

26 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

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FROM :

[Redacted]

SUBJECT : Policy and Decisionmaking in a Crisis: Lessons
from Thirteen Days

1. In light of the meetings you will be attending over the next days and weeks, I took a look at Robert Kennedy's Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Two lessons struck me as relevant to today:

-Debate (such as proposed by Mr. Cutler) was essential

-Participants in the "ExCom" spent more time discussing the issues than they anticipated

-This opened up more options than previously on the table

-The President limited his involvement and this tended to permit people to speak more freely (creatively?)

-Only in the middle of the process (and after first meeting with the President) did the group agree on a procedure to develop recommendations. See Tab A for highlights)



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Attachment C is RFK's chapter on "Some of The Things We Learned."


2. With respect to the issue of you and others being pressured (by the media blitz) into moving more quickly than is warranted:

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- This administration/President has shown itself willing to back off until it had its act together (e.g. energy speech)
- Deliberations over US options in the '62 crisis lasted five full days and it took the "ExCom" three full days to discover new options (e.g. the blockade)



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Attachments

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A

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Thirteen Days

The President sent us back to

our deliberations. Because any other step would arouse suspicion, he returned to his regular schedule and his campaign speaking engagements.

The next morning, at our meeting at the State Department, there were sharp disagreements again. The strain and the hours without sleep were beginning to take their toll. However, even many years later, those human weaknesses—impatience, fits of anger—are understandable. Each one of us was being asked to make a recommendation which would affect the future of all mankind, a recommendation which, if wrong and if accepted, could mean the destruction of the human race. That kind of pressure does strange things to a human being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men. For some it brings out characteristics and strengths that perhaps even they never knew they had, and for others the pressure is too overwhelming.

Our situation was made more difficult by the fact that there was no obvious or simple solution. A dogmatism, a certainty of viewpoint, was simply not possible. For every position there were inherent weaknesses; and those opposed would point them out, often with devastating effects.

Finally, we agreed on a procedure by which we felt we could give some intelligent recommendations to

"A majority opinion . . . for a blockade . . ."

the President. We knew that time was running out and that delay was not possible. We split into groups to write up our respective recommendations, beginning with an outline of the President's speech to the nation and the whole course of action thereafter, trying to anticipate all possible contingencies and setting forth recommendations as to how to react to them.

In the early afternoon, we exchanged papers, each group dissected and criticized the other, and then the papers were returned to the original group to develop further answers. Gradually from all this came the outline of definitive plans. For the group that advocated the blockade, it was an outline of the legal basis for our action, an agenda for a meeting of the Organization of American States, recommendations for the role of the United Nations, the military procedures for stopping ships, and, finally, the circumstances under which military force might be used. For the group that advocated immediate military action, it was an outline of the areas to be attacked, a defense of our position in the United Nations, suggestions as to how to obtain support from Latin American countries, and a proposed communication to Khrushchev to convince him of the inadvisability of moving militarily against us in the Caribbean, Berlin, or elsewhere in the world.

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During all these deliberations, we all spoke as equals. There was no rank, and, in fact, we did not even have a chairman. Dean Rusk—who, as Secretary of State, might have assumed that position—had other duties during this period of time and frequently could not attend our meetings. As a result, with the encouragement of McNamara, Bundy, and Ball, the conversations were completely uninhibited and unrestricted. Everyone had an equal opportunity to express himself and to be heard directly. It was a tremendously advantageous procedure that does not frequently occur within the executive branch of the government, where rank is often so important.

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Thirteen Days

effect the greatest possible safety measures to protect our own aircraft carriers and other vessels.

After the meeting, the President, Ted Sorensen, Kenny O'Donnell, and I sat in his office and talked. "The great danger and risk in all of this," he said, "is a miscalculation—a mistake in judgment." A short time before, he had read Barbara Tuchman's book *The Guns of August*, and he talked about the miscalculations of the Germans, the Russians, the Austrians, the French, and the British. They somehow seemed to tumble into war, he said, through stupidity, individual idiosyncrasies, misunderstandings, and personal complexes of inferiority and grandeur. We talked about the miscalculation of the Germans in 1939 and the still unfulfilled commitments and guarantees that the British had given to Poland.

Neither side wanted war over Cuba, we agreed, but it was possible that either side could take a step that—for reasons of "security" or "pride" or "face"—would require a response by the other side, which, in turn, for the same reasons of security, pride, or face, would bring about a counterresponse and eventually an escalation into armed conflict. That was what he wanted to avoid. He did not want anyone to be able to say that the U.S. had not done all it could to preserve the peace. We were

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"The important meeting of the OAS . . ."

not going to misjudge, or miscalculate, or challenge the other side needlessly, or precipitously push our adversaries into a course of action that was not intended or anticipated.

Afterward, the President and I talked for a little while alone. He suggested I might visit Ambassador Dobrynin and personally relate to him the serious implications of the Russians' duplicity and the crisis they had created through the presence of their missiles within Cuba.

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RFK's Book

"Some of the things we learned . . ."

I OFTEN THOUGHT afterward of some of the things we learned from this confrontation. The time that was available to the President and his advisers to work secretly, quietly, privately, developing a course of action and recommendations for the President, was essential. If our deliberations had been publicized, if we had had to make a decision in twenty-four hours, I believe the course that we ultimately would have taken would have been quite different and filled with far greater risks. The fact that we were able to talk, debate, argue, disagree, and then debate some more was essential in choosing our ultimate course. Such time is not always present, although, perhaps surprisingly, on most occasions of great crisis it is; but when it is, it should be utilized.

But more than time is necessary. (I believe our deliberations proved conclusively how important it is that the President have the recommendations and opinions of more than one individual, of more than one department, and of more than one point of view.) Opinion, even

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fact itself, can best be judged by conflict, by debate. There is an important element missing when there is unanimity of viewpoint. Yet that not only can happen; it frequently does when the recommendations are being given to the President of the United States. His office creates such respect and awe that it has almost a cowering effect on men. Frequently I saw advisers adapt their opinions to what they believed President Kennedy and, later, President Johnson wished to hear.

I once attended a preliminary meeting with a Cabinet officer, where we agreed on a recommendation to be made to the President. It came as a slight surprise to me when, a few minutes later, in the meeting with the President himself, the Cabinet officer vigorously and fervently expressed the opposite point of view, which, from the discussion, he quite accurately learned would be more sympathetically received by the President.

We had virtual unanimity at the time of the Bay of Pigs. At least, if any officials in the highest ranks of government were opposed, they did not speak out. Thereafter, I suggested there be a devil's advocate to give an opposite opinion if none was pressed. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, this was obviously not needed.

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"Some of the things we learned . . ."

government be represented. Thirty years ago, the world was a far, far different place. The Secretary of State and his department could handle all international problems. Perhaps they were not always handled correctly, but at least this handling by one department was manageable. Our commitments were few—we were not as widely involved as we are today—but we were nevertheless a very powerful nation. We could and did, in places we felt our national interests were involved (such as Latin America), impose our will by force if we believed it necessary. The Secretary of State dealt with all the responsibilities without great difficulty, giving foreign-policy advice to the President, administering the department, directing our relationships with that handful of countries which were considered significant, and protecting the financial interests of our citizens around the world.

But that position has very little relationship with that of the Secretary of State today. The title is the same; it still deals with foreign affairs; but there the similarity virtually disappears. Today, the Secretary of State's position is at least five jobs, five different areas of responsibility, all of which could properly require his full time.

The Secretary of State must deal with more than one hundred twenty countries, attend to the affairs of the United Nations, and travel to numerous countries.

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He must receive ambassadors, attend dinners, and handle other protocol and social affairs (and lest anyone believe this to be unimportant, we might remember that Secretary Rusk missed President Kennedy's extremely important meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan in Nassau because of a diplomatic dinner he felt he should attend). The Secretary of State must deal with a dozen crises of various significance that arise every week all over the globe, in the Congo, Nigeria, Indonesia, Aden, or elsewhere. He must deal with the one or two major crises that seem to be always with us, such as Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962, and now Vietnam. Finally, he must administer one of the largest and most complicated of all departments.

Beyond the time and energy that are required in administering the office, there is another major difference in foreign affairs. Thirty years ago, only the State Department was involved in international matters. But that is no longer true. A number of other agencies and departments have primary responsibilities and power in the foreign-relations field, including the Pentagon, the CIA, the Agency for International Development, and, to a lesser degree, the USIA and other independent or semi-independent departments.

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ful single voice is that of the AID administrator, with the Ambassador—even though he is representing the State Department and is ostensibly the chief spokesman for the United States and its President—having relatively little power. In some countries that I visited, the dominant U.S. figure was the representative of the CIA; in several of the Latin American countries, it was the head of our military mission. In all these countries, an important role was played by the USIA and, to a lesser degree, the Peace Corps, the Export-Import Bank, the American business community in general, and, in certain countries, particular businessmen.

Individual representatives of at least the Pentagon, the CIA, and AID must be heard and listened to by the President of the United States in addition to the State Department. They have information, intelligence, opinions, and judgments which may be invaluable and which may be quite different from those of the State Department.

It is also true that because of the heavy responsibility of the Secretary of State, he cannot possibly keep himself advised on the details of every crisis with which his department has to deal. There is also the risk that as information is sifted through a number of different hands up to him or to the President, vital facts may be

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eliminated or distorted through an error of judgment. Thus it is essential for a President to have personal access to those within the department who have expertise and knowledge. He can in this way have available unfiltered information to as great a degree as is practical and possible.

During the Cuban missile crisis, the President not only received information from all the significant departments, but went to considerable lengths to ensure that he was not insulated from individuals or points of view because of rank or position. He wanted the advice of his Cabinet officers, but he also wanted the opinion of those who were connected with the situation itself. He wanted to hear from Secretary Rusk, but he also wished to hear from Tommy Thompson, former (and now again) Ambassador to the Soviet Union, whose advice on the Russians and predictions as to what they would do were uncannily accurate and whose advice and recommendations were surpassed by none; from Ed Martin, Assistant Secretary for Latin America, who organized our effort to secure the backing of the Latin American countries; also from George Ball, the Under Secretary of State, whose advice and judgment were invaluable. He wanted to hear from Secretary McNamara, but he wanted to hear also from Under Secretary Gilpatric, whose ability,

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"Some of the things we learned . . ."

knowledge, and judgment he sought in every serious crisis.

On other occasions, I had frequently observed efforts being made to exclude certain individuals from participating in a meeting with the President because they held a different point of view. Often, the President would become aware of this fact and enlarge the meetings to include other opinions. At the missile-crisis conferences he made certain there were experts and representatives of different points of view. President Kennedy wanted people who raised questions, who criticized, on whose judgment he could rely, who presented an intelligent point of view, regardless of their rank or viewpoint.

He wanted to hear presented and challenged all the possible consequences of a particular course of action. The first step might appear sensible, but what would be the reaction of our adversaries and would we actually stand to gain? I remember an earlier meeting on Laos, in 1961, when the military unanimously recommended sending in substantial numbers of U.S. troops to stabilize the country. They were to be brought in through two airports with limited capability. Someone questioned what we would do if only a limited number landed and then the Communist Pathet Lao knocked

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out the airports and proceeded to attack our troops, limited in number and not completely equipped. The representatives of the military said we would then have to destroy Hanoi and possibly use nuclear weapons. President Kennedy did not send in the troops and concentrated on diplomatic steps to protect our interests.

It was to obtain an unfettered and objective analysis that he frequently, and in critical times, invited Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, for whose wisdom he had such respect; Kenny O'Donnell, his appointment secretary; Ted Sorensen; and, at times, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, former High Commissioner of Germany John McCloy, and others. They asked the difficult questions; they made others defend their position; they presented a different point of view; and they were skeptical.

I think this was more necessary in the military field than any other. President Kennedy was impressed with the effort and dedicated manner in which the military responded—the Navy deploying its vessels into the Caribbean; the Air Force going on continuous alert; the Army and the Marines moving their soldiers and equipment into the southeastern part of the U.S.; and all of them alert and ready for combat.

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"Some of the things we learned . . ."

But he was distressed that the representatives with whom he met, with the notable exception of General Taylor, seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of steps they suggested. They seemed always to assume that if the Russians and the Cubans would not respond or, if they did, that a war was in our national interest. One of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once said to me he believed in a preventive attack against the Soviet Union. On that fateful Sunday morning when the Russians answered they were withdrawing their missiles, it was suggested by one high military adviser that we attack Monday in any case. Another felt that we had in some way been betrayed.

President Kennedy was disturbed by this inability to look beyond the limited military field. When we talked about this later, he said we had to remember that they were trained to fight and to wage war—that was their life. Perhaps we would feel even more concerned if they were always opposed to using arms or military means—for if they would not be willing, who would be? But this experience pointed out for us all the importance of civilian direction and control and the importance of raising probing questions to military recommendations.

It was for these reasons, and many more, that

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President Kennedy regarded Secretary McNamara as the most valuable public servant in his Administration and in the government.

From all this probing and examination—of the military, State Department, and their recommendations—President Kennedy hoped that he would at least be prepared for the foreseeable contingencies and know that—although no course of action is ever completely satisfactory—he had made his decision based on the best possible information. His conduct of the missile crisis showed how important this kind of skeptical probing and questioning could be.

It also showed how important it was to be respected around the world, how vital it was to have allies and friends. Now, five years later, I discern a feeling of isolationism in Congress and through the country, a feeling that we are too involved with other nations, a resentment of the fact that we do not have greater support in Vietnam, an impression that our AID program is useless and our alliances dangerous. I think it would be well to think back to those days in October 1962.

We have not always had the support of Latin American countries in everything we have done. Frequently, our patience has been sorely tried by the opposition of some of the larger South American countries to

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"Some of the things we learned . . ."

measures we felt to be in our common interest and worthy of their support. During the Cuban missile crisis, however, when it was an issue of the greatest importance, when the United States was being sorely tried, those countries came unanimously to our support, and that support was essential.)

It was the vote of the Organization of American States that gave a legal basis for the quarantine. Their willingness to follow the leadership of the United States was a heavy and unexpected blow to Khrushchev. It had a major psychological and practical effect on the Russians and changed our position from that of an outlaw acting in violation of international law into a country acting in accordance with twenty allies legally protecting their position.

Similarly, the support of our NATO allies—the rapid public acceptance of our position by Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan—was of great importance. They accepted our recitation of the facts without question and publicly supported our position without reservation. Had our relationship of trust and mutual respect not been present, had our NATO allies been skeptical about what we were doing and its implications for them, and had Khrushchev thus been able to split off the NATO countries or even one of our chief allies, our posi-

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tion would have been seriously undermined.

Even in Africa, support from a number of countries that had been considered antagonistic toward the United States was of great significance. With a naval quarantine around Cuba, our military reported, Soviet planes could still fly atomic warheads into Cuba. To do so they had to refuel in West Africa, and the critical countries with sufficiently large airports and the necessary refueling facilities were Guinea and Senegal. President Kennedy sent our two Ambassadors to see the Presidents of those two countries.

Sekou Touré of Guinea had been the subject of great criticism in the United States because of his friendship with the Communist nations; but he also admired President Kennedy. When our Ambassador visited him, he immediately accepted as true President Kennedy's description of what was happening in Cuba; said Guinea was not going to assist any country in constructing a military base on foreign soil; and announced that Russian planes would not be permitted to refuel in Conakry.

In Dakar, Ambassador Philip M. Kaiser had a close personal relationship with President Leopold Senghor, who a short time before had had a very successful visit to Washington. He, too, quickly perceived

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"Some of the things we learned . . ."

the danger and agreed not to permit Russian planes to land or refuel in Dakar.

In short, our friends, our allies, and, as Thomas Jefferson said, a respect for the opinions of mankind, are all vitally important. We cannot be an island even if we wished; nor can we successfully separate ourselves from the rest of the world.

Exasperation over our struggle in Vietnam should not close our eyes to the fact that we could have other missile crises in the future—different kinds, no doubt, and under different circumstances. But if we are to be successful then, if we are going to preserve our own national security, we will need friends, we will need supporters, we will need countries that believe and respect us and will follow our leadership.

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CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 8, 9, 10, 13, 20, 27, 31, AND AUGUST 3, 1970

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interested in, gentlemen. We are anxious to hear from you in that context.

Mr. Secretary.

(A biographical sketch of Secretary Nutter follows:)

HON. G. WARREN NUTTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

G. Warren Nutter took office as Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) on March 4, 1969. Born in Topeka, Kansas in 1923, he was educated at the University of Chicago, where he received his A.B. degree in 1941, an A.M. in 1948 and a Ph.D. in 1949. He served in the European Theater during World War II as an enlisted man and later was commissioned as a First Lieutenant in the Army Reserve. His decorations include the Bronze Star, the Combat Infantryman's Badge and three battle stars. Prior to coming to the Defense Department Mr. Nutter was Paul Goodloe McIntire Professor of Economics, Chairman of the Department of Economics, and Director of the Thomas Jefferson Center at the University of Virginia. Before going to the University in 1957, he was on the faculties of Lawrence College and Yale University. During the Korean War, Mr. Nutter served with the Central Intelligence Agency. From 1954 through 1967 he was a member of the research staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research and director of its lengthy Study of Soviet Economic Growth. In the latter capacity, he supervised preparation of several scholarly monographs including his own *Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union* (1962). During four years prior to his present appointment he was active in a number of international conference bringing together economists from the West and Eastern Europe. Together with *The Philadelphia Inquirer* he received the Gavel Award for distinguished journalism from the American Bar Association in 1968, for his series of articles contrasting the legal, political and social institutions of the United States and the Soviet Union, now published as *The Strange World of Ivan Ivanov*. He is also the author of four books, two translations of books and contributor of many articles to scholarly journals. His home is in Charlottesville, Va.

STATEMENT OF HON. G. WARREN NUTTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. NUTTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

My statement will be a little broader than this specific issue but I will be very pleased to focus on this later in questions and I will have something to say about it.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to be with you this morning to discuss our security posture in the Caribbean. The Caribbean basin has always been of special interest to U.S. security. It is, in effect, our "third border." Although the public focus has been mostly on other areas of the world in recent years. I want to assure the committee that we have been keeping a very careful watch on the situation in the Caribbean.

The security threat in the Caribbean can be divided into three elements--the internal threat to the security of the Caribbean governments, the threat from Cuba, and the threat stemming from Soviet military activities in the area. I will discuss each of these briefly in turn.

INTERNAL SECURITY

Active insurgency in the Caribbean area is, in general, under control by the security forces of the local governments, though some countries still require modest U.S. military assistance, primarily training, to develop and maintain adequate security capabilities. [Security deletion.]

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Cuba's help." Castro also continues to encourage local guerrilla leaders to acquire funds and arms through robbery, kidnapping and other violent means.

Castro has moderated his former propaganda campaign against his Latin American neighbors but has intensified the volume and virulence of anti-U.S. propaganda. Havana Radio broadcasts programs in eight languages and two Indian dialects, "Yankee imperialism," the Alliance for Progress, the Nixon administration, and the Central Intelligence Agency are prime targets of these abusive attacks. Havana Radio International broadcasts anti-U.S. speeches and interviews by disgruntled U.S. citizens. It reiterates the theme that there is only one approach to the solution of Latin America's problems: "the path of genuine revolution capable of destroying the present structure and putting an end to imperialist exploitation." The official Cuban Communist Party newspaper, *Granma*, maintains a steady anti-U.S. campaign denouncing racism in the United States and "the brutal aggression of U.S. imperialism" in Vietnam. Castro also supports the Afro-Asian Latin American Solidarity Organization, its propaganda organ, *Tricontinental*; and the Continental Organization of Latin American Students.

In sum, Castro has shown through his actions and words that he will continue to support subversion and revolution throughout the Americas

SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Soviet military activities in the Caribbean consist of military assistance to Cuba and Soviet air and naval operations that some times include visits to Cuba.

[Security Deletion.]

Soviet assistance has given Cuba the best equipped forces in Latin America, but these forces do not have the air or sealift to mount operations outside of Cuba. There are a substantial number of military advisers, technicians, and instructors in Cuba who oversee and protect the Soviet investment and sustain and enhance Castro's defensive posture. There are also advisers in the civil sector where, for example, the Soviets are assisting the Cubans at their experimental nuclear reactor. This reactor has no apparent military application.

The exchange of extended visits by Defense Ministers of the two countries within the past 8 months and Castro's speech of April 22 are indications of continued military cooperation between the two countries. In his speech, Castro explicitly stated that "Cuba would never sever its political and military relations with the U.S.S.R. On the contrary, we shall always be ready to have closer military ties with the Soviet Union."

In the last 12 months, we have observed new forms of Soviet military activity in the Caribbean that may challenge our security interests. In July of last year, Soviet naval combatants entered the Caribbean and visited Cuba for the first time. [Security deletion.] The purpose of this first Soviet naval visit may well have included familiarization with Caribbean waters. In May of this year, a more significant Soviet naval force, made up of three submarines (two conventionally powered, the other nuclear powered), a submarine tender and guided missile cruiser, a missile equipped destroyer, and an oil

CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN

MONDAY, JULY 27, 1970

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Mr. FASCCELL. The subcommittee will please come to order.

We meet this morning to hear testimony from the private sector in connection with the Cuban refugee program and issues relating to Cuba and the Caribbean.

It is our pleasure to have as a witness Mr. Manolo Reyes, a distinguished citizen of Miami, a man who is a leader among the Cuban exiles residing in that community, dedicated to the cause of a free Cuba, and who has gained a great deal of prominence as a broadcaster and creator of Latin American news at Station WTVJ in Miami. Mr. Reyes, I might add, has for years been the voice of warning, and has taken his share of accolades and abuse because of his determination that everybody shall have the best information that is available. Always uppermost in his mind is that some day Cuba will be returned to the Cuban people with a form of government of their own free choosing.

Without objection, I would like to put in the record a more complete biographical summary on Mr. Manolo Reyes.

(The biographical sketch follows:)

MANOLO REYES

Manolo Reyes started in broadcasting at Havana radio station CMQ as a 13-year-old singing talent in 1938. He continued in various capacities in broadcasting while carrying on his studies at La Salle Roman Catholic School and later at the University of Havana where he graduated with a degree in Diplomatic Laws in 1948, receiving his Law Degree in 1949. He was admitted to the Havana Bar Association in 1949 and in 1953 was named Director of the Official Bulletin of that association. When television came to CMQ, Mr. Reyes added to his schedule the duties of panel moderator of "The Great Jury of the People", a series of informal debates on legal and moral matters. He held the position of Sales Manager of CMQ from 1955 until 1960, when he and his family left Cuba for the United States to avoid Communist indoctrination of his children in Cuba's schools. Settling in Miami, Mr. Reyes was appointed Latin News Editor for Television station WTVJ in 1960. He has presented News en Espanol daily, except Sundays, since joining WTVJ and in this capacity serves the Spanish-speaking people in the Greater Miami area, aiming his newscasts to help Latin Americans adapt to new ways of life in the United States. In addition to supplying other media in the United States and Latin America with news of special interest to Latin

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see any obstacle to sending this kind of fuel to the nuclear submarine.
 Mr. ROYBAL. Is it not also possible that some of our own allies are sending fuel oil to Cuba?

Mr. REYES. From the Communist world?

Mr. ROYBAL. Our own allies. Is it not possible that it could come from Great Britain or from Canada or some other country?

Mr. GROSS. Whose tankers are going to Cuba, do you know?

Mr. REYES. As far as I am concerned, they are tankers of the Soviet Union. I know they have trade with Mexico because Mexico has diplomatic relations with Cuba. Now Chile is becoming involved and is going to trade with Cuba, plus Canada, plus Spain, France, and Great Britain. All of these nations are trading with the Castro regime.

We do not know the amount, and I cannot state right now what they are trading, but it could be possible, sir.

Mr. GROSS. Those flatbed trucks excited some curiosity on my part. I assume the flatbed trucks and their tractors that you described as having Soviet military personnel on them, are Russian tractors and flatbed trucks. Were the others operated and guarded by Cubans, Russians or British? The British sold quite a number of motor vehicles of one kind or another to them a few years ago, particularly buses. Do you happen to know whether those flatbed trucks are British-made, or what?

Mr. REYES. No, sir. I do not know the nationality. It seems that they are Russians. Up to now, it seems they are Russians. They are working there in very tight security. The number of Soviets in the island is increasing more and more. The latest estimate is about 10,000 Russian troops inside the island.

This is what we believe, 10,000 Soviet troops in the island.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Morse?

Mr. MORSE. Not at the moment.

CUBA'S "FISHING" FLEET

Mr. FASCELL. What about the increase in the so-called fishing type vessels? I remember there was the *Omicron* class which featured a 50-foot vessel with a lot of electronic gear on it. Are there reports about any increase in the number of those vessels or other changes in the fishing fleet?

Mr. REYES. The reports that we have, Mr. Chairman, are that the so-called fishing fleet of Castro is not actually used for fishing. Some are used for the guerrilla type warfare. With these kinds of fleet they can put a member of a guerrilla group in any deserted beach of the hemisphere, and then take him away. Some of this so-called fishing fleet has been used according to the reports that we have to smuggle not only men but also weapons, and it is believed that the cache of weapons that Castro sent to the Venezuelan guerrillas in 1964, and they were put into a certain beach in Venezuela called Baraguana, was deposited there by a so-called fishing boat. Actually they can smuggle also some kinds of drugs, narcotics, because we have to be very clear in the way we believe that the Castro regime sponsoring, in a large amount, the drug situation in the hemisphere.

He has got two goals in this matter. First, he gets American dollars, which he is hungry for, and secondly, he gets disruption of the family, which is the base of our contemporary society.

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Armed Forces in
Central and South America

by David Wood

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Colombia

General

Population: 18,000,000.
Selective military service of 18-24 months.
Total armed forces: 63,000.
Defence estimates 1965: 936,604,000 pesos (\$69,000,000).

Army

Total strength: 50,000.
8 infantry brigades.
Light armour, motorized infantry, artillery and engineer detachments.
On mobilization a total of about 300,000 trained men could be assembled.

Navy

Total strength: 7,000, including 1,000 marines.
3 destroyers.
1 frigate.
1 fast transport.
5 river gun boats.
8 coastguard vessels.
14 patrol craft.
4 other ships.
A marine battalion.

Air Force

Total strength: 6,000; about 150 aircraft.
6 CL-13B *Sabre* jet fighters.
8 *Catalina* maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
About 30 transport aircraft including C-47 and C-54 *Dakotas*, 4 DHC-3 *Otters* and *Beech C-45*.
Training aircraft include T-6, T-33A and T-34A *Mentors*.
About 20 helicopters are available, some of which are also operated by the Civil Authority.

Para-military forces

A National Police Force of about 35,000 men who can be used in a para-military role.

Costa Rica

General

Population: 1,500,000.
No military service.
No regular armed forces.
Defence budget (Civil Guard) 1965: \$2,300,000.

The Costa Rican Army was abolished in 1948,

and replaced by a Civil Guard with an approximate strength of 1,200.

There is no Navy or Air Force.

Cuba

General

Population: 7,750,000.
Military service: 2½ to 3 years (discretionary).
Total armed forces: 121,000.
Defence estimates 1965: 214,000,000 pesos (\$214,000,000).

Army

Total strength: 90,000.
9 infantry brigades (nominal divisions).
2 motorized brigades.
1 artillery brigade.
200 JS-2, T-34 and T-54 tanks.
Su-100 assault guns and BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers.
Frog short-range surface-to-surface missiles (mainly for coastal defence).
20 battalions SA-2 *Guideline* surface-to-air missiles.

Navy

Total strength: 6,000.
3 frigates.
12 submarine chasers (ex-Soviet).
2 patrol escorts.
12 fast patrol missile boats (ex-Soviet *Komar* type).
24 motor torpedo boats (ex-Soviet P-4/6 type).
Some Mi-4 *Hound* helicopters for ASW duties.

Air Force

Total strength: 25,000; 270 aircraft.
45 MiG-21 jet interceptors.
12 MiG-19 jet interceptors.
22 MiG-17 fighter-bombers.
50 MiG-15 jet interceptors.
About 50 transport aircraft, mostly Il-14 and Il-28, and about 24 Mi-4 troop-carrying helicopters.
60 T-28, T-33 and MiG-15 trainers.

Para-military forces

There is a well-trained militia of about 200,000 men and women.

Soviet forces in Cuba

The Soviet forces in Cuba, now mainly instructors and advisers, have been reduced to below 3,000 men.

Ecuador

General

Population: 5,300,000.
Selective military service of 11 months.
Total armed forces: 19,000.
Defence estimates 1965: 406,000,000 sucres (\$22,750,000).

Army

Total strength: 12,800.
3 infantry brigades.
1 motorized infantry battalion.
Artillery, anti-aircraft, engineer and signals detachments.
30 light tanks.

Navy

Total strength: 3,700.
3 destroyer escorts.
2 coastal escorts.
6 patrol craft.
2 landing ships.
5 other ships.

Air Force

Total strength: 3,500; 60 aircraft.
5 Canberra B-6 light jet bombers.
10 F-80C Shooting Star jet fighter-bombers.
8 Meteor FR-9 jet interceptors.
1 transport squadron with C-45 Expeditors and C-47 Dakotas.
2 Catalina maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
About 25 training aircraft including T-6 and T-33.
There are 3 Bell helicopters.

Para-military forces

Total strength: 5,800.

El Salvador

General

Population: 3,000,000.
Selective military service of 12 months.
Total armed forces: 5,630.
Defence estimates 1966: 26,000,000 colones (\$10,500,000).

Army

Total strength: 4,500.
3 infantry battalions (nominal brigades).

Dominican Republic

General

Population: 3,600,000.
Selective military service.
Total armed forces: 19,300.
Defence estimates 1966: 36,100,000 Dominican gold pesos (\$36,100,000).

Army

Total strength: 12,000.
4 infantry brigades.
1 artillery regiment.
1 anti-aircraft regiment
Reconnaissance, engineer and signals units.
AMX-13 light tanks, some armoured cars and scout cars.

Navy

Total strength: 3,800.
2 destroyers.
3 destroyer escorts.
5 coastal escorts.
5 patrol vessels.
6 patrol craft.
1 landing ship.
2 landing craft.
4 other vessels.

Air Force

Total strength: 3,500 men; 110 aircraft.
7 B-26 Invader piston-engined light bombers.
20 Vampire Mark I jet fighter-bombers.
20 F-51D Mustang piston-engined fighter-bombers.
2 PBY-5A Catalina maritime patrol aircraft.
20 transport aircraft, including 6 C-45 and 6 C-46, 3 DHC-2 Beaver and 3 Cessna 170.
30 training aircraft, including T-6 Texan, T-11 Kansan, BT-13 Valiant and PT-17 Kaydet.
2 Bell 47 and 2 Sikorsky H-19 helicopters.

Para-military forces

The Gendarmerie has about 10,000 men.

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