


The Director of Central Intelligence

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000200020004-7

Washington, D.C. 20505

158-79-1878

15 Aug 1979



MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Communist Intervention Comparison

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During our meeting on July 26th you asked if we could develop a paper discussing a comparison of Soviet, Cuban, and East German interventionist activities around the world from 1977 to 1979. I am sending you the attached matrix which was prepared with the help of Marshall Bement. I think that the matrix format is an appropriate device which permits crisp treatment of the data in a way that facilitates comparison.

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*signed*  
STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment  
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

13 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Robert R. Bowie  
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment

FROM : [redacted]  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Brzezinski Request for Communist Intervention Comparison

1. Action Requested: That you forward the attached memorandum to Brzezinski as our response to his request of 26 July for a paper comparing Soviet, Cuban and GDR interventionist activities around the world since 1977.

2. Background: The present paper was prepared by [redacted] OPA/USSR, following your 26 July conversation with Brzezinski (Your memcon of 27 July 1979 is at Tab A). Marshall Brent, the NSC Soviet Staffer, was consulted to help provide a sharper focus on Brzezinski's interests. The matrix format recommended itself as a device that would permit crisp, parsimonious treatment of the data in a way that would facilitate comparison.

[redacted]

Attachments:

- Study - [redacted] dtd 9Aug79
- Tab A - Memcon of 27Jul79

Upon Removal of Attachment and Caveats this Memo is Downgraded to SECRET

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SUBJECT: Brzezinski Request for Communist Intervention Comparison

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Soviet, Cuban and East German Interventionist Activities, 1977-1979

9 August 1979

Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
SSR: Afghanistan	<p>Since coup in 1978 Soviet involvement has increased substantially: total Soviet presence jumped from estimated 1500 to 3-4000, including military advisory mission, which grew from about 350 to 1500-2000. The countries signed 40-50 new economic aid agreements and a large new military accord; Moscow agreed to reschedule Afghan debts, and promised some food aid. Soviets have become deeply involved in directing government's anti-insurgent effort, but their combat role has thus far been limited to accompanying Afghan ground forces units and Afghan helicopter pilots on combat missions, and, by countersigning military orders, perhaps sharing combat command authority.</p>	<p>Afghan foreign policy now virtually identical to that of USSR, but inability of regime to consolidate power and stabilize domestic situation may prompt Soviets to attempt to replace present leadership in bid to achieve stability and to arrest progressive erosion of Soviet position and that of central leadership. There are no indications that the Soviets are preparing a large-scale military intervention, and they must realize that massive involvement on the ground could be costly in terms of regional relations with India and Iran as well as ratification of the SALT II treaty. Moscow could decide on a more limited operation, however, that would involve an assault unit with air cover in order to assure control of key installations or to protect the Kabul garrison.</p>

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
Angola	<p>Moscow intervened actively in 1975 to ensure the victory of the MPLA over its rivals, UNITA and FNLA. Moscow provided about 1,400 military and civilian advisers and large amounts of equipment for use by MPLA and Cuban troops. In addition to small arms and ammunition, the Soviets delivered tanks, artillery, aircraft and air defense weapons with a value of \$400-450 million. Soviet personnel did not play a combat role during the civil war. Their number remains the same.</p>	<p>The Soviet intervention was successful to the extent that the MPLA is recognized as the government of Angola. UNITA insurgency, however, continues to be a serious problem. Relations between the two states are good but economic difficulties and the insurgency have produced strains between Moscow and Luanda. Moscow remains the dominant foreign influence in Luanda and a radical change in the relationship does not appear likely in the near term.</p>
Ethiopia	<p>The Soviets began a large-scale airlift and sea-lift of military equipment to Ethiopia in 1977. They supplied massive amounts of equipment including tanks, artillery, MIG aircraft, air defense weapons and vehicles. The Soviets also dispatched some 1,300 military advisers that included the then first deputy commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces. Soviet advisers had overall responsibility for planning and directing Ethiopian-Cuban operations in the Ogaden, but they did not take part in combat. The Soviets did not play a combat role in Eritrea but they did provide logistic support and Soviet military assistance continued. Since 1977, Moscow has provided about \$2.1 billion in military assistance.</p>	<p>The Cuban-Soviet intervention was successful in expelling the Somalis from the Ogaden, and Moscow has capitalized on its initial success by expanding its economic and political ties to Ethiopia. While Ethiopia is dissatisfied with some aspects of its relationship with the Soviets (such as Soviet failure to deliver economic, especially hard currency, aid), relations are good and Ethiopia continues to support Soviet policy in Africa and the Middle East and has taken the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute.</p>

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9 August 1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
South Yemen	The Soviets have established a military, economic, and political presence in South Yemen, including increased use of naval and air facilities to support their Indian Ocean fleet, use of Aden as a transshipment point for personnel and material. The Soviets have assisted in establishing staging facilities used by the South Yemenis in lending military support to leftist forces operating against Oman. There are currently some 1,000 Soviet military advisers and 600 economic technicians in South Yemen. In the past decade the Soviets have extended approximately \$400 million in military assistance and \$200 million in economic aid to South Yemen. Military deliveries in 1978 reached a record high of \$133 million, most of it delivered in the second half of the year.	The Soviets have established close political relations with the Ismail regime. While they have gained neither the Friendship Treaty nor the unlimited access to South Yemen's naval and air facilities which they want, they have increased their access to those facilities and have transferred surveillance and monitoring functions to Aden which they previously maintained in Berbera. The USSR and South Yemen share a commitment to support "progressive" forces in the region, and Aden has been used as a transshipment point for material and personnel destined for Ethiopia.
Vietnam	Soviet economic presence in Vietnam quite large since 1975--perhaps as many as 3,000. Military presence quite low until Chinese invasion in 1979, when military presence may have grown from several hundred to over a thousand. Soviet-piloted AN-12s are in Vietnam to facilitate flow of men and materiel within Vietnam and to and from Kampuchea and Laos; Soviets have a communications facility similar to ones in Cuba, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan; they also have established and may be manning a direction-finding facility in Cam Ranh and have an intelligence collector off the coast of Vietnam. There is no evidence of Soviet combat involvement in Vietnam or Kampuchea.	Main military payoff for Moscow thus far has been Vietnamese willingness to allow 2 deployments by TU-95 aircraft to Vietnam as well as some 44 port visits by Soviet naval combatants and auxiliaries since February. Soviets almost certainly sold this to Vietnamese on grounds it would worry the Chinese, but principal Soviet objective is desire to conduct reconnaissance against the US in the area. Regular access to Vietnamese facilities would be useful to Soviets if they plan to maintain a permanent naval presence in the South China Sea. Secure repair (continued)

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9August1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
Vietnam (continued)		facilities in Vietnam would relieve overcrowding at Soviet facilities in the Far East, but Moscow would have to build the facilities in Vietnam. Soviets reportedly have asked for permanent access rights, but decline in their use since March suggests Vietnamese sincere in their protestations that no bases will be permitted.
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia	The Soviets are counting on their role as principal backer for the ZAPU faction of the Patriotic Front to help expand their influence in Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The Soviets provide almost all of ZAPU's weapons as well as training for ZAPU guerrillas at camps in Africa and the USSR. There are at present 475 Soviet military personnel in Mozambique itself acting as advisers to the Mozambique army, and twenty in Zambia working as advisers both to Zambian military and ZAPU.	Soviet support for ZAPU has strained Soviet relations with one of the principal front-line states, Mozambique, which supports ZANU. Despite extensive training by Soviet advisers and large amounts of Soviet equipment, ZAPU has not developed into an effective fighting force. Moscow has so far resisted pressure from Mozambique and Tanzania to provide weapons and training for ZANU. The recent unity agreement announced by ZANU and ZAPU meets one of the Soviet preconditions for such aid, and Moscow's East European allies have recently been more cordial in dealing with ZANU. Moscow could cite the agreement as a major ZANU concession should it choose to provide assistance to the more active guerrilla organization.

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9 August 1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
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CUBA: Angola

By 1977, Havana's involvement had escalated into a full-scale military operation to preserve the Neto Government, including 25,000-30,000 military personnel, many of whom were engaged in a direct combat role. Soviet aircraft began to transport Cuban troops to and from Angola in 1976. Soviet military advisers increasingly assumed a major role in planning of anti-guerrilla operations conducted by Cuban and Angolan troops. 18,000 - 19,000 Cuban troops remain, actually engaging UNITA forces in the south and maintaining defensive positions which free Angolan forces to assume direct combat role.

The Cuban military presence has stabilized the military situation in Angolá, but anti-Neto forces still control a significant portion of territory, particularly in southern Angola. Cuban troops are increasingly turning over ground combat missions to the Angolans, reflecting Havana's unwillingness to incur continued casualties. Angola is especially vulnerable to air strikes from South Africa and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and Cubans are operating SA-2 SAM and radar sites, and training Angolans to take them over, in an effort to develop an integrated air defense network. The protracted guerrilla struggle is having a debilitating impact on Cuban-Angolan relations, but the Neto regime has no viable alternative to a continued Cuban military presence. These minor tensions are unlikely to create serious strains in their relationship.

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
Ethiopia	<p>The Cuban military intervention in Ethiopia was closely coordinated with the USSR from the start in order to provide the Mengistu regime with the military support necessary to repel an invasion by Somali troops. The Soviets transported almost all of the 15-17,000 Cuban combat personnel to Ethiopia, where Soviet generals joined with Cuban and Ethiopian officers to form a unified command structure responsible for planning and conducting the war in the Ogaden. Cuban combat units have not become directly involved in the fighting in Eritrea, but Cuban military personnel have acted in a support role, including training, logistical support, and limited indirect combat support such as providing artillery fire.</p>	<p>The Cuban presence has declined to 12,500 since the defeat of the Somali invasion force. A large contingent remains in the Ogaden primarily as a garrison force, but it has also participated in the counterinsurgency campaign against the Somali-backed Western Somali Liberation Front. Most of the remainder are serving in northern Ethiopia and Eritrea where they provide training, logistical support, and combat support in the Ethiopian conflict with Eritrean separatists. Relations between Cuba and Ethiopia--solidified during the Ogaden conflict--continue to be close despite occasional friction.</p>
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia	<p>Cuban participation in the Rhodesian conflict has been limited by the traditional reluctance of some of the frontline presidents to permit the involvement of non-Africans. There are about 100 Cuban military personnel training ZAPU guerrillas in Zambia, and Cubans have been training ZAPU personnel in Angola, Ethiopia, and Cuba. Havana has also provided the ZAPU forces with a limited amount of military supplies and weaponry. Cuba and the USSR so far have resisted supplying arms requested by ZANU, but have indicated they would reverse their position if the rival factions made significant progress toward uniting their forces.</p>	<p>The level of Cuban involvement in the Rhodesian conflict has not increased significantly over the past year. The guerrilla conflict shows no signs of early resolution. Cuba seems to be focusing primarily on urging unity on the factions of the Patriotic Front before agreeing to increase its support.</p>

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
Namibia	<p>Although Cuban logistical assistance to the Namibian insurgents has been limited, Cuban instructors have played a primary role in training SWAPO's guerrilla force which totals at least 6,000. Most training has been conducted at SWAPO bases in southern Angola and southwestern Zambia. In addition, at least 500 SWAPO trainees have gone to Cuba for advanced training. Cuba sees the South African presence in Namibia as an important obstacle to the consolidation of the Neto regime in Angola. Havana is convinced that the UNITA forces are able to survive only because of the aid they receive from South Africa, much of it through Namibia. Consequently, Cuba has refrained from interfering with Western diplomatic initiatives on Namibia in the hope of reducing the South African military presence there.</p>	<p>The level of Cuban involvement in the Namibian situation has not increased significantly over the past year. The conflict shows no signs of early resolution. Cuba's policy priorities are oriented primarily to the security of the Neto regime and the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Support for the SWAPO insurgents is likely to be accorded less importance for the time being.</p>
South Yemen	<p>Cuba has sent military contingents to South Yemen on two occasions during the past 13 months to augment its 350-600 military advisers engaged in the organization and training of a people's militia. There is no evidence that these contingents have engaged in combat. The power struggle between Party Secretary Ismail and President Ali erupted into open conflict in 1978 and culminated in the execution of Ali; there is no hard evidence to support charges of direct Cuban involvement in Ali's removal, but Cuban advisers reportedly played a key role in rallying the militia in defense of Ismail. In addition,</p> <p>(continued)</p>	<p>In both cases, the mission of the Cuban contingents was accomplished. The Castro regime undoubtedly would act again to assist the Ismail Government should another internal or external threat arise. In the meantime, the number of Cuban military advisers in South Yemen will probably remain at the present level, estimated at 350-600.</p>

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9 August 1979

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
South Yemen (continued)	<p>Cuba reportedly shifted as many as 1,000 troops to Aden from Ethiopia shortly after the coup to ensure the dominant position of Ismail, whose dedicated Marxist ideology made him clearly preferred by Cuba and the USSR. The Cuban troops left when the threat posed by Saudi Arabia and North Yemen began to subside, but a smaller contingent--about 500--was sent in 1979 when fighting broke out between North and South Yemen. The Cuban personnel reportedly gave tactical combat advice, helped supervise the logistical system, and were involved in directing artillery fire from South Yemen. This contingent probably departed in late April.</p>	
Nicaragua	<p>Cuban arms shipments as well as tactical combat guidance provided by some two dozen Cuban military advisers based in Costa Rica played an important role in helping the Sandinistas oust the Somoza regime. The Cubans were careful, however, to coordinate their effort with other governments in the region in order to minimize the risk of a US reaction. During the FSLN offensive some 36 support flights--primarily by Panamanian and Costa Rican aircraft--carried arms, ammunition, and other supplies from Cuba to the FSLN forces.</p>	<p>Following the Sandinista victory, some two dozen Cuban military advisers moved quickly into Nicaragua and a military communications network was established linking Havana with Managua. The Cubans may thus already have begun to assist the new regime on security matters. The new government in Managua is likely to look to the Cubans to send additional military advisers to help transform the guerrilla forces into a conventional army. The Cubans can also be expected to begin using Nicaragua to support guerrillas from countries in the northern tier of Central America.</p>

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
Grenada	<p>While Cuba reportedly planned late last year to provide paramilitary training to members of Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM), we have no credible evidence that this training ever took place. Nevertheless, Cuba provided the NJM with some financial and material support in the months prior to the coup, and Havana clearly had foreknowledge of the event. Since the coup, Havana has reportedly supplied small arms, including rifles, revolvers, and light machine guns for 2,000 troops as well as an unknown quantity of heavy machine guns and four anti-aircraft guns.</p>	<p>Since Bishop assumed power, approximately 30-50 Cuban military advisers have been sent to Grenada. These advisers are probably providing guidance on internal security matters and could also serve as a small defensive force should former Prime Minister Gairy attempt to stage a counter-coup. In addition, it is likely that some Grenadians are receiving military training in Cuba.</p>

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
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
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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
GDR: Angola	There is no evidence of combat participation by the GDR in Angola although there are about 400 East German military personnel in the country in a training and advisory capacity. Some \$60 million in military agreements covering small arms, ammunitions, vehicles and spare parts have been concluded between Berlin and Luanda since 1977. From 1964 to 1977 East German military aid amounted to \$4 million.	East German support was not decisive for the MPLA's success in Angola.
Ethiopia	There is no evidence of combat participation by East Germans in Ethiopia although there are some 250 East German military personnel stationed in the country in a training and advisory capacity. In 1977-78, \$19 million in military agreements were concluded between Berlin and Addis Ababa calling for tanks, anti-aircraft guns, small arms, ammunition, training, and medical supplies.	The GDR's support has been helpful, but not essential, to the regime's success in Eritrea and the Ogaden.
Zambia	There are 30 East German military personnel with the ZAPU forces in Zambia.	The GDR's involvement is important to Nkomo's efforts in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, but not decisive, and Lusaka is not dependent on Berlin's support for its continued viability.

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Place	Nature of Involvement	Results to Date
Mozambique	The GDR has about 50 military personnel engaged in training and advisory capacities in Mozambique. The \$24 million in military agreements concluded between Maputo and Berlin since 1977 call for the delivery of assault and anti-aircraft guns, armored personnel carriers, and training.	The treaty of friendship signed last February opens the possibility of increasing the low levels of existing East German support.
South Yemen	There is no evidence of combat participation on the part of the estimated 300 East German military advisers, who provide training and technical assistance to the Yemenis.	Berlin's support has not been a major factor in the PDRY's efforts to unify North and South Yemen.

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9 August 1979

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Estimated Number of Communist Military  
Personnel Present in Less Developed  
Countries Outside Sub-Saharan Africa  
(as of July 1979)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Cuba</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Other</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>10,990</u>	<u>8,470</u>	<u>1,375</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>845</u>
<u>North Africa</u>	<u>2,935</u>	<u>2,310</u>	<u>215</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>410</u>
Algeria	1,015	1,000	15 <sup>1</sup>	-	-
Libya	1,910	1,300	200 <sup>1</sup>	NA	410
Morocco	10	10 <sup>1</sup>	-	-	-
<u>Latin America</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Guyana	10	-	10 <sup>1</sup>	-	-
Peru	150	150 <sup>1</sup>	-	-	-
<u>Middle East</u>	<u>6,355</u>	<u>4,560</u>	<u>1,150</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>345</u>
Iran	5	5 <sup>1</sup>	-	-	-
Iraq	1,380	1,100 <sup>1</sup>	150 <sup>1</sup>	NA	130 <sup>1</sup>
Kuwait	5	5 <sup>1</sup>	-	-	-
North Yemen	155	150	-	-	5 <sup>1</sup>
South Yemen	2,300	1,000 <sup>2</sup>	1,000	300	-
Syria	2,510	2,300	-	-	210 <sup>1</sup>
<u>South Asia</u>	<u>1,540</u>	<u>1,450</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>90</u>
Afghanistan	1,300	1,300 <sup>3</sup>	-	-	-
Bangladesh	50	-	-	-	50 <sup>1</sup>
India	150	150 <sup>1</sup>	-	-	-
Pakistan	40	-	-	-	40 <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 1978 estimate.

<sup>2</sup> Increased from 500 present in 1978.

<sup>3</sup> Increased from 700 present in 1978.

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9 August 1979

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Estimated Number of Communist Military  
Personnel Present in Sub-Saharan Africa  
(as of July 1979)

Country	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Cuba</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>3160</u>	<u>32335</u>	<u>800</u>	<u>870</u>	<u>37165</u>
Angola	1000	19000	400	-	20400
Benin	30	10	-	115	155
Botswana	-	-	-	5	5
Burundi	-	-	-	10	10
Cape Verde	55	5	NA	15	75
Cameroon	-	-	-	10	10
Chad	5	-	-	-	5
Congo	50	300	25	-	375
Equatorial Guinea	40	25 <sup>1</sup>	-	140	205
Ethiopia	1000 <sup>2</sup>	12500 <sup>2</sup>	250	-	13750
Guinea	35 <sup>3</sup>	50 <sup>3</sup>	40	30	155
Guinea-Bissau	50	50	5	-	105
Madagascar	15	15	-	100	130
Mali	180	-	-	-	180
Mozambique	475	215 <sup>4</sup>	50	100	840
Nigeria	35	-	-	-	35
Sao Tome-Principe	50	50	-	-	100
Sierra Leone	-	15	-	-	15
Sudan	-	-	-	25	25
Tanzania	120	-	-	50 <sup>5</sup>	170
Togo	-	-	-	10	10
Zaire	-	-	-	45	45
Zambia	20	100	30	215	365

<sup>1</sup> Reduced from 150 present during 1978.

<sup>2</sup> Reduced from 1300 Soviets and 16,500 Cubans in 1978.

<sup>3</sup> Reduced from 100 Soviet and 200 Cuban technicians present in 1978.

<sup>4</sup> Revised from 1978 data.

<sup>5</sup> Reduced from 180 present in 1978

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27 July 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,  
26 July 1979 (U)

16. He then asked me if we could develop a paper that would discuss a comparison of Soviet, Cuban and East German interventionist activities around the world from 1977 to 1978 or on to 1979. I told him that the Ethiopian caper overshadowed everything else in terms of numbers of troops and quantities of weapons, but that perhaps we could look at it in light of what number of countries and overall activity levels were for the two years. It is a tough one. Ask the NIOs to look at it and see if they can come up with any ideas.

*WIO/USA*



STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director



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30 July 1979

Collection Study: Soviet Military Activities in Cuba

Introduction

1. The Soviet presence in Cuba and its implications for US security are of utmost concern to US policymakers. Cuba provides the Soviets with a unique opportunity to gather intelligence on US military and space related activities as well as serving as a potential base for Soviet military operations in the Western Hemisphere. The upgrading of Soviet military ties with the Cubans since the beginning of 1976 has emphasized the provision of arms and military assistance. At the same time, [redacted] the possible presence of one or more Soviet ground force units in Cuba. These situations are the subject of close attention by the intelligence community. [redacted]

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2. Two recent interagency intelligence memoranda have addressed the Soviet military involvement in Cuba. CIA/NFAC has reviewed its current collection requirements relating to the Soviet presence in Cuba and has issued a number of additional requirements during recent weeks. In conjunction with these efforts, the National Intelligence Tasking Office (NITO) has reviewed the intelligence community's collection posture against this important intelligence problem. This summary outlines key collection objectives, describes the capabilities of specific collectors against each objective, and assesses the overall collection posture against the problem. [redacted]

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
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Imagery

8. There are standing imagery collection requirements for periodic area coverage of all of Cuba as well as a number of standing problem oriented sets which provide periodic surveillance of the significant point targets of interest in Cuba. Additionally, intelligence needs of high current interest, such as monitoring Soviet naval task force visits to Cuba, are targeted through collection by special airborne platforms. Despite the PHOTINT collection assets that are available, the overall PHOTINT collection capability is limited against the stated objectives. Most of the objectives involve Soviet activities that are not susceptible to collection by PHOTINT. For example, overhead imagery and other airborne assets provide little or no information on the

mission and roles of Soviet military units, the functions of MAG personnel, and plans for the employment or use of military facilities and equipment. [redacted]

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10. No specific recommendations for improving PHOTINT collection against the stated objectives were identified by intelligence analysts and collectors. Given competing target priorities and current resource restraints, both the analysts and collectors noted, however, that the availability [redacted] would give the US a greater capability than presently exists to respond quickly to higher priority special collection requirements that might evolve on the Soviet presence in Cuba. [redacted]

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HUMINT

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