



Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000600160010-1

Foreign
Assessment
Center

25X1

The Pushtuns of the Afghan-Pakistani Borderlands

A Research Paper



October 1979.

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000600160010-157


25X1

Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000600160010-1

Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000600160010-1



National
Foreign
Assessment
Center



25X1


The Pushtuns of the Afghan-Pakistani Borderlands



25X1

A Research Paper

*Research for this report was completed
in June 1979.*



X1

25X1

X1

25X1



25X1

October 1979

**The Pushtuns of the
Afghan-Pakistani Borderlands**

25X1

Overview

Numbering about 15 million—8 million in Afghanistan and 7 million in Pakistan—Pushtuns constitute one of the largest remaining tribal societies in the world. They are an aggressive, martial group of tribes. Although loosely associated by a common language and an Islamic-based culture, they lack cohesiveness as an ethnic group. Pushtun cultural patterns reflect their primary allegiance to small, family-related units, and a tradition of blood feuds and intertribal warfare. The majority of the Pushtuns lives in primitive agricultural villages, although a minority still clings to nomadic lifestyles.

Historically independent and militantly defensive of their tribal territories, the Pushtuns have maintained a semiautonomous status by pitting succeeding Afghan and Pakistani governments against each other in an effective form of political blackmail. They have been less successful in managing the few natural resources of their arid homeland, and herding and agriculture—the traditional Pushtun pursuits—no longer sustain the tribal economies. The high population growth rate of the tribes and the concomitant degradation of tribal lands are increasing Pushtun dependence on government subsidies and on remittances from outside employment for survival. Eventually, economic and demographic pressures may accomplish what Pakistani and Afghan, and earlier British, regiments could not—pacification and control of the Pushtun tribes.

The Pushtuns are numerically and politically the most important of the ethnic groups involved in the current insurgency in Afghanistan. The effectiveness of the tribes, however, is blunted by their preoccupation with parochial concerns, their internecine bickerings and feuds, and their reluctance to accept centralized leadership. The tribes may form a coalition to defeat the Khalqi government—as they have in the past against perceived outside aggressors such as the British—but the union would most likely shatter after that objective had been achieved. Similarly, these considerations militate against the formation of a united Pushtunistan—the land of the Pushtuns—either as an independent unit or as part of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Divided or united, the Pushtuns of the Afghan-Pakistani borderlands will continue to be the dominant ethnic group in border politics for many years to come.

The above information is

25X1

25X1

The Pushtuns of the Afghan-Pakistani Borderlands

25X1

Introduction

Pushtuns are an aggressive, martial group of tribes loosely associated by a common language and culture.* Numbering about 15 million—8 million in Afghanistan and 7 million in Pakistan—Pushtuns constitute one of the largest remaining tribal societies in the world. They are a dynamic group of people, forceful, energetic, and quick to take advantage of others for economic or political gain. Pushtuns dominate the political structure of Afghanistan, whether monarchy or Communist regime, and compose a majority of the officer corps in the Afghan Army. In Pakistan, Pushtuns are greatly outnumbered by the equally aggressive Punjabis and consequently have less political influence there. They are, however, a major ethnic component in the Pakistani armed forces.

international effort to control the production of opium and its derivatives—morphine and heroin. Opium poppies are a cash crop in tribal territory that has few other sources of income. Tribal lands are arid, lacking in resources, and overpopulated. Herding and agriculture, the two traditional Pushtun pursuits, no longer sustain the tribal economies; remittances of tribesmen employed elsewhere and government subsidies make up the deficit. Although economically vulnerable, the Pushtuns will continue to be the dominant ethnic group in border politics for many years to come.

25X1

Tribal Groupings

Pushtuns inhabit the southern and eastern slopes of the Hindu Kush, a strategic area that commands control of the Chaman-Quetta Corridor and the fabled Khyber Pass. Historically, Pushtun control of these routes, connecting Central Asia and the Middle East with South Asia, permitted tolls for safe passage to be levied on the caravans passing through the area. In the 20th century, international transportation routes have largely bypassed the region and the primary economic importance of the passes today is for Afghan import and export of goods via South Asia.

Pushtun tribal structure is based on descent from common ancestors and is the source of most present tribal designations. The ethnic family tree, according to Pushtun tribal history, contains five main groupings, each with numerous subdivisions (see appendix). In reality, three general divisions emerge: the eastern Pushtuns located in the lower Kabul River Valley; the southern Pushtuns who live in the region south of Kabul as far as Quetta and east toward the Indus Valley; and the western tribes, the Durrani, who inhabit a broad arc of territory from the lower Arghandab and Helmand River Valleys eastward toward the Iranian border.

25X1

Pushtun country retains a limited value in international politics as a buffer to Soviet expansion into South Asia. In regional politics, the location of the Pakistani-Afghan border through Pushtun tribal territory periodically erupts as a divisive issue between the two countries. For the United States, Pushtun country is a strategic area of concern on another front: the

The Pushtun pecking order reserves top status to the plains-dwelling eastern Pushtuns near Peshawar and the Durrani tribes in the vicinity of Kandahar. It is to these two cities, and Peshawar in particular, that Pushtuns look for cultural leadership. The former Afghan royal family are Durrani—Barakzais of the Mohamadzai clan—with close ties to Peshawar. The plains Pushtuns in turn view the mountain tribes, including most of the southern Pushtuns, as less sophisticated country cousins. Pakistani Pushtuns are likely to make derisive comments about Afghan Pushtuns, especially the nomadic groups

25X1

* The phonetic spelling of the name of the ethnic group—depending on tribal dialect differences—is Pushtun or Pukhtun in Pakistan, and Pashtun or Pakhtun in Afghanistan. Pathan is the Hindu corruption of the name, which was subsequently picked up by the British to refer to these hill tribes. Pathan is still common usage in Pakistan.

The Pushtuns speak two dialects of the common language. The linguistic boundary generally follows the Kurram River Valley. To the north and east, a more guttural, harsher version is used, phonetically spelled Pukhtu (Pakhto in Afghanistan). To the south and west of the valley, the softer version, Pushtu (Pashto in Afghanistan), is more common.

The territorial limits of Pushtun tribes are based on watersheds. Water rights are the measure for family and clan landholdings, the availability of water determines the areal extent of a holding and its value.

The most important of the borderland Pushtun tribes by virtue of their location, numbers, or militancy are the Yusufzai, Mohmand, Shinwari, Afridi, and Orakzai in the vicinity of the Kabul River and Peshawar Basin and the Ghilzai (especially the subtribes of Ahmadzai and Suleiman Khel), Wazir, Mahsud, Mangal, and Jadran in the region of the upper Kurram and Gomal Rivers. The Durrani, although an influential tribal group in Afghanistan, are not considered borderland tribes.

Demographic Speculations

Pushtun tribal populations can only be estimated. The latest Pakistani census (1972) does not tabulate ethnic background. The first Afghan census was begun on schedule on 15 June of this year, but is likely to be inconclusive due to widespread insurgency in the country. The overall population growth rate is close to 3 percent. The birth rate is high, estimated to be about 47 to 50 per 1,000. Death rates are also high, especially among the young. One infant out of every 10 dies before the age of 1 year, and four children in 10 die before the age of 5, largely from gastrointestinal ailments associated with poor sanitary conditions. Those who survive to young adulthood have a better chance of survival; however, females are prone to death in childbirth, and males to the hazards of blood feuds.

Population of Major Pushtun Tribes (in thousands)

Major Tribe	Dialect	Estimated Total Population ¹
Eastern		
Afridi	Pukhtu	330
Chakmani	Pukhtu	210
Khugiani	Pakhto	72
Mohmand	Pukhtu	240
Orakzai	Pukhtu	114
Safi	Pukhtu	84
Shinwari	Pakhto	66
Turi	Pukhtu	48
Yusufzai	Pukhtu	1,200
Zaimukht	Pukhtu	120
Southern		
Bangash	Pushtu	210
Bhittani	Pushtu	54
Ghilzai	Pashto	3,000
Jadran	Pashto	72
Jaji	Pashto	35
Kakar	Pushtu	138
Khattak	Pushtu	240
Khostwal	Pashto	84
Mahsud	Pushtu	120
Mangal	Pashto	96
Wazir	Pushtu	240
Western		
Durrani	Pashto	1,800

¹ These estimates are based on 1961 data, and although of questionable accuracy are useful for judging comparative tribal size.

This table is

Literacy among the Pushtuns averages about 11 to 13 percent, but varies greatly by tribe, sex, rural-urban status, and country. Educational levels are higher among settled communities, in Pakistan (compared to Afghanistan), in urban areas, and proportionately much higher among males.

Pushtun Lifestyles: Nomadism Versus Sedentary Agriculture

Pushtun society is primarily rural in character, clustered in primitive agricultural villages with few amenities. Only the larger villages and towns have bazaars where supplies and services can be obtained. More than 80 percent of the tribal population is directly dependent in some measure upon agriculture. Arable land is limited to proportionately small parcels of irrigated land along streambeds, in the wider expanses of river basins, and in the vicinity of wells or springs. Wheat is the staple grain, with pulses, lentils, millet, and maize among the other crops raised; vegetables—potatoes, cucumbers, onions—are also grown for family use. There is sometimes a small surplus of fruit in the more fertile valleys from tree crops such as the apricot, from vineyards (raisins), and from vines (melons). Tobacco has been introduced as a cash crop in some areas. Crop yields are erratic, however, even under irrigated conditions. Few villages are self-sufficient in food supplies and in bad years may produce only 50 percent of their needs.

Variation in house structure provides a regional identification of sedentary Pushtun settlements in the tribal territory. The primary unifying characteristic is the defensive nature of the structure. Each family occupies its own walled rectangular-shaped compound with some provision for watchtowers. Villages, which are usually inhabited by extended family or clan, are sited for defensive purposes and are usually located on a knoll or rise of land adjacent to the village fields. Originally, the larger, older towns were walled, although growth has now expanded beyond the town walls. The defensive aspect of Pushtun architecture is an outgrowth of the history of internecine warfare among the tribes. Intertribal, interclan, and even interfamily squabbles are common, frequently ending in bloodshed. All quarters maintained by either the Afghan or Pakistani Governments in tribal territory are fortified.

Pushtun nomads, called *kuchis* or *powindahs*, are easily identified by their characteristic black felt tents. Although fewer in number in comparison to the total

Pushtun population, their mobility and colorful lifestyle command an aura of respect and admiration among their sedentary peers. Nomads cling to their way of life and resist the concept of permanent settlement. Tolerated in Pakistan where settlement effort is stronger, nomadism is more prevalent among the Afghan Pushtun tribes, particularly the Ghilzais and to a lesser extent the Durranis.

25X1

Nomads migrate between winter quarters in the valleys and summer pasture grounds in the mountains. Their flocks of sheep, in particular, are susceptible to extremes of temperature. The summers in Pushtun country, though short, are excessively hot, with daytime temperatures over 37°C. The flocks are moved from the valleys to higher elevations until the approach of winter forces them back to lower, warmer elevations. Nomadic movement develops a seasonal rhythm with peaks of activity during the months of May and September-October. The timing of the spring and fall migrations is closely orchestrated with the activities of the communities along the route, with which the nomads develop a symbiotic relationship. Spring migration precedes crop planting in each of the villages along the way; the return journey in the fall is timed for after the harvest.

25X1

Nomads and villagers are interrelated in other ways. The villagers trade food, mainly wheat and vegetables, in exchange for the meat, milk, and other animal products of the nomads. The nomads are also purveyors of news and gossip. One of the important aspects of the relationship is the nomads' role as itinerant merchants and moneylenders supplying matches, kerosene, cloth, and other small necessities as well as credit to villagers.

25X1

The economic status of the nomads varies; some are well off and others are abysmally poor. The more affluent nomads have gradually acquired land, influence, and monetary control in many remote areas. For example, the moneylending Ghilzai nomads are gradually pauperizing many of the Hazara, a non-Pushtun ethnic group in the Hindu Kush highlands of Afghanistan. The Ghilzais, as practitioners of Islam, do not

charge interest on a loaned sum, but a sizable "gift"—the equivalent of 25 to 100 percent short-term interest—is mandatory with repayment of the principal. Repayment is made more difficult for the hapless Hazara borrower because the whole sum plus gift is due in full. Partial payment is unacceptable, and with the extension of the loan the Hazara and his family, who are also obligated, sink deeper into bondage to the Ghilzai. Similar aggrandizing relationships have developed in areas of the western and northern Hindu Kush between local villagers of other ethnic groups and Pushtun nomads, primarily the Durranis.

Culture, Customs, and Traditions

Tribal genealogy and kinship are important to the Pushtuns. Knowledge of place on the ethnic family tree and of the relationship to others defines the obligations of an individual, a family, the extended family, the clan, and sometimes the tribe. The duties thus derived merge with Pushtunwali, a code of moral responsibilities that governs most aspects of tribal life. The code dictates that a Pushtun, his family, and his kinsmen must exact revenge (*badal*) for a perceived wrong. The counterbalancing theme is the obligation for hospitality (*melmastia*) and the protection of guests. To transgress the code risks disgrace, and the ostracism and retribution of fellow tribesmen.

Pushtun society is male dominant and oriented, and has been characterized as patriarchal, patrilinear, and patrilocal. The universal Pushtun custom of cousin marriage—a boy weds the daughter of his father's brother—perpetuates the inward-looking nature of the society. Because of the tribal social structure, however, male cousins almost automatically become rivals. They vie for inheritance from the common grandfather, for wives, and for influence within the family group. Cousin rivalry is the root cause of many Pushtun family feuds and is an important consideration in tribal politics. If there are two factions within a tribe, cousins will usually be in opposite camps. Cousin rivalry may figure prominently in the most common causes of breach of peace in the frontier: *zar*, *zan*, and *zamin* (money, women, and land).

Devout adherents of Islam, Pushtuns are almost all Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi sect. A few are Shi'ites, the best known of whom are the Turis and many of the Bangash in the upper Kurram River Valley in Pakistan. Among the tenets of Islam, the concept of *jihad* (holy war against unbelievers) blends easily with the natural Pushtun preoccupation with warfare. The insurgency in Afghanistan is fanned by the tribesmen's perception of the Khalqi government as Communist inspired, and thus atheistic and anti-Islam. The Soviet advisers and backers of the regime are tarred with the same brush.

Another aspect of the conservative Islamic society is that women are secluded, protected, and generally uneducated. Purdah as an institution among Pushtun women, however, is slowly fading. In rural villages, traditional conservative ways will linger, particularly with the current upsurge of Islamic fervor, but the longer term trend is toward more liberal standards. The lead in Afghanistan was taken over a decade ago among the women of the royal family and members of the ruling elite. Pushtun women in the settled areas of Pakistan and in the large cities of Kabul and Peshawar have more liberties due to access to educational opportunities and acceptance in certain areas of the work force. Purdah restrictions are relaxed among nomadic families and in rural villages where the chadry or burqa, the traditional enveloping shroud, would interfere with work in the fields. Purdah traditions are strongest in small towns and provincial cities.

The Pushtun reputation for democratic action—the equivalent of one-man-one-vote—is embodied in the institution of the *jirga*, the governing council in each tribal group. A *jirga* is called to establish a course of action when dealing with a particular problem. Every adult male can have a voice in the council. A leader—a malik or a khan—is only one among equals, who derives his leadership through adjudicating opposing views and commanding the respect and allegiance of the group. The title of khan can also be an honorific for a large landholder, herder, or anyone with high tribal standing. Mullahs and maulanas (more highly educated Islamic scholars), the interpreters of Islam, are influential but lack the institutional support of an Islamic hierarchy such as exists in Iran.

Lacking a written literary tradition, much of the Pushtuns' cultural heritage is transmitted through folktales and storytelling. Pushtu is an expressive language, and among Pushtun classics is the poetry of the 18th century bard, Khushal Khan Khattak. Music, predictably martial in tone, is widely popular, as is male group dancing.

Contacts with the world beyond Pushtun country are inevitably introducing new ideas, growth, and changes into tribal life. The isolation and inaccessibility of many villages are ending with the construction of roads and the introduction of trucks and buses. The nomadic way of life is slowly but inexorably dissolving under government pressure to establish permanent settlements, particularly in Pakistan. Population pressures and the economics of survival contribute to out-migration, gradual urbanization and the lessening of tribal ties. Increasing numbers of males are either working in alien lands, serving in the armed forces in both Afghanistan and Pakistan or attending colleges and universities, generally in Kabul and Peshawar. For those who remain behind in tribal territory, the transistor radio has become a status symbol as well as a window on the outside world.

Economic Realities

Economic survival in Pushtun country is becoming more difficult. Population pressures have forced greater numbers of males to migrate outside tribal territory to seek work. At any given time, as many as one in six adult males are working outside tribal territory. Pushtuns work as agricultural laborers on the Indus Plains, as construction workers in the Persian Gulf oil countries, or anywhere else opportunity beckons. They may be absent for a season or for several years at a time. Remittances are a major source of income in tribal territory.

Some Pushtun tribal groups have adopted new occupations. Notable examples are the Afridi and Shinwari tribesmen from the region of the Khyber Pass who, like the Sikhs in India, have an affinity for motors. They are now truckers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly on the strategic Kabul-Peshawar Road through the Pass. Some tribes have developed specialties. The

Andar Ghilzais are renowned for digging and maintaining *karez*, the underground channels constructed to tap a downslope subsurface flow of water. Mahsud tribesmen, once feared for their treachery in combat, have taken over a number of former Hindu businesses, and are now known for their treacherous commercial practices.

The Pushtuns have been quick to exploit any demand for the area's few natural resources. The higher slopes in the border area that receive more rainfall were originally covered by forests. The scarcity and the demand in the villages for charcoal, and in Pakistan for wood as a building material, have resulted within a period of several decades in large areas of cleared slopes to the detriment of the environment. Close cropping and overgrazing by sheep and goats decimate the root structure of the remaining grasses and shrubs, and sheet erosion and gully washers then remove much of the fragile soil cover, leaving more and more areas rocky and sterile. Once devastated, these slopes do not respond well to reforestation efforts. The incentive remains: logs and firewood are one of the high-value commodities in the cross-border smuggling trade.

Trading in opium is a special problem in tribal territory. In Pushtun country east and north of Peshawar opium poppies are cultivated legally under the aegis of the Pakistani Government. Production from illicit cultivation in uncontrolled tribal territory in the borderlands is openly available on the black market in the bazaars of the Khyber Pass. Total tonnage of illicit opium produced in tribal territory increases annually. The estimate for 1979 is 600 to 1,000 tons, up from an estimated 200 to 300 tons in 1970. Attempts to introduce substitute crops have had mixed success. No other crops have comparable monetary returns for the grower, and especially for the tribal middleman. Afghanistan has no allotment for legal opium production, although much of the opium entering the illegal market originates there. With declining revenues from other sources, the Afghan Government would undoubtedly like to exploit tribal expertise and share in the income from the legal sales generated in Pakistan and India.

The insurgency in Afghanistan is having widespread repercussions among the Pushtuns of the borderlands. Whole villages in dissident frontier areas have fled into Pakistan. There are now more than 200,000 tribesmen in refugee camps, most of whom are Pushtuns, and an unknown number who are taking shelter with local kinsmen. The summer crops in their deserted villages have not been planted; moreover, crop yields in the fields of those villages still inhabited are expected to be lower because of reduced runoff from last winter's deficient snow cover in the mountains. Even if the insurgency abates within the next couple of months, food supplies in the border areas of Afghanistan are likely to be low until the summer of 1980. []

The Borderlands

The boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan was established in a treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan in 1893. Called the Durand Line, it represented the furthest penetration—but not control—of the British Empire. The British used various means to monitor the frontier, including periodic forays of shows of force into tribal territory, the establishment of outposts and forts, the building of roads to connect and supply the military garrisons, and subsidies to tribal leaders. []

The methods used by the successor Pakistani government to control the Pushtun tribes have differed little from those initiated by the British. The tribal groups in the more settled agricultural regions in the valleys of the Indus River tributaries have gradually been incorporated into the administrative structure of the North-West Frontier Province, but the groups along the border itself remain semiautonomous. Effective administrative control of the Pakistani Government extends to the border only beyond Quetta, in the Khyber Pass, and in the upper Kurram River Valley. []

Although the border frequently follows high ridge lines, it is not impenetrable. Numerous passes provide ease of movement along the border, which has been termed a "sieve." Because of the terrain, however, the border is difficult to police. On the Pakistani side,

natural lines of communication follow the generally east-west oriented tributaries of the Indus. The middle-to-lower reaches of these rivers typically flow through hill-surrounded basins, which are centers for sedentary agriculturalists, and in which a fair-sized tribal town is located. Peshawar, Kohat, and Bunu are examples of Pushtun centers in "settled districts." Beyond these basins, toward the border, adjacent slopes steepen and valleys narrow to become defiles—excellent country for guerrilla operations. Well adapted to their land, the Pushtuns are adept at the art of ambush and are among the best guerrilla fighters in the world. []

The British established military posts such as Wana and Fort Sandaman in these frontier regions and constructed a road between Quetta and Peshawar to connect these outposts. The road, which traverses the tribal-dominated hill lands between the river valleys, was built with subsidies to the tribes for construction, and subsequently for maintenance and protection (periodically, sections of the road deteriorate overnight—with tribal help). The construction of roads in tribal territory is always a contentious issue. The tribes view a road as facilitating political as well as military control. As recently as several years ago, tribal objections halted construction of a road into Mohmand territory north of Peshawar. Nearby, the Afridis and the Shinwaris have never permitted roads to penetrate their mountain homelands in the Safed Koh where the border follows the highest ridge lines. []

On the Afghan side of the border the transport grid reverses. The easier natural communications corridor follows the Logar Valley, traversing a low divide to the broad Arghandab-Helmand River Plain—the route of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat Highway. Connecting roads that serve the borderlands to the east traverse more difficult terrain. The present insurgency in Paktia Province and the siege of the Afghan Army strongpoint at Khost are based on insurgent control of the latter easily interdicted routes. []

The location of the border cutting across natural routes of movement up and down the valleys of the Indus River tributaries has had a special meaning for the Ghilzais—one of the largest and most nomadic of the Pushtun tribes. Their territory lies to the west of the border in Afghanistan, and the placement bisected their traditional annual migration routes. Beginning in the early 1970s, the border passes have been closed periodically by the Pakistani Government, shutting off great numbers of the Ghilzai from their customary winter pastures near the warmer Indus Valley plains, where many of the men worked as seasonal laborers. The dislocations caused by the border closings and the general Pakistani policy of discouraging the annual migration of the nomads have had wide reverberations in the Ghilzai economy and lifestyle. Some have established new winter quarters in the valleys on the Afghan side of the border; others have continued their cross-border migrations more surreptitiously, expanding their roles as nomad-merchants (smugglers).

The location of the border in tribal territory has been an important factor in Afghan politics. The Pushtuns are numerically the largest, and politically the dominant, ethnic group in the country. For them, the concept of a united Pushtunistan—the land of the Pushtuns—has been a periodic political battle cry. They call for self-determination for the Pushtuns—that is for those in Pakistan—and presumably relocation of the border from its present location eastward to the Indus escarpment. The irredentist approach of succeeding Afghan governments has had progressively less appeal for Pushtun tribal leaders in Pakistan, who seem to prefer greater autonomy for their areas within Pakistan to political union with their Afghan brothers. The lack of a united front on this—or any—subject underscores the individualistic nature of the Pushtuns.

In practical terms, the location of the border in tribal territory has proved to have both political and economic advantages for the Pushtuns. By pitting the Afghan and Pakistani Governments against each other in an effective form of political blackmail, the tribes on both sides of the border have managed to retain a greater degree of autonomy through the years than

would probably have been possible had they been under the sole authority of either government. Economically, differences in the price structures in the Afghan and Pakistani economies have permitted a thriving cross-border flow of trade—regarded by nonlocals as smuggling.


Outlook

Traditionally, Pushtuns have exploited the location of their tribal territory as a source of revenue and as a means of preserving their semiautonomous status. They have been less successful in managing the few natural resources of their arid homeland that sustain agriculture and herding. The Pushtuns' high population growth rate will intensify pressures on tribal lands and will increase their dependency on government subsidies and outside employment. Thus, economics and demographic pressures are eventually likely to accomplish what British, and later Pakistani and Afghan, regiments could not—pacification and control of the Pushtuns.

Pushtun institutions stress independent action of small, family-related units. The reluctance of the Pushtun tribes to accept centralized leadership is limiting the effectiveness of the Afghan Pushtuns' resistance to the present Khalqi regime in Afghanistan. The tribes may form a coalition to defeat the Khalqi government, as they have in the past united against perceived outside aggressors such as the British, but that union is likely to shatter when that objective has been achieved. Similarly, the historical record of the Pushtuns' concentration on parochial concerns, with internecine bickerings and feuds, militates against the formation of a united Pushtunistan either as an independent unit or as part of either Afghanistan or Pakistan. The Afghan Pushtuns' preoccupation with the Pushtunistan cause, however, is likely to keep that issue an important factor in border politics for many years to come.

Approved For Release 2008/02/21 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000600160010-1


Pushtun Territory: Groups, Tribes, Population Density, and Migration Routes



Appendix


Major Genealogical Groupings

THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS



THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS


II. THE EASTERN AFGHANS




K1



THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS



THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS



**THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS**

