



Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP81B00401R0005001300040261  
**Foreign Assessment Center**

**Confidential**  
NOFORN

*Dean*  
+  
*Alphonse*

# Effects of the Southwest Asian Crises on Key Global Issues

An Intelligence Assessment

**Confidential**

PA 80-10243  
May 1980

**Warning Notice** Intelligence Sources  
and Methods Involved  
(WNINTEL)

**National Security  
Information** Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

<b>Dissemination Control Abbreviations</b>	NOFORN (NF)	Not releasable to foreign nationals
	NOCONTRACT (NC)	Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
	PROPIN (PP)	Caution—proprietary information involved
	NFIBONLY (NO)	NFIB departments only
	ORCON (OC)	Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator
	REL...	This information has been authorized for release to...
	FGI	Foreign government information
A microfiche copy of this document is available from OCR/DSB (351-7177); printed copies from PPG/IDCD (351-5203). Regular receipt of NFAC reports in either microfiche or printed form can also be arranged through PPG/IDCD.		Derivative classification by 027096 Review 20 years from date Derived from multiple sources

All material on this page  
is unclassified.



Foreign  
Assessment  
Center

Confidential  
NOFORN

# Effects of the Southwest Asian Crises on Key Global Issues (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

*Research for this report was completed  
on 18 April 1980.*

This assessment was prepared by [redacted]  
International Issues Division, Office of Political  
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and  
may be directed to the Chief, International Issues  
Division, Office of Political Analysis, [redacted]  
(U)

25X1

25X1

It was coordinated with the Offices of Economic  
Research, Geographic and Cartographic Research,  
Scientific and Weapons Research, and the  
National Intelligence Officer for the Near  
East and South Asia. (U)

Confidential  
PA 80-10243  
May 1980

**Effects of the Southwest  
Asian Crises on Key  
Global Issues (U)**

**Key Judgments**

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have implications for a number of international issues beyond the future of Southwest Asia and East-West relations generally. They have embittered world politics and significantly altered the importance of, and the ways in which nations deal with, such global issues as the politics of energy, North-South economic conflict, arms control, nuclear proliferation, and heightened politico social tensions in many less developed countries. (U)

Many of the consequences of these crises will become clear only with time. But a preliminary assessment indicates that, at a minimum, these events are changing many nations' perceptions of the global issues that most seriously affect their interests. As a result, attention is shifting away from the economic issues that tended to dominate international forums in the 1970s and toward military and security-related issues. (C NF)

Developed countries are becoming less sympathetic to developing country demands for a larger role in world affairs and for a greater transfer of resources from rich to poor. Energy is still high on the global agenda, but the focus now is more on security of the energy supply than on the cooperation necessary to cope with longer term problems of energy scarcity. (C NF)

The crises impinge most directly on security-related issues. Prospects for controlling the spread of conventional and nuclear weapons have worsened as many nations perceive what they interpret to be a shift in US priorities, as US-Soviet negotiations become more difficult, and as other states consider extending their military commitments. (C NF)

The example set by separatist activity in Southwest Asia is likely to be contagious. Moreover, the increase in international tensions further heightens the likelihood of violent resistance to central authorities by ethnic and religious minorities. One probable result is an increase in terrorism, which will make it more difficult for many governments to preserve both internal order and civil liberties. (U)

## Effects of the Southwest Asian Crises on Key Global Issues <sup>1</sup> (U)

### The Crises and the Global Political Climate

Many observers have interpreted the recent crises in Southwest Asia, particularly the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as a turning point that ended an era of East-West detente and initiated a new period of rancor and tension in world politics. Comment on the Soviet intervention has centered on Moscow's objectives and strategy in Southwest Asia. Regardless of what Soviet designs prove to be, however, the recent events in Southwest Asia are, for several reasons, already sufficient to make the global political climate significantly more inclement during the next several years than it was during the latter years of the 1970s. (U)

First, the perception of change in superpower policies has greater impact on the world political climate than does the actual change. Detente, cold war, and similar concepts are states of mind—moods with which opinionmakers infect each other from time to time, regardless of whether these moods reflect governmental decisions. The recent worldwide change in mood appears to have gone far enough to assure an alteration in the global political climate that would be difficult to reverse even if the USSR were to take reassuring steps in the coming weeks. (U)

Second, the reactions of some governments, particularly major powers, cause other changes that go beyond mere states of mind and to which other governments must respond. A chain reaction continues even if the first links in the chain are later seen to have been forged out of false perceptions. US responses to the events in Iran and Afghanistan have speeded such a chain reaction by creating new facts: warships are moved, weapons are exported, embargoes are imposed. (U)

<sup>1</sup> This is a preliminary assessment of the ways in which the crises in Afghanistan and Iran may affect global issues and should thus be read more for the questions it raises than for specific predictions. This paper considers only changes triggered by recent events in Southwest Asia. It does not contain a complete and balanced assessment of any global issue. (U)

Third, the Southwest Asian crises, even if their intrinsic importance is played down by future historians, nevertheless mark a transition to a new era made possible by two trends of the late 1970s: the augmentation of Soviet military strength relative to that of the United States and enhanced US interest in more direct involvement in Third World security. Afghanistan did not cause either trend, but provided the occasion for the implications of each to become clear and for their broader effects to be set in train. (U)

Fourth, the near simultaneity of several related or apparently related events has amplified the impact they could have had on world politics separately. The takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused the United States to bolster its military presence in the area. The twin crises subjected other governments to cross pressures but, nevertheless, made the issues of the superpowers' rivalry, the projection of their military power, and their relations with the Islamic world even more salient and urgent. (U)

Apart from the Iranian crisis, several other events closely coinciding with the intervention in Afghanistan have heightened concerns about, and broadened the political effects of, Soviet military expansionism. Indira Gandhi's election victory in India has threatened Pakistan with increased Soviet influence on its southeastern border just as the Soviet Army had marched up to its northwestern border. Tito's illness and death have rekindled longstanding fears that Yugoslavia will become a Soviet target. And the approach of the summer Olympics in Moscow has given the West the retaliatory threat of a boycott, which is forcing other states to decide whether to follow suit. Meanwhile, several recent moves by the United States and its allies—modernization of theater nuclear forces in Europe, a new defense cooperation agreement with Turkey, and Secretary Brown's visit to

China—given their coincidence with the retaliatory steps taken in response to the Soviet intervention, have reinforced perceptions of increased US militancy and hostility toward the USSR. (C)

### **The Crises and Global Issues**

Global issues are those that are subjects of debate and discussion in worldwide forums or that tend to recur in similar form as international problems in different parts of the world. The deterioration of US-Soviet relations and the more general increase in world tensions affect global issues in several ways. (U)

First, military intervention and superpower confrontation bear directly on security-related questions such as arms control. Second, some nonmilitary issues receive increased attention because they are particularly acute or important in the region where the confrontation occurs. Third, other issues receive less attention because the crisis of the moment crowds them off the global agenda—which is of limited size because headlines, debating time, and diplomatic resources are also limited. Fourth, some diplomatic campaigns lose steam because the states leading them reorder priorities to meet new security needs. Fifth, new fears about military security breed new dependencies, thereby changing the leverage that individual states can use to win concessions on their favorite issues. (U)

Realignments within and between alliances and regional groups that crises in superpower relations can entail also affect many global issues. Divisions within NATO over the Afghan affair are already apparent, for example, and some members of the Warsaw Pact evidently view the costs of the downturn in East-West relations as more substantial than Moscow does. Any lingering discord within those alliances can, on other issues, help to weaken old coalitions or to create new ones. (C NF)

### **The Impact on 10 Global Issues**

The Southwest Asian crises and the change in the world political climate associated with them will affect a number of global issues that have been prominent during the 1970s or are likely to be important items on the global agenda for the 1980s: energy dependence; nonalignment and the politics of the nonaligned

movement; demand of less developed countries (LDCs) for a New International Economic Order (NIEO); food supply; ethnic separatism and self-determination for minorities; international narcotics trafficking; governmental respect for human rights; international terrorism; arms control; and nuclear proliferation. The following preliminary observations are chiefly political in nature, and focus more on the rhetoric, fears, alignments, and negotiations associated with these issues than on underlying economic or technical problems. (U)

**Energy.** Because of their proximity to the Persian Gulf oilfields, the crises in Iran and Afghanistan have intensified worldwide interest in the issue of energy dependence. US responses to both events—including the President's declaration that the hostage situation in Tehran proves the danger of dependence on foreign oil and the allocation to gasohol production of some of the grain being denied the USSR—have reinforced the more obvious links between physical security in Southwest Asia and the availability of energy in the industrial nations. Because of these links, energy differs from other economic issues in that it will not receive less attention merely because military security is receiving more. (U)

More specifically, however, the Southwest Asian crises have heightened immediate concerns over security of energy supplies—that is, the danger that military action, civil unrest, or occupation of the oil-producing areas by a hostile power will interrupt the production or shipment of oil. To the extent that the consuming nations focus their attention narrowly on this problem, they have less time and inclination to develop long-term solutions to the more fundamental problem of an overall scarcity of energy resources. For example, the European Community's attempts to establish a dialogue with the Persian Gulf Arab states are intended primarily to secure delivery of oil and only secondarily to discuss longer term issues. (C NF)

The crises also have made cooperation among the industrial countries more difficult because they have placed in sharper focus the greater West European and Japanese reliance, relative to the dependence of the United States, on Persian Gulf oil. The discrepancy in

energy imports, which could divide the United States from its allies on questions of military security in this region, may now divide them more sharply than before on the energy issue itself. Dependence on the Middle East for energy and on the United States for security were already competing priorities in Western Europe and Japan. The more complex relationship between the two issues that the Southwest Asian crises have spawned makes the dilemma more acute. (C NF)

The recent events in this region will also influence the oil producers' decisions in complex ways. For one thing, Iran's experiences demonstrate the potential hazards of generating far more revenue than a government needs merely to maintain itself. Some attributed the Shah's downfall partly to the rapidity with which he spent his oil income to modernize Iran's society, industrial base, and military establishment. The only place to invest excess revenues, however, is in the West, and the blocking of Iranian assets by the United States makes this appear riskier than it once did. To the extent that both domestic development and foreign investment thus appear less attractive, other oil exporters will be more inclined to restrict production and retain more of their wealth in the ground as untapped reserves. (U)

The oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf now fear armed attack from a major power more than they did several months ago. This also is apt to influence their decisions on oil exports but in a less predictable manner. Some officials in these states, including Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Yamani, have interpreted Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan as the first step in a march to the oilfields—part of a military strategy to cope with the USSR's coming energy shortfall. Corresponding fears of US military action have been heightened by both the confrontation with Iran over the hostages and the possibility that Washington will feel compelled to preempt or respond to Soviet advances in the region. (C)

The net effect of this melange of security concerns on individual decisions regarding the pricing and production of petroleum will largely depend on how the producing states perceive the leverage they have over the major powers and vice versa. On the one hand, an increased probability of invasion by a major power or increased dependence on that power to deter or defeat

an attack by someone else tend to weaken the bargaining position of militarily weak oil-producing countries. On the other hand, the West's increased dependence on some of these countries, not only as sources of oil but as frontline states in an effort to contain Soviet military expansion, implies that they can drive harder bargains in future negotiations with the West. The backdrop to all these perceptions is the prospect of an energy-hungry USSR becoming a significant importer of Middle East oil. The oil exporters will be dealing in the future with both camps that are competing militarily in their backyard, and the deals they are willing to make with each will reflect their judgment of the outcome of that competition. (C)

**Nonalignment.** An extension of superpower security commitments and a renewed cold war unquestionably pose a major challenge to the tenets and cohesion of the nonaligned movement (NAM). East-West conflict is making a deepening imprint on world politics in general. The prospect of an unbridgeable split prevented the NAM from convening a formal meeting to discuss either Iran or Afghanistan. The creation of the NAM, however, was a response to the challenges of an earlier cold war and to the desires of its founders to resist subjugation by the superpowers. Now, Third World diplomats are talking of the need to "reinvent" nonalignment. Many of their governments will make renewed efforts to map paths that avoid a close relationship with either camp, not just to preserve bargaining positions from which to pursue their individual interests but to preserve nonalignment and the nonaligned movement. (U)

The embarrassment that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has caused the NAM's current chair, Cuba, should ease these efforts. Havana's withdrawal from the race for a seat on the UN Security Council was the first concrete indication that its patron's aggression was a blow to its own prestige and influence among the nonaligned. The Cuban-led elements that have attempted to steer the NAM toward a more pro-Soviet course in recent years may become less assertive for the time being, particularly on the more divisive political questions. The more conservative members of the movement will not, however, attempt a similar subversion of nonalignment from the right. Instead, the greater reticence of pro-Soviet forces in the NAM will make discourse in the movement sound less

Confidential

factionalized than it was before, or at least less than it had been threatening to become since Cuba's assumption of the chair. (U)

Whether reinvention of nonalignment is accomplished will depend in large part on the leadership of Iraq, which will succeed Cuba as the chair of the NAM in 1982. The events in Southwest Asia have enhanced Baghdad's already excellent qualifications for filling this role. Iraq has sharply denounced the Soviet action in Afghanistan while remaining untainted by close association with the West. It is located on the newest frontline of superpower confrontation and hence is on the frontline of the NAM's efforts to avoid being engulfed by this confrontation. The chaos in Iran's armed forces makes Iraq militarily the strongest Persian Gulf state, giving it a greater role in regional security to complement the important economic role it fills by virtue of its oil. (U)

Meanwhile, the NAM will alter its treatment of specific issues as required to avoid a pattern of consistent support for either superpower. It will change the tone of its pronouncements on some longstanding issues to balance positions it takes on more recent controversies. For example, the stridency of its denunciations of Egypt and the US-sponsored peace diplomacy in the Middle East will be governed in part by the need to appear evenhanded despite its criticism of the Soviet move against Afghanistan. (U)

**LDC Demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).** Because most of the membership of the Group of 77 (G-77)—the caucus that formulates LDC economic demands—duplicates that of the NAM, any factionalism that reduces the cohesion of the latter will have similar effects on the former. The effectiveness of LDC demands for an NIEO could decline because of resulting frictions within the G-77, and are likely to decline a little anyway because of a shift of worldwide attention to security questions and away from economic development. As with nonalignment, however, LDC leaders may make special efforts to counteract these tendencies and to assure that the sense of urgency for establishment of an NIEO does not get lost in the crisis-driven political shuffles in the 1980s. And as with energy, national policies toward the NIEO will partly reflect changing perceptions of who depends more on whom. (U)

Worries about security in Asia or Africa may make industrial nations more generous in providing economic assistance to selected LDCs, either in return for military access rights or as part of broader efforts to nurture relations with critical areas of the Third World. Some West European governments already are responding to the recent crises by reemphasizing such efforts. Increased Western defense spending, however, implies fewer total resources for development assistance, and this could mean less aid to LDCs deemed to be strategically less important. (C NF)

In any case, more generous Western economic aid would not necessarily mute the NIEO issue, for the LDCs' collective posture is shaped less by what they have achieved already than by what they want to attain in the future. Furthermore, additional development assistance would leave unanswered other demands in the NIEO, such as those concerning control over foreign investment. Any appearance of division among Western nations over how to respond to LDC economic demands, even if such divisions stem more from different assessments of Third World needs than from different interests, is likely to stimulate the G-77 to sustain or even strengthen its push for the NIEO. (U)

Changes in relations between the oil exporters and other G-77 members resulting from military developments in Southwest Asia are also likely to affect the NIEO issue. The increased vulnerability of some of the exporting states probably has enhanced the value to them of diplomatic support from other LDCs, and the latter may see this as an opportunity to wrest from OPEC members some of the economic concessions, including greater development assistance, that so far they have been unable to obtain. Even if the oil exporters grant such concessions, however, they may restrain their rhetorical support for the NIEO to avoid needless damage to their relations with the major powers, whose military support has become even more critical. (C)

**Food.** Any effects that change in the global political climate will have on the issue of supply and distribution of food will parallel to some extent the effects that the global political climate has on discussions of the NIEO. It is unlikely, however, that the LDCs will

Confidential



make special collective efforts to counter the distracting effect of new military concerns and to keep the world's attention focused on food. There is less of a sense of urgency in the global arena concerning food than there was at the time of the 1974 World Food Conference. (C NF)

Although security of food supply is at least a latent concern for many LDCs, their interests in the world food trade are divergent. Some are net exporters, for example, and the degree of dependence on imported food varies widely among the others. This issue is thus less suitable than some aspects of the NIEO as a device for cultivating unity among the nonaligned or spotlighting economic inequality between North and South. Furthermore, the Western countries that are most in favor of responding to the current security crises with economic concessions to LDCs are not those with the most food to export. In sum, although the supply of food will be one of the subjects of coming negotiations between industrial and developing countries, the new focus on security questions will tend to divert attention from food as a global issue. (C NF)

The highly publicized grain embargo by the United States as a retaliatory act against the USSR's invasion into Afghanistan had the potential for increasing worldwide attention to food and its relation to other aspects of foreign policy. Third World reaction to the embargo, however, has been mild—surprisingly so in view of the overwhelming LDC support for past assertions that the acquisition of food is a basic human right. Mexico has been the only developing country to reiterate publicly its opposition to the use of food as a foreign policy tool, and it did not link its position directly to US actions. (U)

One reason for the low-key reaction among other LDCs is that several of them, such as India, have built substantial reserves and are less dependent on imported food now than they were during the food crisis in 1974. Another reason is that importing countries welcomed the increase in supply of grain that the embargo caused. Mexico contracted to purchase at least 1 million metric tons of the grain that was to have gone to the USSR, other LDCs took advantage of the situation to increase purchases, and still others expressed interest in increased food aid or PL480 credits.

Finally, most LDCs seem confident that use of the embargo will be confined to the current dispute between the superpowers. The fact that the United States never officially interrupted food shipments to Iran evidently has reassured them that the present embargo does not presage future ones directed against LDCs. (C)

**Ethnic Separatism.** National self-determination, although affirmed as a right by the UN General Assembly and repeatedly invoked on behalf of a few fashionable causes like black resistance movements in southern Africa, has not been debated in global forums nearly as extensively as the numerous discrepancies between ethnic geography and political boundaries would warrant. The principal reason for this is the unwillingness of many regimes to champion separatist movements in foreign countries for fear that others would foment unrest among minorities in their own territories. This widely held belief, true or not, implies that a kindling of ethnic separatism anywhere on the globe can spread rapidly and widely; not only does the activity of one separatist group have a demonstration effect on others, but the tacit agreement among many governments not to rock each other's boat breaks down. (U)

The ethnic geography of Southwest Asia is such that crisis and confrontation in the region are particularly prone to stir up separatist activity and the self-determination issue, both of which can then spread to other regions. The area is a patchwork of minorities whose homelands straddle international boundaries and who lack political autonomy. Some of them (for example, the Kurds and the Baluchis) have recent histories of violent resistance. As external threats increase the vulnerability of governments in the regions, some of these groups are afforded the opportunity to assert their claims more forcefully. Military assistance to established regimes may also provoke more violent resistance by minorities fearful that the new arms will be used against them (currently a Baluchi suspicion regarding military assistance to Pakistan). (U)

Because Islam is identified with neither the predominantly Christian West nor atheistic Soviet Marxism, religion overlays and reinforces nationalism as a basis for resisting the influence of major powers in Southwest Asia. Khomeini's revolution in Iran has made separatism within the region even more complex by increasing the probability of serious Shia resistance in nearby Sunni-ruled countries. Islam as a whole can be a vehicle to spread separatist unrest to other regions—that is, to Muslim groups elsewhere in Asia or Africa inspired by the efforts of their coreligionists in Iran and Afghanistan. The Sahel in Africa, where a Muslim-Christian split complicates the problems of ethnic diversity in several countries, is a particularly fertile ground for such unrest. (U)

The more that Third World politics fractionate and local tensions between ideologically incompatible neighbors develop as byproducts of tension between the superpowers, the less inhibited some governments will become in supporting separatist activity in other countries. The 1975 agreement between Iraq and imperial Iran that squelched Kurdish resistance illustrated how useful such agreements can be to the regions making them and how devastating they are to the separatists. Similar agreements, tacit or explicit, will be less feasible or viable in a more tension-laden political climate. Support for separatist movements in neighboring states may become an increasingly attractive tactic for governments wishing to counteract perceived threats along their borders. (U)

Third World governments may contribute to separatist activity less wittingly by making greater use of nationalist symbols and rhetoric to assert their independence in the face of the more extensive activity of major powers. Nationalist fervor would draw attention to the aspirations of minorities who have their own symbols and slogans that they would invoke in preference to those promoted by their rulers. (U)

**Narcotics.** Turmoil in Southwest Asia impinges directly on international narcotics trafficking because Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran presently constitute the world's leading opium-producing region. Production in these countries determines in large measure the economics of the worldwide illicit narcotics traffic and specifically the supply of heroin reaching Western Europe and North America. (U)

A severe drought in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia and the breakdown of internal order in Iran have contributed to Southwest Asia's current preeminence in opium production. Licensed opium production took place in Iran under the Shah, but early in 1979 illicit production began increasing substantially as Khomeini's revolution disrupted the country and immobilized its law enforcement agencies. Increased activity by separatist groups makes conditions particularly favorable for illicit opium production by further curtailing the central government's control over many producing areas. (C)

Since the Tehran hostage crisis began, the Iranian Government has been not only less able but less willing to cooperate with the United States in controlling the illicit narcotics trade. Discussions on mutual control programs took place as late as September of last year, but that effort is now dead. (C)

The increase in Iranian opium production will probably be offset to some extent by decreased poppy plantings in Pakistan and Afghanistan during 1980. Production in Pakistan is down in part because of market disruptions and consequent lower prices and because of an effective control program by the government. In Afghanistan, the fighting has dispersed field labor that otherwise would be harvesting poppies. Furthermore, shipment of the crop within Afghanistan is often more difficult because combat has disrupted established transportation routes and increased the chance that security forces will find and seize opium shipments while performing other missions. (C)

Despite these difficulties, however, the turmoil in Afghanistan may increase the amount of opium leaving the country in the near term. The opium inventory within Afghanistan was probably high at the start of this year, and many refugees fleeing the country are taking narcotics with them as an easily carried form of wealth. Drug traffickers faced with interdicted transportation networks will seek alternative routes to their markets, whether by sea or through Iran—where the disorder is due to a breakdown of central authority, not a foreign military presence, and the transport of illegal drugs thus has become even safer than before. (C)

**Human Rights.** A rise in separatist unrest, if it occurs, also could degrade the human rights performance of many of the states concerned because their governments will feel compelled to curtail liberties and tighten internal security in an effort to meet this threat to order, territorial integrity, and their own power. The deterioration in US-Soviet relations also is damaging the cause of human rights in other ways. Moscow apparently has concluded that it now must be more vigilant even if this involves highly visible abridgments of its citizens' liberties, such as the internal exile of Andrei Sakharov and a reduction in Jewish emigration. (C)

At the same time, the United States, which for at least the last three years has been the most vocal governmental proponent of human rights, is seen as having lowered the priority of the issue relative to military matters. US nurturing of a security relationship with Argentina to obtain cooperation with the grain embargo would be interpreted similarly. The impact on human rights performance will not be confined to the countries directly involved, because US actions suggest to other regimes relying on US support that a poor human rights record, although it can sour relations with Washington during calmer times, will tend to be disregarded when serious security concerns materialize. (C)

Less observance of human rights in many parts of the world does not imply, however, less attention to the issue. Well-publicized violations of human rights—even those of a lone individual, as in Sakharov's case—will tend to keep the issue on the global agenda. West European governments may henceforth attack Soviet human rights practices more strongly in order to support the United States and demonstrate their displeasure with Moscow without jeopardizing that aspect of detente most important to them—arms control in Europe. The Sakharov affair already appears to have given them a rationale for moving in this direction. (C NF)

**International Terrorism.** A rise in nationalist unrest and in harsh security practices intended to cope with this unrest or with external threats is likely to increase political violence. Much of this will take the form of

localized terrorism, but violence-prone groups that perceive their homelands to be targets of major power expansionism would be more likely to attack the citizens or property of these powers. (U)

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will have little direct effect on patterns of international terrorism, apart from the recent upsurge in terrorist attacks against Soviet targets by groups other than the traditionally anti-Soviet ones like Cuban exiles and the Jewish Defense League. The prospects for greater East-West cooperation on combating terrorism, like the prospects for other forms of East-West cooperation, have become dimmer for the short term.

Experience suggests, however, that counterterrorist measures are one of the last forms of cooperation to be discarded because of bilateral frictions. The USSR's concern over threats to its own personnel and installations should induce it, over the longer term, to continue such cooperation despite differences with the United States and the Western alliance. Cuban-US cooperation against aerial hijacking could serve as a model. (C)

The other Southwest Asian crisis that has dominated the headlines of the last several months—the occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran—bears more directly on international terrorism. The Embassy affair is most important as a chilling new chapter in the story of state support to terrorists. Most patron states have kept their support discreet, but the Iranian regime openly condoned an outrage committed against foreign diplomats on its own territory and became in effect the terrorists' agent in subsequent negotiations. If this action were to inspire other governments to extend new assistance to terrorist groups, it would reverse a hopeful trend over the past few years toward less patron state support. Whether it does will depend in part on how the Tehran crisis is resolved and more specifically on how independent of the Iranian regime's influence the terrorists prove to be. If the regime is shown to be unable to control the Embassy militants—and, therefore, unable to control the costs that it necessarily incurs as the militants' agent—this could discourage other would-be patron states. (U)

The Embassy takeover and another recent and dramatic terrorist action in Southwest Asia—the capture of the Great Mosque in Mecca—have altered prospects in the Islamic world for both international terrorism and counterterrorist cooperation. In the short term, the US confrontation with the theocratic regime in Iran has made the United States more likely to be attacked by Muslim extremists elsewhere, as indicated by the ease with which rumors of US complicity in the Mecca incident spread and touched off attacks on US installations in Islamabad and elsewhere. (U)

Over the longer term, Muslim governments may become increasingly willing to cooperate with Western states in counterterrorist efforts because they now see themselves as more likely terrorist targets. This would be particularly so if the Sunni-Shia split took a more violent turn. The willingness of some Muslim governments to cooperate openly, however, will still be limited by their fear of alienating religious extremists in their own countries. (U)

**Arms Control.** Because arms control is closely related to military force deployments, projection of power, and similar security questions, the Southwest Asian crises are having more direct and immediate effects on it than on any other global issue. In addition to deferring US Senate consideration of SALT II, the superpower confrontation has removed any chance for reinvigorating certain other bilateral arms control negotiations in the foreseeable future. (C)

Early resumption of the Indian Ocean naval arms limitation talks seems highly unlikely in view of the reinforcements that both superpowers have sent to the region. Negotiations to restrain conventional arms transfers (CAT) probably also will remain moribund for the time being, not just because of the general deterioration of East-West relations but because the United States—the chief advocate of this arms control effort for the last three years—has signalled a decision to lower the priority it gives to CAT restraint. This signal has taken the form of efforts to resume or initiate military assistance relationships with Pakistan and Somalia and to offer more advanced weapons to current clients like Egypt. The impact of these moves is enhanced by coming so soon after the US decision to

reverse its earlier prohibition on development of a fighter aircraft solely for export. (C)

The United States guided or stimulated most of the steps that the USSR, Western arms suppliers, and some LDC arms recipients have taken toward CAT restraint. None of these states wants to get too far out in front on this issue, and they will take the US actions as cues to adjust their own priorities in a like manner. (C)

A more bitter global political climate is also damaging the near-term prospects for arms control in less direct ways. The more fearful that LDCs become of hostile action by either a neighbor or an outside power, the more they will welcome or solicit countermeasures in the form of increased imports of weapons or of military deployments by friendly countries. Outside powers will respond positively to most such solicitations, either to protect countries in which they have traditionally maintained interests or to fill vacuums that adversaries might otherwise fill. The United Kingdom might restore some of its lost military presence east of Suez, and several West European states may increase their export of arms to the Third World, a step that also supports domestic economic interests. All of these developments will further degrade the climate for arms control. (C NF)

A retardation of arms control negotiations between the superpowers will produce more hand wringing, recriminations, and exhortations in the larger arms control forums such as the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. There will be more talk in the latter forum about fulfilling the Committee's charter as a genuine multilateral negotiating body so that progress toward global arms control accords need not be held hostage to bilateral relations between the superpowers. Actual steps in this direction, however, will be discouraged by the continued recognition that such accords would be either meaningless or impracticable without the superpowers' cooperation. Greater fractionation of Third World politics will discourage independent nonaligned initiatives in arms control even more than in other global issues on which united action is less impeded by divisions over security questions. In short,

the ability of many states to hasten progress in arms control will decline just as their frustration over the lack of progress is rising. (U)

Over the longer term, the souring of East-West relations could encourage arms control in certain ways. A serious military confrontation between the superpowers in the Indian Ocean or elsewhere, for example, might increase support in both countries for agreements designed to reduce the chance of stumbling into war, similar to the way the 1962 Cuban missile crisis built constituencies for earlier efforts at detente and arms control. More probable would be an effort by West European (and conceivably East European) governments to counteract the injuries to East-West relations by placing greater stress on arms control, particularly those aspects of most immediate concern to them—that is, the control of both conventional and theater nuclear forces in Europe. West European leaders are coming to the view that with the Afghanistan affair having already inflicted so much damage to detente, special efforts to sustain the arms control dialogue are more important than ever. (C NF)

In this perspective, arms control is less a consequence of detente than a means for maintaining a relationship that is threatened on other fronts—a perspective consistent with the superpowers' use of SALT in the 1970s. To extricate European arms control from US-Soviet antagonism, the West Europeans are increasingly supporting the French approach of addressing arms control in forums other than East-West, bloc-to-bloc negotiations. The meeting scheduled for Madrid in November 1980 to review the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will provide an opportunity to pursue this approach, with a probable outcome being a decision to convene a later conference limited to disarmament questions but linked to CSCE. (C NF)

Another possible long-term effect not entirely deleterious to arms control is the faster development of regional security organizations and arrangements. LDCs in several regions are likely to find such arrangements increasingly attractive both as a response to the threatened intrusion of a hostile power and as an alternative to the suffocating embrace of a friendly state. In other words, they are means for

copied with the dangers of a more unstable and insecure world without drawing conflicts into one's own area or sacrificing claims to independence and nonalignment. Regional arrangements initially would be instruments more of self-defense than of arms control. The more that LDCs base their defense strategies on them, however, the more meaningful it would be to base arms control efforts on them as well, to prevent arms races not just within a regional group but also between such groups. Lacking direct superpower involvement, regional groups in the Third World—although they would have many problems of their own—would probably be freer to pursue arms control despite US-Soviet hostility than would the European alliances. (U)

**Nuclear Proliferation.** Like human rights and CAT restraint, the United States has championed nuclear nonproliferation but now is downgrading it in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The proposed lifting of the aid embargo that had been imposed on Pakistan because of its nuclear weapons programs and the favorable decision on nuclear fuel shipments to India, despite New Delhi's refusal of full-scope safeguards—no matter how explicable these actions are in terms of the need to cope with the Soviet advance—will lower the credibility of much of what the United States has been saying about proliferation. Both suppliers and recipients of nuclear materials and equipment as a result could become less willing to cooperate in future US-led nonproliferation efforts. (C)

The recent crises will affect the incentives of would-be proliferators in a variety of ways, with an uncertain net effect on their decisions. On the one hand, a greater fear of becoming a target of great power aggression could strengthen the inclination of some states to acquire a nuclear deterrent. Others might be more likely to develop nuclear weapons because of a hostile neighbor's buildup of conventional military forces or of generally increased tension and instability in its region. Some pro-Western states might conclude from Pakistan's experience that they can disregard US warnings about the consequences of a nuclear weapons program because the United States will still come to their aid

when that aid is needed the most. An interruption in the East-West arms control dialogue also would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by inviting the contention that the nuclear powers were not fulfilling their obligations under Article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith for nuclear disarmament. This issue surely will be debated at the NPT Review Conference that convenes in August (U)

The demonstrated willingness of a power like the United States to aid a threatened state like Pakistan makes the development of nuclear weapons by such a state appear less costly. It also makes nuclear weapons development less necessary because confidence in the security guarantees of powerful friends who are increasingly willing to make overseas military commitments reduces one possible incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. Strengthening indigenous conventional forces through accelerated military assistance programs might have a similar effect on some nonnuclear weapons states. (U)

The alteration of the global climate is also likely to affect the attitudes of nuclear suppliers. West European governments, in an effort to cement relations with key LDCs in troubled regions (for example, Iraq), could fill the requests of these states for nuclear fuel or equipment without requiring stringent safeguards. The near-term prospects for Soviet cooperation in nonproliferation efforts are diminishing along with prospects for many other types of East-West cooperation. The pro-Western orientation of most potential proliferators, however, implies that Moscow should be at least as concerned as the United States about preserving an effective nonproliferation regime in a climate favoring the further spread of nuclear weapons. (C NF)

