a black-led government in Salisbury which is only an extension of the present white-dominated regime.
- Although Nyerere's personal sympathies probably lie with Mugabe, he remains committed to the Patriotic Front in that he believes both ZANU and ZAPU must be accommodated in any settlement if civil war in Rhodesia is to be avoided.
- B. Nyerere apparently has concluded that white dominance in Rhodesia will give way only to military force, and to work for a deal between Muzorewa and Mugabe would weaken Mugabe's position--Nyerere would have to accept such an arrangement if it were presented to him by Mugabe as an accomplished fact.

DCI PRC Briefing

9 April 1979

I. How Would Nyerere Respond to a Call for UN-Supervised Elections in Rhodesia?

A. Nyerere initially would be cool to such a proposal and would wonder why the US was moving away from the Anglo-American Plan and toward what he would perceive as an overly-complicated approach to a settlement.

--He would not agree to UN-supervised elections on the basis of the present constitution.

--He would not take the lead in encouraging the Patriotic Front and the other frontline presidents to accept negotiations or UN-supervised elections, partly because he believes the US and UK would be unable to convince the Salisbury government to participate and partly because of his more immediate concern with Uganda.

--He probably would go along with UN-supervised elections--the Namibian model--if negotiations between the Patriotic Front and the government in Salisbury resulted in new ground rules for an election.

DCI PRC BRIEFING

9 April 1979

I. Would Bishop Abel Muzorewa be receptive to a US call for UN-sponsored elections and negotiations with the Patriotic Front?

A. Muzorewa, at least over short term, would not be receptive to such a call.

--If, as now seems likely, Muzorewa emerges from the election as the head of the new government, his primary concerns will be consolidating his leadership, winning international acceptance of the election, and improving his government's military position. He is considering offering an amnesty to attract guerrillas to return to Rhodesia.

--Although he might invite some prominent guerrilla leaders to participate in the new government, we doubt he would seriously consider entering into negotiations involving any redistribution of power in Salisbury.

B. Muzorewa told US Ambassador Low late last month that after the April election there would be no point in holding further elections.

--Although he said he would not categorically reject the idea of UN-sponsored elections, he is unlikely to consider this option unless forced to by military pressures.

DCI PRC Briefing

9 April 1979

I. Nkomo's Prospects Over the Longer Term

A. Nkomo's reputation has slipped badly.

- Once he was regarded by the international and African communities and by Rhodesian whites as the father of Rhodesian nationalism. As such, his political position transcended his minority Ndebele ethnic base, and he was the logical nationalist with whom to reach a settlement.
- In recent months, Joshua Nkomo's stature has diminished as ZANU leader Robert Mugabe's has increased.
- Revelation last fall of his secret talks with Prime Minister Smith seriously damaged Nkomo's credibility as a nationalist leader who would resist a settlement on Smith's terms.
- The subsequent shooting down of two Rhodesian civilian airliners by ZAPU guerrillas has made an accommodation between Nkomo and the Salisbury regime much more difficult.
- Nkomo faces the prospect of a further deterioration in his position because the Ndebeles, who make up only 18 percent of the country's black population, will have to find other leaders to represent them in the new government

if they are to protect their interests.

- B. Nevertheless, ZAPU continues to expand in terms of numbers and the military support Nkomo is receiving from the Soviet Union and Cuba strengthens his demands to be included in any political settlement.

--Thus a new international initiative would significantly help to revive his political fortunes.

--Any future role for him in Rhodesia, however, is likely to be as an Ndebele politician rather than as a national leader who stands above ethnic ties.

DCI PRC Briefing

9 April 1979

I. What progress has the transitional government made in areas of genuine concern to blacks?

A. Our information on this subject is rather spotty, but thus far change appears to be slow.

-- The repeal of laws allowing racial discrimination (e.g., in public accommodations, schools, hospitals, and land ownership) has not been followed up with any meaningful social changes.

-- Although valuable white farm land can no longer be reserved exclusively for whites, the government has yet to provide the means--by arranging substantial credit--for blacks to buy land. Muzorewa has expressed an interest in what are alleged to be as many as 10 million acres of underutilized or vacant land for re-distribution among the blacks, but we do not know much about the quality of this land or whether Muzorewa's thoughts on the subject have advanced very far.

-- Some blacks have moved into residential areas previously reserved for whites, but most blacks lack the means to buy or rent in those areas.

-- A number of blacks are now enrolled in private schools, but the new multiracial educational system is not scheduled to go into effect until May. For many years, however, Rhodesia has had a relatively good record in providing educational opportunities for talented blacks.

-- In the military, the pace of recruitment of blacks for officer training is accelerating, but this is essentially a continuation of the policy adopted by the Smith government prior to the internal settlement.

B. In sum, the government has thus far moved cautiously and conservatively in implementing changes.

F

DCI PRC Briefing

9 April 1979

Namibia: Status and Prospects
(Revised and Updated)

1. South African Prime Minister Botha and his foreign minister met with Namibian political leaders on 2 April to discuss results of the New York proximity talks on Namibia in mid-March. (See attachment for major Namibian political groups.)

--Botha asked the Namibians to decide within a week whether to accept Western proposals which partially meet South Africa's objections to the truce arrangements which the UN Secretary General announced in late February.

--The tenor of Botha's meetings with the Namibians suggests that he is preparing for further hard bargaining with the Western sponsors of a Namibia settlement.



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--This signals a significant shift from Foreign Minister Roelof Botha's stance at the New York proximity talks, which implied that South Africa would soon proceed toward an internal settlement unless the

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UN truce plan were substantially revised to:

-Provide for UN monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola and Zambia.

--Exclude any possibility that guerrillas inside Namibia after a cease-fire could maintain armed bases under UN monitoring.

3. Consultations among the Namibian political parties are continuing, but the consensus urged by Prime Minister Botha does not appear likely.

--There is broad agreement that a truce should provide for effective monitoring of SWAPO guerrilla forces in neighboring countries, and should not allow SWAPO to maintain bases inside Namibia.

--The basic disagreement is between the members of the Constituent Assembly, who want to proceed toward independence without a UN-conducted election, and the other leaders, who hope that further negotiations will yield adequate truce arrangements.

4. Prime Minister Botha very likely could persuade most of the Namibian political leaders to back one more round of negotiations, focused primarily on measures for disarming any SWAPO forces that emerge inside Namibia after a cease-fire.

--As long as negotiations show progress, the Constituent Assembly probably can be held to merely planning for eventual independence.

--If negotiations prove fruitless, the other leaders are likely to feel compelled to participate in an "internal settlement."

5. SWAPO military commanders probably will continue current efforts to step up guerrilla infiltrations and small-scale terrorism until South Africa unreservedly accepts a UN truce plan and the frontline governments press SWAPO to do likewise.*

--Although SWAPO Vice-President Muyongo pledged at the proximity talks to cease infiltrations as soon as a cease-fire agreement is concluded, he parried calls for pre-truce restraint.

--SWAPO President Nujoma and other long-exiled leaders who do not want to face an election probably will try to disrupt Prime Minister Botha's temporizing strategy as long as possible.

--Neto and Kaunda may withhold additional support for SWAPO as long as truce negotiations appear promising, but they are unlikely to actively restrain SWAPO's cross-border operations until a cease-fire agreement is concluded.

--Under these conditions, it is unlikely that SWAPO can much extend the current pattern of guerrilla activity (mostly in Ovamboland, near the Angolan border), but some small guerrilla bands may infiltrate white areas and carry out small but politically provocative attacks.

--If SWAPO extends its recent strategy of sending some guerrillas-- reportedly newer recruits--farther south with orders to remain inactive until a cease-fire, many could then appear in areas where SWAPO has never operated effectively and thereby establish claims to maintain bases under UN monitoring.

6. The series of South African "lightning strikes" in early March against SWAPO forward bases (mostly in Angola) was primarily intended to preempt a surge of guerrilla infiltrations before an anticipated truce took affect.



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--No significant South African strikes into Angola or Zambia are known to have occurred since shortly before the New York proximity talks and the simultaneous start of UN Security Council sessions on the Angolan protest of recent South African strikes.

--Strikes apparently have been suspended because the immediate military objective was achieved and because Prime Minister Botha decided to avoid further provocations while the South Africans were seeking more favorable truce terms.

--Botha may intend to restrain the military hawks who want to strike deeper into Angola as long as he believes that restraint will influence the Western Five--especially the US--toward meeting South Africa's demands on truce terms.

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--At the same time, Botha probably will take whatever military measures he considers necessary to prevent any significant increase in guerrilla activity inside Namibia.

-He probably believes--with good reason--that even a few assassinations of prominent Namibians or other impressive guerrilla "exploits" would undercut South African influence in Namibia and exacerbate his government's current domestic embarrassments.

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MAJOR NAMIBIAN POLITICAL GROUPS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COMPOSITION</u>	<u>CURRENT STATUS</u>
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)	A South Africa-backed coalition of 11 ethnic-based parties: one white, two mulatto and eight in black tribal groups; nonwhite participants are mostly traditional tribal chiefs.	Winning 82 percent of ballots last December has made DTA fairly confident that it could defeat SWAPO in UN-run election, provided discreet but substantial support from South Africa continues.
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	The nationalist organization recognized by the UN General Assembly as sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people. Dominated by the Ovambos, who constitute about half of the Namibian population. <u>External wing</u> operates out of Zambia and Angola. <u>Internal wing</u> has engaged openly in nonviolent political action.	High voter turnout in December (80 percent of registered voters) despite SWAPO's active boycott has eroded confidence that it would win UN-run election. Internal wing is more willing to face polls than external leaders.
Namibian National Front (NNF)	Loose alliance of one liberal white and a number of nonwhite political parties. The Hereros, Namibia's third-largest black ethnic group, predominate, but NNF also has some broad ethnic support.	Quietly boycotted December election. In an open election, NNF might win enough seats to play pivotal role between DTA and SWAPO.
SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D)	Formed in mid-1978 by former SWAPO members who are disaffected with SWAPO head Sam Nujomas' leadership.	Loosely affiliated with NNF. Quietly boycotted December election. Although still embryonic, in an open election SWAPO-D might attract many Ovambos who have followed the original SWAPO internal wing.
Action Front for the Preservation of the Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR)	Conservative, predominantly Afrikaner party. Formerly associated with the ruling National Party of South Africa.	Apparently is leading party among white residents, who constitute only 12 percent of Namibia's population. Retains some influence in National Party of South Africa.

Note. *The Namibian Constituent Assembly, elected last December, has 50 members: 41 from DTA, 6 from AKTUR, 1 each from 3 miniscule parties (2 exclusively white).*

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DCI PRC Briefing

9 April 1979

Angola-Cuba: Some Strains but No New Developments

1. Despite periodic problems between the two countries--signs that the Angolans are becoming more dissatisfied with the Cubans and indications that Havana views its military role in Angola as increasingly burdensome--Cuba has a large stake in supporting the Angolan Government, and Angola remains basically dependent on Cuban (and Soviet) military and technical support.
2. Both Luanda and Havana probably would like to see a reduction of Cuban troop strength in Angola--if conditions were to allow it.

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--Neto probably would prefer that the Cubans maintain their present military strength in Angola--approximately 20,000 men--and, instead, reduce the number of civilian technicians there. The performance of the Cuban civilians has not been satisfactory.

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3. Angola will continue to depend on Cuban troops for both external and internal security--and for training the Angolan military. The Angolan Government believes that the recent attacks against guerrilla bases by Rhodesian and South African forces demonstrate the continued need for a substantial Cuban military presence.

--Indeed, Angolan officials can claim with some justification that

"the Cuban presence is necessary to preserve Angolan independence."

--If the Namibian problem could be resolved, Neto might be willing to see some of the Cuban troops withdrawn.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] if an adequate air defense system is to be established in Angola, the number of Cuban military personnel may even increase slightly.

4.

[Redacted]

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5.

[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and Neto continues to

affirm his commitment to socialism.

6. Luanda would like to reduce its dependence on Cuba (and the USSR) and within the last eight months has made an effort to expand its political and economic ties with the West.

--The Angolans are dissatisfied with the quality of Cuban economic and technical assistance.

--Neto would like to obtain economic and technical assistance from the West, including the US. Neto also would like to obtain the diplomatic and political prestige of having ties with the US.

7. The Neto government is disappointed that no tangible results came out of the visits to Luanda last year of senior US officials. The Angolans are determined not to give in on the US condition linking diplomatic recognition to a reduction of the Cuban military presence in Angola.

--Inasmuch as the Angolans may believe that the US could influence South Africa to stop the raids and also put pressure on those governments that Luanda believes are aiding UNITA, the Neto government's suspicions of the US may have increased since last fall.

8. If Neto sees his country becoming increasingly beleaguered militarily from within and without--and Angola's economic and social problems also continue--the President may step up his verbal attacks against "imperialist and colonialist" countries that he charges are seeking to undermine Angola.

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--In the face of continuing adversity, Neto might also become less cooperative on other southern African issues that involve Namibia, Rhodesia and the Frontline countries.

9. Despite minor shifts and periodic problems between Angola and its Cuban benefactor, there is no clear evidence to suggest that a new trend has developed that would significantly affect the US.

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Angola: Western Economic and Technical Assistance

Angola is seeking to expand trade and technical and economic assistance ties with the West. Since independence Angola has dramatically increased its trade with Communist countries and has received substantial economic assistance from them. Nevertheless, most of Angola's foreign markets remain in the West and western manpower, capital and technology are needed if the country hopes to stem its economic slide. In an attempt to expand its economic and political contacts with the non-Communist world, Angola since last summer has:

- Hosted EC Commissioner for Development Claude Cheyson. [redacted] 25X1
- Obtained observer status at talks to renegotiate the Lome Convention -- a trade and aid agreement linking the EC to over 50 developing countries. [redacted] 25X1
- Discussed economic and technical assistance with Belgium, France, Holland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. [redacted] 25X1
- Accelerated negotiations with foreign oil companies, mainly American, for offshore oil exploration and development. [redacted] 25X1

Despite increased Angolan interest, western economic and technical assistance to Angola should remain small for the foreseeable future. [redacted]

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- Foreign companies and expatriates are unlikely to return to Angolan until the economic and security situation shows signs of improving. [redacted] 25X1
- Poor living conditions and possibly screening of political backgrounds by Angolan and Portuguese Communist Party officials limit the number of Angolan expatriates that are likely to return from Portugal. [redacted] 25X1
- Western countries remain suspicious of Communist advisers who occupy key positions in the economic ministries. [redacted] 25X1
- Even if political obstacles are overcome the United States cannot participate in any international aid consortium until arrearages on US Export-Import Bank loans are settled. [redacted] 25X1

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[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

2 April 1979

MEMORANDUM

RHODESIA: LOOKING BEYOND THE APRIL ELECTION

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Key Judgments

The election later this month of a black-led government of national unity in Rhodesia will bring substantial pressure on the US and the UK to recognize the new government and to lift economic sanctions.

--The Rhodesians will make an all-out effort to ensure adequate security and a large turnout for the election.

--Although the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union will try to disrupt the election, neither guerrilla group will be able to prevent it from taking place.

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Bishop Muzorewa is the most likely candidate to emerge as the head of the new government.

--He will seek to consolidate his position by strengthening his relationship with the whites, establishing greater control over the countryside, and inducing defections from ZANU and ZAPU.

--He may try to split the guerrillas further by offering to strike a separate deal with ZANU or ZAPU.

--We doubt, however, that the white leaders will show enough flexibility to allow Muzorewa to propose a deal acceptable to either guerrilla leader.

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The election of a new government, coupled with a continuation of the fighting, will create some hard choices for those states most closely involved with the Rhodesian problem.

--The frontline states will continue to support the guerrillas, but an intensification of the fighting could force some presidents into an open-ended commitment to an increased Soviet and Cuban presence in their countries.

--The frontline states might also have to consider the possibility of supporting one guerrilla group against the other in the event of a civil war.

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If the Soviets and the Cubans continue to favor ZAPU over ZANU, they risk alienating Tanzania and Mozambique, who would like to see more support given to ZANU.

--If they agree to support both groups, however, they could become involved in a civil war.

--If Nkomo makes a separate deal with the Salisbury government, they might find themselves forced to throw their support behind ZANU.

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The US and the UK must decide whether to recognize the newly-elected government and lift economic sanctions.

--A positive decision would strengthen the position of the new government, but provoke a hostile reaction from the black Africans.

--A negative decision would undermine the viability of the new regime, but not deter the Africans from supporting further efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.

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




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Prospects for a successful all-parties conference or agreement on the part of the internal government to UN-sponsored elections are exceedingly dim.

--Short-term prospects are for a continuation of the stalemate, particularly now that South Africa has promised to provide substantial military and political support to the new government.

--The fighting certainly will continue, providing expanding opportunities for the Soviets and the Cubans. 

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The Rhodesian government is making an all-out effort to ensure adequate security and a large turnout for the election. Government pressure and intimidation by the black parties and their auxiliary forces should result in a fairly high turnout. The government estimates a total black turnout of about 60 percent, with the highest percentage being urban blacks and blacks living in white farming areas. Over 70 percent of the eligible white voters turned out for the constitutional referendum last January and at least that many should vote in the election.

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[REDACTED]

All military and police leaves have been cancelled during the election period and all civilian reservists have been called up to provide security and to police the polling stations during the election. We estimate that a manpower pool totaling some 75,000 Rhodesians will be mobilized. These forces will be assisted by about 10,000 ex-guerrillas and local recruits who are loyal to internal black leaders Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole.

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[REDACTED]

As the election approaches, Rhodesian security forces will intensify their raids on guerrilla camps and staging areas in Zambia and Mozambique, and possibly in Angola, Tanzania, and Botswana. (See map on page 2.) By forcing the guerrillas to relocate their command posts further from the border and to disperse their camps, guerrilla communication links and supply lines will be lengthened, resulting in an erosion of guerrilla capabilities and morale.

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[REDACTED]

Although ZANU and ZAPU are committed to disrupting the election, it is unlikely either can prevent it from taking place. ZANU and ZAPU now have at least 10,000 guerrillas inside Rhodesia and several thousand more guerrillas are to be infiltrated before the election. Both groups plan to intimidate voters, attack electoral officials and polling stations, and possibly stage incidents near the polling stations to distract the security forces. Nevertheless, we believe the Rhodesian security forces will be able to maintain sufficient control to proceed with the polling in most if not all regions of the country.

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[REDACTED]

ZAPU is planning major attacks into Rhodesia along its northern border with Zambia, but we doubt it possesses the necessary command and control capabilities to launch a major coordinated offensive. The number of guerrilla attacks on "soft" targets of psychological and economic importance to the whites, however, is certain to increase.

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[REDACTED]


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The Election Process

[REDACTED]

White Rhodesians reportedly will go to the polls on 10 April to elect 20 white members to the House of Assembly. Four of these seats are contested by independents, but Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party should

Principal Military Forces Involved in Rhodesian Conflict*



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have little difficulty winning all 20 seats. The 72 black members of the House will be elected sometime after April 12 by both black and white Rhodesians. The election probably will be held over a five day period beginning 17 April. Security forces will be rotated from one region of the country to another--possibly by military district--to ensure maximum security around the polling stations. []

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Both the white and black members will be elected directly from party lists established for each constituency.* A party must win at least 10 percent of the vote in a given constituency to qualify for a seat. Parliamentary seats within each constituency will be allocated based on the proportion of votes received by the parties in that constituency. []

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The 72 black and 20 white members of the House then will caucus to elect 8 additional white members from a list of 16 candidates chosen by the white members of the present parliament. The Senate will consist of 10 blacks elected by the 72 black members of the lower house, 10 whites elected by the 28 white members, and 5 Ndebele and 5 Shona chiefs elected by their tribal counterparts in the Council of Chiefs. Both houses jointly elect a "constitutional" President who then appoints as Prime Minister the person "in his discretion, he considers to be best able to command the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly." The President also appoints the cabinet, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. (See chart on page 4.) []


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Although the new parliament will be numerically dominated by blacks, the whites will retain substantial--if not controlling--influence over the new government. Continued white domination of the military, police, judiciary, and civil service will be ensured by the constitution, which establishes criteria such as senior rank, longevity, and "efficiency and suitability" for appointment to top positions in these fields. []

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**Maps of the white and black electoral constituencies and the five military operational areas appear at the end of this memorandum.*

Formation of Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia



-4-

Moreover, none of the important clauses in the new constitution can be amended or deleted without the approval of all 72 black and at least 6 white members of the House of Assembly. These so-called "entrenched" clauses, which guarantee the whites 28 seats in the House, will remain in effect for at least 10 years, after which a commission--consisting of three whites and two blacks--will be established and empowered to recommend changes. The constitution also states that posts in the cabinet will be allocated according to each party's strength in the House of Assembly, thus guaranteeing the whites at least four positions in the new cabinet.

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Most whites probably are not enthusiastic about a black-led government taking power in Rhodesia, but they appear willing to give the new government a chance. White emmigration dropped considerably this year after a dramatic rise last fall--peaking at 2,937 net departures in December. Net departures for January and February totaled only 1,073 and 592 whites, respectively.

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Muzorewa on Top

Bishop Abel Muzorewa should emerge in a strong position of leadership in the new government of national unity, with his party winning at least half the black seats in Parliament. (See chart on page 6.) His closest rival, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, has lost ground in recent months, and his party probably will win less than a third of the black seats. Chief Jerimiah Chirau, the other black leader in the internal government, lacks broad popular support but should pick up a few seats. Chief Ndiweni, who broke with Chirau last November to form his own Ndebele-based party, has not developed a strong political base, but his party could win enough seats to gain a post in the cabinet.

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Muzorewa hopes to establish more government control over the countryside by augmenting the size and expanding the role of the auxiliary forces. He also hopes to attract more black supporters--including guerrilla defectors--by offering land and social services. The Bishop is expected to announce a major amnesty program soon after taking office that would encourage the guerrillas to return, but not require them to turn in their arms. The government is hoping that many of these guerrillas would agree to join the auxiliary forces.

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
Muzorewa has already entered into negotiations with the white leaders, focusing on cooperation between their parties and a possible modification of some clauses in the new constitution that work to the disadvantage of the blacks. The Bishop realizes that he will need white

Probable Distribution of Seats in New Rhodesian Parliament



**Prime Minister Ian Smith
(Rhodesian Front)**

Under pressure from some whites to leave politics, but so far has resisted. Most if not all, RF candidates are running unopposed.




**Bishop Abel Muzorewa
(United African
National Council)**

Most likely candidate for Prime Minister but would rather place himself above partisan politics and could opt for the Presidency.




**Reverend Ndabanings Sithole
(Zimbabwe African National
Union/Sithole)**

Broke with ZANU external organization in 1977. Popularity appears to be on the decline inside Rhodesia.



**Chief Kayisa Ndiweni
(United National Federal Party)**

Broke with Chirau and the transitional govt. early this year to form a Ndebele-based party. Would be a stalking horse for Nkomo in the election.



**Chief Jerimiah Chirau
(Zimbabwe United
People's Organization)**

Generally considered a "stooge" of the whites but recently has taken a more independent position calling for an all parties conference before the election and the disbanding of all auxiliary forces.

-5-

support for his government and wants to meet with the white leaders before the election to discuss possible ministerial appointments, to plan future government policies, and to map a joint strategy for obtaining international recognition for the new government. [REDACTED]

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Once in power, Muzorewa should be able to capitalize on several trends that have become apparent in recent months, including:

- A deepening political and military rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU. With the virtual collapse of negotiations for a political settlement, each group has come increasingly to perceive the other as a rival in the struggle for control of a black-ruled Rhodesia.
- Continuing disarray within the ZAPU leadership that has weakened Nkomo's position internationally and within his own organization, making it almost impossible for ZAPU to implement its more grandiose military plans.
- The decline of Nkomo's appeal to whites in Rhodesia since the downing of two civilian airliners by his guerrillas.
- Growing weariness in Zambia over the economic and political costs of the guerrilla struggle, which could eventually lead to a political backlash against President Kaunda.
- Growing support for the internal settlement in the US Congress and the British Parliament.
- South African promises to provide substantial political and military support--short of military intervention--to the new government of national unity. [REDACTED]

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The South Africans have also said that they no longer would press Prime Minister Smith to withdraw from politics so long as his presence does not hinder the new government's chance of success. Prime Minister Botha has indicated, however, that South Africa will withhold diplomatic recognition from the new government; we expect Botha to wait until the new government has won some international acceptance and demonstrated a capacity to govern. [REDACTED]

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These factors account for a growing confidence among whites that the internal settlement eventually might succeed. A continuation of these trends could lead to a hardening of white attitudes and a growing

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reluctance to seek a political deal with the guerrillas. Given the probability that the level of fighting inside Rhodesia will escalate, however, most whites probably will continue to support efforts to negotiate a political settlement with the blacks. [redacted] 25X1

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Possible Realignment [redacted]

The formation of a black-led government will open the door to more jockeying among the various players in the Rhodesian situation. Muzorewa, in particular, probably will try to split the guerrillas further by seeking a separate alliance with ZANU or ZAPU. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Joshua Nkomo might try to preempt such an alliance by seeking to make his own deal either with Muzorewa, or with the whites, thus bringing the Ndebeles and the Shonas into a single government. White Rhodesian politicians would favor such a coalition because they see Nkomo as a unifying force and regard Mugabe as too radical. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

The pressure on Mugabe or Nkomo to consider joining forces with the internal government is likely to mount the more each leader perceives the other as trying to preempt him in reaching a settlement. Neither of these realignments, however, would tip the balance of power in Rhodesia sufficiently to bring an end to the fighting because each excludes a major participant who could attract enough foreign support to continue the guerrilla war. Nevertheless, either could change the complexion of the war from one of equilibrium and growing strength on the guerrillas' side to one of strength for the new government in Salisbury. [redacted] 25X1

25X1


25X1

Hard Choices Ahead [redacted]

The election of a government of national unity, coupled with a continuation of the fighting, will create some hard choices for the parties involved with the Rhodesian problem. The frontline states will continue to support the guerrillas, but an intensification of the fighting could force Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Machel of Mozambique into an open-ended commitment to an increased Soviet and Cuban presence in

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Population Distribution in Zimbabwe Rhodesia



ETHNIC GROUP	PERCENT OF BLACK POPULATION
Shona	75
Karanga	25
Zezeru	21
Manyika	11
Ndau	6
Korekore	5
Other	5
Ndebele	14
Kalanga	7
Other (Tonga, Venda, Sena)	4

their countries. (See graphic on page 11.) Kaunda has consistently resisted any augmentation of the Soviet and Cuban role in Zambia, but he might feel forced to reverse himself if it appeared this was the only way to resolve the conflict and remove the military threat posed to his country by the Rhodesians. Machel is less concerned about the Soviet and Cuban presence, largely because of his ideological commitment to ZANU, but he probably is anxious to prevent it from endangering the pragmatic economic ties he has established with South Africa. [redacted] 25X1

In the hope of minimizing the military spillover into their countries, Kaunda and Machel might consider urging Nkomo and Mugabe to strike a separate deal with the government in Salisbury. Such an approach, however, would risk seriously antagonizing the other frontline states. The frontline presidents also have to consider the possibility of supporting one guerrilla group against the other in a contest for power in Rhodesia.

25X1

25X1

The Soviet and Cuban Role [redacted]

The common objective of Moscow and Havana is to secure influence in a black-ruled Rhodesia, and they have decided that backing ZAPU leader Nkomo is the best means to that end. The election of a government of national unity will not force any immediate changes on the Soviets or the Cubans. The fighting will continue, and they will support the guerrillas, hoping that the military pressure will bring a settlement favorable to Nkomo. They will play on African fears of Western recognition of the new government to maintain the momentum of the military option.

25X1

Beyond that, the options available to the Soviets and Cubans have not fully taken form. They will take their cue from the response of the Africans to efforts by the new government to entice the guerrilla leaders to return to Rhodesia. Should Nkomo return, Moscow and Havana probably would prefer to support him. Even though Nyerere and Machel would disagree, the Soviets would weigh the opportunities to improve their credibility and influence with Zambia against the belief that any friction with Tanzania and Mozambique would only be temporary. [redacted] 25X1

Nevertheless, Nkomo's return to Rhodesia carries with it the risk that Nkomo would cut his ties with the Soviets and the Cubans in the process, thereby leading them to support ZANU. This assumes that ZANU's military effort does not evaporate as a result of large-scale defections to the new government. At the present time, Moscow and Havana cannot



Nyerere, Julius

Patriotic Front



Nkomo, Joshua

Patriotic Front



Mugabe, Robert

Mozambique




Machel, Samora

Zambia



Kaunda, Kenneth

Rhodesia



Smith, Ian



Sithole, Ndabaningi



Muzorewa, Abel



Chirau, J.S.

RHODESIA

United National Federal Party



Ndiweni, Kayisa

Botswana



Khama, Seretse

South Africa



Botha, Pieter

25X1 support both ZAPU and ZANU because of the rivalry between them and the potential it holds for an eventual contest between them for power in Rhodesia. []

25X1 Pressures on the US and the UK []

The newly elected government in Rhodesia will press the US and the UK to recognize it and lift economic sanctions. It will argue that the election meets the demands of the US and UK for a transfer of power to a black government on the basis of one man, one vote. [] 25X1

25X1 Recognizing the new government and lifting sanctions certainly would strengthen it. There would be greater white resolve to support the black-led government and a greater willingness among whites in the military to defend it. Government prospects for attracting large numbers of guerrilla defectors could also be enhanced if the economy improved sufficiently to allow the government to improve social services for the blacks. []

The lifting of sanctions would improve the chances of stemming Rhodesia's economic decline and would provide substantial economic benefits and give a major psychological boost to the internal regime. Worldwide demand has been increasing for many goods produced by the Rhodesians such as copper, gold, and chrome. [] 25X1

25X1 At the same time, such a decision would seriously erode the "special relationship" the US has fostered with black African leaders--particularly Zambian President Kaunda, Tanzanian President Nyerere, and Nigerian President Obasanjo. They would conclude that the US and the UK had chosen to support the "enemy" and thus would come under increasing pressure from the guerrillas and the Soviets to pursue a military solution in Rhodesia. []

Such a basic policy shift would also weaken the credibility of Western support for the UN transitional program for Namibia in the eyes of both the Africans and the white government in Pretoria. In fact, the South Africans probably have already interpreted moves to send US observers to cover the Rhodesian elections as evidence of a general weakening of US determination to pursue the UN transition program for Namibia, giving them more room to push a final settlement on their own terms. [] 25X1

While some African leaders might support lifting sanctions if it were followed by US and UK efforts to include ZANU or ZAPU in the new government, the frontline African leaders would be further antagonized

by such a strategy. A call for a new constitution--providing for a more rapid transition to full black rule and approved by both blacks and whites--might dispel some of the frontline president's resentment, but it would still leave the US and the UK very much in disfavor. [redacted] 25X1

Faced with a refusal by the US and the UK to lift sanctions, the internal government would have difficulty taking hold. White emigration probably would increase as the level of fighting escalated. Whites in the military would begin to question why they were fighting for a black-led government that was unable to win external support. [redacted] 25X1


25X1 The frontline states and Nigeria would continue to support Anglo-American efforts toward a political settlement, on the basis that the election was merely one step in a process that eventually would involve the guerrillas in a negotiated settlement. They probably would remain highly skeptical, however, that such efforts would succeed. Meanwhile, regardless of what the US and the UK choose to do, Soviet and Cuban involvement with the guerrilla forces--and with their hosts--would continue to grow. [redacted] 25X6

25X6

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
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Constituencies for the Election of 72 Black Members to the Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly



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Constituencies for the Election of 20 White Members to the Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly




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Operational Areas in Zimbabwe Rhodesia



25X1



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25X1D

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