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US SANCTIONS OVER SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTANSOVIET, POLISH AND ROMANIAN REACTIONSSoviet Union

1. Moscow's decision to invade Afghanistan was probably taken in full awareness that the US would react strongly, that bilateral relations would significantly suffer, but that hostile world public opinion would prove to be transitory. The Soviet leaders probably also assumed that the effectiveness of the US response would be tempered by Washington's distraction with its problems with Iran and a Western inability to pursue a unified policy. Moscow may be confident it can frustrate such a coordinated response. Its tactics will focus on trying to exploit differences between Western countries over policy, and the differing objectives, as between industry and government, within individual countries.
2. Current US actions will not force a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan because that situation has not been resolved according to Soviet criteria and because it would be politically impossible to appear to have capitulated under US pressure. Nevertheless, the US sanctions have had a general impact in that the Soviet leaders now recognize that they cannot receive the benefits of detente if the mutual understandings that underlie that accord are violated. This has probably lead to some difference of views within the leadership over future policy toward the US and the West, as well as toward Afghanistan. If Moscow is unable to drive a wedge between the US and its allies, the Soviets would be reminded that the price for future similar aggressions may be higher than they would be willing to pay.
3. The most damaging measures have probably been the US proposal to boycott the Olympics and the US denial of certain technology. Moscow has a real concern over the potential Olympics failure in that it would represent a serious blow to its domestic and international prestige. The technology boycott will have

its greatest impact on oil and gas exploration and in computer-related branches of industry; the equipment is not available from any other supplier. Moscow presumably hopes to obtain the remaining embargoed goods from other industrialized democracies. Although the grain embargo will have only minimal impact this year, its continuation--especially if coupled with poor harvests--will impact on domestic consumption.

4. On the propaganda front, the Soviets will try to counteract Western criticism of its presence in Afghanistan by giving heavy, probably distorted media coverage of US actions in response to situations in such countries as El Salvador. In general, the emphasis is shifting away from a defense of their Afghanistan policy to attacking the US affirmation that it has vital interests in the Persian Gulf and the Southwest Asia sea. In so doing, Moscow hopes to diminish international attention to Afghanistan by stimulating concern over "increased" US military activities.

Poland -

Polish policymakers probably do not believe that the US response will force the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan and, short of a threatened armed confrontation with the West, they will remain for as long as they deem necessary. Some doubt that the US will maintain a high level of pressure. The leadership's concerns are parochial in that they view the confrontation basically in terms of its potential impact on national interests. Moreover, they do not accept the US assurances that it will differentiate between the USSR and East Europe with regard to the grain and technology embargoes. They are also concerned that the US would retaliate should Warsaw be forced by Moscow to divert such goods or even should the US suspect it is doing so.

Romania -

Bucharest is especially apprehensive over Moscow's intervention, believing it could foreshadow a similar move against Romania. It is also concerned that the consequent deterioration of detente will curtail its ability to pursue independent policies within the Bloc. Nevertheless, Bucharest must have felt that the US was

correct in its response, and probably was relieved that the measures in themselves did not appear to destroy the detente process. Although pessimistic that sanctions will be effective, Bucharest may also feel that the show of determination itself will help deter further Soviet aggression. Romania is the only country in East Europe that has not publicly commented on the Western sanctions.