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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National	Intelligence	Officers
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22 August 1979

	MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution	
25X1	FROM : National Intelligence Officer	for USSR-EE
	SUBJECT : Final Draft of Soviet-Cuban I	IM
	1. Attached is the final edited draft of Military Relations IIM, revised to take into a agreed to at our 2 August cleanup meeting, inc the Key Judgments circulated for your approval	ccount ch <i>a</i> nges luding changes in
25X1	2. I would like to have representatives' concurrences no later than Friday, so that this long-delayed IIM can be forwarded the Director of Central Intelligence for his a for placement on the NFIB schedule for formal principals on the next available date.	COB 24 August promptly to pproval and
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25X1	Attachment:, dtd 22Aug79	
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THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

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KEY JUDGMENTS

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- The Soviet-Cuban military relationship, which has strengthened since its inception in the early 1960s, clearly entered a new phase in 1975. The USSR embarked on a major program to upgrade Cuba's defenses and to give it the capability to conduct military operations in the Third World. Together the two countries entered into overt military intervention in Africa. For four years they have worked together with increasing confidence to promote the fortunes of Third World governments and revolutionary groups they favor.
- 2. The broad decision to modernize the Cuban armed forces apparently was made during 1975, probably before the Cuban involvement in Angola had become a major intervention. Some of the weapon systems delivered since 1975, however, may have been added to the modernization program as a "reward" for Cuba's actions in Angola and Ethiopia and as a result of a mutual desire to enhance Cuba's capabilities in future Third World conflicts. In any event, the weaponry supplied by the USSR since 1975 is transforming the Cuban armed forces from a home defense force into a military power with formidable offensive capabilities relative to those of Cuba's Latin American neighbors, and enables it to sustain an active interventionist role in the Third World.

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