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PRC Meeting on the Indian Ocean, 18 July 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PRC on Indian Ocean
18 July 1979

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DCI, [redacted] (OSR) attending

Date

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #3750-79
17 July 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Robert R. Bowie
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment

25X1

FROM : [redacted]
National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces

SUBJECT : PRC Meeting on Indian Ocean, 18 July 1979 (S)

1. The purpose of the PRC meeting is to determine how the US should proceed in the Indian Ocean arms limitations talks with the USSR in light of recent Soviet and local activities in the area. In addition, the meeting will address the question of how to deal with Soviet Ambassador Mendelevich who will be in Washington this week. (S)

2. You will be asked for a rundown on the situation in the Indian Ocean area. Your briefing book includes a short Talking Paper, as well as several backup papers (Tabs A through O), which review a number of intelligence questions that may arise during the PRC meeting. (S)

3. Your briefing book has been prepared by OSR analyst [redacted] 25X1 who is available to accompany you to the meeting. (U)

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[redacted]

Attachments: As stated

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[redacted]

TALKING
PAPER

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Soviet-Saudi Diplomatic Relations

There have been no further developments concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries that was rumored in the press some months ago.

-- The Soviets are eager, and the Saudis talk about it now and then, but nothing more than that.

[redacted] 25X1

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Soviet Activity in South Yemen

I. The Soviets have been committed to the Marxist regime in South Yemen since 1967, and during this period, they have tried to enhance their access to Aden's naval and air facilities and attempted to establish closer political relations. [redacted] 25X1

-- Soviet ships have called at the port of Aden regularly since 1968. They use the port for replenishment, crew rest, some minor repair, and to obtain water which is either scarce or more expensive elsewhere in the area. [redacted] 25X1

-- Moscow's interest in these facilities increased substantially after the Soviet expulsion from Berbera, Somalia, but the South Yemenis have been reluctant to formalize the Soviet presence. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

II. During the past two years, the Soviets have received increased access to port facilities, [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] and maintained transport aircraft there. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1
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

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III. In return for access to Aden, the Soviets have been very supportive of the Aden regime, providing it with considerable military, economic, and technical assistance. [redacted]

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-- During the past two years, the Soviets have introduced a broad spectrum of military equipment into South Yemen. [redacted] 25X1

-- Deliveries in 1978 were estimated at $133M and approximately $40 million in equipment has been delivered so far this year. Items include BTR-60 and BMP armored personnel carriers, T-55 tanks, ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft guns, OSA missile patrol boats, a T-58 minesweeper, MI-8 helicopters, and MIG-21 and SU-20/22 aircraft. Only small quantities of new equipment have been introduced--less than a dozen of most types--perhaps reflecting South Yemen's limited ability to absorb new equipment. [redacted] 25X1

-- There are at least 500 Soviet military advisers in South Yemen and probably a like number of Cuban advisers. [redacted] 25X1

IV. The USSR has long been aware of South Yemen's intention to topple the regime in North Yemen and has not indicated that it has any problem in principle with that objective. It has expressed reservations

at times about South Yemen's taking precipitate

25X1 action. [redacted]

-- There is no firm evidence that the Soviets were directly involved in this spring's border fighting between the two Yemens, but there is some evidence that they advised--from within South Yemen--[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

-- The Soviets almost certainly continued to provide the maintenance support necessary to keep much of South Yemen's equipment operational. [redacted] 25X1



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

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

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

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Soviet Presence in Countries Bordering the Indian Ocean

Ethiopia	1200 Military Advisers 600 Civilian Advisers
Kenya	10 Civilian Advisers
Tanzania	120 Military Advisers
Mozambique	250 Military Advisers
Malagasy Republic	10 Military Advisers
North Yemen	150 Military Advisers
South Yemen	500 Military Advisers
India	150 Military Advisers
Iran	120 Military Advisers

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

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Ethiopia: Political Developments

I. Five years after the revolution, signs of discontent are developing among various groups in Ethiopia over the government's continuing inability to overcome a number of military, economic, financial and political problems.

-- Ethiopian military forces have grown increasingly dispirited and war-weary as the guerrilla wars in Eritrea and the Ogaden have shown no signs of abating, and the possibility of renewed guerrilla activity in other areas has grown.

-- The government's much-heralded economic development campaign has dismally failed to live up to expectations, and there are unconfirmed reports of armed resistance by peasant farmers to the campaign's centerpiece--agricultural collectivization.

-- The economy is still suffering from the drain on Ethiopia's cash reserves

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caused by the 1977-78 war with Somalia as well as the cost of maintaining a 215,000-man army.

-- New disposable foreign exchange reserves have declined to less than US $10 million and imports have virtually ceased.

-- On the internal political front, serious conflict has developed over the formation of a single Marxist-Lenist workers party, with military hardliners unwilling to cede any degree of significant power to civilian leftists.

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II. Although Chairman Mengistu's position is not in immediate danger,

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III. Mengistu's growing troubles have increased his dependency on the Soviet Union.

-- The Soviet-Ethiopian relationship was cemented by the Friendship Treaty of November 1978, and Moscow appears determined to support Mengistu over the long run.

-- The USSR recently offered Ethiopia a $600 million military assistance package, which, if implemented, would raise the total value of Soviet military aid to Ethiopia since 1977 to $2.6 billion.

-- The Soviets have apparently not carried through on promises of significant economic development assistance, however, and this failing could eventually cause serious frictions in bilateral relations.

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Somalia: The Political Situation

I. Somali President Siad has managed to maintain an apparently firm grip on the levers of power in Mogadiscio, despite persistent internal political and economic problems, stresses arising from support of an apparently stalemated guerrilla war in the Ogaden, and growing anxiety over a Soviet-Cuban supported Ethiopian invasion of his country.

-- Siad has taken steps to consolidate his position by fashioning a new constitution--scheduled to be promulgated over the next few months--which establishes the dominance of the presidency and the primacy of the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party which he controls. [redacted] 25X1

II. Despite his military break with the USSR in November 1977, Siad has kept his Soviet option open, but we see no prospect for any significant rapprochement between the two sides over the near term.

-- Anti-Soviet sentiment remains strong in Somalia, particularly within the military--the mainstay of Siad's support.

-- The Soviets, for their part, are reluctant to jeopardize their considerable investment in Ethiopia by once again courting a

leader--Siad--they intensely distrust and dislike. In any case, Moscow's pre-conditions for reconciliation, i.e. renunciation by Somalia of all claims to the Ogaden, would be totally unpalatable to Siad. [redacted] 25X1

Kenya: Political and Military Developments

I. During the past year Kenya has accomplished--without incident--the transition successor government to the Kenyatta regime that led it to independence.

-- President Moi has become a popular and self-confident leader and is virtually certain to be reelected to a full term later this year.

-- A reasonable level of popular satisfaction with economic conditions--currently in a period of decline--will be the key to continued political stability. [redacted] 25X1

II. Kenya is pro-Western and allows the United States limited military access to its airfields and the port of Mombassa.

-- It views the present level of US naval activity in the region as a useful counter to Soviet, Cuban, and radical Arab maneuverings.

-- Nairobi probably would not oppose an increase in such activity, as long as the expansion did not create a threat of war in the area. [redacted] 25X1

III. Despite its moderate stance, Kenya maintains a military pact with radical Ethiopia based on mutual fear of Somali irredentism. [redacted] 25X1

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The Situation in Djibouti

I. The situation in Djibouti is inherently unstable because of:

-- Longstanding tensions between the country's generally pro-Somalia Issas and the Ethiopian-oriented Afars.
-- The unwillingness of President Gouled, an Issa, to delegate real authority to his Afar Prime Minister.
-- The alienation and militancy of the Afar community.
-- The potential for Ethiopian and Somali meddling and subversion in Djibouti. [redacted] 25X1

II. The French role and military presence in Djibouti is a major factor promoting stability, particularly as a deterrent to direct attack by Ethiopia or Somalia. In addition to the strategic importance of Djibouti for their naval operations in the Indian Ocean, the French view their presence as:

-- An obstacle to Soviet expansion in the Horn of Africa.
-- A beachhead for safeguarding Western interests in the area. [redacted] 25X1

III. Djibouti's deepwater port and protected anchorage make it one of the best harbors on the east coast of Africa.

-- It is homeport for French naval forces in the area, normally the largest Western naval force in the Indian Ocean.

-- The French generally have helped to facilitate US access to Djibouti's port and aviation installations. [redacted] 25X1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center

6 June 1979

MEMORANDUM

REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE US MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN PERSIAN GULF-INDIAN OCEAN

Introduction and Summary

This paper examines the attitude of selected countries toward four levels of US military presence in the Persian Gulf region, beginning with the existing level and progressing to a substantially larger and continuous US military presence. Our aim is to identify the extent to which additional presence would be welcomed by and useful to regional states and the point at which additional US military presence would be politically counterproductive. At what point would we do our friends in the area a disservice and elicit their opposition rather than their support?

We conclude that the political break-even point is much closer to the current level of US forces than to the large and continuous presence posited in Option IV. A significant number of area governments would support a "modest" increase in the US military presence (Option II) if the augmentation were not highly visible, carried no sense of permanence, and were not centered in the Persian Gulf itself. An additional condition that makes even this support suspect is that the buildup should, in most cases, occur in someone else's country. We believe that, barring a Soviet-provoked crisis, there is virtually no support for a major increase in US military presence (Option III) that includes a large naval presence, bases in the area, or prepositioning of materiel. A continuous presence as outlined in Option IV would simply draw a more intensely hostile reaction from friend and foe alike.

This memorandum was prepared by the Near East South Asia Division of the Office of Political Analysis. Questions and comments may be addressed to [redacted]

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What are the basic considerations that govern local attitudes? Ideally, most area governments want no big power military presence in the Gulf or on the Arab Peninsula. It continues to be a contentious issue at Arab gatherings, and in Arab eyes ensures future big power meddling in local affairs. Oil, however, acts as a magnet and makes the ideal unobtainable. The question for most, therefore, becomes what level of US military presence increases security and what level detracts? The answer is not static; it depends to a great extent on the nature and seriousness of security threats perceived by local leaders at any given moment. A US show of force is welcome when South Yemen is attacking North Yemen, but not when the Arab League is arranging a cease-fire.

Gulf leaders see three sources of danger to their regimes:

--Domestic political upheaval fueled by socio-religious and in some cases economic issues.

--Radical or Palestinian subversion, externally supported but using local sympathizers.

--Soviet-Cuban aggression, either direct, through local client states, or through Soviet sponsored insurgencies.

The lesson of Iran to area leaders is that the US will not intervene directly to save a regime threatened with internal unrest, and that a strong US presence, in certain circumstances, might actually weaken a regime's ability to manage internal threats. The preferred US role in such situations might be to provide the means to enable individual leaders to protect themselves.

A significant US military presence is seen as useful only as a deterrent to Soviet/Cuban aggression. Even then, it is not the presence per se that is important to Gulf leaders, but the symbolism. A US military presence presumably conveys to Moscow US preparedness to react strongly to Soviet adventurism in the area. Persian Gulf leaders would have no objection if such a message could be effectively conveyed to Moscow by means other than the stationing of US forces in the region. They would, in fact, prefer that course because it would relieve radical Arab pressures on US friends in the area and avoid the risk of stimulating a military response from the USSR.

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Indian Ocean Arms Control: Attitudes of Littoral States

An Intelligence Assessment

Secret

PA 79-10268
June 1979

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

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National Foreign Assessment Center

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Indian Ocean Arms Control: Attitudes of Littoral States (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

Research for this report was completed on 29 May 1979.

The authors of this paper are [redacted] 25X1
25X1 [redacted] International Issues Division, Office of Political Analysis. The paper was coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces. Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to the authors, [redacted] 25X1

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PA 79-10268
June 1979

Indian Ocean Arms Control: Attitudes of Littoral States (U)

Key Judgments

The littoral states that are pro-Western welcome a continued US military presence in the Indian Ocean to the extent necessary to balance Soviet forces. Some of them might view with concern a US decision to resume the US-Soviet bilateral talks on the Indian Ocean that have been suspended since February 1978 as a sign of Washington's unwillingness to play a role in the region, but few would desire a major or conspicuous buildup of US forces near their territories.

Although the radical regimes all oppose a US military presence, some of them (for example, Ethiopia and South Yemen) are more sanguine about Soviet military activity in the region than others (for example, Madagascar).

Because the littoral states resent their exclusion from the US-Soviet negotiations, they will probably continue to criticize the talks even if they show progress.

Most littoral states would publicly applaud a US-Soviet agreement only if it committed the superpowers to a significant reduction and eventual exclusion of their forces from the Indian Ocean and accepted the littoral states' participation in regional arms control. Their private reactions would depend on whether they felt the pace and balance of any reductions posed security problems vis-a-vis either one of the superpowers or some potential regional adversary (for example, Pakistan's concerns about India).

Although virtually all littoral states voice support for an Indian Ocean "zone of peace," they differ over its meaning:

- They agree that the military presence of great powers should eventually be excluded from the Indian Ocean but disagree on the definition of military activity, the limits of the zone, and the timing of great power withdrawal.
- There is more serious disagreement over the extent to which the littoral states should restrict their own military activity—in particular, whether to maintain local balances of forces and whether to establish a regional collective security system and code of conduct.

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- The littoral states agree that the great powers' nuclear weapons should be excluded from the Indian Ocean but disagree on whether a zone of peace should include a renunciation of nuclear weapons by the littoral states themselves. (

25X1 [redacted]

Harmonization of the views of littoral states at the first formal United Nations meeting of littoral and hinterland states on this subject on 2-13 July will be difficult. The meeting, in New York, is expected to produce a program of action to implement a zone of peace, but it will probably be little more specific than previous documents on the subject. [redacted] 25[redacted]1

Contents

Preface

For several reasons, the Indian Ocean littoral states will probably express their views on arms control in their region more forcefully during the coming months than before. Already discontented with the lack of progress in the US-Soviet negotiations on the Indian Ocean, their interest in the superpowers' intentions in the area has been heightened by the Iranian revolution, conflict in the Yemens, and the recent deployment of US and Soviet carrier task forces. Meanwhile, multilateral diplomacy aimed at establishing an Indian Ocean zone of peace is accelerating. Preparations are now under way for the meeting of littoral and hinterland states on this subject in July.

This assessment examines the littoral states' positions, both public and private, on Indian Ocean arms control, as well as the diplomatic and strategic factors that underlie them. It discusses how these states would respond to possible future developments in the US-Soviet negotiations and how they view key issues in those talks. It also analyzes the different ways the littoral states define a zone of peace and the extent to which they will be able to agree on a common program for security in the Indian Ocean.

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

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Indian Ocean Arms Control: Attitudes of Littoral States (U)

Introduction

The Issues

Arms control in the Indian Ocean presently involves two general objectives:

- A negotiated limitation of the US and Soviet military presence.
- Establishment by the regional states of a zone of peace. (U)

The US-Soviet negotiations on the Indian Ocean have addressed such specific issues as the level of naval forces, the admissibility of strategic forces and land based strike aircraft, base construction, port calls, and transits. The zone of peace is an umbrella concept to which different states have attached different meanings, including not just removal of the superpower presence but also exclusion of nuclear weapons from the Indian Ocean or an assurance that they will not be used there, stabilization of military balances among states within the region, and "collective security" or other cooperative arrangements.

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A variety of motivations shape the attitudes of littoral states toward Indian Ocean arms control because the subject involves so many specific issues and because, for most of these states, it is secondary to other security concerns.[1] Their views reflect their interests in local conflicts and rivalries around the rim of the ocean more than it does any thinking about the region as a whole.

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The Strategic Setting

Over the last decade or so, there has been a gradual buildup of the Soviet and US military presence in the Indian Ocean. The levels and patterns of these deployments reflect the different interests of each superpower. The United States seeks to secure Western access to Middle Eastern oil supplies, to maintain economic and political stability, and to counter Soviet activities in the area. It maintains a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean composed of three ships based in Bahrain and a naval support base on Diego Garcia, from which a detachment of maritime patrol aircraft operates. In addition, the United States has deployed task forces of four or five ships each to the Indian Ocean about three times a year. Normally, one of these task forces has been headed by a carrier and the other two by cruisers, with each one remaining in the area for six to eight weeks. Since November 1978, the US task force presence has been continuous, with six to 14 ships on station.

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The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is designed to enhance the USSR's image as a global power, to ensure a Soviet voice in regional political affairs, and to provide support to friendly regional states. While this presence has increased substantially during local crises, it has now stabilized at about 18 to 21 ships, two-thirds of these being auxiliaries. Since they first became active in the Indian Ocean in 1968, the Soviets have sought access to naval facilities in several littoral states. They currently have some access in Ethiopia and South Yemen, and they call periodically for replenishments in Mozambique, Iraq, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and other regional states. However, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron continues to rely primarily on its own auxiliaries for logistic support, and much of the squadron's time is spent in sheltered anchorages in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

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France, India, Australia, and South Africa maintain the other significant naval forces in the area. France usually has the largest military presence of any nonregional power and has the use of naval and air facilities in Djibouti as well as in its own territory of Reunion. Although the United Kingdom does not

[1] Throughout this assessment, the term "littoral states" includes all states, whether island or mainland, bordering the Indian Ocean and its gulfs. (U)

maintain a permanent naval force in the Indian Ocean, it does occasionally make modest deployments. Iran, since the Islamic revolution and subsequent reduction of Iranian military capabilities, can no longer be considered as even a potentially significant Indian Ocean power for the immediate future. 25X1

The Diplomatic Setting

Efforts to exclude the military forces of major powers from the Indian Ocean are rooted in the anticolonialist sentiment among states of the region and the belief of nonaligned nations generally that "when elephants fight, the grass suffers." The earliest formal declarations concerning an Indian Ocean zone of peace emanated from the nonaligned movement, particularly its 1970 Lusaka summit. In 1971, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the first of several resolutions endorsing the concept and the Soviets first showed interest in making a joint declaration on arms restraint in the region, although they did not pursue it. US-Soviet negotiations, proposed by the United States, began in July 1977, and in December of the same year the General Assembly decided to convene a meeting of littoral and hinterland states as the next step toward an eventual conference on the Indian Ocean. Preparations for the meeting have already begun in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. 25X1

The littoral states and other nonaligned governments have become increasingly critical of the bilateral talks on two counts. First, the talks seemed too limited in scope to meet the objective of a zone of peace. Second, even with the modest objectives of the talks, there was an apparent lack of progress. The declaration of the nonaligned foreign ministers' meeting in July 1978 sounded both of these themes, and the Indian Ocean has been placed on the agenda for the nonaligned summit meeting to be held in Havana this September. In the face of this criticism, the USSR has increasingly distanced itself from the United States on this issue, publicly blaming Washington for the lack of progress and voting in favor of the last two Indian Ocean zone of peace resolutions in the General Assembly, while the United States continued to abstain. 25X1

Recent events, some of which were spawned by the Iranian revolution, have bolstered the commitment of many of the littoral states to a zone of peace. The deployment of a US carrier task force to the region heightened anticolonialist sensitivities, and the disintegration of CENTO was interpreted by some as demonstrating the ineffectiveness of military ties to a Western power. The USSR's sending of its first carrier task force to the Indian Ocean, its logistical support for South Yemen, and its continued involvement in the Horn of Africa reinforce concerns over Moscow's intentions in the area. 25X1

Responses to US-Soviet Negotiations

The littoral states generally applaud the objective of the US-Soviet bilateral talks on the Indian Ocean. Nonetheless, because of the limited scope of, and participation in, the talks, the littoral states' criticism—and agitation on Indian Ocean arms control generally—will probably continue even if the talks resume and begin to show results. 25X1

The public attitudes of many littoral states toward the bilateral talks differ from their privately held views. Consequently, a state might change its public posture not because it had reevaluated the necessity for certain arms control measures but rather because it found the posture difficult to maintain as the overall tone of the debate on the Indian Ocean shifted. The degree and direction of any such change in public positions in response to developments in the bilaterals are, however, highly dependent on other events. 25X1

Some littoral states would take a termination of the talks by the United States as a cue to stiffen their demands against the superpowers. Others would see formal termination as little different from the present suspension of the talks, while still others might become more discouraged about arms control in the Indian Ocean and hence less inclined to push for it. On balance, the rhetoric of the littoral states on the subject

would probably become somewhat more critical of the United States but otherwise would undergo little change. Private views, particularly those held by moderate governments, would depend on the circumstances accompanying termination of the talks. These governments would be displeased by the setback to arms control in the region and by the prospect that it would become more difficult to keep the radical regimes in the area from taking even more extreme positions. If US termination of the talks followed a further buildup of Soviet forces in the region, however, most of them might view termination as justified. [redacted] 25X1

Similar considerations would govern littoral state responses to a resumption of negotiations. Resumption would dampen criticism of the superpowers only slightly and would not derail efforts to involve the regional states more directly in Indian Ocean arms control. The moderate littoral states would welcome resumption per se, but they would look for signs—particularly in the naval activity of the two superpowers—that the United States was becoming unwilling to counter the Soviet presence in the region. [redacted] 25X1

Although virtually all littoral states would acknowledge a US-Soviet agreement as a positive step, the extent of public enthusiasm would chiefly depend on whether the agreement:

- Committed the superpowers to future reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence in the Indian Ocean, rather than merely a freeze in the level of forces.
- Accepted the littoral states' participation in regional arms control, preferably by accepting the concept of a zone of peace and the need for an Indian Ocean conference in the near future. [redacted] 25X1

Private opinion on a US-Soviet bilateral accord would depend more heavily on the balance of forces that would remain under the agreement. Pro-Western states like Kenya, Saudi Arabia, or the countries belonging to the Association of South-East Asian Nations [2] (ASEAN) want to see a US presence at least sufficient to offset Soviet forces, while pro-Soviet states like Mozambique, Iraq, or South Yemen take the opposite view. The littoral states would interpret the settlement of such currently outstanding issues as the definition of military presence and the status of naval auxiliaries in this context. [redacted] 25X1

There are several other outstanding issues in the bilateral talks in which littoral states would have a special interest, either because the issues involve possible military activity on the territories of the littoral states or because they have been specifically mentioned in multilateral diplomacy on the Indian Ocean: 25X1

- ***Utilization of facilities.*** The US position on this issue—that utilization of a port beyond routine port calls should be defined and limited—would probably enjoy broad support. Many littoral states permit port calls by foreign warships, garnering revenue in the process, but deny base rights. These states would welcome a restriction on permanent or exclusive use of facilities because it would restrict the options of hostile neighbors and make it easier for themselves to resist pressures from major powers to grant base rights.

- ***Diego Garcia.*** Although some littoral states have approved of the US base, at least privately, it has become such a familiar symbol of the superpower presence in the Indian Ocean that continued construction there would likely draw strong criticism.

- ***Land-based strike aircraft.*** Littoral states have divided interests on this issue, which has not been extensively discussed in the bilateral talks. Some pro-Western countries, particularly Australia and Saudi Arabia, would oppose restrictions that would prevent US aircraft from defending their territories. They would view any limit on deployment of the superpowers' strike aircraft as working to the disadvantage of the West, since the Soviets would be more apt to circumvent the restrictions by using Cubans or other surrogates. Conversely, left-leaning states that see US aircraft as a potential threat would tend to support restrictions.

[2] ASEAN members are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. [redacted] 25X1

25X

• ***Ballistic missile submarines.*** As evidenced by the 1971 UN zone of peace resolution, littoral states generally agree that the superpowers' nuclear weapons should be excluded from the Indian Ocean. This implies their support for an explicit ban—favored by the USSR and opposed by the United States—on missile-carrying submarines. Because they probably believe that the missiles' targets lie outside the Indian Ocean region, however, a ban on submarines might not be of major concern to them. These weapons, which are out of sight, could be kept largely out of mind.

25X1

25X1

Security Concerns of Littoral States

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Southeast Asia

The security concerns of the ASEAN countries center on Indochina and on Vietnamese intentions in the wake of the invasion of Kampuchea. They certainly support the idea of zones of peace, but they are less interested in the entire Indian Ocean than in their own proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. They have supported the US-Soviet talks and criticized the military deployments of both superpowers. They privately admit, however, their concern over any US retrenchment that would give the

USSR a freer hand in the region. A resumption of the talks and conclusion of a bilateral agreement might worry the ASEAN countries, not so much because of the specific naval limitations involved but because it would seem to signal a decreased US willingness to act in the region. 25X1

Indonesia likes to call attention to its archipelagic geography as a reason for having a special interest in naval arms control. Indeed, it has been quite active in the Ad Hoc Committee, calling for an international conference on a zone of peace and suggesting that the committee draft a treaty on the subject. Despite this activity, however, its maritime and security interests lie more to the north and east, and it would be relatively unperturbed if an Indian Ocean zone of peace were not established. Although Indonesia has publicly criticized the US base at Diego Garcia, it is more concerned about Soviet military activity. It feels reassured by a nearby US presence and has quietly facilitated transit through its waters of US warships while rejecting Soviet requests for naval port calls.

Malaysia has also been active in the Ad Hoc Committee and may enjoy playing the same kind of leading role in establishing an Indian Ocean zone of peace that it did in writing the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ZOPFAN. It criticized the US construction at Diego Garcia, but mainly because it feared that the base would stimulate additional Soviet deployments to the Indian Ocean. Malaysia recently denied landing clearance for flights of KC-135 air tankers on their way to Diego Garcia, citing pressures from within the nonaligned and Islamic movements as the reason. Nevertheless, with the increased Soviet presence in Vietnam having heightened what was already a strong Malaysian concern over Moscow's intentions, Kuala Lumpur should continue to welcome privately an offsetting US presence in the Indian Ocean. 25X1

Of all the ASEAN states, ***Singapore*** has been the most accommodating to visits by foreign warships and aircraft. US military operations in the Indian Ocean—including flights by P-3 reconnaissance aircraft, supply flights to Diego Garcia, and naval patrols—make use of Singaporean airspace or port facilities. The Soviet Navy has also used Singapore for repair and replenishment. As a militarily vulnerable but economically robust city-state, Singapore is, in comparison with its neighbors, less interested in excluding outside powers from the region and more interested in controlling arms races among the states within it. Accordingly, Singapore is less partial toward an Indian Ocean zone of peace, and more openly supportive of a US military presence, than the other ASEAN countries. It will not, however, allow its diplomatic posture to diverge much from those of Indonesia and Malaysia. 25X

Thailand has historically bent with the changing winds in its region in order to protect itself from stronger states, and it has been doing so during the past decade on Indian Ocean issues. In 1971, 25X 25X Bangkok 25X abstained on the first UN General Assembly resolution concerning an Indian Ocean zone of peace. 25X Thailand became 25X less willing to support American activity in the region publicly, although most Thai officials were still privately supportive. Bangkok continues to share its ASEAN colleagues' desire to keep the Soviets at bay. It thus welcomes a US military presence in the region and, like Indonesia, has rejected Soviet port call requests. 25X

The other Southeast Asian littoral state, besides the ASEAN countries, is obsessively neutral ***Burma,*** which will support any measure designed to rid the area of the superpowers' presence. Its principal concern in zone of peace diplomacy is to avoid antagonizing either India or China. The issue of denuclearization of South Asia—an element in some conceptions of a zone of peace—has already given Burma difficulty in this regard, since support for denuclearization would be a slap at India while failure to support it could be seen as an indirect slight of China. Such dilemmas will reinforce the Burmese tendency toward diplomatic passivity when the zone of peace is discussed in detail. 25X1

South Asia

The security concerns of South Asian littoral states—India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh—are exceedingly complex, reflecting not only the Indo-Pakistani dispute but also the influence of great power rivalries. The South Asian littoral states—especially India and Sri Lanka—were the leading proponents of an Indian Ocean zone of peace, but from the outset there were differences—reflecting intraregional conflict—in interpretation of, and support for, the concept. All of the littoral states have supported the US-Soviet Indian Ocean naval arms limitation talks and have criticized the military presence of both superpowers in the area, including the US facility at Diego Garcia. Nonetheless, because of their limited military capabilities relative to India, the other states look to the outside powers, including the United States and China, to check what they regard as India's hegemonial aspirations [redacted]

25X1

India perceives itself as a regional power, whose proper role in the region has been stinted by the presence of outside forces. As a result, it has traditionally been the most active advocate of an Indian Ocean zone of peace and has vociferously supported efforts by the superpowers to negotiate a reduction of their military presence in the Indian Ocean. Although India's armed forces are by far the largest in the area and it enjoys basic military security, New Delhi regards the naval presence of the outside powers as a continuing challenge to its regional leadership. [redacted]

25X1

The pro-Soviet tilt of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi led New Delhi to accept at face value the Soviets' claim that they had no military bases in the Indian Ocean and to blame the United States for the absence of a US-Soviet agreement on arms restraint in the region. Since Mararji Desai took office in March 1977, however, New Delhi has taken a more balanced view on the relative merits of the Soviet and US positions, and no longer exempts the USSR from its criticism. Its policy now is to encourage the Soviets and the United States to resume their negotiations as a first step toward the complete neutralization of the area. India is likely to support, at least for the near term, force stabilization measures proposed by the superpowers, but its long-term goal is still the complete elimination of outside military forces from the region.

25X1 [redacted]

Pakistan's views toward an Indian Ocean zone of peace and toward the presence of the outside powers in the area are shaped by its relations with India. It believes that militarily dominant India will be the main beneficiary if naval forces of outside powers are excluded from the region. Consequently, Islamabad has consistently advocated a zone of peace formula that requires not only the elimination or reduction of the military presence of outside powers but also the establishment of "reasonable ratios" between the military and naval forces of the major littoral states. Pakistan will urge that the July meeting's final document incorporate this security formula. [redacted]

25X1

Pakistan believes that the radical coup in Afghanistan in April 1978, the continuing turmoil in Iran, and the recent fighting between North and South Yemen are the result of either direct or indirect machinations by India's Soviet ally. This conviction has heightened Islamabad's insecurity and reinforced its sense of encirclement. Pakistani officials are convinced that these developments have increased their political and military vulnerability and reflect growing Soviet and, by association, Indian influence in the area. In view of these circumstances, Pakistan would obviously prefer that the Soviets reduce their presence in the region. Just as clearly, however, it does not wish the United States unilaterally to reduce its presence. Moreover, Pakistan's own tendencies are to some extent reinforced by the views of its longtime supporter, China. For these reasons, Pakistan has not actively encouraged the bilateral talks either publicly or privately since mid-1978, although, like other Indian Ocean littoral states, it nominally continues to support both a zone of peace proposal and the US-Soviet bilateral negotiations. [redacted]

25X1

In recent years, ***Bangladesh's*** position on an Indian Ocean zone of peace has become ambivalent. The current leadership in Dacca came to power in 1975 following a series of coups with some anti-Indian and anti-Soviet overtones. Although relations have improved considerably since 1975, Bangladesh continues to be concerned about India's regional intentions and has moved closer to the Pakistani position on a zone of peace formula, a shift that has been evident in several multilateral forums. Bangladesh's improving relations

with China and its recent moves to acquire arms from the West, China, and Saudi Arabia is another sign of Dacca's desire to reduce its political and military reliance on India and the Soviet Union and to expand its relations with outside powers. 25X1

Sri Lanka was more responsible than any other state for generating early support among the nonaligned countries for an Indian Ocean zone of peace. But President Junius R. Jayewardene, who took office in July 1977, has been less active in the nonaligned movement and more concerned over India's intentions in the region than was his predecessor, and members of Sri Lanka's foreign policymaking elite apparently share this concern. While they publicly continue to support an Indian Ocean zone of peace and to favor demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, they are equally concerned over the political-military vacuum, favoring India, that they believe would be created by a total US-Soviet naval withdrawal. Over the past year, therefore, Sri Lanka's officials have been privately expressing their hope that the US-Soviet Indian Ocean negotiations, if resumed, will not lead to such a withdrawal. 25X1

Middle East

Most of the Middle Eastern countries have consistently supported the Indian Ocean zone of peace proposal in the United Nations but have not taken a stand on the US-Soviet naval arms limitations talks. Even those most concerned with the presence of foreign powers in the region have only a general familiarity with the issues involved in the US-Soviet bilateral negotiations and consequently have yet to assess the potential impact on their security. Nevertheless, the recent unsettling events in the region have heightened their security concerns and probably will cause them, in the coming months, to focus more attention on the superpower military presence in the area and on arms control initiatives in the Indian Ocean. 25X1

Iran's revolutionary regime is scrapping the pro-Western approach of the Shah's government toward most regional and international issues and has disavowed any intention to serve as policeman of the Persian Gulf. In any case, the revolution has drastically eroded the country's military capabilities. Iran's current anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric and its withdrawal from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) demonstrate its shift toward nonalignment in foreign policy. Tehran has made it apparent that it will deny the use of its naval and air facilities to both superpowers for military or related purposes. Although it is difficult to forecast Iran's future positions on regional security issues, its emerging nationalism and fears of foreign manipulation suggest that Iran will actively support initiatives favoring reduction and elimination of both US and Soviet military presence in the region. 25X

Saudi Arabia, with its huge petroleum reserves, is strategically the most important state on the Arabian Peninsula. In the past, Riyadh has had a close relationship with the United States and has counted on US support to help guarantee its security. Saudi views on regional security issues, with the exception of the Arab-Israeli dispute, have generally been similar to those of the United States. Saudi Arabia is concerned over Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen. It views recent developments in Afghanistan and Iran and the border war between North and South Yemen as the result of Soviet machinations and as threats to its security. 25X

25X

25X1

The smaller states on the Persian Gulf—***Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates***—have essentially pro-Western foreign policies and have never been active participants in the Indian Ocean zone of peace diplomacy. The Iranian

revolution and its unsettling effects on the region have exposed the vulnerabilities of these states to foreign-inspired subversion and have spurred increased coordination among them. They share the Saudi concern over what they view as Soviet encirclement of the Arabian Peninsula. Similarly, they privately encourage greater US efforts to counter Soviet advances in the region but generally oppose any enlargement of the US presence that could stimulate additional great power rivalry. These states—except for Oman—publicly support nonaligned themes to escape criticism from Arab leftists. They probably will remain passive on naval arms control issues while voicing support for the Indian Ocean zone of peace in multilateral forums. Oman, however, may support the United States more openly; it welcomed the recent US naval deployments in the Indian Ocean because it feels severely threatened by Soviet-backed South Yemen. [redacted]

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Since 1971, ***Egypt***, ***Sudan***, and ***North Yemen*** have steered their foreign policies more toward the West. They are wary of Soviet and Cuban activities in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen and are apprehensive about a possible Soviet foothold in the Arabian Peninsula. All three countries have encouraged US efforts to counter Soviet-supported subversion in North Yemen. At the same time, however, these states are leery of the establishment of a conspicuous US military presence in the area. So far, they have refrained from commenting on the US-Soviet bilaterals, although both Egypt and North Yemen have been active in zone of peace diplomacy. Given their heightened distrust of the Soviet Union, they may not welcome the resumption of the US-Soviet talks if this were seen as possibly leading toward significant constraints on the ability of the United States to act decisively in the Indian Ocean. [redacted]

25X1

Israel favors an increased US military presence in the Persian Gulf–Indian Ocean area and is thus likely to offer the United States the use of its own naval facilities, including Eilat as a frequent port of call. While the Israelis did not openly oppose the US arms shipments to North Yemen during the recent fighting with the South, they are apprehensive about the possibility of these weapons being used against them in the future. Nevertheless, they probably welcomed the move, if only as a sign of renewed US determination to check Soviet-backed aggression in the area. Israel wishes to be more active in the Indian Ocean zone of peace diplomacy and has shown an interest in attending the meeting of littoral and hinterland states in July. The frigid attitudes toward Israel in the United Nations have, however, resulted in its exclusion from the meeting. [redacted]

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Iraq is profoundly suspicious of the United States and, within the UN framework, led the opposition to the recent US naval deployments to the Indian Ocean. At the March session of the Ad Hoc Committee, Iraq unsuccessfully sought to convene a ministerial-level emergency meeting of regional states to discuss the "deteriorating situation" in the Indian Ocean area. Iraq tolerates a Soviet military presence in the Persian Gulf–Indian Ocean region as a balance to US support of Israel and conservative Arab states. It has permitted the Soviet Navy to use the Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr, which was constructed with Soviet assistance. Despite its leaning toward Moscow, which furnishes the bulk of its weapons, Iraq remains intensely nationalistic and is sensitive to being labeled a Soviet client. At the July meeting, it probably will take the lead in pushing for a program of action that emphasizes the elimination of all great power military presence from the Indian Ocean. [redacted]

25X

South Yemen's relations with the West in general and the United States in particular are poor. Since 1969, South Yemen—strategically located at the exit of the Red Sea—has been closely aligned with the Soviet Union and has actively opposed US military presence in the area. Since they were expelled from Somalia in late 1977, the Soviets have shown greater interest in South Yemen, apparently hoping to acquire a secure base of operations for their Indian Ocean fleet as a replacement for the facilities in Berbera, Somalia. This increased interest was underscored by a visit to Aden, in August 1978, of the commander of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron. Soviet maritime reconnaissance flights operate out of the Aden airfield, and the Soviets

have installed a naval communication station nearby. Moscow reportedly has exerted considerable pressure on South Yemen formally to grant unlimited access to its air and naval facilities. Despite Aden's Marxist bent and desire to accommodate most Soviet requests, however, it does not appear to have done so in this regard. 25X1

At the July meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, Aden's position probably will resemble Iraq's. Because of its arrangements with the Soviet Union, however, it will be less likely to endorse specific measures for implementing the zone of peace concept. Outside the UN framework, South Yemen will continue to back the Soviet line in criticizing the US naval facility at Diego Garcia and blaming the United States for lack of progress in the US-Soviet bilateral negotiations.

Africa

The security concerns of East African states have focused on the armed conflicts in the Horn, Uganda, and southern Africa. Their opinions on arms control in the Indian Ocean, and on superpower military activity there, are strongly influenced by their special interests in these disputes. At the same time, these states include some of the most vocal members of the nonaligned movement, whose rhetoric in support of a zone of peace will partially mask specific differences growing out of the conflicts on the African continent. 25X1

Ethiopia's preoccupation with warfare in the Ogaden and Eritrea overshadows any interest it has in Indian Ocean arms control. The Mengistu regime's heavy dependence on Soviet and Cuban assistance to combat the separatist movements in those regions, coupled with its own Marxist persuasion, will lead it to adhere to the Soviet line in criticizing US military activity in the region and blaming Washington alone for lack of progress in the US-Soviet bilateral talks. This dependence also implies its continued acceptance of the largest foreign military presence in East Africa, which includes Soviet advisers and Cuban ground troops as well as increasing Soviet naval activity along the coast. Despite reports that Ethiopia has granted the USSR exclusive rights to a naval facility to be built north of Assab, Moscow probably intends to rely instead on the limited facilities now under construction on Dahlak Island. The Soviet presence could put Ethiopia on the defensive in discussions of a zone of peace, but it is unlikely to deter it from joining in denunciations of foreign bases in the Indian Ocean region. It will probably deny it has granted exclusive base rights to anybody, just as Somalia denied there was a Soviet base at Berbera. 25X1

Somalia's dispute with Ethiopia has already spilled over into deliberations on the Indian Ocean in the form of a fierce contest for one of the vice-chairmanships of the Ad Hoc Committee. The conflict over the Ogaden will continue to shape Mogadiscio's views on the subject. As long as the USSR remains the friend and backer of its chief enemy, Somalia will oppose an extension, or even a continuation, of the Soviet military presence in the area. It welcomes port calls by US warships and would be reassured by a nearby US naval presence. Somalia, however, does not seek a permanent Western military presence on its territory, only weapons and diplomatic support. Having received no lasting return from the earlier Soviet presence, Somalia now firmly supports the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the entire Indian Ocean region. 25X1 25X1

Sandwiched between feuding neighbors, subject to ethnic division, and a target of Soviet desires to gain a foothold on the western shore of the strait of Bab al Mandab, ***Djibouti*** sees the French forces on its territory as crucial to its continued independence. France now has 4,500 troops and a naval force based there. Djibouti will probably maintain a low profile in discussions of a zone of peace and will consider any embarrassment caused by the French presence as a small price to pay for its security. 25X1

Kenya takes several seemingly disparate approaches toward its security and toward arms control in the Indian Ocean. Its foreign ministry, which frequently appears to be out of step with the rest of the government, strongly espouses an Indian Ocean zone of peace in the United Nations and opposes foreign military bases in the area. At the same time, the Kenyan leadership welcomes a continued US presence in the Indian Ocean to balance Soviet naval activity. It also permits ships of the US Navy to use Mombasa

25X1 port
25X1 Because it perceives Somalia to have designs on the Somali-inhabited portions of Kenya, Nairobi is allied with radical Ethiopia in joint efforts to contain Somali expansionism. Nevertheless, Kenya will probably continue to look to the United States for its overall security, especially since Tanzania's successful operation in Uganda intensified Kenya's fear of encirclement by various self-styled socialist regimes.
25X1

Tanzania is the most vocal African supporter of an Indian Ocean zone of peace and will probably continue to be so despite its preoccupation with the armed conflicts in southern Africa and, more recently, Uganda. This activism reflects both President Nyerere's leadership in Third World diplomacy and his genuine desire to see the military forces of both superpowers vacate the region. Related to this desire has been an increase in Tanzania's own military activity in the region, such as the Uganda operation and the dispatch of a small contingent of troops to the Seychelles in April of this year.
25X1

Tanzania's perception of where the superpowers stand on issues in southern Africa colors its statements on US and Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. In the past, Dar es Salaam has privately justified its one-sided criticism of US activity in the Indian Ocean by observing that the Soviets have a more favorable southern Africa policy and seem to be less resistant to the concept of a zone of peace in the area. Such perceptions will continue to influence Tanzania's posture, but are unlikely to result in logistical support to the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet.
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Like Tanzania, ***Mozambique*** is a "Frontline State" in the southern Africa conflict and voices strong support for an Indian Ocean zone of peace (an objective mentioned in the Mozambican constitution). It is much more closely aligned with the USSR, however, and subscribes to an avowedly Marxist ideology.
25X1
It has also opened the port of Maputo to Soviet warships, although evidently without granting base rights. The Machel government prefers a Soviet naval predominance in the area, but its desire to expand economic ties with the West may induce it to restrain its criticism of US activity.
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South Africa will be excluded from the July meeting of littoral and hinterland states, as it has been from the Ad Hoc Committee. Despite its isolation, however, its current emphasis on regional interdependence in southern Africa could lead it to endorse an Indian Ocean zone of peace. Because of reevaluations of the threat it faces, Pretoria has oriented its navy toward coastal defense and gives priority to the army and air force. Moreover, there is little prospect—or desire on South Africa's part—for reintroduction of a Western military base like the formerly British naval facility at Simonstown. Since South Africa needs the cooperation of other states in order to make its regionally-oriented foreign policy work, it is likely to support a zone of peace even if the formula for such a zone is written in its absence. Nevertheless, it still perceives the USSR as the greatest threat and will tacitly favor a US naval presence as long as Soviet forces are also in the area.
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The Island States

Of all the littoral states, the island republics are the most interested in Indian Ocean arms control. They are not distracted by conflicts with adjacent states, while they feel particularly vulnerable to hostile naval activity, including seaborne mercenary attacks. All of them ardently voice support for the concept of a zone of peace, but their political persuasions vary widely, as does their willingness to receive visits of foreign warships.
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So far, agitation in the island states in support of a demilitarized Indian Ocean has mostly been the work of the political leftwing. A "Conference of Progressive Parties and Forces of the Southwest Indian Ocean," promoted by the opposition Mauritian Militant Movement and held in the Seychelles in April 1978, issued a zone of peace declaration that contained several anti-Western demands, including the dismantlement of the US-British base at Diego Garcia, the withdrawal of French troops from Reunion, and the dissolution of CENTO. The declaration gave general approval to the US-Soviet bilateral negotiations but criticized any effort to link the talks to other military problems—an apparent reference to the US decision to suspend the talks partly because of events in the Horn of Africa.
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Madagascar, the largest and most left-leaning of the island states, has recently sharply criticized US naval activity in the Indian Ocean. President Didier Ratsiraka is suspicious of both superpowers, however, and he has generally practiced what he has preached regarding the exclusion of all military forces from the region. He uses a Soviet transport aircraft with Soviet pilots, and he welcomes, as a deterrent to foreign overflights, the four North Korean MIG-17s with their crews that were "loaned" to Madagascar last year and are still there. There has, however, been no other permanent foreign military presence on the island since France vacated Diego Suarez in 1975. Even port calls by foreign warships are no longer welcome. Despite the attractiveness of Diego Suarez to foreign navies, Ratsiraka is unlikely to depart from his policy of denying base rights. He will try to persuade the other island and littoral states to support his conception of a zone of peace, which includes a system of "collective security" without military alliances. This system is not clearly defined, but one apparent manifestation of it was the recent participation of a Malagasy detachment in a joint military "exercise"with the Seychelles. [redacted]

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The Government of the ***Seychelles*** is almost as critical of US naval activity in the Indian Ocean as Madagascar and also publicly opposes the permanent stationing of foreign forces on its territory. Socialist President Albert Rene recently wrote to President Carter to protest the possible establishment of a new US naval force based at Diego Garcia. [redacted]

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Union delivered a small shipment of arms to Rene's government last December, but no Soviet advisers were sent. The Seychelles allows visits by the ships and aircraft of both superpowers, with American ships being more popular among the Seychellois because their crews spend more money. Although Rene has threatened to deny the use of Victoria port to any power that increases its forces in the Indian Ocean, the economic motive will probably deter him from closing the port. [redacted]

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Western-oriented ***Mauritius*** favors an Indian Ocean zone of peace as a long-term goal, but considers it unrealistic for the time being. It is suspicious of Soviet intentions in the region and would like the United States to stay there as long as the Soviets do. Mauritius has indicated its desire for more visits by US warships to Port Louis—which it has kept open to all—to balance the frequent Soviet port calls. The status of Diego Garcia, which was detached from Mauritius prior to the latter's independence, might cause friction with the West. Agitation on this issue, however, has been largely confined to the opposition, which has little prospect of supplanting the Labor government of Prime Minister Ramgoolam in the near future. [redacted]

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Strategically, the ***Comoros*** are the least significant of the island states. The regime of President Ahmed Abdallah is economically dependent on the West and is unlikely to be active in zone of peace diplomacy. However, because of its dubious birthright—having come to power through a white mercenary coup—Abdallah's government may join in criticism of the US use of Diego Garcia in an effort to establish its legitimacy with African and other nearby states. [redacted]

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President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of the ***Maldives*** strongly supports demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. He is unlikely, despite Soviet overtures, to lease the naval and air facilities on Gan Island that were vacated by the British in 1976. To do so would be inconsistent with his view of nonalignment. He will take his cues on Indian Ocean issues from the moderate Islamic states, with which he has tried to align his foreign policy. [redacted]

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Diplomacy of the Zone of Peace Concept

Zones of Peace as a Multilateral Issue

The concept of an Indian Ocean zone of peace is not only an approach to arms control in one region, but also an element in the general demand for greater progress in disarmament that the less developed countries have collectively made on the developed world. Proposals for zones of peace are favorite vehicles for pressing this demand because they also assert the independence of the developing countries from powers that have stronger and farther-reaching military forces than their own. [redacted]

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Of all the regions for which such zones have been proposed, the Indian Ocean currently appears to be the strongest candidate. Malta's idea of a Mediterranean zone of peace seems unrealistic because the sea adjoins both NATO's territory and critical areas of the Middle East. A Southeast Asian zone of peace is a less remote goal, but the distrust between ASEAN and Vietnam—heightened by the latter's invasion of Kampuchea—will make it difficult for them to reconcile their competing formulas for such a zone. The Indian Ocean is also the only area of the Third World where the superpowers have attempted to negotiate limits to their military activity. The resentment of most countries in the region over being excluded from this effort has made them particularly anxious to establish their claim to participation by promoting a zone of peace.

25X1 [redacted]

This wider, symbolic role of an Indian Ocean zone of peace has several implications:

- The Indian Ocean zone of peace concept has broad support among many developing countries, not just those in the Indian Ocean region.
- The Indian Ocean littoral states, almost all of which are developing countries, will try hard to show progress toward a zone of peace—and hence progress in their overall debate with the developed world—even if they realize that an agreed formula for a zone of peace would do little or nothing to strengthen their security in the short term, and even if the US-Soviet negotiations make headway.
- To show such progress, the littoral states will tend to paper over the more specific security issues that divide them.
- Confrontation, rather than cooperation, with the superpowers will continue to be the dominant tone of

25X1 Indian Ocean zone of peace diplomacy. [redacted]

Different Conceptions of a Zone of Peace

The 1971 General Assembly resolution is the basis for efforts to define an Indian Ocean zone of peace. This document is only a framework, however; it does not resolve several sharp differences among the littoral

25X1 states over what a zone of peace should mean. [redacted]

There is general agreement about the responsibilities of the great powers. The resolution establishes the objectives of halting the expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from it all bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, and any other "manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great power rivalry." Nevertheless, there are several unresolved issues. [redacted] 5X1

5X1 [redacted]

5X1

A more serious issue concerns the geographical limits of a zone of peace, which the 1971 resolution states are "to be determined." Disagreement over the zone's limits concerns chiefly the territories of littoral and hinterland states. Somalia has called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from all states in the region, but littoral states that play host to Soviet, Cuban, or French military personnel naturally prefer a more restrictive definition of the zone of peace. There is also the question of islands under foreign control, such as the French territory of Reunion. The "progressive" parties' conference called for the withdrawal of forces from Reunion, but others have raised the possibility of omitting such islands from a zone of peace. [redacted] 25X1

A further issue concerning the responsibilities of the great powers is timing. The 1971 resolution gives the goal of withdrawing the great power military presence but does not establish a timetable. Some states have demanded immediate withdrawal, but the more moderate and more common demand is for a freeze on deployments followed by some sort of graduated reduction of forces. [redacted] 25X1

There is even stronger disagreement over the extent to which the littoral states should restrict their own military activities. The disagreement is manifested in the Pakistani proposal—and Indian rejection—of a "reasonable ratio" of forces and in the issue of whether to establish an Indian Ocean collective security system and a regional code of conduct. The disagreement stems from differences in military strength and the concern of some littoral states about the military intentions of countries excluded from the zone of peace or deliberations on it (for example, the concerns of ASEAN with Vietnam, India with China, the Arab states with Israel, and the Frontline States with South Africa). [redacted]

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Exclusion of nuclear weapons from the region could be made a responsibility of either the great powers alone or jointly with the littoral states. The littoral states generally agree that the great powers' nuclear weapons should be excluded from the Indian Ocean as part of the withdrawal of their overall military presence, which is the context in which the 1971 resolution mentions nuclear weapons. Pakistan, however, has argued that a zone of peace should also include a binding renunciation of nuclear weapons by the littoral states. Most other littoral states believe that nuclear proliferation should be examined in a broader context that includes the "vertical proliferation" of the superpowers' weapons. These states would, therefore, probably oppose a formulation that placed a special nonproliferation obligation on themselves. [redacted]

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Finally, there is the issue of a mechanism for monitoring, review, or enforcement of a zone of peace. A common view has not yet evolved on whether such a mechanism is necessary and, if so, whether its creation should await the great powers' full acceptance of an Indian Ocean zone of peace. [redacted]

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The Meeting of Littoral and Hinterland States

The states whose concerns were reviewed above will dominate the July meeting in New York.[3] Most great powers and major maritime users will be invited only as speakers at the opening session of the meeting and as observers thereafter. The decision to restrict their participation reflects the opinion—espoused most strongly by Madagascar and Tanzania—that the Indian Ocean states should use the meeting to harmonize their own views to enable them to bargain with the great powers more effectively. Given the differences in those views, harmonization will be difficult. The document currently being prepared for the meeting is a declaration that on many points—particularly those pertaining to obligations of littoral states—will probably be little more specific than was the 1971 General Assembly resolution. Some of these states, especially Australia and India, would find such a result satisfactory anyway, believing that the negotiation of specific formulations should be deferred to an Indian Ocean conference or to a time when all great powers are ready to accept a zone of peace in the area. There may be some pressure to set a date for such a conference, perhaps as early as 1980, but both the disagreements among the littoral states and the reservations of great powers will encourage further delay. [redacted]

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[3] The 48 participants will include 33 littoral states (Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burma, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, North Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Yemen, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates), 11 most minor "hinterland" states (Afghanistan, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Lesotho, Malawi, Napal, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zambia), and four other countries that are members of the Ad Hoc Committee (China, Greece, Japan, and Panama). China has no significant interest in using the Indian Ocean itself, has denounced the US-Soviet talks as a "fraud," and strongly supports the concept of a zone of peace in the area. Japan supports both bilateral and multilateral approaches toward arms control in the region. It would not want the US position in the area to weaken appreciably relative to the USSR's, but given its dependence on Arab oil, it would be very sensitive to any charges that it was supporting a US naval presence directed against Arab states. [redacted]

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

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

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