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[Redacted]

1340, 1 Oct 79

TALKING POINTS ON PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA

I. Evolution of brigade

A. Historical

- 1. From '64-'79, US Intelligence Community believed the majority of Soviet gd. combat units which accompanied Soviet missile units in '62 had left Cuba by '63-'64 and that

- What was observed was consistent with transferring remaining equip. to Cubans
- And we were aware Soviet advisors & personnel remained
- Saw Soviets turn over 3 of 4 camps to Cubans

(-4th camp was Santiago; also presumed turned over)

In HINDSIGHT, size of Soviet presence at Santiago probably went down, but Soviets didn't leave or turn over

- 2. 1964-'70: Construction started up at Santiago [Redacted] 25X1

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- Assumed for Cubans

- 3. Early-mid-1970s - minimum intelligence collected primarily [Redacted] nothing indicating inconsistency w/previous intell. judgments

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- 4. Beginning in 1975-'76

[Redacted]

- 5. Spring of '79, NSC request for "Sov-Cuban Mil. Relationship" analysis

Process initiated review of intelligence observations as well as accumulated data

In July '79, Intell. Comm. concluded body of evidence suggests presence of Soviet gd. combat unit in Cuba at least since '76.

NSC review(s) completed.

[Redacted]

- Reported to Sr. officials & comm. of Congress
- Discussed w/SSCI, SFRC, Senate Armed Services Comm.

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As a result intensified efforts

-To substantiate (NSC memo 27 July 1979)

B. Current:

Results: Aug '79: [redacted] confirming evidence obt25X1ed

- Brigade indeed present
- Est. about 2600-3000
- Consists of hdqtrs, 3 motorized rifle bn., 1 tank bn., 1 art. bn. & other service & support elements

[redacted] Soviet tank bn., related combat & service support 25X1
[redacted]

[redacted]

But part of same equip [redacted] at Santiago 25X1

Another part [redacted] nr. Lourdes (10 mi fr Santiago) 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

II. Summary of what now known

- At least a small Soviet mil. presence stayed behind at Santiago when bulk of Soviet ground forces w/drawn in '62-'63
- Brigade (probably) evolved out of that presence
- Achieved essentially its present form at least by 1975-'76

-Not yet poss. to reach definite conclusion as to how long brigade as currently configured actually in Cuba.

-Mission: unclear

(-No direct evidence on this; that's why sought from Sovs in negotiations)

-5 basic hypotheses

(1) Trip wire

(2) Security for Sov interests [redacted] 25X1

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(3) Symbolic commitment to Castro, esp. as Castro sent troops to Africa

(4) Train Cubans

-Very possible that brigade initially had trng mission & that this atrophied between '70-'75 (why ? Cubans well-trained)

-But then Castro says "Don't leave"

-Don't want appear to lose any of commitment of Sovs at sensitive time

-Rev. turning outward again
-Angola, Ethiopia

-But no evidence brigade has training mission now

-T&E is for unit with integrated combined arms combat mission

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-No evidence of kind we would expect of Cuban involvement with unit

-Can't, however, exclude possibility of isolated instances of joint training activity

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(5) Some combination

III. Issue of brigades current function

A. Intell. has determined unit to be a combat brigade

B. Soviet claim: "training center" - of Cuban mil. personnel

C. Discussion: Possibility of some training not entirely excluded

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-In recent years (since '75)

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Brigade clearly is Soviet combined armed force unit

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D. Except for Castro's recent speech, Cuba references - not acknowledged (existence, identity, or location) 25X1

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JUL 1979

1. The US has had a competitive as well as cooperative relationship with the Soviets for a number of years. The Soviet-Cuban military connection is a major manifestation of this competition but the presence of 2-3000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba is a very small part of the challenge posed by the Soviets. Thus the issue raised by these troops needs to be put in perspective, and relative to events such as

- The buildup of Soviet military forces over the 1970s, about which there has already been substantial discussion.
- Soviet activities in Africa and elsewhere in Third World.

It is clear that the Soviet intentions are committed to expanding their influence and military presence wherever opportunities exist. The US, therefore, must both maintain an effective US-Soviet balance and be prepared to meet our aggressive competitor in Africa, C. America, and the Caribbean.

2. With respect to the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba, I have said that status-quo is not satisfactory. I have every intention to see to it that these forces are not used in any way that would disrupt stability in Latin America.

- To assure this, I have taken the following steps:

- a. Increased surveillance
- b. Pursuant to '62 Cuba Resolution and resolution of the Council of the OAS that if Cuba armed forces based, supplied, or serviced in Cuba, take or threaten offensive action against any American state, I will take measures, including use of armed force, as I deem necessary, to prevent or counter such offensive actions.
- c. Respond in a similar manner if Cuban armed forces take offensive action in other parts of the world that impair national interests of the U.S.

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These measures will adequately and effectively provide the ability to monitor closely the Soviet activities in Cuba and gauge the significance their presence represents.

3. As I have stated before, the current Soviet brigade in Cuba is not now a military threat. Our intelligence indicates that this unit

- a. has a ground force combat capability
- b. that elements of it probably have been in Cuba since 1962, although different in its organization and structure
- c. has changed from that of primarily an advisory/training unit for the Cubans to that of a combat unit, operating in recent years, independently of the Cubans.

However, its exact mission is unclear to us, and we will continue in our negotiations with the Soviet Union to determine the mission of the brigade.

4. We are not on the verge of a crisis similar to that we and the Soviets faced over Cuba in 1962 - And the steps I have taken assure that it won't become such.

5. There is, of course, another side of our relationship with the Soviet Union with which we must also deal appropriately. The brigade should not overshadow the significance of maintaining the dialogue established with the Soviets to deter a nuclear war. This has been something sought by every U.S. administration since the start of the nuclear era and that is why the responsible course is to proceed with SALT II. We must also reestablish our determination to move forward carrying out our strategic and other elements of our 5 year defense budget. We must enhance our efforts to meet our competitive challenge but avoid an irresponsible course of action of delaying or postponing SALT ratification.

In order to improve and ensure the effectiveness of our intelligence organizations, it is essential to protect needed secrecy of information concerning intelligence sources and methods. We cannot afford continued disclosures of sensitive intelligence information. Such disclosures risk the lives of our human sources and risk neutralizing our technical means of intelligence collection. We cannot afford the burdens unnecessarily imposed on our intelligence agencies by those who misuse their legal rights in an effort to destroy this country's intelligence capability, including those few misguided persons who wish to take the law into their own hands and destroy this country's clandestine human collection capabilities by deliberate exposure of CIA employees or agents under cover.

Accordingly, I have instructed Attorney General Civiletti to give the highest order of priority to finding ways to use the laws of the United States against those, whatever their motives, who engage in unauthorized disclosure of sensitive, classified intelligence information. In addition, I will promptly send to the Congress legislative proposals that, I am convinced, will strengthen legal protection of sensitive intelligence information without impairing the public's right to know relevant information. These include:

-- First, a proposal to exempt from the Freedom of Information Act categories of information on intelligence sources and methods, designated by the Director of Central Intelligence. The proposal will relieve the CIA and other intelligence agencies from the burden of searching vast quantities of unevaluated intelligence information with the attendant risk of inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. The proposal will, however, preserve the current right of every citizen to seek any information on himself that may be held in intelligence agency files.

-- Second, a legislative proposal to make it a crime for any person to knowingly and intentionally disclose, for the purpose of impeding United States intelligence activities, the identity of any person known to him to be an undercover intelligence officer or agent. Such a statute would curb the activities of those few Americans who seek to circumvent the due process of law and to destroy duly constituted agencies of the United States Government through the weapon of exposure of persons under cover.

DCI'S PROPOSED INSERT ON IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE

I have directed additional intelligence effort on Soviet/Cuban activities worldwide. Further, I am requesting the Congress to provide more resources to improve intelligence on Cuba, the Caribbean and Cuban as well as Soviet activities worldwide, especially in our own hemisphere. We will increase the number of analysts working on these problems. We will upgrade our collection efforts to give them better data and will provide them with better research aids with which to work.

Additionally, I will be asking the Congress for support in helping deter those who deliberately impede our intelligence agencies through the unauthorized release of intelligence information. The actions of such people have been particularly injurious in the Caribbean and Central American areas.