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CHINA:
An Area Manual
Volume I Geographical, Historical,
and Military Background

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assumptions. Comments and criticism of
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Volume I Geographical, Historical,
and Military Background

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PREFACE

This is the first of three volumes of an area manual on China prepared by a group of scholars familiar with the Chinese language, geography, history, and culture. It is intended to serve as a compendium of general information for use by military personnel. Years of academic research and study are represented in this document which is, obviously, a distillation of myriad sources available on the subject. So vast is the field of literature on China that only selected reading lists — for a reader interested in a specific aspect of the material — are included at the ends of various chapters.

As China is in the throes of rapid social, political, and economic changes, it is difficult to make any definitive observations and generalizations regarding her people. Also, the limitations and imperfections of research techniques, the geographical remoteness of the country, and language barriers combine to make it almost impossible to arrive at positive conclusions regarding the four-hundred-and-fifty million people who live in that vast country. So academic research can do little more than identify and explore certain problems that will confront the military. It would be wise to check against current intelligence data the statements and principles to which this type of study leads. The latter should be modified, or even cast aside, as and when these data render them suspect.

Volume 1 deals with Chinese geography, provinces, history, military affairs, and Communist leaders.

Volume 2 surveys the socio-political areas: traditional ideologies, social organization, government, politics, education, literature, mass communication, and such sketchy miscellany as humor, modes of dress, superstitions, etiquette, the traditional and modern calendar, and traditional personages.

Volume 3 is a detailed analysis of Chinese attitudes and thought patterns. How and why the Chinese act in their unique manner is systematically explained for the understanding of the uninformed Occidental who may one day have to deal with them. This volume is of particular interest to paywar personnel since the emphasis is placed upon this phase of military operations.

In the preparation of this Manual the following rules have been adopted for the transliteration of Chinese words:

1. For place names the NIS Gazetteer, February 1952, is standard with the following exceptions:

(a) Names of all provinces, provincial capitals, large and/or well-known cities, rivers, canals and peninsulas are given conventional spelling (Chinese Postal Guide). An alphabetical table of all such place names is provided below, giving both the conventional spelling and the transliteration, according to the NIS Gazetteer.

(b) When place name is not covered by NIS Gazetteer transliteration is according to the Wade-Giles system.

(c) For non-Chinese place names not covered by the NIS Gazetteer (Mongolian, foreign, etc.) we use the Chinese Postal Guide's spelling as found in the National Geographic Society "Index to Map of China" (1945).

2. Personal names are transliterated according to the Wade-Giles system with the following exceptions.
 (a) Names of well-known Chinese persons are given conventional spelling. For the convenience of the reader such names are listed below in an alphabetical table giving both the conventional spelling and the Wade-Giles transliteration.
 3. All other Chinese words are transliterated according to the Wade-Giles system.

LIST OF PLACE NAMES (CONVENTIONAL TRANSLITERATION)
 WITH NIS GAZETTEER EQUIVALENTS

Conventional Transliteration	NIS Gazetteer Transliteration	Conventional Transliteration	NIS Gazetteer Transliteration
Amoy (Stroming)	Hsia-men	Hokiang	Ho-chiang
Amur River	Hsi-lung Chiang	Hopei	Ho-pei
Anhui	An-hui	Hsin River	Hsin Ho (Hsin-chai Ho)
Anshan	An-shan	Hsingan	Hsing-an
Antung	An-tung	Hulan River	Hu-lan Ho
Argun River	O-erh-ku-na Ho	Hunan	Hu-nan
Brahmaputra River	Ya-lu-t'ang-pu Chiang	Hubei	Hu-pei
Canton	Kuang-chow	Hui River	Hu-i Ho
Chaiar	Ch'i-a-sherh	Hwang (Yellow) River	Huang Ho
Changsha	Ch'ang-sha	Hwangpo (Whang-poo) River	Huang-p'u Chiang
Chefoo	Yen-t'ai	Ih River	I-h Ho
Chekiang	Ch'e-chiang	Jehol	Jo-ho
Cheng River	Cheng Shui	Kaifeng	K'ai-feng
Cheng-tu	Ch'eng-tu	Kan River	Kan Chiang
Chinghai River	Ch'in-hai Ho	Kan-su	Kan-su
Chinhsien (Chinchow)	Chin-hsien (Chin-chow)	Kiang River	Chia-ling Chiang
Chohui River	Ch'oh-hui Ch'i	Kiangsi	Chiang-shih
Chungking	Ch'ung-ch'ing	Kiangsu	Chiang-su
Dairen	T'ai-lin	Kiria	Chi-lin
Engtung (Yungting) River	Eng-teng (Yung-ting) Ho	Kiung River	Chiung-ling Chiang
Fen River	Fen Ho	Kowloon	Chiung-ling
Fuchun (T'aien Tang) River	Fu-ch'un (Ch'ien-t'ang) Chiang	Kwangchowaa	Ch'ang-chiang Shih
Fukien	Fu-chien	Kwangsi	Kuang-shih
Fushun	Fu-shun	Kwangtung	Kuang-tung
Hai River	Hai Ho	Kwei River	Kuei Chiang
Hailar River	Hai-lar-erh Ho	Kweichow	Kuei-chow
Han River	Han Chiang	Shansi	Kuei-sui
Hangchow	Hang-chow	Shantung	Kuei-yang
Hankow	Hai 'you	Shenai	Shen-hai
Heilungkiang	Hoi-lung-c'ang	Shi (West) River	Shi Chiang
Hofa	H-fai	Siao	Hsiao
Honan	Hon-an	Siang River	Hsiang Chiang
Hong Kong	Hsiang-kang (Hsiang-chiang)	Sikang	Hsi-kang
		Sining	Hsi-ning
		Sinkiang	Hsin-chiang

LIST OF PLACE NAMES (CONVENTIONAL TRANSLITERATION)
 WITH NIS GAZETTEER EQUIVALENTS

Conventional Transliteration	NIS Gazetteer Transliteration	Conventional Transliteration	NIS Gazetteer Transliteration
Liaotung Peninsula	Liaotung Pan-tao	Soochow (Wuhsien)	Su-chow (Wu-hsien)
Lien River	Lien Shui	Suifu River	Sui-fen Ho
Linyu (Shanhai-kuan)	Linyü (Shan-hai-kuan)	Suiyuan	Sui-yuan
Liu River	Liu Chiang	Sungari River	Sung-hua Chiang
Lo River	Lo Ho	Sungkiang	Sung-chiang
Luan River	Luan Ho	Szechow	Szech'ou
Lungkiang (Tsitahar)	Lung-chiang (Ch'i-ch'i-ha-erh)		Su-ch'uan
Macao	Ao-men	Taching River	T'ach'ing Ho
Manchuria	Tung-pei (Lo-pin)	Taipei	T'ai-pei
Mei River	Mei Chiang	Taipei River	T'ai-pei Ho
Mekong River	Lo-t'ang Chiang	Taiwan (Formosa)	Tai-wan
Mi River	Mi Shui (Mi Chiang)	Tao River	Hsiao Shui (Tao Chiang)
Min River	Min Chiang	Tatu (Tung) River	T'achun Ch'uan
Minhou (Fochow)	Min-hou (Fu-shou)	Tenian	T'ien-ching
Mukden	Sho-yang	Tu River	T'u Chiang
Muling River	Mei-ling Ho	Tsuan	Chi-nan
Mutan River	Mu-tan Chiang	Tinghai	Ch'ing-hai
Nanchang	Nan-ch'ang	Tinghai River	Ching Ho
Nanking	Nan-ching	Tingtao	Ch'ing-tao
Ningxia	Ning-hsia	Tingyuan (Paoting)	Ch'ing-yuan (Pao-ting)
Ningsia (Yinchuan)	Ning-hsia (Hsin-ch'uan)	Tumen River	T'umen Chiang
Noli River	Nao-lí Ho	Tung (East) River	Tung Chiang
Noni (Nun) River	Nen Chiang	Turfan	T'u-fu-fan
Nunkiang	Nen-chiang	Tzu River	Tzu Shui (Tzu Chiang)
Pai River	Pai Ho	Urumchi (Tibwa)	Urumchi (Ti-hua)
Pei River	Ch'i Chiang	Usun River	Wu-sui Chiang
Pei (North) River	Pei Chiang	Wanchuan (Galgan)	Wan-ch'uan
Peiking	Pei-king	Wei River	Wei Ho
Penki	Pen-ch'i	Wu River	Wu Chiang
Pinkiang (Harbin)	Pin-kiang (Hsien-chin)	Wu River (Su-chou Ho)	Wu Chiang (Su-chou Ho)
Port Arthur	Lu-chuan	Wuchang	Wu-ch'ang
		Wushih	Wu-shih
Red River	Yuan Chiang	Yuan (Yachow)	Wa-an (Yachow)
Salween River	Na Chiang	Yalu River	Ya-lu Chiang
Shanghai	Shang-hai	Yangku (T'ai-yuan)	Yang-ch'ü (T'ai-yuan)
Shan-tzu (Pai) River	Shang-tzu (Pai) Ho	Yangtze River	Ch'ang Chiang
Shansi	Shan-shih	Yellow Sea	Huang Hai
Shantung	Shan-tung	Yenan (Fushih)	Yen-an (Fu-shih)
Shenai	Shen-hai	Yi River	Yi Ho
Shi (West) River	Shi Chiang	Yuan River	Yuan Chiang
Siao	Hsiao	Yun Ho (Grand Canal)	Yun Ho
Siang River	Hsiang	Yung River	Yung Chiang
Sikang	Hsi-kang	Yungku (Kerlin)	Yung-ku (Ch'ien)
Sining	Hsi-ning	Yungku (Wenchow)	Yung-ku (Wen-chow)
Sinkiang	Hsin-chiang	Yungting (Nanning)	Yung-ting (Nan-ning)
		Yunnan	Yun-nan

LIST OF PLACE NAMES (CONVENTIONAL TRANSLITERATION)
WITH NIS GAZETTEER EQUIVALENTS

Conventional Transliteration	Wade-Giles Transliteration	Conventional Transliteration	Wade-Giles Transliteration
Chen, K. P.	Ch'ên Kuang-p'u	Liu Shao-chi	Liu Shao-ch'i
Chiang Kai-shek	Chiang K'ai-shek	Mao Tse-tung	Mao Tse-tung
Chiang Kai-shek, Mme.	(née) Sung Mei-ling	Soong, T. V.	Sung, Ts'ü-wên
Chou En-lai	Chou En-lai	Sun Yat-sen	Sun Chang-shan
Chu Teh	Chu Teh	Sun Yat-sen, Mme.	(née) Sung Ch'ing-ling
Kon, V. K. Wellington	Ku Wei-chun	Tan Kah-kee	Ch'ên Chia-keg
Kung, H. H.	K'ung Hsiang-hai	Tsiang, T. F.	Chiang Ting-lu
Kurg, H. H., Mme.	(née) Sang Ai-ling		

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Introduction—Ai Sze-ch'i—Chang Ch'ung—Chang Hsi-jo—Chang Lan—Chang Po-chün—Chang Ting-ai—Chang Tung-sun—Chang Wen-t'ien—Chang Yun-ai—Ch'én I—Ch'én Li—Ch'én Ming-shu—Ch'én Po-ta—Ch'én Shao-min, Miss—Ch'én Shao-t'ung—Ch'én T'an-ch'iu—Ch'én Yün—Ch'eng Ch'ien—Ch'eng Wei-sao—Ch'iao-ting—Ch'ien Ch'ang-chao—Ch'ien San-ch'ang—Chou En-lai—Chou Yang—Chu Teh—Feng Wen-pin—Fu Tsai-i—Ho Hsiang-shang, Miss—Hsiang—Hsieh Chueh-tsai—Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien—Hsu Ping—Hsu T'ung—Hsu Ts'ing—Hu Ch'ao-mu—Huang Shao-ch'ang—Huang Yen-p'ing—Jao Shao—K'ang Sheng—Kao Ch'ung-min—Kao K'ang—Ku Ts'ao-t'ung—Kuo Xun—Li Chi-shén—Li Chu-ch'én—Li Fu-ch'eng—Li Hsien-nien—Li Liang—Li Sh'uan, Miss—Li Wei-han—Liao Ch'eng-chih—Lin Feng—Lin Piao—Liu Ts'ao-han—Liu Fei—Liu Ning-i—Liu Po-ch'eng—Liu Shao-chi—Liu Ts'ao—Liu Ya-t'ai—Lo Jui-ch'ing—Lo Jung-huan—Lo Lung-chi—Lo Shao-ch'ang—Lu Ting-i—Lung Yün—Ma Hsi-tun—Ma Ming-fang—Ma Yün—Mao Tse-tung—Nieh Jung-chén—P'eng Chén—P'eng Teh-huai—P'eng-min—Po I-po—Shao Li-t'ung—Shen Chün-ju—Shen Yen-ping—Shen Ts'ung—Su Yu—Sun Yat-sen, Mme.—Sung Jen-ch'ung—Tan Chén-tai—Kah-kee—Tan Ping-shan—T'eng Hsiao-p'ing—T'eng Tai-yuan—T'eng-hui—T'eng Ying-ch'ao, Miss—Ting Ling, Miss—Ts'ai Ch'ang, Miss—Ts'ai Ch'ing-k'ai—Tseng Shan—Tseng Sheng—Tung Pi-wu—Wang Chia-hsi—Wu Yu-chang—Yeh Chi-chuang—Yeh Chien-ying—Yun Tsé

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
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CHINA:
AN AREA MANUAL



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CHAPTER I GEOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

The purposes of the present chapter are: first, to give to the reader the main facts about Chinese geography; second, to give a general picture of the Chinese people, with special attention to how they vary in particularities from region to region; third, to direct attention to certain continuing problems which the land and its people pose for any regime that governs China, and for any individual or group which lives there.

It is assumed that military personnel will do a more effective job and pull fewer "bones" if they can visualize the physical context with which they are dealing. They can carry in their minds a picture of the way the Chinese divide from the standpoint of racial origin and resultant physical characteristics; they can have a grasp of the problems of the Chinese people insofar as these problems derive from the fact that this kind of people live in this kind of physical context.

The most popular conception of China in recent years is: China is a huge country, very remote geographically from the US, dense, populated by hard-working farmers; it is visited at brief intervals by devastating wars and/or famines, but is destined, despite everything, to develop into a virtually unlimited market for manufactured goods from the more fortunate West.

As the reader will discover in the following pages, this picture is partly correct, partly incorrect; partly made up of an answer, neither correct nor incorrect, to a question that cannot be answered at all until it has been restated. The real question is: what limits are placed on China's future development by geographical and demographic factors that have deeply affected China's development in the past? It will not be answered here in complete or systematic fashion. But it has been constantly present in the minds of the authors and the reader will probably find the discussion more useful if he keeps it in mind as he reads what they have written. For a sense of the limits on a target country's future development should, like a grasp of a target audience's problems, help military personnel to hold their blunders to a minimum.

This should not be understood to mean that the present chapter attempts any special pleading for the importance of geography and/or demography (as opposed to, for example, accident of personalities) as determinants of history. The point is, rather, that Chinese history at least has demonstrably been what it has been in considerable degree because Chinese geography and Chinese demography are what they are. Too, the reader will understand that history better if he approaches it already knowing the main facts in this chapter.

THE AREA CONTEXT

The reader will understand China better if he thinks of it always against the background of the great natural "area" to which it belongs, the continent of Asia. Its being

in the eastern part of Asia, for example, explains its climate. The fact that it has such and such neighbors, separated from it by such and such distances across or off the coast of Asia, explains much about its external communications, including its trade. Before considering China itself, then, it would be well to grasp the essentials of Asian geography.

Central Asia lies to the west of China and to the north of India. It is a land sharply divided by great mountain ranges, between which stretch, at high altitudes, vast plateaus. To the northwest of India there is the Pamir Range. Along the northern frontier of India there are the Himalayas; north of the Himalayas lies the Tibetan Plateau, then the Kunlun Range (running eastward into China, where it is known as the Chin Lung Range), then — another plateau — the Tarim Basin, and then, at its northern extremity, the T'ien Shan (or T'ien Mountains). These mountain ranges are not only high but extensive, so that the plateaus account for a bare one-fifth of Central Asia's total area.

This information is included because of the effect the geography has had upon the development of the continent as a whole and of China in particular. Because of its high mountains and its vast, desolate plateaus, this is a part of the world where political or even cultural unity on a continental scale has always been out of the question. China and India have developed, politically and culturally, with a degree of mutual independence that is only in small part a matter of the distance between them. Divided as they are by the Tibetan Plateau and the Himalayas, they had to develop independently. Such contact as they had with one another took place for many centuries either along a route from northwest India through the Tarim Basin and Turkestan into northwest China, or along a sea-route from the coast of India to the coast of south China. Both routes were so long and difficult and dangerous as to discourage regular travel. Of the two, however, the land route was the easier, which is to say that China was most open to penetration, from India and the rest of the outside world, on the north. Here it was, therefore, that China built its Great Wall as a protection against invaders.

This geographic setting encouraged China, from the earliest moments of its history, to develop a civilization and culture markedly different from those of other countries, and to maintain — by skillful and energetic exploitation of its natural defensive barriers — its territorial integrity and its political autonomy. China's so-called isolation through the centuries can be, and often is, overemphasized. The flow of goods and even of ideas back and forth across its borders, though sometimes reduced to a mere trickle, has at no time been entirely interrupted. At the same time, however, the flow had seldom, even as late as the nineteenth century, been large enough over any considerable period to have any noticeable impact upon China's cultural, political, or economic development. The one notable exception was the introduction of Buddhist religion, philosophy, and art from India. It is, therefore, only as one grasps the meaning of this isolation through the centuries, and the connection between it and the facts of Asia's geography, that one is able to understand what has happened to China in recent decades. A long series of technological developments in the outside world, the first of which was the emergence of the steam-driven ship, gave to foreigners the means with which to surmount or circumvent the barriers that had made China's isolation possible. Another long series of developments in the outside world, partly technological and partly economic — frequently called the industrial revolution — caused foreigners to adopt a new attitude toward the long journey to China, and to knock more insistently than formerly at China's door once they had made the journey. Because they had been isolated for so long, the Chinese were slow to comprehend that an age had ended. It took three generations to convince any substantial number of Chinese that they could no longer rely on geographical obstacles to penetration — perhaps even absorption — by the outside world.

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THE AREA AND POPULATION OF CHINA

There are several facts that must be kept in mind from the very beginning of any discussion of the area and population of China. One is that much of what history knows as Chinese territory, especially Outer Mongolia and Eastern Siberia, has been lopped off. The geography considered herein is that of a mutilated China. Another is the great lack of reliable statistics. Even the number of people in China is a matter for conjecture: some estimates put it as high as five-hundred million, some as low as three-hundred-thirty million, while the most widely accepted estimate, four-hundred to four-hundred-fifty million, has a built-in margin of error of fifty million — roughly one-third the total population of the US. If one inquires about the rate at which China's population is increasing, the best answer is "very rapidly," since here again figures are mostly guesswork. One authority puts the probable increase at thirty-seven million every ten years; but *ipso facto* it makes allowances for the population scourges, especially famines and wars, that have always operated to keep China's population down. To these scourges it is impossible to assign any special numerical value. The "very rapidly" answer rests on sound if not precise evidence. The T'ai-ping Rebellion (about 1850-64), whose death toll is thought to have been about twenty million (in Central and South China), does not appear to have relieved China's problem of over-population, except momentarily. Large families are looked on with favor by Confucianism, which holds that there is no personal failure to be compared with not perpetuating one's family, i.e., not providing for the continuous worship of one's ancestors.


The bulk of China's population lives on farms, not in the cities. This is certain if not precise, although travellers to China often come away, having visited only the few large urban centers, with the opposite impression. Its agricultural countryside is thus densely populated, for only a small proportion of its estimated 3,657,765 square miles is fit for cultivation. In the Yangtze Plain, for example, there are perhaps as many as 891 persons per square mile, in the North China Plain perhaps 647, and in the basin of Szechwan perhaps 581 per square mile. Assuming the accuracy of these figures, they work out to only two-fifths of an acre per person living on cultivated land. Already one can see why China has a food problem: for the people who live on cultivated land must feed the people who do not, and with only two-fifths of an acre apiece the task cannot be easy.

Unavoidably, given its population and territory, China is a country of extremely low living standards. For the same reasons, human labor in China always fetches a low price, in terms at least of purchasing power. Thus, the mass of the population does not play, as consumers of goods, a role nearly so important as that which they play in the US. The great potential market that some observers in the West have professed to see in China is not there, nor will be until China solves the problem posed by its population — whether by reducing its numbers somehow, or by introducing machine methods of production and thus ultimately increasing the size of the pie the millions must share. The reader will learn later why the introduction of machine methods on any large scale is unlikely during the foreseeable future.

Ethnology

Little or nothing is known about the origins of the Chinese people, although certain tribes that exist today have good claim to be their descendants. Certain human bones, discovered near Peking in 1928 and said to be some five hundred thousand years old, are thought to belong to Peking Man (*Sinanthropus pekinensis*), i.e., to a human species of the

* Peking is used throughout for editorial consistency. The name has been changed from Peking to Peiping several times, but the city was known as Peking for most of the modern period and is so called by the Communists now.



(G. B. Cressey, ASIA'S LANDS AND PEOPLES)

Fig. 2 — China's Population

Centuries of famine, invasion, and normal population increase have pushed the 450,000,000 STAT into every area that will possibly support life. The population map is at the same time a guide to agriculture possibilities and level land. The dark areas are densely populated because people can live there; the lightly dotted areas have been demonstrated to have a low population-supporting capacity. No conspicuous changes are possible.

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Early Stone Age. The Chinese could, then, have descended from very ancient ancestors in the very territory they now inhabit, there being no conclusive evidence for the view that they are descended from peoples who migrated into China. Some authorities speak, in this connection, of an alleged migration of culture and peoples eastward from the West, probably along a route north of Nan Shan. Others hold that the point of origin of the Chinese lay to the south. Inconclusive attempts have been made to link the early Chinese people to the Alpine race.

Whether their main line of descent is from stay-at-homes in their own territory or from migrants who came into it from elsewhere, the present-day Chinese are a mixture of races. There are definite records of numerous invasions of the fertile valleys and plains of North China, the seat of Chinese civilization, by non-Chinese stocks from the less favored regions on the North, Northeast, and West. Such of these incursions as led to a prolonged or extensive occupation presumably left their mark, not only culturally but racially as well. The names of the leaders of some of these intrusions are known, and scholars have been able to designate at least the major strains that have been added, over the past two thousand or twenty-five hundred years, to whatever race may have inhabited the territory at the beginning of the period. The Turks, the Mongols, and the Manchus must all have made their contribution. So must the aboriginal groups, such as the Man, the Miao and the Yao. So must the peoples on China's present borders: the Tibetans, the Mongols, and the Koreans. There was, in short, good reason for the five-barred flag of the Republic of China of 1912, which symbolized the so-called five races of China: the Chinese, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Moslems. The test of races that inspired it is ethnically unsatisfactory. But it is a useful reminder of the heterogeneity of China's present population.

In physique, however, the Chinese are extraordinarily homogeneous, considering the number of persons and the diverse natural conditions in which they live. The reason for this appears to lie in the recent origin of the Chinese as compared to, e.g., the people of Europe. The latter, who seem to have had a much longer racial history, also differ among themselves in physique much more than the Chinese.

Thus, the geographical distinction between the northern and southern parts of China is not merely geographic: the people differ in stature (southern Chinese being shorter), in complexion (southerners are slightly darker), and perhaps, though this is less certain, in the shape of their noses (southerners are said to have broader noses). Such differences evidently must be accounted for by reference either to racial or to environmental factors, and the latter are difficult to isolate and explain. Thus, while the small stature of the southerners might conceivably be due to environmental conditions, a more probable explanation is that at some time their ancestors intermarried with short-statured aborigines (or did not intermarry with tall stocks that somehow entered into the racial composition of the northerners). On the other hand, the difference in skin color is probably due to more frequent exposure of the southerners to the sun's rays. But they may also have mixed with darker-skinned races in the remote past, and may therefore owe some of their pigmentation to racial factors.

There is little of the kind of detailed knowledge one needs to speak authoritatively about their ethnology. All one can say is that the term Chinese denotes a fairly definite physical type, which, however, varies somewhat from region to region of the country — most probably because of comparatively recent blending with other races.

As for the theories put forward concerning the actual origin of the Chinese people, all one can say about them is that none has yet been conclusively proved. A word is in order here about the Chinese Moslems. Although only a number hardly more than ten million, they have played an important and disturbing role in Chinese history, and pose

interesting problems of their own from the ethnological point of view. They fall into three distinct groupings — Arab, Mongol, and Turki — and speak different languages. The Arab Moslems are to be found in Tientsin, Peking, and Canton. The Turki Moslems live mostly in Kansu, but extend as far east as Ta-tung in Shansi. Both are late comers into China, but have already absorbed many Chinese customs. Less, however, than the community of the Jews that settled a long time ago in Kaifeng, the principal city of Honan. They have so mingled with the Chinese population of this place that they have practically lost their identity. The Mongol Moslems live in western Inner Mongolia and north-eastern Sinkiang.

PHYSICAL FEATURES AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

From the standpoint of topography, China is divided into four sections: a, the northern uplands, including Mongolia, Shansi, Hopeh, and part of Manchuria; b, the central plain, or the area running roughly southeast from Peking to Shanghai and up the Yangtze to the head of deep-water navigation at Ich'ang; c, the Central Mountain Belt in the northwest, central west, roughly separating north China from South China; d, and the high lands of the southern coast, of Yunnan, and of western Szechwan. This breakdown does not, of course (in view of China's size), give areas that are topographically homogeneous, and it includes mainly the part of China on the mainland and south of the Great Wall, i.e., "China Proper." For regions that have a truly individual topography and location, thus a human geographic environment entirely their own, one needs a breakdown of twelve to sixteen regions (authorities differ on the exact number). For present purposes the general divisions given will suffice, plus some detailed information on the special features of China's topography.

The student unacquainted with China finds himself up against a vast number of unfamiliar proper names of places, provinces, mountains, rivers, and other geographical features. How many of these he must connect up with what they stand for, and then carry in his mind, will of course vary with his purposes in studying them. This chapter attempts to do no more than identify the chief mountains, rivers, provinces, and cities, with a word or two about them, on the assumption that the student who requires more than that will turn to one of the many treatises on Chinese geography.

Mountain Ranges

Chin Ling Range: the eastern end of the Kunlun Range, which borders the northern side of the Tibetan Plateau. It runs roughly east and west through the provinces of Kansu, southern Shensi, and Honan, to a point close to the sea.

The Shantung Massif: rises in central and western Shantung Province; formed an island in the Yellow Sea in early geological ages but has since been connected with the mainland by the alluvial deposits of the Yellow River (Hwang Ho).

T'ai-hang Range: a branch of the Chin Ling, running north into Shansi.

Kunlun Mountains: western Manchuria and Jehol.

The Ch'ang-pai Shan: eastern border of Manchuria; run northeast from the Linotung Peninsula.

The Szechwanese Alps: surround Red Basin of Szechwan Province, in western China. The mountains of southern and eastern China run from the Yunnan Plateau eastward to a point close to the southeastern coast of China.

Rivers

The Yellow River or Hwang River: some 2700 miles in length, it follows a course from Tibet to Kansu Province to Inner Mongolia, then south along the western boundary of Shansi Province. Here it turns northwest, to empty into the Yellow Sea north of the Shantung Peninsula. It is for the most part unnavigable.

The Yangtze River: China's greatest river, and also one of the world's greatest. It runs a distance of over 3000 miles from eastern Tibet to the sea. From the sea near Shanghai to I-ch'ang above H'ankow, a distance of 1000 miles, it is navigable by steam vessels. Ocean steamers call regularly at Hankow. Above I-ch'ang, the rapidity of the current is such that only specially-constructed steamers with powerful engines can navigate it, but these carry a considerable traffic through the famous Yangtze Gorges. Some 1600 miles of the river's course can be classified as navigable or semi-navigable.

The West River or Si River: one of the three rivers that run into the sea near Canton. It rises in Kwangsi Province and runs east into Kwangtung. Only its lower reaches are navigable.

In addition to these, mention must be made of the Mekong, Red, and Salween rivers of Yunnan Province, which run into the sea outside China and are not navigable; also the Min River of Fukien, and the Tarim River of Sinkiang.

Administrative Subdivisions

A further list of proper names that the student ought to have in mind is that of the present administrative subdivisions of China. While their political status is not necessarily stable or permanent, they do provide a convenient means of referring to particular localities.

Since the "Bamboo Curtain," like the "Iron Curtain," prohibits easy access to information, and since continental China is now under complete Communist control, knowledge of the political geography of present-day China tends to be sketchy. It is known, however, that the People's Government has changed many traditional boundaries, and created the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, which includes what was formerly northern Chahar and western Heilungkiang. China, in consequence, now consists of six Administrative Areas and one Autonomous Region. A total of 29 provinces lie in one or another of the six Administrative Areas. Taiwan (Formosa), if and when it is "liberated" by the Communists, will be a 30th province, and would presumably be incorporated in the East China Administrative Area. A further administrative category is that of the Special Municipalities, which are 13 in number and are administered directly from Peking.

The present status of Tibet is far from clear. What is called Nearer Tibet includes two provinces, Tsinghai and Sikang, the first of which belongs to the Northwest and the second to the Southwest Administrative Areas. Farther Tibet, an area of about 350,000 square miles with an estimated population of 1,500,000, has its capital at Lhasa. Under the terms of a treaty signed by the Chinese Communists in May 1951, the Panchen Lama, one of Tibet's two religious rulers (the other is the Dalai Lama; there has been much dispute over the political status of both) now heads the government of Farther Tibet. This area, however, has since then become virtually another province of Communist China, all former officials either having been removed or having gone over to the Chinese Communists.

The territorial organization of China, as of 1953, is:

(1) *North China Administrative Area*: three provinces: Hopeh, Shansi, and Suiyua; two special municipalities: Peking and Tientsin.

- (2) *Northeast Administrative Area*: six provinces: Liaotung, Liaosi, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Sungkiang, and Jehol; five special municipalities: Mukden, Port Arthur-Dairen, Anshan, Fushan, and Penki.
- (3) *Northwest Administrative Area*: five provinces: Shensi, Kansu, Ningsia, Tsinghai, and Sinkiang; one special municipality: Sian.
- (4) *East China Administrative Area*: six provinces: Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, and (if and when "liberated") Taiwan; two special municipalities: Shanghai and Nanking.
- (5) *Central-South China Administrative Area*: six provinces: Honan, Kiangsi, Hopeh, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi; two special municipalities: Hankow and Canton.
- (6) *Southwest Administrative Area*: four provinces: Sikang, Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kweichow; one special municipality: Chungking.
- (7) *Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region*: this region is divided into six "Leagues," but the present meaning of this term is a matter of conjecture. It is directly subordinate to the Central People's Government in Peking.
- (8) *Tibet (So-called "Farther Tibet")*: this area is similar in status to Inner Mongolia, i.e., it is autonomous in name only.

An administrative structure paralleling that of the central government is being created for each of the six administrative areas except that of the North China, which is administered by a Ministry of North China Affairs in the Central Government. Actually, only one of these administrative structures, the Northeast People's Government, is a going concern. In the remaining four regions, government is still in the hands of military administrative councils.

TABLE I
PROVINCES, PROVINCIAL CAPITALS, AREA, AND POPULATION

Province	Capital	Area (Sq. Mi.)	Population
Anhwei	Hofei	54,305	21,842,039
Chekiang	Hangchow	39,021	19,657,551
Fukien	Mingow (Foochow)	45,539	11,084,333
Honan	Kaifeng	63,744	26,994,200
Hopeh	Tsingyuan (Pooting)	54,482	31,897,088
Hunan	Changsha	70,042	28,171,117
Hopeh	Wuchang	71,936	21,271,862
Kansu	Lanchow (Kasalan)	151,121	6,765,744
Kiangsi	Nanchang	66,783	12,830,019
Kwangsi	Wueh	42,455	40,964,134
Kwangtung	Yungning (Nanning)	84,505	14,535,868
Kweichow	Canton	84,443	29,128,924
Shansi	Kweiyang	65,696	10,328,293
Shantung	Yangku (Taiyuan)	50,378	14,725,102
Shensi	Shao	54,544	39,165,459
Sinkiang	Siao	72,533	9,649,168
Szechwan	Urumchi (Tibwa)	660,805	3,870,054
Yunnan	Chingtu	117,197	48,991,378
	Kunming (Yunnan)	162,300	9,284,579

(above data from Cressey, p. 40, quoting Directorate of Statistics, Nanking, *Statistical Monthly*, National Govt., January and February 1947, from Nelson Dickerman, "Mineral Resources of China," *Foreign Minerals Survey*, II, No. 2 (1948), 7, Washington, US Bureau of Mines.)

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Province	Capital	Area (Sq. Mi.)	Population
Heilungkiang	Lungkiang (Ishihara)	100,009	5,521,581
Kiria	Yungki (Kirin)	46,127	6,935,671
Liaosi	Chinshien (Chinchow)	21,643	7,391,492
Liaotung	Antung	79,755	8,587,606
Sungkiang	Pinkiang (Harbin)	79,243	5,149,909
(above data on the Manchuria region from Cressey, p. 40, quoting <i>People's Handbook</i> , April 1, 1950)			
Tsinghai	Sining	267,553	1,123,219
Jehol	Chengdeh	65,473	2,184,723
Ningsia	Ningsia (Yinchuan)	90,062	1,371,536
Sikang	Yaan (Yachow)	174,287	1,655,215
Suiyuan	Kweichai	127,147	2,057,753
Taiwan (Formosa)	Taipei	13,881	7,026,883

The largest of the provinces in area (over 500,000 square miles) is Sinkiang, which, however, is thinly populated. The largest in population (some fifty millions) is Szechwan, and the next largest (approximately forty millions), Hunan. Other provinces with relatively large populations are Kwangtung, Shantung, and Kiangsu.

Cities

Shanghai: population probably four million, which means that it may well become the most populous city in the world, for it is still in an early stage of its predictable growth. It is the New York of China, the chief trading port of a vast hinterland; at the mouth of the Yangtze, in Kiangsu Province.

Tientsin: population 1,200,000. The major port for North China, and will become increasingly important as the resources of that region, both mineral and agricultural, are developed; in Shantung Province.

Peking: population 1,500,000. It was the capital of the Empire and of the early Chinese Republic, and the Chinese Communists have made it the capital of their regime. It has for several centuries been the cultural center of China; in northern Hopeh Province.

Canton: population 1,000,000. The chief trading center of South China; in Kwantung Province.

Nanking: population 1,000,000. It was the capital of the National Government of China; an important Yangtze port; in Kiangsu Province.

Hankow: population 800,000. The Chicago of China; i.e., its position with respect to important (by Chinese standards) iron and coal deposits has made it a manufacturing center. Near the head of deep-water navigation on the Yangtze, it is connected with the north and south by the central railroad system (from Canton to Peking); in Hupeh Province.

Chungking: population 800,000. Situated in the rich and populous province of Szechwan, in western China. Many of central China's industrial plants were moved there during the war.

THE REGIONS OF CHINA

The physical (topographical) differences within China from area to area are only one of several criteria that can be employed in a regional break-down of China. Climate combines with land-forms, for instance, to condition agricultural production in China. From this point of view, China can well be divided north from south by the line running about half way between the valleys of the Yellow River and the Yangtze. South of this east-west line, the farm lands are superior to those north of it, the precipitation heavier, and the major

crop rice (the north grows wheat, millet, and kaoliang). North of the line and over much of the Yangtze Valley most of the inhabitants speak the Mandarin dialect; south of it many dialects are spoken, most of them unintelligible to those not accustomed to them. The people south of the line tend to be short in stature, those north of it tall — on the average as tall as Americans or Europeans, despite the widespread impression that all Chinese are on the short side. Southern Chinese are known for their volatile personalities, northerners for their relative placidity. (Some writers have made much of the fact that many of China's revolutions have started in the southern provinces.)

The north-south regions previously described include only China south of the Great Wall, that is, what is usually referred to as China Proper. Three general regional categories are required to take in all of China today. These three regions, together with the geographical sub-regions and political subdivisions included within them are:

(1) *North China:*

a. *Geographical sub-regions:* Shantung, the Yellow Plain of North China, the Loessland* of Northwest China, the Jehol Mountains to the southwest of the Manchurian Plain.

b. *Provinces:* Jehol, Suiyuan, Ningsia, Hopeh, Shansi, Shensi, and Shantung.

(2) *South China:*

a. *Geographical sub-regions:* Yangtze Plain, Central Mountain Belt, Szechwan Basin, South Yangtze Hills, Southeastern Coast, and Southwestern Uplands.

b. *Provinces:* Kiangsu, Honan, Hupeh, Szechwan, Hunan, Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, Kiangsi, Kweichow, Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung (includes Hainan Island).

(3) *Outlying areas* (lying to the northeast, north, west, south, and southeast of China Proper):

a. Manchuria, including the five provinces of Sungkiang, Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaotung, and Liaosi.

b. The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

c. Sinkiang (a province).

d. Tibet, including Farther Tibet and the provinces of Tsinghai and Sikang.

e. Taiwan (Formosa).

Detailed descriptions of the various provinces included in these regions and outlying areas may be secured from the following chapter "The Provinces of China."

Provincial Capitals

The various provincial capitals are, in varying degree, great centers of population and of governmental and educational activity. Some of the more important are Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi; Changsha, in Hunan Province; Kunming (formerly Yunnan), the capital of Yunnan Province; Chengtu, in Szechwan Province; Lanchow in Kansu Province; and Sian, in Shensi Province. Lanchow and Sian are situated on the line of communications westward to Russian Turkestan, through Sinkiang. Kunming is both the Chinese terminus of the road to Burma (built during the war to provide a "back door" out of China) and of the railroad from Indo-China.

THE CLIMATE OF CHINA

China may be divided into several distinct climatic zones, the difference being partly latitude, and partly the varying effects of the large land mass of central Asia. The three

* An area covered with a fine, yellow silt, originally carried off from Mongolia by the winds and deposited in wide areas, particularly in North China where it is found in some places in a thickness of hundreds of feet.

south coast provinces of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien may be grouped together in one zone, in which precipitation is heavy, the winters mild, and the summers hot. Central China is fairly uniform in climate as far north as the Ch'in-Ling range, except for variations from sea-level to elevation above sea-level. Rainfall there is adequate, and winter temperatures moderate to cold. At Nanking, for instance, the temperature sometimes goes down to 10° F. This is cold compared to similar latitudes in other parts of the world, when it is remembered that Nanking is about lat. 38° N., roughly the same as Vicksburg, Mississippi. Indeed, the temperatures are found farther south in Asia than anywhere else in the world. Being so large, Asia's land masses cool faster than do its water masses. In summer, central China is hot, almost as high temperatures being registered there as in the southern zone. This again is due to the monsoon, which blows in from the ocean during the summer. In fact, even the northern climatic zone of China, below the Great Wall at least, has temperatures nearly as high as those of the southern coast. Its winters, however, are much colder, Peking winters, for example, being notoriously cold. This is remarkable when it is considered that Peking is on approximately the same level of latitude as Philadelphia. During the winter the winds are for the most part from the northwest, and bring with them the intensely low temperatures of the central Asiatic highlands. Practically all the area's precipitation is in the spring and summer months. The winters are so dry that snow, when it falls, promptly evaporates instead of remaining on the ground to be melted by warmer weather.


Manchuria has extremely cold winters and short summers, with only moderate rainfall. Mongolia, where the precipitation varies from light in Inner Mongolia to almost none in the Gobi, has uniformly severe winters and mildly hot summers. The altitude keeps the temperature relatively low in summer.

Another distinct climatic area is in the mountainous region of Yunnan Province. But for the altitudes which keep the temperatures low, Yunnan would presumably have the much warmer climate of the South China zone. Tibet, to the west and north, is a region of very high altitudes. The temperature there is almost constant from season to season. Much the same is true of Sinkiang, even with its lesser elevation above sea-level.

In addition to the monsoon and the differences in topography, there are two further influences on the climate of China that must be mentioned as affecting the central and southern zones particularly, and the North China Zone somewhat less. These are the recurrent cyclonic storms, which sweep in a generally east-to-west direction in the central area, and the tropical typhoons, which rise in the southwestern Pacific and travel in a north-westerly direction to the China coast. To a certain extent both tend to break down the summer and winter rhythm of the monsoon cycle.

The cyclonic storms originate in central Asia, and travel over the middle portion of China, accompanied by winds and rains. Some of them pass over Japan. The typhoons, the bane of shipping in the South China Seas, resemble West Indian hurricanes in violence and destructive force. They come mostly in the summer months, especially in the latter part of the summer.

In general, China's climate may be characterized as temperate in character, and conducive to a relatively high level of work and achievement on the part of its inhabitants. On the other hand, the generally high temperatures in the summer months are a handicap, making the maintenance of health difficult, and definitely decreasing human efficiency. When high temperature and high humidity are combined as they are in the Central and Southern Zones, the climatic influence is definitely unfavorable. Those who travel to these regions from less humid areas of the Western Hemisphere find the task of adjustment quite difficult.



(URAAF, Report No. 690, WEATHER AND CLIMATE OF CHINA, p. 105, Part A and B, 1943)
Fig. 3 — Climatic Provinces of China, Chang-wang Tu

NATURAL ENDOWMENTS FOR THE USE OF MAN

In China as in all eastern Asia, the economic future will be determined for the most part by the main features of the natural resources map. The Chinese people must, to be sure, decide their own political fate, and their decision will unavoidably have implications as to the way in which its natural resources will be used. But even if this question is decided in favor of a free and independent China, and even if that free and independent China uses the resources wisely, its capacity to become economically strong enough to maintain its independence against external threats will have sharp upper limits. And these will be set by its available resources.


China is predominantly agricultural. Its land is already so heavily overburdened that the country cannot hope for a standard of living even approaching that in the United States. Its land area is not, as commonly supposed, uniformly fertile and adapted to cultivation; not more than 15 to 20 percent of its total land surface is being cultivated today, and there is nothing China can do to raise this figure appreciably. For not only does it have little exploitable but unexploited land; a considerable part of the land it exploits is marginal, and is being cultivated only because of the extreme pressure exerted by China's vast population. And there is reason to believe that even if this pressure were to increase, it would not result in the cultivation of much land that today is considered submarginal. The soil, nevertheless,

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less, is China's prime national resource, so that the student can hardly know too much about its character, its distribution and its use.

The best soils of China are found in the Yangtze Valley and the Hwai Valley of Anhwei Province. These same areas also happen to have the best climate for agriculture, and they account, in consequence, for a relatively high percentage of the country's total produce. The soil of the Yangtze Valley is alluvial in origin, i.e., it is sediment that has been washed



(David Nelson Rowe, CHINA AMONG THE POWERS)

Fig. 4 — Arable Land of East Asia

down by the river, and should be expected to have a high natural fertility. Its natural fertility has long since been exhausted, and farming it successfully is today possible only because of the extensive use of fertilizers, most particularly the excreta of the human beings themselves, although animal manure is used when and where it is available. Agriculture in the Yangtze would be economically out of the question if it had to defray the cost of artificial fertilizers.

The Chinese farmer also uses irrigation and the transfer of top-soil as means of maintaining the fertility of his lands. He has shown, where the topography lends itself to such operations, great skill at terracing hillsides and leading water to the terraces, a practice which, of course, besides making for larger crops also arrests the rapid erosion of the topsoil that would otherwise take place. He has also developed a considerable know-how about rotating crops. There is, in other words, every reason to believe that he is using the one natural resource at his disposal as intensively as it can be used. In some sections, as a matter of fact, he is using it more intensively than it should be used, with the result that the slightest derangement of normal conditions produces famine, and strikes at the very life of millions of the population. China cannot rely upon its soils for the additional strength it needs in order to become a modern, independent state.

Forests

Nor can it rely to any considerable extent on natural vegetation, which to all intents and purposes has long since disappeared from all land capable of being used for agriculture. The forest growth that once blanketed China's mountainous areas was long ago cut down and the wood used for fuel. (In the more prosperous agricultural districts today, given the population pressure on farming, no fuel is available except wild grasses and reeds. These spring up afresh every year, and at least provide fuel for cooking.)

The indiscriminate cutting of forests and the failure to reforest when they are cut are responsible for many of the disastrous floods that occur in China. There is nothing left on the hillsides to hold vegetation in the ground and absence of vegetation here, as elsewhere in the world, results now in drought and now in excessive rainfall. The northern provinces of Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, and Hopeh provide ample evidence of the unavoidable result.

Centuries ago, there appear to have been forests all the way from the southern coast of China to Manchuria. Important stands of timber today are mainly in the coastal range of South China, the Ch'in Ling Range, the mountains of Szechwan, Tibet, and Manchuria. The latter appears to have the best stocks of timber in the Chinese region. The forests of Manchuria extend right into eastern Siberia, and normally supply much-needed lumber to Japan.

Animal Life

The animal life that abounded in the ancient Chinese forests disappeared when the trees were cut. Wild animal life is not a natural resource of any importance in China at the present time although there is excellent hunting in the remote parts of the country.

Flora

It should not be concluded from anything stated previously that China is lacking in numerous species of flora. Rather, China has always been and is today a rich storehouse of numberless varieties of vegetation, many of which have been imported to the West. But the vegetation is not of such character as to play much of a role in solving China's future economic problems.

Minerals

Modern civilization in the West is based in large part on machine fabrication of consumers' goods from various materials. A whole series of minerals are needed in order for this fabrication process to go on: coal to serve as fuel, oil to lubricate the machinery, iron to make goods for consumption, and to make the machines of production. How many of these and other minerals are to be found in China? And in what quantities?

As for coal, China has one of the world's largest reserves (probably half as large as that of the U.S.). If it were to go in for large-scale industrialization, therefore, its coal stores should, according to the best expert opinion, hold out for centuries. Most of the reserve lies in the northern section of China, which was one of the reasons for Japan's eagerness to take over the northern provinces. The richest deposits are in Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu; there are somewhat smaller, but still considerable reserves in the Yangtze Valley, near Hankow. Nevertheless, Chinese coal production has remained small in comparison with that of the highly industrialized nations, even if we include in it the production in Manchuria.

China has, then, plenty of coal; but it does not have the iron ores it would need in order to make the most of its coal. A single province, Chahar, probably has greater iron deposits than Japan and Korea put together, and there are further deposits in Jehol, Hopeh, Manchuria, Shansi, and the central provinces, Anhwei and Hopeh. But the total quantity remains small by Western standards — small enough, certainly, to constitute a major limi-

tation on Chinese industrial potential. Nor is that all. China's deposits of coal and iron do not happen to be conveniently close together. The one must be carried a great distance to the other, which means high transportation costs that must enter into the price of the pig-iron produced. This puts — and will continue to put — the price so high as to be prohibitive except when the world price (i.e., the price at which iron can be purchased abroad) is inflated as a result of abnormal demand, as in wartime.

An even more serious problem is posed by China's lack of oil. Extensive search has failed to reveal any supplies of petroleum economically worth exploiting, and there is reason to believe that none will be found in the future. Advances in existing methods of extracting oil from coal may, to be sure, remedy this defect in China's natural endowments to some extent. Experiments are under way looking to the use of vegetable oils for diesel type internal combustion engines. Even were these experiments successful, China could supply itself with significant quantities of vegetable oils only on the improbable assumption that the necessary agricultural resources could be freed from producing foodstuffs.

The following minerals are those that China possesses in quantity: tin, of which there are large deposits in Yunnan; antimony, of which China at one time had a world monopoly; tungsten, of which central China is the world's chief producer; and salt, which China can produce in vast amounts, both by mining and by the evaporation of sea water.

The warranted conclusion as to the future potentialities of China as an industrial state appears to be this: China lacks both iron and oil, and either of these deficiencies would, even without the other, probably keep it from becoming self-sufficient industrially. It does have resources that might see it through to a decidedly higher level of industrial development than it has achieved, and might materially raise the standard of living of its people. But only with great difficulty could it become a first-rate industrial nation. If it ever did so, it would be as a result of trading arrangements the like of which the world has never seen, for something Chinese for which the world would trade oil and iron would have to be found, and a surplus of it produced. Future technological change may reduce China's present weaknesses in this regard, but no such change is discernible on the horizon. The Chinese might — this is another possibility — first build up strength at home, and with Russian help embark on a course of imperialism in, say, Southeast Asia, in the hope of obtaining by conquest the materials they lack at home. Current Chinese Communist plans for "leading the revolution" in the rest of East Asia, as also current Chinese aggression in Korea and indirect military intervention in Indo-China, lend a certain weight to this possibility.

CHINA'S COMMUNICATIONS

Waterways

China's internal communications system, generally speaking, is rudimentary. The one exception to this statement is the country's waterways. The Yangtze River is navigable for about 1600 miles. Its lower section, as far as Hankow or I-ch'ang, has long been the chief avenue of trade for China's central valley; even its tributaries, in this region, are navigable by small craft. But with the development of modern steam navigation, the whole Yangtze Valley has been thrown open for the transport of goods, not only domestic but foreign as well.

Above I-ch'ang, the famous Yangtze Gorges confine the river to a narrow and rocky canyon, and navigation is impeded by swift rapids, rocks, and whirlpools. Formerly, craft were towed through them by men trudging along narrow paths on the rim of the canyon. Although both boats and cargoes were sometimes lost, it was the only avenue to the Szechwan Basin, and the traffic through it was fairly heavy. Specially constructed high-powered steam craft now navigate this dangerous stretch, though at the height of the summer floods




Fig. 5 — Strategic Communications in Eastern Asia

even they have difficulty in passing the swiftest of the rapids, and are at times brought almost to a standstill.

The Hwang (Yellow) River, though very long, is virtually unnavigable except in its lower stretches, where small steam launches and shallow-draft native boats ply its waters. (What traffic there is on the upper section moves on rafts.) The reason for this is that the river carries a heavy burden of silt, which is constantly being deposited on the bottom of the stream, making it too shallow for ordinary river craft. (The famous Hwang River floods are also due to the silt, and the attempts that have been made to confine them by increasing the height of the dykes have been mistaken. A more promising solution is to excavate the bottom of the stream bed.)

Among China's artificially constructed avenues of travel the Grand Canal, now silted up and unusable at many points, was at one time the most important, with heavy freight traffic moving along its entire length (from Hangchow, south of Shanghai, to Tientsin). The cargoes were mainly rice, en route from the central valley to the Imperial Court at Peking. (From Tientsin, the rice moved along the Hai River to T'ung-chü, twelve miles east of Peking, and thence by land.) Most of the Grand Canal lies in three provinces: Kiangsu, Shantung, and Hopeh. It is still in use for local freight shipments.

The rivers of the south coastal area account for very little of China's waterway traffic. Only the Si River (West River), in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, deserves mention here, and even it is navigable only by small vessels. The other rivers of the area are either too rapid or too small for navigation.

Roads

Road systems have a long history in China, and some of its ancient roads still do service in remote areas. They varied greatly in quality, and for the most part were intended for rudimentary types of transport like wheelbarrows, sedan chairs, carts, and human carriers—all of them slow and, despite the cheapness of human labor, expensive. Those accustomed to the swift means of transportation of the present-day West can hardly visualize what it has been to travel in certain parts of China even in the quite recent past: to move by sedan chair a bare twelve or fifteen miles in an entire day, and even less if the route covered is in mountainous country. Yet in many areas of China this is still the only alternative to going on foot. The major exceptions, apart from the strictly modern means of transport in certain areas, are found in the north, where some travel is accomplished by cart, or on horse- or camel-back.

The big transport development of the last twenty years has placed a strong emphasis on the building of roads for motor transport, which many Chinese have regarded as the quickest and easiest means of opening the back country to trade and new influences, and a better bet by far than waiting about for railways to be built. (Some, indeed, have been of the opinion that highways might obviate the necessity of building railroads in some areas at all.) The west, the southwest, the northwest, and north are the areas in which the most important results of this type of thinking are to be seen. One difficulty with the whole idea is that China has no domestic source of petroleum, and imported gasoline and oil, most of which, in the past, was brought from the US and the Dutch East Indies, comes high. (The recent experiments with vegetable oil as fuel for internal combustion engines may well fail, and could not, in any case, satisfactorily solve the problem here in question.)

China's newly built roads are by no means up to the standards of road construction that prevail in the US and Europe. Most of them are of dirt, reminiscent of little-travelled back-roads in the US. To surface them would be expensive—so expensive, indeed, that it might well make the costs of motor transport prohibitively high. Until they are surfaced,

traffic over them must move at extremely low speeds, and China's cars and trucks will wear out much faster than they should. But all this is not to deny that the new roads have proved valuable.

Railways

China's total mileage of railway tracks is small by comparison with its large area. Its railway system, if such it may be called, is oriented toward Manchuria, where the principal rail network is located. One line runs from southern Manchuria through Tientsin and Peking into inner Mongolia, with Pao-t'ou as its terminus. Another important line has as its major points Tientsin, Nanking, and Shanghai, while yet another links the north and south (Peking-Hankow-Canton). Still another, the Lung-hai line, runs roughly from east to west, from T'ung-hai (Haichow) (on the sea, south of Shantung) to Pao-chi in Shensi Province. There are, in addition: a north-south line through Szechwan; a line running from Shanghai to Hangchow and then to Nanchang in Kiangsi Province; and two lines in the west and southwest: one from Kunming in Yunnan to Hanoi, French Indo-China, and one, constructed only recently between Chungking and Chengtu in Szechwan. Most of the system was built with foreign capital, payments on which have been completely suspended by the Chinese Communist regime. Prior to the last war, the system's earnings had been more than sufficient to meet interest and amortization payments.

Air Transport

Pre-World-War-II China had a rapidly developing and extensive system of air transportation, which China has more reason to value than most other nations because its great cities are so far apart, and because in many areas and for many purposes it lacks any alternative means of communication. Indeed a major obstacle to China's political unification has been its lack of communications by which political control could be made effective in its more remote regions; and Chinese domestic trade, which might have made a greater contribution than it has made to unification, would have grown more rapidly if better communications had been available.

In short the airplane was welcomed in China both for its political and for its economic implications, as even a casual look at its aviation network will make clear. There are major lines from Peking to Shanghai and Canton, from Shanghai west to Chengtu and up the Yangtze Valley, and from Peking to Canton. Other important lines are those connecting Canton and Chengtu in Szechwan, and the USSR and western Sinkiang with north China and the capital at Peking.

A few words must be included, finally, on China's external communications, i.e., those that connect it with the outside world. China once lived in isolation from outside contacts, save as the old trade routes through Central Asia and the sea routes from southern China to India and the Near East brought it intermittently in touch with other nations in Asia itself. The former led from Kausu in western China into Sinkiang, around the northern or southern borders of the Tarim Basin, and into northwestern India. (Such contacts as China had with the Roman Empire took place via the Parthian Empire in the region southeast of the Caspian Sea during the Han dynasty.)

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Sea Routes

The first Europeans to come to China in the modern period traveled by sea, so that the first beach-head for communications with Europe was on the south China coast. It spread gradually up the coast, and such modern ports as Hongkong, Shanghai, and Tientsin grew up to handle the resulting new trade.

The sea routes remain the most important approaches to China, although they are now supplemented by a land route through Russia and Siberia (there is a fortnightly service between China and the European capitals over the Trans-Siberian Railroad). They were further supplemented, until the Chinese Communist take-over, by the trans-Pacific air route from the US. The only present-day air-links between China and the outside world, are via Taiwan and the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

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CHAPTER 2
THE PROVINCES OF CHINA

INTRODUCTION

The political geography of China has undergone several major reorganizations in the last fifteen years. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, China was organized into 27 provinces and the 2 special territories of Tibet and Outer Mongolia. The province of Sikang was then created in 1939. In the immediate period following World War II, the Nationalist Government reorganized China into 35 provinces and 1 territory. The three northeastern provinces in Manchuria (Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning) were divided into the 9 provinces of Hsingan, Heilungkiang, Nunkiang, Hokiang, Sungkiang, Kirin, Linopoh, Liaoning, and Antung. Outer Mongolia became a legally independent area under Soviet influence in 1945. The return of Taiwan in the same year materially offset the loss of Outer Mongolia. Thus, by an order of the National Government dated 5 June 1947, China was organized into 35 provinces and the Special Territory of Tibet, with 12 special municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the central government.

China is now composed of 30 provinces and 2 autonomous regions. Taiwan (Formosa) is one of the provinces, but it is still under Nationalist control; until "liberated" by the Communist Peoples Republic it remains the stronghold of the National Government of China under Chiang Kai-shek.

Since 1949 the Communist regime has instituted several changes of its own. In 1949 the entire country was divided into 6 Administrative regions and 2 Autonomous regions. The Administrative regions were composed of 30 provinces while Tibet and Inner Mongolia were made autonomous.

The remaining and most significant changes have occurred in Manchuria. This northeastern territory is now divided into five provinces: Heilungkiang, Sungkiang, Kirin, Liaotung, and Liaosi. In addition, the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia was established in western Manchuria. This latter development drastically reduced the territory of Jehol Province. Chahar was similarly affected; its territory has now been entirely distributed to other provinces. However, the provinces of Ningxia and Suiyuan, which are geographically part of the Inner Mongolian area, have not been affected. The special municipalities, which now number 13, remain substantially the same as under the Nationalist Government. These are Mukden, Port Arthur-Dairen, Anshan, Fushun, Penki, Peking, Tientsin, Sian, Chungking, Hankow, Canton, Shanghai, and Nanking.

These brief individual sketches of China's Provinces and Autonomous regions are based on the administrative organization as of 1953.

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Anhui

Anhui Province is in the East China Administrative Region, bordered by Kiangsu, Honan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Chekiang. It has a total area of about 55,000 square miles and an estimated population of 21,842,000.

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No provincial government exists to date; instead, the province is divided into North and South Administrative Districts with respective capitals at Hefei and Wu-hu. It contains excellent agricultural plains centered around the Yangtze and Huai rivers which cross the province in a west-east direction. The southern section contains the scenic Huang Range. The other major mountain range is the Ta-pieh, located in the north. Climatic conditions are generally mild, with abundant rainfall.

Agriculture is the economic backbone of the province. Rice and tea are particularly important, Anhwei producing 60 percent of China's tea. Beans, kaoliang, corn, tobacco, peanuts, and silk are also cultivated. Mining industries include coal at Fan-ch'ang, Su-hsien, Huai-yün, and Kuei-ch'ih, and iron at Tang-u and Wan-shan. This is the second ranking iron-producing province in China. Factories are concentrated at Wu-hu along the Nanking-Wu-hu railroad and consist mainly of flour mills and small chemical works. Paper and Chinese ink are also manufactured in this province.

Three major railroad lines traverse the province: the Tientsin-P'u-k'ou line passes through its northern corner; the Nanking-Wu-hu line crosses the southeastern corner and joins the Hsianan railroad at Yu-Ch'i-k'ou. The latter line runs from T'ien-chi-shan on the Huai River through Hefei, Ta'ao-hsien, and Yu-ch'i-k'ou across from Wu-hu City. There are about 5,500 kilometers of highways with important junctions at Hefei, Wu-hu, P'eng-p'u, Huai-ning, and Chieh-shou. Besides the Yangtze and Huai rivers, the majority of the smaller rivers are also accessible to steamboats. Important river ports are Wu-hu, Huai-ning, Ta-t'ung, and Ti-chiang.

Hefei (31° 54' N and 117° 18' E) was the proposed provincial capital located in the approximate geographic center of the province. It is now the North District capital and serves as a rice and cotton market. Railroads and highways link it to Wu-hu and Huai-ning. The South District capital is Wu-hu (31° 21' N and 118° 23' E), a river port on the Yangtze which is one of China's largest rice markets. Factories are also congregated around this city. Huai-ning (30° 31' N and 117° 2' E) is an important river port located in western Anhwei on the north bank of the Yangtze. It was the pre-war provincial capital. North of Huai-ning is T'ung-cheng (32° 53' N and 118° 59' E), noted as the birthplace of many famous literati of the Manchu dynasty. Two cities of minor importance in the south are Chi-men (29° 52' N and 117° 41' E) and She-hsien (29° 34' N and 118° 14' E). The former is a famous tea center and also produces porcelain clay; the latter is famous for its Chinese inks and brushes.

Like Kiangsu, Anhwei is divided by the Yangtze River into North and South, though the cultural differences between the two are less conspicuous. North Anhwei is a wheat-producing region; the South is the area for rice and tea. Wu-hu, opened as a Treaty Port in the Ch'ing dynasty, is an important rice port. Not a coastal province, Anhwei is not receiving extensive industrial development; while famous for its scenery, it is not attracting a large tourist trade. North Anhwei is rather poor; Chu Yün-chang (1328-1399), founder of the Ming dynasty, was born in Chung-li, Anhwei, and was brought up as a Buddhist novice in the Huang-chieh Monastery in Feng-yang. The monastery still stands; and a ballad goes that since the birth of Chu Yün-chang, Feng-yang has never been the same.

Anhwei food achieves a slight reputation beyond its provincial territory; its restaurants are famous for noodles, fish, and eels. Anhwei supplies China's best paper and ink sticks; the finest paper for Chinese calligraphy and painting is the Hsüan Chih, made in Hui-i; hence the Anhwei people used to dominate the stationery trade. They are also famous as pawnkeepers.

Anhwei possesses a fine literary tradition; the T'ung-chen school of prose-writers flourished in Anhwei, with many exponents during the Ch'ing dynasty, the last of whom was

Lin Shu, who translated Dickens, Scott, Dumas, and Conan Doyle into classical prose. Some of its famous sons have been the philosopher, Chung Tai; the Chin philosopher and poet, Chi Kang; the Sung statesman and China's most famous judicial administrator, Pao Ch'eng; the first Ming Emperor and his greatest general, Hsi Ta; the Ch'ing philosopher, Tai Chen, and the great statesman and diplomat, Li Hung-chang. The best modern exponent of Chinese culture, Hu Shih, comes from Anhwei. The war lord and self-styled "Christian General," Feng Yu-hsiang, and Chiang Kai-shek's trusted generals, Sun Li-jen, Wei Li-huang, and Chang Chih-chung, also came from this province.

Chahar

This province, in the North China Administrative Region, was surrounded by Jehol, Inner Mongolia, Suiyuan, Shansi, and Hopeh. It formerly had an area of 109,500 square miles. (As of October 1953, this province was totally absorbed into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and Hopeh Province.) The population totalled about 2,036,000 over a decade ago.

Chahar is generally a steep grazing area on the fringe of the Mongolian Plateau. The Yin Shan Range in the north and the Hsiao-wu-t'ai Shan in the south produce gentle slopes and basins in an otherwise monotonous plain. The two major rivers are the Engheng, which flows across the province from Suiyuan to Hopeh, and the Shangtu (Pai), which runs southward into Jehol and Hopeh. The climate is continental with hot summers, bitter winters, and strong winds. Precipitation is scanty.

The territory of Chahar is an agricultural area producing wheat, barley, kaoliang, and beans. Mushrooms and rhubarb are produced in exceptional quantity here. Livestock breeding, furs, and wools formerly provided Chahar with its chief income, and, although this industry now belongs in Inner Mongolian territory, its marketing still extends into Chahar. This was the fourth leading province in iron production (after Liaoting, Anhwei, and Hupeh provinces). Production is centered at Lung-kuan and Hsian-hua. There are also large coal deposits. One railroad, the Peking-Suiyuan, serves the province and passes through the towns of Huai-lai, Hsuan-hua, and Wanchuan. Highways total approximately 2,000 kilometers, while old trade routes connect the area with other provinces in the northeast.

The city of Wanchuan (40° 50' N and 114° 55' E), also known as Kalgan, was the provincial capital and is now in Hopeh. It is the largest trading town in the Inner Mongolia area and commands a strategic part of the Great Wall. Hsuan-hua (40° 37' N and 115° 1' E) is an iron and coal town on the Peking-Suiyuan railroad. The city of Ta-t'ung (40° 6' N and 113° 14' E) in the south was formerly part of Shansi territory and is an important railroad and trading center for areas in Mongolia. It is also the center of a coal producing area.

There are some Tibetans and Manchus in addition to the dominant number of Mongols and Chinese.

For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this chapter entitled "Mongolia."

Chekiang

This coastal province is bounded by the China Sea, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Fukien and is part of the East China Administrative Region. It has an area of 39,000 square miles and a population of 19,658,000. Chekiang is chiefly a plains area with mountains only in the southwest, where there are extensions of the Hsien-hsia, Hsien, and Hai-Tien-mu ranges in neighboring provinces. The most famous mountain is the sacred

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Buddhist T'ien-t'ai Shan in the east. The three major rivers are the Fuchun, Yung, and Wu. The Grand Canal in the northeast reaches to Hangchow after passing Chia-hsing. The climate is generally mild, but semi-tropical conditions exist south of the Hsien-hsia range.

Climate and location make this a wealthy province. Agricultural production consists of rice, cotton, silk, wheat, and tea. Chekiang's silk production, the largest of any province in China, is centered at Hangchow and Wu-hsing. Fishing is also extremely important and is pursued by over a million fishermen over the largest fishing area in the East China Sea, namely that along the Chou-Shan Archipelago. The province is poor in minerals, although there are some collieries at Ch'ang-hsing. Salt and alum are found in abundance. Other well-known products are Shao-hsing wine, Chia-hua ham, and Yin-hsien furniture.

Two railways serve the province; the Shanghai-Hangchow-Yin-hsien line and the Chekiang-Kiangsu line. They form a junction at Shao-hsing, southeast of Hangchow. There are over 2,300 kilometers of highways with major junctions at Hangchow, Yin-hsien, Li-shui, Chiang-shan, and Yungkia. With the exception of the lower Fuchun River, which is navigable for coastal ships, river traffic is generally limited to small steamboats.

Hangchow (30° 8' N and 120° 5' E), on the north bank of the Fuchun River, is the industrial and educational center of the province, and the political center as well. The National Chekiang University and Hangchow Christian College are both located here. The Hsi Hu (West Lake) in the vicinity is a well-known tourist attraction. The population of Hangchow exceeds 600,000. North of Hangchow Bay is Cha-p'u (30° 37' N and 121° 6' E), one of the harbors proposed for development under the plan of Sun Yat-sen. Yin-hsien (29° 48' N and 121° 35' E), a marketing center for the eastern part of the province is located on the Yung River 16 miles from the sea. It is the leading port in this province and was made a treaty port at the end of the Opium War. Shao-hsing (30° 0' N and 120° 34' E) is a railway town of ancient historical significance located southeast of the provincial capital. Its wine is well-known throughout China. Wenchow or Yungkia (28° 1' N and 120° 38' E), is a small port on the Wu River in the south, located 19 miles from the sea. It is a center for timber, tea, bamboo, and leather, but its utility is limited by small shoals and the presence of Wenchow Island in the middle of the estuary. The Chou-shan Archipelago (30° 30' N and 122° 30' E) contains over 200 islands and is the center of the important fishing area of Chekiang.

North Chekiang shares with Chiang-nan (South Kiangsu) its climate, soil, and dialect; the type of culture it exhibits is also similar. Except for the few coastal cities, South Chekiang is a picturesque mountainous region, though the scenic spots in North Chekiang and its coastal isles attract a larger tourist trade. In the time of the Warring Kingdoms, Chekiang was the domain of Yueh; Fan Li, the man who befriended Hsi Shu and devised the strategy for the downfall of Wu, represents a type of shrewdness still characteristic of Chekiang. With the invasion of North China by the northern tribes, Chekiang, like Kiangsu, received its quota of wealthy northern Chinese who helped to make Chekiang a prosperous cultural center.

Hangchow was the capital of the Southern Sung dynasty; it had been a cultural and commercial center famous for its silk and tea even before that time. The Hsi Hu or West Lake, named after Hsi Shu, is a genuinely delightful place to visit; its placid water shines like a mirror under the sun and is diversified with variegated hills, temples, and other scenic attractions. The Po Embankment and Su Embankment were erected respectively by two poets who served as mayors of the city: Po Chu-i and Su Tung-po. When Marco Polo visited the city, after it was taken over by the Mongols, his enthusiasm for it was unbounded. Though the citizens of Hangchow are far less affluent now than at the time of Sung and

Yuan, the beauty of the city is still intact. The saying goes: "Heaven above, Soochow and Hangchow below." The streets and canals of Soochow, however, are narrow and dirty.

Near Hangchow are the Mo-kan Shan and Hsi-t'ien-mu Shan, also noted scenic spots. P'u-t'o Shan, an islet near the coast, is a famous Buddhist center; annually tens of thousands of pilgrims used to go there. Yin-hsien, a fishing center, was opened as a treaty port after the Opium War. The sea coast of Chekiang was often attacked by Chinese and Japanese freebooters during the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties.

The Chekiang people speak the Wu dialect; as in Chiang-nan, each city has its local variations. The dialects of Yin-hsien and Shao-hsing are particularly noticeable. An impure type of Mandarin is spoken in Hangchow. After the establishment of the Southern Sung dynasty, it had attracted a large group of northern courtiers and officials.

The people of Chekiang cannot be adequately characterized because each important city has developed its own characteristics. For example, the people of Yin-hsien are industrious and enterprising and eat a very salty kind of sea food; most of the men leave Yin-hsien early to engage in business in Shanghai. Shao-hsing has been famous for its shrewd lawyers and legal counsellors; the writer Lu Hsain, noted for his pungent essays, is representative of its traditional mentality. Chekiang produces the largest number of eminent men of letters and statesmen in China, a remarkable tribute to its literary and culture.

The rice wine of Shao-hsing, the Dragon Well green tea of Hangchow, and the ham of Chin-hua (Kinwa) are nationally famous. In the occident pork is never properly seasoned; in China, as a staple meat, it is cooked especially well with soy bean sauce. The Chinese ham, as represented by Chin-hua, is much more delicious than Virginia ham. The meat has a redder color and the texture is harder. It can be eaten as it is, but small quantities mixed with other food like chicken and fresh-water fish invariably accord the flavor of the latter. Shao-hsing wine is China's drink of moderation; it is usually warmed before being drunk.

Representing Chekiang's many contributions to Chinese history are the beauty, Hsi Shu; the Han philosopher, Wang Chung; the founder of the Taoist religion, Chang Tao-ling; the painter and calligrapher, Chao Meng-fu; the novelist, Lo Kwan-chung; and the eminent Ming statesmen and scholars like Liu Chi, Wang Yang-ming, Fang Hsiao-ju, and Huang Tsung-hsi. Feng-hua, famous for its peaches, was the birthplace of Chiang Kai-shek. Many of the Kuomintang officials and generals like Ch'én Kuo-fu, Ch'én Li-fu, Ch'én Ch'êng, Wang Wen-hao, Chu Chia-hua, Hu Tsung-nan, and T'ang En-po, came from here. Always a vigorous center of literary men, Chekiang gives to modern Chinese literature Lu Hsain and his brother, Chou Tsu-jên, as well as the novelist Mao Tun. The province is represented in the Communist Government by Premier Chou En-lai; the economist, Ma Ying-ch'u; the propagandists, Hu Yu-chih and Fêng Wen-pin; and the Supreme Judge of the People's Court, Shên Chun-ju.

Fukien

This province is bounded by the Formosan Straits, Chekiang, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung, and has an area of 46,000 square miles and a population of 11,081,000. It is in the East China Administrative Region. The general topography of Fukien is mountainous, particularly in the west and northwest; it levels off toward the sea. The chief mountain ranges are the Wu-i, Fêng-ling, Tai-yün, and Liang. The chief river is the Min which flows through the northern half of the province and empties into the sea at Minchow (Fuzhou). The climate is almost continental in the northeast while in the southeast there are regular seasonal changes and a mild climate. Precipitation is heavy, particularly in June, July, and August. The coastal area is often subjected to typhoons after July.

Fukien is deficient in food production, although rice, corn, and wheat are cultivated within its boundaries. Large quantities of sugar, fruits, tea, and timber are produced. Large coal and iron deposits have been reported, but mining is undeveloped. The chief industries are paper, sugar, tea, textiles, and lacquerware, of which the last is the most famous. Ship-building is another traditional activity.

The province is supplied with 4500 kilometers of highways leading to the various neighboring provinces. There are no railroads, but a line is planned along the Min River from Minhow to Kuang-tse in Kiangsi Province, to link eventually with the Chekiang-Kiangsi railroad. River navigation is generally limited to small steamboats with wooden junks. Foochow and Amoy are important air terminals as well as centers for river navigation.

The provincial capital of Minhow (26° 5' N and 119° 19' E) has a population of over 300,000 and is a commercial center for timber, paper, lacquerware, tobacco, and, particularly, tea. The city is located on the northern bank of the Min River, and commercial transactions are actually concentrated on Nan-t'ai Island in mid-river. Due to the shallow harbor at Minhow, larger vessels must dock at Ma-wei (Mamoi) (25° 59' N and 119° 26' E), a naval base east of the provincial capital and the former site of a naval academy. Amoy (24° 26' N and 118° 4' E) is an important port for eastern Kiangsi and southern Fukien with tea as the chief export. It is a small island of about 45 square miles, connected with Sung-yu on the mainland by ferry and forms two harbors. Amoy was opened as a treaty port after the Opium War of 1842. An important commercial center for southeastern Fukien, handling silk and sugar as its major goods, is Lung-ch'i (24° 43' N and 117° 44' E), on the north bank of the Kiung River.

Quite a number of non-Chinese aborigines still live among the mountains of Fukien. Communications in the province are quite rudimentary. This leads, on the one hand, to emigration to the South Seas and Taiwan, especially by the coastal people of South Fukien around Amoy; and on the other, to the preservation of ancient dialect forms which are truly a different language from Mandarin. There are two chief groups of dialects, around Minhow and Amoy respectively. The Amoy dialect is nearer the Canton dialect and is also spoken by the Chinese in Taiwan. The Foochow dialect is reputed to be the most difficult of all Chinese dialects to understand. Because of the dialects and other factors of isolation, the Fukien people used to be regarded with suspicion by the people of other provinces, who regard them as subtle and selfish. Actually the Fukien people are no more selfish than other provincials, as is seen in the fact that the emigrants from this province yearly send large remittances to their relatives in China. The Fukien women are good-looking.

In Minhow there was developed a fine literary tradition, so that the classics are more widely read there than in other cities. Because of the linguistic difficulty, the Fukien primary and middle schools vigorously enforced the program for adopting Kuo Yu (Mandarin), so that most educated Fukienese, in spite of their special dialect, now speak good Mandarin. Fukien produces rice, tea, sugar, camphor, and the finest lacquer work. The lac comes from the carefully refined sap of the *rhus vernicefera*, popularly called the "Varnish Tree." Layer after layer of paint is put on a thin wood foundation, which is afterwards removed, so that the genuine lacquer ware is extremely light in weight and has a very fine artistic finish. Amoy and Minhow were opened as treaty ports after the Opium War; there used to be many missionary colleges and schools there. Ma-wei, near Minhow, is a fine naval center.

Fukien is blessed with a variety of interesting fruits, like the lichee, tangerines, oranges, wen lan (a larger-size grapefruit), and with sugar cane. As a coastal province, Fukien is famous for its sea-food, which is superior to the sea-food served in this country. Though less popular than Cantonese food, Fukien food is served in most big cities in China.

Since the founding of the Republic, Fukien has been subjected to Communist infiltration (in the thirties) and a number of bad governors. The former governor of Fukien, Ch'en Yi, later served as governor of Taiwan. He was sentenced to death after he caused the unfortunate Formosan uprising in 1947. The nineteenth Route Army generals, Ts'ai Ting-k'ai and Chia-g Kuan-nan, once staged an abortive Communist insurrection here.

Fukien was the home of two Confucian philosophers at the time of the Southern Sung dynasty: Chu Hsi and Lu Chiu-yan. Chu Hsi was the pre-eminent neo-Confucianist and guided Chinese students of many centuries in their study of the Classics. Fukien also was the home of a remarkable father and son, Cheng Chih-lung and Cheng Ch'eng-kung, both of whom refused to bow to the Manchurians after the downfall of the Ming. The marauding forces of Cheng Ch'eng-kung once came near Nanking. His fortunes can be seen in more detail in connection with Taiwan. Lin Tsé-hsu was the opium commissioner who dealt harshly with the British in the 1830's and later died in inglorious exile under British pressure. Among the eminent Fukienese of the last few decades were the late President of the Republic, Lin Sên; the tycoons of China's overseas industry and commerce, Chen Chia-Kun and Hu Wen-hu; the versatile writer, Lin Yu-t'ang, and the Communist propagandist, Ch'en Po-ta.

Heilungkiang

This Manchurian province is in the Northeast Administrative Region, and is bordered by Kirin, Sungkiang, and Russia in the north, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in the West. The area totals over 109,000 square miles, and has a population of 5,522,000. Under the Communist rearrangement of provincial boundaries, its territory includes areas formerly belonging to Nunkiang, Sungkiang, and Heilungkiang provinces as established by the Nationalist government after World War II.

The northern portion of the province is mountainous. The I-i-hu-i Range, part of the Ta-hsing-an (Greater Khingan) Range in Inner Mongolia, forms part of the boundary between Heilungkiang and northeastern Inner Mongolia. It is known as the Hsiao-hsing-an (Little Khingan) Range in its subsequent development parallel to the Amur, extending in a southeasterly direction into Sungkiang Province, and is the watershed for the Nonni, Amur, and Sungari rivers. The southern part of the province is a great alluvial plain watered by the Nonni and Sungari rivers. The latter forms portions of the provincial boundary with Kirin and Sungkiang; the former is part of the provincial boundary with Inner Mongolia. The national boundary with Russian territory is formed completely on the Amur River, the largest in this province.

Heilungkiang is one of the coldest provinces in Manchuria, with a temperature range from -40°F to 95°F (annual mean: about 33°F). As one might expect, the northern area is considerably colder than the south. Precipitation averages 15 inches annually and increases to 29.5 inches in the southern area.

The lower half of the province produces a large and varied agricultural crop and is known as the "granary of the northeast." Chief crops are wheat in the Hu-lan River basin, North Lungkiang and Pei-an areas; soybeans in the Pei-an Lungkiang (Taishan) and Ning-nien regions, kaoliang along the Sungari, corn near Hsiao-an and Lungkiang, rice along the lower Nonni River and in the Pei-an Region, and some millet. Tobacco and hemp are also produced in the Pei-an Region. Timber is important, there being vast forests in the north, especially in the Ta-hsing-an Range. Gold is the most important mineral of this province, for three-fourths of the reserves in the northeast region are found here. Gold mines are in operation at Mo-ho, Hu-ma, Ou-p'u, Nen-ch'eng, and Ai-hun, mostly along the northern Amur border. Natural soda is found near An-ta. Industrial

development is limited to distilleries, small flour mills, and vegetable oil and tanning plants in the Lungkiang and Pei-an areas.

The three major railroads in the northern area are centered at Pei-an. One goes to Lungkiang, another to Hu-lan in Sungkiang Province via Sui-hua and Hai-lun. The third line extends northward to Ai-hun over the Hsiao-hsing-an Range and links with the Soviet-Siberian Railroad. A short coal line runs from Sui-hua to Chia-mu-ssu in Sungkiang Province. In the west, one line connects Ning-nien to Ho-lung-men via Na-ho and Nen-ch'eng. Farther south, the Chinese Ch'ang-ch'un railway enters the province from Inner Mongolia and cuts directly across to Pinking in Sungkiang Province. At Angang-ch'i it intersects the line running south from Lungkiang to T'ao-an. The T'ao-an-Angang-ch'i line is connected to the railroad hub at Lungkiang as well as to Lin-yuan in Liaosi Province in the south. It is intersected at T'ao-an by the Ch'ang-ch'un line running from So-lun in Inner Mongolia to Ch'ang-ch'un in Kirin Province. A few highways are centered around Lungkiang and extend into Inner Mongolia, but are of little significance. The portion of the Sungari River in this province as well as the Amur River below Mo-ho are both accessible to steamer navigation. Small steamers may also navigate the Nonni River below Nen-ch'eng.

Lungkiang (47° 22' N and 123° 57' E) is the provincial capital and major railroad terminal on the Nonni River. It also serves as a trading center for the surrounding Russian and Inner Mongolian territory. Pei-an (47° 22' N and 123° 57' E) is another important railroad hub in the north; it is also the center of an agricultural area and a trading city for agricultural and animal products. The town of Chiu-ai-hun (Aigun) (49° 59' N and 127° 28' E) is a railroad terminus and a strategic border town opposite the Russian town of Blagoveshensk. Mo-ho (53° 26' N and 122° 21' E) is a gold producing area on the Soviet border in the extreme northwest. Angang-ch'i (47° 9' N and 122° 48' E) and T'ao-an (45° 37' N and 122° 53' E) are two of the most important railroad junctions in this province.

The population is composed mainly of Chinese, Manchus, and Mongols with a limited number of Oronchons, a hill people also found in Sungkiang Province.

For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this chapter entitled "Manchuria."

Honan

Honan is a province in the South-central Administrative Region bordered by the provinces of Anhwei, Hopeh, Kiangsu, Shansi, Shantung, Shensi, and Hupeh. Its former territory, totalling 63,744 square miles, has been slightly increased by changes in its boundary with Hopeh.

The province is mountainous in the west, but levels off in the central and eastern areas. The five major mountains are the Tai-hang, Hsiao, Fu-niu, 'a-pieh, and the Sung, the last being one of the five sacred mountains of China. The province is located in the valley of the Hwang River and has suffered from the floods and changes in course of "China's Sorrow." The river was forced back into its old channel after World War II, and now empties again into the Po Hai (Gulf of Chihli) north of the Shantung Peninsula. Portions of the Hwai River and the Grand Canal are also found in the province. The climate is continental with marked summer-winter differentiation. There is abundant precipitation in late summer and early fall.

Climatic conditions place this province in what is called Winter West-Kaoliang agricultural region. Major crops include soybean, cotton, kaoliang, and tobacco, but wheat is by far the most important. Fruits are also grown in large quantity. Large deposits of iron, copper, tin, lead, and silver are reported, but coal production is the most significant and

is centered at Chiao-tso and Liu-ho-kou. Industries are limited to chemical works and cotton and flour mills mainly at Kaifeng, Cheng-hsien, and Hsu-ch'ang, and An-yang.

There are two major railroads in the province: The Lung-hai crosses the province in an east-west direction; the Peking-Hankow line runs in a north-south direction, almost bisecting the province, and intersects the Lung-hai at Cheng-hsien. A large network of highways covers the entire province. The Hwai River is the chief water route between Honan and Anhwei; the Hwang River by contrast, provides poor navigation due to extensive silting.

The provincial capital of Kaifeng (34° 48' N and 114° 21' E) is located in the east on the Lung-hai railroad. It is of historical interest as well, having been the capital of the Five dynasties and the Northern Sung dynasty. The communications and economic center of the province is at Cheng-hsien (34° 45' N and 113° 40' E), which receives cotton and hides from Shensi and Kansu for trans-shipment to Tientsin, Tsingtao, and Hankow. This is also the junction of the Peking-Hankow and Lung-hai railroads. The Peking-Hankow railroad bridge, which spans the Hwang River north of Cheng-hsien, is the largest of its kind in China. The city of Lo-yang (34° 49' N and 112° 26' E), in the west, is also of historical significance. It was the seat of the Eastern Han dynasty, was the provisional national capital in 1932, and contains the Pai Ma Ssu or White Horse Temple, the first Buddhist temple built under Emperor Ming Ti (58-75 A.D.). A strategic railroad city in the south is Hsin-yang (32° 9' N and 111° 8' E) which commands several vital mountain passes. The chief marketing center in the southwest is at Nan-yang (33° 3' N and 112° 32' E), which has highway connections to Shensi and Hupeh.

Honan marks the transition from North China to South China. The transition is especially evident in the gradual change from the dry wheat fields of the loess highlands in the north to the wet rice lands in the level plains to the south. Honan has been one of the central provinces in Chinese history; it must also have been one of the richest, for dynasty after dynasty chose to establish its capital there. But like many provinces under the capricious sway of the Hwang River it has in modern years suffered from recurrent floods, droughts, locusts, and other natural afflictions. The land, which has been tilled for many thousand years, shows signs of impoverishment.

Lo-yang and Kaifeng have been famous as the capitals of earlier dynasties. Lo-yang was the capital of the Eastern Chou dynasty and the Later Han dynasty; Kaifeng was the capital of the Five dynasties and of the Northern Sung dynasty. Now these places have local importance only. They depend on the Lung-hai railroad for whatever trade they now enjoy.

The famous Lung Men (Dragon Gate) rock temples, which show to the best advantage the genuine zeal and artistic achievement of Chinese Buddhist artisans, are vestiges of still another civilization. The Lung Men sculptures have been carved into the sheer cliffs rising from the Yi River. According to tradition, Shang-ch'iu was the birthplace of Lao Tsu. Sung Shan was one of the Five Sacred Mountains of China; the tradition belief is that Boddhidharma (Ta-mo) lived and taught there. The Hsiao Lin Monastery was famous for its tradition of gymnastics and boxing.

In Kaifeng there are some of the descendants of a colony of Jews, who settled there centuries ago. Three stone tablets record the history of these Kaifeng Jews. One tablet asserts that the Jews came to Kaifeng as early as the Han dynasty as merchants in the silk trade, though the first synagogue was established there only in A.D. 1103. By the 13th century of the Yuan dynasty, there were quite a few Jewish communities in China. In 1386 the first of the Ming Emperors formally presented the Jewish colony in Kaifeng with a tract of land upon which they might live perpetually in peace. Today the Jews are almost completely assimilated by the Chinese. Vaguely aware that they are different from the Chinese,

they have preserved a few Jewish traditions, but can neither write nor speak Hebrew. As a central province in China, Honan has often been the battle-ground of rival armies. Relics of other days abound in it. Near Kaifeng is the small Chu Hsien Chun, where Yo Fei scored his last victory against the Chin Tartars before he was recalled by the cowardly Southern Sung government.

The Honan people are typical Northern Chinese, industrious and ignorant. They earn their livelihood, for the most part, by farming, the returns from which are precarious. The manner of living, eating, and clothing shows no deviation from North China traditions. Whenever one thinks of North China, one feels the urgent need of industrialization. Admittedly not fertile, many of its provinces need industry and trade to put them on a sound economic footing. It is evident that intensive agriculture with uncertain crop returns will no longer support the population.

As an earlier center of culture, Honan has produced brilliant Chinese in every field: the founder of the Later Han dynasty, Liu Hsiu, the poets of the Northern and Southern dynasties, Yuan Ch'i and Hsieh Ling-yun; the famous T'ang pilgrim Yuan-tsang and the T'ang beauty Yang Kuei-fei; the Confucian writers and statesmen, Han Yu, Sa-ma Kuang; the Sung philosophers, Chen I, Chen Hao; and the great patriotic Sung general, Yo Fei. Typical of the decline of the province since Sung is the fact that it has produced no eminent men in recent centuries. The only Honanese of some reputation in recent years is the philosopher Feng Yu-lan, who, in a sense, continues the rationalist tradition of the Chen brothers. There is no eminent Communist leader from Honan.

Hopoh

Hopoh Province is politically and historically the most important province in China. It is bordered by the Po Hai (Gulf of Chihli), Liaosi, Jehol, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, Suiyuan, Shansi, Honan, and Shantung, and falls within the North China Administrative Region. Under the Communist rearrangement of provincial boundaries it has exchanged some territory in the south with the province of Honan, and gained some from Chehar Province in the northwest. The total gain probably amounts to about 15 percent of its former area of 54,480 square miles. The population was formerly 31,897,000 and probably has been increased by these changes.

The chief mountain ranges of this province are congregated in the northwest and include the Sung, Yen, Wu-t'ai, and T'ai-chang ranges. These are all extensions of the Yin Shan system. Geographically the province is part of the North China Plain. The leading rivers are the Pai, Engteng, Taching, and Huto. All these rivers and the Grand Canal converge at Tientsin as the Hai River and enter the Po Hai (Gulf of Chihli) at Ta-ku K'ou. The climate is typically continental, with hot summers and cold winters, but is generally milder along the coastal region.

Crops are produced in large quantities and include wheat, kaoliang, corn, millet, cotton, and fruits. There is little rice cultivation. The province is one of the leading coal and salt producing areas. The Kailan collieries at K'ai-p'ing, and those at Men-t'ou-kou and Ching-hsing supply coal to North China, Shanghai, and Nanking. Kailan is capable of producing six million tons annually and is one of the two leading coal producing areas in all China. The province leads all others in coal production. Substantial reserves of iron, alunite, and aluminous shale are also located here. Some petroleum is produced as a coke by-product. The port city of Tientsin is the province's industrial center, with cotton and flour mills and small chemical works. Handicraft production of carpets, rugs, and porcelainware is also carried on.

The national capital of Peking is the center of a railroad network extending in four directions via the Peking-Hankow, Peking-Liaosi, Peking-Suiyuan and the Peking-Jehol railroads. The Tientsin-P'u-k'ou line in the east runs almost parallel to the Peking-Hankow line and these two lines are linked by the Shih-men-Te-hsien line. Te-hsien is a border city in western Shantung. There are about 2,500 kilometers of highways centered at Peking and Tientsin and concentrated in the area east of the Peking-Hankow railroad. Steamship navigation is well developed along all the inland rivers. Peking and Tientsin are also important airline terminals.

The provincial capital, Tsingyuan (Paoting) (38° 52' N and 115° 29' E), is located south of Peking and west of Tientsin. Tsingyuan contains fairly large egg and flour processing plants. The Paoting Military Academy was formerly located here.

China's cultural and political center is Peking (39° 56' N and 120° 24' E), the capital of the Yuan, Ming, and Manchu dynasties as well as of the Republic of China. It is now the capital of Communist China and a special municipality, with a population exceeding 1,800,000.

Tientsin (39° 0' N and 117° 15' E) is the largest port in North China, with a population of 1,773,000. It is a river port rather than a sea port. The development of T'ang-ku Harbor, about 15.5 miles to the east, will result in the decline of Tientsin's port utility, for the latter is often hindered by excessive silting of the several rivers converging there.

Tientsin is a major railroad junction and serves as a marketing center for North China, Mongolia, and Sinkiang, exporting wool, hides, cotton, eggs, and egg products, and manufactured articles such as rugs. It is a Special Municipality. Ta-ku and T'ang-ku (38° 59' N and 117° 41' E) are twin cities facing each other on the Hai River estuary; they are the gateway to Tientsin and Peking. The industrial town of Shih-men (38° 2' N and 114° 28' E) has a population of 217,300 and specializes in cotton mills and glass factories. It is the junction of the Peking-Hankow and Cheng-ting-Te-hsien railroads. T'ang-shan (39° 38' N and 118° 11' E) is another industrial town in the northeast.

Ch'in-huang-tao (39° 55' N and 119° 38' E) is the chief outlet for the Kailan coal mines and is an important port in North China since its freezing period is short and not severe. It is located southwest of Lin-yü in Liaosi Province, on a small peninsula 109 miles northeast of T'ang-ku and connected to the Peking-Mukden railroad by a branch line. Southwest of this city is the summer resort of Pei-tai-ho.

In the Ch'un-ch'iu Period, Hopoh was the location of the Yen State, with its southern territory under the control of the Chi State. As a flat coastal province, it is comparatively rich in agriculture and textile plants. Ever since the time of the Sui dynasty, the Grand Canal has been the means of transporting foodstuffs from the South to the North. Peking, now the symbol of old Chinese culture, has always been important as a frontier post facing the northern tribes outside the Great Wall. Earlier Chinese civilization had centered around the Shensi-Shansi-Honan area, and it was only after the gradual decay of the earlier capitals like Sian, Lo-yang, and Kaifeng, that Peking assumed an important cultural and symbolic position. The use of Peking as the capital always indicates the importance of the North to China; during the period of foreign contact, however, Peking proved to be fairly vulnerable, when foreign ships could easily sail to Tientsin. At least twice the Manchu Court and the Empress Dowager had to flee from it; and the sacking of which it was the victim after the so-called Boxer Rebellion is notorious. The Yuan Ming Yuan, the Imperial Park erected by the Empress Dowager, was completely destroyed.

Peking is still a beautiful city with broad paved streets, many trees, and more homogeneous architecture than the sea-ports like Shanghai. It is the center of higher education in China; Tsinghua University, Peking University, Yenching University, and other lesser

national and missionary universities attract to it a large number of teachers and students from other provinces of China. They add color and variety to the Peking scene. It is not an exaggeration to say that more than half of the students in Tsinghua and Yenching come from Kiangsu, Chekiang, and South China.

The people in Hopeh are typical of the people of North China as a whole. They differ in many respects from the southern Chinese. They are taller and heavier; their facial features are less expressive and lack distributional variety. With the periodic invasion of the Mongolian, Manchurian, and other tribes from the North, many rich Chinese families moved south, so that the present-day northerner usually represents a mixture of Chinese with other tribal blood. While Mandarin is the official spoken language of China, the Wu and Canton dialects have preserved older forms of pronunciation and have more tonal and inflexional variety than Mandarin. The Cantonese people, in other words, preserve the Tang pronunciation, while the present Peking dialect represents a somewhat later form of development, in which many sound distinctions are lost. Thus while the Peking people are usually regarded as typically Chinese, in terms of ethnic and phonological development the southerners may be truer to the ancient Chinese type.

The food habits of North and South China are different. The people in Hopeh take to wheat, kaoliang, and millet. It is only the relatively rich who can afford rice. Food preparation is also simpler and there is less regard for taste; the kind of exotic quality for which Chinese food is famous is missing. The most famous dish in Peking restaurants is roast duck served with paste-like soy bean sauce and white bread. Another kind of food, of un-Chinese origin, is Shao Yang-jou, ultra-thin slices of lamb dipped in a broth of vegetables boiling in a charcoal-heated chafing dish. Since most Chinese meat is well-done, this type of meat, which is on the rare side, has a distinctive character. Vegetables are scarce, except for Chinese cabbage during the winter season; fruits are a luxury. Turnips are eaten raw and pickled. People in Hopeh are fond of drinking tea with dried jessamine flowers.

The northerners are a straight-dealing, courteous people who abide by the Confucian virtues. More traditional and less enterprising than the southerners, they are losing out commercially, and as a result the southerners are invading the North, while the northerners who do business in Shanghai and Hong Kong are relatively few. Since the Imperial Examination system drew select officials from all provinces, many leading families in Peking were from other provinces. The native Peking population still preserves its interest in music, art, handicraft, and such small graces of life as birds and flowers. But with changing social trends, many families are impoverished and are unable to maintain this tradition. The old people nostalgically recall the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty and the time of Yuan Shih-k'ai, and deplore the sad decline of Peking.

Since most Occidentals who have visited Peking have praised it to the skies, it is necessary to correct the impression they have given of it to some extent. Most foreigners who have lived there have been in a position to hire a number of servants and live in spacious, well-heated rooms; they were thus unaware of certain of the disadvantages of living in Peking. Actually Peking is a very cold place in winter; for the populace, living in bare, heated rooms, life can be very uncomfortable. In summer it is very hot, though the nights are comparatively cool. In spring the sky is overcast with dust storms, so that even upon reaching home after a short walk, one must wash. Only the fall months are relatively pleasant. The palaces of the Forbidden City are extremely photogenic; but, like other Chinese buildings, they suffer from the sparing uses of stone and marble. The rooms are improperly lighted and most woodwork inside is in a dilapidated condition; the yellow tiled roofs and imposing facades contrast sharply with the dingy interiors.

Because of the cold weather and the scarcity of woolen materials, most northerners wear too many thicknesses of cotton-padded clothes and are not in a position to take baths regularly. The fact that they take to kaoliang drinks often adds a stale smell to their bodies. Nevertheless they maintain an honesty and gentility which are touching in view of the general decline of living standards. The homes of upper middle class people are quite handsome. Red doors open upon a court facing the reception room. Most houses are of the one-level type of construction.

In spite of its importance in China's national life, Hopeh has not produced many great men (it has, however, been the chosen home of many eminent people from other provinces). Popular figures in Chinese history who came from Hopeh are Chang Ch'ieh, leader of the Yellow Turbans; Liu Pai, colorful figure of the Three Kingdoms; Shih K'o-fa, patriotic Ming general who made a heroic stand against the Manchus at the city of Chiang-tu (Yang-chou); Chang Chih-tung, brilliant statesman who in the declining years of the Ch'ing dynasty initiated many new industrialization measures. The novelist Lao She and the playwright Ts'ao Yu, noted for their racy Pekingese, are natives of Hopeh. Very few eminent Communists come from Hopeh.

Ninety percent of the people in Hopeh live in small villages and are directly dependent upon agriculture. The houses are built either of soft grey bricks poorly burnt with straw or, more frequently, of pounded earth or sun-dried cakes of mud. The roofs are often of mud laid upon kaoliang stalks, which in turn rest upon wooden rafters that lie on the main beams. The houses commonly face south, in order to take advantage of the warmth of the sun. The meals, much the same day after day, consist of boiled millet or kaoliang with a few vegetables, steamed bread or noodles made of wheat, and bean curd.

Hunan

Hunan, commonly referred to as the "rice bowl" of China, is in the South-Central Administrative Region and borders on Kiangsi, Hupeh, Szechwan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces. Its area totals 79,042 square miles, and it has a population of 26,171,000. The northern topography is generally flat with increasing hilliness toward the south. The chief mountain range is the Hsueh-feng in the central area, which is also the location of the sacred mountain of Heng Shan. Other important mountains are the Nan-hing and Wu-ling. There are a large number of rivers in the province, the most important being the Yuan, Tzu, Lien, Tao, Siang and Mi. In the north is Tung-t'ing Lake, a large body of water which is part of the Yangtze River system. Climatic conditions are generally mild, particularly in the lake region, but sub-tropical conditions prevail in the far south.

The province is of great agricultural importance, a large rice yield being taken from the lake shores and alluvial valley. Beans, tobacco, cotton, and tea are other important crops. The province is also important in mineral production. Substantial iron production is found at An-hua, Ning-hua, Hsin-hua, I-ying and Shao-ying. The last three areas are also the center of antimony production and at one time produced 80 percent of the world supply. Other minerals produced in significance are mercury, sulphur, silver, manganese, lead, zinc, and tungsten. Coal is produced in good quantity at Lei-ying, I-shang, Hsiang-hsiang, Hsiang-t'an, Shao-ying, Ch'i-ying, and Heng-shan. There are several small fac-

ories at Changsha, Ch'ang-te and Heng-yang. The province is also well known for its embroidery, linen, porcelain, and paper handicrafts.

The Canton-Hankow railroad crosses the eastern part of the province from north to south. The Ping-hsiang-Chu-chow railway links it to Kiangsi in the east while the Hunan-Kwangsi line connects it to Kwangsi Province. A well distributed road network of 3,500 kilometers connects the province to the surrounding areas. Steamship navigation is well developed on the rivers and on Tung-t'ing Lake.

The provincial capital and commercial center of Changsha (28° 12' N and 112° 59' E) has a population of 421,610. Rice, tea, tung oil, porcelain, minerals, and embroidery are the major goods produced here. This city was the scene of four major battles during the Sino-Japanese War. Yueh-yang (29° 28' N and 113° 12' E) is a town of military significance near the Yangtze mouth on Tung-t'ing Lake, on the Canton-Hankow railroad. A commercial town dealing chiefly in tung oil and serving Kweichow Province and eastern Szechwan is Ch'ang-te (29° 2' N and 111° 32' E), on the Yuan River in western Hunan.

The communications center is Heng-yang (28° 56' N and 112° 35' E), in the central part of the province. It is the junction of the Canton-Hankow and Hunan-Kwangsi railroads and the confluence of the Siang, Cheng, and Lei rivers. The sacred mountain of Heng Shan is located north of this city. South of Heng-yang is Shui-kou Shan (28° 28' N and 111° 23' E), in one of China's major tin and zinc-producing areas. Hsin-hua (27° 44' N and 111° 23' E) in western Hunan contains the world's largest antimony deposits, with production centered at Hsi-k'uang-shan (27° 46' N and 111° 38' E), about 12.5 miles from Hsin-hua.

In the old days, Hunan was the Kingdom of Chu, the center of ancient southern Chinese culture. As such, it is one of China's richest store-places of myths and legends, its Tung-t'ing Lake, Siang River, and many picturesque mountains easily giving rise to a magic interpretation of the world. Because Hunan is in China's richest rice-producing area, its people are comparatively well-off, strong, and energetic. The Hunan women are all healthy and good-looking, less restricted than other Chinese women by the Confucian code of subservience. Living in a humid country, the Hunan people take to hot food; every meat and vegetable course is served with red or green pepper, so that the lips and tongue are perpetually tantalized with a burning sensation. Apparently the highly seasoned food does no damage to the people's digestion.

The Hunan people speak a special kind of Mandarin, conspicuous for certain consonantal shifts from the Peking dialect and often heard among Chinese soldiers and officers. This is because Hunan men are China's best soldiers. The novelist, Shen Tsung-wen, who was himself once a soldier, writes with affection about Hunan peasants and soldiers. The fame of Hunan soldiery spread far and wide with the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion. To quell the Rebellion, the Manchu government made use of the Chinese scholar-generals, Ts'eng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t'ang, and Li Hung-chang. Both Ts'eng and Tso were natives of Hunan and represented the finest tradition of responsible Confucian statesmanship. Ts'eng, Tso, and Li made trained soldiers out of the Hunan peasants and defeated the T'ai-p'ings. Later, the Hsiang Chün or Hunan army under Tso Tsung-t'ang penetrated into Tsinghai and Sinkiang to suppress the Moslem Rebellion, and many Hunan soldiers settled down permanently in that district. As the last of Confucian statesmen, Ts'eng Kuo-fan is the model upon which Chiang Kai-shek patterned his personal life. Without Hunan statesmen like Tso, Ts'eng, and P'eng Yu-lin, the Manchu dynasty would have been overtaken by disaster decades earlier than it was.

Among the prominent men of Republican China, Hunan can claim the Chinese representative at the United Nations, T. F. Ts'ang, the painter Chi' Pai-shih, General Sung

Hsi-lien. A large number of eminent Hunanese serve under the Communist regime. Mao Tse-tung was a native of Hunan, with the result that many trusted Communist leaders are Hunanese. For example, the No. 2 man of the CCP, Liu Shao-chi, the labor boss, Li Li-san; the Field Army commanders P'eng Te-huai and Liu Po-chi; General Hu Luog; and the writer Ting Ling. The leaders of modern China appear to come almost without exception from the three provinces, Hunan, Chekiang, and Kwangtung.

The traditional clan warfare among the Hunan water-front people forms the basis of much adventure fiction, and many Taoist magical practices still persist among them. Changsha was the scene of many famous battles during the Sino-Japanese War. Heng Shan, in central Hunan, is one of China's five sacred mountains, and attracts a large tourist trade. Its history goes back about 4,000 years, and it now serves equally as the sacred place for Buddhists and Taoists. The poet Chu Yuan drowned himself in the Mi (Mi-lo) River.

The population of Hunan is, for the most part, Chinese. In east Hunan, however, there are still a few Miao tribesmen, and in South Hunan, Yao tribesmen.

Hupeh

This is one of the leading industrial provinces in China. Bordered by the provinces of Anhwei, Honan, Shensi, Szechwan, Hunan, and Kiangsi, it belongs to the South Central Administrative Region. The area totals 71,900 square miles, and its population is 21,271,900.

The border areas in the northwest are mountainous, but the central area is flat, with the Han River basin providing the richest agricultural area. There are four mountain ranges, the Ta-pieh along the borders of Honan and Anhwei, the Ch'ing in the northwest separating the Yangtze and Han rivers, the Wu-ling in the Southwest, and the Mu-fou along the Kiangsi border. The Han and the Yangtze are the chief rivers, the former entering in the northwest and flowing into the Yangtze at Hankow in the east, while the latter enters from Szechwan Province in the west and traverses the southern part of the province to the Anhwei-Kiangsi border. There are numerous lakes in the southern area above Tung-t'ing Lake in Hunan, and in the Hankow area. Climatic conditions show distinct seasonal changes, with warm, humid summers, and cold winters. There is abundant precipitation.

Hunan has a high production of rice, cotton, wheat, beans, and jute plus considerable quantities of tea, silk, and tung oil. It is one of the most intensely cultivated areas in China.

This province ranks third in iron-production, the iron industry being centered at Ta-yeh, southeast of Hankow. Coal production is substantial, with collieries at Ta-yeh, Yang-hsing, Tsung-yang, and I-tu. There are a few copper mines in the southeast. Hankow and Hankow are important industrially and the iron and steel foundries and arsenal there are among the best in China. In addition, there are cotton and flour mills, tea factories, and chemical works. Handicrafts are found throughout the province.

The Peking-Hankow and Canton-Hankow railroads meet at Hankow. Two lines are planned from Hankow into the central area in the west. Small steamers come to Hankow from Szechwan Province via the Yangtze, from Hunan via the Siang River and Tung-t'ing lakes and from various points along the Han River. Ocean steamers ascend the Yangtze and dock at Hankow in high water during the summer. Highways totalling more than 4,000 kilometers are concentrated in the central and eastern areas. Air transportation reaches Hankow, Shao-shih, and I-ch'ang.

The provincial capital is Wu-chang (30° 32' N and 114° 17' E), with an estimated population of 360,000. The National Wuhan University is located here. The special

municipality of Hankow (30° 33' N and 114° 17' E) is the leading commercial and communication center of central China. It is located at the confluence of the Han and Yangtze rivers and contains an important airfield. The major commodities collected here for transshipment are cotton, iron, tung oil, eggs, and tea. The population totals 721,600. An arsenal and iron works center is located at Han-yang (30° 31' N and 114° 14' E), opposite Hankow on the Han River. A city of historical significance is Hsiang-yang (32° 1' N and 112° 4' E), in the northwest on the bank of the Han River across from the town of Fan-cheng. Hsiang-yang is the center of several projected railroads. Northwest of this city lies the commercial town of Lao-ho-k'ou (32° 23' N and 111° 38' E) on the Han River, a marketing center for northern Hupeh, southwestern Honan, and southern Shensi. In the southwest along the Yangtze are two commercial towns with airfields: I-ch'ang (30° 42' N and 111° 17' E) and Shih-shih (30° 16' N and 112° 17' E) which was made a Treaty Port under the terms of the treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. They serve as commercial centers for Szechwan and Central China.

Wuchang, Hankow, and Han-yang, located around the meeting place of the Yangtze and the Han rivers, are known collectively as Wu-han, the "Chicago" of China. Like Shanghai, Wu-han is a commercial and political center. It is also a revolutionary center in the history of modern China. The revolution resulting in the founding of the Republic was begun by revolutionaries at Wuchang on 10 October 1911; during 1927 Wu-han was again the scene of the expulsion of Communist elements from the Kuomintang and the National Government.

Hupei shares the wealth and customs of the Yangtze provinces; the people there take to hot flavored food, though in North Hupei, the customs and agricultural habits of North China begin to prevail.

As the meeting place of North and South, Hupei has witnessed many important battles and events. The reader of the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* will find many historical spots on the map of Hupei. The Red Cliff, in the Chia Yu hsien, was the place where the superior forces of Ts'ao Ts'ao were successfully repulsed by the strategems of the Wu and Shu generals. Kuan Yu, China's military hero, fought and met his tragic death here.

Hupei has not produced many popular heroes in China's history, though its education and literacy have been no whit inferior to those of other provinces. Even in modern times, it does not boast of many illustrious personages, as do, for example, Chekiang and Hunan. Among Chiang's trusted men are the Governor of Taiwan, Wu Kuo-chen, and the diplomat Wang Shih-chieh. Among the top Communist personnel are Lin Piao, Commander of the Fourth Field Army and leader of the Chinese troops in Korea during the early stages of the Communist offensive, and Tung Pi-wu, Vice-Premier of the Administrative Council.

Jehol

Under the Communist rearrangement of provincial boundaries this province in the Northeast Administrative Region has lost about 35 percent of its former territory of 69,500 square miles to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Its former population of 2,184,700 has not been proportionately reduced, however, since the southern areas, with the highest population density, were not affected. The province is bordered by Liaosi, Inner Mongolia, Chahar, and Hopeh.

The province contains several fertile basins, the most important being the Liao River valley in the eastern area; otherwise it is a mountainous highland. The chief mountains are the Ta-hsing-an (Greater Khing-an) on the Chahar border and extending into Inner Mongolia, the Lin-wu, Chi-lao-tu, and Sung-ling. The chief rivers are the Liao in the north-

east, the Luan, and the Je. The continental climate is similar to that of Chahar Province, with extremely bitter winters. Rainfall is limited and is concentrated in the summer months.

Jehol is a fertile agricultural region, and has more cultivated land than Chahar. Major crops are wheat, barley, kaoliang, corn, and beans. The Mongols in the northern area live by cattle-raising. A substantial amount of coal is produced, with the largest colliery located north of Chengteh at Pei-p'iao. Good deposits of iron, gold, and silver are also reported. Industrial activity is limited to handicraft production of woolen goods and animal products.

The two railroads in the province are the Peking-Jehol and Chin-hsien-Chengteh lines. There are also approximately 2,500 kilometers of highways in the central and southern areas leading to the neighboring provinces.

Chengteh (40° 59' N and 117° 52' E) is the provincial capital as well as the commercial and communications center. It was also the location of the summer palace of the Manchu dynasty. Ch'ao-yang (41° 34' N and 120° 26' E) is a trading and communications center, with the northeast provinces located south of the coal producing town of Pei-p'iao (41° 47' N and 120° 47' E). Chin-feng (42° 18' N and 119° 0' E) is the most important city in the north. It is a trading and communications center. An adjacent railroad town of strategic importance is Ping-ch'uan (41° 1' N and 118° 35' E).

For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this chapter entitled "Manchuria."

Kansu

Kansu Province is in the Northwest Administrative Region and borders on Shensi, Ningxia, Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tsinghai, and Szechwan. This province has a relatively high altitude; the Ch'i-lin, Ch'in Ling, and Min ranges traverse it. Agriculture is located mainly in the southeast around Lan-chow and T'ien-shui, while the northwestern areas are suited to grazing. The southeastern half straddles the upper Hwang River. Other rivers are the Wei, Tsingshui, and Kialing. The climate is continental, with hot summers, harsh winters, and little rainfall.

Arable land is limited to the southeastern area, which produces wheat, kaoliang, corn, beans, some rice, and tea. There are large forested areas in the Liu-p'an, Hsi-ch'ing, and Min mountains. The Yu-men and Lan-chow areas have oil resources, those in the former being the most extensive in all China. Kansu is the largest oil-producing province after Liliotung. Small amounts of iron, coal, and gold are also produced here. Its major industries are its chemical and woolen factories.

The Lung-hai railroad terminates at T'ien-shui in the southeast and work is under way to extend it to Lan-chow and eventually into Sinkiang. There are reported to be 6,500 kilometers of highways. The Lan-chow-Urumchi (Ti-hua) highway is the most significant of these with other major routes leading to Shensi, Szechwan, Tsinghai, and Ningxia. Lan-chow is also an important air terminal, linking this province and Sinkiang to the interior.

The provincial capital of Lan-chow (36° 3' N and 103° 11' E) or Kao-lan is located on the south bank of the Hwang River and has a population of 156,500. It is a commercial center for wool, cotton, and other goods, and a vital communication center for the northeast provinces of Sinkiang, Tsinghai, and Ningxia. T'ien-shui (34° 38' N and 105° 28' E), in the southeast, is an agricultural and industrial center and the present terminus of the Lung-hai railroad. Yu-nen (40° 15' N and 97° 13' E), also known as the Jade Gate, is a trade center for Sinkiang Province, and is also the center of the largest oil fields in China. Tun-huang

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(40° 8' N and 94° 47' E) is a place of historical importance, and is the site of caves decorated with ancient Buddhist wall-paintings and sculpture. Chia-yü-kuan (39° 49' N and 98° 18' E) marks the end of the Great Wall. A large Lamaist center is located at Hsia-ho (35° 25' N and 102° 22' E), southwest of Lanchow. The Hsia-ho Monastery here controls 108 small lamasseries in the area with 300,000 lamas. East of Hsia-ho is Lin-hsia (Ho-chou) (35° 36' N and 103° 3' E), the leading Moslem center of China.

Kansu has been, traditionally, the western limit of effective Chinese influence. Its outermost large town, Yu-men (Jade Gate) has been a strong citadel as well as a trade center between China and the West by the land routes. With the opening up of sea routes, however, Kansu has declined in prosperity. The Communist regime now attaches great importance to Kansu, as it is linked with Soviet Turkestan through Sinkiang. Railroads are being built by virtual slave labor to make communication easier in the Northwest. This step will further tighten Soviet Russia's hold on China. As Sun Yat-sen saw it on the map, Lanchow, the capital of Kansu, is the center of China and should, consideration of population and climate to one side, be the center of rail communications in China. But even with increasing aid from Soviet Russia, this grandiose plan is hardly feasible at present.

Kansu was made a province after the founding of the Republic. It has been a major meeting-place of Buddhism and Islam with Confucianism. Its turbulent peoples are a heterogeneous mixture of Chinese, Mongols, Arabs, Turks, and a dozen miscellaneous central Asian tribes. Chinese influence has been greater in Kansu than in the neighboring provinces of Tsinghai and Ningxia which, even now, are relatively non-Chinese. The recovered art and literature, of T'ang and pre-T'ang origin, in the Caves of Tun-huang, are indicative of the Chinese and Buddhist culture in Kansu at T'ang times. However, approximately at that time, Mohammedans began to supplant Chinese influence in that region. In 956 an army of 4,000 Arab mercenaries was sent by the Caliph of Islam to help the Ming suppress the An Lu-shan Rebellion. For their services, they were rewarded with Chinese wives and settled on ample grants of land in the sparsely-populated Northwest. Not long afterward, Uighur migrants began moving eastward from their ancestral pastures in Kashgaria. They settled principally in Sinkiang and along the borders of Kansu and Mongolia. Being Moslems, they served as a bridge for the march of Islam into Northwest China.

The Mecca for China's Moslems is Lin-hsia, a sizable walled city in western Kansu. From the far corners of Asia they journey to Lin-hsia to worship at its famous mosques. The present Moslem leaders come from the Lin-hsia Ma's. The older brother of Ma Pu-fang, Ma Fu-ching, controlled the Kansu corridor. Ma Hsiang-kuei was governor of Ningxia from 1933 until the communists took over. During the war, however, part of Kansu was under Communist control. Since the Liberation, the Communists have been tightening their control over the Moslem population and suppressing its seditious tendencies.

Compositely considered, the Moslem is taller and huskier than the Chinese. His features are decidedly aquiline, with deep-set eyes and a high nasal bridge clearly reflecting his occidental ancestry, remote though it is. Whereas the Chinese rarely wears a beard before he is forty, the Moslem youth is proud of his whiskers.

The men are hardly distinguishable in attire from their Chinese neighbors except in isolated communities, where the brightly colored costumes of their ancestors may still be seen. Generally, the Moslem has found the ubiquitous blue denim garments of the Chinese more practical and less expensive than these costumes. The women, however, have retained the traditional veil of Islam. In the wealthier families the veil is of light texture, often delicately embroidered and colored. Among the poorer classes, where the women must work in the fields and rare for the household, the veil has had to compromise with expediency

and necessity, so that today it is a sort of hood, with an oval opening from the eyebrows to the chin.

The Moslems are sharp traders and enterprising shop-keepers. They are the horse dealers, muleteers, butchers, and restaurateurs of China. But pork, which the Chinese love so dearly, is still not to be found in any Moslem restaurant; along with liquor and opium it is forbidden by their religion.

There is a mosque in every Moslem community. Most mosques are built in the Chinese style, with tile roofs and upturned corners. Inside, however, they are completely bare of furnishings. This austerity contrasts sharply with the highly embellished interiors of the Chinese temples. The ahungs (priests) are the real masters in Moslemism. The white turban or skull-cap is their badge of office.

Though they speak the Chinese language, the Moslems tend to be extremely race-conscious. Down through the centuries their religious hatred for the Chinese has exploded into periodic rebellion. The most violent in recent history was the Tung Chih Uprising, during which three million people were slain and millions more died of famine and pestilence (1861-1877). In order to quell this rebellion, the great Ch'ing statesman Tso Tsung-t'ang conducted a patient campaign during which he pacified Kansu and considerably extended Chinese influence in Sinkiang.

Kansu contains one of the active earthquake zones of the world. During the big earthquake on 16 December 1920, tens of thousands of farmhouses were destroyed.

Kiangsi

Kiangsi is located in the South-Central Administrative Region and is bordered by Chekiang, Anhwei, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Fukien. It has a population of 12,836,000 and an area of 66,800 square miles. It is mountainous, most of its ranges running in a southwest-northeast direction. Among these are the T'ai-yü, Chiu-ling, Wu-i and Hui-yü. There are yet others in the west, including the Mu-fu along the border of Hupeh, where the summer resort of Ku-ling is located (on Lu Shan, the range's highest peak). The Yangtze River runs eastward in the north, forming part of the provincial border; the Kan River runs northward in the central area and enters P'o-yang Lake. P'o-yang Lake, with a surface of over a thousand square miles, is connected with and serves as a reservoir for the Yangtze. The climate is generally mild, with abundant rainfall in April and May followed by a fairly dry period beginning in early fall. This is one of the wettest areas in the Yangtze region.

This province is one of the major rice-producing areas in China, with production centered around P'o-yang Lake and the Kan River Valley. Other important crops are black tea at Hsiu-shui, Wu-ning and Chi-an; jute at Wan-tai, I-hung and Jui-chin; tobacco at Jui-chin, Kuang-feng, and Yu-shan; beans and kaoliang in the Kan Valley; sugar cane at Kan-hsien, Tung-hsiang, Lo-p'ing, and P'o-yang; and citrus fruits at Nan-feng and Lin-ch'uan. Timber is also an important commodity.

Kiangsi is rich in minerals. Tungsten production is of particular significance; it formerly accounted for 60 percent of world output. Production is located at Ta-yü, An-yüan, Hui-ch'ang, Kan-hsien, Lung-nan, Ch'ung-i, and Shang-yü. Coal production is found in various areas and the P'ing-hsiang mines are one of the largest producing areas in the Yangtze region. Manganese, gold, copper, and tin deposits are also reported. The first of these is actually being produced. Iron production is located at Chiu-ch'ang and Jui-ch'ang. Nanchang, Chiu-ching (Kou Kiang), and Kan-hsien are the centers for small chemical industries. Handicraft production, however, is most important, especially porcelain production at Fou-liang (29° 18' N and 117° 12' E) in the northeast.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3 OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

G-3 OAO ORO (23 June 54)

2 July 1954

SUBJECT: Technical Memorandum ORO-T-229, Volume I, "CHINA: An Area Manual, Geographical, Historical and Military Background."

TO:

1. Transmitted herewith for your advanced information is a copy of Technical Memorandum ORO-T-229, Volume I, "CHINA: An Area Manual, Geographical, Historical and Military Background."
2. This publication is a working paper of the Operations Research Office (Project POWOW).
3. Request that appropriate comments on this Technical Memorandum be submitted to the ACofS, G-3 (RR&SW) as desired by addressee for consideration by the Director, Operations Research Office in the preparation of the final report on this project.

H. M. Roper
H. M. ROPER
Major General, GS
Deputy ACofS, G-3 for Research,
Requirements and Special Weapons.

The most important railroad line is the Chekiang-Kiangsi from Hangchow in Chekiang Province, through Nanchang, ending at Pinghsiang on the western border and linking with the Canton-Hankow railroad in Hunan Province. There is also the short Nanchang to Chiu-Chiang line in the north. A southern extension of the Nanking-Kuei-ch'i line from Wuchu in Anhwei Province to Kwei-ch'i is currently being built. There are about 7,000 kilometers of highways, which cover all parts of the province, and also minor motor roads. Water transportation is well developed, with steamboats plying the Yangtze River and P'o-yang Lake.

The provincial capital of Nanchang (28° 40' N and 115° 53' E) is the major railroad junction. It is located on the right bank of the Kan River, and is an important marketing center for rice, porcelain (linen (ramie), timber, paper, and tobacco. Its population numbers over 203,000. The center of coal production is at Ping-hsiang (27° 37' N and 113° 50' E), a railroad town in the west, the collieries being located some six miles to the east. Tungsten production is centered in the south at Ta-yu (23° 30' N and 114° 19' E). Kuan-hsien (28° 52' N and 114° 54' E), in the agricultural area, has military as well as economic significance. Chiu-chiang in the north is an important Yangtze port, noted for tea, rice, and porcelain production.

For the last 2000 years the production of China's best ceramics has centered about Fou-lang. Even during the Ming and early Ch'ing dynasties, despite its primitive equipment, it was producing the world's best porcelains; and it maintains high standards today, although new equipment is sorely needed to ensure uniform quality and mass production. Fou-lang is an interesting medieval town, whose trade has not changed in essential character for centuries. It is dirty, and its people live in crowded, dingy quarters. Practically all the members of the borough are engaged in the process of making porcelain, and many of the typical features of life in a medieval borough have been preserved among them.

From 1927 to 1934 Kiangsi was the home of the Chinese Soviet Republic, headed by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh. The capital was at Sui-ch'uan. Its people, having lived under Red rule at that time, had, and still have, no illusions about Communism, though today they have no choice but to accept Communist tyranny. Nanchang was the city in which Chiang Kai-shek launched the New Life Movement to counteract Communist subversion.

The Kiangsi farmers are very clanish, in the sense that it is customary among them for all the people of one name in a village to band together for self-protection and for defense against robbers and bandits. Like another people who are often spoken of as clanish, the Scots, they are regarded by people in other provinces as over-frugal and selfish. Wealthy farmers among them are said to put up with the poor clothes and spare diet usually associated with those who earn their rice by the sweat of their brow. Quite a number of people in Kiangsi have moved out into the coastal provinces.

Kiangsi was the home of Tao Ch'ien, the famous Chinese poet. It also was the home of China's greatest reformer-statesman, Wang An-shih, who was a great poet and prose writer. Wang and another contemporary Kiangsi poet, Huang Ting-chien, started the Kiangsi School of Poetry, which flourished in the Sung period and was noted for its erudition and allusiveness. Wen T'ien-hsiang, the great Sung patriot who fought against the Mongols, was from Kiangsi. Chen Yun-ko, perhaps the greatest traditional Chinese scholar now living, came from Kiangsi. He lives in Hong Kong, and is one of the few scholars who have refused to collaborate with the Communists. The leader of the Democratic League, Lo Lung-chi, is a native of Kiangsi.

Kiangsu
The coastal province of Kiangsu, in the East China Administrative Region, is bordered by the China Sea, Shantung, Honan, Anhwei, and Chekiang. It has an area of 12,500

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square miles and population of 40,964,200. As of March 1952, no provincial government had yet been established, the province's administration being a responsibility of the North and South Administrative Districts, with headquarters at Chiang-tu and Wush respectively.

The province is a plains area except in the north and west. Its points of greatest altitude are in the Yanti Range in the northeast. Other hills are the Chung and Ch'i-hsia near Nanking, and the Chin and Chiao near Chen-chiang — all these being part of the Mao Range. The chief rivers are the Yangtze (which empties into the sea at Wu-sung (Woo-sung) near Shanghai), the Hwai, and the Hwangpoo. Of considerable historical but secondary utilitarian significance is the Grand Canal crossing the western part of the province from north to south. The Yangtze Delta region covers much of South Kiangsu. There are also numerous lakes, the largest being the T'ai and Hung-tse.

The climate in the extreme northwest is almost continental; otherwise the climate is oceanic with abundant rainfall in June and July prevailing throughout the province. The winds, southeasterly in summer and northeasterly in winter, cause comparatively large temperature variations.

Kiangsu, one of China's richest provinces, has its agricultural wealth concentrated in the south. It leads China in cotton and is the second largest producer of silk, with production centered around the T'ai Lake area. The centers of rice production are Nan-hui, Nan-tung, Ch'ung-ming, Ch'ang-shu, T'ai'sang, and Chia-ting, the largest rice marketing area being at Wush. Marine products are also abundant, the Chou-shan islands along the southern coast being one of China's largest fishing areas. Industrial development is fairly advanced, with electrical manufacturing and chemical industries in various parts of the province. The Lu-sho chemical works and the Lung-an cement plant are among the largest and best in China. There are numerous cotton and flour mills at Wush, Nan-tung, and Shanghai. Handicraft production includes I-hsing pottery, cotton cloth from Nan-tung and Ch'ung-ming, silk piece goods from Nanking and Soochow, and embroidery from Soochow. Coal production at Hsiao-shan and I-t'ou-chou is substantial.

The several railroads in the province are the Nanking-Shanghai, Shanghai-Hangchow, Nanking-Wu-hu, and the Lung-hai in the north. The Tientsin-P'u-t'ou line enters Kiangsu near Nanking. Highways total approximately 4,000 kilometers, the most important being in the Nanking-Shanghai area. Oceanic and coastal navigation are centered at Shanghai, but the Yangtze carries ocean-going and river ships far west of the provincial boundaries. The lakes and canals are also navigable. The air terminals at Shanghai and Nanking link the province and country with international air routes.

The present South Administrative District capital and proposed provincial capital is Wush (31° 35' N and 120° 18' E) on the T'ai Lake shore. It is an important railroad, industrial, and marketing center for silk, cotton, rice, cotton goods, and cooking oil.

Chiang-tu, or Yangchow (32° 24' N and 119° 27' E) on the Yangtze, is a town of historical and cultural interest. The world's fourth largest and China's largest city is Shanghai (31° 14' N and 121° 30' E), on the Hwangpoo River, with a population of about 4,000,000. It is China's largest seaport; goods are brought here from central and western China, some via the Yangtze and some via the arteries of international and coastal trade. The International Settlement and French Concession were located at Shanghai, which was opened as a Treaty Port in 1842. It is now a Special Municipality, under the direct administration of Peking. Nanking (32° 3' N and 118° 48' E), a Special Municipality, was once the capital of China; it has a population of about 1,000,000 and is located on the south bank of the Yangtze. It is of great historical and cultural significance, having been the capital of several dynasties and kingdoms. The mausoleum of Sun Yat-sen is located there. Chen-chiang (32° 10' N and 119° 26' E) is a former provincial capital near the Yangtze's confluence with

the Grand Canal, on the Nanking-Shanghai railroad. A historic city famous for its scenery and embroidery is Soochow (31° 19' N and 120° 37' E), with a population of 500,000.

The province of Kiangsu is bisected by the Yangtze River. In dialect, material wealth, and culture, North Kiangsu (Chiang-pei) and South Kiangsu (Chiang-nan) are dissimilar. South Kiangsu is one of the richest agricultural and cultural centers of China; North Kiangsu, because of inadequate communications and bad irrigation, is comparatively poor and cannot support its population. Since the opening of rail and sea traffic, the Grand Canal, for centuries the channel for transporting the tribute rice of South China to North China, has been relegated to a secondary position. When the Hwai River is brought under proper control and the Lung-hai railroad is more effectively used, North Kiangsu bids fair to become a prosperous agricultural and industrial region.

In the time of the Chou dynasty, the people of Kiangsu were semi-barbaric. The state of Wu emerged for a period into prominence during the time of the Warring States, mainly through the efforts of the able statesman Wu T'ai-hsu. The city wall of Soochow, the capital of Wu, was built under his supervision; the Hsu Gate still stands and is, moreover, in good repair; in and outside the city there are many supposed relics of that time, particularly around such tourist spots as the Tiger Hill and the Lin-yen Shan. The story of Wu's feud with its rival state Yueh (Cheking) is well known; Hsi Shu, the most celebrated beauty of ancient China, played a role in it not unlike that of Helen of Troy in the Trojan War.

Equally famous with Soochow, for its soft voluptuous culture during many periods in China's history, was Chiang-tu (Yangchow), a city on the northern bank of the Yangtze; it declined greatly in prosperity after two famous ten-day massacres of its population by foreign invaders. Of greater political and historical significance is the southern capital, Nanking, known in earlier periods as Chia-ting. It was once famous for its Chihhui River, upon which gorgeously lighted barges used to float. Though now stagnant and dirty, it is still frequented by prostitutes and pleasure-seekers.

As a coastal province, Kiangsu was opened to foreign contact quite early; Shanghai was one of the five ports thrown open to foreign trade after the Opium War and since then, as the most important city in China, it has expanded phenomenally. Zikawei, a Shanghai suburb, was the place of retirement for Hsu Kuang-ch'i, an enlightened Ming official who was a friend of Christianity; otherwise Shanghai had been a relatively obscure place until some hundred years ago. The International Settlement has been famous for its volume of trade, its cosmopolitan racial picture, and its intellectual life. Its great educational institutions, St. John's, the University of Shanghai, and Aurora University were all pioneer missionary colleges; its Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist, and Moslem temples stand side by side with Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox churches and Jewish synagogues. Though it is today a center of Soviet power, many White Russians once knew it as a place of refuge.

Racially, Kiangsu is predominantly Chinese; numerous Northern invasions drove the rich Northern Chinese into this region, and they were assimilated by the native population. The dialect spoken in Chiang-pei is an unorthodox form of the northern dialect; Nanking speaks a form of Mandarin. But in most of Chiang-nan the people speak the Wu dialect, of which there are many forms. The Shanghai form is predominant, since it is heard wherever Shanghai business interests have penetrated. The pure Wu dialect is spoken only in Soochow; it is a soft language, with rounded vowels, and is cultivated by prostitutes in every part of China. The high-class sing-song girls in Peking, for example, speak the Soochow dialect, though most of them are Northern. Chiang-pei is so poor that many of its people emigrate to Changan, where they and their dialect are held up to much ridicule. Most of them have little education; large numbers of them become Shanghai coolies (most of the ricksha-pullers in Shanghai are from Chiang-pei). As Shanghai prostitutes, during the

Japanese occupation, many people from Chiang-pei collaborated with the Japanese in order to earn money, and many Chinese accordingly think of all Kiangpeiese as Han-chien (traitors). Chiang-pei was also a Communist stronghold during the occupation, when hard living conditions made the people susceptible to Communist propaganda. Shanghai attracts many people from other provinces, notably Chekiang and Kwangtung.

Because of its rich productivity, Chiang-nan has been a center of refined living. In Shanghai there are countless restaurants, serving Kwangtung, Fukien, Peking, Szechwan, or Muslim food. Soochow, Chen-chiang, and Chiang-tu are all famous for their cuisine, especially their meat tarts, noodles, fresh-water fish, shrimp, and crab. The boiled fresh-water hard-shell crabs during the fall season are easy to serve and, when dipped in Chen-chiang vinegar, are unexcelled in taste. No American sea-food, not even lobster, can remotely approach it. Chiang-nan has, besides the fruits consumed in the US, its own Pi-pa, which is delicious. Living as they do in a cotton and silk center, most people in Chiang-nan are better dressed than their counterparts in the rest of China.

Chiang-nan boasts a relatively high percentage of literacy, and is proud of its many literary men and artists such as the pioneer painter, Ku K'ai-chih, and Mi Fei, perhaps the greatest of China's impressionist landscape painters. Among present-day Chinese it can point to such eminent people as the elderly statesman Wu Chih-hui; the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, V. K. Wellington Koo; the Kuomintang general, Ku Chut-tung; the political boss, Huang Chiu-yung and Tu Yieh-shang; the industrialist Wu Yun-chu; the painters Liu Hsi-su and Hsu Pei-hung; and the opera singer Mei Lan-fang.

Kirin

Kirin is a Manchurian province in the Northeast Administrative Region, bordering on Sungkiang, Heilungkiang, Inner Mongolia, Liaosi, Liaotung, Korea, and the Russian Maritime Province. As constituted under the Nationalist Government reorganization after World War II, it had an area of 46,127 square miles and a population of 6,936,000. Under the Communist reorganization a small territory has been added to it from what was formerly Liaopei Province.

There are several mountain ranges along the Sungkiang border in the north are branches of the Ch'ang-pai Mountains, the Lao-yeh Range, and the Chang-kuang-t'ai Range. The latter separates the waters of the Mutan and Sungari rivers. The Ying-ling Range is in the central area near An-t'u while the Hs-ta Mountains are in the southwest and extend into Liaosi and Liaotung provinces. The chief rivers are the Sungari and Mutan which eventually join in Sungkiang. The Sungari is the chief river and, with its tributaries, is responsible for most of the irrigation, but is frozen over from October through February. The climate is cooler than that of Liaotung Province, with an annual average of about 38°F. Precipitation amounts to 29 inches per year and is concentrated in July and August.

The chief agricultural crops are soybeans, millet, wheat, kaoliang, rice, hemp, corn, and tobacco. There are over 1.5 million acres of forests. A large quantity of coal is produced at the collieries of Chiao-ho, Yungki (Kirin), Chiu-t'ai, Ho-lung, and Hun-ch'un. There are small gold mines at Hua-tien, Ho-lung, Hun-ch'un, Yen-chi, An-t'u, and P'an-shih. The last area also has limited deposits of copper, lead, and iron. The two hydroelectric power plants at Hsiao-feng-men and Hung-shih-li-tzu, with a capacity of over 1,020,000 kilowatts, provide the major power sources for the northeastern province. Ch'ang-ch'un is the chief industrial center, with soybean oil, wool textile, paper, hemp, and chemical factories. The product of these industries, however, is absorbed locally.

There are about 730 miles of railroads centering around Yungki and Ch'ang-ch'un. The Ch'ang-ch'un railway runs from Harbin in Sungkiang to Kung-chu-ling in Liaosi via Ch'ang-

ch'un, Te-hui and Shuang-ch'eng. The Ch'ang-pai line in the northwest connects Ch'ang-ch'un and Tao-an in Inner Mongolia. A short line runs from Yungki to Ch'ang-ch'un, another from Kirin to Hsi-lung in Liaotung Province; the Yungki-T'u-men-ching lines link the city to the Tumen River and Yen-chi in the east. The La-fa-Pinkiang (Harbin) line terminates at La-fa, east of Kirin. There are a limited number of highways, most of which are concentrated between Kirin and Ch'ang-ch'un and lead to Liaosi and Liaotung provinces.

Yungki (Kirin) (43° 51' N and 126° 32' E) is the political and railway center on the southern bank of the Sungari River. It is also an important commercial center for goods from the Sungari River valley. Its population exceeds 239,000. The economic center for the entire northeast region is Ch'ang-ch'un (45° 53' N and 125° 20' E), in the heart of the most fertile area in this region. The capital of the puppet Manchukuo government was located here. After the Japanese surrender in 1945 it was also a local headquarters for the Chinese Republic, and the administrative seat of the Chinese Ch'ang-ch'un railway as well. The population totalled 505,000 in 1946. Yen-chi (42° 55' N and 129° 31' E), a commercial and railroad town near the Korean border, produces gold. It is also a center for Korean immigrants.

For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this chapter entitled "Manchuria."

Kwangsi

This border province in the South-Central Administrative Region is surrounded by Kwangtung, Hunan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Indo-China, and the Gulf of Tonkin. As of 1953 it had a total area of 94,500 square miles and a population of 16,336,000. Its limestone solution topography, with sheer walls jutting above the plains, is typical of the landscape depicted by many Chinese artists, and is equalled only by that of Yugoslavia and Puerto Rico. The scenery around Kwei-lin and Liu-chou was made famous by the descriptions of the Tang essayist, Liu Tsung-yuan. This karstic topography is chiefly found in the northern and western parts of the province, and is formed by the extensions of the mountains in Yunnan, Kweichow, and Indo-China. The important rivers are the Siang, Liu, and Kwei, all tributaries of the Si River (West River) which enters Kwangsi in the southeast. The province is divided into two climatic regions, a northern and a southern. The northern area is generally mild, with cool winters; the south is near-tropical. The summers tend to be long and hot with abundant rainfall throughout the year but minimum precipitation in winter.

Rice is the chief agricultural crop, and the southern half of the province is a double-cropping area. Only one rice crop is obtained in the rest of the province, but it is supplemented by beans, wheat, and some opium. Fruit production is excellent, particularly in the southern areas. Kwangsi is the second leading tin-producing province after Yunnan. It has varied mineral resources, including tungsten, manganese, coal, iron, zinc, and antimony. There are chemical and machine industries at Kwei-lin, Wu-chou, and Liu-chou.

The chief railroad is the Hunan-Kwangsi-Kweichow road from Ho-kuang in Hunan, which passes through northern Kwangsi via Ch'uan-hsien, Kwei-lin and Liu-chou and proceeds into Kweichow Province. The important railroad from Liu-chou to the Indo-China border is now complete. There are some 5,000 kilometers of highways. The Si River and the Kwei River are navigable by steamboats. The air stations in the province are at Kwei-lin and Wu-chou.

The new provincial capital is Yungning (Nanning) (22° 48' N and 108° 18' E), on the Kwangsi-Indo-China railroad. It is an important marketing center. Kwei-lin (25° 20' N and 110° 10' E), the former provincial capital, is a marketing center for Hunan and Kwangtung provinces. It is located in the northeast, on the Hunan-Kwangsi-Kweichow railway.

and is famous for its scenery. The trading center between Kwangsi and Kwangtung is Wu-chou (23° 28' N and 111° 19' E), a border town at the confluence of the Si and Kwei rivers. It has a paramount position in the Si River valley. Another important trading city for rice, hides, tung oil, timber, and herbs is Liu-chou (24° 18' N and 109° 16' E), in the general geographic center of the province. It is also an important railway city, the junction of the Hunan-Kwangsi-Kweichow and the Kwangsi-Indo-China railroads.

During the Ch'ing dynasty, Kwangsi and Kwangtung were combined in the vice-royalty of Liang Kuang. The Kwangsi people, though less adventurous and having little access to the sea, share the stubborn footholdiness of the Kwangtung people. Though they live mainly by agriculture, they also keep livestock in order to make use of their poorer land. The T'ai-p'ing Rebellion (1849) began in a small town in Kwangsi, Chin-t'ien-Tsun. The majority of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's followers were Kwangsi people, and it was due to their fighting ability and discipline that the rebel armies reached Nanking so quickly.

With the establishment of the Nationalist Government, Kwangsi was for many years governed well by two able generals, Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Li Tsung-jên, who did much to give the province peace and a stable economy. Though not friends of Chiang Kai-shek, Li and Pai were not run-of-the-mine war lords; rather they were men with a sense of public responsibility. Their partial independence enabled them to train one of the best armies in China. During the Sino-Japanese War, Li and Pai joined forces with Chiang, and after the war the so-called democratic elements pushed Li Tsung-jên into the vice-presidency. In 1949, therefore, on the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek, he assumed the office of President, but proved unable to cope with the Communist crisis. He was later exiled to the United States, where his repeated public airing of private grievances against Chiang have clearly shown him to be a man of considerable personal ambition. Pai Ch'ung-hsi still holds a high position under Chiang.

Ethnically, the Kwangsi people are mixed. Remnants of aboriginal races, mixed with the Hakkas, still occupy the infertile regions in the Southwest. The aboriginal Yao still inhabit the Yao Mountains. The eating habits of the Kwangsi people can fairly be described as barbarous. A foreign observer in the early days of the Republic was shocked to find cats, dogs, and snakes being sold among them; and indeed, the people in that part of China have been known to eat rats. The civilizing influence of the Li-Pai rule may have changed all this.

Kwangsi is still thinly populated; the people are militant and province-conscious. Used as they are to just and equitable government, they are finding it extremely difficult to live under the Communist regime.

Though many able men have been sent as exiles to Kwangsi, Yunnan, and Kweichow, Kwangsi produced no eminent figures until the Ch'ing dynasty. Both Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Li Tsung-jên were natives of Kwei-lin. A dissenting Kuomintang politician now serving in the Communist government, Li Chi-shên, is a native of the province, as was one important figure in the literary renaissance, Liang Shu-ming.

Kwangtung

Kwangtung is the nerve-center of South China. It is in the South-Central Administrative Region and borders on Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangsi, and the South China Sea. As of 1953 it had an area of 71,400 square miles and a population of 27,129,000. The island of Hai-nan is administratively a part of Kwangtung.

The province is mountainous, its ranges belonging to the Nan Ling system. They include the Chia-lien along the Kiangsi border, the Lo-fou separating the East and North rivers, the Lien-hua south of the Mei River, the Yun-wu south of the Si River and the

Wu-ling. The chief river is the Pearl (Chu), which with its upper tributaries, the Tung (East), Si (West), and Peh (North) rivers, drains a large area of Kwangsi Province.

The climate is near-tropical, with long summers and short winters. July and August are the hottest months, but temperatures do not generally exceed 100°F. Precipitation is abundant, particularly in April and May. The coastal areas are subject to frequent summer typhoons.

Rice production is high but does not meet the requirements of the large local population. Large quantities of fruits, tea, sugar cane, mulberry, sweet-potato, and tobacco are also cultivated. The Canton area is the most intensively cultivated area. Kwangtung is the fourth-ranking producer of iron. Coal, antimony, and tungsten are also produced, as well as tin, gold, and salt. Canning, chemical, and textile plants are found at Canton, Swatow, and Ch'ao-an. The embroidery, silk-weaving, and carving handicrafts industries are also well developed. Railroad lines are limited but important. The longest is the Canton-Kowloon line. A short line also links Canton to San-shui. The side of the delta west of Macao is covered by a few short railroad lines. Kwangtung has the most extensive highway system of all the provinces in China, totalling 14,516 or over 9000 miles. Water navigation is also well developed, and the three major rivers are served extensively by motor launches and native junks. The Si River accommodates steamers over the 200 miles up to Wu-chou, while the Pearl River in the delta area has well-developed steamship navigation connecting Hong Kong to the mainland. Air navigation is centered at airfields in Canton, Swatow, and in the British Colony of Hong Kong.

The largest commercial port in South China is Canton (23° 7' N and 113° 16' E) on the Pearl River. It was one of the five Treaty Ports opened as a result of the Opium War of 1842. At present it is the provincial capital and a Special Municipality, and has a population of about 1,128,000. It is a trading and shipping center for goods from the surrounding provinces. The seaport of Swatow (23° 22' N and 116° 39' E), the largest on the eastern Kwangtung Coast, is on the Han River estuary and serves as a marketing outlet for the surrounding provinces. About 11 miles southeast of Canton is Huang-pu (Whampoa) (23° 5' N and 113° 24' E), the site of Wharppa Military Academy, China's West Point, where Sun Yat-sen proposed to construct China's major southern port. On the east coast of Lei-chou Peninsula lies the port of Kwangchowan (20° N and 110° E) which was leased to France as a naval base in 1898 and returned to China in 1945. Kung-pei (22° 12' N and 113° 32' E), a port on Ma-liu Island near Macao, was opened to foreign trade in 1887. It now serves as a transshipping point between Macao and Canton, but has decreased in utility due to the silting in Macao Harbor. Another coastal city is Chung-shan (22° 31' N and 113° 23' E) or Hsing-jan, south of Canton; it is the birthplace of Sun Yat-sen. In northern Kwangtung is the wartime provincial capital of Ch'u-chiang (24° 50' N and 113° 33' E). It is an important marketing and railroad city on the Canton-Hankow railroad.

The island of Hai-nan lies 15 miles from the mainland. It has an area of 14,000 square miles and a population of about 3,000,000. Its topography is mountainous and is dominated by the Li-mu or Five-Finger Mountain. A coastal plain occupies the northern quarter of the island, and extends to the eastern and western coasts. The major river is the Kiung how in the north. Rice is the chief crop, but there is some rubber and timber production. Large iron ore deposits are present which were exploited by the Japanese. The island is climatically similar to the opposing Kwangtung coast, but with variations due to latitudinal oceanic influences. The only rail line runs along the northern and western coastline. There is a main round-the-island highway plus a few minor roads.

The chief port of Hai-nan is Hai-k'ou (Hohow) (20° 3' N and 110° 20' E) in the north, which suffers from frequent typhoons and irregular tides. The shallowness of the harbor necessitates the use of motor launches to transport cargoes from ocean vessels which must anchor off-shore. Its activity sustains the city of Ch'ing-shan (20° 2' N and 110° 21' E), the largest city on Hai-nan and the northern terminus of the highway system. Yu-lin (18° 13' N and 109° 31' E) and San-ya (18° 10' N and 109° 30' E) are two important ports formerly used by the Japanese as naval bases.

Hong Kong (22° 12' N and 114° 30' E) is a British colony of 32 square miles, ceded by China in 1842. It is a coastal island, and has an excellent harbor. It has increased greatly in population with the influx of refugees from the Communist mainland. Its chief city, Victoria (22° 15' N and 114° 11' E) had a population of 1,800,000 in 1935. Across from Hong Kong on the tip of a small peninsula is Kowloon (22° 18' N and 114° 12' E), a British leased territory (the lease is to expire in 1997), which serves as a point of transshipment for exports and imports between South China and Hong Kong. Macao Island (22° 12' N and 113° 32' E) is a Portuguese colony, and has a port-city of the same name. Its area totals about six square miles and its population was 387,000 in 1947.

The Kwangtung people offer a marked contrast to northern Chinese. They are short and stocky, and have a reputation for being extremely enterprising, adventurous, pugnacious, carefree, and progressive. They are darker-skinned than other Chinese, and many of the women are very attractive, with large almond eyes and dainty slim figures. Northern women are more flat-faced and have duller eyes than Cantonese women. Climate and diet may partly account for these differences.

In a sense the Cantonese represent the older Chinese stock. For example, they preserve the old spoken dialect, and can still read Tang poetry as it should be read. (In reading Tang poetry in Mandarin, one easily loses track of the rhyme, the rhythm, and the inflections.)

The adventurous spirit of the people of Kwangtung is partly due to the tropical weather in which they live, their exposure to the sea, and their early contact with foreign trade. Until the Opium War, Canton was the only trade port legally open to business men from Britain and other countries. Macao, a venerable Portuguese colony, is now virtually reduced to a gambling, opium-smoking, and prostitution center. After the Opium War, Canton was opened as a Treaty Port and Hong Kong was ceded to the British as a Crown Colony. The near-by city of Kowloon was leased to Britain and Kwangchowwan was later leased to France. In Kwangtung, therefore, there are at least five ports well-known to the western world: Hong Kong, Swatow, Canton, Macao, and Kwangchowwan. As North Kwangtung is mountainous and its agriculture cannot support the large population, the coastal people have always tended to look to the sea. Cantonese have migrated in large numbers to the Philippines, Malaya, and Indo-China, as well as Indonesia. Many have gone to Hawaii. And during the railroad-building days in the US, many Canton coolies went there (many of the Chinese Americans who flourish in the US today are their descendants, and a substantial Chinese colony of Cantonese origin is to be found on both the West and East coasts). Most of the Chinese who went to America were from a particular part of Kwangtung called T'ai-shan, which has its special dialect.

The so-called foreign ideas came to Kwangtung earlier than to the other provinces. Thus Sun Yat-sen, father of the Chinese Republic, was a Cantonese, and many of his trusted followers were Cantonese. But even before Dr. Sun, the reformers of the Ch'ing dynasty came from Kwangtung, notably the great Confucian scholar K'ang Yu-wei and his disciple, Liang Chi-ch'ao. Canton also produced active business men and industrialists, who dominated the trade in Southeast Asia, Shanghai, and Hong Kong.

In spite of their adventurousness and revolutionary fervor, the majority of Cantonese are tenaciously traditional, as witness the fact that the American Chinese still cling to their native customs and ideas.

Cantonese food represents the utmost refinement of the Chinese cuisine, although the legends about the consumption of snakes, dogs, and live monkeys' brains have, however, a factual basis in the eating habits of the Cantonese. The chop suey restaurant in the US adequately represents only the eating habits of the lower social classes, and does scant justice to genuine Cantonese food, which is rich and fanciful. Its chief ingredients, however, are beef, pork, chicken, and fish so that its exotic character has been exaggerated in people's minds. The Cantonese are not only good at preparing regular courses, but at concocting tarts, pies, and noodles as well. Only the Sochow district can challenge Kwangtung's supremacy in "breakfast" and tea-time dishes. In the good old days, the leisurely Cantonese stayed in teashops from morning to night, enjoying various kinds of fill-ups at all hours. Gay pleasure boats with pretty Cantonese girls on hand to entertain customers were once a standard fixture on the Canton waterfront.

At Macao, opium is still sold publicly. Opium smoking, one of the traditional curses of China, has now been practically stamped out on the mainland. There is nothing exotic about opium smoking, although the fact that the smoker lies on a couch contributes to it a note of oriental languidness. The instruments used are a bamboo pipe and a small long steel needle upon the tip of which one places a small pellet of opium which one first heats above a small lamp, and then places in the pipe bowl to be smoked. Opium is said to have curative qualities, but any confirmed smoker suffers from dyspepsia and a general lassitude of will (among other things, he becomes personally untidy). One claim sometimes made for it is that it gives a mellow quality to the voice; many singers have become smokers in this belief. The validity of this claim has never been scientifically tested.

Exposed as they are to warm weather, the Kwangtung people do not, like many Chinese, wear disfiguring cotton-padded clothes, but rather simple silk and cotton garments. The *Ch'i-p'ao*, the more casual close-fitting blouse and pants, set off the slender curves of the Cantonese woman to good advantage. A favorite fabric worn by men and women alike is Hsiang Yün Sha, an extremely durable black-colored summer material, which dries quickly and needs little pressing.

As the home of the revolution, Kwangtung has had a turbulent history ever since the Opium War. Hung Hsu-chuan, who started the Tai-ping Rebellion on the border of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, was a native of Kwangtung. Sun Yat-sen and his early followers Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, were all Cantonese. His trusted general Ch'én Chiung-ming, who revolted against him in 1922, was also Cantonese. The Soong family, T. V. Soong, Mme. Sun Yat-sen, and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, are Cantonese. The Whampoa Military Academy has been the training center for China's best generals: not only Chiang's officers but some of the best Communist generals, like Lin Biao and the late Yeh Ting, are its graduates.

Modern statesmen and generals from Kwangtung are too numerous to list here. One may mention, on the Nationalist side, the brilliant lawyer Wang Chung-hui, Sun Yat-sen's son, Sun Fo; Wu Tieh-ch'eng; the generals Hsueh Yueh, Yu Han-mou, Chang Fa'k'uei, and Lo Cho-ying; the publisher Wang Yun-wu; the reigning movie beauty of the twenties and thirties, Hu T'ieh. On the Communist side are Kuomintang dissidents like Ch'én Ming-shu, Yeh Chien-ying, Ts'ai Ting-K'ai, Chiang Kuan-nan, and the violinist and director of the Central Conservatory, Ma Ssu-tung.

South of Kwangtung is the island of Hai-nan. Its population is 3,000,000; the majority of whom are still aborigines, since only the northern coast has been populated by the Chinese.

It is dominated by the Five-Finger Mountain, and most of it is still uninhabitable. It was first occupied by the Chinese in the Han dynasty after the year 111 B.C., but was not actually incorporated in the Empire until its reconquest during the Yuan dynasty. Since then it has been used as a penal colony, a pirate's lair, and in recent years as an outlet for emigrants from South China.

Along the border of Kwangtung and Fukien are a group of people called Hakka, meaning the "guest people." The name suggests that they are genuine Chinese settlers, mainly from Honan and Shantung, who fled the northern tribes during the South and North dynasties. Their peculiar dialect preserves the pronunciation of pre-T'ang Chinese. In a sense, therefore, the Hakka can be considered the most genuine and unadulterated Chinese there are. They are a clean, courteous, and industrious people. The men mostly engage in trade in the South Seas, the women carrying the major responsibility for the farm work at home. The women invariably wear wide-brimmed hats.

Kweichow

Kweichow Province is bordered by Hunan, Szechwan, Sikang, Yunnan, and Kwangsi provinces and is in the Southwest Administrative Region. Its area of 65,700 square miles is populated by a total of 10,528,300 persons. Topographically, the province is a plateau extensively cut by deep valleys. The altitude here is midway between that of the lower Kwangsi area in the southeast and the higher Yunnan region in the west. The mountains are extensions of the Nan Ling system, the Miao Ling being the largest. The Wu (or Chien) River is the major river; it joins the Yangtze in Szechwan Province. The southern latitude of the province is offset by its altitude; the climate is consequently mild with a temperature range of about 80°F to 20°F. Precipitation is concentrated in July and August. The high mountains and thick forests cause a great deal of fog and humidity.

The limited amount of arable land, plus soil erosion and an adverse climate, make Kweichow a poor agricultural area. One summer crop of rice is supplemented by the cultivation of sweet potatoes, wheat, and corn. Substantial reserves of antimony, mercury, and iron are reported to be located here, in addition to some coal, copper, and petroleum. These minerals, however, are largely undeveloped as an economic resource. The province is also industrially undeveloped, except for a few small electrical and chemical plants at Kweiyang, Tsun-i and Ssu-nan. Its best known product is Ma-sai wine, famous throughout China. The only railroad is the Hunan-Kwangsi-Kweichow line which extends to Tsu-yün in south Kweichow. An extensive line traversing the province from east to west and linking it to the major railways in South China is currently being planned. Another will link Kweichow and Szechwan provinces. There are about 3,000 kilometers of highways connecting the province with the surrounding areas. The poverty of the communications network is enhanced by the rivers which accommodate only junk traffic.

The provincial capital and commercial center is Kweiyang (26° 35' N and 106° 43' E), with a population of 282,740. It is located at the approximate geographic center of the province and was used as a medical center during the Sino-Japanese War. The leading commercial and highway town in the north is Tsun-i (27° 42' N and 106° 55' E), the gateway to this area. Southwest of Kweiyang is An-shun (26° 15' N and 105° 53' E), the focal point for relations with Yunnan. It will become an important communications center with the construction of the proposed east-west rail line. T'ung-jen (27° 41' N and 109° 11' E), a river port and marketing city for mercury and tung oil, is situated in the northeast, on the upper reaches of the Yuan River which flows through Hunan Province.

Kweichow is one of the poorest provinces of China. It has little agriculture and commerce and its chief contribution to China's economy will be its not yet completely explored

mineral resources. The bulk of Kweichow's population is concentrated on the high plateau in the heart of the province, of which Kweiyang, the capital city, is the nucleus. Formerly Kweichow was mainly populated by the aboriginal Miaos. The Chinese, now accounting for 80 percent of the population, cluster about the larger trading and commercial centers, while the Miaos have been driven to the villages and hamlets, especially in the remoter sections. They are known as White Miao, Black Miao, Flowery Miao, and so on, the difference between them being a matter of what color clothing the women wear. Most of the menfolk of the aboriginal races have adopted ordinary Chinese peasant dress. The women, however, have held tenaciously to the garb of their ancestors. The colors of the costumes among Miao women are strong and the designs bold. Some prefer them woven into the cloth; others prefer them in figured embroideries. The Flowery Miaos use wax and dyes to make batiks with exquisite flower patterns. The Chung-chia Miao are fond of wearing layer upon layer of knee-length, deeply-shirred petticoats, which look like the kites worn by the ancient Greeks. Some of the women wear as many as twenty or more of these petticoats. The more layers worn the richer the wearer is believed to be. All wear bangles, neck loops, earrings, bracelets, and ornamental shells.

The Miaos are the Chinese counterpart of the American Indians. They formerly inhabited the better parts of China, but were driven into the northwest, supposedly by the mythical Chinese leader Huang-ti. In one decisive battle at T'ao Lu the Miao leader Chih Yu was caught and killed. Like the Red Indians in America, they were gradually reduced in number but held on to a certain amount of marginal or sub-marginal land and retained their primitive culture. They are fun-loving people, fond of music and dancing. The most popular of their social events is the bull-fight. A pair of gaily dressed bulls are led into an arena or little clearing, where they are goaded into fighting until one of them runs away. After this there is much feasting, and a general letdown of moral restraints. The courtship festivals, especially on the fifth day of the fifth moon, are elaborate affairs. Many Miaos, as a result of the great freedom they enjoy in sexual matters, are afflicted with venereal diseases. Their staple food is oatmeal. The women are sturdy and diligent, and the Flowery Miao women at least are quite beautiful.

Like all the southwestern provinces, Kweichow was extensively colonized by the Chinese as recently as the Ch'ing dynasty. When the Manchu court was ousted, most remote provinces were autonomous regions run by war lords only nominally under the Nationalist control. Only after the retreat of the Kuomintang forces to the interior did the central authority reach down to Kweichow, Yunnan, and Szechwan. The only eminent man from Kweichow is General Ho Ying-ch'ün, Chiang's trusted Chief of Staff.

Liaosi

Liaosi, a new Manchurian province created by the People's Republic, includes territories from the former provinces of Liaoph and Liaoning. It is bordered by Liaotung, Kirin, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Jehol, Hopoh, and the P'ei Hai (Gulf of Chihli). It has an area of 21,643 square miles and a population of 7,391,500. The boundary with Jehol in the west, is formed by the Sung-ling Mountains. Other important mountains include the Chien Shan in the east central area and the Ha-ta Mountains in the northeast. The chief river is the Liao, with headwaters in Jehol and Inner Mongolia, which crosses the province and empties into the Gulf of Liaotung at Ying-k'ou. The rest of the topography is largely a plains area, part of the fertile South Manchurian Plain. The climate is continental with hot summers, and cold winters, particularly in the northern area. Precipitation, which is abundant, is concentrated in June, July, and August. The Liao River is frozen over from November to February.

The leading agricultural product is kaoliang, which is produced chiefly in the lower Liao Valley. Other important products are soybeans, millet, rice, corn, peanuts, and cotton. Hemp and corn are also produced in the Ha-ta Highlands. Fishing, also an important industry, is carried on from the Gulf of Liaotung and the Po Hai out into the Yellow Sea. There are almost no areas of mineral or industrial importance in Liaosi. Its economic foundation is agricultural, and complements that of the adjacent industrial province of Liaotung.

The province has several rail lines, mostly in the central and southern areas. Part of the Chang-ch'un-Dairen line from Kirin Province runs through Liaoning to Mukden. It forms a junction at Ssu-p'ing with the Ssu-p'ing-T'ao-nan and Ssu-p'ing-Mei-ho-k'ou lines. The latter runs eastward and joins the Yungki (Kirin) Mukden line in Liaotung Province. The Ssu-p'ing-T'ao-nan road runs west to Liao-yuan on the border, then northward to T'ao-nan in Heilungkiang Province. The T'ung-liao-Ta-hu-shan runs from Inner Mongolia in the west and joins the Peking-Mukden line at Ta-hu-shan. The Peking-Mukden line runs along the Po Hai to Tientsin and Peking. There are other short lines in the west connecting these railroads to Jehol Province with junctions at Hsin-min, Chihhsien (Chinchow), Hsin-li-t'un, and I-hsien. The most important highways are found around Mukden and in the south; they lead to Jehol and southern Liaotung. The Liao River is navigable by boat up to T'ieh-ling; small steamers may proceed only up to the junction with the Taitzu River.

The new provincial capital, Chihhsien (Chinchow) (41° 7' N and 121° 7' E), north of Hu-lu-tao, is an important communications center. Mukden or Shen-yang (41° 18' N and 113° 20' E), is a Special Municipality. Formerly the provincial capital of Liaoning Province, it has a population of 1,021,100. It is the military, economic, and cultural center of South Manchuria, and contains most of its machine, chemical, steel, munitions, and cement factories as well as its vegetable oil and flour mills. Liao-yuan (123° 30' E and 43° 30' N), the former provincial capital of Liaopei Province, is now on the western border. It is an important trading and rail center for Inner Mongolia and Heilungkiang. The chief items of trade are horses, fur, and wool. The nearest port to the provincial capital is Hu-lu-tao (40° 45' N and 121° 0' E), on a small peninsula jutting into Liaotung Gulf. It is one of the largest harbors in this area and has been used as an outlet for coal and petroleum from Liaotung Province. A minor port on the Po Hai just across the Hoph border is Linyu or Shanhaikwan (40° 0' N and 119° 14' E). Like Hu-lu-tao, it is on the Peking-Mukden railroad, which runs along the Po Hai to Tientsin. Ssu-p'ing or Saepingki (43° 11' N and 124° 22' E) is an important rail junction in the north.

For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this chapter entitled "Manchuria."

Liaotung

This is the leading industrial province in the Northeast Administrative Region. Bordered by Korea, Kirin, Liaosi, the Liaotung Gulf, and the Yellow Sea, it has an area of 39,800 square miles and a population of 8,587,700. The territory now includes areas formerly in Antung, Liaopei, and Liaoning provinces as defined by the Nationalist Government. The South Manchurian Plain extends into the northwestern section of this province, the rest of the area being generally hilly. The Ch'ang-pai mountains in the northeast together with the Yalu River form a natural boundary with Korea. The Chien-shan Range in the west turns southward below Liao-yang and runs down the Liaotung Peninsula. The Ha-ta Mountains extend into the northwest from Liaosi Province. The Yalu in the east, the leading river in the province, flows into the Yellow Sea. In the northeast is the Tumen River, with headwaters in the Ch'ang-pai Range. The northern section is drained by several

small rivers which flow into the Sungari Reservoir in Kirin Province. The climate is continental, with a mean temperature of about 42°F in the area accounted for by the Ch'ang-pai Mountains. Precipitation is greatest in the east, with over 38 inches annually at Antung. The Yalu is frozen from November through February.

The chief agricultural products are soybeans from the northwest, paddy rice and tobacco from the southeast, and kaoliang from the T'ung-hua area in the east. The Yalu River basin contains large forested areas. Fishing is conducted in the Gulf of Liaotung and the Po Hai and out into the Yellow Sea. Mineral resources are inferior in quality to those of China proper, but Japanese organization and industrialization have made the province the leading producer of iron ore and petroleum in China. Its coal production, centered at Fushun and Penki near Mukden, is a close second to that of Hoph Province. Fushun is also the leading area for petroleum production. Chian and Tung-hua are other important areas, in part because of their coal reserves. Iron ore is located in the Chian, Lin-chiang, and Tai-tzu-kou areas; steel production at Anshan. Substantial deposits of copper, lead, alum, and gold are also reported. A large industrial complex is located in the central area of the province extending from Fushun and Penki to Liao-yang, Anshan, and Mukden. This is the largest and most advanced industrial area in China. Its capacity was destroyed with the Russian looting of Manchuria after World War I. The extent to which it has been reconstructed under the Communist regime is unknown. Salt production is found on the Liao-tung Peninsula. (Hydroelectric power is supplied by the Sui-fen Dam and other plants on the Yalu River and a large reservoir on the upper Sungari.) Marble and kaolin clay are found at Hai-ch'eng.

Liaotung also contains several excellent rail lines. The Kirin-Mukden crosses the northwest area to Mukden, where it links with several important lines including the Mukden-Dairen, which runs parallel to the western border and down into Liao-tung Peninsula. The Kirin-Mukden line is connected to the Chang-ch'un-Mukden railway in Liaosi Province by the Ssu-p'ing-Sian-Mei-ho-k'ou line, which continues southeast to Tung-hua and Chian on the Korean border. This line is paralleled in the south by the Mukden-Antung line, which also runs to the Korean border. Both lines are connected to the Korean railroad system at the border. Except for the extreme northeast, there is a fairly large highway network extending to Kirin and Liaosi provinces. The Yalu River is navigable for about 600 kilometers but the upper reaches are accessible only to rafts.

The provincial capital is Antung (40° 9' N and 124° 23' E), located west of the Yalu and one of the largest cities in this province. It has a population of 315,200, and is an important military, industrial, and commercial center. It has, however, only light industries, of which the chemical industry is particularly important. The city is served by T'ung-kou Harbor (39° 52' N and 124° 10' E), about 19 miles southwest from Antung. Port Arthur (38° 48' N and 121° 16' E) is a military port of great significance at the extreme tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, giving it virtual command of the Po Hai. The port has often changed hands: in 1905 from Russian ownership to Japanese and in 1945 from Japan to Russian control. It is still garrisoned by Russian forces, although it is part of the Port Arthur-Dairen Special Municipality. Dairen (38° 56' N and 121° 39' E) with a population of 543,700, is the largest port in North China, and is second only to Shanghai in volume of trade. It is located in a bay north of Port Arthur and, like the latter, is now under Russian control. Anshan (41° 1' N and 122° 57' E) is another Special Municipality located south of Liao-yang (population: 213,900). Because of its large deposits of iron and coal, it is the leading center of iron production of all China. The second-ranking iron-producing center is the railroad town of Penki (41° 20' N and 123° 43' E), southeast of Mukden; it also is a special municipality. Coal production is centered at Fushun (41° 53' N and 123° 51' E),

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a Special Municipality northeast of Mukden (population: 270,000). South of Mukden on the South Manchurian railway is the railroad, industrial, and agricultural city of Liao-yang (38° 48' N and 121° 16' E), dealing mainly in iron, coal, soybeans, wheat, and cotton. Farther south, at the delta of the Liao River west of Liaotung Peninsula, about 12 miles from the sea, is the port of Ying-k'ou or Newchwang (40° 40' N and 122° 13' E), with a population of 154,700. It has declined in importance since the construction of the South Manchurian Railroad. T'ung-hua (41° 43' N and 125° 57' E) in the east is an important industrial and communication center linking the province to North Korea.

The extreme importance of Liaotung Province may be seen in the fact that of the thirteen Special Municipalities of China, governed directly by the national government, four are found in this province.

For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this chapter entitled "Manchuria."

Ningsia

Ningsia, in the Northwest Administrative Region, is bordered by Suiyuan, Outer Mongolia, Kansu, and Shensi. It has a population of 737,500 and an area of 90,060 square miles. The province is geographically a part of the Mongolian Plateau, which has vast desert areas. Its largest mountains belong to the Ho-lan or Ala Shan Range. Its largest river, the Hwang (Yellow) in the southeast, forms part of the provincial border with Suiyuan. There are several lakes in the province, the largest being Ka-shun-no-eh in the north. Many irrigation canals have been cut along the Hwang River between P'ing-lo and Chung-wei. The climate is continental, with hot summers and bitter winters aggravated by the Siberian winds. Precipitation is generally limited to the southeast, with the maximum in August and September.

Agriculture is confined to the southeast, along the Hwang River and the many canals. Rice, wheat, barley, and kaoliang are the chief crops of this area. A lucrative trade in furs and hides thrives in the pastoral areas of the west. Aside from an abundant salt supply and small coal deposits, there are no mineral resources. Industries are limited to handicrafts such as carpet-making. There are no railroads, although it has been planned for some time to extend into Ningsia the line now terminating at Paotou in Suiyuan Province. Roads, totalling 2,500 kilometers are concentrated in the northwest and southeast. The lone highway which traverses the province in the north is the Suiyuan-Sinkiang road. Old trade routes also connect Ningsia with outer Mongolia and the other provinces.

The provincial capital of Ningsia (38° 28' N and 106° 19' E) or Yin-chuan is a center for communications and commerce (hides, sheep, camel wool, and medicinal herbs). It is located west of the Hwang River and has a population of 38,600. Chung-wei (37° 30' N and 105° 9' E) is in the south, on the Hwang River, and is an agricultural center for rice, wheat, other cereals, wool, and hides. Some coal is produced here. Tzu-hu (38° 54' N and 102° 25' E) is a Mongolian trading town northwest of Ningsia, on the old trade routes to Mongolia. Another leading agricultural and trading center along the Hwang River is P'ing-lo (38° 53' N and 106° 37' E).

As is to be expected from its geographical location, Chinese and Mohammedans live in the eastern and southern parts of the province, while Mongols lead a nomadic life in the northwestern part. The agrarian section of Ningsia uses the water of the Hwang River, which is led into canals that resemble small rivers. Large areas have been transformed from semi-desert to green oases. The canals around Ningsia are two thousand years old, and represent engineering feats of considerable skill. Hence this part of Ningsia has been called the Chiang-nan of the Northwest.

As in other Inner Mongolia provinces, the Mongols live in tents called yurts, made of a collapsible framework of willow sticks covered with layers of thick felts. Strictly dependent for their living on the maintenance of livestock, they are perpetually on the move to look for good grass lands. The Mongols are organized according to banners, of which there are only three in Ningsia. What has happened in the last fifty years is that the land hunger of the Chinese has led to intensive colonization of the Inner Mongolian provinces, and driven the Chinese and Mongols, as the latter see good grass lands converted to agricultural purposes to which they are really not suited. Drugged as they are by Lamasism and unable to advance beyond the nomadic mode of life, the Mongols have lost much of their virility which, under great leaders like Genghis Khan and Kublai Khan, made them the greatest conquerors in history. Like the Tibetans, the Mongols regularly send their male children to lamaseries, live on dairy foods and buttered tea, and are dirty beyond words. They are still good horsemen and capable of sudden bursts of fierce energy. As a rule their life is marked by great inertia.

The position of leadership at Ningsia is held by the energetic Moslems. From 1933 to 1949 Ma Hung-kuei was governor of the province, though the region east of the Hwang River had been in Communist hands since the Sino-Japanese War.

For further historical and sociological information on this province see the section of this chapter entitled "Mongolia."

Shansi

Shansi, in the North China Administrative Region, is bordered by the provinces of Hopeh, Suiyuan, Shensi, and Honan. Its territory totals 60,100 square miles. Shansi is a mountainous province with six major ranges: the Wu-t'ai, Heng-shan, Tai-hang, Tai-yueh, Lu-liang, and Yung-chung. Wu-t'ai is a sacred Buddhist mountain. Level land is found in Central Shansi and continues south-westward along the Fen Valley. The entire province is loessland, and marks the major area of soil difference in North China. The leading rivers are the Hwang, Fen, Hsin, and Huto rivers. The Hwang is the boundary with Shensi Province in the west. The climate is continental, but with less than usual summer heat due to the altitude.

The province is in the winter-wheat-millet area, but production of these crops is limited to the Fen River valley and other basins. An abundant fruit supply furnishes good liquor and wine. There are large forested areas in the north. Shansi has the largest coal deposits in all China, but ranks only fifth in production. Pas-ch'ui, Chin-ch'eng, P'ing-ting, and the central Fen River valley, with well-developed large-scale mining, lead in production in the province. There are also good quantities of iron ore, salt, and sulphur deposits, with a fair amount of actual production. Yangku (Taiyuan) and Yu-tzu are centers for the cotton and chemical industries. The longest rail line runs through central Shansi from Wan-shan (Kalgan) in Hopeh Province, and joins the Lung-hai in the extreme southwest corner of the province. It is joined by the Yangku-Cheng-ting line, which runs eastward into Hopeh Province. The major line is also connected to the southeast by a line extending southeast to Chi'ang-chai. A well distributed road network of 3,200 kilometers covers the province.

The provincial capital is Yangku or Taiyuan (37° 52' N and 112° 35' E), an important center for communications and commerce (wheat and beans). It has a population of 251,600 and contains some textile and chemical industries. Liu-fen (36° 5' N and 111° 31' E) was an ancient cultural center in the south, but is now important as a rail and marketing

center for that area. P'ing-ting (37° 48' N and 113° 37' E) is a coal-producing and communication center for the east.

The Fen River valley was the heart of Chinese culture in the time of China's first dynasty, the Hsia, which ruled for over five centuries following its establishment by Yu in 2205 B.C. Farming has gone on continuously for some 4,000 years, despite the fact that the loesslands of North China require intensive cultivation and, without proper rainfall and irrigation, are often disappointing in yield.

In the Ch'un-ch'iu period, Shansi was a domain of the highly powerful and cultured Chia state. Only when Chin was split into three smaller kingdoms was its neighbor Ch'in able to expand and conquer the other contending states. During the North and South dynasties, Shansi was overrun by the To Pas, the Mo Juns, and other tribesmen from the North, who became acclimatized to Chinese culture and became zealous Buddhist converts by the fifth century.

Situated at the extreme north of the province are the cave-temples at Yün Kang. There the To Pas chiseled the mile-long face of a rock cliff into thousands of Buddhist images, with a honeycomb of figure-filled niches and grottoes reaching deep into the sandstone mountain. They represent the first and perhaps the very finest temples of Buddhist rock sculpture in China.

Shansi has many sacred Buddhist mountains like Wu-t'ai Shan, Heng Shan, and T'ai-hang Shan. Heng Shan is traditionally the North Peak among the five Sacred Mountains.

From the 1911 Revolution to the Communist takeover, with only brief intervals, Shansi had only one governor, Yen Hsi-shan who, though an old-fashioned war lord, had the interests of his people at heart (he was a native of the province). He instituted his own currency and initiated many reforms of a generally socialist line, with the result that for many years Shansi was considered a model province, and Chiang was more than willing to let Yen run things as he saw fit. During the Sino-Japanese War, Yen only controlled a small portion of Shansi, and found himself surrounded by Communist, Japanese, and Kuomintang forces. During the "war of liberation," Yen Hsi-shan put up a heroic defense at Yangku, the provincial capital, for many months, in sharp contrast with the way in which most Kuomintang forces disintegrated in face of the Communist onslaught. Yen Hsi-shan is now in Taiwan.

Instead of sleeping on individual beds, most families in the province sleep on the k'ang, the family communal bed, built in such a way that the kitchen fire is directly transmitted there to provide winter heat. Most families on the less highlands live in caves. These are quite cosy, but lack good lighting and other modern conveniences. Most Shansi people who make a living in other provinces are engaged in banking and money-exchange. Until recent decades, the Chinese-style small banks in many towns were exclusively run by Shansi people. The most prominent citizen of the province, noted for his astuteness in money matters is H. H. Kung, who like T. V. Soong amassed a huge personal fortune during his years of service in the Nationalist Government. He is partly responsible for the blackened reputation of Chiang Kai-shek among foreign observers.

A vicious custom persists in Shansi. The diet of Chinese is deficient in calcium, and thus most Chinese women do not have sufficient intake of calcium during pregnancy. The custom in Shansi, however, is for a mother to eat nothing but gruel, completely devoid of calcium, during the first month after she bears her child. The necessity of producing milk for the baby extracts all the available calcium from her body, which is good for the child but often results in the mother's suffering from osteomyelitis, which softens her bones to such a degree that the pelvis becomes too weak to support the weight of her body. Many Shansi women die of this malady each year.

Shansi has produced a number of men famous in Chinese history: the founders of the Tang dynasty, Li Yuan, and his more brilliant son Li Shih-min; the Buddhist pilgrim Fa Hsien; the Tang poet and painter Wang Wei; the Tang general Hsueh Jü-Kuei and the Sung General Ti Ch'ing. The last two are popular military heroes, and are much celebrated in fiction. Besides Yen Hsi-shan and H. H. Kung, both from Shansi, the Kuomintang government once had an able Shansi general, Fu Tso-yi, who later joined the Communists. The governor of Suiyuan, Tung Ch'i-wu, and the Minister of Finance, Po I-po, are Shansi's contributions to the Communist hierarchy.

Shantung

This coastal province in the East China Administrative Region is on a peninsula bordered by the Yellow Sea, the Po Hsi, Honan, Hpeh, and Kiangsu. Its area is 54,541 square miles, population: 39,165,500. The topography is about equally composed of lowland and upland. The rolling hills and mountains are denuded of forest and are seriously eroded. The principal mountains are the sacred Tai Shan in the central and southern area and the Lao Shan in the peninsula. The major waterways are the Hwang and Hsiao-ch'ing rivers and the Grand Canal. The climate is continental inland, but is mitigated along the coastal area by oceanic influences. Precipitation is greater here than in other parts of the Yellow Plain, particularly in the southeast.

Agriculture is found in the river valleys and lowland basins. The chief crops are wheat, kaoliang, corn, peanuts, cotton, and fruits. The last are nationally famous, particularly the dates, peaches, and pears. There are fair-sized deposits of iron, coal, and salt, and all these are produced on a considerable scale. Shantung ranks third among the provinces in coal production, and its coal is of exceptionally good quality. Production is centered at Chung-hsing and Luta. Though Shantung is one of the leading producers of salt and sulphur, iron production there is only moderate. Bauxite ore is found in the province.

Shantung is one of the leading industrial areas in North China, with factories at Tsingtao, Chefoo, Tsinan, and Chou-s'ün. Tsingtao is the major industrial center of the province, and has locomotive shops, chemical plants, iron mills, arsenals, and motor assembly plants. Textile and flour mills are centered in Tsinan.

Two railroads cross the province. The longest is the Tientsin-P'u-k'ou along the western border, which is joined by the Chiao-chow (Kiaochow)-Tsinan system at Tsinan. The Lung-hai and Tientsin-P'u-k'ou railways form an important junction at Hsu-chou in the northwest corner of Kiangsu Province. The highway system of 6,300 kilometers is well distributed. Excessive siltling limits river navigation to junks and small motor launches. Extensive coastal navigation and trade is centered at the ports of Tsingtao and Chefoo.

Tsinan (36° 41' N and 117° 0' E) is an economic, military, and communication center as well as the provincial capital. A large arsenal, flour and cotton mills, and match factories are located there. It has a population of 591,500 people. Taming Lake in the vicinity is a well-known tourist attraction. The only major port between Shanghai and T'ang-ku is Tsingtao (36° 4' N and 120° 19' E), located in Chiao-chow Bay, one of China's finest natural harbors. There are actually two harbors, both well protected by breakwaters, with a cargo handling capacity of over 7,800,000 tons per annum. Tsingtao is also a highly industrialized city and linked to the capital by the Chiao-chow-Tsinan railroad. Wei-hai-wei (37° 31' N and 122° 6' E), a former naval base on the north coast of the Shantung Peninsula, was leased to Great Britain in 1898 and returned to China in 1950. Its actual landing facilities are now limited to small craft. Its population is around 222,250. A minor marketing port west of Wei-hai-wei, facing Port Arthur across the Chih-li Straits, is the important naval base of Chefoo (37° 32' N and 121° 24' E). Ch'ing-ching (35° 27' N and 116° 39' E), 100 miles south of

Tainan on the Grand Canal, is an important point of transshipment between the Grand Canal and the Tientsin-P'u-k'ou line, from which a branch extends to Chi-ning. A town of historical significance is Ch'ü-fou (Kufu) (35° 39' N and 117° 3' E), the birthplace and grave of the sage Confucius.

Shantung is noted for its tall, sturdy men, of whom it is said that they lack brilliance but are vigorous and hard-working. This is a far cry from the times of Ch'un-ch'iu, when Shantung was the center of Chinese culture and the home of such philosophers as Confucius, Mencius, and Mo Tzu. The little state of Lu, unmolested by big states in its practice of Chou culture, in a sense conditioned Confucius' thought and laid the intellectual foundations of the nation. Ch'ü-fou, Confucius' burial place, situated under the shadow of T'ai Shan, is still a picturesque tourist spot.

As a coastal province, Shantung was early earmarked for territorial and economic aggression by foreign powers. In 1898 Chiao-chow Bay was ceded to Germany, which tried to take all Shantung under its control. During the World War I, Japan did most of its fighting against Germany on the Shantung Peninsula with a vow to obtain control of Tsingtao. Japan made the most of the crisis occasioned by Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchal ambitions by forcing upon China the Twenty-one Demands, but in doing so aroused national indignation on such a scale as to cause the downfall of Yuan. Wei-hai-wei was for many years leased to Britain. Chefoo was early opened as a treaty port. Tsingtao is a noted Chinese sea resort, and has a climate that is oceanic and lovely.

Shantung is not a poor province. It has good soil for farming, and is especially famous for its fruit (such as the Chefoo apples, Lai-yang pears, and Te-hsien watermelons). However, years of misrule by war lords like Chang Chung-chang and Han Fu-chu so bled it that large numbers of its population were compelled by poverty to seek a livelihood in other provinces as coolies. The exodus of Shantung peasants was what made possible the Chinese colonization of Manchuria, especially during the years 1923-1929.

The Shantung people speak a kind of Mandarin which is heavier and less melodious than the Peking dialect; hence the common saying: "Better to quarrel with a man from Soochow than to suffer conversation with a Shantungese." As in all provinces in North China, the staple food of Shantung consists of wheat, millet, and kaoliang. Proteins are derived from soybeans, peanuts, and sweet potatoes, plus the meat and eggs that are the festive fare on holidays. The poorer peasant and urban population cannot afford whole-wheat bread. They usually eat a coarse breadstuff of mixed millet, kaoliang, and soybeans called Wu wu Tou, which is fairly nourishing.

Missionary activities got off to an early start in Shantung. The Chefoo University at the provincial capital Tsinan, founded in 1864, was the first American missionary college in China.

Besides its early philosophers, Shantung has produced eminent men in many fields: the Han scholar Fu Shêng; Chu-ko Liang and Kwan Yu, two prominent figures of the Three Kingdoms period; Huang Ch'ao, the rebel bandit; the calligrapher Wang Hsi-chih; the Sung poet Hsin Chi-chi; and Ch'i Chi-kuang, the Ming general who fought against the Japanese pirates. Liang Shan was the hideout of a group of bandit-heroes of the Sung dynasty, romanticized in the great novel *Water Margin*. Semi-fictional Shantung characters like Lin Chung, Wu Sung, and Sung Chiang, have become just short of real to millions of Chinese. Because of the failure of North China to assume national leadership, there have been no eminent men from Shantung serving in either National or Communist government. However, Fu Sü-nien, the late president of Taiwan University and a well-known scholar and educator, was from Shantung.

The lineal descendants of Confucius have been accorded official homage since the Han dynasty. The male descendant of Confucius in the 77th generation now holds the sinecure of Officer of Confucian Rites at Taiwan.

Shensi

Shensi, in the Northwest Administrative Region, borders upon the provinces of Shansi, Suiyuan, Ningxia, Kansu, Szechwan, Hupch, and Honan. It has a total area of 72,500 square miles and 9,649,200 population. Much of the province is a dissected plateau buried in loess, particularly in the north. The North Shensi Plateau is mountainous, in the central area is the Kuang-chung Plain. South Shensi contains the Han and Wei river basins, surrounded by the Ch'in Ling Range. The two major mountain systems are the Ch'in Ling and Ta-pa Shan. The chief rivers are the Hwang and Lo in the north, and Wei and Han in the south. Irrigation canals supplement the rivers. The province marks the geographic boundary between the loessland and the South China region. The Ch'in Ling Range divides the province into two broad climatic areas. The northern area has a characteristic continental climate with light precipitation and cold winters. The southern area is humid with abundant rainfall and some foginess in February and October.

The crops reveal the geographic differences between north and south. The north produces wheat, beans, kaoliang, and corn; the south produces rice, mulberry, and other cereals. There is large-scale cotton production in the Wei River valley in the south. Large forested areas are found in the mountainous areas. Shensi is exceptionally rich in coal reserves, ranking next to Shansi, but no great amount is produced as yet. Petroleum deposits are located at Yen-ch'ang, but production is still on a small scale. The province also produces a certain amount of iron, which notably increases the over-all industrial potential. Most of the cotton and chemical factories are located at Sian, Pao-chi, and Nan-cheng. Tung oil and handcraft goods such as rugs, hides, and tinware are also produced in good quantity. The only rail communication is the Lung-hai line which traverses the province along the course of the Wei River, and has some short extensions to the north (more extensions are being planned). There are over 4,500 kilometers of roads radiating from the central area along the Lung-hai line, one of them being a major highway connecting the province with Szechwan, Kansu, and Sinkiang. River navigation is generally limited to junk transportation. Sian and Nan-cheng are important air terminals on the coast-to-northwest air route.

Sian (34° 16' N and 108° 34' E) is the provincial capital and a Special Municipality. It is an important communications center on the Lung-hai line and has some cotton and chemical factories. The city is of great historical interest, having been the political and cultural center of China during the Chou, Chin, Sui, and T'ang dynasties. The leading city in the north is Yenan (Fu-shih) (36° 30' N and 109° 27' E), communications center in the heart of the loess area which for over a decade, was the headquarters of Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party. Another city on the northern border is Yu-lin (38° 17' N and 109° 45' E), an important military center and focus of trade with the Mongolians. Nan-cheng (33° 5' N and 107° 4' E) is a commercial city in the Han River valley; from it goods are shipped to Hankow via the Han River. Some cotton and chemical factories are also located there. Of minor historical interest is the town of Huangling (35° 37' N and 109° 40' E), in the central part of the province on the Hsien-yang-Yu-lin highway, where the tomb of Huang-ti, the first emperor of China, is located. Lin-Yung (34° 21' N and 109° 8' E) is another historic city; located east of Sian, it contains the Hsia Ching Kung Palace remains of the T'ang dynasty.

Shensi is the very heart of ancient China. The Chou people originated in the valley of the Wei River, and the capital of the Western Chou was situated somewhere near present-day Sian. When the Eastern Chou moved its capital to Lo-yang, part of Shensi was gradually taken over by a nomadic tribe from the west, the Ch'in. When the Ch'in unified China, its capital was near Sian in a city called Hsien-yang. The Han dynasty and the T'ang dynasty both had their capital at Sian (Chang-an), which, together with the country surrounding it, is a happy hunting-ground for archaeologists. T'ung-kuan is the fortress city which for centuries guarded ancient China on the East.

With the scarcity of timber and other building materials, most Chinese in northern Shensi and the loess highlands live in cave-dwellings. (The loess is soft and easily cut, so that excavating it is easy.) The caves are cool in summer and warm in winter. Doors and windows are fitted to the entrance, and some have passages within that lead to adjoining rooms. In some places, chimneys have been cut from the caves to the fields, so that one sees the curious phenomenon of smoke rising in the middle of a field of grain. Even the homes of the important Communist leaders occupied at Fu-shih were scooped out of the loesslands.

The loess highland is known for its earthquakes, among others for the greatest natural catastrophe ever recorded in all human history, namely the severe 1556 earthquake in the valley of the Wei River near Sien. Eight-hundred-thousand people in Shensi, Shansi, and Honan are said to have lost their lives in it.

Shensi's best-known folk dance is the *Yang-ko*, which the Communists have helped to make popular.

After the Chinese moved their cultural and political centers further east, Shensi was an unlikely source for men of talent. But its extant sculpture testifies to the high quality of its ancient culture. Lung-men, near the border of Shensi and Shansi, is rich in Buddhist rock sculpture, equal in beauty to the cave-temples at Yun Kang.

If it had only its agriculture to depend on, Shensi could never regain its former glory. But with its oil and its coal deposits, inferior only to those in Shansi, there is some hope that Shensi will one day become an industrial center. For the most part, the population is Chinese, with an intermixture of Manchu and Moslem settlers. In 1861 a big Mohammedan rebellion broke out in the province, and was not completely suppressed until 1878. Both Kansu and Shensi were fearfully devastated, and the loss of life was estimated to exceed ten million people.

Shensi was the home of the Ch'in leaders, notably Shih Huang-ti, the first Ch'in Emperor. In the Han dynasty it was the home of China's two pre-eminent historians, Ssu-ma Ch'ien, author of *Historical Records*, and Pan Ku, compiler of the *History of the Former Han Dynasty*. Pan came from one of China's most remarkable families. His brother was the famous Pan Ch'ao who pushed the barbaric tribes back on China's Western front. His sister Pan Chao, herself a talented woman of letters, completed the *Han History* upon the death of her brother. Under the T'ang dynasty Shensi could point to the poet Po Chü-i, the general Kuo T'zu-i (he quelled the An Lu-shan Rebellion), and the calligrapher rebels, Li T'ao-ch'eng and Chang Hsien-chung. A native of Shensi, Kao Kang, is Vice-Premier of the Peking government and the number-one man of Communist Manchuria.

Sikang

Sikang Province is in the Southwest Administrative Region, and is bordered by Szechwan, Tsinghai, Tibet, India, Yunnan, and Kweichow. It has an area of 174,300 square miles and a population of 1,655,200.

This province is a mountainous offshoot of the Tibetan Plateau. The extensions of the K'un-lun and Himalaya systems form five major ranges in the province: the Himalayas, Lu-shan, Ning-ching Shan, Sha-li-li Shan, and Ta-hsieh Shan. Numerous rivers are found between these ranges, most of which flow southward, including the Yangtze, Mekong, and Irtys. The Brahmaputra enters and leaves in the southwest. Temperatures are extremely low in the snow-covered mountains, but climatic conditions in the western and southeastern sections are less severe, with greater seasonal variations and precipitation than in the rest of the province.

Less than a third of the land is under cultivation and agricultural possibilities are limited. There is large-scale rice and wheat cultivation in the Ynan and Hsi-ch'ang areas, the first of which also produces tea. There are large forest areas, and animal products are in plentiful supply. The mineral resources have not been fully surveyed, but small deposits of gold, coal, petroleum, and iron are known to exist. Production of the mineral products mentioned is limited, but iron is produced in fairly large quantities. Gold is worked in the upper Yangtze.

There are no railroads in Sikang, although a Szechwan-Tibet line has been under consideration for a long time. The road network totals only some 1,600 kilometers, the most important single highway being the Ch'eng-tu-K'ang-ting (Tatsienlu)-Hsi-Ch'ang. For communication with Tibet and Yunnan the old trade routes are still important. Most of the rivers are not navigable except for a small part of the Brahmaputra River.

The new provincial capital is Ynan (Yachow) (30° 0' N and 103° 2' E) in the east near the Szechwan border. It is a highway town dealing mainly in tea and salt. The former provincial capital of K'ang-ting (30° 3' N and 102° 2' E), with somewhat more than 18,000 inhabitants, is a commercial town (herbs, hides, wool, musk, tea, and cotton goods). The center of agriculture and sericulture is at Hsi-ch'ang (27° 53' N and 102° 18' E) a highway town in the southeast. Pa-su (30° 1' N and 98° 56' E) is a center for small scale grazing and farming. Kan-tzu (31° 38' N and 99° 59' E) is a commercial town in the north and contains a well-known lamasery with 4,000 lamas.

Most of the territory of Sikang originally belonged to Tibet. Only in 1930, when British power over Tibet had greatly increased, did the National government map out Eastern Tibet as another province, completely under the authority of the central government of China, to localize the Tibet issue and protect Szechwan from possible British encroachment.

Sikang had a relatively small population for a province until, in 1939, the western section of Szechwan (including 17 *hien* and a population of 1,400,000) was ceded to it with a view to making it more self-sufficient economically. The eastern part of Sikang is inhabited mainly by Chinese, while west of K'ang-ting there are Chinese, Tibetans, Manchus, and Mongols, the Tibetans being the largest group.

Sikang was originally inhabited by aborigines (probably the Miaos), who were warlike and had their own religion. During the time of the Three Kingdoms, Chu-ko Liang sent expeditions against the barbaric tribes and introduced them to Chinese culture. Before long, however, Chinese influence was displaced by Indian Buddhist influence. Since the seventh century Sikang had been in the orbit of a non-Chinese culture, and has been little interfered with by the Chinese (Kublai Khan once conquered it, however, and his descendants' Mongolian troops constitute a part of the Sikang population). Not until the Ch'ing dynasty, when Tibet and Sinkiang were under British and Russian pressure, were serious efforts made to Sinitize western Sikang and bring it effectively under Chinese control. During the reign of Kuang-Hsi, Chao Erh-P'ing was sent to take over Sikang, and subsequently made great progress Sinitizing not only the Tibetans but the aborigines as well.

Afterwards, Chinese and Manchu soldiers sent to the province as garrison troops settled there. Thus while most of the Sikang people are Tibetan in language and religion, they are a complex mixture of aboriginal races and relatively immigrants. The Lolo retain their primitive customs.

The province's Chinese population is engaged in farming and such activities as prospecting in the upper Yangtze, known there as the Chin-sha Chiang (River of the Golden Sand). The population of K'ang-ting is 18,040, of whom 56.83 percent are Tibetans and 43.17 percent are Chinese immigrants. West of K'ang-ting there are few Chinese, mostly Tibetanized. Therefore, the culture of Sikang is part of the Tibetan culture.

The predominant religion is Lamaism. It is customary for most families to send their first-born male child to the lamaseries. Such a child is assured a good education and a decent living — in conditions of ecclesiastical comfort — throughout his life. Given the general poverty of the land, this custom is perhaps a shrewd adjustment to the need of keeping the population down so that there will be enough food to go around. The lamas on the other hand, are a great economic burden, and the fact that they do not themselves engage in agriculture helps keep the land in a poor condition.

Tibetan customs prevail as regards food, dress, marriage, and burial. Thus the Sikang people, like the Tibetans, depend on China for a special brand of tea, just as the US depends on South America for coffee. As in Tibet, polyandry and polygamy are practiced; largely for economic reasons, it is common for sisters to share one husband and brothers to share one wife. This further checks the population increase. Sexual habits are rather free, and the incidence of venereal disease is high. Since they wear ragged sheepskin garments (without trousers or underwear) the year round, the people are dirty. Smallpox is still very common, and large numbers of the population have pock-marked faces.

Sinkiang, Tibet, and the other western provinces perch on a high plateau where agricultural opportunities are highly limited. The Chinese are vigorous people, and would have advanced to the Western frontier long ago but for the fact that they could not support themselves there by agriculture. This is why they have moved instead toward Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Southeast Asia, and left the West alone. Barring large-scale industrial development, it will be hard even for the Communist government to induce the Chinese to leave the over-populated coastal areas and go to China's Northwest and Southwest.

Sinkiang

This vast border province in the Northwest Administrative Region is surrounded by the Mongol People's Republic, Soviet Russia, India, Tibet, Tsinghai, and Kansu. Its area is 660,805 square miles, and its population 3,870,950. It is the largest province in China and contains four large mountain ranges. The T'ien Shan, in the western and central areas, subdivides in the latter into the North Tianshan or Pei-lu and the South Tianshan or Nan-lu. The other ranges are the Altai in the north, the Karakoram along the Indian border, and the K'un-lun on the Tibetan border. Outside these areas, the province is a high altitude plateau, with many steppes and deserts. There are several land depressions, the largest occurring near Turfan, where the altitude is 928 feet below sea-level.

The important rivers are the Tarim, Manass, and the Ili. The Tarim River with its tributaries forms an extensive network in the western and central areas and empties into the salt lake, Lop Nor. South of this river in the central area of the Tarim basin lies the Takla Makan Desert. The Manass River in the north, with its terminal lake, Teli Nor, is another long river. These rivers and lakes are well known for the shifting course they follow due to silting or the low water table. In addition to these river valleys there are several oases where there are permanent settlements. The province is arid, but less in the

north than in the south; precipitation amounts to about 10 inches annually, with a maximum on the mountain slopes, but variations are extreme. Temperatures vary greatly by season as well as from day to night, with a range of over 100°F to -25°F.

Agriculture is found in the river valleys and at such permanent oases as Yarkand, Khotan (Ho-tien), Kashgar, Aksu, Turfan, and Quomal (Ha-mi). Some areas with semi-permanent streams are heavily cut with irrigation ditches and cultivated at times when water from the uplands replenish the flow. The crops cultivated are wheat, kaoliang, millet, beans, rice, tobacco, cotton, and excellent fruits. The Dzungaria area north of the T'ien Shan offers some possibilities for dry agriculture. The slopes and uplands of the Altai and T'ien Shan serve as grazing areas for sheep, horses, and goats, most of the plains area being too arid for this. The animal husbandry provides a good wool supply. Sinkiang is reported to have large resources of coal and iron ore and a certain amount of oil at Wu-su, along the T'ien Shan. Lead, zinc, gold, silver, and jade are also present, gold being produced at Altai, Keriya, and Chuguchak. The province ranks sixth in iron ore reserves, but as yet produces no iron. Industries are limited to a few small chemical plants and cotton and woolen mills at Urumchi (Tihwa). There are general handicrafts in many sections.

The province has no rail lines, although a Urumchi-T'ien (Kuldja)-Lan-chou line has been proposed. Its 6,600 kilometers of roads, meager in relation to its vast territory, connect it mainly with Russian and Kansu. Sinkiang is the center of the old "Silk Route," which connected China with the Middle East and Rome in early history and is still used. There are three air terminals, at Urumchi, Quomal, and Ta-ch'eng.

The provincial capital of Urumchi (Tihwa) (43° 48' N and 87° 36' E) is a trading center for wool, furs, hides, salt, and cotton goods. It is the terminus of the important roads from Ha-mi through Ch'i-t'ai. An important oasis in the southwest is Yarkand (38° 24' N and 77° 16' E), with an area of 810 square miles and a population of 60,000. It is also a trading city on the old trade route to India and Afghanistan. Other important oases and trading towns are Aksu (41° 6' N and 79° 58' E), on the Apsu River, with a cultivated area of 600 square miles and a town population of 20,000, Khotan (37° 2' N and 79° 56' E), with an area of 620 square miles and a town population of 20,000, Kashgar (39° 27' N and 75° 59' E), with a cultivated area of 1,000 square miles and a population of 35,000, and Ha-mi (42° 48' N and 92° 27' E), a small town famous for its melon production. Southwest of the Ha-tu-shan gold mines is the frontier town of Ta-ch'eng (46° 45' N and 82° 57' E). Farther north is the trading center of Ch'eng-hua (47° 52' N and 88° 7' E), which is inhabited mainly by Mongols and Moslems engaged in grazing and farming. I-ming (Kuldja) (43° 55' N and 81° 17' E), in the West, is a strategic commercial town specializing in tea and livestock.

Sinkiang is the largest but one of the most thinly populated provinces in China. With the exception of Tibet, it is the least Chinese of the provinces as regards ethnic composition, Chinese accounting for only about 5 or 6 percent of its population. It also has a few Mongols and Manchus, but 90 percent of its population are members of various Moslem tribes in Central Asia, of which the more important are the Uighurs, called in China the Chien T'ou Hui (Turlan Head Moslem), the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz, the Taranchis, and the Uzbeks. The dominant tribes like the Uighurs and Kirghiz are Turkic in race and speech. This population has evolved historically by the merging of an indigenous population with successive waves of invaders. The Uighurs are agricultural, and live on the oases of the Tarim basin; some of the population, like the Kirghiz, are nomads. There are also a few naturalized White Russians.

Sinkiang has been intermittently under Chinese rule for 2,000 years. Known in history as Hsi Yueh (Western territory), it was re-named Sinkiang, meaning New Dominion, by the Manchu government. The great Han generals, Chang Ch'ien and Pan Ch'ao, reached

Sinkiang. Effective Chinese influence was extended there also during the early T'ang dynasty. During the decline of the T'ang, however, the Moslem religion took hold on the Sinkiang population. During the Yuan dynasty, the Mo-gols conquered Sinkiang and the various tribes did not wax strong again until the Ch'ing dynasty. Following the exploits of Yo Chung-ch'i and Nien K'eng-yao, the Emperor Ch'ien-lung made an expedition to Sinkiang, and when he departed took back with him the Moslem princess Hsiang Fei, the "Fragrant Royal Concubine." (There is a portrait of her by Castiglione which shows her as a remarkably beautiful woman in martial dress.) About the time of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, the Moslems in the Northwest broke into rebellion, and it became clear that Russia had designs on Sinkiang, especially on the Western district called I-li. An expedition led by T'ao Tsung-t'ang put down the rebellion, and since then Sinkiang has been governed mostly by governors of Chinese origin. The I-li problem, however, caused the Ch'ing government a great deal of trouble.

After the establishment of the Republic (1912), Sinkiang was at first ruled by Yang Ts'eng-hsin, who preserved the area's neutrality and played Russia off against the Nationalist government. He was murdered in 1923, and was succeeded by Chin Shu-jen, a less able and more greedy man. After the rebellion of Ma Chung-ying, Sh'eng Shih-ts'ai took over and controlled the territory from 1932 to 1944. He was in some ways a remarkable governor, but his harsh rule provoked the Kazakhs and led them to form an autonomous East Turkestan Republic in the I-li District. His replacement, when finally it occurred, was nevertheless an indication that central authority had at last penetrated Sinkiang. After that time the most influential figure in Sinkiang affairs was General Chang Chih-chung, who improved economic relations with Soviet Russia and had some success in pacifying the various peoples. He later joined the Communist government. The political integration of Sinkiang into Communist China, however, is apparently proceeding slowly.

The various national groups in Sinkiang, of course, have different customs and habits. One major problem is that the Chinese minority, though they have the advantage of being better educated, can not assume positions of leadership without provoking the other national groups.

Suiyuan

Suiyuan is a province in the North China Administrative Region. It is bordered by the Inner Mongol Autonomous Region, the Mongol People's Republic, Ningxia, Shensi, Shansi, and Chahar. Its population totals 2,057,750, and its area is 127,147 square miles. The province is geographically part of the Mongolian Plateau, and has the characteristic sparse population of desert areas. The Yin Shan in the central area, the chief mountain range, joins the Ho-lan Range to the west in Ningxia. The only river of significance is the Hwang (Yellow), which enters the province in the west. It separates into two courses within the province, the major channel running eastward to T'o-k'o-t'o, where it turns southward to form the boundary between Shensi and Shansi provinces. The other course, to the north, is an ancient channel (it dates back to the Ming dynasty). A system of irrigation canals is located between Pao-t'ou and Kweisui. The climate is continental, with severe winters, particularly in the areas north of the Yin Shan. The desert areas receive almost no precipitation; the latter, therefore, is confined to the southern areas.

Agriculture is limited to the Hwang River area, particularly south of T'o-k'o-t'o. The crops cultivated are wheat, barley, kaoliang, soybeans, and medicinal herbs. Animal husbandry, primarily in the hands of Mongols, is prosperous; camel hair and sheep wool are the chief exports. There are small deposits of coal, salt, and soda, with as yet only limited production. Industrialization is in its very beginnings: there are a few wool, flour, and egg-

processing mills at Kweisui, Pao-t'ou, and Feng-chen, and wool and rug handicrafts are represented.

The only rail line is the Peking-Suiyuan line, which enters Suiyuan in the southeast and extends west to Pao-t'ou. There are over 1,000 kilometers of highways leading to surrounding areas, chiefly concentrated in the southeast area. Only a portion of the Hwang River around the T'o-k'o-t'o region is accessible to junk navigation.

The provincial capital of Kweisui (40° 47' N and 111° 37' E) is a trading and communications center for Mongolia. It is on a rail line, and owes its development to this fact. It is about two miles from the old city of Kwei-hua. The terminus of the line is at Pao-t'ou (40° 36' N and 110° 3' E), which serves as a center for the transshipment of goods between Tientsin and the northwest provinces. The goods handled include imports of matches, tea, and kerosene, and exports of wool, fur, cotton, and medicinal herbs. T'o-k'o-t'o (40° 15' N and 111° 12' E) is a trading center in the heart of the best agricultural area. Feng-chen (40° 27' N and 110° 8' E), in the east on the rail line, is one of the few towns with industrial development. Northwest of the provincial capital is Pai-ling-mao (41° 50' N and 110° 27' E), seat of a lamasery with 1,000 lamas and one of the largest in China.

For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this chapter entitled "Mongolia."

Sungkiang

This Manchurian province has an area of 79,200 square miles and a population of 5,149,909. It is surrounded by Russia, Heilungkiang, and Kirin, and includes the territories that the Nationalist government designated as Sungkiang and Hokiang provinces (a third of what was Sungkiang, however, has been incorporated into Heilungkiang Province). Major branches of the Ch'ang-pai Range are included in the province: the Hsiao-pai Shan in the central area, the Lao-yeh Ling across the southern area (which is the watershed of the Muling and Sufen rivers), and the Wan-tu Mountains in the northeast from the Muling to the confluence of the Sungari and Ussuri rivers. Westward, there are the Hsiao-hsing-an Mountains, which form the boundary with Heilungkiang Province. The Sungari is the leading river in the province. It enters in the west and is joined by several rivers before flowing into the Amur at Tung-chiang. The Amur and Ussuri form part of the national boundary with Russia. The Muling and Noh rivers are tributaries of the Ussuri, and are partially utilized for irrigation and navigation. The climate varies considerably according to locality, temperatures ranging from 100°F to -10°F (yearly mean: about 36°F). Precipitation, which is most abundant in the south, decreases toward the northwest (annual mean: about 22.6 inches).

The chief agricultural crops are soybeans and beets around Pinking (Harbin), and rice, soybeans, and tobacco in the Matun River Valley. The northern area of the province is agriculturally undeveloped. There are large forests in the upland areas which extend down to Kirin. Coal is the only significant mineral resource, there being large deposits at Mu-leng, Tung-sing, Mi-shan, I-han, and Har-hi. In production the Mi-shan and Mu-leng mines are the most important. Chia-mu-su contains a munitions works, other industries, including small chemical plants and wine, flour and vegetable oil factories are at Mu-tan-chiang.

There are several rail lines in Sungkiang: the Chinese Ch'ang-ch'un line runs from Pinking to Sui-fen-ho on the Russian Maritime Province border in the east; the Tu-men-Chia-mu-su line intersects the Ch'ang-ch'un line at Mu-tan-chiang; the Chia-mu-su-Sui-hua line runs to the latter town in Heilungkiang Province; and the coal-carrier Hsiao-

line runs from Lien-chiang-k'ou to the Hsing-shan mines. Others run southward from Harbin to La-fa and Yungki (Kirin). The highway system is secondary, and merely supplements the rail lines. Water transportation is important throughout the year. The Sungari is navigable beyond Pinkiang, and is used as a highway for horse-drawn vehicles during winter. The Ussuri accommodates small steamboats up to Hu-lan, while the Mutan River is navigable for smaller craft in the vicinity of the city of that name. The Tumen River is accessible to small steamboats.

The provincial capital Pinkiang (Harbin) (45° 47' N and 126° 39' E), is an important communications and commercial center for the entire northeast region. It has a population of 700,000. Mu-tan-chiang (45° N and 129° E) is the former provincial capital in the east, and the junction of the Ch'ang-ch'un and "Tu-chia" rail lines. It is the marketing center for the surrounding Mutan River valley. An important rail terminus in the north is the agricultural town of Chia-ma-su (45° 49' N and 130° 21' E), on the south bank of the Sungari River. The richest agricultural town in the north is Hu-lan (45° 59' N and 125° 36' E), located north of Harbin at the confluence of the Hulan and Sungari rivers. At the confluence of the Sungari and Mutan rivers on the northern boundary lies I-lan or San-hsing (45° 19' N and 129° 33' E), a rail and commercial town for the Sungari Valley.

For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this chapter entitled "Manchuria."

Szechwan

The province of Szechwan is bordered by Hupeh, Shensi, Kansu, Tsinghai, Sikang, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Hunan, and is part of the Southwest Administrative Region. It has an area of 117,200 square miles and a population of 48,091,400. According to an authoritative report of March 1952, it then had no provincial government, and was being administered by Districts, the North, East, West, and South, with District administrative headquarters at Nan-ch'ung, Wan-hsien, Chengtu and Lu-hsien respectively. Szechwan is practically isolated by mountains surrounding the fertile Red Basin. The average altitude of the province is over 9,500 feet, but it has many areas of depression below sea level, the largest occurring between the Min and Tu rivers. The only large level area is the alluvial fan around Chengtu. The chief mountain ranges are the Min Shan in the northwest, the T'ung Shan or Wu Shan along the Hupeh border, the Chunglai between the Min and Tu rivers, and the Ta-liang Shan along the Sikang border. Four major rivers, the Min, Tu, Wu, and Kialing rivers, all of which empty into the Yangtze, traverse the province and give it its name which means "Four Rivers." The province, because of its topography, has a unique climate for its geographic position: the Ch'in Ling Mountains to the north bar the cold Mongolian air. The climate is consequently temperate, with scant snow or frost in winter. Precipitation, abundant throughout the year, is at its maximum during the summer months, when some areas, particularly Chungking, are hot and humid.

Agriculturally, Szechwan is one of China's richest provinces. The Chengtu Basin is capable of producing three crops annually. The leading crops are rice, wheat, cotton, beans, corn, sweet potatoes, and tobacco. Szechwan produces the largest quantity of medicinal herbs in all China, and its silk production is exceeded only by that of Chekiang and Kiangsu. Tung oil, hog bristles, tea, and sugar are also produced in large quantities for export. Iron, coal, oil, and sulphur deposits are found in fair quantity, with sufficient production to make Szechwan one of the leading producers. Salt leads all other minerals, and the numerous salt wells at Tzu-hu-ching resemble a miniature oil field. The major industries are salt and sugar refining, but the chemical, metallurgical, textile, and oil industries, though smaller, are thriving. Industrialization went forward rapidly during the latter phases of World

War II, when the province became China's leading industrial base. Its embroidery and porcelain products are well-known.

Prior to 1952 there were no rail lines in the province, but the long planned Chengtu-Chungking railway has now been completed. It is being extended north. There are about 6,000 kilometers of highways, the most important being the Chengtu-Chungking, Szechwan-Shensi, Szechwan-Sikang, Szechwan-Kweichow, Szechwan-Yunnan and Szechwan-Hunan highways. All the major rivers are navigable for steamships (the province's largest shipping firm, the Ming Sung Industrial Company, was once a ship-building firm). Air service connects Chungking, Chengtu, Lo-shan, and Lu-hsien with the rest of China.

The provincial capital of Chengtu (30° 49' N and 104° 4' E) is located in the richest agricultural area of the province. It has impressive scenery, and is a historical center of some importance, having been the capital of the Shu kingdom during the period of the Three Kingdoms. The population totalled 620,300 in 1948. The Special Municipality of Chungking (29° 34' N and 106° 35' E), China's wartime capital with a present population of 985,700, is located at the confluence of the Yangtze and Kialing rivers. It is a commercial center for the surrounding provinces and the leading communications center of Szechwan itself, with major highways leading to the surrounding areas. Northeast of Chungking lies the Yangtze River Port of Wan-hsien (30° 19' N and 108° 24' E), a marketing center for tung oil, sugar, and hog bristles. Another marketing center in the south, mainly for trade with Yunnan, is I-pin (28° 46' N and 104° 34' E), which marks the upper limit of steam navigation on the Yangtze. Lo-shan (Kiating) (29° 34' N and 103° 14' E) is another important trade town located at the confluence of the Min and Tu rivers in the southwest. The center of salt production is at Tzu-hu-ching (29° 25' N and 104° 45' E) in the central part of the province, while its parallel center of sugar production is at Nei-ching (29° 35' N and 105° 3' E) on the Chengtu-Chungking highway. Northeast of Chengtu is the town of Kuan-hsien (31° 0' N and 103° 37' E), of considerable historic interest because of its 2,000-year old irrigation system. The famous Chengtu plain irrigation system was initiated by Li Ping in the time of the Ch'in dynasty (221 to 207 B.C.). This indicates that even at that early time Szechwan was an area of some importance to central China. The Ch'ing-ch'eng Shan, west of Kuan-hsien, was reputedly one of the centers of early Taoism.

After the fall of the Han dynasty, Szechwan was for a time the center of the Kingdom of Shu, under the wise management of the able statesman Chu-ko Liang. It was mainly the area's self-sufficiency that enabled Shu to withstand the onslaught of the Wei for so long a time. Other important episodes in the history of Szechwan are: the flight of T'ang Ming Huang to the province upon An Lushan's revolt; the strangling of his favorite concubine, Yang Kuei-fei, at Ma-wei; and the systematic massacre of the Szechwan population by the notorious bandit Chiang Hsien-chung upon the collapse of the Ming dynasty. However, the influx of other provincials into Szechwan after the massacre during the Ch'ing dynasty soon restored its population to its previous level.

Despite the fact that Szechwan is one of the richest provinces in China, the farmer's life there was not easy during the first decades of Republican China. The area was then the happy playground of war lords, some of whom taxed the farmers as much as sixty years in advance. Because it promised immediate cash returns, poppy-planting was encouraged in favor of cereal cultivation, with the result that many people in Szechwan and Yunnan often took up the habit of opium-smoking. During the thirties, when Chiang's forces were engaged in liquidating the Communists in Kiangsu, two war lords, Liu Wen-hui and his uncle Liu Hsiang, fought each other for the control of Szechwan completely disregarding the welfare of its people. Upon the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Chiang eliminated the war lords, and Szechwan came under central authority.

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During the war years, Chungking was famous as the wartime capital of China. However, its location and weather are far from ideal; it is overcrowded, it is humid, hot, and rainy through most of the year, and it has scant transportation and traffic facilities. Its great advantage as a wartime capital lay in the numerous mountain caves in and around the city, which provided natural air-raid shelters for the inhabitants. It became notorious, however, for its rats, which grew in large numbers and had little fear of humans. Chungking, on the other hand, is not typical of Szechwan. Chengtu, for example, enjoys a temperate climate and has much more pleasant surroundings.

Szechwan people are very clannish; the water-front coolies, for example, are efficiently organized in secret societies. The natives have bitterly resented the intrusion of large numbers of government personnel and businessmen from coastal provinces, especially enterprising folk from Shanghai. The native populace have continued to patronize their own shops, while the immigrants have established their own retail shops, restaurants, and banks, and were soon doing a larger volume of business than their native competitors.

As in other humid provinces along the Yangtze, the natives take to hot food and pepper. A famous hot condiment used in the province is Ch'a Tsei, which adds a genuinely delicious flavor. The cuisine has a style of its own, and many foreigners find it quite delicious. Szechwanese restaurants are popular in Shanghai and Peking.

Szechwan has many picturesque mountains. The O-mei Mountain has been famous as the sacred home of Buddhist monks and Taoists, the Yangtze Gorges equally so for their weird scenery. The monkeys on the cliffs of Wu Ch'a have been celebrated in verse by Li Po. The Red Basin is entirely inhabited by the Chinese, but there are Lolos in southwestern Szechwan and Miaoos in the areas close to Kweichow. Many Chinese have gone to live among the aborigines and have since followed their customs.

Szechwan has produced many men of letters: the Han Confucianist and writer Yang Hsiung; Ch'en Shou, chronicler of the official *History of the Three Kingdoms*; the Tang poet Li Po; the Sung poet, prose-writer, painter, calligrapher, Su Tung-p'o; and his slightly less famous brother and father, Su Tsé and Su Hsien. The Han poet Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju was a native of Szechwan; himself an impoverished scholar, he courted the rich widow Cho Wên-chün. Their romance was celebrated in China, and Cho Wên-chün was considered one of China's beauties. Modern Chinese writers from Szechwan, like Kuo Mo-jo and Pa Chin, are noted for their emotional intensity.

Chang Ch'un is an important Kuomintang official, and Chang Ta-chien a noted painter from Szechwan.

Chu Teh came from Szechwan, and the province can point to some prominent Communist generals as its sons. Liu Po-ch'eng, "the one-eyed dragon," is the Commander of the Second Field Army; Ch'en I was formerly Commander of the Third Field Army and Mayor of Shanghai.

Taiwan (Formosa)

Taiwan (Formosa) includes the island proper, 16 nearby islands, and the 64 islands of the P'eng-hu or Pescadores group. All these are still under the National Government of China. Upon their return to China by Japan in 1945, the islands gained provincial status under Chiang Kai-shek's government. Under the Communists, they would presumably become a province and fall within the East China Administrative Region.

Taiwan Island has an area of 13,881 square miles (it is 249 miles in length and 93 miles in width) and a population well in excess of 8,000,000. It is located 93 miles from the Fukien Coast and has a coastline 1,062 miles in length.

One-third of Taiwan is mountainous, the remainder being "plain." The Tai-wan or Central Mountain Range runs roughly north and south through the eastern part of the island. The mountainous eastern section also contains the T'ai-tung and Fan-chieh-ling ranges. Most of the rivers are found in the plain area in the west, the largest being the Dakusui or Choshui River. Their swift currents make them highly suitable for water-power development. There are only two natural lakes on the island. One of these is an irrigation reservoir at Kanden (Kwanden) west of Mato City. The Sun Moon Lake or Hsiungtsu-tan (Lake Candillus) is the more important, because it supplies the power for major hydroelectric installations. It is located north of Dakusui at the approximate geographic center of the island.

The island is located in the tropical zone, but benefits from oceanic winds. The summers are long, with abundant precipitation. Average annual precipitation totals 98 inches, but varies from 40 inches along the coast to 289 inches in the mountains. The temperature ranges from 100°F to 33°F with an average temperature of 71°F at Taipei and 80°F at Kao-hsiung. The island lies in the typhoon belt, and is particularly threatened during the months from May to October. It also lies within the earthquake zone: quakes average almost one per day, but nearly all are weak and insignificant.

Chiefly an agricultural area, the island produces mainly sugar cane, rice, tea, potatoes, peanuts, wheat, barley, sesame, jute, longans, vegetables, and fruits. The first three crops mentioned are the most important and are produced mainly in the south, central, and northern areas respectively. Export products are cane sugar, rice, tea, menthol, and camphor, of which Taiwan supplies three-fourths of the world's supply. There are three rice crops annually.

Mineral resources are varied but limited; they include gold, silver, copper, mercury, and sulphur. Taiwan is the leading copper producer in all China. There are large coal deposits in the north and salt evaporating centers along the west coast. Petroleum production is being expanded, and Taiwan is already the third-largest producer of all Chinese provinces. The island is highly industrialized, with over 9,500 factories including textile, lumber and ceramic mills, and chemical, metal, and machine-tool plants. Cotton piece goods, flour, fertilizer, and kerosene are the major exports of these industries. By far the greatest resource, however, is hydroelectric power. The economy of Taiwan reflects the planning under past Japanese rule, which made the island one of the most efficiently exploited colonial areas.

There are about 2,200 miles of railways, most of which have had to be repaired due to damage during the last war. The major rail line runs from Chi-lung (Keelung) in the north through the western plain to Kao-hsiung and Tung-chiang (Doko) in the south, with branch lines extending east and west at various points. A single line from T'ai-tung to Chi-lung links the east coast to this major railroad. There is an equal mileage of highways, which generally accompany the railroads. A crude but important highway runs along the cliffs on the east coast. Push-car lines penetrate the inaccessible areas, but the final resort is the native trails, which are often the only means of transportation in the mountain areas. The swift currents that make the rivers potential sources of hydroelectric power make them, by the same token unsuitable for navigation. External communication is via air and oceanic navigation. Chi-lung in the north and Kao-hsiung in the south are the two major ports, with the latter playing a major commercial role in Southeast Asia trade.

The provisional capital of the Nationalist government and proposed provincial capital under the Communists is Taipei (23° 3' N and 121° 30' E) known as Taihoku under Japanese occupation. It is the political, economic, and cultural center of the province, and the center of the tea production. The 1940 population of 362,407 has now increased to an

estimated 500,000. A major commercial port and former naval base (during the Japanese occupation) is the northern port of Chi-lung or Kiuun (25° 8' N and 121° 44' E). Surrounding it is a rich agricultural area, with coal reserves suitable for steamers. Trans-shipment of goods is hampered by excessive rain storms. The population is estimated at 145,000. Kao-hsiung (22° 38' N and 120° 17' E), formerly known as Takao, is the chief port in the south. Its chief advantage over Chi-lung is the limited precipitation in the area, which makes it easier to handle such products as chemicals, salt, and sugar. It is the chief export port and in 1950 handled almost twice the tonnage that passed through Chi-lung. It is the center of the cement, sugar, iron, steel, and ship-building industries (population: 275,000). Tai-chung (Taichu) (24° 8' N and 120° 40' E) is the marketing center and leading agricultural town for the Tai-chung Plain, in the geographic center of which it is located. Its population is estimated at 207,000. The oldest city on the island is Hsin-chu (Shinchiku) (24° 28' N and 120° 55' E), a highly developed industrial and agricultural center with a population of 165,000. On the east coast supported by the surrounding agricultural, forest, and mining industries is the city of Hua-lien (23° 59' N and 121° 36' E), known under Japanese rule as Karenko. T'ai-nan (23° 0' N and 120° 12' E), on the west coast, has a population of 229,000 and is a city full of historical interest, having been the ancient capital of the island.

Taiwan became a part of China during the Yuan dynasty. Although the administration ceased to function temporarily after the downfall of the Yuan dynasty, it was reestablished in 1405, when the Ming eunuch, Cheng Ho, began his adventures in the South Seas. Large number of Chinese from Fukien and Kwangtung began to migrate to Taiwan in the seventeenth century, and as early as the Sui dynasty (581-618) some Chinese had already moved to the island.

Portuguese sailors first went to Taiwan in 1383 and called it "Ilha Formosa," meaning "Isle Beautiful." At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Dutch and Spanish tried to establish themselves there, and held on until 1661-62, when they were driven out by Cheng Ch'eng-kung and his band. The latter remained loyal to the fallen Ming dynasty, and used Taiwan as a base for an attack on the mainland. Cheng Ch'eng-kung died in the prime of his life, but his son maintained a precarious hold over the island when it was conquered by the Manchus in 1683. Under two hundred years of Manchu rule many Cantonese and Fukien folk from around Amoy emigrated to Taiwan. This emigration ceased when the island was ceded to Japan after China's shameful defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Upon the defeat of Japan in World War II, Taiwan was returned to China.

The large-scale Chinese immigration forced the aborigines into the mountainous regions. There are seven major tribes, who account for some 150,000 out of a total population of over 7,400,000. They are tattooed, have had little contact with Chinese culture, and still practice such customs as head-hunting. Even aborigines who live among the Chinese still cling to their native customs. They engage in agriculture in the mountain districts and, on the whole, are harmless. The Japanese population in Taiwan, even during the occupation, was small, though its members naturally filled all the positions of leadership in government and industry. For all that it suppressed native leadership and discouraged higher learning for the Formosans, Japan did an excellent colonial job there, industrializing Taiwan and giving it a compulsory primary education (China proper has never had compulsory primary education). When the Chinese government took over Taiwan, it found most of the population to be bilingual (Japanese and Chinese). After the liberation, most Taiwan people learned to speak Mandarin.

The Japanese also inculcated habits of personal cleanliness, so that the Formosans make a point of taking baths rather frequently. They are cheerful and courteous, though

the men are sometimes inclined to self-protective sullenness and mistrust. Untouched as they are by the restrictive influence of Confucian morality, the women are gay-hearted and uninhibited; they are industrious workers and make good wives. Because of the strong sugar element in their diet and the prevalence of mosquitoes, their beauty is often marred by gold-filled teeth and mosquito-bitten legs. Before the liberation, the men wore shabby clothes, usually only shirts and pants, and the women wore skirts and blouses of loud color. Now the Taiwan women imitate the women on the mainland, and take to Ch'i-pao and leather shoes. With the influx of Chinese, new housing projects are replacing the fragile but pretty Japanese-styled structures with straw-filled tatami floors. Because of the intensive effort at national defense and ever-constant apprehension about a Communist attack, the restaurants, bars, and picnic resorts in Taipei are no longer as gay as they used to be.

Except during the typhoon seasons, the coastal cities of Taiwan enjoy good rainfall and sunshine and are pleasant places in which to live. It is an extremely rich province, though the mountain ridges in the center and east of the island occupy much valuable space. Fruits are abundant: oranges, bananas, pineapples, and watermelons are sold during every season of the year. The native population takes to sea food, but the cuisine in most of the restaurants does not compare with Chinese coastal city food. Rice is the staple cereal. Many picturesque Chinese customs regarding the New Year, burial, and worship have been preserved.

Production has now surpassed the pre-war record of the Japanese. The Formosan people enjoy equitable representation in provincial and national government. There is some reason to believe that the mutual distrust and antagonism between the native population and the Chinese from the mainland is diminishing.

No Formosan has yet been entrusted with a position of prominence in the National government. A conspicuous member of the CCP is the Taiwan woman Hsiueh Hsi-hung, who in her younger days was a bound servant and concubine. She now represents Formosan interests in the Communist government.

Tsinghai

The province of Tsinghai is in the Northwest Administrative Region and is bordered by Kansu, Sinkiang, Tibet, Sikang, and Szechwan. It has an area of 257,000 square miles and a population of 1,123,200. Geographically, it is part of the Tibetan Plateau, and is a mountainous area except for the Tsaidam Basin in the north and the Ch'ing Hai (Koko Nor) Basin in the east. The latter are enclosed by the Asfin Tagh and Nan Shan ranges in the north and Kun-lun in the south. The basin of Tsaidam is a desert swamp, while the Koko Nor Basin contains a beautiful salt lake at 10,500 feet altitude. Both areas are semi-desert, with meager pastoral possibilities. The Kun-lun extensions in the province are known as the Bayan Kara and Ch'i-lien ranges. Within the province are the headwaters of the Hwang Yellow, Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween rivers. The climate is of the extreme continental type, with great differences in temperature between day and night and from season to season. The summers are hot, with little rainfall. The Southeast has the heaviest precipitation.

The agricultural area is mainly in the east, the chief crops being wheat and barley. They are, however, barely adequate for local consumption. Large quantities of medicinal herbs are cultivated. The Mongolian nomads depend for their livelihood on wool from camels and sheep. The province is reported to have iron, tin, silver, and aluminum deposits, and to produce small amounts of gold, coal, and salt. There is no modern industry, and trade is restricted to woolen goods, hides, and oil. The topography makes communication

extremely difficult, but the old trade routes have been converted into a few roads linking Tsinghai to Sikang and Kansu provinces. There are no railroads; rivers are navigable only by raft.

Sining (36° 37' N and 101° 49' E) is the provincial capital, and has a population of 55,600. It is a historical point of contact between the Chinese and the border groups, and a market town for wool, timber, salt, and tea. Northwest of Sining on the Hwang River is Huang-yuan (36° 42' N and 101° 13' E), the "Little Peking" of Tsinghai. Huang Chung (T'a-erh-su) (36° 31' N and 101° 37' E) is the location of a famous lamastery with over three thousand Lama priests. An important communication and trading town is Yu-shu (33° 1' N and 96° 52' E) in the south, it being the terminus of the highway to Sikang.

Tsinghai was made a province in 1929. It is populated by Tibetans, Mohammedans, Mongols, Chinese, and aboriginal tribes. At present, the Mongols inhabit the northern border; the Tibetans the southern border; the Chinese and Moslems the cities near the provincial capital, Sining. It would be interesting to trace the history of each race in this district. Suffice it to say that Tsinghai was once the home of fierce barbaric tribes, variously known as Si Tsung or Si Hain, and was a constant nuisance to the Chinese during the Han, T'ang, and Sung dynasties. After the conversion of Tibetans to Lamaism, the Tibetan culture and religion permeated Tsinghai (as noted, Tsinghai forms a part of the Tibetan Plateau). During the Sung dynasty, the Mongols began to come down in search of pasture for their horses and cattle. During the Yuan dynasty, the Moslems began to increase their influence in the area. In numbers the Tibetans and Mongols exceed the Moslems, but the Moslems are definitely superior in political influence. They are a more dynamic people, and it was no accident that the Nationalist Government appointed the Mohammedan Ma Pu-fang governor of Tsinghai. The Moslems there speak the Chinese language.

The early years of the Ch'ing dynasty were a remarkable period of Chinese colonization and expansion. During the reign of Yang Ch'eng, the militant generals, Nien K'eng-yao and Yo Chung-chi conquered Tsinghai; Yo Chung-chi went further into Tibet, and exacted obedience from the Tibetans and the aborigines.

The Tibetans and Mongols wear fur clothing most of the year. Their habits as regards personal cleanliness leave much to be desired. There is great freedom among them regarding marriage and sex. The Moslems, by contrast with the Mongols and Tibetans are clean and vigorous, and their sexual morals are strict. They are fiercely nationalist, and have rebelled several times during the last few decades. They are fiercely nationalist, and have executed at Lan-chou by F'eng Yu-hsiang, an 18-year-old Moslem lad, Ma Chung-ying, raised the standard of Moslem revolt in Sining. The revolt spread to many Moslem provinces before it was finally quelled. Because they are nationalist the Moslems are fiercely anti-Communist, but since the general collapse of the Kuomintang, their leaders have not been able to hold out against the Red tide. In the past decade, relations between the Chinese and the Moslems have been happy. The last Tsinghai governor, Ma Pu-fang, was nominally subject to Nationalist authority but exercised unchallenged authority in the province. Under him the province made notable progress on the social, political, and economic fronts. The Moslem leaders in the Tsinghai-Ningxia-Kansu region are Hoehow Ma's.

The climate of Tsinghai is continental, and is noted for its violent transitions of hot and cold. The proverb has it that only during the months of July, August, and September, is the traveler relatively unhampered by the weather. Because of the many tribes represented in the province, sharp differences in marriage and burial customs exist.

Yunnan

This province is in the Southwest Administrative Region and is bordered by Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechwan, Sikang, Burma, and Indo-China. It has an area of 162,300 square miles and a population of 9,284,000. Yunnan is a part of the Yunnan-Kweichow Plateau, and has an average altitude of 5,000 meters. It is broken by small plains in the east. The Kao-li-kung Shan, Xu Shan and Yun-ling Shan are the three major ranges, all originating in Sikang Province. The Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween rivers enter from Sikang and pass through Yunnan. Among the few lakes in the province, the Tien Ch'ih, on the outskirts of the provincial capital, is the largest. The climate is subtropical, but mild and comfortable due to the influence of altitude. Seasonal changes are not great and precipitation, half of which is in July and August, averages 42 inches annually. Kunming has a particularly attractive climate, with a temperature range of 29° F to 90° F. Western Yunnan has suffered severely from earthquakes.

Since only 5 to 10 percent of the province is level land, potential cultivation is limited. Rice, wheat, barley, and cotton are the chief crops, with tea, silk, and medicinal herbs produced for export. Only one summer crop of rice is produced, despite a growing season of 325 days. Two-fifths of the fields raise a winter crop. As with Szechwan, where transportation costs make a compact, high-priced commodity desirable, Yunnan has been a high producer of opium.

The province is extremely rich in mineral deposits, particularly copper and tin. Tin production, the leading industry in the province, is centered at Ko-chiu, and is the largest in all China. In copper production the province ranks a poor third after Taiwan and Manchuria. Coal and iron are produced in fair quantities, and gold, silver, and iron deposits have been reported. Kunming is the industrial center. It was developed for the most part via the transfer of coastal factories during the war, but in view of the high transportation costs to and from the city it is a matter of conjecture how many of these factories have stayed on.

The Yunnan-Indo-China railroad is the chief line in the province, connecting Kunming with the Indo-Chinese rail system. A short line, the Pi-se-chai-Ko-chiu, joins it in the south. A major line has been planned to connect the province with Burma in the south and with Kweichow and Szechwan in the northeast. The Kunming-Ch'iu-ching section is reported finished, and the rest under construction. Highways total 4,500 kilometers, the most important being the Burma or Stilwell Road, which was China's last land lifeline of supply during World War II. The rivers are almost unnavigable due to the swift currents. Another wartime development, due to the air-ferrying of vital war supplies, was the establishment of Kunming as an important air terminus.

The provincial capital and the political, communications, and commercial center of the province is Kunming (25° 4' N and 102° 41' E), which has a population of 255,500. Goods marketed here are copper, tin, silk, tea, and Yunnan ham. The tin center of Ko-chiu (23° 22' N and 103° 5' E) with over 7.5 square miles of tin mines, is located in the south, on the Pi-se-chai-Shih-p'ing railway. Meng-tzu (23° 20' N and 103° 23' E), a border town on the Yunnan-Indo-China railway, is the province's southern gateway. The center for marble production is Ta-li (25° 43' N and 100° 11' E), a highway town in the northwest, which is also famous for its scenery. The junction of the Yunnan-Indo-China and Pi-se-chai-Shih-p'ing rail lines is at the town of Pi-se-chai (23° 26' N and 103° 24' E).

During the earlier Ch'ing dynasty the frontiers of Yunnan were protected by two Chinese tributary states, Burma and Annam. In 1885, during the reign of K'ang-hsi, Indo-China became a French protectorate, and Burma was incorporated in the British Indian Empire. Thus Yunnan came into direct contact with France and Britain. Since the Man-

chu government was hazy about what constituted the precise Yunnan frontier, the French and still more the British took advantage of the fact and appropriated areas of Yunnan, the British government actually sending troops to occupy the northwestern frontier up as far as Pien-ma. At present, the area of Yeh-jen Shan and Chiang Hsin P'o is legally still Chinese, though in actual fact most of it has long been occupied by Burmese. In maps made in other countries, as compared to those made in China, one immediately notices the reduced territory along the Western border. As a result of the abatement of British and French imperialism after World War II, Yunnan now has more secure borders. When the Nationalist Government moved to western China after 1937, Yunnan suddenly became important as the only communications center through which western munitions and goods could be transported to China. The Burma Road became justly famous.

Yunnan is beautiful country, with a subtropical climate and good rainfall; its capital, Kunming, perhaps enjoys the best climate in all China. It was an important province even during the Ch'ing dynasty, because of its invaluable deposits of copper, marble, and tin. All China's coins used to be minted there.

Yunnan is inhabited by many races. Among the aborigines Shans and Lolos predominate. The Shans are akin to the nation of tribes along the Yunnan-Burma border. The Lolos live mainly in the remote mountain districts, along the Yunnan-Sikang border, and number about 1,500,000. They are a nomadic people, very brave and warlike. They lead a Spartan life and are trained to fight from childhood. They have a blinding passion for blood feuds, which they pursue endlessly from one generation to another. There are three distinct classes of Lolos: the "Black Bones," who constitute the pure-blood nobility; the "White Bones," who are enfranchised descendants of Chinese slaves; and the *Wa Izu*, or newly-enslaved Chinese. The "Black Bones" spend much of their time raiding distant Chinese communities and carrying off men and women to serve them as slaves. Women hold an exalted position among the Lolos.

Yunnan has also been the most important Moslem stronghold outside the North-western provinces. The Moslem settlers were cruelly oppressed under the rule of Manchu viceroys. During the Tai-ping Rebellion they took advantage of Peking's preoccupation with the Yangtze rebels to stage their own uprising in Yunnan. This rebellion lasted from 1831 to 1873, and cost millions of lives.

Yunnan was famous for the 1915 uprising against Yuan Shih-k'ai, led by Ts'ai O. From 1913 to 1927 it was governed by the ambitious Tang Chi-shao, and for the next eighteen years (1927-1945) was under the power of another irresponsible war lord: Lung Yun, a native of Yunnan. Under their reign, the people's life was hard and poppy-growing became widespread. It was estimated in 1923 that it accounted for two-thirds of the cultivated land during the winter season, and that 90 percent of the men and 60 percent of the women in Kunming were opium addicts. Only when the Nationalist Government moved into the interior did the central authority reach the province. Lung Yun was then replaced by another native of Yunnan, Lu Han.

The retreat of many higher institutes of learning into Kunming, especially the South-west Combined University (comprising Tsinghua, National Peking, and Nankai Universities), had a beneficial effect upon the culture of the province. The Chinese in Yunnan speak a readily intelligible Mandarin.

Yunnan has not produced many eminent men. Its most remarkable son, perhaps, was the Mohammedan eunuch Cheng Ho, who served under the enterprising Ming Emperor Ch'eng Tsu and equipped with fleets and men, made several expeditions into the South Seas. If such expeditions had been continued, China would have emerged as a sea power and might have avoided the disasters resulting from the isolationist policy of the Ch'ing emperors.

The Yunnan diet suffers from the scarcity of salt and iodine. Many of its inhabitants, in consequence, are afflicted with goitre.

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

Inner Mongolia is one of the two so-called autonomous regions created by the Communist Government of China. It is bordered by Heilungkiang, Russia, Outer Mongolia, Suiyuan, Chahar, Jehol, Liaosi, and Kirin. The reference of the term Inner Mongolia is less geographical than political, since the newly organized Autonomous Region excludes the old provinces south of Outer Mongolia, which are geographically part of Inner Mongolia. A better name perhaps would have been "West Manchuria." The region includes the following Manchurian areas: all of Hsingan Province, most of Chahar and Liaopoh, and a large portion of Jehol (as these provinces were constituted under the Nationalist Government). Exact statistical information is lacking, but the total area is almost equal to that of the entire Northeast Administrative Region, which totals 343,600 square miles. The population is by another rough estimate somewhat less than 2,500,000. As of March 1952 there was no formal administrative organization in the region; instead administration of the region was directed from nearby Wanchuan (Kalgan), the capital of Chahar Province.

The Ta-hsing-an Range, which begins in the south between Chahar and Jehol, is the chief mountain range in the region. It crosses the entire region up to the northern border. Its extension along the northern border into Heilungkiang Province is known as the I-li-hu-li or Hsiao-hsing-an Range. The Yin Shan lies farther south; it reaches out from Suiyuan Province and forms slopes and small basins within Inner Mongolia. Two major rivers in the region constitute parts of the national as well as the provincial boundaries. The Argun River in the west forms part of the national boundary with Russia, while the Nonni River in the east forms part of the provincial boundary with Heilungkiang. The Hailar River runs through the northcentral area from the Soviet border to Heilungkiang Province, and is paralleled by an important rail line. The Liao River with its tributaries lies in the south-east, and flows into Liaosi Province. The northern half of the region has the most unfavorable climate in northeast China, being bitterly cold and arid much of the time. The temperature ranges from -40°F to 96°F , with extremes in the mountain ranges. Annual precipitation amounts to about 11 inches annually. The southern half is similarly unfavorable, because of the cold winds from Siberia. The area projecting into the southeast, adjacent to Liaosi Province, has the best climate but even it is subject to the extreme cold emanating from the north.

Agriculture in the north is limited to the small quantities of corn, millet, wheat, and potatoes grown on the western slopes of the Ta-hsing-an Range. Grazing is more important: cattle, horses, and sheep are found in large numbers, tended mainly by Mongols. The southeast area produces soybeans, fur, wool, and timber, in addition to the aforementioned crops. The leading mineral resources are coal, salt, and gold. Coal production is centered at Cha-lai-no-eh, along the Ch'ang-ch'un rail line close to the Soviet border. The production, based on large reserves, serves the railroad and helps supply Heilungkiang Province. There are a few gold mines in the north, but in general gold deposits are undeveloped. A good salt supply is obtained from the various salt lakes in the region, particularly in the west. Timber is an important resource, the timberlands of the Ta-hsing-an Range being the largest in all China.

There are only three rail lines in Inner Mongolia. The longest is the western section of the Ch'ang-ch'un, which is linked with the Soviet system in the northwest at the border town of Lu-pin (Man-chou-li). It follows the course of the Hailar River, and enters Heilungkiang Province in the east. From T'ao-an in Heilungkiang Province another line crosses the region at its narrowest portion to Wen-ch'un near the Outer Mongolian border. A short

line areas into the southeast corner, connecting T'ung-liao in Inner Mongolia to Liao-yian and Ta-hu-shan in Liaosi Province. Highways are limited in mileage, with Hsai-la-erh serving as a focal point for roads leading to Russia and Outer Mongolia in the north. The southern focal point for roads leading to Russia and Outer Mongolia in the north. The southern portion also has a few roads leading to Outer Mongolia and adjacent Chinese provinces. Old trade routes also connect the region with Russia and Outer Mongolia. The Argun River is navigable by small craft, but its length diminishes its value as a route of transportation.

Wu-lan-hao-te (Wang-yeh-miao) (40° 5' N and 122° 1' E) was originally selected as the capital of this autonomous region. It is located in the east central area, and is an important communications center on the railway running from T'ao-an in Heilungkiang to Wen-ch'uan in the west. Hsai-la-erh (Hailar) (49° 13' N and 119° 41' E) was the former capital of Hsingan Province. It is an important communications center on the western Ch'ang-ch'un rail line, and a trading center for cattle, sheep, and animal products. To-lun (42° 10' N and 116° 25' E) is a communications and trading town in the southeast, near Jehol, which specializes in furs, wool, animals, rugs, carpets, and timber. The border town of Lu-pin (40° 30' N and 117° 27' E) is the terminus of the Ch'ang-ch'un line and its junction with the Russian rail system. It also serves as a trading center for Russia and Outer Mongolia. T'ung-liao (43° 33' N and 122° 14' E) is a railroad town and trading center for animals, furs, and wool in the southeast.

For sociological and historical information on this Region, see the section in this chapter entitled "Manchuria."

Tibet Autonomous Region

The so-called autonomous region of Tibet is a frontier region of far southwest China, bordered by Sikang, Tsinghai, Sinkiang, India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Its borders like those of Yunnan, have never been completely defined, but Chinese sources claim an area of 469,400 square miles and a population of 1,500,000. The region is a high plateau with an average altitude of 4,500 meters for the plains area and 5,500 meters for the mountainous areas. The Himalaya Range forms the southern boundary with India and Nepal. Parallel to and north of this is the Trans-Himalaya Range. Other major ranges are the Karakorum, extending into eastern Tibet from Kashmir in India, and the K'unlun Range, across the northern boundary of the region. The headwaters of several major rivers, including those of the Indus, the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra (or Tsan-po as it is called in Tibet), are found in this region. The most important is the Tsangpo, which flows across the southern part of the region into Sikang Province in the east before turning south into India. There are numerous lakes, most of which are salty; there are also extensive areas of salt and alkali surface crust. The Chang Tang (or Chang Tsang) Plateau in the north covers a large area. The Tsangpo Valley in the south, through which the river flows, is the most densely populated area.

The climate is distinctly continental, with sharp temperature changes due to radiation, isolation, aridity, and altitude. Temperatures range from -40°F to 90°F, with intensely cold winds during winter. Precipitation is limited to the Tsangpo Valley, the Himalayas serving to block off most of the moisture-laden monsoon winds coming from the south. The Chang Tang Plateau is too cold and dry for vegetation.

Barley, tea, wheat, and beans are cultivated in the southeast valley area, but the frosts there are severe. The northern area sustains a limited pastoral economy based on yak, sheep, wool, furs, and hides. Tibet is reported to have substantial deposits of gold, silver, copper, iron, petroleum, coal, and salt, but, except for gold and salt, which are produced in small amounts, these resources have yet to be exploited. Lhasa, though still dependent on

primitive means and old trade routes, is the hub of the transportation system. Two routes lead east to China, and a third goes west to India. A few additional routes cross the Himalayas to India, the most important of these being that which links Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet to Darjeeling, terminus of the Indian railroad system.

Lhasa (29° 43' N and 91° 11' E) is the capital and Holy City of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The religious, political, and communications center of the entire region, it has a population of about 60,000. The Potala, the palace of the politically powerful Dalai Lama, is located there, and is a magnificent architectural achievement. The traditional spiritual counterpart of the Dalai Lama is the Panchen Lama, who resides at Trashih-bumpo, Tibet's second largest city (population: 20,000). Gyantse (28° 57' N and 89° 36' E) is an important trading town south of the Tsangpo River near the southern border. It is connected with the bordertown of Yatung (27° 26' N and 88° 53' E) from which primitive trails link Tibet to the Indian rail system at Darjeeling. Near Gyantse on the Tsangpo River is the trading town of Shigatse (Zhikatsé) (29° 15' N and 88° 53' E). Another important center for trade with India is Garok (31° 45' N and 80° 20' E), on the Main West Road on the upper Indus River in the west.

The Tibetan Plateau is the most elevated extensive region on earth inhabited by man. Because of its theocratic government and its lack of communication with the outer world, Tibet has been invested with a certain glamour, which has been exploited in such popular novels as *The Lost Horizon*. Rarely does an Occidental traveler go there without writing an article or book about it. With its inclement climate and rarefied atmosphere, Tibet, however, is hardly an ideal place for a retreat. And despite the accumulated wealth in the gold-topped lamaseries, the people for the most part live in poor and unsanitary conditions. Its height and inaccessibility, however, has thus far saved Tibet from becoming the scene of bloody strife, though it has been a center of political intrigue, what with British, Indian and Russian interests vying with each other and disputing China's claim to it.

The political history of Tibet goes back some two thousand years. Tibetan warrior tribes raided the frontiers of the Chinese Han Empire from the first century B.C. By the seventh century A.D., Tibet had become a powerful military state under the kingship of Songsten Gampo, with whose reign Tibetan civilization dawned. He made repeated raids on Chinese territory. To blunt his conquering ambitions the great T'ang Emperor, Li Shih-min, sent a kinswoman, the capable princess Wen-ch'eng, to become his bride. Aided by the king's Nepalese consort, like herself a Buddhist, Wen-ch'eng converted Songsten Gampo to Buddhism, and persuaded him to use his influence to spread its pacifying principles among his warrior people. Buddhist scriptures were brought in from India, and a Tibetan written language was invented from an alphabet taken from the Sanskrit. Thus began the peculiar Buddhist culture of Tibet. The warlike Mongols, who became so powerful under their great leaders Genghis Khan and Kublai Khan, were also later infected with Lamaism, and lost much of their original aggressiveness. Since the Yuan dynasty, Tibet has been nominally a part of Chinese territory, though actual political and military interventions by Chinese in that region were rare.

Tibet is still nominally ruled by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, the topmost ecclesiarchs in Lamaism, usually distinguished as, respectively, the temporal and spiritual leaders of Tibet. As the head of the State, Dalai has greater political power. Formerly, when the Tibetans were completely under their sway, China's and Britain's diplomacy usually centered on securing the good will of the Lamas. During the thirties, while the British were feasting the Dalai Lama in India, the Panchen Lama was enjoying the good life in Peking, Shanghai, and Nanking. When the present Dalai Lama escaped to India upon the imminent Communist conquest of Tibet, the Panchen Lama became the hostage

of the Chinese Communists, and this obliged the Dalai Lama to return from India. The election of the Lama is based on belief in the transmigration of the soul of the dying Lama to the body of an infant. Hence most Lamas have been juniors under the power of ruling cliques. Under the treaty signed with the Chinese Communists in 1951 the Dalai Lama was guaranteed tenure of all his previous powers. In fact, however, the Communists have taken Tibet over completely, and it has become virtually another Chinese province. Communist military development there has caused some nervousness in India.

The combination of temperature extremes, inhospitable terrain, and serious deficiencies in both food and fuel are reflected in a low population density (about five or six persons per square mile). Where the land can be cultivated, the sedentary Tibetans cluster in farm-villages surrounded by community fields. Most Tibetans, however, are members of nomadic tribes that live in tents and move from grass to grass with their herds of sheep, goats, yaks, and horses. A man's wealth is measured by his livestock. The most important animal to the Tibetan is the yak: he not only uses it as a beast of burden, but eats its meat, drinks its milk, burns its dung for fuel, and makes ropes and cloth for his tent from its long hair. The hide is used to build a coracle to ferry goods and passengers across the large rivers.

The staple diet in Tibet is boiled mutton or yak's meat and tsamba (parched barley flour). The Tibetan starts his meal as follows: a chunk of Chinese brick tea is tossed into a kettle of boiling water. The bowl of scalding tea is flavored with a pinch of salt and a lump of yak butter. After a number of bowls of buttered tea are consumed, a handful of tsamba is placed in a bowl half-filled with tea and kneaded with a circular movement of the fingers. The dough-like preparation is then eaten. The Tibetan occasionally varies his meal with the meat of domestic animals and game. The habit of drinking buttered salted tea is also universal among the Mongols.

Men and women wear substantially the same garment. For warmer temperatures this is usually made of palm, a coarse homespun of wool, in varied colors. For colder weather a sheepskin cloak is worn, with the wool on the inside. The women's hairdress is very elaborate. In some parts, the hair is commonly done up in 108 braids, with the ends attached to a rectangle of heavy cloth extending to the heels. This is richly studded with ornaments of silver, coral, amber, and gold nuggets.

The Tibetan is frank, fun-loving, and almost completely uninhibited. Sexual habits are free and women enjoy a high social position. Marriage is an economic rather than a romantic or religious institution. Polyandry is commonly practiced, the plural husbands usually being brother. Should the polyandrous family prosper, more wives may be added. Each wife and husband are then shared by every other wife and husband.

The woman, however, is inferior in matters concerning religion. At least half of the male population enter lamaseries in boyhood. The child is thereby assured a good education, a high social position, and a permanent livelihood. Except for Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, and a relatively few trading posts, the lamaseries are the principal centers of settled activity for the entire Tibetan Plateau. Many have several thousand lamas in permanent residence and exercise temporal as well as spiritual power over large regions, from which taxes are exacted in the form of gifts. Some of the bigger lamaseries are famous for their architecture and their lavish use of gold to embellish their rooftops and giant idols.

When a Tibetan dies his corpse is taken to a clearing or hollow in the hills to be devoured by vultures. After the bones are picked clean, they are pounded to a pulp and buried. This custom stems from the Tibetan's belief that this life is but a penance for misdeeds and shortcomings in earlier lives. The liberation of the imprisoned spirit must await the destruction of the body.

SUPPLEMENTAL

Manchuria: Historical and Sociological

What is known in the West as Manchuria is usually referred to by the Chinese as the Northeastern Provinces or simply Tung-pei (the Northeast). Although originally the home of the Manchu peoples, the population is almost entirely Chinese. In fact, almost nothing remains of the old Manchu culture, and those of Manchu blood have adapted the language and culture of the Chinese. The Manchus are decidedly a minority and are hardly differentiated from the Chinese.

Manchuria used to consist of three provinces: Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang. Later the Manchukuo government remapped the area, making nineteen provincial units. After the war, the Nationalist Government divided Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang into nine provinces. Today, in the Communist set-up, Manchuria consists of six provinces and a large Inner Mongolian Autonomous Area.

Manchuria was once known as *Kwan sui* because it is separated from China Proper by the Great Wall. The latter, however, was not so much a cause as a symbol of the division between the Chinese and the peoples beyond the Wall.

Historically, the original home of the Manchus was in the valleys of the Sungari and Mutan rivers. They were closely related to the Jurchens, who moved into the Liao Peninsula and actively harassed China during the Northern Sung dynasty. Finally the Jurchens took possession of North China and established the Chin (Gold) dynasty. This dynasty was parallel to the Southern Sung dynasty and came to an end in 1234, when it was overcome by the Mongols under Kublai Khan.

Four hundred years later, a number of descendant tribes of the Jurchens were welded together into a powerful fighting force by Nurhachu (1559-1626), who took control of the whole of Manchuria and set up his capital at Mukden. The Mings were in difficulties at the time, and the Ming general Wu San-kuei asked the Manchus to help save the tottering Ming Empire from the bandits. They thus came inside the Great Wall; and Emperor Shun Chih, Nurhachu's grandson, established the Ch'ing dynasty on Chinese soil in Peking in 1644.

Realizing that they owed their success to their fighting ability, the Manchus at first rigidly safeguarded their soldiers against falling prey to the temptations of Chinese culture. They also deliberately discouraged Chinese immigration into Manchuria, in the hope that this region of their ancestors might remain a reservoir of strength from which stalwart fighting men could be recruited. But the first Ch'ing emperors, especially Ch'ien Lung, were lovers of Chinese culture; and the Manchus in China were soon assimilated. They adopted the Chinese language and let their own script fall into desuetude. The banner men (Manchu soldiers) stationed in China, exempted from physical labor by a pernicious pension system, soon degenerated; so that by the nineteenth century it was necessary to train Chinese soldiers under Chinese leadership to put down the Tai-p'ing Rebellion. In the Northeast, conditions were not much better; with the migration of numerous military and civil personnel into China, the remaining banner men ceased to be stalwart fighters. With the opening of rail communication, the tide of Chinese immigration was overwhelming. By the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, therefore, the Chinese and Mongols in Manchuria far outnumbered the Manchus, who today account for only a small percentage of the total population.

The modern history of Manchuria epitomizes Russian and Japanese ambition and treachery in dealings with China. The need of ice-free ports long ago drove the Czars into imperialist ventures in Manchuria. As early as 1689, China signed away to Russia large tracts of territory north of the Amur River. When Britain, France, and Japan were exact-

ing increasing concessions from China, Russia stepped in and in a spirit of feigned friendship obtained the right to build the Chinese Eastern railway in Manchuria and to use Dairen and Port Arthur. These Russian special privileges clashed with Japanese imperialist ambition and immediately led to war. Japan emerged from the contest as a world power and held the ascendancy in Manchuria for the next forty-five years. The thriving South Manchurian Railway Company was the principal agent of Japanese economic exploitation of the area.

After the founding of the Republic, the warlord Chang Tso-lin was able to compete with Japanese interests by building rival rail systems and developing rival ports in Manchuria. Realizing the possibility that political unity in China might increase the direct power of China in Manchuria, Japan took control of Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang after the so-called Mukden incident on 18 September 1931. In spite of weak guerrilla resistance and ineffective protest by the League of Nations, Japan founded the so-called State of Manchukuo and invited Henry P'u-yi, the last Emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty, to become titular head of the puppet state. The Japanese Kwantung Army was the virtual ruler of Manchukuo; in 1933, it annexed Jehol as well.

The population of Manchukuo is mainly Chinese. Northern Chinese were moving into Manchuria as early as the turn of the century. As the sea route from Tsingtao in Shantung to the Liaotung Peninsula is a short one, immigrants from Shantung came in large numbers, especially in the late twenties. Though most were seasonal workers, many preferred to stay on and take advantage of the agricultural and industrial opportunities, which were infinitely greater than in China proper. Even the establishment of Manchukuo did not check the migration. The result is that the Manchurian has the husky physique and dialectal inflection of the Shantung man. The Mongols, the next largest group (though minor by comparison with the Chinese), occupied the four Hsingan Provinces, which have recently been reorganized and absorbed as the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Japan put billions of dollars into the industrialization of Manchuria — a long-term investment which did not pay off because of the relatively short tenure of Japanese power there. The civil administration of Manchukuo left much to be desired. In spite of its pretense to the benevolent way of government known as Wang Tao ("The Way of the Sage-King"), the average Chinese chafed under its tyranny. The exploitation of monarchical symbol and sentiment did not fool the Chinese either. The Japanese discouraged higher education for the Chinese in Manchukuo, except for short-term vocational and technical training. All the key positions in government, industry, and commerce were filled by Japanese.

Soviet Russia sent troops into Manchuria on 9 August 1945, at a time when Japanese defeat was imminent and certain. Six days later, Japan surrendered to the Allies. By this nominal participation in the Eastern front, Russia got all the privileges and concessions exacted by Stalin from Roosevelt and Churchill during the Yalta conference. Russia virtually reassumed the position in Manchuria that it had occupied in 1904, before the Russo-Japanese War. This was a bitter anti-climax, in view of China's nine years of war with Japan, a primary aim of which had been the recovery of Manchuria. Russia not only kidnapped the Manchukuo Emperor (his destiny is unknown) and took prisoner a large body of demoralized Japanese troops; it also stripped away all essential industrial equipment.

Soviet troops stayed in Manchuria long enough to assist in its infiltration by Chinese Communists and systematically obstruct a speedy take-over by the Nationalist Government. Furthermore China was obliged, under the Yalta Agreement, to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty and agreements of August 1945, by which Russia obtained joint-ownership of the Chinese Ch'ang-ch'un Railway System and the right to use and garrison Dairen and Port

Arthur. Nationalist troops never regained control of Manchuria except in a few key cities like Mukden, and were precluded from doing so when actual war broke out between the Nationalists and Communists. The Nationalist troops under the able command of Tu Yu-ming put up a heroic defense in Mukden, but this did not stop the Russians from arming the Chinese Communists, who were soon to overrun the mainland of China.

During the time of Japanese occupation, the population of Manchuria consisted of Chinese, Mongols, Japanese, Koreans, and White Russians. Many Koreans were employed as agents of Japanese terrorism, not only in Manchuria but in the big Chinese cities as well — with the result that even today, after all the intensive Aid-Korea-Anti-US propaganda, the Chinese still remember the Koreans as the "running-dogs" of Japanese imperialism.

The White Russian colony first came into being with the building of the Chinese Eastern railway. After the Bolshevik Revolution a new flood of White Russians came into Manchuria. Though a great number had moved to Shanghai, a substantial Russian population stayed on in Harbin, which remains a picturesque Russian city. Pretty Russian girls graced the night life there as cabaret entertainers, taxi-drivers, and waitresses. With the Russians' heroic stand against the Germans during World War II, however, the White Russians in Shanghai and Harbin suddenly developed a homesickness for their old country. Most of them were later easily persuaded to accept Soviet citizenship and return to Russia. The Russian population in Manchuria now consists of persons sent there in political, military, and industrial capacities.

Manchuria has the largest forests of all China and many mineral resources. Chinese traders used to go among the mountain forests to look for sapphires and for ginseng and other medicinal herbs. Most Manchurian cities have beautiful parks. The massive tombs of Nurhachu and Ch'ing T'ai Tsung are famous tourist spots in Mukden.

As in North China, the people in Manchuria use kaoliang, millet, and wheat as staple foods. But the chief agricultural product is the soybean, comprising 60 percent of the world's production. The soybean is the most versatile food in China and a special blessing to the poor because of its high protein content. It is the source of soybean curd, soybean milk, and the soybean saure that is used in preparing most Chinese foods.

Mongolia: Historical and Sociological

Unlike the Manchus, the Mongols were never really assimilated by the Chinese. They conquered China once during the thirteenth century but were soon driven back to their home beyond the Great Wall. About 75 percent of the Mongolian people used to be subjects either of the feudal lords or princes of the "banners" (Manchu administrative units), or of monasteries that owned large tracts of land given to them by the banners. They are primarily a nomadic people; this explains their weakness in the modern age because, in spite of their traditional valor, they could not compete with the Chinese colonists who began to encroach on their land in the Ch'ing dynasty. Nor could they cope with the wiles of Russian imperialists. Reluctant to adopt the agricultural and industrial mode of existence, they developed a kind of nationalism which, largely ignored by the Chinese governments, found increasing sustenance in Russian propaganda and Russian offers of aid over the past fifty years. In 1911 Outer Mongolia broke away from the Manchu government and, after the establishment of the Chinese Republic, fell increasingly under Russian influence and political and military control.

First the government of Outer Mongolia remained clerical and aristocratic in character, with the Living Buddha of Urga nominally exercising supreme spiritual and temporal power. But with the success of the October Revolution in Russia, and with increased

Russian influence, the Mongol Revolutionary Party led by Sukhe Bator soon became predominant. In 1931 all land was nationalized and the Lama church was disestablished. Soviet Russia recognized the Mongolian People's Republic as early as 1921. Chinese recognition came only as the result of the Sino-Soviet treaty in 1945, which gave the Outer Mongolian people the right to a plebiscite concerning their independent status. The present Premier of Outer Mongolia, Chibolsan, is well indoctrinated in Communist theory. He has done much to replace the lamaistic and nomadic social order with Soviet methods of collective farming and cattle-raising.

Outer Mongolia is a huge and barren territory, very thinly populated and little penetrated with Chinese influence. The Mongols in Inner Mongolia inhabit a richer territory and come more often in contact with the Chinese. Strictly speaking, Inner Mongolia should denote the Mongol-inhabited parts of the provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, and Ningxia; but the western and southwestern territories of Manchuria, largely inhabited by Mongols, have come to be known as Eastern Inner Mongolia. The Mongols in Sinkiang, Tsinghai, and North Ningxia are Western Mongols. The provincial set-up of the Republican government primarily represented an attempt to minimize Mongolian nationalism and to safeguard the peaceful coexistence of Mongols and Chinese, particularly in Inner Mongolia.

At first the Mongol leaders welcomed Chinese settlers in their territory as a means of getting the cheaper foodstuffs that the Chinese farmers could produce. But as their land steadily shrank, they became alarmed, and clashes between Mongols and Chinese became frequent. The policy of the Ch'ing and Republican governments, partial as it was to the Chinese, only inflamed Pan-Mongolian sentiment. At first, the Inner Mongolian leaders, nobles and princes mostly, were suspicious of Soviet Russia, and had no inclination to follow the Mongol People's Republic of Outer Mongolia into domination by Russia. The Japanese, meanwhile, had taken possession of Manchuria, and were sensitive to the pressure of Mongolian nationalism. Four Mongol provinces — the Hsingan provinces — were established in Manchukuo by the Japanese to give special protection and the privileges of organization to the Eastern Mongolian population. Seeing this example, the Mongols in Inner Mongolia demanded autonomous government from the Chinese Nationalists. Their movement was led by Teh Wang or Prince Teh, who temporarily turned Japanese puppet as governor of a new Méng Chiang — "Mongol Frontier" — Province during the Sino-Japanese War. After the war he emerged as the staunch anti-Communist leader of a minority Mongolian group. After the war, the pro-Communist faction gained ascendancy in Inner Mongolian politics under the leadership of the Moscow-trained Mongol Ulanhu, and the fate of Prince Teh in Communist China is unknown. Later an Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was set up, comprising Eastern Inner Mongolia and parts of Inner Mongolia. It is probable that the Mongols are now discarding feudal nomadism in favor of a Communist mode of existence.

The strength of the Mongols was sapped by Lama Buddhism, which they adopted in the sixteenth century. The Manchus, after they had obtained possession of China, encouraged this religious practice among the Mongols, precisely to keep them tame and peaceful. Lamaism blunted the warlike spirit they had inherited from their forefathers, and kept a large percentage of the male population from practising any useful occupation. It also partially modified the nomadic social structure, as the lamaseries, which were not movable like the yurt tents, served as nuclei for permanent settlements. So not a few Mongols have taken up farming in addition to cattle-raising, though most of the arable land in Suiyuan and Chahar has been wrested from their hands by Chinese colonists.

Depending on grasslands and oases in the desert for a living, the Mongols are excellent horsemen, inured to physical hardships and discomforts. They are trained in horse-back

riding from earliest childhood. Much smaller than the Arabian or European breeds, the Mongol pony is extremely hardy and swift. On little food and water it can carry heavy loads at high speeds, and endure the rigors of the Mongolian winters.

The Mongols rarely wash themselves. Forever cloaked in their sheepskins, they are extremely dirty and are indifferent to skin diseases, which are very prevalent among them. Because of the dust storms from the Gobi, most Mongols have contracted trachoma, and the percentage of blind people is quite high. Freedom in sexual relationships makes for a high incidence of venereal diseases.

The Mongols are a polite people, and most foreign tourists who have been entertained in the courts carry away a favorable impression of their hospitality. Their food consists of salted-and-battered tea, animal meat, and tsamba, a kind of paste made of barley flour mixed with tea. Their diet is conspicuous for the lack of leafy vegetables and fruit. On occasions, the Mongols are hard drinkers.

The Mongol youths marry quite early, usually with a'd of the matchmakers. The men are not particularly energetic; they traditionally scorn manual labor. The women do all the household chores. A rich Mongol often keeps two or three concubines; in such a household, the first wife is the undisputed mistress. Like her Tibetan sister, the Mongol woman wears an elaborate hairdress, and is loaded down with necklaces, earrings, and ornaments of all kinds.

A SELECTED READING LIST

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CHAPTER 3 CHINESE HISTORY

Chinese Mythology concerning the Origins of their Society

Like all other peoples, the Chinese possess a body of legends and myths concerning the origins of their society. These are of great interest because they have had a profound influence upon political and social thinking in China. The Chinese tend to look back into the past for guidance in the solving of current problems, to regard the past as the only Golden Age, rather than to expect great things of the future. The heroes of their legendary tales are, moreover, thought of as embodying the qualities of perfect rulers, and their supposed conduct is deemed relevant to the definition of all the virtues that are to be admired. Nor are these recent phenomena; they are traditional ways of looking at things.

According to Chinese mythology, after Heaven and Earth were separated and the world came into being, the universe was first ruled by a succession of supernatural emperors. One popular account holds that first there were the Twelve Emperors of Heaven, each of whom reigned eighteen thousand years. They were followed by the Eleven Emperors of the Earth, who also ruled for eighteen thousand years each. Finally there were the Nine Emperors of Mankind. Traditional Chinese historians were fairly unanimous in assuming that a period of rule by supernatural emperors actually occurred, but no effort appears to have been made to establish a uniform account of this period. Rather, different localities developed their own variants of the general theme, free rein being given to the imagination of storytellers.

Following the Nine Emperors were the Three Sovereigns, and it is only with them that the traditional histories converge on an "orthodox" account. The first two of these heroes, Fu Hsi and Shên Nung, were of supernatural origin, but they are depicted as having been concerned about the development of human civilization. By tradition Fu Hsi invented most of the early arts and crafts, and taught them to the Chinese. Shên Nung is said to have contributed to the development of agriculture, and to have taught the Chinese their methods of raising crops.

The Third of the Three Sovereigns, Huang Ti, was China's first human ruler, although he instructed his people out of a wisdom that was divine. All the subsequent rulers and princes of ancient China claimed descent from him, and based their right to rule on that claim. Huang Ti, so legend has it, was followed by four rulers who were instrumental in transforming the Chinese from a savage and barbaric people into the most civilized people in the world. All of these rulers were so very great that they did not attempt to establish family dynasties; each recognized, that is to say, that his sons were unworthy to serve as leaders of the Chinese people. Of the four rulers, Chuan Hsiu, Ku, Yao, and Shun, Confucius regarded the latter two as the greatest. Confucianist writings make repeated reference to Yao and Shun as examples of perfect rulers, and orthodox Confucianists think of them as having set the standards of governmental and ethical practices. Confucius himself stated that he was not originating ideas about government, but merely attempting to set down practices that Yao and Shun had established. Thus Yao and Shun were traditionally regarded as embodiments of the Confucianist ideals.

According to tradition, Shun chose as his successor a man named Yu. He, like the others, was a descendant of Huang Ti, and is remembered in Chinese tradition as the symbol of selfless public service, since he was called upon to devote thirteen years of ceaseless labor to combatting great floods that threatened the very existence of the Chinese people. During those years he refused even to visit his own home and family, although on three distinct occasions he passed by the door of his home and heard the cries of his children.

Yu attempted to follow the example of his predecessors by claiming that his sons were not worthy to succeed him. The people, however, insisted that tribute be paid to his memory by having his son follow him as emperor. Thus, we are told, the first of the traditional Chinese dynasties, the Hsia, was founded.

According to the traditional chronology, the Hsia was founded in 2205 B.C., and lasted until 1766 B.C. Although there probably was a Hsia dynasty, modern historical research has shown these dates to be completely untrustworthy.

The Origins of Chinese Culture

All the preceding is legend. Generally speaking, the actual origins of the Chinese people and their culture are matters of conjecture. Only within the last few decades has scientific research focused upon such questions, and the results to date have been meager, enough work having been done to discredit most of the traditional accounts but not enough to justify any significant number of firm statements about the origins of Chinese civilization.

It seems probable that Chinese culture originated in the lower Hwang (Yellow) River Valley of North China in prehistoric times, that it spread westward along the river, and was, in its early stages of development, largely independent of influences from other areas. What is known of the origins of Chinese culture may be summarized in a few paragraphs.

In 1927 an important archeological discovery was made in a cave about thirty miles from Peking; the remains of a prototype of modern man now called *Sinanthropus Pekinensis*, or Peking Man. These remains are regarded as being about five hundred thousand years old.

Archeological studies in the Ordos Desert have uncovered stone implements that have been placed in the paleolithic (Old Stone) age, which would make them about fifty thousand years old. More extensive finds have been made of remains from several neolithic cultures that appear to be directly related to subsequent Chinese civilization. The most important two of these are the Yang Shao and the Lung Shan cultures. The Yang Shao culture appears to have spread southeast from Kansu into what is modern Honan and Shantung. Its distinguishing mark, for present purposes, was its crude gray pottery, which was of the same shape as the later Chinese bronze vessels. These three-legged vessels, the *li* and the *ting*, may fairly be regarded as distinct products of Chinese culture. Although some of the Yang Shao finds seem to resemble discoveries of remains from the same period in the Black Sea area, North China appears to have been the center from which the culture spread.

The Lung Shan culture is believed to have originated in what is now Shantung, and to have spread to the north and west. The Lung Shan culture also appears to have developed fairly advanced techniques for making and designing pottery, many of the designs being found in the bronze vessels of later periods. This has led to the assumption that the two cultures were not only indigenous to the North China area, but were probably the direct predecessors of the subsequent Bronze Age culture of China.

The Shang Dynasty

Traditional Chinese history held that the first Chinese dynasty, the Hsia, was followed by the Shang dynasty, which was said to have dated from 1766 to 1122 B.C. During the

latter years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, historical research tended to cast doubt on the existence of the Shang as well as the Hsia. In 1928, however, an archaeological expedition working near An-yang in northern Honan located the ancient capital of the Shang or, as it is also called, the Yin dynasty. The importance of the An-yang find lies not merely in the recovery of tools, implements, foundations of houses, and the like, but also in the discovery of a large collection of bones and tortoise-shells, the so-called oracle bones, which were used in divination ceremonies. They are especially valuable because the inscriptions carved on them are the oldest examples of the Chinese written language. They have shed interesting light on the derivation of many Chinese characters, and, what is more important, scholars have been able to decipher them, and thus to increase the available knowledge of Shang society. Among other things, the oracle bones mention the names of most of the kings formerly attributed to the Shang period, and thus verify the record set forth in the traditional histories. It is now known, then, that the Shang did exist, although the dates for the period do not coincide with the orthodox records. The Shang period was probably from around 1500 to 1050 a.c.

The fact of having found convincing evidence that the Shang actually existed has disposed specialists on ancient China to assume that there probably was a Hsia period as well. There is still no direct evidence to support this assumption, but enough circumstantial evidence to indicate that the Shang must have been preceded by some fairly advanced culture. The Shang was so highly skilled in such arts as bronze casting and had developed so ingenious a written language that it seems safe to assume an earlier though less highly developed culture preceding it.

All the evidence indicates that the Shang people had a sedentary agrarian economy. The oracle bones, to be sure, mention hunting and fishing, but there is reason to believe that these activities were indulged in more as a sport than as a basic part of the economy. It seems likely that the Chinese not only developed their agrarian way of life at a very early stage, but that they probably never passed through a pastoral period.

The Shang society was feudalistic, the king and the aristocracy owning all the land. The masses of the people were serfs bound to the land, and during the early period it is doubtful that they were permitted even to have their own family units. The nobility, on the other hand, were extremely conscious of family ties, and appear to have engaged in a form of ancestor worship. In addition to the nobles and craftsmen supplied the wants of the nobility, and produced the ceremonial implements required by the priests. Especially in the field of bronze-casting, the Shang artisans achieved a very high degree of technical and artistic proficiency, establishing standards that later periods never equaled.

The Shang priesthood exercised great power. Neither the kings nor the nobility made any important decisions without consulting it. Besides being closely associated with divine things, the priests had the advantage of being the only experts in reading and writing. They were responsible for the development of the Chinese written language, and it was they who initiated the tradition of holding in reverence the ability to manipulate the written word. This tradition was to assume tremendous importance in subsequent Chinese history.

Chou Dynasty, 1050 to 221 n.c.

In the year 1050 n.c., Chinese records state, the Shang was conquered by the house of Chou, and a new dynasty was established. The roots of the Chou were in present-day Shensi Province. Even before defeating the Shang, it seems that they had already adopted many features of Shang culture. Having so, they retained the Shang's artisans and the Shang script. But they were not mere imitators. It was they, for example, who introduced

the rigid patriarchal family system that was to become an essential and enduring aspect of Chinese culture. Also, they brought with them the "cult of Heaven," and the belief that their ruling house had won its power as a grant from Heaven, and that their Emperor was, as he is called, the Son of Heaven. From this cult there developed the Chinese concept of the Mandate of Heaven, which held: first, that the Emperor ruled in the name of Heaven; second, that so long as he followed the will of Heaven the people and the government would prosper; but, third, that if the Emperor failed in his function of mediating between Heaven and Man and lost the Mandate, the people had a right of revolution.

The introduction of the Chou family system rendered unnecessary the main functions of the Shang priesthood, since it required the head of the family to perform personally all the important religious rites. The main religious ceremonies, in other words, became secularized, and there was no longer any need for a special priestly class. In time, the old priestly class was transformed into a group of secular advisors to the Chou court and the nobility. They continued to be valued for their skill in reading and writing, which enabled them to perform many essential functions associated with ruling. They entirely ceased, however, to be a distinct religious elite.

The Chou kingdom was organized along feudalistic lines, the Chou lands, considerably larger than those of the Shang, being entrusted to nobles to "have" and to "hold." These nobles were a law unto themselves within their own estates, but were expected to give allegiance to the king and defend him against any external attack. The feudal lords, however, gradually gained in political power, until the Chou court finally lost its direct control over them. With the reduction of its political power, the Chou court became increasingly a religious institution, concerned mainly with performing ceremonies relating to Heaven. The feudal estates became the arena in which competing power groups struggled for ascendancy.

In 771 n.c. Chang-an (now Sian), the capital of the Chou kingdom (in what is now the province of Shensi), was captured by rebellious vassals, and the Chou emperors, though able to re-establish their court near what is now Lo-yang, never again ruled as a central government. The period from 771 to 481 n.c. is known as the Ch'un-ch'iu, or Spring and Autumn period, from the name of a set of annals recounting the events that occurred between these dates. The annals reflect mainly the continued deterioration of the Chou House, and the incessant struggles among the various feudal families, now the masters of small principalities and states rather than mere feudal holdings. None of them, however, sought to replace the Chou family, many of them, indeed, continued to fight in the name of the Chou Emperor, and the strongest regularly assumed the honorary title of "Protector of the King." The Chou court, left as it was with only ceremonial functions to perform and shorn of any political power, had become too unimportant to make it worthwhile for any of the great families to dislodge it. It may be, also, that potential attackers were restrained by the knowledge that if a state were presumptuous enough to claim for itself the power of a new dynasty, it would be faced immediately with the combined opposition of all the other states.

At the very end of the Ch'un-ch'iu Period, however, the conflict among the various states had become so intense that, pretty clearly, the issue being decided was that of which would be powerful enough to establish a new centralized dynasty. This period of conflict lasted from 481 to 221 n.c., and is known as the Warring States Period. There gradually emerged from its turmoil a number of powerful states, of which the most prominent were on the outer boundaries of what was then China. First one and then another of the states seemed likely, at different times, to conquer the other leading contenders and establish a new dynasty that would control the area as a whole. At the beginning of the state of Chi (in

present-day Shantung), then Chin (in Shansi), and then successively Ch'in (in Shansi), Sung (in the border regions of Shantung, Kiangsu, and Anhwei), and Ch'u (a semi-barbarian state in the middle-reaches of the Yangtze River).

Out of the Chou period there came a remarkable body of political and philosophic thought, and it seems safe to say that the middle and late Chou periods were the most vigorously creative periods in the entire history of Chinese intellectual life. Most of the important themes and topics that dominated traditional Chinese philosophy were first formally enunciated at that time.

Several factors appear to have accounted for the remarkable activity of philosophers during this period. First, there was the group of men who followed the tradition of the early Shang priests, and served as political advisors to the various princes and feudal lords. They had, as noted, given up their religious functions, but they had retained their interest in the development of the script, and therefore possessed a skill that was needed in the conduct of state affairs. Their role as political advisors unavoidably turned their minds toward the task of developing philosophical and theoretical concepts as to the correct way of ruling a state. Secondly, there was a large number of impoverished noblemen who had lost their landholdings, as a result of the downfall of the Chou feudal system, or for reasons of entirely different character had either been left without inheritances (some were younger sons), or had seen their wealth slip through their fingers (e.g. in time of war or other great national calamity). These men sought the protection of the more powerful lords, and had nothing to offer in return except their services. Some became military adventurers and swash-bucklers; others became teachers, secretaries, or advisors. The day came when many of them claimed to hold the philosophical answer to the problems of successful government, and to be able to advise the prince on how to maintain and expand his power. A situation arose not unlike that in Renaissance Italy, when men like Machiavelli offered their services to the various princes contending for power, except that the Chinese advisors were profoundly conscious of their role as teachers of men, and from an early moment strove to develop bodies of followers and disciples. One of the reasons for this, which will come up for notice in many contexts in the present study, was the extreme complexity of the Chinese written language; anyone who learned to read and write became, *ipso facto*, a member of a distinct elite group. The masses of the people and most of the rulers being illiterate, the learned philosopher-advisors possessed a distinct advantage over nearly everyone else on the horizon, and came finally to think of themselves, in consequence, as a superior group of men.

The most influential of all these philosopher-advisors was Confucius (K'ung Fu-tzu, 551 to 479 B.C.), whose ideas have influenced Chinese thought far more than those of any other man. Confucius, like all the other thinkers, was profoundly disturbed by what he thought of as the disintegration of Chinese society during the Chou period. He felt that the only salvation for society was a return to an older Golden Age, in which all the relationships in the society had been clearly defined, and each man had had a definite place in society and had been expected to discharge certain specified functions in a clearly prescribed manner. In particular, Confucius spoke of following the examples of Yao, Shun, and Yu, the mythical rulers of pre-history and the founders of the Hsia dynasty. In the later history of China, Confucianism was to be the bulwark of conservative thought. But originally Confucius represented a revolutionary force, whose major insistence was that moral behavior and virtuous conduct are more important than hereditary birthright.

The most prominent follower of Confucius was Mencius (Meng Tzu, 372 to 288 B.C.), whose teaching stressed the innate goodness of man's nature. Another important follower was Hsun Tzu (c. 300 to 230 B.C.), who held that man is by nature bad, and can be saved

only through education and training in etiquette. Hsun Tzu's emphasis upon the importance of education has influenced orthodox Confucianism at least as much if not more than the teachings of Mencius.

Ironically, two of Hsun Tzu's disciples became the outstanding proponents of the Legalists, who advocated a centralized political power, the harsh application of laws, and a complete disregard of social class and rank, and thus became the great antagonists of the Confucianists. The Legalists believed that the state of social confusion typical of the Chou period could be eliminated only by a strong government, which would ruthlessly enforce definite rules and laws and, via an appropriate system of punishments and rewards, cause society to become stable and peaceful once more.

Another school of philosophy was that of the Taoists, who explained the social conflict of the Chou period in terms of there having been not too few but too many rules, and argued for a return to the simplicity of the state of nature. There were also the followers of Mo Tzu, who argued in terms of such principles as that of universal love and that of non-discrimination. Finally, there were numerous minor philosophers, each of whom developed a following and sought to influence the rulers of the various Chou states or, failing that, declared that there was no hope to be found in the political field. Although in the long run the Confucianists were to have the greatest influence, in the short run it was the Legalists who most affected political developments.

The Ch'in Dynasty, 221 to 208 B.C.

The last ruler of the Chou dynasty abdicated in favor of the feudal prince of the state of Ch'in -- in 256 B.C. The date usually given for the establishment of the Ch'in dynasty, however, is 221 B.C., the year in which the last of the feudal states was defeated and Ch'in Shih Huang-ti (first Emperor of the Ch'in) became the Emperor of a strong centralized state.

The Ch'in state was originally located in present-day Shensi and eastern Kansu. Because of its conquests, however, it came to include most of northwest and west China, and achieved military victory over the remaining states in the Hwang (Yellow) River Valley. Its success is usually attributed to the leadership of its great Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang-ti and his trusted advisor Li Ssu, who served as the prime minister and was known as an advocate of Legalist principles.

The Ch'in dynasty was short-lived, but it left a lasting impression on all subsequent Chinese history. It not only formally abolished feudalism; it established the Chinese tradition of a centralized state with an emperor as supreme ruler. The Ch'in rulers quickly saw that they could not control all of the territories they had conquered without uprooting feudalism, under which the independent nobles, with their hereditary rights to the land and the revenue they derived from taxes, formed centers of power that the imperial court could not bring under its sway. They went to the heart of the problem by abolishing the practice of granting estates to the feudal families, and by appointing administrators who ruled in the name of the Emperor, did not have any hereditary right to their posts, and remained in office only so long as they satisfied the demands and expectations of the central court. In a word, China differs from many other countries in that the formal practices of feudalism were abandoned there for political reasons, i.e. because they stood in the way of efficient control of conquered territories. Ch'in Shih Huang-ti also strove to break up the large feudal families, which he correctly regarded as potential foci of opposition to his new regime. The change from rule by a feudal aristocracy to rule by an administrative bureaucracy was, as a result, well under way by the end of the Ch'in dynasty, and its beginnings should be regarded as an achievement of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti and Li Ssu.

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The other thing to remember about the first Ch'in Emperor is that he took vigorous steps to centralize and regularize all phases of government and life in China. For example, the written language was formalized during his rule, largely as a means of improving administration, and a correct form was decreed for the writing of each character. Uniform standards of weights and measures were established and, of course, greatly facilitated the collecting of taxes for the central government. Military and administrative post roads were built and uniform widths of axle for all vehicles prescribed as a first step toward standardizing the widths of all highways. Finally, the walls built as defense works to the north of China were linked together to form the Great Wall, which stretched fifteen hundred miles along the frontiers that guarded China against the raids of the nomadic barbarians in Mongolia - a feat which only a centralized government could have accomplished. All these reforms, furthermore, were carried out with a ruthless determination that must be explained, in part, in terms of the Emperor's devotion to the Legalist philosophy.

The Chinese tradition of the Emperor's devotion to the Legalist philosophy. In order to carry out his policies, the First Emperor set up what may fairly be described as the first totalitarian state in history. The Ch'in's methods, to be sure, were a far cry from modern totalitarian techniques but their dominion was authoritarian and ruthless to a degree that had never before been seen or dreamed of in China. As might be expected, therefore, the Ch'in government met constant opposition not only from the common people, who were called upon to bear the real economic costs of the new policies, but also from the educated Confucian elements in Chinese society.

Ch'in Shih Huang-ti, in his attempt to cope with these powerful opponents, adopted measures of the kind that is classified today under the general heading of "thought control." In 213 B.C., for example, all Confucian books were ordered burned, and while this edict was repealed in 191 B.C., much irreparable damage had already been done, and many historic works of the earlier periods of Chinese culture had been lost. Many, however, survived, which suggests that the Ch'in state, insofar as it was totalitarian, was not completely efficient.

So widespread was the opposition to Ch'in rule that immediately after the death of the founder of the dynasty its empire began to crumble under the impact of a series of revolts. Ch'in Shih Huang-ti's successors were weak personalities, and conflicts soon developed among the advisors at court that tended to undermine the efficiency of the central administration. The provinces, in consequence, gained greater autonomy, and became bases for new power groupings that were soon struggling with one another for mastery over the entire area of China. The central government that Ch'in had established collapsed, but the tradition in favor of such a government did not disappear with it. Once it was gone, the military and political leaders consciously engaged in a struggle to establish a new centralized dynasty, and do not appear to have considered seriously the possibility of reverting to a system of localized principalities.

The Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to A.D. 220)

The struggle for power following the Ch'in dynasty eventually resolved itself into a conflict between two men and their followers. One was Liu Pang (Liu Chi), a man of humble origin who had served in the Ch'in military organization, possessed great gifts for organization, and used them well in enlisting the political support of the various rebel leaders. The other was Hsiang Yu (Hsiang Chi), who personified the typical qualities of feudal China. He was a dashing and heroic military leader, who deeply believed in the customs and practices of the earlier aristocracy. Liu Pang's political and organizational

skill ultimately won out over the small but brilliant group that gathered around Hsiang Yu. Hsiang Yu had what it took to win the battles, but did not know how to marshal the political support needed for a long campaign.

When Liu Pang, usually known by his reign title of Kao Tsu, ascended the throne and so established the Han dynasty, he did not at first carry on the policies associated with the Ch'in. Rather he granted fiefs, similar to those of feudal days, to his immediate supporters, and these became, even in the first few years of the dynasty, centers of power capable of challenging the central administration - which they did, increasingly, until 154 B.C., when there was a serious but unsuccessful revolt against the central government.

Kao Tsu, just before his death, decreed that only members of the imperial family could hold fiefs. However, he left it to his successor, Wu Ti (140 to 87 B.C.), one of the most brilliant of all China's emperors, to eliminate the last vestiges of formal feudalism. This he accomplished by a decree prohibiting primogeniture (i.e., the passing on of an estate to the eldest son alone) and ever since then, it has been a basic principle of Chinese customary law that all male heirs have equal rights in their father's estate.

The Han government, finding that it needed administrators if it was to rule successfully over its large domain, turned to them to the Confucianist literati, thus establishing the Chinese tradition according to which the functions of government should be performed by Confucianist scholars. The Han system of government did not carry the development and refinement of bureaucracy nearly so far as they were carried later, but the general pattern of administrative rule by qualified civil servants was clearly established at this time. The scholars, moreover, proved useful. Their skill in writing eminently qualified them for the reporting side of administration, and the emphasis they were trained to put on ceremony and ritual gave to the Han government a great deal of dignity and prestige that the first Han ruler, perhaps in part because he was a commoner, appears to have welcomed.

Even before the Han government had completed the task of organizing the resources within its territories, it initiated a series of military expeditions that were to be among the most glorious in Chinese history. The armies of Emperor Wu Ti penetrated the territory of present-day Manchuria, northern Korea, Kashgar, and Russian Turkestan. Other expeditions moved south, and reached the site of modern Canton and the Red River in Annam (Indo-China). Subsequent Chinese historians of Confucianist leanings have tended to deflate the glories of the Han martial record, but popular accounts have kept them alive into the present day. This first great period of Chinese imperialism had, in any case, a lasting effect on China's neighbors, and the Chinese people are still called "men of Han" both in China and in the non-Chinese border regions.*

The expansion of the Han domains brought the Chinese into close contact with the nomadic tribes on their north and northwest frontiers. These non-Chinese groups, "barbarians" as the Chinese called them, were a constant threat to the security of China's border areas. The Han government attempted to deal with this problem partly by stationing troops in the outposts of the empire, and partly by working out a systematic policy toward the border peoples that was basically one of maintaining a balance of power among them. The Chinese called this policy of "playing one barbarian off against another." In accordance with this policy, the Chinese often built up the strength of one barbarian tribe so that it could fight the others and then, if it subsequently became too strong, promptly shifted their support to the now weaker tribe or group of tribes. The Chinese always made it their

* The term "men of Han" is especially common among northern Chinese. It is used in South China, but is less common than the expression "men of Tang" - a name of a later great dynasty during which South China was brought into closer cultural contact with the center of Chinese civilization.

business to maintain enough effective military power at home to provide the troops needed for victory in any major clash.

The Chinese regarded the northwest as particularly important, because the overland trade route extended through that area into Central Asia, where it finally joined up with the eastern trade routes of the Roman Empire. The Han records make it clear that the Chinese traveled this route extensively, and came to know Roman society and European geography much more thoroughly than the Romans knew Chinese society and geography. The early trade between Asia and Europe was conducted through, so to speak, third parties, the most important of whom were the Parthians and the Arabs. China exported to Rome large quantities of such prized items as silk, tea, spices, and works of art. The Europeans, since they had little of value to offer in exchange except a few curiosities, had to pay mainly in gold and silver. There appears to have been a drain of precious metals out of Europe into China during the Han period on such a scale as to affect both economies profoundly. Some authorities believe it may have accelerated the eventual fall of the Roman Empire.

Another important consequence of Chinese expansion under the Han was the transplanting of Buddhism from India into China. Travelers to India had brought back with them interesting accounts of this religion, and in due time individual Chinese made the long trip to India to learn more about it and to obtain copies of its holy books. While the Han state remained strong, Confucianism was to continue to serve as the basic ideology of its government and Buddhism was regarded rather as a curiosity than as a living religion. It was only during the period of political confusion after the fall of the Han dynasty, when the organized Confucianist scholars found themselves unable to offer effective opposition, that Buddhism began to catch on in China as a popular religion.

In spite of its remarkable record of military and administrative accomplishment, the Han dynasty never fought itself free of serious problems. One persisting difficulty (of which, incidentally, Chinese imperial government was never able to rid itself even under later dynasties) was intrigue and favor-seeking at the Imperial Court. The causes of this evil were many and varied. Much of the intrigue revolved about the families from which the Emperor obtained wives and concubines for his harem. In post-feudal China all families were regarded as commoners, which meant that it was necessary to raise the status of any prospective consort family; and as this practice continued the empresses' families became so numerous and powerful that they were able to dominate even the Imperial family. Besides seeking favors for themselves, they made such use of their position as enabled them to grant favors to others, and thus became an important factor in the conduct of the government.

Another important source of intrigue was the practice of employing eunuchs as servants to the women in the Imperial Court. The eunuchs' functions situated them, of course, in close proximity to the emperor, and they made the most of this strategic position by setting themselves up as advisors on affairs of state and by trafficking in audiences with the Emperor. The opportunities for intrigue by the eunuchs were multiplied by the Emperor's practice of maintaining an imperial harem, which increased the number of strategically situated eunuchs — to say nothing of the fact that the harem itself became a further source of petty rivalries that affected state policy.

The Han were also obliged to face serious issues arising from within the government. The most vexing of these resulted from the tendency on the part of the bureaucracy to separate off into cliques and groupings that vied with one another for control of the administration, and in doing so inevitably lessened the effectiveness of the government. Another lay in the fact that the Confucianist bureaucracy early became the defenders of the landed interests, and helped the latter to evade taxation and to accumulate ever-larger land holdings.

During the years from a. d. 9 to 23, the Han throne was occupied by the usurper Wang Mang, who attempted, among other radical reforms, the reduction of large land holdings, the regulation of prices, wages, and rates of interest, and the imposition of a larger tax burden. He met violent opposition on the part of the Confucianist leaders, who saw in his proposals a threat to the position of the conservative landed gentry class. They frustrated his reforms, and saw to it that he was driven from the throne. Wang Mang's brief rule ended what is called the Earlier or Western Han period, during which the capital was at Sian in Shensi. There ensued the Later or Eastern Han Period, when the capital was at Lo-yang, in the present province of Honan.

The final collapse of the Han dynasty, some two hundred years later, was the product of a series of revolts by various government ministers and military leaders, and of an attempt (the first in Chinese history) by a secret society, the Yellow Turban Society, to overthrow the ruling house. Suppressing these revolts-called for expenditures that wrecked the government's finances, and left it so weakened that one of the rebellious military leaders was finally able to capture the capital itself.

The Three Kingdoms (220 to 265)

During the final years of the Han dynasty, several military leaders were contending for power, each determined to capture the last Han emperor and, by taking over the seals of state, to establish a new dynasty. The last emperor was, in point of fact, several times the captive of one or another of these military leaders, none of whom, however, ever succeeded in unifying the entire country. Their struggles, resulting in the disappearance of the Han empire, introduced a period of about three hundred and sixty years during which there was no centralized government capable of governing all of China. This period has been labeled the "Dark Ages" of Chinese history. Politically, it was indeed a time of great confusion, during which alien groups were often in control of much of North China. It saw the establishment of numerous dynasties, none of which, however, achieved the power of such ruling houses as the Han and the later T'ang. They were, indeed, little more than military dictatorships, destined to last only so long as their founders could maintain their local military ascendancy.

During the years immediately following the collapse of the Han regime, three kingdoms or dynasties were established in China. In the north, the Wei dominated the area of present-day Shansi, Honan, and Shantung. In the modern province of Szechwan, the Shu Han, claiming to have descended from the Han family, gained ascendancy. In the southeast there appeared the State of Wu, with its capital near modern Nanking. These three states engaged constantly in military campaigns against one another, but to little or no purpose as far as the subsequent development of China is concerned. It must be noticed, however, that later ages romanticized this period of China's history as a golden age of chivalry and heroic struggle. The exploits of its military leaders have played a prominent role in Chinese literature, e. g. in the famous novel *Sun-Kuo-Chih Yen-I*. Half history and half legend, they were for centuries the main theme of professional story-tellers, and millions of Chinese are more or less familiar with them to this day. The most clever and dashing of the period's heroes was T'ao T'ao, who is credited with the celebrated epigram: "I would rather betray the whole world than let the world betray me." Another was Kuan Yu, who has been immortalized as Kuan Ti, the god of war, who, as the common people glorify and revere as the god who seeks to prevent war. Others are remembered for their clever stratagems, for example, Lu Fu, Yuan Shao, Sun Tzu, and Liu Pei.

Chin Dynasty (266 to 419)

The epic period of the Three Kingdoms ended when the head of one of the powerful families which provided advisors to the Wei emperor usurped the latter's throne, and declared himself the first emperor of a new dynasty, the Chin. Forming an alliance with the nomadic Hsiung Nu tribe, he waged war first against the Shu Han and then against the Wu, both of whom he had conquered by a.p. 280, thus reuniting China under a single ruler. The new dynasty almost immediately involved itself, however, in a war with various northern barbarian groups who were eventually to conquer large areas of northern China. The most important of these tribes came into China from what is now Mongolia (plus certain Russian territory), and were known as the Toba, Hsien Pi, Tibetans, and the Hsiung Nu. They established, with some assistance from Chinese leaders, a series of so-called dynasties, the most famous of which, the Toba Wei dynasty, controlled most of northern China from 385 to 550.

The Wei succeeded in driving the Chin into southern China, where they continued to maintain a court in Nanking. China was thus partitioned, with the North dominated by aliens and only the South still under Chinese control. After the Chin dynasty was overthrown in 419, a succession of four minor dynasties ruled the lands.

The Spread of Buddhism

The concepts of Buddhism were first introduced into China at the height of the Han dynasty. The new religion, which had long dominated India, awakened a certain amount of interest, but as indicated above it could not, while the Han government remained strong and the Confucianist scholars continued to monopolize the state bureaucracy, even begin to play in China the role it played in the neighboring sub-continent. The Confucianists recognized it, from the early moment when the appeal of its complex doctrines and its rich literature to the Chinese mind had become clear, as a threat to their leadership in Chinese society.

In the conditions of political chaos following the disintegration of the Han, however, the Confucianist scholars lost the strategic positions that had enabled them to put the power and prestige of the state to work in defense of their ideology and against inroads by other systems of thought. China became a philosophical open market in which all schools of thought could compete, and Buddhism entered the lists with certain advantages. Its answers to such troubling questions as those relating to death and sin were highly sophisticated. Its complicated theology and massive scriptures appealed strongly to educated Chinese. Its mysticism was highly congenial to the superstitions of the masses. And in North China, particularly, the spread of Buddhism was facilitated by the fact that the area was controlled by non-Chinese, with whom Confucianism did not have the inside run it enjoyed in the rest of China, as also by the fact that the conquerors had driven out many of the landed Confucianist gentry. Here the Buddhist leaders were soon able to establish large monasteries, and to gain control, through them, of much of the area's land. The conquerors, products of a nomadic society, had failed to buttress their power by obtaining immediate title to farm lands. The Buddhist monasteries took advantage of this state of affairs, and came to dominate the North's farm economy.

The Confucianists, of course, finally reestablished their bureaucratic monopoly, and were able to see to it that Buddhism should never again make a bid for the kind of ascendancy Confucianism enjoyed in China. Among the masses of the people, to be sure, Buddhism remained an important religious force, but only in this sense, and perhaps a little through the wealth and influence of its monasteries, has it been a factor in Chinese politics and government.

Sui Dynasty (589 to 618)

In the closing centuries of the Han dynasty China was torn, as it had been during the decline of the Chou, by dissension and strife. The Sui, who succeeded the Han, thus inherited from them a China whose recent tradition was one of political instability, disturbance, and deterioration. They governed for only a generation, and are best thought of as a bridge from the Han to the great Tang dynasty, whose reign spanned nearly three centuries. The Sui introduced no major innovations. The dynasty did, however, restore in China the pattern of centralized rule initiated by the Ch'in and the Han, e.g. by strengthening the civil service and returning it to its traditional methods of recruitment. It put its strengthened civil service to work directing the construction of the Grand Canal, which joined the Yangtze River to North China. It followed up the military successes by which it reunited China with campaigns into Korea and what is now Indo-China. But the resources at their command were not equal to their ambitions, and probably would not have been even had they not weakened the Chinese economy by excessive expenditures on luxury and display at court.

Tang Dynasty (618 to 907)

The Sui's high taxes led to a series of revolts, the end result of which was the capture of the Sui capital of Ch'ang-an (Sian) and the destruction of the ruling house. The prolonged period of civil strife that might well have ensued was, however, prevented by one of the Sui's own military commanders, Li Shih-min, who succeeded in conquering the entire land, placed his father, the first of the Tang emperors, on the throne and, in time, under the name T'ang T'ai Tsung, succeeded him. His great subsequent achievements were the reestablishment of the administrative organization built by the Sui, substantial reduction of the tax burden that had driven the landed interests into revolt, and the strengthening of China's economy through an enforced redistribution of land that vastly increased the number of land-owning peasants.

The Tang gave China one of the proudest and most glorious eras in its history. They conquered an empire larger than that of the Han. They opened up new trade routes in the northwest. They expanded northeast into Manchuria, and south into Indo-China and Burma. They made China's power felt in distant places, so that across Central Asia its diplomacy came into conflict with the advancing empire of Islam. They made China the undisputed hub of all eastern Asia, the peoples of the surrounding areas either being conquered outright or becoming, militarily and culturally, Chinese "satellites." They taught Asia to think of Chinese military power both as something to be feared and as a source of help in time of trouble. They brought the satellite or tributary states to respect the cultural attainments associated with their dynasty, and to try to imitate them. More important still, they developed the tradition that the position of a dependent state can be an honorable and happy one, a tradition that survives in China to the present day and helps explain much that would otherwise be incomprehensible about the relation between the Chinese Communists and the USSR.

They made of their court a great cosmopolitan center, in which foreigners and their ideas and religions were freely tolerated in China, for so sure were they of their own superiority that they had no fear of influences from abroad. Christians of the Nestorian, Jacobite, and Greek Orthodox sects, for example, made their appearance in China at this time, and were permitted to propagate their beliefs, as were the proponents and practitioners of the religions of the Middle East and Central Asia, such as Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and Islam. (The failure of these sects to survive in China testifies, however, to the secure position held by Confucianism.)

Moreover, the T'ang period was undoubtedly one of the most productive and inspired in the history of Chinese art and letters. T'ang poetry became a model for all subsequent Chinese efforts at verse, and Li Po and Tu Fu are by common consent the outstanding poets of all Chinese literature. In the field of painting the outstanding artist of the dynasty, possibly even of all Chinese history, was Wu Tao-hsuan, who is also known by the names Wu Tao Tai and Wu Tao-yuan.

It was, however, the political and social stability the T'ang brought to China that made possible all these artistic achievements. In the field of government the T'ang provided a model not only for later Chinese dynasties, but also for (among other imitators) Japan. The administration of state affairs was conducted through an elaborate bureaucracy, staffed by candidates who had been successful in a carefully planned series of civil service examinations. China under the T'ang was an avowedly Confucianist society, ruled by an elite made up of men who had demonstrated their competence by mastering a vast corpus of classical learning and by achieving great skill at manipulating written words. The test was perhaps a narrow one, but the bureaucracy was based on merit rather than on favor, and while so organized as to produce centralized rule for some purposes, it allowed a relatively high degree of autonomy to local officials for other purposes. The theory, to be sure, was that all the officials, even local ones, were in a single hierarchy directed from the center. Normally, however, it was unnecessary for the upper levels of the bureaucracy to concern themselves with problems at the local level. Because one and the same ideology pervaded all sections of the bureaucracy, and all of them applied a single and common ethical standard, the official at the local level did not require detailed control.

Although it was during the Han dynasty that the tradition of using Confucianist scholars as the backbone of government and administration had first appeared, the T'ang perfected the institutional arrangements that made possible the privileged status they were to enjoy through the centuries. The idea originated under the Han; it came to fruition under the T'ang. And it is to the efficiency of its administration that we must attribute the perpetuation of the rule of the T'ang House for nearly three hundred years, especially in view of what is known about the weakness of some of the individual emperors.

By the end of the ninth century, however, the dynasty was beset by all the disintegrating forces that had brought its predecessors low. Its court was torn by personal jealousies, corrupted by the backstairs intrigue of the harems and eunuchs, and weakened by independent leaders who defied the central government from points of vantage in the provinces. The latter problem was especially urgent in the extreme north, where the commanders of the defenses against nomadic incursions had succeeded in building up large military organizations, and had used the latter to usurp civil control in the territories under their command. In time, moreover, this urgent problem generated another. For as tension increased between the frontier commanders and the court, and between different frontier commanders, the nomads themselves began to be brought into the fracas as allies of whatever faction could win their support. This introduction of non-Chinese elements into the Chinese political and military scene was to have lasting consequences, one of which was that through most of the next thousand years all or part of China's territories was to be controlled by alien peoples.

The T'ang court, in trying to cope with this treachery on the part of its military officers, increased the tax and conscription burden in the areas still directly under its control by leaps and bounds, and thus produced the causes for further revolts in the rest of its territories. And it was these revolts, aided and directed by secret societies and supported by the mass of the peasantry along with disgruntled office-seekers, that gave the coup de grace to the T'ang dynasty.

The Five Dynasties (907 to 960)

The Chinese call the period following the collapse of the T'ang (the Wu Tai or Five Dynasties). The term is not quite accurate: while there was indeed a succession of five minor dynasties in North China between 907 and 960, ten others came and went during the same period in South China. It was in other words, a new period of such widespread political confusion that no government was ruling the entire country. Even the five dynasties in the north were in power for such short periods that we need do no more than list their names: Later Liang (907 to 922), Later T'ang (923 to 936), Later Chin (937 to 946), Later Han (947 to 950), and Later Chou (951 to 959).

The suspension of the bureaucratic state during this period forced the Confucianist-scholar class into a new type of activity, namely, trade. For a time, indeed, it appeared that the members of the scholar bureaucracy would completely abandon their traditional aloofness from economic activity. This did not happen, for once China again had a centralized government the Confucianist scholars for the most part returned to the bureaucracy. But they did so without entirely severing their connection with economic activities. On the level of formal ideology, to be sure, they continued to hold that the scholar-civil-servant could only be corrupted by interesting himself in trade and commerce. But from the time of the Five Dynasties it was common knowledge that members of the official class were in fact augmenting their personal wealth through commercial activities. Part of the price China paid for the Five Dynasties was, therefore, a real depreciation of standards in its bureaucracy, which could no longer be relied upon not to subordinate the public interest to private profit.

It remains to mention another important development of this period (the last days of the T'ang, and the Five Dynasties): the introduction of wood-block printing, which made it possible to produce books at a much lower cost than formerly and thus drastically reduced the cost of education. This led in time to a considerable increase in literacy, which was to have far-reaching consequences in the field of entertainment literature as well as in education.

Sung Dynasty (960 to 1279)

Traditional Chinese history treats the Sung dynasty as one of China's great periods of centralized rule, and tends to ignore the fact that the Sung at no time controlled all the territory of China proper. During the early years of the Sung, to be sure, the Chinese did restore their rule over certain large areas to the southeast that had been autonomous since the fall of the T'ang. But there were large areas of North China from which the Sung were never able to drive out the alien invaders, especially the Kitan peoples, who in 937 had established what is known as the Liao dynasty. The Liao, indeed, became strong enough to take the initiative against the Sung, and to liquidate most of the latter's foothold in North China. The struggles between the Sung and the Liao continued until 1127, and ended disastrously for the Sung, since the Juchén chose the moment of the Sung defeat by the Liao to turn on the former and force them further into South China. The Juchén then established the Chin dynasty, which came to control most of North China and was even able to exact tribute from the Sung.

Through the period from 1127 to 1279, therefore, the Sung domains lay exclusively in South China, which explains why this is called the Southern Sung period, and also why the Sung dynasty is remembered in large part for its political and military weakness. The period was, on the other hand, one of great achievement in the arts and philosophy. Confucianism underwent during these decades a considerable transformation, at the hands of a body of thinkers led by Chu Hsi (Chu Teh), who attempted to reinterpret the Confucianist classics in the light of Buddhist and Taoist ideas, and thus founded the school of thought

known as Neo-Confucianism, which differed from traditional Confucianism in at least two major respects: it incorporated a great many Buddhist and Taoist ideas, and it was built on an elaborate metaphysical foundation, so that it could not, like Confucianism, be described as merely a system of ethics. It retained intact, however, most Confucianist doctrine respecting the administration and government. Landscape painting, porcelain-making, and printing all pushed ahead into new territory, and the greatest of the Sung poets rivaled those of the T'ang period. Some experts, indeed, consider the works of Su Tung-p'o (Li T'ung), Su-ma Kuang, and Shao Yung, all of whom belong to this period, among the finest in all Chinese literature.

Alien Rule

For a long period after the fall of the T'ang dynasty, all or part of China was dominated politically by non-Chinese elements. The Khitan tribes (the Liao dynasty) controlled northeast China from 937 to 1125. Elements from Tibet, known as the Hsi Hsia dynasty, governed northwestern China from 1038 to 1227. The Liao dynasty, to be sure, was finally forced out of the northeast; but the Sung accomplished this feat only by enlisting the aid of the Jurchen tribes, which proceeded to occupy the former Liao territories themselves. The dynasty they created, the Chin, lasted from 1115 to 1234.

The greatest of the alien victories over the Chinese, however, was that of the Mongols, whose Yuan dynasty, established in 1290, controlled Chinese territory in its entirety until 1367. The Mongols, like all of the alien groups contending for power in China through this period, were nomads, and the issue at stake between them and the Chinese was never merely that of who was to govern certain territories. There was always the further issue as to how to reconcile two entirely different social and economic systems. The Mongols early recognized, however, that if they tried to impose their system upon all phases of Chinese life, e.g. to destroy the sedentary agrarian pattern of the economy, they would be attempting the impossible. They accordingly permitted the Chinese to retain most of the features of their native culture, and had, in the face of Chinese resistance, to content themselves with dominating only the topmost elites of the Chinese social structure, particularly the Confucianist scholars. For, as it turned out, the central role of the literati and the bureaucracy in Chinese society made the latter easy to control from outside — if the outsider was wise enough to have the Confucianist scholars operate the government along traditional bureaucratic lines, and confine his own activity to the making of important policy decisions. The Mongols did just that, thus making the most, for their own purposes, both of China's authoritarian tradition and of the fact that the masses were accustomed to being governed by the Confucianist elite. As for the scholar class itself, it appears to have been reasonably satisfied with this arrangement and the career opportunities its members enjoyed under it. It showed, in any case, no inclination to rebel, and there were no other organized elements in Chinese society that could serve as centers of positive opposition to the regime.

In a word: the outsiders, the Mongols and others as well, discovered that by preserving and maintaining China's traditional system of government and controlling only over-all policy at the top, they could dominate China with relatively small forces and a minimum of difficulty. In general, the alien rulers prohibited intermarriage between their own people and the Chinese, and attempted to preserve intact both cultures. They did, however, adopt some Chinese ideas and practices, and in rare instances forced the Chinese, as a token of their subordination to the conquerors, to modify some of their customs. For example, the alien rulers were obliged to learn the Chinese written language in order to control the administrative apparatus at their disposal, and in doing so were unavoidably influenced by Chinese forms of thought.

Yuan Dynasty (1280 to 1367)

The most spectacularly successful of the alien dynasties, as indicated above, was the Mongol or Yuan dynasty. During the latter part of the Sung dynasty, some scattered tribes in the part of Mongolia that is today under Russian influence formed a union that was to develop, with the passing of time, one of the most remarkable armies of all history. Both the union and the army were the handiwork of the Mongol leader Temuchin, later to be known as Chinghis Khan (Jenghiz Khan). Chinghis, once his army was ready, turned his face to the south, where he conquered successively what was left of the Hsi Hsia and the Western Liao peoples. Afterwards he struck out into Central Asia on the campaign that was to carry him, eventually, to Poland and to the very gates of Vienna. In China itself, he followed up his early victories by conquering first the Chin and then the Southern Sung, thus making the Mongols rulers of all China.

In 1259, power in the China area of the Mongol domains fell to a leader named Khubilai Khan, who was destined to complete the conquest and occupation of China. Like the earlier alien rulers, he supported the interests of the Confucianist scholar class, and used its members to restore the traditional Chinese pattern of centralized government.

Under the Yuan, the centralized Chinese state came once again to dominate all the peripheral regions of Asia. This, together with the extension of the Mongol Empire into Eastern Europe, brought all the ancient trade routes under Mongol control, which in turn greatly stimulated contacts between East and West. These were the days when Marco Polo made his famed trip to China, and went home to tell Europe of its splendor, its wonders, and its cultural achievements.

The Mongol empire was, however, short-lived. Khubilai Khan himself spent much of his power on unsuccessful attempts at further conquest, the most disastrous being his two expeditions against Japan, each of which ended in failure when the Mongol invasion fleets were destroyed by a typhoon. After Khubilai's death in 1294, the Mongol Empire steadily declined, although the Yuan dynasty survived until 1367. The final years of Mongol rule in China were years of grave economic difficulties, partly resulting from the government's failure to maintain certain services that no agrarian economy can do without, and partly resulting from its attempts to cover excessive expenditures at court by inflating the currency. At the end, its printed money was being accepted only for tax payments, all other business being transacted either with bullion or with notes from private banks.

Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644)

The Yuan dynasty lived its last years on borrowed time, in the sense that a series of revolts occurred which, if they had been coordinated, would probably have destroyed Mongol power in China well before 1367. The man who finally brought it low was Chu Yuan-chang, a peasant by origin, who was successively a Buddhist monk, leader of a bandit band, a soldier, and leader of one of the armies rebelling against the Mongols. In the latter capacity, he early displayed a remarkable talent for organization. By 1364, four years before the downfall of the Yuan, he was in control of the central Yangtze region of China, and was styling himself the Prince of Wu. In 1365, having driven the Yuan court from its capital near modern Peking, he established the Ming dynasty, and chose Nanking as its capital.

Ming power reached its highest point in the reign of Yung Lo (1403 to 1424). He moved the capital to Peking, where many of his grandiose public works still stand. Among other things, he rebuilt the Yun Ho (Grand Canal) to facilitate grain shipments from the Yangtze to Peking, and sponsored a compilation of all extant Chinese literary works (it was so huge that it was never published; only scattered manuscript volumes are extant). His

patronage of literature helped to restore the prestige of the Confucianist scholars, for the projects he sponsored not only gave employment to many of them, but also reawakened interest in the tradition of which they were the embodiment.

The Ming military successes exceeded those of any Chinese dynasty since the T'ang. Even so, they were necessary to reopen the overland trade routes through the Northwest, and Chinese trade, in consequence, flourished during their reign in the area of Southeast Asia. For the first time in its history, China now developed enough seapower to enable it to send its ships as far West as the Arabian Sea. Court-sponsored expeditions explored the Indies, and crossed the Indian Ocean to Ceylon. Much Ming trade followed the pattern of the earlier overland trade, however, in at least this respect: imports were regarded as tribute from overseas areas to the Chinese court, and exports as gifts from the Emperor to vassal peoples.

Chinese Concept of Suzerainty

The idea that foreign trade was an exchange of "tribute" against "gifts" was a corollary of the Chinese concept of suzerainty. China, according to this concept, was the center of the world, and its Imperial Court held sway over all neighboring peoples. The latter, though (in the Chinese view) such lowly barbarians that they could not appreciate the splendors and superiority of Chinese culture, naturally turned to China for guidance and instruction. Thus, while other kingdoms indeed existed, their monarchs could claim legitimacy only if their rule was sanctioned by the Chinese emperor. (As early as the T'ang dynasty, the Japanese emperor was granted a seal from the Chinese court which alone, in Chinese view, gave him the right to govern the Japanese islands.)

The Chinese did not conceive of suzerainty as a matter of exact legal relationships. They thought of it, rather, as involving relationships comparable to those within a family. The Chinese Emperor was father or at least elder brother to the lesser peoples, whose natural role was to accept the blessings of Chinese civilization and, at the same time, those of Chinese political and social ideas. On the other hand, the vassal countries were to pay homage to the Chinese Throne and, in general, defer to the wishes of the Chinese Emperor, though beyond this their internal affairs were not China's responsibility. In time of war, China would go to their aid, as it would expect them to rally to the defense of the Chinese Throne if this were needed.

During the early period, when Asia was relatively isolated and China clearly its dominant power, this concept was well-suited to the needs of the area. After the advent of Western sea power to China's coasts and the introduction of Western notions of international law, it rendered unavoidable a series of conflicts between the Western powers and China. The West felt that China's claim to dominion over its neighbors made it responsible for their actions as well as its own; or, to put it the other way around, if China were not responsible for its neighbors' actions then it had no claim to dominion over them, and the West should have a free hand in dealing with them. The Chinese, in the Western view, claimed jurisdiction over the surrounding nations only when it was to their own benefit to do so, and disclaimed all responsibility for them when this was the more convenient course to follow.

In the nineteenth century, accordingly, the Western powers repeatedly clashed with China over such areas as Korea, Annam, Indo-China, Chinese Turkestan, and the Liu Ch'iu or Ryukyu Islands—all of them, as it happened, areas in which China, with its scant military power, was in no position to uphold its claims against a third party. It is, however, questionable to infer from this that the Chinese claims were empty; before the advent of Western power China's position with respect to all the areas mentioned had been one of

great influence, and one whose maintenance had seldom required the exercise of military power or any other form of force or coercion. It is significant, in this connection, that Chinese governmental organization left the conduct of foreign affairs to the Ministry of Rites or Ceremonies, on the grounds that the most important aspect of foreign affairs was the performance of the correct ceremonies of homage to the Emperor by the representatives of foreign peoples. For both the Chinese and the border people these ceremonies formalized the acceptance by the non-Chinese of a dependent status in both cultural and political relationships. The non-Chinese and the border people, furthermore, regarded this dependent status as both honorable and privileged. In general, that is to say, they had no quarrel with the Chinese concept of suzerainty.

Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 to 1911)

During the last years of the Ming dynasty the Imperial Court was confronted with the traditional problems of internal disorder, aggravated by continued mismanagement of affairs of state plus the new problem of defending the North against the rising power of the Manchu tribes. It gradually became evident that the Ming could not marshal sufficient power to defend themselves against either their internal and external enemies, especially since their efforts to defend themselves led to higher taxation and merely increased the number of internal enemies. Toward the very end, which was hastened by a series of famines, there were major revolts by organized bands of brigands. The most powerful of the rebels was Li Tzu-ch'eng, who captured Peking in 1642. The last Ming Emperor hanged himself in despair as the city fell.

A Chinese general on the northeastern frontier, Wu San-kuei, promptly joined forces with the Manchus, and set out to destroy the armies of Li Tzu-ch'eng. In this he was successful, but the Manchus had hardly advanced south of the Great Wall when they turned on Wu San-kuei and drove him into Yunnan Province. From there in subsequent years, he launched forays against the Ch'ing government. But he was finally reduced to impotence.

The Manchus, even before entering China, had adopted many of the fundamental features of the Chinese system of government, and had established a dynasty called the Ch'ing. Having defeated the remaining Ming forces, they moved their government to Peking, and in 1644 they proclaimed the Ch'ing dynasty the legitimate government of all China. The Ch'ing, like the earlier alien dynasties, mobilized the Confucianist scholars behind their regime. In the initial years, to be sure, many of the scholars resisted the inducements offered by the Ch'ing, but most of them finally bowed to the necessity of cooperating with their Manchu rulers.

The Manchus soon became as adept as the Mongols had been at turning the Chinese tradition to their own purposes. Two of the Ch'ing emperors, K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung, are remembered among the greatest individual rulers ever to mount the Chinese Throne. Both achieved a mastery of Chinese classics and Chinese scholarship that placed them on a footing of scholarly equality with the leading Chinese Confucianists of their day.

Under the Ch'ing dynasty as under previous alien dynasties Chinese institutions and customs, most particularly traditional patterns of government, remained virtually intact. In one important respect, however, the Ch'ing did not imitate the Mongol precedents: they saw to it that the key positions, both in government and society, were occupied by Manchus, and maintained an elaborate machinery of discriminations, ranging from the petty to the critical, as guarantees that these positions were not recaptured by Chinese. The important political decisions, especially those in which the security of the Manchu Imperial House was involved, were thus made by Manchus.

During the reigns of K'ang Hsi (1661-1722) and Ch'ien Lung (1736-1796), the Ch'ing reclaimed for China all of the territories traditionally associated with the Chinese Empire, and established suzerainty over the remote regions of what are now Russian Turkestan, Eastern Siberia, Korea, Nepal, Burma, Annam, and the Malay Peninsula. Chinese power became supreme throughout eastern Asia. The Ch'ing government also, in this great early period, administered China's internal affairs with notable efficiency. The death of Ch'ien Lung appears to have been the turning-point. The subsequent history of the Ch'ing regime reveals a rapid decline both in its power and in its grasp of China's problems. When the threat of Western seapower began to make itself felt, China found itself, in consequence, in an extremely weak position.

The early Ch'ing period is also noted for its achievements in literature and art. It produced little that was original or creative in either field, but its criticism, both literary and artistic, was of a high order of excellence, and it performed well, from the standpoint of the Chinese tradition, such subordinate but important chores as collecting and cataloging the great works of the past. This was the period, for example, when Chinese scholars first began to use rigorous methods in testing the authenticity of the ancient classical works.

The Advent of the West

As has been mentioned, Chinese relations with the West date back as far as the Han dynasty, in the sense that then, as in subsequent periods of great imperial power, the Chinese had limited cultural and commercial contacts with Westerners. As has also been mentioned, the overland routes through the northwest were the well-nigh exclusive avenues for these contacts. Thus the latter could be maintained without any risk to China's political power to be set off against the considerable profit, in terms both of wealth and knowledge, derived from them. They were, in short, a matter of Chinese power pushing out toward Europe, rather than European power pushing out toward China.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries initiated a marked change in this regard: Western seapower began now to explore the Eastern world, and Western ships began to put in along the South China coast. The Chinese suddenly faced a situation in which the routes to and from the West were not largely under their own control. At first, nevertheless, they welcomed the new routes, on the assumption, apparently, that they meant merely expanded opportunities for mutually beneficial trade. As the number of Portuguese ships putting in to China increased, however, and brought in their wake Spanish, Dutch, and (by the end of the eighteenth century) British ships, the Chinese were obliged to recognize that this was by no means a matter of more of a good thing being better than less of it. The ships, what with the development of Western armament in the course of these centuries, overwhelmed the local coastal defenses at any point along the China coast. Nor was it long before the Western traders who came by sea were taking advantage of this new, coercive element in the situation. The day came, in fact, when much of the "trade" conducted by the Portuguese was little more than open piracy; they were in the business of plundering towns along the Chinese coasts and reselling the loot where they could.

Another disturbing factor in this relatively sudden advent of the West, from the Chinese point of view, was the active penetration of China by Christian missionaries. Initially, the latter were well received, e.g., to mention the most important, the Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, who came to the Portuguese-controlled town of Macao in 1582 and had made his way to Peking by 1601. He and his companions were not only well treated, but were looked on with favor at the Ming court. After the fall of the Ming, moreover, and despite their having lent assistance to the Ming in their resistance to the Manchu invasion, they won the confi-

dence of the Ch'ing. The turning-point, nevertheless, came during the early years of Ch'ing rule, when the Ch'ing found themselves with a considerable influx of members of other orders on their hands and, worse still, discovered that the representatives of the Church could not even get along with one another. The tendency of the different orders to carry their disputes to the Pope in Rome for settlement appeared to the Chinese court as an invasion of China's internal sovereignty. It finally began, therefore, to discourage all Christian missionary activity, and by 1721, Emperor K'ang Hsi had issued the famed edicts prohibiting foreigners from engaging not only in missionary activity but in other activities as well. The Chinese government, in short, gradually became aware of the dangers, from its point of view, of Western penetration of its territory, and set out to minimize these dangers by placing restrictions on Chinese-Western relations. Its position thus changed from one of notable tolerance toward foreigners and their doings to one of open intolerance, which expressed itself in strict regulations and controls. By the middle of the eighteenth century, China had constructed the equivalent of a Great Wall around its sea approaches by forbidding foreigners to enter the country or even establish contact with it at any point except Macao and Canton.

On one side, at least, the new policy failed of its purpose and ultimately defeated it. For one thing, Canton was soon flourishing as a trading center. At first, to be sure, Western traders were up against the difficulty that while China had much that the West prized, the Chinese had great sales resistance to Western products. For a time, therefore, it was a matter, roughly speaking, of exchanging Western silver and gold for Chinese silk and tea. But this soon changed. The Western traders discovered that by buying opium in India and selling it in China, they could not only foot the bill for their purchases in China, but actually run up a favorable balance that the Chinese had to meet in bullion. The end result was an actual intensification of Western-Chinese trade relations, i.e. the reverse of what Chinese policy had intended, plus two further and entirely unexpected evils: a tremendous drain on China's supply of silver, and a vast increase in the consumption of opium by Chinese. The Chinese government, rather more than less tardily than accens logical, in retrospect, responded to all this by putting further barriers in the way of Western-Chinese trade.

A further source of tension developed first in the Canton trade. The Chinese government had, among other things, limited all trade with the West to a group of Chinese merchants known as the Co-hongs. This, in the view of the Western merchants, denied them access to many potentially profitable customers, and to this complaint they soon added a further one about the Co-hongs themselves. Some of the latter went bankrupt, and the Western traders took the position that the Chinese government, since it had given them a monopoly of all commerce with the West, should itself assume the debts of the bankrupts. Other grievances, real or alleged, developed as time passed. The Western traders disliked the regulations restricting their movements within the city of Canton, as also the regulations forbidding them to bring firearms or women into the city and, finally, those governing the construction work they might undertake there. Lastly, mention must be made of the mounting tension over the differences between Chinese and Western law, the foreigners' increasingly vocal contention that if they submitted to Chinese law they could not expect justice, and, most important of all, Britain's attempt, greatly resented by the Chinese, to regularize relations with China by prevailing on the latter to adopt Western diplomatic practices and Western notions about international law. The British felt, from their own point of view quite naturally, that the problems in and about Canton would disappear if the Imperial Court would extend "diplomatic recognition" to Britain, and decree that all controversies between Western traders (many of the leading ones were British) should be

resolved in accordance with recognized principles of international (i.e. Western) law. The Chinese, from their point of view quite naturally also, could make no sense either of the notion of recognizing Britain as an equal or of Western concepts of international law. China, in their view, was now as in the past the center of the civilized world; instead of making presumptuous and ill-mannered demands for an equality that had no basis in fact the British, the Chinese felt, should be demonstrating their deference to the Chinese Throne.

The tension between the British and the Chinese finally culminated in the First Opium War (1840), which resulted in the decisive British victory formalized by the Treaty of Nanking of 1842. The Chinese were forced by this treaty to acquiesce in the British demands for diplomatic equality, to open five additional trading ports, to cede Hong Kong to Britain, to abolish the special trading privileges of the Co-hongs, to assume the Co-hongs' debts, to pay an indemnity, and to promise that all future tariffs would be based upon published schedules and not left to arbitrary determination by local Chinese officials.

The Treaty of Nanking opened a new period in the relations of China to the West, during which the central issue was to be the question of treaty rights and obligations. In 1844 the American government signed a treaty with China that guaranteed to American citizens trading with China all the rights enjoyed by British traders and established the so-called principle of extraterritoriality, according to which Americans in China would be bound by American not Chinese law. The European countries were soon signing treaties with China vouchsafing to their nationals also the benefits secured in the British treaties. Before long, moreover, all treaties were embodying a "most favored nation" clause, by which China guaranteed to the signatory, in advance, any benefits that it might see fit to grant to any other nation. No longer could China effectively use the power of granting concessions to "play off one barbarian against another." A favor extended to one was a favor extended automatically to all.

It was not until 1858 and 1860, when Britain and France applied further military pressure on China, that the Chinese fully accepted the system of treaty relations whose main features have been noted in the preceding paragraphs, and which, with one further refinement, was to deprive China of certain of the prerogatives of a sovereign state through a period of several decades. Having opened special ports for foreign trade, China next found itself confronted with a demand for "concessions," i.e. special areas in leading Chinese cities where administration was to be in the hands of foreign states. This was, to be sure, merely a further detraction from Chinese legal power over foreign nationals within Chinese territory along the lines of the "principle" of extraterritoriality, but it was to have far-reaching effects, particularly as regards Chinese attitudes toward the West and toward Westerners. In the end, China even lost control over its own tariff schedules and its own Customs Service. And, needless to say, those who negotiated the treaties that underlay the complicated array of treaty arrangements did not forget to write into them clauses protecting foreign religious and philanthropic organizations.

It cannot be denied that the treaties here in question conferred certain benefits on China: e.g., they served to stabilize the Ch'ing government. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, large numbers of Chinese were convinced, that, to say the least, these benefits were inadequate compensation for the disadvantages and humiliation attached to Western control over various aspects of the nation's life. China's mood became increasingly rebellious. After the Revolution of 1911, the Nationalists were to turn their more or less latent antagonism against the West, and to demand, as a basic feature of their program, complete elimination of what they termed the "unequal treaties." The Chinese were to contend that, on the very showing of Western international law itself, it was intolerable for their government, supposedly sovereign and thus entitled to diplomatic equality with all

other governments, to remain permanently bound by a set of treaties dictated under coercion and clearly calculated to place China in an inferior position in the society of nations. The West was to turn a deaf ear to this entire line of argument. The weakness of the Chinese government and its indifference to Western principles of law and justice, the West was to insist, rendered maintenance of the treaties absolutely necessary as means of preserving conditions of reasonable safety for foreign nationals in China.

Internal Developments During the Ch'ing Dynasty

By the middle of the nineteenth century, i.e. the very time when the West was forcing its demands on China, the Ch'ing government had already been seriously weakened by the forces of disintegration that had plagued earlier Chinese dynasties — e.g., declining standards of honesty and performance within the bureaucracy, which foreigners and Chinese alike regarded as corrupt, a growing economic crisis, especially in agriculture, and a general accumulation of basic problems beyond the governments' power or capacity to solve.

These problems were intensified and complicated by the far-reaching changes being initiated in China under Western influence. These were in part the result of the Westerners' having brought with them new and revolutionary ideas in many fields, in part a matter of what the Chinese were beginning to learn about Western technology, and in part a matter of the Chinese themselves coming to feel that China should adopt or imitate many features of Western civilization. Issues had arisen that would affect China's development through many decades, and that would divide Chinese society as it had never been divided before. Roughly speaking, they added up to one major problem, namely, that of how far China was to go in sloughing off its traditional practices and ideas. This problem was especially acute for the Chinese intellectuals. For, though it was obvious that the answer would be determined by a multitude of forces that lay beyond the control of any single group of Chinese, the intellectuals could not sidestep their obligation to decide individually what forces to support, and how vigorously to support them.

Until the early years of the twentieth century, most leading Chinese thinkers believed a solution could be found that would enable China to incorporate merely the technological aspects of Western culture, while maintaining the values and attitudes toward life and human relations that tradition had handed down. In the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty, the Chinese government, struck by the example of Japan (which was rapidly adopting the Western technology and the Western emphasis on industrialization, but at the same time redoubling its glorification of such basic Japanese institutions as the Emperor and the Japanese *Weltanschauung*), tried to develop similar plans for China. Japan, in other words, became an officially recognized model for the future evolution of China. Large numbers of Chinese students crossed over to Japan, many of them generously financed by the government, to observe the Japanese experiment at first hand; and not a few of them, either while in Japan or after their return, joined organizations bent on bringing about great reforms in China. A considerable percentage returned to China convinced that there was little hope for change under the Manchu government, and joined the revolutionary groups that were later to play an important role in the Revolution of 1911.

China's growing trade with the West, now conducted via the various Treaty Ports, was another factor making for change in Chinese society. Foreign traders now did business in China through middle men, or *compradores*, who shortly became one of the wealthiest groups in China, although the traditional attitudes relegated them, as merchants, to a lowly rung of the social hierarchy. The latter fact in itself would presumably have mobilized them against the traditional order, and would have made them more susceptible than other Chinese to Western notions. Also, however, considerations of economic advantage dis-

posed them to support the interests of the foreign groups, and to become a sort of bridge between China and the outside world.

They became, in any case, an important center of opposition to the mandarin or scholar-official group in Chinese society. Their opposition was, to be sure, unorganized, and only a few of them had, strictly speaking, strong political convictions or objectives. But they undoubtedly contributed to the weakening of the old order.

There were, of course, other economic consequences of the expanded foreign trade besides the rise of a new merchant class. The large coastal cities became increasingly dependent upon foreign commerce, and, with the passing of time, the interior of China similarly dependent upon the port cities. China, meantime, was making slow progress in the field of industrialization, which in China as elsewhere was confined to the cities, where initial plants were built for the manufacture of light consumers' goods. The cities also became, in China as elsewhere, the well-nigh exclusive source of credit, both developments taking place on a scale large enough to create a new relationship between the cities and the agrarian countryside. Industrialization helped undermine the traditional self-sufficient economy of the peasants; the city-based, nationwide market for credit provided the institutional base for a continued expansion of the debt-burden of Chinese agriculture, now as ever unproductive and consequently unremunerative.

The Imperial Government had neither the power nor the capacity to deal effectively with these problems. According to the traditional view, however, government was responsible for the well-being of the masses, who would one day hold the government accountable for what was happening to them.

Rebellions Against the Ch'ing

By the middle of the nineteenth century the Ch'ing government faced the two-fold problem, then, of mounting external pressures exerted by foreign powers and a rising tide of internal revolts.

The most far-reaching of these rebellions was the T'ai-p'ing movement, which had its origins in the eighteen forties. By 1854 it had gained control of much of Central China, and had established a capital at Nanking. Before it was suppressed in 1865, its armies had penetrated deep into North China and threatened to capture not only Tientsin but the Imperial capital at Peking as well. The central personality in the movement was a Chinese student named Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, who had been unsuccessful in the Imperial examinations. He may well have suffered from mental delusions, though this is not certain. He did, however, exploit the dissatisfaction of the agrarian population of Kwangsi by asserting that he had been selected by God himself to establish "his kingdom on earth." The ideological basis of the movement was thus a peculiar blending of peasant frustration, anti-Manchu sentiment, and (Hung is known to have been influenced by a Christian missionary) warped and tangled snatches of Christian teachings.

The defeat of the T'ai-p'ing armies was finally accomplished by peasant militia recruited for the purpose by such Chinese leaders as Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, who despite not being military men (both were bureaucrats), had received mandates from the Throne to suppress the rebels. (Two of the armies that took the field against the rebels were led by foreigners: the American Frederick T. Ward and the Englishman Charles "Chinese" Gordon.) The government's success in routing the rebels was, however, dearly won, and not merely because raising the necessary armies had put a severe tax on its resources. For the rebellion had reduced the resources themselves. The T'ai-p'ings had controlled most of the nation's important agricultural areas for several years, thus depriving the government

of huge tax revenues. And the last phase of the war had so devastated the richest part of China that the government could count on no revenues from it for many years to come.

There were several other nineteenth century revolts against the Manchu regime. All of them, it should be noticed, developed in the peripheral areas of the Empire, and testified to the gradual but nevertheless steady weakening of the central government.

Foreign Pressures on the Ch'ing Dynasty

By the middle of the century there were many visible signs that the Manchu dynasty was rapidly losing its power to govern China. The Western powers, however, were slow to recognize its decline, and thus missed its implications as to the rational course for them to pursue. At the very time the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion was sweeping through Central China and seemed most invincible, for example, the British and French were dispatching armed forces to extract further concessions from the Manchu government, and to impress the obstinate Manchu court with the necessity of ratifying the Treaties of 1858 (under which formal diplomatic relations were to be established at the Chinese capital).

But the concessions that the Western Powers wrung from the Chinese through the application of seapower and military strength seem, in retrospect, less important, as far as the long-term effects on China were concerned, than the gradual imperialistic advance of Russian land power into Chinese territories during the same period. Until Western gunboats had exposed China's military weakness for all the world to see, the Chinese had been highly successful in withstanding pressure on their land frontiers. Thus, for example, the first treaty between a Chinese court and an important European power, that negotiated between China and Russia at Nerchinsk in 1689, clearly reflected the fact that Chinese power was equal to Russian. The Chinese not only made in it no concessions like those embodied in the later treaties with the sea-powers; they obliged the Russians to retract their initial demands, obtained the disputed Amur River boundary, and got the Russians to agree to the northern watershed of the Amur River as the boundary between Manchuria and Siberia.

Even during the early years of the nineteenth century, when Russian explorers established settlements and colonies along the Pacific coast of northeast Asia and moved southward as far as the Amur River, the Peking government, despite numerous clashes between Cossack bands and Manchu troops, did not (and had no immediate reason to) view the growing power of Russia in Asia with serious concern. But as the conflicts developed between the Chinese and the British and French in the eighteen-forties and fifties, the Russians began, unobtrusively at first, to make demands on the Ch'ing government — always by stepping forward as "honest brokers" who, in return for such and such a consideration, were prepared to help persuade the sea powers to reduce their demands. This sugar-coating made the concessions China granted to the Tsarist government seem less onerous and dangerous than those granted to the other Western Powers, but they were none the less costly for that. In 1858, for example, when the Western Powers were attempting to secure a revision of the treaties signed in the forties, the Russians succeeded in negotiating the Treaty of Aigun, which redefined the Russo-Chinese boundary to follow the Amur River as far as the Ussuri River and beyond that point left it undefined.

Two years later, when the British and French expeditions moved on Tientsin and Peking to enforce the ratification of the treaties of 1858, the Russians were able to secure a further agreement from the Chinese court, under which all the territories to the east of the Ussuri became a part of the Russian Empire. Through these agreements — all of them, to be sure, obtained without the direct application of force — the Russians gained control of the present-day Maritime Provinces and the port of Vladivostok. In the end, the Rus-

sian Empire extended around the northern half of Manchuria down to the Korean border, and Russian influence was making itself felt both in Korea and in Manchuria.

Even while the European powers were forcing concessions from the Manchu government and rebellions were sweeping over China, it was widely felt that the weakness of China was only temporary, and that one day the "sleeping dragon" would awaken and show great strength. It was only with the amazing triumphs of the Japanese over the Chinese in the war of 1894-5 that the world realized that the Celestial Empire might collapse.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, which arose over Sino-Japanese competition for influence in Korea, actually decided several different and much broader issues. The rapid victory of the Japanese clearly demonstrated not only that the island empire had successfully incorporated many aspects of Western culture and built up formidable military power, but also that China would have to abdicate its role as the leading Far Eastern Power. The world, including China, little realized that it was witnessing the first phase of what was to develop into a sustained expansion of Japanese imperialism on the continent of Asia.

By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which terminated the conflict, China lost Taiwan and the Pescadore to Japan, and had to pay an indemnity for the cost of the war. A further Japanese demand, cession of the Liaotung territory in southern Manchuria, went by the board when Russia, supported by Germany and France, intervened to prevent its being pressed. This "Triple Intervention" was motivated, however, not so much by a concern to protect China as by a determination to check Japan, and prevent its pre-empting areas of the Chinese Empire where the Russians had a special interest. The intervention of the three powers made it clear that while the Ch'ing government was now incapable of defending itself, there was still hope for the maintenance of the integrity of Chinese territories insofar as the other interested powers balanced and neutralized one another.

It was also clear, however, that China would henceforth be powerless to prevent further inroads of Japanese and Russian influence in the Chinese territory of Manchuria — that the struggle for control of the area would be fought out between Japan and Russia, without any third or fourth power to balance them. In 1896 Russia obtained from China the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railroad across Manchuria, to connect the Trans-Siberian Railroad with Vladivostok. Two years later, when China was being forced to grant concessions to certain European powers, Russia obtained from China a lease on the Liaotung territory, including Port Arthur and Dairen, thus acquiring the very territory it had been instrumental in denying to Japan. Over the next years, moreover, Russia's behavior left no doubt as to the seriousness of its expansionist intentions. The building of the South Manchuria Railroad, to connect Port Arthur to the Chinese Eastern Railroad, was only the most conspicuous example of the growth of Russian interests in that area.

Meanwhile Japan, besides actively developing its stake in Korea, was expanding its economic activities in Manchuria; indeed the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 was a result of the clash between Japanese and Russian interests in precisely that area. Japan again surprised the world by defeating a far larger country than itself, and under the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which terminated the war, Japan replaced Russia in the Liaotung territory, assumed control of the South Manchuria Railroad, and obtained the southern half of Sakhalin Island. From this time until 1917 Manchuria was to be roughly divided into a Japanese sphere of influence in the south and a Russian sphere in the north. After the Russian Revolution, however, Russian influence entered upon a long period of decline. There was a brief revival of Russian pressure in the nineteen twenties, but it was brought to an end by the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931. Russia, nevertheless, was to win out once again: Japan's defeat in the Second World War eliminated it as a factor in Manchuria, and under the Yalta agreement the United States and Britain, ignoring China's

rights, agreed to restore Russia to the position of dominance in Manchuria that it had enjoyed before 1905.

Japan and Russia were not the only countries to recognize China's weakness after the defeat of 1895, and to put pressure on it for further concessions. In fact, each of the leading European powers sought to establish claims to one segment or another of the crumbling Empire, and by 1898 the Ch'ing government found itself obliged to grant major territorial concessions to several of them. Germany obtained the port of Tsingtao, and rights to build railroads in and develop the resources of the province of Shantung. (Russia, as we have seen, obtained Port Arthur and Dairen.) The British leased the port of Wei-hai-wei, and staked out claims to a sphere of influence in the Yangtze Valley. France exacted a concession for the harbor of Kwangchowan, and a promise from the Chinese government that it would not concede rights in the Southwest provinces without giving the French the refusal of them. The Japanese spoke for the province of Fukien if and when the Chinese Empire were to be divided among foreign powers.

One result of this rapidly accelerating partition of Chinese territories was the announcement by the United States government in 1900 of its "Open Door" policy for China. The Americans, with the active encouragement of Great Britain, sought to obtain promises from the interested powers that they would allow all other powers equal trading rights in their special "spheres of influence" in China. The other powers did not by any means unanimously accept the principle of the "Open Door" in the same spirit or define it in the same manner as the Americans. But the declaration did have the effect of at least momentarily checking the partition of China among foreign powers. The desire of each power to prevent others from obtaining excessive advantage had now been reinforced by the declared policy of the United States to oppose any compromise of the equal trading rights in China.

Ever since it enunciated the "Open Door" policy, the United States has followed a policy of seeking to preserve the independence of the Chinese government and people. At times American policy has perhaps not actually forwarded this objective, but the record of the American government in defense of the independence of China should commend itself to the Chinese beyond that of any other power.

The Revolution of 1911

Numerous elements within China followed the lead of the foreign powers in recognizing that the Manchu dynasty had fallen upon evil days. Most particularly, many Chinese were shocked by their defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895 into realizing that China would now have to strengthen its government and "Westernize" many features of its society. The Japanese victory sent large numbers of Chinese students off to the enemy country in an effort to learn how the Japanese had been able, in such a short period of time, to raise their position to that of the strongest power in Asia. The Japanese victory over a non-Asiatic nation, Russia, further strengthened this trend. Many who went to study in Japan and in other overseas areas returned home convinced that China would have to rid itself of the Manchu government, and begin to organize for revolutionary purposes.

The Imperial government set out, however tardily, to strengthen the Chinese nation and introduce some Western innovations. In 1898 for example, at the very moment when the West was pressing its most extreme demands upon the Ch'ing government, the Imperial court, under the lead of a young emperor, began to issue a torrent of decrees whose objective was to "modernize" China and to lead, eventually, to a constitutional monarchy. The immediate effect of this "Hundred Days of Reform," as the historians of China call it, was negligible, since the "reactionary" elements, under the direction of the Empress Dowager, Tz'u Hsi, soon regained control of the government and rescinded all the important decrees.

thus leaving the reform's sympathizers no alternative but to support the revolutionary groups abroad. But the Manchu leaders could at most postpone, not prevent, further concessions to "modernization."

By the time the Throne began to introduce programs looking to genuine change, however, the government was already too weak to carry out measures of the type called for. For one thing, opposition to the regime itself had become so endemic that no program it espoused could possibly succeed. Worse still, the reform programs tended to weaken, not strengthen, the regime: China's first provincial assemblies, for example, when they were created as a first step toward China's first national assembly, promptly became centers of opposition to the Manchus.

The opposition the Manchu government confronted at home, though powerful, was unorganized. But there was also an opposition abroad, which under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen finally took shape as a genuine revolutionary party. First known as the Tung M'ing Hui (later called the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party), it was this party that took the lead in demanding that the Manchu government be eliminated in favor of a republican form of government. Sun Yat-sen did attempt to organize cells of the Party in China, and even directed several abortive attempts at rebellion. But his main energies went to recruiting followers and funds from the communities of Chinese living outside the country.

It was no coincidence, therefore, that when on 11 October 1911, a bomb accidentally exploded in Hankow and ignited a revolution in China, the country's most persistent and famous advocate of revolutionary measures was abroad, thus in no position to influence directly, much less control, the subsequent course of events. Even the groups within China that had been planning to overthrow the regime were caught unprepared for the suddenness with which events moved their way, and had no choice but to come out in the open and seek to rally any and all individuals and groups into a revolt against the Manchus. Concretely, the revolutionists found themselves receiving a great deal of assistance from elements that had previously been considered loyal to the government. The Imperial garrison at Hankow, for example, joined the rebels, and soon other garrisons in the Yangtze Valley were refusing to obey the order to march against the opponents of the Manchu government. Prominent among the latter, incidentally, were numerous leaders of finance and commerce who had been opposing the Throne's attempt to establish government-directed railroad and industrial enterprises in Central China.

By the time Sun Yat-sen was able to return to China, the success of the revolution was already assured. But it had also become clear that Sun Yat-sen's followers were not to be its undisputed leaders. Nor, for that matter, was any other identifiable group. Rather the movement was to limp along without any coherent leadership, dissipating its energies on the negotiation of compromises among diverse groups whose only common ground was opposition to the Manchus. Different people, it became increasingly evident, had opposed the Manchus for different reasons, and then several purposes by no means added up to a definite program once the Emperor had abdicated.

Among the more intelligent and thoughtful revolutionists, the best organized were the followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Even they lacked the unity and the power to carry through a definite program during the post-revolutionary period. They had accomplished their major objective, namely, to overthrow the Manchus and establish a republican form of government; but they could not govern China. And the unavoidable result was that political power in China went, by default, into the hands of the country's military leaders. Even during the first days after the Hankow incident, in point of fact, it became clear that the revolutionaries would have to rely to a considerable extent on military support if they were to force the Manchus to abdicate and reunite China under a republican government.

The support, of course, came at a price: concessions had to be made to the military leaders. And concession followed concession until the military leaders had become the guiding power in the movement.

Thus, when the time came to select the first president of the new republic, the members of the Kuomintang did not feel free to support the (for them) logical choice, Sun Yat-sen. Rather they found themselves obliged to help give the post to the strongest military leader in China, Yuan Shih-k'ai. Chinese politics were to follow more or less this same pattern for the next two decades, with the military leaders dominating all forms of civilian politics.

The Phantom Republic

Yuan Shih-k'ai was president of the Chinese Republic from 1912 to 1916. He held the office, as his actions clearly showed, by virtue of his being the strongest military leader in the land, and before the end his personal power had achieved such proportions that he was planning to change his formal title from president to emperor of a new Chinese dynasty. The basic situation, meantime, was this: there was not enough support of republican institutions to permit the translation of the slogans of the revolution into living reality. The forces wedded to the old order, on the other hand, were by no means powerful enough to ignore the demand for a more modernized system of rule. For a time, five years to be exact, Yuan Shih-k'ai's personal power barely sufficed to keep the issue from being drawn, and thus to hold together an inherently unstable situation. Then, shortly before his death (in June 1916) he himself drew it, or rather forced it, by taking steps to have himself declared emperor. For opposition to a strong central government and unwillingness to return to the old imperial pattern were at least deep-seated enough to make impossible what Yuan Shih-k'ai wanted to do. Revolts broke out at once in the peripheral areas, and by the time Yuan died they had spread throughout the southwestern provinces.

With the passing from the scene of Yuan Shih-k'ai, China entered upon a period of straight warlord politics, during which the establishment of a strong centralized government was virtually out of the question. The various military leaders, each seeking to expand his personal power at the expense of the others, paid only formal allegiance to the Peking government. None was powerful enough by half to impose his will on the others. But no non-military leader was powerful enough to challenge the group of them as a whole, and demand an end to its monopoly of political authority.

Now, as at earlier periods, China's obvious weakness served as an open invitation to foreign powers with imperialist ambitions. The world balance of power, to be sure, operated to deny to any single country the complete control of China; but nothing at Peking stood in the way of such control, and even the balance of power did not suffice to prevent a single country, namely Japan, from emerging as a major and continuous threat to China's integrity. In 1915 that country had made its long-run intentions abundantly clear by presenting to the Chinese government the so-called "Twenty-one Demands," to some of which China had had no alternative but to agree. The entire list, had China been obliged to accept it, would have added up to complete mastery over China's political, economic, and social destiny, which world opinion, for the moment at least, had determined not to permit. In the end the Chinese government did accept some of the demands, but since even these were humiliating, their acceptance unavoidably produced in China a rising tide of anti-Japanese feeling.

Both of China's major problems of the post-revolutionary period, ascendancy of the military at home and increasing imperialist pressure from abroad, were sharply accentuated by World War I and its sequelae. The Peking government, under pressure from the United States but after a good deal of hesitation and divided counsels, declared war on Germany--

in the hope and expectation that it would be rewarded by Allied financial assistance. The mere fact of the country's being at war, of course, tended to strengthen the hand of the military leaders, and thus to weaken that of the democratic elements. (The Kuomintang faction in the government, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, recognizing this, soon decided to break with Peking and try to set up a second government for China, to be located at Canton.) On the other hand, the Peking government promptly found itself in difficulties over the disposition of the German holdings and concessions in China, whose return to China it viewed as part of the reward it should receive for entering the war. Japan, however, had not only entered the war first but also had been instrumental in ousting the Germans from Tsingtao, and once the war was over entered its claim to the ex-German holdings. When, finally, news reached China that the Paris peace conference had recognized the Japanese claim, the immediate result was an unprecedented mass protest against the government's evident powerlessness to defend Chinese interests. The Peking government eventually succeeded in negotiating an agreement with Japan (in 1922), under which the Shantung concessions would be returned to China upon payment to Japan of a sum to cover the costs incurred by Japan in "improving" the territories. The terms of the agreement, plus the fact that China had to borrow the money from Japan itself to make the payment, further damaged the government in the eyes of the Chinese populace, and fanned the fires of mass indignation against Japan. May fourth, the day of the Paris decision, has remained a day of "national humiliation" for China in both the Nationalist and the Communist calendar. (In recent years, however, the Communists have emphasized the anniversary's importance as a reminder of the treacherous deeds of the Western Powers and of the first popular movement against "imperialism.")

The Washington Conference of 1921-2, held under the leadership of the United States with the avowed purpose, *inter alia*, of protecting China from further foreign encroachment, rounds off this phase in Chinese foreign relations. Out of it came the bilateral agreement between China and Japan about the Shantung question, a Nine Power Treaty committing the signatories to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and an agreement among the United States, Britain, and Japan on naval limitation and the construction of military and naval bases in the Pacific. Under the terms of the naval agreement, which was an Anglo-American attempt to convince Japan that she had nothing to fear from foreign naval attack, the United States stood committed not to fortify or expand the naval stations west of Hawaii, and Great Britain not to fortify or expand its bases east of Singapore. The long-term result of these commitments was to render Japan relatively free to pursue aggressive policies against China — with prior assurance that the British and American navies could not easily take any effective counteraction.

The Rise of the Nationalists

With the Peking government increasingly under the domination of military leaders, and struggling to stave off both moral and economic bankruptcy, the new government at Canton slowly built up a following. Sun Yat-sen performed a role much like that which he had performed before 1911: he collected funds and enlisted political support for a movement to eliminate a government that had clearly demonstrated its incapacity to rule China. The Canton government claimed to be the rightful heir of the 1911 Revolution and thus the only legal government of all China. Nevertheless, it was pretty much on a par with several other semi-autonomous governments in the provinces.

Sun Yat-sen soon found himself involved in negotiations of a highly complex character, e.g., while discussing a possible arrangement with groups in Japan and with some of the leading northern war lords, he was also sounding out the Soviet Union about possible help from it.

Sun's negotiations with the Japanese and the war lords did not prosper; those with the USSR did, though the fruits — a promise of help with apparently not much in the way of strings attached — did not come until 26 January 1923. An agreement signed on that date by Sun and the Comintern representative in Asia, Joffe, gave the former control over any aid that might be forthcoming, and declared China not yet "ripe" for communism.

Soviet aid gave the Canton government new life, and made its party, the Kuomintang, a major if not the major factor in Chinese politics. Sun did not live to see his party obtain national power. — But it was from the struggle for power among the leaders of the Kuomintang ensuing upon his death that Chiang Kai-shek, who was to lead it to power, emerged as its leader, though not its undisputed leader. Chiang's position was from the very first constantly challenged by Chinese Communists, who had joined the Kuomintang as individuals in 1923; indeed, much of the present-day distrust and animosity between Chiang and the Communists date back to their first days of uncertain collaboration.

By 1927 the Nationalists felt they were adequately prepared for a long-planned military expedition in which they intended to conquer and reunite all of China. As of the moment when the Nationalist armies set out from Canton, Chiang and the Communists seemed determined to work together, and had they in fact done so the desired goal might well have been achieved. Actually, however, tension between the two elements was never less than extreme, and by the time the armies were in the Yangtze Valley a break between them had become inevitable. It soon occurred, and its immediate effect was to give China two capitals: one, beyond the reach of Chiang's army, at Hankow, dominated by the Communists; another, Chiang's, at Nanking. Presumably one of the two, had they both survived for a while, would have destroyed the other. But the Hankow government soon collapsed because of divided counsels and internecine struggles within its own leadership.

By 1928 Chiang was able to cull Nanking the capital of a new Chinese national government, under the direction of the Kuomintang. This did not mean, however, that China was at last reunited. The warlords Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi, and Feng Yu-hsiang in Shensi, Honan, and Shantung, each with his own army, defied Chiang's authority to the North, and were under constant pressure from Japan not to join the new government. Even as late as 1930 and 1931 Chiang was busy suppressing revolts on the part of individual military leaders and warlords. And by that time a considerable part of his resources and energies were going into campaigns against the growing power base of the Chinese Communists in Kiangsi.

The Nationalists and International Wars

In September 1931, at a moment when the Nationalists were making real progress toward the reunification of China, the Japanese struck in Manchuria, occupied the three northeastern provinces, and proceeded to behave in such fashion as to leave no doubt of their intention to expand their conquests in China. From that date forward, therefore, Chiang's primary task was that of preparing the country for an imminent war with Japanese imperialism.

The ensuing years were, nevertheless, years of not inconsiderable achievement for the Kuomintang — and for China. The early period of the Nanking government was characterized throughout China by an unprecedented political awakening, as a result of which large numbers of people came to feel that at last China could give itself a solid system of government, and make of that government an instrument for the long-postponed modernization of Chinese society. Education made great forward strides during the period, and a concerted effort was made to reduce illiteracy. The task of expanding China's industrial capacity received a certain amount of serious attention, both from the government and from private individuals and groups. In the field of international relations the Nanking

government launched and sustained a drive for renegotiation of all existing treaties between China and the other powers that China deemed "unequal." (These treaties, however, were not to be abrogated until the Second World War, and at a moment when the Nationalists seemed about to succumb to the Japanese. Thus the Kuomintang, though it could say at last that the diplomatic equality that it had promised had been achieved, never profited from this politically as it might otherwise have done.)

By the end of 1936, in any case, China appeared to be on the point of achieving a degree of unity without precedent in modern times. Even the Communists indicated their readiness to cooperate with Chiang in resisting Japan. And the need for unity was soon demonstrated: on 7 July 1937, the Japanese struck at the Marco Polo Bridge (La Kou Chiao), on the outskirts of Peking, and China began to wage a "war of resistance" that was to last until the defeat of Japan on 2 September 1945.

After the entry of the United States into the Pacific War, all groups in China tended to assume that Japan would ultimately be defeated, and the real issue in Chinese politics soon became that of who was to have power in the postwar era. Tension between the Kuomintang and the challenging Communist Party became, in consequence, more acute as victory seemed nearer. Upon the defeat of Japan, it broke out into an open civil war that eventually gave the Communists control of the mainland.

History of the Chinese Communist Party

Not until after the Russian Revolution did Marxist and Communist ideas begin to awaken interest in China. The Chinese intellectuals, preoccupied as they had been with the implications for China of liberal democracy and modern science, were taken completely by surprise when the Bolsheviks won out in Russia, consolidated their victory, and proclaimed to the world that they owed their success to a corpus of doctrine that could be found in any good Western library. Their surprise, however, quickly changed in some cases into curiosity, first about the doctrines themselves, then about such questions as whether they might be applicable to China, and whether China could, by embracing them, transform itself into a world power and escape from all the ills which had reduced it to impotence.

The first Chinese to begin thinking seriously about the possibility of transplanting Communism to China were some professors and students in Peking. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a professor at Peking University, not only organized the Marxist study group, China's first, that was to serve as the nucleus of the future Chinese Communist Party, but gathered around him a following of students that included two future leaders of the Party, Mao Tse-tung and Ch'u Ch'i-pai. There is reason to believe, however, that the group began as an enterprise in intellectual inquiry, and might well have remained that but for the arrival in China of Gregory Voitinsky, the first representative of the Comintern in China, who met Ch'en Tu-hsiu in June of 1920 and persuaded him that the time had come to leave behind idle discussion of Marxism and get busy organizing the cell groups that would be needed for the realization of Marxist objectives. By August, Voitinsky had founded the Socialist Youth Corps, which in time recruited members from the leading universities in China. Further Communist groups were organized in the leading cities of China: Peking, Shanghai, Hankow, and Canton.

By July of 1921 it was decided that the time was ripe to summon a First Congress of the (hitherto non-existent) Chinese Communist Party. Its handful of delegates assembled in the French Concession in Shanghai, but attracted unfavorable attention from the local police and were obliged to remove to Shao-hsing in Chekiang Province. Even there, according to some reports, the meetings of the Congress had to be conducted in row boats, off the shores in a lake, in order to elude the police.

No official report of this First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party has ever been published, although the Communists are usually careful to maintain full records of this sort of thing. One possible explanation of this gap in official Communist literature is that an embarrassingly large number of the charter members of the Chinese Communist Party were later to leave it and become prominent in an enemy camp. T'ai Chi-t'ao was to become spokesman of the Kuomintang's right wing. Ch'en Kung-po and Shao Li-tzu were both to defect to the Kuomintang, the latter to serve one day as personal secretary to General Chiang. Ch'en Kung-po and Chen Fu-hai were to become puppet leaders for the Japanese during the Second World War. The current Chinese Communist report on Party history contents itself with the statement that those attending this first Congress included Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Li Li-san (Li Lang-tzu), Li Ta-chao, and "others."

Although Ch'en Tu-hsiu was not present at the Congress, the latter recognized him as Party Chairman — a post he was to hold until 1927. Apparently the mood among those present was highly optimistic; now that it was formally organized, the Party would immediately take up its rightful place as a factor to be reckoned with in Chinese politics, and a Chinese Communist Revolution would ensue before many years. This was presumably due, since other reasons have not come to light, to Li Li-san's remarkable success in organizing the workers at the Hanyehping Iron Works in Hankow, the largest foundry in China. Li Li-san's message to them at the time, however, was (in the language of the US trade union movement) "economic," not "political." He spoke to them, that is to say, about the need for improving the working and living conditions of Chinese workers, and certainly found them highly responsive. But when, later, the message changed, and they were called upon to give of their time and energy for political purposes, especially that of establishing a proletarian dictatorship, they showed little interest, and some were openly hostile.

Nevertheless, the Chinese delegation to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow in November 1922, with Ch'en Tu-hsiu as chairman, had not yet abandoned its optimism about the chances of producing a proletarian revolution in China by merely organizing the workers and encouraging them to strike. The Russian leaders, especially Radek, chose to rely on other sources of information available to them, took the Chinese delegation sharply to task for their "unrealistic outlook," and ordered the Chinese Communist Party to seek the cooperation of the intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie in the "struggle against the European and Asiatic imperialism." The Party was, of course, to keep on trying to organize workmen; but no doubt was left in anyone's mind that its major mission was to assist the Soviet Union in its attempt to weaken the Western democracies. Soon, indeed, the new representative of the Comintern in China, whose name was Maring, was going a step further and ordering the Chinese Communist Party to collaborate with any and all groups, regardless of class background, willing to oppose the "imperialists," and making it clear that this form of words included even the Kuomintang. When some of the Chinese Communists took exception to these instructions on the allegedly Marxist grounds that a proletarian party must never permit itself to be drawn into cooperation with any bourgeois group, the Kremlin itself took the matter in hand. The Kuomintang, it declared, was a coalition of all classes in China, and in any case it was permissible — in colonial and semi-colonial countries during the "stage of imperialism" — for proletarian, national bourgeois, and petty bourgeois elements to act together against domination by foreign interests and/or foreign powers.

By the end of 1922 the Chinese Communist Party was, accordingly, putting itself on record to the effect that cooperation was possible on an "individual basis," i.e. with the Communists joining the Kuomintang as individuals with a view to exploiting it as a "front

organization."* Certainly the Party was attempting to use the Kuomintang for its own purposes well before the famous Sun-Joffe Declaration of 26 January 1923, which stated explicitly that the "conditions do not exist in China for the establishment of Communism and Socialism," and that the Russians would therefore help China to obtain "national unity and national independence."

The resulting period of collaboration between the CP and the Kuomintang was to last from 1923 to 1927, although at no time did the two groups cease to regard each other with a good deal of suspicion. The Communists made little effort to conceal the fact that they were out to exploit the Kuomintang as a front, that what they were interested in was increasing their own power, and that their ultimate objective, which might on occasion be postponed but never abandoned, was a clear-cut assumption of national power by themselves. The Communists, moreover, though they clearly had much to gain from exploiting the Kuomintang, were always restive in the presence of the grave problems that working within another organization unavoidably posed for them. They had not had time, before the period of collaboration began, to create the strong, well-disciplined, and obedient party cadres they knew they would need in the long run, and the decision to work through the Kuomintang made it extremely difficult to solidify the necessary core group and inculcate in them the all-important practice of strict adherence to the commands of the Party leadership. Concretely, the fact that the leadership had sanctioned the dilution of Communism by cooperating with enemy bourgeois groups tended to undermine its authority over those of its members who were excessively eager to work with non-Marxist elements.

The Communist leadership faced a further dilemma, namely, that of reconciling the Kremlin mandate to maintain its proletarian base and strengthen its organization with the further mandate to cooperate with and support the Kuomintang. But for the skillful leadership and guidance of Russian advisers like Borodin, Galen, and Maring, all of whom were of course fully cognizant of the objectives of the Soviet Union, it seems probable that the Chinese Communist Party would never have emerged from the period of collaboration with even the semblance of a united organization. In any case, the Chinese leadership of the Party failed to escape from the horns of its dilemmas in a manner satisfactory to the Comintern. After the break with the Kuomintang in 1927, it was unhesitatingly purged.

Lenin's death in January 1924, and the ensuing struggle for power in the USSR between Stalin and Trotsky, may be seen in retrospect as major events in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. This is true in two senses, which must be carefully distinguished: one, the struggle between the heirs apparent of Lenin was promptly reflected in a similar inter-ecne struggle within the Chinese Party; second, the Chinese Party promptly became a major issue between Stalin and Trotsky. The Stalinist leadership insisted, as one would expect from the foregoing paragraphs, that the "correct line" in China was that of cooperation between the "proletariat" (the CCP) and the petty and national bourgeoisie of the Kuomintang — with, of course, a view to "weakening" the position of the "imperialist" powers in Asia. They held that the Chinese Party should, in consequence, refrain from pushing the socialization issue in China, postpone the establishment of Soviets until China had been united by the armies of the Kuomintang, and urge no extreme demands until they received new instructions — lest such demands alienate the leadership of the Kuomintang. The Chinese Communists, in short, should not seek to assume state power directly

* It is a matter of some interest that at the present time Mao Tse-tung claims that he did not attend the Second Party Congress, although he was in Shanghai at the time. Mao offers the rather distinguished explanation that he "forgot" the name of the place where it was to be held, "could not find any comrades, and was not invited." The official historian has yet to strike his name from the record of those present, but it is clear that Mao has sought to dissociate himself from any action implying cooperation with the Kuomintang at that time.

until after the Kuomintang had realized its twin goals of uniting the country and opposing "imperialism."

Trotsky and his followers took the opposite view, insisting that the Chinese Communists must not become a tool of the Kuomintang, and that this danger could be avoided only by ordering the Chinese Party to adopt at once an all-out revolutionary program, including the introduction of Soviets, redistribution of the land, and worker control of factories. The Stalinist line, the Trotskyites argued, could have no other long-term result than that of making the Kuomintang so strong that it could destroy the Communist Party, which, they added, it would certainly not hesitate to do. (The notion that the Communist Party could help bring the Kuomintang to power and then unhorse it when the time came to part company with it, the Trotskyites denounced as idle dreaming.) The Trotskyites, in short, held that Stalin was seeking to destroy the revolution, and was defeating, not forwarding, the communization of China.

Within the ranks of the Chinese Party, the Stalinists promptly gained the ascendancy, and proceeded to expel all members who sided with Trotsky's views. (The main support for the Trotsky case, indeed, came from the left wing of the Kuomintang itself, which was by no means disinclined to adopt a radical program looking to an immediate solution of China's social and economic problem. There was, however, never any question of the Kuomintang's heeding the counsels of these left-wing elements.) There ensued a period of relative peace and unity within the CCP, and between the CCP and the Kuomintang, partly because almost everyone's attention, through the period when the Nationalists were establishing themselves at Canton and building the military forces with which to conquer the rest of China, was concentrated on preparations for the Northern Expedition. Moreover, Borodin's energetic campaign to reorganize the Kuomintang gave the Communists confidence that a revolutionary wave was about to sweep over China, and that differences over the form the revolution was to take might profitably be postponed until a later day.

Within the Kuomintang itself, by contrast, this was a period of widespread disunity (which the Communists were able to turn to their own advantage). During the Canton period of collaboration, however, the friction within the Nationalist camp never turned on a clear-cut Kuomintang-versus-Communist issue, if for no other reason than because the three-way struggle for leadership between Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, and Hu Han-min, following the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, rendered any united opposition to the Communists out of the question. There was increasing suspicion among the Nationalists that the Communists would not accept Kuomintang discipline indefinitely, but the suspicion never crystallized into an attempt to weaken the position of the Communists within the Canton government. Rather, the various factions in the Kuomintang were more than eager to win Communist support. Only one group, the Western Hills Clique, took the position that the Communist policies had somehow replaced those of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and it soon broke with the Kuomintang on that new issue, leaving an open field for those who did not share their concern, and the pattern emerged clearly when Hu Han-min, presumably the most conservative of the triumvirate bidding for the mantle of Sun Yat-sen, went promptly to Moscow after his fall from power at Canton in August 1925. Once in Moscow, moreover, he put himself forward at the Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International as the most revolutionary of the leaders at Canton!

Even when, on 20 March 1926, Chiang Kai-shek moved to assume active leadership of the Kuomintang, and ousted elements on both its right and left wings — including Wang Ching-wei, the Chinese Communists took the turn of events in their stride — despite the fact that some of the men he removed from their posts were Communists. Borodin encouraged them in this. Chiang Kai-shek's move, he argued, including the elimination of dis-

ruptive elements on both right and left within the Kuomintang, would give Chiang full control over the Nationalist military forces, strengthen his hand against the politicians in the Canton government, and clear the way for the Northern Expedition, which in his view could not fail to produce results favorable to the CCP.

The Chinese Communists, then, viewed the drive from Canton into the rest of China with approval. They saw in the process of expanding the territories of the Nationalists an opportunity for carrying their independent agitation to more and more people, and, meantime, for eluding close scrutiny of their activities by the Kuomintang. And as the Nationalist Armies marched north, the Communists were indeed active in the fields of propaganda and organization. In the areas occupied by armies directly under Chiang's command, to be sure, they had little success with their independent operations, but the armies that moved directly up into Central China let them have a free hand — with the result that when they reached the Yangtze River the Communist elements were already in a commanding position. Although still under orders from Moscow to continue to work through Chiang Kai-shek and under the name of the Kuomintang, they took prompt action, once the city of Hankow had been occupied, even going so far, with Borodin's advice, as to decree the removal of the capital of the Nationalist movement from Canton to Hankow, which Chiang Kai-shek, then at Nanchang, could hardly fail to construe as an attempt to undermine his influence in the Kuomintang. Chiang did not see fit to take any immediate action against the Hankow (or Wu-han) government. But the fundamental divisions within the ranks of the Northern Expedition were clearly about to lead to an open rupture between the Communists and the Kuomintang.

The Hankow government, though it continued to maintain the fiction that it represented the Kuomintang, was manifestly dominated by the latter's left wing, and was, again manifestly, far more radical in character than its predecessor at Canton. At the same time, the Communists were by no means certain what, within the general objective of cooperating with the Kuomintang while preparing to wrest power some day from the other groups in the Nationalist movement, was the correct policy for them to follow — especially since many of the military commanders at Hankow would be unwilling to continue to support a government that every day looked more like the Communist ideal and less like that of Sun Yat-sen. The problem was complicated by the Trotskyites' insistence that the Hankow government immediately set about instituting a general strike among the workers and establishing Soviets in the countryside, i.e. that it launch a direct attack against the landowners and the directors of the factories. The Stalinist leadership, what with Ch'en Tu-hsiu's determination to maintain ostensibly cooperative relations with the Kuomintang, were obliged to answer that such a program would merely solidify all opposition (reactionary forces), and that so long as the military conquest of the country had not been accomplished, drastic policies should be postponed. The most that could be got out of Moscow was permission to redistribute any land in the Wu-han area that did not belong to the family of a military leader or a soldier. The effect of this, as might have been predicted, was to have every landowner on the horizon claiming relationship to some member of the Nationalist Army.

As it became clear that the Hankow government did not enjoy the support or even the good wishes of Chiang Kai-shek, many of the leaders who doubted the wisdom of cooperating with the Communists began to withdraw their support from the new government. This tended to sharpen the conflict between the Communists and the left wing of the Kuomintang in Hankow, so that when Chiang Kai-shek moved into Shanghai (March 1927) and began, while still ostensibly supporting the policy of collaboration, to strike back at the Communists, the Hankow government found itself facing a major crisis.

Over the next two months, in consequence, the stage was set for the now-unavoidable break between the two elements in the Kuomintang. On 1 June 1927, Stalin telegraphed new orders to the Chinese Communist Party in the name of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. It was to change its policy in the direction of greater aggressiveness, still, however, without making any final break with the Kuomintang. Concretely, Stalin instructed the Chinese Party to form a separate army of 20,000 Communists and 50,000 workers and peasants, establish a revolutionary court that would try "reactionary" officers, and secure the appointment of a "well-known member of the Kuomintang" as chairman of the court — so that the creation of the latter would not look like a Communist-inspired move. Stalin, clearly, was thinking forward to the day when the Communists would take over control of the Nationalist movement; nor was anyone left in doubt about this far long, for due to an indiscretion on the part of Ray, the Indian representative of the Comintern in Hankow, Stalin's telegram was made public. Not only the Kuomintang left-wingers but many members of the Communist Party itself were so shocked at its contents that they promptly broke with the Hankow government, on the grounds that the Communists in control of it were completely under the domination of Moscow.

Soon afterward, the Hankow government fell — a disaster far too big, from the Kremlin point of view, to leave the leadership of the CCP any hope of surviving. The Trotskyites, of course, were prompt to point out, presumably to Stalin's annoyance, that they had always predicted that the Stalinist Chinese policies would lead to such a major disaster. The obvious scapegoat was Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who made a last desperate move to save himself by leading an armed insurrection in the city of Nanchang on 1 August 1927, the first in the Chinese Party's history. But it also failed, and the only remaining question was when, organizationally speaking, the heads would roll.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu was duly removed from his post as Chairman of the CCP on 7 August, at an Emergency Conference of the Party's Central Committee. (Ch'u Chiu-pai was named his successor.) Chinese Communists to this day single him out as the greatest traitor in the Party's history, and as the prime example of the "errors" that comrades should seek to avoid. Ch'en — so runs the indictment — followed a course of "right opportunism," and sought to sacrifice the Party to the goal of collaborating with the Kuomintang. He was, moreover, a "liquidator"; i.e., he allegedly moved the Party along toward liquidation by merging it with the Kuomintang. The record, in point of fact, clearly shows that Ch'en faithfully carried out the orders the Party had received from the Kremlin, that he as an individual had grave misgivings as to the advisability of all-out cooperation with the Kuomintang, and that if he deviated at all it was in the opposite direction from that which his former comrades allege; i.e., he failed to cooperate in the loyal manner that the letter of the Comintern instructions called for. The Comintern needed a scapegoat for the Hankow fiasco. Thus Ch'en, as Chairman, had to go, and anything in the record that conflicted with what the Comintern needed to prove must be ignored.

Ch'en had great popular prestige, which presumably accounts for the fact that he was not at that time purged from the Party, but was merely deprived of his posts of leadership; and when he was finally expelled, in the spring of 1929, it was over an entirely different matter. Chang Hsueh-liang, military and civil governor of Manchuria, was engaged in armed conflict with the Soviet Union over certain issues arising out of the joint control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The CCP received orders from Moscow to start a propaganda campaign based on the slogan "Protect the Soviet Union," which would have put the Chinese Communists in the position of supporting a nation that was at war with Chinese forces. The other CCP leaders accepted the orders without opposition, but Ch'en Tu-hsiu pled for the slogan "Oppose the Kuomintang's Mistaken Policy" — which would have

served the same purpose without offending the national sensibilities of the Chinese. Ch'én, not so much because he had refused as because he had failed to support the Soviet Union openly and fully against the national interest of China, was promptly read out of the Party.

Ch'u Ch'iu-pai replaced Ch'én as Chairman of the Party at a moment of great uncertainty as to what future Party policy ought to be. Moscow, however, needed successes, of whatever kind, with which to silence the Trotskyite opposition, and it was finally determined that the Chinese Communists were to adopt a "more revolutionary" line, including the establishment of Soviets and the carrying out of terroristic measures against landowners. The Trotskyites were quick to claim that Stalin was merely stealing the program they had always advocated, to which, of course, the Kremlin replied (via *Pravda*) that the "objective conditions" had only just become ripe for such a policy, and that if it had been advocated earlier it would have ended in failure. Both were due for a surprise in the months and years ahead, for the revolutionary policy was to be merely a further Kremlin failure in China.

The new policy of armed activity in the countryside, known as the "Autumn Harvest," though unsuccessful, did bring to prominence the Party's future leader, Mao Tse-tung. Mao had, up to this point, channeled his energies into organizing peasant groups in Hunan rather than into activities at Party headquarters; the latter, moreover, had not attached much importance to the peasant organization phase of its program, and had been content merely to give Mao instructions from time to time. After the Hankow debacle, however, the Party leaders took another look at the organizations Mao had developed, and saw in them centers for conducting armed raids throughout the province of Hunan. This was an important turning point. For while the ruthlessness of these armed bands was to increase popular opposition to the Communists, and thus defeat the leadership's purpose, it was the beginning of the Communist Party's policy of maintaining its own armed forces.

Mao Tse-tung was, therefore, identified from an early moment with the utilization of military power to obtain political objectives. Current Chinese Communist writings on the history of the Party tend to gloss over the period of the "Autumn Harvest," and to ignore the role Mao played in directing the armed bands that were to serve as the basis of the first army of the Communist Party. The two principal reasons for this appear to be (a) the desire not to associate the present leader of the Party with a policy that failed, and (b) the wish to strike from the record the fact that Mao in point of fact overstepped Comintern orders and did things that were not sanctioned by the Central Committee of the Chinese Party. This he certainly did: the Comintern had directed the Chinese Communists merely to press forward with peasant agitation; Mao, on his own initiative, had decided to carry out a far more ambitious program.

The Comintern's decision to apply more violent measures resulted in some important events in the Canton Commune. The same Emergency Conference of the Central Committee that removed Ch'én Tu-shiu was instructed by Lominadze, the new representative of the Comintern, that the moment was ripe in China for an armed rebellion. Plans were accordingly laid for an uprising in Canton, the purpose of which would be the immediate establishment of a Communist government to which the Kremlin could point in answering criticisms of its China policy. A group of trusted Western (but non-Russian) Communists, under the direction of Heinz Neumann and including Earl Browder, Gerhart Eisler, and John Pepper (alias Joseph Pogany) were dispatched to South China, to maximize the project's chances of success. (The Chinese Communist leaders, though associated with the project, were not given trusted posts.) Whether despite or because of their intervention, the Commune, when it was finally established on 11 December 1927, lasted only three days. Furthermore, it was established after a violent and bloody rebellion which so shocked and

antagonized the Kuomintang as to set aside all hope of cooperation between the Communists and other Chinese groups in the immediate future. Those who had questioned whether the Communists would employ extreme tactics in China now saw their error, and henceforth would take the position that working with men capable of such violent behavior was impossible.

The Chinese Communist Party promptly became, in the eyes of the Comintern, "responsible" for the failure of the Canton Commune. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai was forced out of the Party leadership, on the grounds that he had followed an "adventurist" policy and failed to read correctly the trend of events in China. He had, it was alleged, committed the error of "putschism"—by favoring armed uprisings when the "revolution" was in a trough. The fact that he had been faithfully following a "line" from Moscow was conveniently overlooked, although it may have softened his punishment. He was not purged from the Party, and after three years in Moscow he was permitted to return to China in 1930 and lend a hand to the new leadership. It is interesting to note that his predecessor, Ch'én Tu-shiu, who did not go to Moscow after he fell into disfavor, is still regarded by the Chinese Communists as one of the arch enemies of the "revolution," while Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, who was also identified with a policy of failure but promptly reported to Moscow, has been regarded as a hero.

Ch'u's successor as leader of the Chinese Communist Party was Li Li-san, himself just back from Moscow bearing instructions from the Comintern nearly identical to those under which Ch'u had been operating. Li, however, was to "organize the proletariat" before attempting "armed uprisings." He had won a reputation in the Chinese Labor movement for getting things done. Indeed, his rise to the chairmanship was itself an indication that the CCP was entering a phase in which the trade union and the strike would be its main weapons in the struggle for power. But the moment for this change of tactics does not appear to have been wisely chosen, for it soon became evident that Chinese workers were not attracted by Communist policies as such (i.e., as contrasted with *ad hoc* measures calculated to raise their living standards), and that they shied away from political strikes. Li, in any case, soon found that he was losing the labor groups to the Kuomintang, and little by little reinterpreted the Comintern's orders to "organize the proletariat" to mean that he must knit the Chinese Communist Party itself into a tightly disciplined group. This called, as he saw it, for extending his personal leadership and direction into all phases of the Party's activities on the one hand, and integrating the various groups within the Party on the other. In these two enterprises he was fairly successful, in part at least because of the assistance of Chou En-lai, who had survived all the previous shifts in Party leadership and was to continue to do so in the years ahead. Chou became Li's hatchet-man for dealing with "deviations, sectarianism, and extreme democratic tendencies" in the Party.

While Li Li-san was pouring new life and direction into Party activities in the urban areas of China, Mao Tse-tung, fully recovered from the "Autumn Harvest" fiasco, was rebuilding the Party's organization in the mountains of Kiangsi. His assistant for this purpose was Chu Teh, future commander in chief of the Red Army. Mao's goal, from an early moment, was to build a strong military organization that would be completely subordinate to the Party's political command. In the winter of 1928 he won P'ing Tê-huai and Ho Lung to that cause, and by January 1929 a new Red Army was winning victories and expanding the area under Communist control. Li Li-san viewed the activities of the Kiangsi leaders with approval, but, convinced as he was that work in the cities was far more important, gave them a relatively free hand. Even the Comintern appears to have adopted a laissez-faire attitude toward what was happening in Kiangsi.

A clash nevertheless became increasingly unavoidable as the new Red Army grew in size and power, and finally occurred toward the end of 1929 — in the form of an ideological dispute between Li Li-san and the Kiangsi leaders. The former insisted that only the "proletariat" could lead the Communist movement, so that he and his headquarters had the last word about the movements of the Red Army. Mao agreed with the axiom, but disagreed about its application: only the "proletariat" could lead the Red Army, but this meant merely that its leadership must be in the hands of professional revolutionaries on the actual scene — in short, the Kiangsi leaders.

The dispute never assumed serious proportions. Early in 1930, the Comintern again summoned the Chinese Communists to armed revolt, and Li Li-san had no alternative, since the workers clearly could not be counted on to conduct a major revolutionary campaign, but to seek the help of the military leaders he had been opposing. The Red Army, it was decided, would strike at some of China's larger cities, and first of all at Changsha, which P'ing Te-huai attacked on 28 July 1930. He held the city for three days, but was then driven out, and Li Li-san's plans for Hankow, Nanchang, and Nanking had to be abandoned. The events at Changsha had clearly shown that the Red Army was not yet strong enough to be relied upon for engagements of this character.

Li Li-san had no alternative but to accept responsibility for the defeat at Changsha and to acquiesce in his removal from his post of leadership. The Comintern, indeed, was soon to "discover" that Li had been guilty of a vast assortment of errors, including "failure to appreciate the uneven development of the workers' and peasants' struggle," "adventurism and putschism," and, finally, "placing too much reliance upon World Revolution to bring about victory in China." Li publicly recanted all these errors, confessed that he had followed a "semi-Trutskyst" line, and was next heard of in Moscow, where he was to remain until 1916 — when he returned to Manchuria with the Soviet Armies after the Second World War, to be reinstated in the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party.

The fall of Li Li-san did not, as might have been expected, result in immediately increased influence for Mao Tse-tung and the Kiangsi leaders. Mao was not directly involved in removing Li, this having been done by the Comintern itself. (This helps explain why it was easy for Mao to accept Li Li-san back into the upper hierarchy of the Party in 1946.) And the Comintern chose to replace Li with Wang Ming (Ch'en Shao-yi) and to put the CCP under a group of young men (the Returned Students Clique) who had been studying in Moscow from 1926 to 1930, and were presumably well trained in revolutionary tactics. These young leaders, the "28 Bolsheviks" as they were also called, only discovered that only full support from the Comintern, that is, from the new Comintern representative, Mif, could keep them in control. Many of the older CCP leaders regarded them as too inexperienced to be trusted with responsibility for the Party's destiny. Li had left behind him an organization that still reflected his views, still looked upon him as the true Bolshevik agitator, and viewed the new leadership without enthusiasm. Finally, there were the groups that had hoped to replace Li when he fell from power, and would presumably be ready to replace the 28 when they fell from grace. But the Kiangsi or "border regions" leaders were not a part of this potentially formidable opposition, in part because of Mao's loyalty to the Comintern, in part, mostly perhaps, because the Comintern had ordered Party headquarters in Shanghai not to interfere with the activities of the "Soviets." The Kremlin, in other words, was not yet ready to take into its hands direct control of the activities of the Red Army, but it had accepted the policy of Mao as correct for the so-called border areas. (The term "border areas" refers to the Communists' practice of operating along the borders of two or more provinces so as to be constantly in position to move from one to the other and thus escape the jurisdiction of any provincial governor who might

attempt to suppress them. Later, during the Japanese occupation, the Communists continued to establish "border areas" between the areas controlled by the Japanese army, the puppet government, and the Nationalists.)

The Wang Ming leadership soon established control over the CCP machinery in the urban areas. The opposition groups were read out of the Party, and when they held a special opposition meeting some of their members were imprisoned and executed by the Kuomintang police. (It is impossible to determine whether the new Communist leadership assisted the Kuomintang by informing the police of the meeting of the opposition leaders.) By the summer of 1930, nevertheless, events had begun to take a turn that would, in time, gradually reduce the power of the Wang Ming leadership, and bring Mao to the fore. For one thing, the Nationalists were by now consolidating their power and expanding their operations against the Communists. Secondly, the threat of invasion by Japan tended to make the Chinese people rally around the Kuomintang leadership as never before, and tended also to put the Communists, with their program looking to the ultimate overthrow of the government, in the position, as far as many people were concerned, of aiding and abetting a hated foreign enemy. Not until 1935, when the Kremlin put its imprimatur on a "united front" in China for all groups opposed to fascism and Japanese militarism, did the CCP begin to convince many people that they were interested in saving China from conquest by the Japanese. And doubt of the Communists' good faith was especially widespread in the urban areas, where the Wang Ming leaders were attempting to develop strength.

The leaders of the Kiangsi "Soviet" were, to be sure, up against these same difficulties. Even so, especially after the failure of the Nationalists' "First Communist-Bandit Suppression Campaign" in November 1930, the stature of the Red Army continued to grow, and it became increasingly clear that the political-military Communist leaders in Kiangsi had developed the most stable force the Communists possessed in China. The importance of the Kiangsi group grew from day to day with the prestige of the Red Army and with the decline in the fortunes of the urban Communists; no dramatic event ever occurred to mark its rise, but the time finally came when the fact of its having risen could no longer be ignored, either in China or in Moscow.

Mao Tse-tung's leadership in the "border areas" did not, meantime, go unchallenged. For one thing, he was constantly up against one of the great problems of traditional Chinese politics, namely: how to keep men with growing armies under their command from claiming autonomy with respect to their nominal superiors in civilian government and administration. For another thing, he frequently had to leave other matters to one side and deal with those who took exception to his policies and methods. Mao's formulae for coping with this two-fold obstacle to his ambitions are the true measure of his capacity as a Communist leader. The first of the two problems he solved by becoming a recognized military leader himself, by closely identifying himself with Chu Teh, and, finally, by bringing Chu Teh into the top political leadership of the Soviet. He thus established the principle that the leading political figures in the movement were to become (if they were not that already) experts in military matters, and that the movement's military leaders were to be regarded as eligible for high posts in the Party and in civil affairs. The Red Army would henceforth be intimately associated with and integrated into the Party, and would not be regarded as a mere instrument for the Party to use in achieving power.

Mao's solution to the second problem was less ingenious and original, but not less effective: he made it his policy not merely to defeat but to liquidate, rapidly and ruthlessly, any and all opposition to his leadership. The Fu Tien incident provided him an early opportunity to establish the pattern, and to get across to his colleagues the extent to which he meant business. It occurred near the end of 1930, and began when a group in Kiangsi

questioned certain steps Mao had taken with a view to expanding the area of the Soviet. Mao promptly (7 December 1930) ordered seventy members of the Kiangsi Soviet arrested, whereupon Liu Ti-ts'ao, Commander of the XX Corps of P'eng Te-huai's Third Army, went into rebellion, liberated the arrested men, and summoned a "People's Conference" which censured Mao's arbitrariness and demanded his removal from the leadership. Mao, spurred on no doubt by news that the rebels had killed more than 100 of his supporters, did not hesitate: the rest of the Army, firmly under his command, spilled the blood necessary for bringing the rebels to heel. And once this had been accomplished, he summarily executed every last participant in the rebellion.

After the Fu-T'ien Revolt, the question was not whether Mao would come to dominate both the Red Army and the Party, but rather when he would claim a post and title appropriate to his actual power and influence. He did not become Secretary-General of the Party, as a matter of fact, until 1935. But the men who held that post from 1931 until 1935 had little of the authority it was supposed to carry with it. Wang Ming remained as Secretary-General until 1932, when he was replaced by Po Ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien); Po Ku held the post until 1934, when he was replaced by Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien). But these changes in the leadership were effectuated, for the reason just mentioned, without anything even approaching a major crisis; given the limited scope of current Party (as opposed to Chinese Soviet) operations, nothing was at stake except the efficient management of a small Party office. (Wang Ming, upon abandoning the post of Secretary-General, had gone back to Moscow, to serve as Chinese representative on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. His removal had not, therefore, been accompanied by the usual purge.)

In 1933, the Communists having found it impossible to continue effective operations in China's main cities, Party headquarters were moved out of Shanghai and all the leaders became identified with the Kiangsi group. Even before that date the center of Communist power had clearly shifted to the latter's mountain stronghold. The First All-China Conference of Soviets had convened as early as 7 November 1931, when Jui-chin in Kiangsi was declared to be the capital of the Provincial Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. All these moves reflected a basic change in Communist strategy, that is, a shift of emphasis away from revolt and infiltration throughout the country toward bids for control and actual administration of specific areas. The new strategy was to lead, unavoidably, to ever-increasing reliance upon military power, without which such control was obviously out of the question. In the long pull it was to have a further meaning: in 1948 the CCP would be the first Communist Party to achieve state power with prior experience in the administration and government of territories.

The Chinese Communist Party had long before learned the lesson that a modern totalitarian movement must, if it is to succeed, possess a well-disciplined and highly-organized party structure; it was now taking a leap from the traditional political wisdom of China itself, and learning a lesson about the use of military force for political purposes. Powerful Chinese political leaders had always used private military organizations as a basis for their political power, and had developed what might be called a tactics for doing so. Once adapted to the purposes of the Communist movement, this tactics became a matter of (a) keeping the military force completely under the domination of political, and (b) keeping specific geographic territory under complete control. The conflict between the Communists and the other groups in China thus became merely a new chapter in the age-old struggle between rival armed forces, each maneuvering for the domination of territory, and lost much of the earlier overtones of ideological conflict and underground conspiracy. The Communists, in short, became committed to a policy that required them to control bases of power that were as nearly as possible self-sufficient, and that were so situated as to make

it difficult for the Nationalists to mount effective campaigns against them and yet enable them to cause maximum embarrassment to the Nationalist government.

One must not, however, infer from this change in Communist tactics in China in the early nineteen-thirties that the CCP had in any way relaxed its ties with world Communism. On the contrary: the Comintern welcomed and fully approved the change in tactics, partly, it seems, out of a recognition that the situation in China called for something of the kind, and partly because the USSR, already thinking in terms of a new world war in which it might be attacked by Japan, wished the Chinese Communists to adopt any policy that might contribute, in the long run, to the defense of the "Motherland of Socialism." The new policy would clearly do that, and all the more surely if the Chinese Communists, while maximizing their military strength, were to force the Nationalist government to devote its main attention to preparing for a conflict with Japan. For the moment, therefore, the CCP must abandon all thought of indiscriminate revolts and conspiratorial anti-Nationalist measures, since these could only render the Nationalists less capable of assisting in the future defense of the USSR in a war against Japan.

The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in September 1931, followed by the clash between Nationalist and Japanese forces at Shanghai in early 1932, was the signal for the aforementioned change in Kremlin planning on behalf of and/or in conjunction with the Chinese Communist Party. The Nationalists drew a different inference, however, from the Japanese threat. If war with Japan was inevitable, they reasoned, one of the first steps to take in preparing for it would be to eliminate the Communist armies and unify the entire country for the grand struggle. They reasoned further that the Communists, if left free to do so, would exploit every opportunity during the war with Japan to expand their own power. Unless they were destroyed before the fighting began, they would almost certainly emerge from the war more powerful and threatening than ever. The moral was obvious, so that simultaneously with the first Japanese moves against China the Nanking government began to launch vigorous campaigns against the Red Army. The crucial campaign was that of 1934: it dislodged the Communists from their stronghold in Jui-chin and forced them to embark on what is now known as the "Long March"—first into western China, then almost to the Tibetan border, and then northward to the province of Shensi, where they resettled, establishing their capital at Yanan (Fu-shih).

The "Long March" holds a very important place in the Chinese Communists' own version of their history. Whether or not a Communist leader took part in the Long March is an important determining factor with regard to his present place in the Party's upper hierarchy. One reason for this is that the Party was drastically reorganized in the course of the expedition, and along lines that greatly strengthened Mao Tse-tung's personal power and prestige. The Long March, in other words, figures in CCP mythology much as the Civil War figures in that of the Russian Communists.

Those who took part in the Long March have good reason to feel that they are the surviving heroes of a major ordeal during which the very existence of the Party was often at stake. The Red Army, partly because of the casualties it sustained and partly because of defections by its less devoted members, ended its long trek with about one-third of its original personnel. The Communists, we may note in passing, introduced into this campaign a savagery that was without precedent in the history of Chinese civil wars. In the province of Kiangsi, for example, where the heaviest fighting occurred, the population was nearly twenty-five million before, and about half that after, the campaign. All along the route of the Long March, the Communists' terrorism created strong anti-Communist sentiment, which had by no means disappeared when the Reds returned after the Second World War.

Upon their arrival in Fu-shih in 1935, the Communists were ordered to seek the re-establishment of a "united front" with the Kuomintang against the Japanese. Once again they found themselves required to put aside their demands for a revolution, to emphasize nationalistic slogans, and to call for a patriotic war against Japan. (The policy of the "united front" or "popular front" was at this time being adopted by Communists all over the world, the Russians having decided that a general war was approaching in which they would need all the support that they could possibly get from non-Communist groups and governments.) In the event, their demand for a front was flatly rejected by the Kuomintang leaders, but it soon showed itself to have greater popular appeal than earlier Communist policy had ever had. By the end of 1936, indeed, the new line had become so appealing that Chiang Kai-shek found it worth his while to make a personal visit to Sian and urge the Manchurian troops under Chang Hsieh-liang to accelerate their efforts to eliminate the Red Army. (This was the now famous occasion when Chiang was kidnapped and threatened with execution. The Kremlin itself ordered the Chinese Communists to release the Generalissimo, whom the Russians regarded as the only leader in China capable of uniting the country against Japan.)

Out of the Sian Incident there emerged China's second United Front — which, however, got under way in quite different circumstances from those that had obtained during the years 1922 to 1927. Instead of joining the Kuomintang as they had done before, and placing themselves in the hands of the Nationalist leadership, the Communists now retained their independent army. They did commit themselves, however, to obey any orders they might receive from the Nanking leaders, and to give up their practice of establishing independent governments.

Simultaneously with their adoption of the "united front" policy, the Communist leaders set out to make their movement appear more palatable to liberal opinion throughout the world. In particular, they helped to create and disseminate the myth that they were "peasant reformers," conducting a democratic program of agrarian reform. At the same time, however, they continued to insist that they were a completely correct and dedicated Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist Party. (After the war they openly referred to the period here in question as their "Agrarian Reform Phase.") At the very time when Mao was writing his book, *New Democracy* (to which some people wrongly attribute the notion that the CCP was sincerely interested in furthering a future coalition form of government for China, to include representatives of all classes), the Chinese Communists were busy strengthening their Party organization and establishing cell groups and cadres in areas where they had previously been prevented from doing so. The New Democracy was a basic part of a new Communist tactic, namely, that of seeking to establish "people's republics" that would at first appear to involve a coalition form of government but would prepare the way for complete domination by the Communists.

During the war years, the Communists were careful not to weaken their organization, and to expand their power at every opportunity. They continued, for example, to establish local administrations (the "Border Regions"), which though nominally coalitions were invariably so set up that real power was in their own hands. Also, their practice of employing guerrilla tactics behind the Japanese lines made it possible for them to build up political influence in areas to which they had been previously denied access, and thus get ready for the postwar period.

When the war ended the Communists were, as the Kuomintang had feared, in a far stronger position than they had been at the beginning of the conflict; and during the postwar period they pressed the advantages this gave them at every opportunity. Most particularly, they resumed their fighting against the Nationalists, further disrupting the war-torn

Chinese economy by means of guerrilla operations, isolating the cities from the food-producing countryside, and, as they gained greater power, moving gradually over to a war of position. By the end of 1943 the Red Army, vastly strengthened by the large supplies of munitions that the Russians had captured from the Japanese, was in position to undertake major campaigns against Nationalist troops.

The parallel Communist political tactic was that of attempting to translate their increased power into greater Communist participation in the Central Government. (This is the same tactic the Communists have employed in Eastern Europe, where they first used a coalition government as a device for seizing total power.) Among other things, they soon learned that they could wear the Nationalists down by involving them in interminable negotiations while the Red Army would go ahead with its military operations just as if no negotiations were going on.

Immediately after the war the United States also adopted the view that a coalition government was the best means of resolving the civil conflict in China. Not until the Marshall Mission did the US discover that the Chinese Communists were so confident of their power that they were unwilling to make any of the compromises that would be needed for a coalition. Negotiations finally broke down over the Communists' refusal to give up their control of their army, which by then was the basic factor in their power, and over their insistence on controlling the strategic posts in the cabinet.

The moment finally came when the Communists were ready to abandon all pretense of an intention to come to terms with the Nationalists, and to launch a major civil war with the clear objective of conquering the entire country. The moment chosen was that when the economy of China had been so disrupted and weakened by Communist guerrilla operations as to be facing total breakdown, and when the Nationalists, in their effort to protect the country's lines of communications against those same guerrilla operations, were over-extended to the point of impotence. (It was also a moment when the Nationalists had spent much of their military power on a futile attempt to reconquer Manchuria, which the Russians, in complete denial of their pledged word, had virtually handed over to the Communists.)

By the summer of 1949 the Communists had achieved extensive victories on the mainland, and were prepared to consolidate their conquests. On 1 October they formally proclaimed the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Peking was selected as the capital, and the Communists set about altering the face of Chinese society. The very memory of the Kuomintang, the Nanking government, and the October 11th Revolution was to be eradicated, and all phases of Chinese life were to be changed. The attitudes and values of traditional Chinese society were to be replaced by those of a society which, in all its particulars, would follow the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist pattern, and would take Soviet Russia as its immediate model and example.

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CHAPTER 4 MILITARY AFFAIRS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY

The Chinese Communists state that the Chinese Communist Army was officially founded on 1 August 1927. This day, known as the People's Liberation Army Day, is now celebrated as a national holiday. The Chinese ideograms for the numbers "8" and "1," standing for the first day of the eighth month, thus appear in the upper left corner of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) flag and on the PLA insignia. The significance of 1 August 1927 is that it marks the outbreak of the Nanchang Rebellion, the first attempt by the Chinese Communist Party to seize power through armed violence.

Nanchang Rebellion

The Nanchang Rebellion occurred about a month after the fall of the Hankow government and the subsequent expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. At the time of the fall of the Hankow government, the Executive Committee of the Communist International (the Comintern) had ordered the Chinese Communist Party to organize an independent Communist Army. The public announcement of this order was in large part responsible for the debacle of the Hankow government, since it alienated many of the non-Communists who had been active in supporting the Hankow regime. When news of the fall of Hankow reached the Communist International, it promptly ordered the Chinese Communists to initiate armed uprisings. The result was that on 1 August 1927, some of the troops of the Kuomintang General Chang Fa-kuei, under the command of two of his officers, Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, rebelled, taking Nanchang in a surprise attack. They had terrorized the captured city for only five days when the Kuomintang defeated them, and drove them out into the countryside. Ho Lung moved his forces to the Hunan-Hupch border area, where he maintained his command until after the Long March in 1935. Yeh T'ing moved his forces into Kwangtung province, where they were to take part in the Canton Rebellion of 11 to 13 December 1927, the second attempt of the Chinese Communist Party, on orders from the Communist International, to engage in armed revolt. It was to end as disastrously for the Communists as the Nanchang Incident.

1927-1932

By the end of 1927 the break between the Communists and the Kuomintang had clearly become definitive. The Communist elements that had rebelled against the Nationalist armies moved into Kiangsi Province, and established a center at Chi'ng-kang-shan, near the Hunan border. In May 1928 Chu Teh, the present Commander in Chief of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), joined forces with Mao Tse-tung and began the task of organizing and developing the Chinese Communist Army. In a sense, indeed, the story of Mao Tse-tung's rise to leadership in the Chinese Communist Party is simply the story of the rise to power of the Communist Army. Mao's power has always been closely associated with Communist military power, since he has always relied heavily upon military force to insure both his control of the Communist Party and the Party's control of China.

By taking advantage of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek was busy fighting the remaining northern war lords, the Communists were able to expand their base in Kiangsi and so enlarge their manpower reserves. Not until December 1930 was Chiang able to initiate his first expedition — there were to be two others — against the Communists in Kiangsi. His third expedition showed some promise of success, but Chiang had to abandon it when, on 18 September 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria.

1932-1937

After the armistice with Japan in May 1932, the Kuomintang renewed its drive against the Communists in Kiangsi, first establishing a tight cordon around the Communist-controlled areas and then slowly moving in to annihilate the Communist Forces. The Communist leaders, recognizing their own plight, staked everything on a major effort to break the Kuomintang ring. This effort succeeded; on 29 October 1934, the Communists broke through the last encircling line of the Kuomintang Forces, and started their famous "Long March," which was to take them northwest into Shensi Province.

The Communists sustained heavy losses during the Long March, ending up with only about one-third the number of men they had had when they set out. Even so, their Army emerged from the experience a highly effective and skilled fighting force. It was during its six thousand mile Long March, for example, that it developed its tactics of rapid maneuver and its great skill at guerrilla operations. Once arrived in Shensi, moreover, the Communists took as the first item on their agenda reorganization of their Army and systematic consolidation of their new area of control. Japan's continued pressure upon the Kuomintang Forces in North China gave them just the breathing spell necessary for this operation, and by December 1936 the pressure had reached such a point that the Kuomintang could no longer afford to use its main forces against the Communists. Communist propaganda then turned the international situation to its advantage by insisting that all elements in China unite to fight the foreign foe "instead of fighting each other." The turning point here was the Sian Kidnapping Incident of 25 December 1936, in connection with which the Communists were able to extract from the Nanking government the concessions they needed in order to maintain their own military forces indefinitely.

Sino-Japanese War

A period of uneasy collaboration between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang began, therefore, just before the Sino-Japanese War broke out on 7 July 1937. One aspect of this collaboration was the attempt to integrate the Communist Army, formally at least, into the forces of the Central Government. The Communist units that had made the Long March were regrouped, and renamed the Eighth Route Army (Pa Lu Chun). The remainder of the Communist forces out over the country, especially those that had remained in Central and South China, were regrouped and named the New Fourth Army.

The Eighth Route Army, which was put under the command of Chu Teh (with P'eng Tê-huai as his deputy), consisted of three divisions under the command of Lin Piao, Ho Lung, and Liu Po-ch'eng respectively. In 1938 the Nationalists, in the attempt to bring it somewhat more under their control, named it the Eighteenth Group Army, and ordered it to garrison the Shensi-Kansu-Singai Border Region. The result of this, however, was that the Eighth Route Army, as the Communists kept right on calling it, entered upon a period during which it rapidly expanded not only its military strength but also the territory it controlled. The Kuomintang elements in North China, for example, cut off as they were from direct communication with Chungking, had to rely upon the Communists for guidance

and instruction, and in time came to be absolutely dependent upon them. (During the war the Communists were able to dispatch elements of the Eighth Route Army all over North China, and to operate on all sides of the Japanese controlled cities.)

At no time during the war against Japan did the Communists commit their forces in any major engagement against the Japanese. They systematically avoided positional warfare, using only guerrilla tactics and developing their mastery of the technique of ambushes and surprise raids. The Nationalist Forces thus sustained the major brunt of the Japanese onslaught, and suffered the heavy losses. The Communist strategy throughout was that of "never a defeat," i.e., not exposing their forces in any engagement in which they did not have either a clear superiority of numbers or the advantage of surprise plus the opportunity to withdraw before the enemy could counterattack. As the war proceeded, therefore, the Communists both expanded their forces and accumulated large quantities of arms and munitions for the post-war conflict (with the Kuomintang), the inevitability of which, following the certain defeat of Japan, they always took for granted.

As the Sino-Japanese War progressed, relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists became more and more strained. (During its first three years the Communists received not only allotments of ammunition but a monetary subsidy from the Central Government. In view of their continued refusal to obey the commands of the Government however, this assistance was gradually reduced and, finally, stopped altogether.) Actual armed clashes began to take place, as a matter of fact, even before the war ended. The most serious of these was the New Fourth Army Incident (January 1941), when the Central Government ordered the New Fourth to move north of the Yangtze and operate in the area between that river and the Yellow River. The Communists' refusal to obey the order resulted in a clash with Kuomintang troops, during which Communist commander Yeh Ting was captured, Hsiang Ying, his deputy commander, was killed, and some elements of his army were disbanded. After this incident Chen Yi (Ch'ên Yi) assumed command of the New Fourth, which, having regrouped, continued its guerrilla operations in Central and South China — in complete disregard of the orders of the Central Government. Certain New Fourth elements, to be sure, moved north of the Yangtze, as they had been ordered to do. But this also the Communists were able to make into an opportunity for expanding the total area under their influence.

1945 —

The end of the Second World War found Chinese Communist Forces, some 666,000 strong, conducting operations, mostly guerrilla, throughout North China and in certain areas of Central China. The Kuomintang Armies moved into the main cities of what had been Japanese-occupied China, and thus took command of the important communications centers. A major conflict between the Government forces and the Communists could not, as soon became evident, be long postponed.

The United States, through the Marshall Mission, now sought to mediate between the two groups. On 25 February 1946 the Executive Headquarters established by the Marshall Mission was able to complete a military reorganization agreement, which provided for the reorganization and integration of the Chinese Communist Army and the Kuomintang Forces. The latter were to be reduced to 50 divisions and the former to 10, and there were not to be more than 14,500 troops in a division. Together they would constitute a national defense force of 20 armies.

The Communists, at the very moment of engaging in the negotiations mentioned, were vigorously reorganizing their total forces and regrouping their commands. During 1946, however, there were few direct clashes between the Communist and Nationalist forces, the

Communists contenting themselves with moving their troops into Manchuria, where they were able, with the cooperative assistance of the Soviet Union, to occupy key locations and take over very large amounts of captured Japanese arms.

By the end of 1946 the Communists had completed the reorganization of their forces, and were at last prepared to strike out against the Nationalists. Early in 1947 Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Communist Army, was announcing that the primary mission of the Communist Army was the piecemeal annihilation of the Kuomintang Armies by hit-and-run tactics. The Communist Army, he added, would henceforth acquire and hold territory, whether urban or rural, only as a means of accomplishing this ultimate objective.

The Communist Forces had, he it noted, now grown to a strength of approximately one million one hundred thousand. Over the next months, moreover, the Communists reorganized their Red Army into larger and larger units, and by the end of the year they were ready, in some areas at least, to undertake full-fledged positional warfare against the Nationalists. And, meantime, they had isolated Manchuria from the rest of China, and situated effective strangulation forces athwart all the main lines of communication in Central China.

By mid-August 1948 the Communists felt themselves adequately prepared to engage in major positional campaigns covering China as a whole. The basic Communist tactic of disrupting communications and destroying the economic balance between the countryside and the major cities had made its mark, and the Nationalist forces found themselves at a serious disadvantage.

The Communists had by now transformed their forces from primarily guerrilla elements into a major integrated force, well supplied with offensive weapons (including the artillery from the Japanese stocks that the Russians had captured in Manchuria). Thus during the 1949 campaigns, which culminated in its over-running all the Chinese mainland, the Red Army was again and again able to carry out large-scale movements of fully organized and equipped army and army group units.

It was, then, during the period 1946-1948 that the Chinese Communist armies were regrouped into the now-existing organization. In 1946 the Communists' Forces had still consisted of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army plus certain independent units of varying but in all cases small size. The main purpose of the reorganization carried out in 1947 had been to guarantee greater centralized control, clearly a necessity if the Army was to realize the leaders' ambition to win effective political control over the entire nation. Thus the first move in the reorganization plan had been the grouping of all brigades and divisions into column units of three divisions each. In December 1947 the Communist Forces in Manchuria, now in control of a large territory, had been reorganized into the Northeast People's Liberation Army (NEPLA), with General Lin Piao in command. (This was the first use of the term "People's Liberation Army -- PLA.") At the same time organization of what was to become the Fourth Field Army of the PLA had been undertaken, and over the next months reorganization along territorial lines had been vigorously pushed in the other areas under Communist control. In North China, the North China People's Liberation Army (CCPLA) had been set up under the command of Nieh Jung-chén. In the Northwest, the troops under the command of P'eng Teh-hsi had been designated the Northwest People's Liberation Army (NWPLA). In Central China, the Central China People's Liberation Army (CCPLA) had taken shape under Liu Po-ch'êng (the "One Eyed Dragon"). In East China, the East China People's Liberation Army (ECPLA) had been set up under Ch'ên I.

In November 1948, a still further reorganization plan was put into effect, to speed up the process of centralization. Previously each area commander had had as many columns of three divisions each as he could muster. It was now decided to reorganize all their forces into a single National Army, under direct central control, and to this end all the columns were reorganized into armies of three divisions, each with expanded personnel at the staff level. Seventy such armies were formed, with designations from 1 to 70. Their divisions were given designations from 1 to 210, and the regiments designations from 1 to 630.

At the same time the area groups were reorganized into Field Armies. The Northwest People's Liberation Army became the First Field Army, and was assigned nine armies (the First through the Ninth). Seven of these armies were formed out of its own elements, and two out of captured Nationalist Forces. The Central China People's Liberation Army became the Second Field Army, and was assigned ten armies (the Tenth through the Nineteenth), all of which were built out of its own former columns. The East China People's Liberation Army was designated the Third Field Army, and assigned eighteen armies (the Twentieth through the Thirty-Seventh). The first thirteen of these (the Twentieth through the Thirty-Second) were built out of its own former columns, and the remainder (the Thirty-Third through the Thirty-Sixth) were manned with Nationalist Forces captured during the Shantung campaigns. The Thirty-Seventh Army was organized out of the former Pohai Column, which had been a service unit. The Northeast People's Liberation Army was assigned twenty-one armies, the largest block of all (the Thirty-Eighth through the Fifty-Eighth), and was redesignated the Fourth Field Army, the twelve columns of the NEPLA becoming the Thirty-Eighth through the Forty-Ninth Armies, and former Nationalist troops captured at Ch'ang-sh'un becoming the Fiftieth Army (the remaining armies were built out of militia and surrendered Nationalist elements). The North China People's Liberation Army became the North China Army Group, under the direct control of the Peking headquarters of the People's Liberation Army. The North China Army Group is often unofficially called the Fifth Field Army. It consists of twelve armies (the Fifty-Ninth through the Seventieth).

ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

At the same level with the State Administrative Council and directly beneath the Politburo is the People's Revolutionary Military Council (PRMC), the highest military-political decision-making body in Communist China. It has 22 members, with Mao Tse-tung as Chairman and Chu Teh as Vice-Chairman.


Because the Politburo makes all the important governmental decisions in China and Mao Tse-tung holds all the top posts in both the Party and the government, activities in the military and civil fields can be integrated with a minimum of tension and conflict. In theory, the PRMC is responsible only for the military problems of the regime. But in practice its authority extends through its subordinate units, to much of the country's civil administration. For even since their military victory in the Civil War, the Communists have continued to rely mainly upon their military to control and administer the nation.

Immediately under the PRMC stands the GHQ of the PLA, with Chu Teh as Commander in Chief, and P'eng Teh-hsi and Li Fu-chun as Deputy Commanders. When the PLA was reorganized into a National Army with centralized control, the GHQ was completely transformed. Through the days when it had been engaged mainly in guerrilla warfare, the Communists had needed little in the way of a general staff organization. Those responsible for the reorganization were determined to make it a modern military organization in the fullest sense of the term, and regarded rapid expansion of its staff organizations an urgently needed step in that direction.

The GHQ of the PLA is divided into three main staffs, or bureaus: Political Affairs, the General Staff, and Rear Services.

It is the Political Affairs Bureau that stamps the PLA as a typically Communist and totalitarian organization, for it is through its activities that the Party conducts its political indoctrination of all PLA troops. The Propaganda Department of the Bureau, for example, determines what books the troops shall and shall not read, organizes and controls the self-

TABLE 2
INTEGRATION OF MILITARY CONTROL
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA




Each Field Army Commander also commands a Military Area. Since he is at the same time chairman of the Military and Administrative Committee in each region, he rules all three. Thus the military commanders dominate the regions and provinces.

criticism meetings, and directs all internal security activities. The Popular Movements Department is responsible for integrating the activities of the Army with civilian affairs, and bringing to the attention of the public the Army's role in public affairs. Thus the Political Affairs Bureau is responsible not only for political propaganda within the Army but also for the Army's propaganda to the general public. But it is not a mere public relations and education-indoctrination organization. It is one of the most powerful groups in all of China, with an authority that extends not only into every corner of the Army but also, by direct chain of command, into many areas of civilian life.

The second bureau is the General Staff, which is divided into seven staff sections: Operations, Intelligence, Communications, General Affairs (Administration), Unit Affairs (Personnel, or G-1 function), Training and Military Schools, and Classified Materials. It

should be remarked that the General Staff does not include the functions usually associated with supply (G-4 function), these being reserved for the Rear Services Headquarters. Some observers believe, moreover, that this unorthodox breakdown of staff functions has notably impaired the efficiency of the Communist staff activities, partly by making difficult the integration of planning and operations, partly by encouraging organizational competition and conflict (which in turn has made it possible to "shift responsibility" for inefficient planning).

TABLE 3
ORGANIZATION OF THE PLA'S HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF*



* Adapted from: Lt. Col. Robert B. Egan, *Red China's Fighting Order*, The Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, p. 72.

The activities of the Rear Services Headquarters, which has its own Political Department in addition to the five main departments of Supply, Ordnance, Health, Finance, and Transportation, are closely integrated with the Communist agencies that control the nation's

economy. For example, the Transportation Department's work is tied in with the activities of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation; and, again for example, the Health Department has a strong voice in the nation's medical schools. The Ordnance Department has the difficult task of attempting to deal with the problems posed by the multiplicity of weapons that the PLA has acquired from one source or another through the years (e.g., the supply problems resulting from the fact that the Army uses guns of several different calibers). This department is also working with and through Soviet advisers, on such problems as that of introducing Russian equipment into the PLA and that of standardizing weapons with the rest of the Communist world.

The Field Armies

The combat forces of the PLA are divided among the large Field Armies that were created in connection with the post-war reorganization. The very process by which they came into existence tended to make each of them different from the other, and China is still far from having standardized field armies (they differ not only in size but even in pattern of command relations). All of the Field Armies report directly to the PLA GHQ, and all have approximately the same GHQ organization. Each commander in chief is assisted by two deputy commanders, and by a Political Commissar with two deputies; and each Field Army Headquarters is organized in three major sections: Chief of Staff, Chief of the Political Department, and Chief of Rear Services. This breakdown parallels that at the GHQ of the PLA. The Political Department at the Field Army level, it is interesting to note, is as large as the general staff.


The PLA differs significantly from the armies of other nations in that each commander in chief of a Field Army has held his command ever since it was first organized. The commanders, in consequence, all have a long history of identification with their commands, and have had every opportunity to develop strong personal ties with their subordinates. Each of the Field Armies, moreover, reflects in various ways the personality of its commander. Should any of the Field Army Commanders be removed from his command, it would be an event of major importance in the history of that Army.

First Field Army. The former Northwest China People's Liberation Army is the smallest and poorest of the four Field Armies, in large part because of the economic backwardness of the area in which it is stationed and upon which it relies for most of its funds and supplies. Its most striking characteristic is that it includes large numbers of non-Chinese: the Kirgiz, the Kazakh, the Sibo, the Tartar, the Mongol, and the Moslem have all found places in its ranks.

The Communist victories in the Northwest did not add greatly to the First Field Army's stores of arms and equipment. And, since the Army is located in an area in which there is little likelihood either of further civil war or of international conflict, the regime has not exerted itself greatly in the attempt to build up the First Field Army's deficiencies in materiel.

The First Field Army has the distinction, however, of being under the command of General P'eng Te-huai, the Senior Field Army Commander and also the Deputy Commander in Chief (under Chu Teh) of the entire PLA. He appears to have been placed in command of the First Field Army because he was regarded as possessing greater political skills than the other commanders, and better qualified than they to handle the delicate political problems that might develop in an area of diverse peoples and cultures. After the Chinese entered the Korean War, P'eng Te-huai, again presumably because of his flair for politics, was made the Commander of the Joint North Korean Army-Chinese Communist Forces Headquarters at Mukden, Manchuria. He thus commanded the first Chinese "volunteers" who crossed the Yalu.

TABLE 4
GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY



The First Field Army also enjoys a certain prestige by dint of controlling the area in which both the Red Army and the Communist Party grew to maturity. The Communists are sentimentally attached to the Shensi area as the cradle of their movement, and, derivatively, to the field army that defends it. Many of its older men and officers were serving with the Red Army as long ago as the Long March and the Fu-shih (Yenan) period.

Second Field Army. The Second Field Army was formed out of the old Central China People's Liberation Army, and consists mainly of men from that region. Its initial cadres were skilled guerrillas — members of the New Fourth Army who had spent the years of the Japanese War in Central China. (Not only the Japanese but the Kuomintang as well had sought to force them out of this strategic area.) Many of its characteristics today reflect this early history. It is especially noted for its proven ability to engage in remarkable forced marches, i.e., for its extreme mobility on foot. And it has attempted to preserve in its present organization and training many procedures and practices appropriate to guerrilla warfare. (Its combat record during the Civil War shows that it has lost none of its traditional maneuverability.)

The Second Field Army also reflects the qualities of its extremely colorful commander, Liu Poch'eng, the "One Eyed Dragon." Liu, though indeed half blind, is reputed one of the best field generals in the PLA, and is credited with a special flair for the tactics of mobile warfare. It was he who set the pattern of Communist tactics during the Civil War: no positional warfare, no defending captured cities. His Second Field Army was called "The Wanderers of the Yangtze."

It was the Second Field Army that was called upon to "liberate" Tibet.

Third Field Army. The Third Field Army is rated the second best of the Field Armies from the standpoint of combat efficiency. It was formed out of the East China People's Liberation Army, and during the Civil War its mission was to disrupt the Kuomintang communications between Central and North China. It operated primarily in Shantung Province, and to this day most of its men are natives of this province. It took part in the fighting at Hsu-chou, Nanking, and Shanghai, and continued to garrison these cities after the conquest of the mainland. It includes a large number of men who prior to their induction had been simple peasants. It was they about whom the war correspondents were writing when they reported that the Chinese Communist troops, upon "liberating" a modern city like Shanghai, contemplated its many wonders with incredulity and awe.

Unlike the Second Field Army, the Third is noted for its ability to engage in fixed defensive warfare and to use siege tactics. It did some of the hardest fighting of the entire Civil War, and made a good account of itself in the Central and South China campaigns. It has been chosen to prepare for the invasion of Taiwan, and unlike the other Field Armies has, in consequence, been trained to some extent in amphibious warfare.


The commander of the Third Field Army, Ch'ên I, has no great reputation as a military commander, but is highly regarded for his skill in personal relations and his knack for surrounding himself with loyal and competent subordinates. Actual organization and military direction of the Third Field Army has been in the capable hands of Su Yu, Jao Shu-shih, and Chang Ting-ch'eng. (Ch'ên I has the distinction of having bought over to the Communist side more Nationalist generals than any other high Communist commander.)

As of when the Chinese entered the Korean War, elements of the Third Field Army had already been moved up into Manchuria. It was they who attacked the Chosin Reservoir area.

Fourth Field Army. The Fourth Field Army was formed out of the Northeast People's Liberation Army. It has a longer history of operating as a unit than any of the other Field Armies, and is generally regarded as the most efficient fighting force China has at its disposal. It is, for example, better trained and equipped than the other PLA Field Armies (the bulk of the US equipment captured from the Nationalists has ended up in its hands). Its original cadres were the new Fourth Army elements that had moved into Manchuria after the defeat of Japan, and its men are said to be deeply conscious of the combat record they have inherited (along with the designation, which continues to be used, "new Fourth

Army"). It won the earliest major Communist victories against the Nationalist Army, capturing Manchuria and roundly defeating the troops Chiang had dispatched to the Northeast. After that victory, the Fourth moved into North China, "liberated" Peking, and then advanced all the way down into South China. Thus its last major campaign in the Civil

TABLE 5
ARMY ORGANIZATION IN THE PLA



War was the capture of Hainan Island, a far cry from the scene of its early victories. It has been the key element in all the Communists' major campaigns, and has never been defeated in a major engagement. Its men are said to have a highly developed *esprit de corps*, and to exemplify the proud and cocky type of soldier that the Chinese Communists have tried to produce.

Most of the Fourth Field Army's men are from Shantung, and either joined the New Fourth during the Japanese War or were recruited in Manchuria after the war. (A large percentage of the Chinese peasants in Manchuria are immigrants from Shantung Province.) However, the Fourth also includes Mongols from Inner Mongolia, along with both captured Nationalist troops and former Japanese puppet troops. (The Mongols are in cavalry units, which are of doubtful utility.)

The Fourth Field Army has from an early moment been the main Chinese force in the Korean war. Its Thirty-Eighth, Thirty-Ninth, Fortieth and Forty-Second Armies made the first contacts with the United Nations Forces in the western sector of Korea, and its Fiftieth and Sixty-Sixth Armies joined in the clash soon afterward. (The Fiftieth Army is the old Nationalist Sixtieth Army, with its original high-ranking officers, except that political officers have been added to it. This Army has been called upon to do much of the heaviest fighting for the Chinese Communist regime, and it is estimated that less than 20 percent of its original number have survived. The Communists apparently set out, to begin with, to test its loyalty, and seem to have regarded it, all along, as expendable. It is by no means certain that the Fourth Field Army has preserved its traditional characteristics, what with its continued heavy losses in Korea and its absorption of large numbers of replacements. But the Communists continue to play it up in their propaganda as the old New Fourth, and to attribute to it all the qualities that once made it, by reputation at least, the elite of the PLA.)

The Commander in Chief of the Fourth Field Army, General Lin Piao, is generally considered the ablest strategist and theoretician the Communists have, especially because of his performance at the time when the Communists turned their backs on guerrilla operations and adopted positional warfare.

In spite of its having moved all the way from Manchuria to Hainan Island during the Civil War, the Fourth Field Army does not have the Second Field Army's reputation for skill in maneuver. Lin Piao's operations have been, in general, highly orthodox by contemporary military standards, particularly as regards reliance upon railway communications and mechanized units. In this respect the Fourth Field Army represents the coming of age of the PLA, and will almost certainly set the pattern for its future development. Besides being far more mechanized than the other Field Armies, the Fourth has led the way as regards adoption of Soviet military practices.

North China Army Group or the "Fifth Field Army." There is a certain amount of mystery about this organization, and why it was not officially set up as the Fifth Field Army. As the "palace guard" of Peking, under the direct control of the GHQ of the PLA, it has become a sort of national reserve; and there has apparently been no attempt made to raise it to a position of equality with the other field armies.

A probable reason why the old North China People's Liberation Army did not become a field army is that it was given the task of garrisoning Peking, the future capital of Communist China, and thus (a) had no subsequent opportunity to gain experience and reputation in the Civil War, (b) was unable to expand its strength by absorbing captured Nationalist arms and men. The end of the Civil War found it little stronger than it had been at the beginning of that conflict, and responsible for a geographic area that was small and comparatively weak in resources. Despite the centralization of the PLA, many traditional Chinese military practices have survived, including that which leaves each command largely on its own, i.e., dependent on the manpower and resources in its area, for all its recruitment and procurement. The command fortunate enough to be located in a rich area thus enjoys a considerable advantage over other commands.

General Nieh Jung-chen is the commander of the North China Army Group. During the Sino-Japanese War, Nieh made himself a great reputation as a guerrilla commander. But, as noted, he had no opportunity during the Civil War to participate in a major campaign, and is, therefore, still an unknown so far as orthodox warfare is concerned.

Specialized Units

The bulk of the Communist Ground Forces are in one or another of the field armies. There are, however, certain specialized units, called guerrilla columns, that are to this day largely independent of the field armies. Guerrilla operations, as is well known, contributed greatly to the Communists' rise to power, and the regime, in part perhaps for sentimental reasons, has clearly been reluctant to compromise the integrity of the guerrilla organizations. (During the Civil War the guerrilla organizations not only distinguished themselves in combat, but in fifth column and intelligence operations for the larger military aggregations.) It has, in any case, left them under the direct control of the GHQ of the PLA. They range in strength from 4,000 to 15,000 men, have been thoroughly modernized, and train as independent units for the performance of specialized missions. What functions they might be assigned in a completely modernized PLA is a matter for conjecture, but their major task at present is to conduct operations against Nationalist guerrillas on the mainland, and to provide mobile support for the local militia. (They are likely to see further service in Southeast Asia, i.e., in support of the Communist forces in Indo-China and Burma.)

The columns have been given area designations, not numerical ones. These include, in each case, the area in which the column operates and thus that from which its men are recruited. The most important of these, eight in number, are: (1) Kwangtung-Kwangsi (or Liang Kuang) Column, commanded by General Tsing Sheng. (2) Fukien-Kwangtung (or Min Yuch Border Double Column), commanded by Fiang Fang, who is also Vice-Chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Government. (3) Central Kwangtung (or Yuch chung) Column, commanded by Wu Yu-hsing. (4) Kwangtung-Kwangsi-Kiangsi Kan Hsiang Border Column, commanded by Liu Ping. (5) Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi (or Min Yuch Kan Border) Column, commanded by Liu Yung-sheng. (6) Kwangsi-Yunnan-Kweichow (or Kwei Tien Chien Border) Column, commanded by Chuang Tien. (7) Kwangtung-Kwangsi (or Yuch Kwei Border) Column, commanded by Liang Kuang. (8) Hainan (or Chung-yen) Column, commanded by Feng P'ai-chu.

Division Organization


The PLA employs the so-called "rule of three": three divisions to each army and three regiments to each division. Present estimates place the size of the average PLA division at 7,000 men, but as more Soviet equipment is adopted the size of the division will probably increase to approximately 10,000 to 11,000 men.

The most striking feature of the divisions in the PLA is the power and functions of the political officers. In each division there is a Political Commissar and a Deputy Commissar who, rankwise, are at the level of the division commander. There is also a Political Section, which is charged with responsibility for such areas as propaganda, organization, internal security, "popular movement" groups, and political indoctrination of troops. (The role and functions of the political officers will be discussed in detail later.)

In spite of the manpower needed for the political sections and their internal security activities, the division size (army-wide) in the PLA is extremely low, according to one estimate, slightly over 11,000 men for a 1,000-man division. This is partly due to the fact that the PLA makes extensive use of civilian labor for line-of-communications and supply

work, and partly due to its practice of living off the local land for many of its requirements. Even so, this statistic is remarkable, and doubly so in view of the extent to which the Chinese use men to do many things that, in the US, would be done by machine. What it means, clearly, is that the combat troops themselves perform numerous functions that, in other


TABLE 6
DIVISION ORGANIZATION IN THE PLA
(Infantry Division)



armies, are reserved for service units. (For example, the Chinese soldier transports not only his own gear but also the equipment of his organization as the latter moves from place to place.) It also means that the standard of living in the PLA is low (i.e., the men are neither fed well nor kept comfortable), which again results in a considerable economy of manpower. What it does not mean is that the PLA has a high army-wide fire-power potential. Manpower, that is to say, is indeed concentrated at division level where it could

increase firepower, but the rate of fire-power per man is kept low by inadequate armament. There are differences here from division to division, but the general practice is to have numerous men forward who share a weapon with somebody else and are expected to retrieve the weapons of wounded or dead comrades.

TABLE 7
REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION IN THE PLA



People's Militia

The Chinese Communists have sought to build up a reserve of military trained personnel in the form of a People's Militia. Initially the plan was to establish a citizen army and even, as was sometimes suggested before the end of the Sino-Japanese War, to have it replace the regular Army altogether. Even during the Civil War period, however, the Militia never developed into a serious military organization, and while the regime has launched a program looking to its expansion on a considerable scale, there is now no talk of its ever replacing the regular Army or even of its engaging in major combat operations as distinct units.

The major present function of the People's Militia is to provide manpower for the PLA. Its individual members who demonstrate abilities the PLA needs are soon recruited or drafted into the ranks. Sometimes, indeed, whole units of the Militia have been called up by the PLA as replacements.

On paper the plans for the People's Militia state that all able-bodied men from 18 to 35 years of age shall be required to join the Militia. But there are very few if any areas of China in which this policy has been carried out.

The goal of universal membership in the Militia does not appear to have been dictated by military considerations (e.g., that of maintaining a reserve of maximum size for the PLA), but rather by the hope that getting everyone into the Militia would attenuate the regime's internal security problem. The Communist indoctrination program, for example, would by this means automatically reach the entire population of potential bearers of arms, and it would be possible to punish ideological dissidents and subversive elements under military rather than civil law. In short, the People's Militia should not be thought of as a serious (actual or potential) military factor in estimating Communist China's capabilities. It is a major policing and indoctrination organization, capable in a pinch of supplying manpower for the Army. This is borne out by the type of training the members of the Militia receive, which is wholly inadequate from the standpoint of modern warfare.

Political Control in the PLA

The organization of the PLA at all levels reflects a deep concern, on the part of Red China's leaders, about ideological indoctrination and internal security, both as distinct problems and as different aspects of one and the same problem. Thus Political Officers or Commissars have been placed on all echelons of the PLA, and assured adequate authority by setting up an independent chain of command for their operations.

The first and most conspicuous function of the Political Officer is that of maintaining the purity of the Communist line within the organization to which he is assigned. He has the say, subject to correction only by his superiors, as to what the line is at any moment on any particular subject, and what are its implications and presuppositions. A second function is that of propagating the line among the troops, especially during training and rest periods, which is when the indoctrination program tends to be pushed. A third function, which comes into its own when the unit is actually fighting, is that of riding herd on troop morale, i.e., checking and observing morale, and intervening to raise it when it is giving way before the hardships of combat.

Because of the third of the three functions just mentioned, no Political Officer can possibly confine himself to problems within the immediate domain of ideology. For example, political officers have been known to put pressure on the supply organizations, to insure the delivery of the materials they deem essential from the standpoint of morale. Here, incidentally, is the point at which the Political Officers are most likely to interfere with the operations of the purely military officers. And it is a safe guess that as the Political Officers

learn more and more about the problems of morale they will be increasingly tempted to make their influence felt in the field of logistics, since it is here they must go ultimately for what it takes to stop gripes.

To date the Political Officers in the PLA do not appear to have interfered much with the activities of the military commanders. Most particularly they seem to have used sparingly the power, which undoubtedly rests in them, to over-ride military decisions. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, most of the Political Officers, not to say all, have received scant military training, and do not think of themselves — yet — as competent to judge whether a given military decision is well-advised. In the second place, the PLA commanders are not merely professional military men; they are also tried and tested Communists, so that the Political Officer who challenged a decision by one of them on political grounds would be up against the fact that the presumption is in favor of their absolute political loyalty — and of their knowledgeability about what political loyalty implies in the military field.

It should not be inferred from the absence of trouble up to the present time that the regime will always be able to avoid conflicts between these two important skilled groups. Soviet experience suggests that the conflicts are unavoidable, and are likely to occur when the Political Officers, having been about for a long while, become sure of themselves, and, having learned a thing or two about military operations, begin to entertain opinions of their own on military questions which they are more and more tempted to express to or even impose on the commanders. This is the more likely to happen because of the close relationship between morale and command behavior: it is they who are ultimately responsible for morale, and the commanders alone who are in a position to do something about it. The temptation to overrule decisions they regard as likely to have a pernicious effect on morale will, when the going is rough, be very strong.

The relationship between the Political Officers and the troops is somewhat more complicated. The tremendous power of the Political Commissars, and their constant professional concern about what the troops are saying and thinking, automatically places them in a position where their charges are sure to regard them as natural enemies — if for no other reason than because they can mete out violent punishment, not merely within the unit but to a man's family. Not many of the professional soldiers in the PLA, moreover, are likely to get interested in the political materials with which the Political Officer is forever trying to indoctrinate them. What they are likely to feel is that the Political Officer gets in the way of military routine and efficiency. The fact that indoctrination more or less monopolizes the time of the troops when they are in reserve is a further potential source of trouble. For these are the periods when, but for the indoctrination, the troops would be free to amuse themselves or at least do what they like; and, particularly if the speeches and lectures are tiresome, they can be counted on to grow restive and blame the Commissar. This consideration, however, undoubtedly cuts both ways: some soldiers will find the political activities directed by the Commissars both interesting and relaxing, and will react to them in terms of lessened fear of the Political Officers' powers.

It is extremely difficult to predict troop reaction to the indoctrination activities of the Political Officers, particularly since as the civilian indoctrination program gets into high gear reactions to it in the military field will become increasingly complex. One great strength the Political Officers have, when it comes to obtaining support from or at least acceptance by the men lies in the fact that they are teaching a great number of the illiterates in the PLA to read and write, which means, in China, that a very considerable percentage of their charges receive from them something that they regard as valuable in the extreme, and not noticeably less valuable because it comes in ideological wrappings.

On balance, it seems improbable that the favorable reactions to the Political Officers will outweigh the negative ones, especially in combat conditions, when it becomes the task of the Political Officers to urge the men on to greater sacrifices. The Political Officers are more rather than less vulnerable on this point because they are with the Army but not part of it, because this means that the demands for greater sacrifices emanate, as far as the troops are concerned, from a non-military source. They are more vulnerable again because the demands, being politically motivated, will often not make sense militarily, and the men, whose point of view in combat conditions can be counted on to be highly military, will regard them as unreasonable.

The role of the Political Commissars affords numerous opportunities to enemy psychological warfare against the PLA. For most effective results, however, direct attacks on them should be avoided in favor of all-out exploitation of the situation created in the PLA by their very existence. Psychological warfare campaigns can, for example, move in vigorously on the troops' anxieties about internal security agents. Any serious question it can raise as to the loyalty of elements or individuals in the PLA will automatically cause the Political Officers to behave in a manner that will threaten the security of the individual soldier and of the unit to which he belongs. The Political Officers, moreover, are sure in any tight situation to make promises to the troops that cannot be kept, and those that are not kept will be made-to-order themes for psychological warfare output.

Two further points are in order here. The Commissars' activities automatically bring the political element in the war into an unusually close relationship with military operations. Psychological warfare will therefore be able (though against a Western army it would hardly dare) to stress the contrast between the expressed political aims of the Communists and the actual conditions in which the men find themselves. The fact that the Political Officers will have reduced somewhat the political apathy of the Chinese soldier means, moreover, that the latter will be much easier to address and influence on the political level than he would have been if the PLA had no such officers.

Personnel of the PLA

Much has been written about an alleged traditional antipathy on the part of the Chinese toward military life and war. The point may or may not be valid as far as the earlier periods of Chinese history are concerned, but even if it is it would be a mistake to assume that the present-day Chinese do not make good soldiers or that they instinctively dislike the military. The social status of the soldier in traditional Chinese society was, to be sure, relatively low, and the upper classes and the better educated still feel that military service should be left to the peasant and laboring classes. But the Communists have been remarkably successful, propaganda-wise, in dramatizing the role of the soldier in the society of the future. Similarly, the PLA has been able to inculcate in its troops a kind of pride and *esprit de corps* that was conspicuously lacking in earlier Chinese armies, and has offered the individual soldier rewards and social prestige that he could never have won as a civilian. The power of the military in civil administration and other activities that affect day-to-day living on the part of civilians has also tended to raise the social status of soldiers. Nor should it be forgotten, in this connection, that it was through their armies that the Communists were able to obtain power in China. The Communists know that their rule rests upon the military power that they command.

This does not mean, however, that a majority of the men in the PLA are happy about being in the Army. At most it means that on the verbal and symbolic levels the Communists have offered their soldiers not inconsiderable rewards, which have overcome many traditional Chinese attitudes toward the individual soldier. Even the soldiers who are

generally dissatisfied with Army life, and continue to serve only because they have to, are pleased at the fact that the regime is attempting to raise the prestige of the military profession and that, meantime, soldiers are officially regarded as members of a superior class.

Morale in the PLA appears to go up with military successes and down with military reverses. When the Communists achieved their great victories in the Civil War, general morale in the PLA was, according to the available evidence, extremely high. The men identified themselves with the "wave of the future," and believed that they were making the destiny of Chinese society. But in the presence of military setbacks this spirit has always crumpled fast, and it will probably crumple fast in any major war the PLA may fight in future as soon as things begin to go badly for it.

Background of the PLA Soldier

It seems probable that not less than 90 percent of the PLA manpower comes from peasant backgrounds. The percentage is considerably smaller if we fix attention on officers only, but here also the percentage is considerably higher than in most other modern Chinese armies.

The life the PLA's men knew before induction was a hard one which, with little in the way of comforts, offered a dreary round of meager food, inadequate clothing, and hard toil. Most therefore find life in the PLA at least tolerable, and many no doubt feel that they have "never had it so good." They never expected to be pampered either in or outside of the Army, and so long as it meets for them certain minimum standards, very low ones according to Western notions, they are likely to accept the strict discipline and hard work associated with their military service without much complaint.

Despite the statement above about peasant origins, the men of the PLA differ greatly among themselves as regards certain background characteristics. For one thing, they are drawn from all over China, thus from many quite distinct geographic areas. And there are sharp differences as regards length of service in the PLA and extent of identification with the Communist cause.

Recent estimates of the composition of the PLA show the following military background of PLA troops: (a) 15 percent are veterans of World War II; (b) 25 percent, veterans of the entire Civil War; (c) 30 percent, ex-Nationalist troops (also veterans of World War II); (d) 30 percent have been inducted into service since about 1948.*

These figures tend to obscure the fact, an important one to keep in mind, that the PLA has numerous professional military men in its ranks who have spent most of their adult life in one army or another. These professionals are the hard core of the PLA from the standpoint of technical skill. Even they, however, belong to distinct categories, which would have to be taken carefully into account in connection with any attempt to predict their behavior. They include men who are: (a) professional Communists, former members of the Eighth Route Army, and loyal Party members; (b) former Nationalists, who tend to be apolitical and will fully accept their present political masters so long as they can continue their military careers; (c) former Nationalists who take a more or less dim view of communism but see (and have) no realistic alternative to continued military service; (d) former Nationalists who are more or less willing to go along with the Communists, politically; and, (e) professional soldiers, who have never had any strong political feelings and look to the army only for satisfaction of certain personal goals. Prolonged military service in one and

* These figures are at best rough approximations, that is, even as approximations they can be seriously questioned. The breakdown is far from clear and raises such questions as: Were't the Nationalist troops veterans of World War II? And did the Communists add to their strength from the beginning of the Civil War until 1948 only by capturing Nationalist troops?

the same army may in the long run give these professionals numerous common characteristics and attitudes. But psychological warfare can safely assume that the qualities that differentiate them from one another are more important and critical than those that they have in common.

Conscription and Period of Service

The PLA has no fixed periods of service, so that the individual who is inducted into it can look forward to no specific date at which he will be free to return to civilian life. One remains in the Army until one is physically no longer capable of performing one's duties. There is not even any organized system of release, and although Article 25 of the Common Program states that "revolutionary servicemen" shall receive public care at the time of retirement, it seems improbable that any of them take such promises seriously. It is known, moreover, that the Political Officers do not, in their indoctrination programs, stress this individualistic feature of the Communist program, which suggests that no one expects the relevant plan to materialize.

Men who are no longer physically fit for military service are either permitted to go home or are drafted into the Labor Battalions, which although formally a part of the military establishment are not under the same ministry as it. (These Labor Battalions are used on large government projects like conservation, river control, dam construction, and railroad and highway building.) Life in these battalions is much more like that of the soldier than that of the civilian.

One of the principal reasons why the Communists have not introduced an organized system of discharging men from the PLA is undoubtedly that they know the Chinese economy to be incapable of absorbing large numbers of veterans, and fear that the discharges, if unable to find satisfactory civilian occupations, would put their military skills to use in handiwork and subversive activity. The same fear has caused the Communists, all along, to recruit most of the former Nationalist troops they have captured, despite their dubious loyalty to the Communist regime.

The Communists still rely upon the traditional "rope and tie" system of recruiting new men, the essence of which is that "recruiting" officers descend upon peasants in the fields and impress them into the Army. They have, however, attempted to set up a kind of quota system, under which each county or *hsien* is assigned a quota of young men, and which it proceeds to fill by any methods it sees fit to use.

All members of the PLA, however recruited, are officially called "volunteers." The Communists carefully preserve the fiction that all members joined the PLA by an act of individual choice.

The need for replacements in the Korean war has driven the PLA back on the "rope and tie" system, especially in the rural areas. Even the People's Militia had proved unable to supply the need for recruits. For the most part the quota system is fiction.

Pay

The pay PLA members receive is so low as to be almost negligible. Even the officers do not receive enough money either to accumulate any savings or to buy goods and services in the civilian market. The Army, however, provides all the basic essentials of life, and the men have little free time, thus scant opportunity to spend money. (The complaint that their pay was too low did not appear in the list of the complaints articulated by Chinese POWs in the interrogations in Korea.)

The fact that the pay in the PLA is so low as to prevent the men from operating in the civilian economy means that the Chinese soldier suffers genuine social discrimination, and is set apart from all the other important groups in the society. Civilians know that the

soldier is not able to pay for goods and services, and, despite the strictness of PLA discipline, there is a deep fear on their part that he will resort to violence and obtain what he wants by looting and confiscation. This is a real barrier to the Communist attempt to raise the status of the military class in the eyes of public opinion. It is improbable that many PLA men realize that it is their low pay that complicates their relations with civilians. They merely accept the fact that soldiers are poorer than civilians. (Actual figures on pay rates are meaningless since they do not, if given in terms of the exchange rate between the People's Currency and the US dollar, indicate real purchasing power in the Chinese economy.)

The low pay for officers apparently causes more difficulties than the low pay for enlisted men. The officers, necessarily, move more often in civilian quarters, and are more likely to be frequently reminded of their relatively low prestige. Officers in the PLA are the paymasters of all the troops under their command, and some Communist reports indicate that PLA officers are following the traditional practice of padding the rolls with imaginary individuals and failing to report casualties so as to increase the sums of money at their disposal. The Communists have sought to prevent their doing this by organizing Economy Committees, requiring that all payments and expenditures be posted, and authorizing the Political Commissars to report any such malpractices.

Rations

Rations in the PLA are far from generous. The POWs interrogated in Korea speak frankly of this inadequacy, although, as noted, they are silent about their low wages.

In more or less normal conditions as regards supplies, the PLA soldier is given about enough food to satisfy basic hunger, but not enough to keep food from being the subject of constant thought and discussion throughout the ranks. The usual practice is to serve two meals a day, the second one at about 1600, i.e. well before the end of the work day. The meals are extremely simple: steamed wheat bread usually, or, in the South, rice with two vegetables and tea. The daily quota is approximately 31.2 ounces of grain (rice in South China and millet in the North) and 10.0 ounces of vegetables. Meat is not served every day, and when it is served the per-man quota for a day is about 1.4 ounces.

The regime has provided space for vegetable gardens in most of the main military bases, so that the troops can grow some of their own food and help hold down the expenses of the military establishment. The gardens are planted and cared for either by the individual soldier or by a unit in which he "volunteers" to work. The expectation is that the gardens shall account for about one-quarter of the troops' food.

The PLA has neither the organization nor the equipment it would need in order to provide substantial quantities of food in combat situations. The troops are normally expected to live entirely off the land, or rather each soldier is expected to, since no attempt is made to maintain company messes, and field rations are practically unknown. The men often go without food for extended periods of time even while actually fighting.

There is a marked difference, both in quality and in quantity, in the food provided for officers and that provided for enlisted men where messes are maintained. The officers eat at a separate mess, and have their own cooks. This is one of the few conspicuous privileges of the officers in the PLA, and the troops, when in the past food has been in particularly short supply, have shown marked resentment about it.

Discipline and Privileges

The PLA makes little or no distinction between military discipline and political punishment, actions that violate military regulations often being treated as acts against the state, and conclusions about political loyalty often being drawn from the mood and extent

of a man's compliance with military regulations. Both the Political Commissars and the military commanders have the power to punish, and practically speaking there is little difference between the type of misbehavior with which they deal.

The PLA maintains so-called Revolutionary Soldier Committees, through which the enlisted men make certain decisions regarding breaches of discipline. But the powers of these committees are highly circumscribed, besides which they are made up of loyal Communists who are only too ready to back up the Political Officer or the military commander.

The discipline in the PLA is strict in the extreme, severe punishments being imposed even for very minor infractions of the regulations. Punishment is determined with an eye not only to the book but also the need at the particular moment for an "example." Executions and physical beatings always take place, as one would expect from the foregoing statement, in the presence of the entire unit.

The PLA has nevertheless eliminated much of the arbitrariness of the discipline maintained in the traditional Chinese armies. The officers at company level and below are mostly men who have risen from the ranks, and for the most part treat their men fairly. Cases of arbitrary cruelty on the part of an officer toward an enlisted man are very rare. Thus the soldiers accept the discipline, severe as it is, as one of the hardships of army life in general, and do not, apparently, react to it in terms of direct hostility toward their immediate superiors.

Soldiers in the PLA have few privileges and although the Communists are attempting to raise the prestige of the military as a whole, the individual soldier sees a great deal more of the stick than of the carrot. For example, it is almost impossible for a PLA soldier to get permission to marry. There is no organized system of furloughs and passes; indeed, the individual soldier can count himself lucky if he can get home for a visit once every two years. The men accept the fact that once they are in the Army they have to give up close ties with home, and do not expect to see much of their families until after they leave the service. When a unit is stationed in a small village or in the countryside, its men are sometimes allowed to mix freely with the civilians, though the foregoing statement about passes still applies. But when it is stationed near a large city, its men are held in close check, and it is not uncommon for a PLA man to be in easy reach of a large city for weeks on end and never once be allowed to go visit it on his own.

The state of affairs just described is to some extent, no doubt, tied up with the low pay scale, and the notion that the men will, penniless as they are, get into trouble if they mingle much with civilians. Also, the PLA has been on the march through so much of its history that furloughs and passes would have been out of the question. What is primarily involved, however, is a conviction on the part of the commanders that the men should regard military life as a full-time business, and that even during periods of routine garrison duty all their time, energies, and interest should go on their military activities.

Training

PLA training is mostly a matter of political indoctrination and hard physical labor, especially extensive marching. Weapons and ammunition are in such short supply that giving the men much opportunity to fire weapons and improve their marksmanship is out of the question. (Troops have often been thrown into combat without ever having fired their weapons.) This does not mean, of course, that the PLA consists entirely of men who do not know how to take care of themselves on the field of battle; rather it has seen a great deal of combat in recent years, and has, in consequence, a considerable incidence of well-trained and experienced veterans. But the gap that divides veterans from green troops, because the latter do not train with live ammunition, is wider than in any other modern army.

Two to three hours of each day's training are set aside for political indoctrination sessions. These are devoted to lectures by the political officers and to "self-criticism." In the self-criticism meetings the men discuss various political or social questions, hear the Communist Line presented, and comment on it. The soldier who expresses disagreement with an official position is asked to relate his entire life history, and is shown, little by little, how his "reactionary background" makes it difficult for him to understand the position of the "people." Usually group pressure and the fact that a Political Officer is present are enough to prevent anyone from taking genuine issue with the Line.

The military training offered is, by US standards, extremely poor. The veterans and NCOs instruct the recruits informally in all phases of military and combat activities and, although they are men skilled in combat they are not necessarily competent instructors. The instruction, moreover, given its informality, is unavailingly uneven. In some units the veterans take great pride in being instructors and in getting across what they know; in others they tend to treat their knowledge as an asset that would be lost if it were shared with somebody.

The Communists have had to rely upon the ex-Nationalist troops as instructors in the more modernized and technical fields, especially tanks, artillery, bazookas, and motor vehicles. This means, of course, using instructors whose own training was in American Army techniques. No data are available as to the quality of the instruction.

The dominant feature of the training—and of life in general—in the PLA is, as noted previously, the hard physical labor that all must perform. The fact that little or nothing is mechanized makes it necessary to utilize the troops' own physical strength in even the simplest operations. Besides finding themselves called upon to serve as pack animals for practically all of their equipment, the PLA soldiers are required to produce individually certain essential supplies. The gardening activities mentioned previously are only one example, for the regime reports that in Sinkiang province alone as of 1950 the Army was operating 85 flour mills, 37 coal pits, 3 weaving mills, 3 paper mills, and 2 gold mines. Even top-grade combat units are obliged, when on garrison duty, to do common labor on public works, e.g., river control projects and the construction of railroads, highways, and dams.

One of the major complaints of POWs in Korea is that "life in the PLA is 'too hard,'" a reference not to the discipline but to the daily output of sheer physical energy. The long training marches, night marches in particular, were mentioned by POW after POW as major ordeals. Undoubtedly it is these ordeals that have made the PLA one of the toughest fighting forces in Chinese history, predictably able to withstand extraordinary hardships in any future war.

Officer Training

Most of the line officers of the PLA, having risen from the ranks, have had little or no formal military training. During the Red Army's early years, at least up to the time when the PLA's leaders set out to modernize it, there were great advantages in using officers of this type. But that is no longer the case. The PLA can no longer afford to have the high incidence of illiteracy that is part of the price it pays for using officers up from the ranks; and it needs officers capable, as they are not likely to be if they come up from the ranks, of developing the technical skills required in modern warfare.

Since the end of the Civil War, therefore, the Communists have established a considerable number (not less than a dozen) of military academies. Until 1949 the chief function of these academies was to provide junior officers for the Field Armies, which accordingly

had them under its direct control. Today, all the academies are under the direction of the GHQ of the PLA. (The central academy is located at Peking, and has an enrollment of about four thousand men.)

The fact that the academies are under GHQ shows that they are thought of as the source of the staff and general officers of the future, for all that the training lasts only for a year or two.

The training emphasizes political indoctrination above all, thus indicating that the basic essential for future high officers in the PLA is, in the Communists' view, loyalty to the regime.

Life in the military academies is no less austere than that in the PLA, and the discipline no less strict. The instruction in military science is, in general, of a highly elementary character. The tactics and strategy utilized by the PLA during the Civil War campaigns figure prominently in the curriculum. Some of the materials and principles the academies teach came originally from the US Army, but the current emphasis is upon introducing Russian practices.

At the present time there are no advanced training schools, although some of the more promising young officers are sent to Russia for further study. Specialized skills have to be learned in the field.

A survey of the fifty-two most prominent generals in the PLA, including seven ex-Nationalists, shows that twenty-seven have apparently received no formal military education, that seven have attended Soviet schools, that two of the former Nationalists once studied in Japan, and that the remainder attended Chinese military academies.* Some of the latter, however, had notoriously low standards. (Among them are the academies established by the provincial governments before the Revolution of 1911.)

The lack of formal military training is not the only educational deficiency of the officer class of the Red Army. About one-half of the PLA's top leaders did not, for example, attend school beyond the first ten grades, and some of the older staff officers even at Field Army level are illiterate. Since the enlisted men have even less educational background, no other conclusion is possible than that the PLA is, man for man, the most uneducated of the world's large armies.

The lack of officers with training and experience at staff level is one of the greatest weaknesses of the Communist Army. The present generals of the PLA learned their military science in the school of experience, mostly with guerrilla warfare. Until the later stages of the Civil War, indeed, most of them had never faced anything like the responsibilities of command in positional warfare. To some extent, to be sure, they have been able to apply to their new tasks the principles picked up in directing small-scale operations. For the most part, however, they have had to learn a new type of warfare as the PLA has become a National Army. They were greatly helped in this, at the time when they needed help most urgently, by advisors from the USSR. These advisors have stayed on, and still deeply influence the tactical and strategic thinking of the top commanders.

Health

One of the PLA's biggest problems is that of providing adequate medical care for its men. (This, of course, is an aspect of the much wider problem faced by China as a whole, namely, that of running an economy and a military machine with a population which, because of ill health, cannot deliver the performance its numbers would suggest.) Up to the present time, its standards in this respect have been a matter of applying a single general

* *Reg. op. cit.*, pp. 58-9.

rule: if a man is too ill to perform his required tasks he will be removed from the Army. Even this rule, however, could be made effective only if the PLA were far better supplied with doctors and medical equipment than it is. Thus there is a high mortality rate in the PLA's ranks, obviously the result, in large part, of requiring heavy physical exertions from tens of thousands of men who should not be in the Army at all.

The Chinese Communist armies are highly vulnerable to communicable diseases. The standards of sanitation do not include even the most elementary precautionary and preventive measures. Outbreaks of disease are especially common at times when PLA elements have just moved from one area to another, and the men are exposed to new maladies.

The PLA, like China as a whole, has only a fraction of the doctors it needs. In 1946 there were only 13,447 registered doctors in all China, i.e., one doctor for approximately thirty-three thousand people. The US Army Surgeon General's Office estimates that not much more than half of these doctors (8,000) are capable of meeting minimum US military standards, and of them, of course, only a fraction are available to the Army.

No figures are available as to the number of doctors in the PLA. It is improbable that the ratio of doctors to men would exceed 1 to 3,000. At the end of World War II the Nationalist Army, far better equipped from the standpoint of military medicine, had only 1,922 qualified doctors, 18 dentists, 384 nurses, and 438 technical personnel. Large numbers of Chinese doctors fled from China when the Communists were coming to power, which means that there are fewer qualified doctors out in the civilian population whom the PLA can conscript.

The Communists have attempted to meet this problem by rapid training of additional personnel. But it is well known, qualified doctors cannot be produced by speed-up techniques.

According even to Communist statistics, there are more than one hundred million people in China who need medical care that they are not getting. Perhaps the most dramatic relevant statistic has to do with the nation's hospital resources: 2,000 hospitals with a total of 90,000 beds. The Communists aggravated this problem, when they assumed power, by suppressing foreign-supported medical institutions and expelling their foreign employees.

The PLA has attempted to teach its men something at least about the relationship between sanitation and illness, and the training program, which includes lectures and the enforcement of a few simple sanitation regulations does appear to have reduced the danger of uncontrollable epidemics. This danger is still of such character as to justify the statement that the PLA lives, and will continue to live for a long while, at the mercy of the first major epidemic that comes along. Some types of inoculation have been introduced, but there are no routine arrangements for inoculating troops.

Treatment of Wounded

The lack of medical facilities in the PLA is most conspicuous in combat situations, where there is hardly even the pretense of doing anything for the wounded. The POWs in Korea mentioned this fact, which cannot be concealed, as having been highly destructive to morale. Field hospitals are manned by untrained "medics," and a man's chances of recovering from a wound are extremely slender. Drugs and medical supplies, for instance, are in short supply at all echelons.

The chief promise the PLA is able to hold out to the man who thinks he might be wounded is that it will try, when the moment comes, to remove him from the immediate scene of battle. Each division in the PLA has a stretcher company, and the bulk of the men in the medical platoon at regiment are also stretcher bearers. The PLA also employs large numbers of civilian stretcher bearers. For good reason, since it has no motor vehicles

for transporting hospital cases. The mere presence of so many stretcher bearers is said, incidentally, to be quite unnerving to troops about to go into combat, since they are an eloquent reminder of the PLA's willingness to accept vast numbers of casualties in any combat operation.

Psychological warfare should continually stress the theme that the Communists are incapable of taking care of their wounded, and that we are in a position to offer medical assistance to all who need it.

Logistics

Until the latter stages of the Civil War the Chinese Communists had little need to concern themselves about problems of logistics. The Red Army lived, during its guerrilla phase, entirely off the land, and depended for specifically military supplies on the Nationalist supply centers it raided from time to time. The fact that it commandeered its food tended to alienate the peasants, whose support was sorely needed in the guerrilla campaign, except as their feelings could be soothed with promises of the rewards they would receive when the Communists came to power. (The Communists paid for such goods and services as they took from the villagers in their own currency or in IOUs. This gave many of the peasants a reason for supporting the Communists far more persuasive than the Party's agrarian program. Only if the Communists came to power could they hope eventually to realize the value of the paper promises they ended up holding.)

The Red Army developed great skill in extracting military equipment from the enemy. In this way, throughout the war years the Communists were able, without any regular system of supply of their own, to add continuously to their total stock of equipment, so that at the end of the war they had more supplies than at the beginning. After the war they obtained large quantities of former Japanese military equipment — especially in Manchuria, where they were helped in this sense by the Russian Army. And during the Civil War they acquired a good deal of former US Army equipment from defeated Nationalist units.

The need to depend upon the enemy for supplies dictated, to some extent, the strategy and tactics employed by the Communists, e.g., their refusal to engage in positional warfare, and their practice of first capturing a city, then milking it of supplies, and then giving up control of it.

When the Communists decided to reorganize the PLA into a National Army, they were forced to adopt more conventional ways of handling their logistical problems. One great advantage they have had in this connection is their clear grasp of the fact that many Chinese armies of the past were less effective than they might have been precisely because their manpower exceeded their logistical capabilities. The Communist regime had the courage to reduce the numbers of men in the first line units, thus bringing manpower more or less into balance with logistics and greatly increasing the effectiveness of at least the better Communist units. Since the men in these units were now assured certain minimum amounts of necessary materiel, morale improved as a result of the new arrangements.

As has been mentioned, the Communists also sought to make the PLA partially self-supporting by having it undertake its own production activities. (After the Communists became responsible for the political control of the country, it was impossible to have the troops live off the land as they had when they were actively fighting the Nationalists.) In other words, the Communist leaders have never felt it to be necessary for the central government to assume the full financial responsibility for the military establishment, as central governments do in other countries. Making the PLA partially self-supporting means not only reduced outlays for the actual commodities required, but also reduced expenditures of

energies (and money) on problems of procurement and transportation. On the other hand, the idea appears to work well only for units that are given prolonged garrison duties. And even when it does work well there are some results that must be entered on the other side of the ledger. Units that are in the habit of producing a large proportion of what is required to meet immediate needs are, for one thing, unprepared to deal with supply problems under conditions of actual combat. In the second place, a unit that is producing for its own use is a unit that can be transferred to another area only at considerable sacrifice in terms of current production. This is doubly important because the Communists have political reasons for not keeping a unit in one and the same place for too long a time (the line officers might establish personal connections with local leaders, and thus reduce the effectiveness of civilian political control from the center).

The PLA is still attempting to rely as much as possible upon the troops' producing for their own needs. It is now recognized, however, that this is a cumbersome method of handling problems of logistics, though probably a necessary one until the Communist regime feels strong enough financially to support the military establishment via direct appropriations.

One reason for the Communists' attempt to hold down some military expenditures is that they are greatly increasing others, i.e., those having to do with modernization and mechanization of the forces — both of which will add to the PLA logistical problems. For there is a great difference between the logistical needs of a guerrilla army and those of a modern military force.

The PLA's modernization program has, among other things, demonstrated anew one of China's basic weaknesses as a military power. The Chinese cannot produce the heavy equipment a modernized army needs, which means that arrangements must be made to import it and to provide for its transportation and maintenance within the country. Even so simple an item as a truck must be procured abroad, as must all the petroleum products essential to a modern army. As the PLA turns its back on foot-power and animal-drawn vehicles it becomes increasingly necessary to construct a network of highways and roads, since without it the new motorized equipment will be useless. (Even North Korea has a more advanced system of highways than most of China.)

The inadequacy of China's transportation system has obliged the PLA to establish supply depots all over the country and, given the difficulty of moving things from one to another, to guard carefully against getting too many supplies in a single place. The PLA may, indeed, find itself in a seriously weakened position if it moves to modern means of warfare before the economy can give it effective logistical support. There is a real danger that over-rapid mechanization will seriously reduce its effective fighting power.

In the attempt to overcome its logistical problems the PLA has greatly expanded its staff at Peking, so that the Army, which formerly operated with very little in the way of a centralized staff, has now become heavily loaded with bureaucrats. The appearance in China of Russian advisors and specialists has accentuated this trend. This is all the more conspicuous because expansion of staff personnel can never solve the PLA's real logistical problems, even if the expansion takes place in the latter's name. These problems are tied up with fundamental economic and social conditions in China, and will persist until China is more extensively industrialized and less dependent upon a predominantly agricultural economy.

The PLA's major strengths in the field of logistics are: (a) The tight police control that the Communists exercise over the people of China. This enables them to marshal very large numbers of men for military purposes, and thus to assign almost unlimited amounts of personnel to logistical operations if and when they are needed. (b) The Chinese soldier's

acceptance of his low standard of living. Because of this, the PLA does not require the large varieties or quantities of supplies necessary in an American or European army. (c) The fact that its operations have thus far been confined to China or immediately contiguous areas. This has enabled it to live off the land and avoid dependence upon long supply lines. (d) The fact that it is still largely unmechanized. This has kept any large logistical problem from arising in the sensitive area of liquid and solid fuels. The present rate of modernization is not so rapid as to bring this problem to a head in the near future. (e) The fact that logistical problems can now be handled with the direct assistance of qualified Russian advisors. It can be expected that PLA staff planning will improve as a result of this assistance.

But the logistical weaknesses of the PLA far outweigh its logistical strengths. The principal weaknesses are revealed by the following statements: (a) The PLA has not organized, or trained personnel for, the large services of supply that a modernized army would require. (b) The transportation facilities for rapid large-scale movements of goods do not exist over much of China. The railroad system is highly inadequate, and there is no extensive net of highways. The air force is incapable of air-lifting any appreciable tonnage. (c) The total personnel of the PLA is entirely out of proportion to its present services of supply. The commitment to full-scale combat of more than a small part of the total Army at any given time is out of the question if any attempt is to be made to supply the troops committed. (d) The medical services of the PLA are completely inadequate. This radically reduces the PLA's capacity to solve logistical problems by merely assigning more manpower to the operation in hand. (e) The PLA lacks senior officers with experience in logistics, and thus cannot provide the staff direction essential to rapid development of a sound logistical organization. (f) The PLA is obliged to import most of the equipment a mechanized army requires. China is incapable of producing, for example, the motorized equipment that is essential to a modern army. (g) The fact that troops from different geographic areas of China have very different eating habits would place a great strain on PLA logistics in any future war situation. (h) The Chinese economy does not afford people an opportunity to acquire the mechanical and other types of training required in modern logistical operations, and there is no existing skill group in the population capable of staffing them. (i) The great variety in types and calibers of weapons used by the PLA creates numerous problems of supply and maintenance. (j) The inadequate communications system in both the Army and the nation makes it extremely difficult to direct, organize, and facilitate supply movements.

Communications

The general backwardness of China as far as modern communications are concerned is reflected in the PLA's own communications system. Radio equipment is scarce and, although the Communists were able to capture stocks of field telephones from the Nationalists, wire is in such short supply that they cannot make efficient use of them.

From the division level down, orders are usually transmitted orally, and there is a minimum of paper work. This eliminates paper-pushing and many of its wastes and abuses (e.g. the need to make multiple copies of each order), and might be placed high on a list of the negative military virtues the PLA possesses. But it does not dispose of the fact that control and coordination is, in the very nature of the case, clumsy, slow, and inflexible. Most orders are transmitted by messengers, which normally means that an order that is unclear cannot be clarified in time to do any good, so that commanders have to go ahead and act, without the knowledge of higher echelons, on their own initiative. Organizing and planning a major movement calling for the coordination of many different units becomes

time-consuming in the extreme. Effective control of such movements lapses as of when the initial orders are executed. In combat conditions, for example, decisions at division and below have to be made without communicating with army.

During the days of guerrilla warfare battalion commanders were given a great degree of freedom, and communications were not essential for effective operations. At present the communications problem is critical, since the Chinese have, for good or ill, adopted the large-scale type of organizations that cannot dispense with coordination of a kind that calls for rapid and frequent exchanges of messages. This is all the more true because the PLA is trying to reproduce in its mass armies the traditions of rapid maneuver and flexibility that characterized the old guerrilla columns. Given the present communications system, and the lack of army control at battalion, the whole attempt is necessarily doomed to fail. The individual units may be able to retain their aggressiveness, but the lack of coordination will, predictably, often have the effect of immobilizing whole armies.

The PLA's signal equipment is as heterogeneous as its infantry weapons, partly because it includes Japanese, American, Russian, and German items, and partly because the principal means of signaling employed is a series of devices such as whistles, bugles, gongs, and flags. When a PLA unit sounds its bugles before an attack, this is only partly to unnerve the enemy; it is mainly a signal to the PLA troops themselves. Considerable confusion thus results when the enemy "jams" such signals with whistles and bugles of its own.

Material

In all categories the materiel of the PLA is inferior to that of any of the world's major armies. However, inferences from this fact as to its combat capabilities are dangerous. The Chinese soldier is remarkably adept at taking care of himself with whatever equipment he happens to have.

Uniforms

The men in the PLA are issued summer and winter uniforms which are worn until it is no longer possible to patch them. No "spare" uniforms are issued, and few PLA soldiers can afford to purchase even minor accessories. If one sees what seems an odd assortment of uniforms in a typical company it is in part because some of the troops are wearing garments captured from the enemy, in part because of the patches.

The PLA has had a hard time providing shoes for its men. The standard shoe is made of cloth and, what with all the marching the troops are required to do, wears out very quickly. China's shoe factories simply cannot provide enough shoes for an army the size of the PLA, and, this being the case, the Communists have called upon the women of China to "volunteer" to make shoes at home and contribute them to the Army. Aside from a large quantity of fur-lined boots that once belonged to the Japanese, the PLA has never had significant quantities of leather shoes for its men. Individual soldiers will be found wearing US field shoes taken from captured Nationalists, but the PLA itself has never issued footwear of that type. Even in the winter campaigns in Korea few Chinese soldiers wore leather boots.

The uniform, both winter and summer, is made, like everything else the PLA uses in the way of cloth, of cotton. The winter uniform is of bulky padded cotton, like the winter clothing of most Chinese civilians. One of the things that Chinese POWs in Korea say most impressed them when they surrendered was the clothing and blankets that the US Army was prepared to issue to them.

Psychological warfare should constantly stress the theme that the Chinese soldier is ill-clad, ill-shod, and ill-blanketed, and that we are in a position to provide him with needed items if and when he surrenders.

Ordnance

One of the great weaknesses of the PLA lies in the fact that its weapons are not standardized. Through almost all its history, the Chinese Communist Army has had to depend primarily upon captured enemy stocks for its supplies of weapons and ammunition, which has meant that it has had to use whatever types and calibers of weapons came its way. Even today, the PLA is largely dependent upon its captured stocks of Japanese, American, Nationalist, and assorted European arms. This is true even in the category of heavy weapons, which makes major headaches of both ammunition supply and maintenance. Spare parts are seldom available, and repairs are either out of the question or so highly improvised as greatly to reduce firepower.

Communist China's capacity to produce munitions, heavy weapons in particular, is highly limited. However, more than 70 small arsenals have been set up within China, and these, together with the large arsenals developed and expanded by the Japanese in Manchuria, now produce, according to some estimates, around 50 percent of what the PLA needs in the way of small-arms ammunition. They can also supply most of the required quantities of hand grenades, mines, and mortar ammunition.

The two large Mukden arsenals had been capable of producing fairly heavy munitions and ordnance pieces, but American bombing in the Second World War — and Russian and Chinese Communist looting immediately after the War — greatly reduced their productive capacity in these categories. The Communists have now restored their pre-war levels of production.

The only other major arsenal is in Yangku (Taiyuan), Shansi Province, where production is confined to small arms and mortar ammunition. The other arsenals operating in Central China before the Communist take-over were either heavily damaged in the Civil War or dismantled by the Nationalists, and thus pose a problem not of "reconstruction" but of planning and execution of new construction projects.

The Chinese still produce nothing in the categories of heavy artillery, field artillery, anti-tank artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, tanks, and armored combat vehicles. Present supplies of these items, and the ammunition to go with them, therefore came either (via capture) from enemy sources or from the USSR, and over at least the next ten years (failing a large war in which further equipment could be picked up from an enemy) the Soviet Union will continue to be China's sole source of supply for such equipment. Soviet advisors, as pointed out, have been assigned to the PLA for the purpose of hastening standardization of its ordnance, and are presumably in position to arrange for the procurement of necessary items from Russia. These items continue to be delivered to the Chinese at greatly reduced prices, but meeting the required payments is nevertheless a great strain on the Chinese economy, and will continue to be throughout the foreseeable future. The arms shipments, in other words, are not gifts or subsidies, since the Chinese are evidently billed for every item the Russians deliver. Most of it, up to the present time, has been of Russian manufacture, but an attempt is now being made to include in these transactions arms produced in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany.

Unless shipments from Russia are forthcoming in unprecedented quantities, the Chinese will face a serious interim problem with regard to the standardization of weapons in any of the several categories the PLA uses on a large scale. Available estimates of the amounts of equipment taken from the Nationalists and the Japanese are rough at best, but it is a safe assumption that this equipment will keep on being used until present stocks of ammunition are depleted and/or the weapons become unserviceable. For at least the next ten years, then, the PLA will continue to make use of a wide variety of weapons, and the task of maintaining them and supplying ammunition for them will be one of its major staff problems.

The PLA, by comparison with other armies, is highly dependent on and skillful in the use of mortars, and this also is tied up with the backwardness of the Chinese economy. Mortars are easy to manufacture, and even during World War II the Communists produced mortar ammunition in the arsenals they were able to build in the hills around Yenan. Their present supplies of such ammunition are, in consequence, reasonably adequate — sufficient, at least, to permit training and practice with live ammunition.

The average PLA regiment early in the post-November 1950 phase of the Korean war had the following ordnance:

Rifles	614	50-mm Mortar	30
Pistols	180	60-mm Mortar	28
Carbines	162	81-82-mm Mortar	12
Sub-machine guns	168	Anti-tank guns	6
Light Machine guns	94	75-mm guns	3
Heavy machine guns	27	Bazookas	4
		Flame throwers	3

There is reason to believe these regiments were the best-equipped the PLA had. If so, it seems a safe assumption that the Communists are seeking a short-run regimental distribution of ordnance at approximately the level indicated by these figures, which were obtained in interrogations of Chinese POWs (they represent a composite picture of the various regiments for which information was obtained). Some of the entries, for example the low figure for rifles, appear to be open to question. During the Civil War a Communist independent guerrilla battalion of 441 men had 300 rifles, which suggests that in the better-equipped present-day infantry regiment there should be more than 614.*

Tactics and Strategy

Formal training and instruction in tactics and strategy are, even today, not highly developed in the PLA, although some attempts have been made to produce training manuals, and translations have been made of both US and Russian materials.

The tactics and strategy the PLA actually employs are derived mainly from its experience in the guerrilla campaigns of World War II and in the Civil War, and thus relate to a type of warfare the Communists will not necessarily fight again and reflect a situation of availability of resources that no longer exists.

The PLA has developed exceptional skill at executing strategic movements that require mass mobility. This skill is all the more remarkable in view of the PLA's dependence on marching rather than mechanized transportation. During the Civil War the Communists proved that they could march 50 miles in twenty-four hours and be prepared at the end of it to engage immediately in battle. During the Civil War campaigns, this kind of mobility enabled the Communists to keep the initiative in their hands, and to select the time and place at which they would pin battle. They could strike fast and hard where the enemy least expected them to be, and complete their withdrawal before the slower-moving Nationalists could re-deploy their forces.

This strategy involved the adaptation to larger-scale combat of the basic techniques of guerrilla warfare, in which small groups move quickly to deliver blows at the enemy's vulnerable points and then disappear before the enemy can marshal his forces for a counter-movement. Once a battle was under way, however, mobility proved repeatedly to be less of an advantage than the Communists may have hoped, because their inadequate communications prevented them from turning it to any fixed purpose. Thus, though they were

* See *Regg. op. cit.*, p. 345.

still able to get their troops to perform remarkable feats of marching, and did so profitably where strategic maneuvers were concerned, they often found themselves sorely needing new tactics.

Another powerful factor that influences the strategy and tactics of the PLA is its unavoidable reliance upon riflemen for its main fire power. The PLA has built itself, for tactical purposes, around the rifle and the mortar, which is one of the reasons for its remarkable mass mobility. But it means that it can increase its fire power only by building up manpower at or very near the point on which it wishes to put pressure. This greatly increases its own vulnerability, once the additional fire power is built up, to enemy artillery and planes.

In fact, dependence for fire power upon the particular weapons mentioned is the central fact in determining the character of the principal tactical and strategic operations that the PLA regularly executes. It has, for example, always made considerable use of the ambush, which not only dominated its early guerrilla period but continued to be used frequently in the Civil War and even in Korea. Without themselves attempting to hold fixed positions, the Communists would permit the enemy to maneuver himself into a position where he could be trapped in an ambush, which the Communists were able to set up because their weapons were highly portable and could be moved into relatively inaccessible positions — by contrast with the enemy's fire-power, which depended upon more complex means of transportation.

Other tactics that reflect reliance on man-carried weapons are the PLA's famous infiltrations and night movements. In both of these tactics the Communist objective is to achieve surprise and move into a position in which the fighting will take place at close quarters. The enemy then cannot employ his heavier weapons to advantage, and the Communists can engage him, on equal terms or better, with platoon weapons.

The PLA's dependence on riflemen as the major source of fire power also accounts for their "human wave" tactics. As a last resort the PLA commanders seek to increase their fire-power through great frontal assaults by large masses of troops. They are prepared to accept the heavy losses because only so can they hope to balance off the enemy's heavy weapons, the ultimate objective being to create a situation in which they will be able to engage him in close-in-fighting. Here, as in all their other favorite tactics, the Communists attempt to avoid situations in which the enemy's superior fire-power will be decisive, and to force the battle into a phase in which only hand weapons count.

The fact that the PLA is willing to accept tremendous casualties in order to exploit the tactical and strategic advantages of mass manpower does not mean that its commanders are reckless. In fact, extreme caution dominates much of their tactical thinking. Attacks are not attempted unless and until overwhelming numerical superiority has been assured, and protracted periods of regrouping and planning always separate the attacks. Heavy losses are acceptable if victory is the *quid pro quo* (the more since manpower is the resource of which the PLA has most). If, on the other hand, the issues doubtful, the Communist commanders tend to be hesitant and cautious. The PLA is an army of revolutionists, but its tactics are decidedly not revolutionary. According to some available evidence, the Russians are urging the Chinese to adopt more daring tactics. But given their long history of having to conserve and hoard limited stocks of military equipment, and the certainty that for the immediate future the shortages will persist, it is not surprising that the leaders of the PLA choose the more conservative course. Their feelings in the matter are all the stronger, no doubt, because of their experience in the Civil War, in which they were nearly always able to determine the pattern and pace of the conflict, and thus to wait for advantageous situations to develop.

These characteristics of Chinese Communist strategy and tactics are clearly visible in the Ten Military Principles, which the PLA teaches to all officers and NCOs. Although they were developed during the period of guerrilla conflict and came into general usage during the Civil War, they continue to be accepted doctrine throughout the PLA.

(1) First strike at scattered and isolated enemies, and later strike at concentrated, powerful enemies.

(2) First take the small and middle-sized towns and cities and the broad countryside, and later take the big cities.

(3) We take the annihilation of the enemy's fighting strength, and not the holding or taking of cities and places, as the major objective.

(4) In every battle, concentrate absolutely superior forces (double, triple, quadruple and sometimes even five or six times those of the enemy), encircle the enemy on all sides, and strive for his annihilation. Strike the enemy in annihilating combat, striving always to concentrate enough forces to annihilate parts of his forces. Avoid battles of attrition.

(5) Fight no unprepared engagements. Fight no engagements in which there is no assurance of victory.

(6) Promote the valiant combat characteristics of not fearing sacrifice, fatigue, or continuous action, of fighting several engagements in succession within a short period of time without respite.

(7) Strive to destroy the enemy while he is in movement. At the same time, lay emphasis on the tactics of attacking positions and wresting away enemy strong points and cities.

(8) With regard to the question of assaults on cities, resolutely wrest from the enemy all strong points and cities which are weakly defended. At favorable opportunities wrest all of these hostile points which are defended to a medium degree. Wait until conditions mature to wrest all enemy strong points which are powerfully defended.

(9) Replenish ourselves by the capture of all the enemy's arms and most of his personnel. The source of the men and material of our army is mainly at the front.

(10) Be skilled at using the intervals between two campaigns for resting, regrouping, and training troops. The period of rest and regrouping should, in general, not be too long. In so far as possible do not let the enemy have a breathing space.

As can be seen, some of these principles are applicable only to civil war conditions, others describe actual PLA practice, while still others represent ideals that the PLA is still striving to realize. In general, they clearly indicate the type of concepts that dominate the tactical and strategic thinking of the PLA's leaders. The emphasis is upon being certain of all actions and being highly cautious about decisions, on attempting always to exploit the enemy's weaknesses, and on offensive operations with the numerical superiority clearly on your side. There is, moreover, a close identity between Chinese Communist concepts in the field of military strategy and their concepts in the field of political strategy. For them military victories are meaningless unless they include political victories, and political activity is ultimately inseparable from military operations. Already in their guerrilla warfare phase the Communist military leaders divided their attention between political warfare and military operations, and sought above all to coordinate the two. For their guerrilla warfare to be successful, they recognized they had to have the general population politically sympathetic, or at worst politically apathetic. They therefore channelled tremendous energies into political warfare, demagogues, and when persuasion or promises of future rewards failed to elicit support did not hesitate to make use of threats. Their constant use of sudden strikes and raids was, in part, calculated to impress on the population the fact that the Nationalists were unable to preserve peace and order, and their propaganda

always stressed the inability of the Nationalists to protect and defend the "people" and always got across the idea that the Communists could win local victories wherever and whenever they chose. Thus, though initially inferior in power to the Nationalists and hard pressed by them, they were able to maintain the initiative in all local conflicts.

The Communists realized, however, that they would never be able to gain control of the entire country if they continued to practice only a hit-and-run type of warfare. Pin-pricking the enemy could throw him off balance and harass him, but it could never achieve the major victory that would give the Communists control of the country. Even as they continued the tactics of expanded guerrilla warfare, therefore, the Communists were organizing mass armies. Then, with the acquisition of heavy weapons from the Russians after 1945, they slowly shifted over to a more orthodox form of warfare. However, as noted, features of the old guerrilla tactics and strategy still exist in the PLA. The most important of these is the concept of the "short attack," which appears to be one of the favorite military concepts in the PLA. The short attack consists of limited operations, directed at weak points in the enemy's position, in which the objective is not the occupation of territory but the destruction of specific enemy forces. Concentration may be either at a single point in the enemy's position or at several points. The objective is not to obtain either a break-through or envelopment but rather to annihilate specific elements of the enemy. This may be followed by withdrawals for regrouping or by a series of new short attacks.

It may be assumed that much of the strategic thinking of the Communists will be changed as the result of the modernization of the PLA and the immediate direction and teaching of its Soviet advisors. Soviet doctrine will, almost certainly, become the doctrine of the PLA. But this will take time, and in the short run it appears that the Soviet advisors are trying, above all, to add to the infantry power of the PLA the supporting power of artillery. The results are visible even in the Korean war, where the PLA has been noticeably stronger because of the coordination of artillery attacks with infantry assaults. Up to the present, however, the Russians have not succeeded in greatly modifying the PLA's weapons system, and it can be assumed that only in time will the Russians be in a position to provide the armor necessary to alter drastically the PLA's abilities in this field.

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CHAPTER 5

BIOGRAPHIES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS

INTRODUCTION

A selection of biographies of one hundred Chinese Communists now in positions of leadership in Communist China is presented in the following pages. In most cases two brief accounts are offered, one from a US source, namely *Leaders of Communist China* (OIR Report No. 5126, 4 August, 1950), published by the Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition, Department of State, and classified RESTRICTED, the other from an official Chinese Communist source, *The Peoples' Yearbook*, 1950 (*Jen Min Nien Chien*), Ta Kung Book Co., Hong Kong, 1950.

AI Ssu-ch'i 艾思奇

US Source

Member, Committee of Culture and Education of the State Administration Council; member, National Committee of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth; member, representing social scientists in China, of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

AI Ssu-ch'i, one of the Communist Party's leading Marxist philosophers, was born in Yunnan Province. During the Sino-Japanese War he was in Fu-shih (Yenan), where he served as Professor of Philosophy at Yen-an University, assistant editor of the *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* (*Emancipation Daily*), editor of a bimonthly publication *Life of Learning*, and member of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government Council. At one time AI was a member of the Communist Party Central Research Institute. He was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Liberated Areas People's Assembly in July 1945, and served on the Presidium of the All-China Youth Congress in the spring of 1949.

Communist Source

None.

Chang Chih-chung 張治中 (Courtesy name: Wen-pai or Wen-po)

U. S. Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; member, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman of the National Research Section of the People's Revolutionary Military Council; specially invited member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A liberal, Christian military official with a long record of service to Nationalist China, General Chang Chih-chung was born in Ch'ang-yuan, Ch'ao Hsien, Anhwei, of a family of relatively low income. He graduated from the Paoting Military Academy in 1916 and reportedly attended a military academy in the United States. He served in the army of

the Southern Military Government under Sun Yat-sen from 1916 to 1918, and in 1924 was commander of the Cadet Corps of the Whampoa Military Academy. Presumably it was at Whampoa that General Chang and Chou En-lai, then Director of Political Training at the Academy, established their friendship, which has enabled Chang during the past several years to be a valuable negotiator in Kuomintang-Communist conversations.

By 1926 Chang had joined the Northern Expedition as Chief of Staff of the 2nd Division of the Nationalist Army, but left China in 1927 for travels in the United States and Europe. Returning to China in 1929 he served for three years as Dean of the Central Military Academy. Throughout the 1930's he held numerous army commands and in 1937 was elected to membership in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, a position he held until 1949. Chang was Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government in 1939 and 1940, and served in 1941 as aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In the same year he became Director of the Political Board of the National Military Council and Secretary-General of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps. Chang was engaged in negotiations with the Communists from 1944 to 1946, the latter year as the Kuomintang member of General Marshall's three-man military committee. In late 1945 he was sent to Sinkiang Province to negotiate with native elements that had revolted in 1944, established an autonomous regime in the northwest section of the province, and were asking for complete independence. These negotiations, conducted with Soviet representatives as mediators in Urumchi (Tihwa), culminated in an agreement (June 1946) giving the Ili group considerable representation in the provincial government. Prior to the 6 June agreement, Chang had been appointed Director of the Generalissimo's Northwest Headquarters, a post he held until May 1949. He served from May 1946 until April 1947 as Chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, and the improved relations between the Nationalist Government and the Ili group which existed in Sinkiang from 1946 to 1948 have been attributed to his efforts.

In early 1918 Chang was one of those approached by the Russian Ambassador Roschin with an offer of mediation in the Chinese Civil War, and after the fall of Mukden in October 1945 he advocated a re-opening of negotiations with the Communists. He was active from that time until April 1949 in maneuvers designed to end the Civil War. He was appointed Minister without Portfolio in both the Nationalist Sun Fo and Ho Ying-ch'in cabinets, and early in 1949 negotiated with the Russians regarding economic concessions in Sinkiang. He was appointed head of the Nationalist delegation for peace negotiations with the Communists in Peking in the spring of 1949, and following the breakdown of the conversations, remained in Peking, working with the Communist authorities. He reportedly was the person responsible for the peaceful turn-over to the Communists of the Sinkiang provincial authorities, and took an active part at the September-October plenary sessions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Though occupying several important government posts, Chang has been characterized by a Russian lecturer in Moscow as an example of the type of individual whose usefulness to the regime will end when the Chinese Communists have sufficiently solidified their power.

Communist Sources

His courtesy name is Wen-po. Native of Ch'ao Hsien, Anhwei. Sixty-two years of age (1953). Graduate of Paoting Military Academy, Chang was Commandant of the Central Military Academy, Commander of the Fifth Army (Nationalist), personal Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, Governor of Hunan Province, and for a few years Minister of the Political Training Board. After the War of Resistance ended, he was transferred to the post of Director of (President Chiang Kai-shek's) Northwest Headquarters and concur-

rently to that of Governor of Sinkiang. In 1949 he became Administrative Director for the Northwest. Later he played an important role in the peace negotiations between the Communists and the Nationalist Government. Delegate of the People's Political Consultative Conference and Vice-Chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Committee (1950).

Chang Hsi-jo 張奚若 U. S. Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Committee of Political and Legal Affairs, State Administration Council; member, Standing Committee, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing "non-partisan democratic personages," Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of four), China New Political Science Research Association; head, Department of Political Science, Tsinghua University; member, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

Chang Hsi-jo, British-and American-educated political philosopher, was born in Ch'ao-i, Shensi, in 1889. He received his M.A. from the University of London and his Ph.D. from Columbia. In 1926, Chang was Director of the Bureau of International Exchange, Ministry of Education. From 1927 to 1928, he served as Director of the Department of Higher Education of the same Ministry. He was a professor at National Central University from 1927 to 1929, and has been a professor at National Tsinghua University since about 1929. He has been head of the Political Science Department of the Northwestern Associated University. He was a member of the third and fourth sessions of the People's Political Council, but declined to attend the 1943, 1944, and 1945 sessions, reportedly because he thought them futile and partisan. In Kuming, Chang, a leader in liberal circles, was outspoken in his criticism of the Chungking regime. Noted for his integrity and fearlessness, he was reported in 1945 as a strong supporter of "Anglo-Saxon liberal ideas."

Chang was one of the professors who took refuge in the American Consulate in Kuming at the time of the assassination of Wen I-tao. Returning to Peking after the Japanese surrender, Chang continued his criticism of the Nationalist regime and was one of the leaders in the campaign against American aid to China. Since the Communist occupation of Peking he has been active in various Party-sponsored educational and political movements. In April 1949 Chang was a member of the Chinese delegation attending the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace. He served as a member of the Commission on Higher Education of the North China People's Government and as a member of the Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's Preparatory Committee. During the sessions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Chang was a standing member of the Conference's Presidium. In September 1949, he was among those instrumental in the establishment of the China New Political Science Research Association.

Communist Source

Native of Shensi. Chang Hsi-jo is over sixty years of age (1953). In his early years he was a member of the Tung Meng Hui. He worked hard for the Cause during the Revolution of 1911. But after the Tung Meng Hui was reorganized into the Kuomintang in 1911 and before he went to the United States, he formally severed his relations with the Shensi Provincial Kuomintang branch. After his return to China, Chang devoted himself to academic and educational work. He first served as chief of the Department of Higher

Education of the Ministry of Education and then became a professor at Tsinghua and other universities. In 1949 and 1950, because of poor health, he lived on the Tsinghua campus and seldom left it. In April 1949, he attended the World Peace Conference. He is Vice-Chairman of the Committee of Political and Legal Affairs of the Central People's Government and chairman of the Department of Political Science at Tsinghua University (1950).

Chang Lan 張蘭 (Courtesy name: Piao-fang)

US Source

Vice-Chairman (one of six), Central People's Government Council; Chairman, China Democratic League; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; member, representing the China Democratic League, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of six), Preparatory Committee, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

Chang Lan, elderly, distinguished Chairman of the China Democratic League, was born in 1872 at Nan-ch'ung, Szechwan. Following a period of revolutionary activity, Chang was a delegate from Szechwan to the Peking Parliament. In 1914, he took part in raising an army in his native province to depose Yuan Shih-k'ai and to restore the Republic. He served as Civil Governor of Szechwan from about 1915 to 1918, and was President of Chengtu University from 1918 to 1931. Though elected to the People's Political Council in 1938, he was never active in the Council.

An outspoken critic of the Kuomintang Government, Chang joined the Federation of Democratic Parties soon after its organization in 1941, and later assumed its chairmanship. He was also Chairman of the China Democratic League, successor organization to the Federation, and was active in the Chengtu branch of both organizations. At the Political Consultative Conference of January 1946, Chang Lan was a member of the China Democratic League delegation. Chang has been quite fearless in expressing his own views even when this could have involved him in great personal danger. On 15 August 1946, he presided over a Chengtu memorial meeting held for Democratic League members Wen Y-tao and Li Kung-po, who were assassinated in Kunming. After the outlawing of the Democratic League by the Nationalist Government in October 1947, Chang Lan lived in retirement in Shanghai until the Communists took over in May 1948. Shortly thereafter he went to Peking where he served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's Preparatory Committee, and during the Conference sessions in September and October 1949 was a member of the Standing Committee of the Presidium.

Communist Source

Native of Nan-ch'ung, Szechwan. Eighty years of age (1953). Received the Lin-sheng degree during the Ch'ing dynasty. Studied in Japan. Formerly Governor of Szechwan and President of Chengtu University. Many military men of Szechwan have been his students. He is a good orator, and bitterly attacks dictatorship and despotism in every speech. When the old People's Political Consultative Conference was in session at Chungking, he represented the Democratic League. After Chiang Kai-shek declared the Democratic League "illegal," he lost his freedom in Shanghai. After the liberation of Shanghai, he proceeded to Peking. He participated in the People's Political Consultative Conference, again as a representative of the Democratic League, and became a standing member of the Presidium of the Conference. Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council (1950).

Chang Po-chan 章伯鈞

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member and Minister of Communications, State Administration Council; member, Committee of Finance and Economics of the State Administration Council; Chairman, China Peasants and Workers Democratic Party; member, Central Executive Committee, China Democratic League, and head, League's Organization Department; member, Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; member, representing the China Democratic League, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Standing Committee, China New Political Science Research Association; member, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; publisher of the *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Peking organ of the China Democratic League.

A German-educated philosopher and Third Party leader, Chang Po-ch'ün was born in Tung-ch'eng, Anhwei, in 1895. After graduation from Peking University, he studied philosophy at the University of Berlin from 1922 to 1925 and, during this period in Germany he was closely associated with Chu Teh. Though reportedly a member of the Berlin branch of the Chinese Communist Party, Chang has denied this; he has, however, admitted an interest in Marxism. Returning to China, he taught at the Anhwei Provincial Normal School, and later he served as head of the Propaganda Section of the General Affairs Department of the Kuomintang in Wu-han. In 1927 he was dismissed from the Kuomintang for ultra-leftist leanings. He was one of the founders of the Third Party (now the China Peasants and Workers Democratic Party), which grew out of the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927. Chang participated in the Fokien Rebellion (1933), and then left for Japan back in China, he was named a member of the First People's Political Council. He was later deprived of his seat because he criticized the government at the time of the New Fourth Army Incident in 1941, but he regained his membership in the PPC by 1944.

Long an advocate of coalition government, in July 1945 Chang was one of the PPC members sent to Yunan (Fu-shih) by the Kuomintang to sound out the Communists on the question of participation in the proposed National Assembly. He later was a member of the Kuomintang-sponsored Political Consultative Conference and was accused at that body's meetings of being a spokesman for the Communists. He fled to Hong Kong shortly after the China Democratic League was outlawed in October 1947, and has since that time been highly critical of the Kuomintang. He left for Communist-occupied China in September 1948, and in the summer of 1949 was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. He was a member of the Standing Committee of the Presidium of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference session in September and October 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Tung-ch'eng, Anhwei. Fifty-seven years of age (1953). After graduation from the Department of Foreign Languages of the Normal University of Wu-ch'ang, Chang Po-ch'ün became principal of a normal middle school at Tung-ch'eng. Later, he went to Germany on a government scholarship, and took courses in philosophy at the University of Berlin. While studying in Germany, he came to know T'ung Yen-ta and others, participating with them in the activities of the Kuomintang; began his career as a revolutionary. At the time of the Northern Expedition, he was called back to China by T'ung Yen-ta. He went by way of Hong Kong to Wu-han to participate in the Northern

Expedition Government. After the split between the Wu-han and Nanking governments, he retreated with the Revolutionary Army to Kiangsi and then withdrew with Yeh T'ing, Ho Lung, and others to Kwangtung. Finally he escaped to Shanghai and took refuge in the foreign concessions there. With T'an Ping-shan and Chu Yun-shan, he laid the foundation for the Third Party. During the War of Resistance, he took part in the People's Political Consultative Conference. Later he joined Chang Lan and others in organizing the Democratic League. Represents the Democratic League in the People's Political Consultative Conference. Minister of Communications of the Central People's Government (1950).

Chang Ting-ch'eng 張鼎丞

US Source

Member, Central Committee of the Communist Party; Chairman, Fukien Provincial People's Government; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, State Administration Council; Political Commissar, Fukien Provincial Military District; member, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Chang Ting-ch'eng, Communist Party military official, was born in 1898 in Yung-ting, Fukien. He was educated in rural schools and at the Kwangtung Farmers Institute. A school teacher prior to 1922, he became active in revolutionary work and joined the Communist Party in 1927. In 1929 Chang established a "soviet government" in western Fukien, of which he became chairman. He was elected to membership in the Central Committee of Kiangsi Soviet in November 1931 and was appointed Land Department head of the Kiangsi Soviet Government. He apparently did not make the Long March, but seems instead to have remained behind in Kiangsi with guerrilla forces that later became the nucleus of the New Fourth Army. For several years during the Sino-Japanese War, Chang commanded the 7th Division of the New Fourth Army. Following the Japanese surrender, he was appointed commander of the Communist Central China Military District. He was elected to membership in the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress, held in Fushih (Yenan) in April 1945. From 1947 to 1949, he served as Deputy Commander in Chief of the East China People's Liberation Army (later designated the Third Field Army), and was appointed to his present Fukien positions in August 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Yung-ting, Fukien. Fifty-five years of age (1953). Came of a family of poor farmers. In his earlier years Chang was a primary school teacher in the countryside and witnessed exploitation by the landlord class. His revolutionary ardor was thus aroused. In 1922 he studied at the Farmers' Training Center in Kwangtung. At that time, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party were cooperating with each other, and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, in addition to planning the revolution, was responsible for the training of cadres for agrarian revolution in the Farmers' Training Center. In his early days, therefore, Chang received the teachings of Chairman Mao. After graduating from the Farmers' Training Center, he returned to his native community, and began to organize the farmers. In 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the cause of revolution, General Chang Ting-ch'eng began to organize an armed force of farmers in western Fukien. With Ting T'ai-hui, he led the Western Fukien Red Guerrilla Force to welcome the great Red Army as it advanced eastward. He developed a center of revolutionary power in western Fukien, organizing the farmers of the area. Chang Ting-ch'eng was then elected member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Western Fukien Soviet Government.

In October 1931, when the Red Army started its Long March, General Chang was ordered to remain in the Fukien-Kiangsi Border Region to continue leading the people in guerrilla warfare and revolutionary activity. During the War of Resistance, he participated in the New Fourth Army. He was elected Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the Seventh Plenary Conference of the Chinese Communist Party, and Governor of Fukien Province (1950).

Chang Tung-sun 張東蓀

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, Committee of Culture and Education; professor of Philosophy, Yenching University; member of the Secretariat and member of the Standing Committee, China Democratic League; member, representing the China Democratic League, of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Standing Committee, China New Political Science Research Association; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Shensi Provincial People's Government.

Chang Tung-sun was born in 1886 at Hangchow, Chekiang. He has two sons, both of whom were educated in the United States and are members of the Democratic League. One son is working in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Communist North China Government. Chang Tung-sun received his B.A. degree in philosophy from Tokyo Imperial University in 1916. Some of his publications are: *New Philosophy, Moral Philosophy: The Rejection of Dualistic Materialism*. A participant in the 1911 Revolution, he was appointed secretary at the Ministry of Interior of the Nanking Provisional Government. He was an editor of *Righthousness*, an anti-Yuan Shih-k'ai magazine founded in Shanghai by the Democratic Socialist, Hsu Fu-lin. Following Yuan's death, Chang became chief secretary of the restored Peking Parliament. Previous to his appointment as professor of philosophy at Yenching (a position which he has occupied since 1929) he served as editor of the *China Times* in Shanghai. Acting President of the China Institute in Wu-sung, and Dean of the College of Arts at Kuanghua University in Shanghai. With Carson Chang, he founded the National Socialist Party in 1929. Shortly after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, he founded the Northern branch of the National Salvation Association. He was arrested by the Japanese about the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and was in prison until 1943. In 1945, he published the *Cheng Pao*, a liberal paper in Peking. Chang was a representative of the China Democratic League in the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) of January 1946.

In December 1946, Chang withdrew from the Democratic Socialist Party (reorganized from the National Socialist Party), and later he organized a reformist group of the party. However, he continued to be active in the China Democratic League, serving as its Secretary-General from 1946 to 1947. Chang has been active in political, cultural, and educational movements in Peking since the Communist occupation. He served as a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and participated in organizing the China New Political Science Research Association.

Communist Source

A native of Hangchow, Chekiang. Born in 1886. Sixty-seven years of age (1953). Graduate of the Imperial University of Tokyo. During the past twenty years, Chang Tung-sun has lived in North China and has devoted himself to teaching, primarily in the Department of Philosophy of Yenching University. During the War of Resistance, he remained at his educational post in Peking, and was thrown into a concentration camp when the Japanese Army took the city. But from beginning to end he did not yield. With the

Japanese surrender, he was finally released. He attended the old People's Political Consultative Conference as a representative of the Democratic League. Later he returned to the North.

Chang Tung-sun's academic career began with the study of the idealistic philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Later he shifted his interest to the writings of George Berkeley. He went finally to Germany, where he acquired a thorough understanding of Kant. Upon his return to China his thought underwent a great change. He became interested in rationalism and inclined toward materialism. He has participated in the People's Political Consultative Conference on behalf of the Chinese Democratic League and has been a member of the Presidium of the Conference. He is a Member of the Committee of Culture and Education of the Central People's Government (1950).

Chang Wen-t'ien 張聞天 (Alias: Lo Fu)

US Source

Member, Central Committee and Politburo, Communist Party; member, Northeast People's Government; member, Northeast Bureau, Communist Party; designated head, Central People's Government's delegation, United Nations and concurrently representative, Security Council (in expectation of future accreditation).

Chang Wen-t'ien, who during the 1930's was more commonly known as Lo Fu, is considered one of the Communist Party's foremost Marxist theorists and is one of its most prolific authors. He was born in Nan-hui, Kiangsu (a suburb of Shanghai), of a wealthy farmer family. He studied at the Wu-sung Middle School for three years, and then attended the Yellow River Conservancy School in Nanking. In 1919 he left school to participate in the May Fourth Movement and, going to Shanghai, became associated with the Chung Hua Book Company and the Commercial Press. While an editor of the Commercial Press, Chang became acquainted with Shen Yen-ping (Mao Tun) and his brother Shen Tse-min. According to his story, it was through Shen Tse-min (who later served as Chief of the Department of Propaganda of the Communist Party during Ch'én Shao-yu's period of leadership) that Chang met Mao Tse-tung. Chang spent six months in Japan in 1920 and later that same year came to San Francisco, where for a year-and-a-half he worked on a Chinese-language newspaper and attended the University of California.

Returning to China in 1922, he taught in several schools in Szechwan and in 1925 joined the Communist Party in Shanghai. Chang was in Moscow from 1926 to 1930, studying first at Chungshan University and later teaching at the Institute of Red Professors and Lenin University. While there, he became closely associated with Ch'én Shao-yü and Wang Chia-hsiang. The three men are said to have been proteges of Pavel Aleksandrovich Mif, vice-president of the university. They returned to China in 1930 with Mif, following the latter's appointment as Comintern Representative to the Far East. This group was among those opposing the then Chinese Communist Party leadership under Li Li-san. In January 1931, when the Li leadership was overthrown, Chang was elected a member of the Politburo and the Central Committee. For the next two years he served in the Shanghai Party headquarters, for a time as Chief of the Department of Organization, but in 1935, fled to the Kiangsi Soviet where he became People's Commissar of Propaganda. He made the Long March, and in January 1935 was elected Secretary of the Party Central Committee and concurrently a member of the Party Secretariat. He continued in these posts following establishment of Communist Headquarters in Yenan (Fu-shih). While Chang, with his associates Ch'én Shao-yü and Wang Chia-hsiang, was among the most prominent Chinese Communist leaders in the 1930's, the three appeared to be in eclipse from 1942 to 1945.

Though the connection cannot now be established, this occurred either at the time of or following the so-called "ideological remoulding movement." Possibly Chang retained his party positions, but during these years his activities were not recorded in available sources. In April 1945 he was reelected to the Party Central Committee and the Politburo; in November of that same year he went to Manchuria, where he served as Political Commissioner of the Ho-chiang Military District and secretary of the Ho-chiang Provincial Committee of the Communist Party.

Presumably Chang remained in Manchuria until early 1950. He was closely associated with the Northeast People's Government and its predecessor, the Northeast Administrative Council. On 20 January 1950 he was appointed head of the Central People's Government delegation to the United Nations and representative on the Security Council pending future accreditation. This appointment marked the return of the last of this group of three Comintern-trained men to positions of prominence. In October 1949, Ch'én Shao-yü became Chairman of the Law Commission, and Wang Chia-hsiang was appointed the Central People's Government's Ambassador to the USSR.

Communist Source

Native of Nan-hui, Kiangsu. Fifty-three years of age (1953). In his early years, he was a leading member of the Literary Research Society and was intimate with such famous authors as Chu CH'ü-po, Shen Yen-ping, and Shen Tse-min. Later he joined the Chinese Communist Party. He went to Moscow to study in 1926 and returned in 1929. He has been successively a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, member of the Politburo, head of the Central Department of Farmers in the Party, head of the Party's Central Department of Organization, member of the Secretariat of the Party, head of the Central Information Department, Chairman of the People's Commission, member of the Central People's Government Council, head of the Southeast Work Corps, member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and standing member of the Committee of the Northeast branch of the Party. Chief Delegate of our country to the United Nations (1950).

Chang Yun-i 張雲逸

US Source

Member, Central Committee of the Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; vice-commander, South China Military Headquarters, Chinese People's Liberation Army; second secretary, South China Bureau of the Communist Party; Chairman, Kwangsi Provincial People's Government; member, representing the South China People's Liberation Army, of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Central and South Military and Political Affairs Committee.

Chang Yun-i was born in 1897 in Kwangsi Province and is a graduate of the Puotung Military Academy. He joined the Communist Party in 1927 and was at one time a leader of the Seventh Red Army. In 1940 Chang was Chief of Staff of the New Fourth Army; he became Commander of the 2nd Division of that army in 1941. By 1943 he had become a vice-commander of the New Fourth Army. Though the army was redesignated several times, Chang continued as vice-commander under Ch'én I until at least April 1946. Chang was elected to the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress held in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 1945, and from 1946 to 1947 he was Director of the East China Military and Political College in Shaoting. By late summer 1949 he had been transferred to the deputy command of the South China People's Liberation Army.

During the September-October 1949 session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Conference's Presidium.

Communist Source

Native of Hainan Island. More than fifty years of age (1953). In his boyhood, he studied in the Army Primary School at Canton. Later he graduated from the sixth class of Praoting Military Academy, and returned to Kwangtung, where he served in the staff section of T'eng K'eng's 1st Division of the Kwangtung Army. When Mr. Sun Yat-sen organized the National Revolutionary Army, and General Li Chi-shên assumed the command of the Fourth Army, Mr. Chang served as a staff officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel (in the Fourth Army). Later he was transferred to the post of Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army.

When the Northern Campaign reached the Yangtze River, Chiang Kai-shek betrayed Dr. Sun Yat-sen and adopted a counter-revolutionary policy. Mr. Chang, therefore, resolutely participated in the Nanchang coup d'état and started making his great contribution to the cause of the Chinese Revolution. Later, a central revolutionary base was established at Jui-chin and he went to work there.

After the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, the Red fighters remaining south of the Yangtze River were organized into a Fourth Army. Chang took an indirect route from the Northwest to the region south of the Yangtze River, and served in the army headquarters there. Later when the general headquarters of the People's Liberation Army ordered General Ch'ên I to establish the East China Military Zone, Ch'ên appointed General Jao Shu-shih Political Commissar and General Chang Yin-i Deputy Commander in Chief and concurrently Chief of Staff for the region. Later, under General Chang's courageous and intelligent leadership, the East China Liberation Army advanced from Central Kiangsu into Shantung, engaging in the battle of Huai-hua, the Yangtze River Drive, and the siege of Shanghai. The army inflicted total defeat upon the reactionary Kuomintang Forces. Governor of Kwangsi Province (1950).

Ch'ên I 陳毅 (Courtesy name: Chung-hung)
US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Commander, Third Field Army, Chinese People's Liberation Army; second secretary, East China Bureau, Communist Party; Mayor of Shanghai; Chairman, Shanghai Military Control Commission; President, East China Military and Political College; member, representing the East China Liberated Area, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Standing Committee, Shanghai General Labor Union; member, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Commander, East China Military District; member, East China Military and Political Affairs Committee.

A high-ranking Communist general with a long record of field experience, Ch'ên I was born in 1898 in P'eng-an, Szechwan, of a wealthy farming family. Upon graduation from a technical high school in Chengtu, he became a member of the "worker-student" group that went to France in 1919. After preparatory work at schools in Paris, Lyon, and St. Germain, Ch'ên studied chemistry at the University of Grenoble and together with Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, and others of the Chinese students became a founder of the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Participation in a Chinese student movement caused him to be expelled from France in 1921, and upon his return to China he became a political worker in the forces of the Szechwanese warlord Yang Sên, founding and editing in Chung-

king the leftist newspaper *Hsin Shu Pao*. Ch'ên went to Peking in 1923. There he joined both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and attended the Sino-French University, from which he graduated in 1925. The same year he proceeded to Canton, joining the Northern Expedition and serving for a time as an instructor at the Whampoa Military Academy. Later he headed a military academy near Hankow. He joined the Communist Forces in Nanchang following the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, and accompanied the troops of Yeh T'ing and Ho Lung in their march into Kwangtung Province. In 1928 he became Director of the Political Department of the Fourth Workers and Peasants Red Army commanded by Chu Teh, and during the period of the Kiangsi Soviet organized and led various guerrilla groups. In 1931 Ch'ên was elected to membership in the Kiangsi Soviet Central Committee and was appointed Chairman of the Communist Kiangsi Provincial Government.

He did not make the Long March, but commanded guerrilla troops in South China from 1929 until 1937 at which time his guerrilla bands were included in the newly-formed New Fourth Army commanded by Yeh T'ing. After the arrest of Yeh in 1941, Ch'ên assumed the post of acting commander of the New Fourth Army and was appointed Commander of that Army in 1946, a post he still holds, although the New Fourth Army has been redesignated several times, most recently being designated the Third Field Army. Ch'ên was elected to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the Seventh National Party Congress held in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 1945. In May 1949 his troops captured Shanghai, and immediately following the occupation he was appointed mayor of the city, as well as Chairman of the Shanghai Military Control Commission. He has been active in all Party-led movements and activities in Shanghai since that time. Ch'ên was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and during the plenary sessions of the conference in September and October 1949 served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Presidium.

Communist Source

Native of Szechwan. More than fifty years of age (1953). Like General Nieh Jung-chên, Ch'ên studied in France as one of the "worker-students," and is one of the very few high-ranking generals of the Chinese Communist Party who is a trained engineer. When he was preparing to enter a French school of electrical engineering, he joined the Socialist Youth Corps, the predecessor of the Chinese Communist Party, but before finishing his studies, he was deported by the French Government. Starting in 1921, he managed the *Hsin Shu Pao* (*New Szechwan Newspaper*) at Chungking for two years. Later, he joined the Communist Party at Peking. In 1927 he went to the Soviet Region in Kiangsi. When the Red Army marched west, he was left behind to conduct guerrilla warfare. As Commander of the New Fourth Army, he defeated several tens of thousands of reactionary forces. During the War of Liberation, he won one distinguished victory after another in Shantung, northern Kiangsu, and the Nanking-Shanghai area. Mayor of Shanghai (1950).

Ch'ên King 陳庚

US Source

Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; Deputy Commander, Second Field Army, Chinese People's Liberation Army; Commander, Fourth Army Group, Second Field Army; Director, Department of Public Safety, Shanghai Military Control Commission (does not, however, seem to have assumed this post).

Ch'ên K'eng, Number two man in Liu po-ch'eng's Second Field Army, was born in 1904 in Hsiang-shiang, Hunan, of a wealthy landlord family. He is a graduate of both the

Kwangtung Military School and the first class of the Whampoa Military Academy. He attended school in Moscow in 1926. At one time he served as Chief of Chiang Kai-shek's bodyguard and was once credited with saving the Generalissimo's life. Ch'en participated in the Nanchang Uprising and the Canton Commune. After they failed, the Communist Party, which he had joined in 1927, assigned him to underground activity in Shanghai. About 1930 he was active in the O-yü-wan (Hupei-Honan-Anhwei) Soviet, and by 1933 he was director of the Red Army School in Jui-chin, Kiangsi.

One of the military leaders of the Long March, in 1936 Ch'en became commander of the 1st Division of the First Red Army and following the reorganization of the Communist Armies in 1937 was appointed commander of the 386th Brigade of Liu Po-ch'eng's 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Throughout the Sino-Japanese War, he was active mainly in southeastern Shansi. In 1946 he was the Communist Party representative on the Yangku (Taiyuan) Field Team of the Peking Executive Headquarters. Ch'en has been closely associated with Liu Po-ch'eng since at least 1937 and is currently Liu's deputy commander. He was elected an alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 1945, though prior to that time he seems to have been a regular member of the committee.

Communist Source

Native of Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan. Fifty years of age (1953). In his teens he gave up the pen for a military career. In the army of Lu Ti-p'ing, he served as a soldier of second rank for five years, enduring the hardships involved without complaint. Later, he obtained a chance to study at Canton Military School. After the rise of the revolutionary tide of thought, he entered Whampoa Military Academy.

During the Northern Expedition, he joined the Communist Youth Corps. In the fifteenth year of the Chinese Republic (1926) he went to study in Moscow. One year later, he returned to China and participated in the Nanchang coup d'etat. Then he led Red troops in battle, and was seriously wounded.

At Jui-chin he was for some time Principal of the Red Army School. Later he led students in the 25,000-li Long March. After his arrival in northern Shensi, he became a commander in the 1st Division of the First Army.

During the first stage of the War of Resistance, he was a brigade commander of the 129th Division (whose Commander was Liu Po-ch'eng) of the Eighth Route Army, and fought against the Japanese invaders in the Niang-tai-kuan area in Shansi.

During the War of Liberation, he led the People's Liberation Army of Southeastern Shansi across the Huang (Yellow) River, winning one victory after another in their march southward. In 1949 Kwantung was liberated, and he continued to push southwest. An alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and commander of the Second Field Army (1950).

Ch'en Ming-shu 陳銘書 (Courtesy name: Chen-ju)

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; member, representing the San Min Chu I Comrades Association, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Standing Committee, San Min Chu I Comrades Association; member, Standing Committee, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and the China Democratic League; a senior official, Shanghai branch, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; member, Central and South Military and Political Affairs Committee.

Ch'en Ming-shu was born in 1889, in Ho-p'u, Kwangtung. He received his education at Paoting Military Academy. An early revolutionary, he was a member of the Tung Meng Hui, predecessor of the Kuomintang. About 1924, he was on the general staff of the Kwangtung Army 1st Division. For his achievement in defeating Ch'en Chung-ming, he was promoted to be commander, 10th Division, Fourth Army, and concurrently commander of the Southern Route Army. In 1926, he went to Hunan with Pai Ch'ung-hai and persuaded the leaders there to join the revolution. Leading two divisions, he took Wu-ch'ang and defeated Wu Pei-fu. Ch'en became Garrison commander of Wu-ling and concurrently commander of the Eleventh Army. In 1927, when the Communists rebelled in Kwangtung, he went as commander of the Eleventh Army and concurrently commander of the East Route Army to defend Kwangtung. He later became Chief of the General Political Bureau of the Nationalist Army Headquarters. He was Governor of Kwangtung from 1928 until his expulsion by Ch'ei Chi-t'ang in 1931. From 1931 to 1932, Ch'en was Garrison Commander of the Shanghai-Nanking area, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan, and concurrently, Minister of Communications.

Ch'en was considered the moving spirit behind the Nineteenth Route Army's resistance against the Japanese invasion of Shanghai in 1932. His participation in the Fokien Rebellion in 1933 led to his expulsion from the Kuomintang. In May 1936, he was reported as being in Moscow, returning to China in January of the following year. During the war and post-war years, Ch'en remained relatively inactive. He was reported to have been an emissary of Li Chi-shên in negotiations with officials of Shanghai to arrange its surrender to the Communists on the Peking pattern. Ch'en was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and during the conference sessions in September and October 1949 was a Presidium member.

Communist Source

Native of Kwangtung. Studied at Paoting Military Academy. During the Northern Expedition, he was Commander of the Eleventh Army and Director of its Political Department. He participated in the Fokien coup d'etat. In South China he ranks second only to Li Chi-shên in prestige and record of service. Formerly he was Commander of the Nineteenth Route Army, and during the cooperation between Nanking and Kwangtung in 1932 he served as Garrison Commander for Nanking and Shanghai. After the incident of 28 January 1932, he was always discriminated against by Chiang Kai-shek. During his stay at Chungking, he lived on the southern bank of the Yangtze River, reading books, practicing calligraphy, and studying Buddhism. After our victory over Japan, he returned to Nanking, and quietly led the life of a gardener. He participated in the People's Political Consultative Conference on behalf of the San Min Chu I Comrades Association. Member of the Presidium of the Conference and of the South Central Military and Administration Committee (1950).

Ch'en Po-ta 陳伯達

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; Vice-Director, Propaganda Department, Communist Party Central Committee, Vice-President, Institute of Marx and Lenin; Vice-President (one of four), Academy of Science, State Administration Council; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Committee of Culture and Education; member, representing social scientists in China, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A well-known Marxist theoretician and Communist Party historian, Ch'en Po-ta was born in 1905 in Hunan, Fukien, and studied at the Ch'ng P'ei (Ch'ng) School in Amoy, a

school founded by Tan Kah-kee. He later graduated from the Chungshan University in Moscow. A Party member by 1927, he was teaching in Peking in 1930, and apparently remained in that city until 1937. In that year he went to Yen-an (Fu-shih) as a propagandist for the Party and has been connected with the Party Propaganda Department since that time. In 1943 he was reported as secretary to Mao Tse-tung. Ch'én is the author of numerous books, his best known works being a *Critique of Chiang Kai-shek's China's Destiny*, and *Four Great Families*. At one time during the Sino-Japanese War, he was in Chungking where he edited the Party newspaper, the *Hsun Hua Jih-pao*, and was active in the Livelihood Book Company. Reported as a member of the Communist Party Central Committee in 1940, Ch'én was elected an alternate Central Committeeman at the Seventh National Party Congress held in Fu-shih in April 1945. He is presently a regular member, having replaced a deceased colleague. Ch'én accompanied Mao Tse-tung to Moscow in December 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Hui-an, Fukien. More than forty-five years of age (1953). Of poor family. Studied at Chi-mei School. After graduation served as a small clerk in the army of Chang Ch'én.

He secretly participated in the revolution and was arrested at Nanking. Chang Ch'én tried his best to have him released but Chiang Kai-shek would not release him. After a few years of imprisonment, he was released and went to Peking.

After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he went to Yen-an (Fu-shih), and became a lecturer on "The Problem of China" at the Central (Communist) Party School.

In recent years, he has written many books which have attracted the attention of the world: *The Four Big Families of China* and *The Common Enemy of the People: Chiang Kai-shek*, both constituting a most searching analysis of the political and economic conditions under the Kuomintang reactionary rule; *Consult the Masses, Don't Disrupt the Existing Industrial Set-up, The Crucial Problem: How to Study Intelligently*, etc. He is a first-rank theorist in the Chinese Communist Party.

Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences (1950).

Ch'én Shao-min, Miss 陳少敏
US Source

Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; committee member, People's Procurator General's Office; member, Executive Committee, All-China Federation of Democratic Women; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the All-China Federation of Labor, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Miss Ch'én Shao-min, alias "Big Sister Ch'én," a woman guerrilla leader, was born c. 1908 in Tsinan, Shantung, and is a graduate of the Northeastern University. Though a member of the Communist Party since 1929, she was not among those who made the Long March. During the Sino-Japanese War she commanded forces around the Wu-han area and served in various capacities in the Central China Bureau of the Communist Party. In the fall of 1945 Miss Ch'én was acting chairman of the People's Representative Assembly of Hupeh, Honan, and Anhwei and was assistant secretary of the Central China Bureau of the Party. She was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the Seventh National Party Congress held in Yen-an (Fu-shih) in April 1945 and was chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the East China Women's Representative Conference in February 1949. In September and October 1949 Miss Ch'én served on the Presidium of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

Native of Shantung. About forty-three years of age (1953). Became a heroine during the 25,000-li Long March of the Red Army. At the beginning of the War of Resistance, she was a close aide of General Li Hsien-nien. She went south from Chu-kou in Ch'üeh-shan, Honan, and established a guerrilla base in the Ta-pieh Mountain region. She was in charge of Party work of the whole border region, and directed local organization, people's political rights, and nursery school work. In 1944, with the establishment of the Chung-yuan Military Zone, she was on duty at Hsiao-hua-shen on the Pai-cho Hill at the foot of the Ta-hung Mountain, commanding a garrison regiment and directing the military operations west of the Peking-Hankow railroad. A delegate to the People's Political Consultative Conference (1950).

Ch'én Shao-yü 陳紹禹 (Alias: Wang Ming)

US Source

Member, Central Committee and Politburo, Communist Party; Director, Commission of Law; committee member, Supreme People's Court; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Standing Committee, China New Political Science Research Association; member, representing social scientists in China, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Founders Committee, New China Jurisprudence Research Institute.

A Russian-educated former Secretary-General of the Communist Party, Ch'én Shao-yü was born in 1907 in Liusan, Anhwei, of a wealthy farmer family. He studied at the Japanese Dolan Shoin College in Shanghai and later, following his graduation from the University of Shanghai, went to Moscow where he joined the Chinese Communist Party. He studied at Chungshan University from 1925 until 1927, and it was during these years that he was first connected with the Comintern. In 1927 he returned to China as interpreter for Pavel Aleksandrovich Mif, then Vice-President of Chungshan University, but went back to Moscow later in the same year. Ch'én attended the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in 1928 and was also present at the Sixth National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held near Moscow in August of the same year.

By 1930 he was back in China serving in the Shanghai branch Party headquarters. Ch'én was a moving spirit in a Communist Party group which at this time opposed the then Party leadership of Li Lissan. When Li, with the approval of the Comintern, was ousted from Party posts, Ch'én became one of the foremost members of the Party, being elected to membership in both the Central Committee and Politburo in 1931 and assuming the post of Party Secretary-General later in the same year. He served in this latter position briefly, and, in 1932, went to Moscow where for six years he was the Communist Party representative to the Comintern. From 1933 to 1935 he was a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935 was re-elected to that position as well as being made an alternate member of the ECCI Secretariat. In 1937 Ch'én returned to China, becoming associated with the development of the United Front Movement, of which, by 1938, he had become the head. He was a member of both the Second and Third People's Political Councils, but does not seem to have attended any of the council meetings in Chungking.

In 1942 Ch'én was removed from his positions in the Communist Party as the result of a "purge," the nature and cause of which are largely unknown. He remained inactive for several years, although he was re-elected to membership in the Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress held in Fu-shih in April 1945. In 1947 Ch'én was

reported head of the Research Department of the Communist Party Central Committee and more recently has headed its Law Committee. The date of his reported recent appointment to the Party Politburo is unknown. Ch'en is married to Méng Ch'ing-shu, Party member and one-time Director of the Communist Women's University in Yen-an (Fu-shih).

Communist Source

Native of Liu-an, Anhwei. More than forty years of age (1953). In his early years he participated in student movements, joined the Chinese Communist Party, studied in France, was a leader in organizing for the revolution, and served as the Chinese Communist's delegate to the Comintern. In 1931 he was a professor at the Sun Yat-sen (Chungshan) University in Moscow. During the War of Resistance, he was a member of the People's Political Conference on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Vice-Chairman of the Committee of Political and Legal Affairs of the Central People's Government, and Chairman of the Law Codification Commission of the State Administration Council (1950).

Ch'en T'an-ch'iu 陳潭秋

US Source

A little-known Central Committee member, Ch'en T'an-ch'iu was born c. 1899 in Hupeh Province. He studied in the USSR and was one of the Party founders in July 1921, attending the First National Party Congress as a delegate with Tung Pi-wu from the Wu-han area. Ch'en was elected to membership in the Central Committee at the Sixth National Party Congress, held in 1928 near Moscow, and it is thought that he studied in the Soviet Union at that time. In 1931 he was reported to be head of the Ministry of Food in the Kiangsi Soviet. He later was active in Party work in Sinkiang Province, where he was arrested and imprisoned for some years. Ch'en was released by the Kuomintang in 1946, went to Yen-an (Fu-shih), and has been unreported since that time. Member, Central Committee, Communist Party.

Communist Source

None.

Ch'en Yun 陳雲

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; Vice Premier (one of four), State Administration Council; Chairman, All-China Federation of Labor; Chairman, Committee of Finance and Economics; Minister of Heavy Industry; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A top-level Communist economist and labor expert, Ch'en Yun was born in 1901 in Shanghai and received a primary school education. He was at one time employed by the Commercial Press in Shanghai, later joined the Workers' Guild and was employed by the Chung Hua Book Company in Shanghai. Joining the Communist Party in 1924, Ch'en was active in the Shanghai general strikes in 1925 and 1927. Following the Kuomintang-Communist split he went to the Kiangsi Soviet, where he was a member of the Labor Union Organization sponsored there by the Communist Party. He was first elected to membership in the Party Central Committee in 1934, participated in the Long March, and served as

Chairman of the National Soviet Labor Union. He reportedly went to the USSR for training following the Long March and worked in Sinkiang Province in 1937 and 1938 in liaison with Soviet officials.

In Yen-an (Fu-shih), in 1939, he became first Deputy Chief and later Chief of the Department of Organization of the Communist Party, a post he held until 1944. Ch'en was elected to the Politburo in 1945 and in January 1946 went to Manchuria, where he became Secretary of the Northeast (Manchuria) Bureau of the Party. Later in the same year he became Chairman of the Commission of Finance and Economics of the Northeast Administrative Council, a position he held until May 1949. Ch'en was a member of the Presidium of the Sixth All-China Labor Congress, held in Harbin in August 1949, and was named Chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor organized by the Conference. In November 1948 he assumed the chairmanship of the Mukden Military Control Commission (the Mukden Military Government), and in April 1949 is reported to have attended the Tenth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions in Moscow. Ch'en was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and during the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference sessions in September and October 1949 was a member of the Conference's Presidium.

Communist Source

His real name is Liao Ch'eng-yün. Native of Ch'ing-p'u, Kiangsu. Forty-nine years of age (1953). Formerly he was a typesetter of the *Commercial Press*. While in Shanghai, he devoted himself to the labor movement by educating and organizing workers. He was active in the justifiable struggle against imperialism of 30 May 1925. He worked for the improvement of the livelihood of the workers and thus became an outstanding labor leader. Later, he entered the Soviet region in Kiangsu, and became an organizer of the Central Government of the Chinese Communists. After his arrival in northern Shensi, he became head of the Central Department of Organization of the Communist Party and together with Li Fu-ch'un was in charge of the work of examining and educating the party cadres. Later on, he assumed the post of head of the Northwest branch Committee of Finance and Economics to promote industrial reconstruction and step up agricultural production. After our victory over Japan, he marched into the Northeast with Lin Piao and Kao Kang and directed all organizational and economic activities. At the All-China Workers' Conference he was elected Chairman of the Presidium. When Mukden was recovered, he was appointed Chairman of the Military Control Committee of Mukden. Vice-Premier of the State Administration Council of the Central People's Government, and concurrently Minister of Heavy Industry (1950).

Ch'eng Ch'ien 程潛 (Courtesy name: Sung-yun)

US Source

Vice-Chairman (one of five), People's Revolutionary Military Council; member, Central People's Government Council; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, Hunan Provisional Military and Political Committee; specially invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Central and South Military and Political Affairs Committee.

A high-ranking Kuomintang military official who defected to the Communists in July 1949. General Ch'eng Ch'ien was born in 1881 in Lichang, Hunan. He is a graduate of the Hunan Military Academy and the Japanese Military Cadets' Academy. Following his return to China he took an active part in the 1911 Revolution. Closely associated with Sun Yat-sen, Ch'eng occupied a series of military posts, including that of Minister of Mil-

tary Affairs of the Provisional Government in Canton. He became a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in 1927 and during the Northern Expedition commanded the Sixth Army. A member of the State Council of the Wu-han Government, he was appointed Governor of Hunan in 1928 by the Nanking Government, though he had been deprived of membership in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. He was arrested late in 1928 by Li Tsung-jen for suspected counter-revolutionary activities against the Nanking regime. Released in 1929, he lived in retirement in Shanghai until his reinstatement as a Central Executive Committeeman in 1931.

From 1935 until 1937 Ch'eng was Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army and in 1939 served as Governor of Honan. Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters in the Northwest in 1939 and 1940, he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army in 1940, a post he held until late 1945. During this period he was a member of the Chinese mission that attended the Cairo conversations with American and British leaders. From 1946 until 1948 Ch'eng was Director of the Generalissimo's Wu-han Headquarters and in the spring of 1948 was one of the unsuccessful candidates for the Vice-Presidency of China. He was appointed Governor of Hunan in June 1948, a post he held at the time that he defected to the Communists. General Ch'eng's name had previously appeared on the Communist War Criminal List.

Communist Source

Native of Li-ling, Hunan. Seventy-three years of age (1953). Ch'eng Ch'ien received his Hsiao-tsi degree during the Ch'ing dynasty. After graduating from the Military Officers' School of Hunan, he went to Japan to study at the Japanese Military Academy. During the Northern Expedition, he was Commander of the Sixth Army, and received credit for the siege on Chin-chiang and the occupation of Nanking. During the first stage of the War of Resistance, Mr. Ch'eng succeeded Liu Chih as Commander in Chief for the First War Zone. Later, he became Chief of Staff of the Military Council, and Superintendent of Military Training. Besides, he has held the posts of Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters in the Northwest, member of the Supreme National Defense Committee, Chairman of the Party and Political Committee for the War Zones. After the conclusion of the War of Resistance, he was transferred to the post of Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters in Wuhan. In 1948, he ran for the Vice-Presidency of the Generalissimo's Headquarters in Wuhan. When the People's Liberation Army reached Changsha, he resolutely rebelled against Chiang. Vice-Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council (1950).

Ch'eng Wei-sun 程位三

U.S. Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Ch'eng Wei-sun was born in 1901 in Huanan, Hupeh. He is a college graduate who joined the Communist Party in the early 1920's. Following the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927 Ch'eng was active in the O-yu-wan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhui) Soviet, but by 1934 he had been ordered to northern Shensi. During the Sino-Japanese War, he returned to Central China where he served as Political Commissioner of the 5th Division of the New Fourth Army. In 1945 he became Secretary of the Central China branch Bureau of the Communist Party and in 1946 was appointed Secretary of the reorganized

China Bureau. Ch'eng was elected a Central Committee member of the Communist Party at the Seventh National Party Congress in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 1945.

Communist Source
None.

Chi Ch'ao-t'ing 冀朝鼎

U.S. Source

Deputy Director, Bank of China; manager, People's Insurance Company; member, Committee of Finance and Economics; Director, Foreign Capital Enterprises Bureau Committee of Finance and Economics.

Chi Ch'ao-t'ing, economist and statistician, was born in 1903 in Feng-yang, Shansi, the son of Chi Kung-ch'uan, now a professor in the Law Department of National Peking University. He married an American, whose father was a well-to-do businessman in New York. They have two children. A graduate of Tsinghua University (1921), he received a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1927, and a Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1936. His doctoral thesis entitled *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History* won for him the Seligman Economics Prize.

He was a lecturer in the New School for Social Research, New York, from 1934 to 1937, and from 1939 to 1940 was a research staff member of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Until the summer of 1945, when he accompanied H. H. Kung to China, Chi served successively as private secretary to K. P. Chen, as Assistant Vice-President of the Universal Trading Company in New York City; Secretary-General of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, and secretary to H. H. Kung. Concurrent with some of these posts, he was Secretary-General of the Stabilization Board of China from July 1941 until April 1944 and Secretary-General of the Foreign Exchange Control Commission from 1943 to 1945. Chi was Director of the Economic Research Department of the Central Bank of China from 1944 until he went to Peking in January 1949, ostensibly to assist Fu Tso-i in setting up the Economic Monetary Commission. He has also been a member of the Jehol Provincial Government. Appointed economic adviser to the People's Bank in Peking in April 1949, Chi assumed the post, two months later, of Deputy Manager of the Bank of China. He attended the Third ECAFE Session (Delaware and, India, June 1948) and the Fourth ECAFE Session, Lapstone, Australia, in December 1948. He was named by the Chinese Communist Government as their intended representative to the ECOSOC in February 1950.

Communist Source

Native of Shansi. Son of Chi Kung-ch'uan, former Commissioner of Education for Shansi Province (under the Nationalist Government). Chi graduated from Tsinghua University. He studied in the United States and received his Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University. Ch'ien Kuang-p'ing, former Commissioner of Education for the Assistant Manager of the Universal Trading Company.

In 1941, when the Stabilization Board of China was established, he came back and served as the Secretary-General of the organization. Also he attended the World Monetary Conference and the Far East Economic Conference. After the Foreign Exchange and Assets Control Commission (successor of the Stabilization Board of China) was abolished, he was appointed director of the Economic Research Division of the Central Bank.

When the situation in North China was tense, he left his work in the Economic Research Division of the Central Bank and flew to North China to help Fu Tso-yi in the peace move-

ment. Head of Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Trade of the Central People's Government (1950).

Ch'ien Ch'ang-chao 錢昌照 (Courtesy name: 1-4)

US Source

Member, Committee of Finance and Economics; vice-head (one of three), Central Planning Bureau; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; specially invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Ch'ien Ch'ang-chao was born in 1901 in Ch'ang-shu, Kiangsu. He studied at the London School of Economics and Political Science from 1919 to 1922 and at Oxford University in 1922 and 1923. Returning to China, Ch'ien held a number of posts in government service. In 1927 he was Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and during the following two years held the position of Senior Secretary of the National Government Headquarters. In March 1931 he was appointed Administrative Vice-Minister of Education and served in that capacity until 1934. Later Ch'ien was Deputy Secretary-General of the National Defense Planning Council, and from 1935 to 1938 was Deputy Secretary-General of the National Resources Commission. In 1938 he was appointed Deputy Director of the National Resources Commission, and Director in May 1946. Ch'ien was elected an alternate member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in May 1945. He was succeeded as Director of the National Resources Commission in April 1947 by Wang Wen-hao, a close associate, but remained in the commission organization as an adviser. Generally regarded as having been close to T. V. Soong, Ch'ien in February 1948 was one of the sponsors of the Chinese Association of Social and Economic Research, an organization financed largely by Soong. Though an individual desirous of government reform and considered progressive among Chinese government circles, Ch'ien seemingly had no contact with anti-Kuomintang elements until his appearance as a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. A 1945 Communist Party report has described Ch'ien as able and pro-American.

Communist Source

Native of Ch'ang-shu, Kiangsu. More than fifty years of age. Brother-in-law of Huang Pu and Shen Yi. Ch'ien studied in London and Oxford Universities. He worked under the Chiang regime as secretary of the Nationalist Government, Vice-Minister of Education, Deputy Secretary-General of the National Defense Planning Committee, Vice-Chairman, Chairman, Director-General, and Adviser of the National Resources Commission. Now he has taken the side of the people. Special delegate at the People's Political Consultative Conference, and elected member of the National Committee of that Conference. Assistant head of the Central Financial and Economic Planning Bureau (1950).

Ch'ien San-ch'iang 錢三強

US Source

Member, Committee of Culture and Education; member, Executive Committee, World Federation of Democratic Youth; Vice-Chairman (one of four) and member, National Committee, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Ch'ien San-ch'iang, a French-educated atomic scientist, was born c. 1912 in Choking and is a 1936 graduate in physics from National Tsinghua University. With his wife, Ho

Tsé-wei, also an atomic scientist, Ch'ien spent several years studying in France and did research under Mme. Joliot-Curie at the Curie Institute, where he specialized in atomic physics and is said to have discovered a new method of splitting uranium. Both Ch'ien and his wife were connected with the French Academy of Science in 1946 and 1947, and in December 1946 he attended the First Session, UNESCO General Conference, Paris, as an expert with the Chinese delegation. The couple returned to China in 1948, previously having been appointed members of the Academia Sinica's Atomic Research Department. Following his return Ch'ien taught at National Peking University. He was a delegate of the China Scientific Workers' Association to the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace in April 1949 and in that same month was elected a vice-president of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth. He was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in the summer of 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Shao-hsing, Chekiang. About forty-three years of age (1953). Son of Mr. Ch'ien Hsuan-t'ung, the historian. Ch'ien received his B.S. degree in Physics in 1936 from Tsinghua University in Peking. He received a scholarship from the China Education Foundation and went to France in 1937 for advanced study. When he was in Paris, he entered the Curie Institute and studied radium with Mme. Joliot (Miss Curie). He received the French doctorate degree in 1943 and remained in France during the occupation. Besides working in the Curie Institute, he engaged in research and directed research students in the Atomic Research Laboratory of the College of France under the leadership of Professor Joliot. His wife, Dr. Ho Tsé-wei, and he are co-discoverers of the three- and four-part fission of the radium atom, and, together, won international acclaim as atomic physicists.

Chou En-lai 周恩來 (Courtesy name: Shao-shan)

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat, Communist Party; Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, State Administration Council; member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of five), People's Revolutionary Military Council; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of five), National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Standing Committee, China New Political Science Research Association; Vice-Director (one of six), Preparatory Committee, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Chairman, Committee of Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Chinese Communist Party's top negotiator, Chou En-lai was born in 1898 in Huai-an, Kiangsu Province, of the local gentry. His family moved to Mukden when he was thirteen years of age. Two years later, he left for Tientsin, where he studied at Nankai Middle School. In addition to having received advanced training at Yuseida and Nankai Universities, Chou studied in France, Germany, and the USSR. His wife, Ts'ing Ying-ch'ao, who was a leader of a radical students' movement in Tientsin when he first met her, is now an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

In France under the "worker-student" plan, Chou, along with such present-day prominent Communists as Chen I, Li Fuch'an, Nieh Jung-chén, Li Li-san, Li Wei-han, and others, founded the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. With Chu Teh, he also established the Berlin branch of the Party. Returning to China in 1924, Chou became Secretary of the Kwangtung Provincial Communist Party and served as political instructor

and Acting Chief of the Political Department of Whampoa Military Academy. He was secretary to General Blücher, a Russian adviser at the military academy. Among Chou's students were such Communists now well-known in the Party's military ranks as Lin Biao, Ch'ên I, Hsi Hsiang-shên, Hsiao Ching-kuang, and Nieh Ho-tung, most of whom shared the bitter struggles in Nanchang and Canton following the Kuomintang-Communist break in 1927. The esteem in which the Whampoa cadets held Chou En-lai has been credited with saving him from execution in 1927, after his arrest in Shanghai.

He was appointed by the Communists to head Party work in the Kuomintang armies in 1926, but was later assigned to organize workers in Shanghai where he led the uprising of 21 March 1927, which ended in failure when Chiang Kai-shek entered the city. Arrested, Chou escaped and later went to Moscow, where he studied at Chungshan University from 1927 to 1930 and served as Chinese delegate to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. He was back in China in 1931 and joined the Kiangsi Soviet as Secretary of the Central Communist Bureau. In 1932, he became Political Commissar under Chu Teh. He participated in the Long March in 1934 and was appointed a member of the Politburo.

Chou's reputation as a negotiator apparently dates back to December 1936, when he served as the chief Communist representative in negotiations which finally resulted in Chiang Kai-shek's release at Sian. He was Communist representative in Nanking and later Chungking, 1937 to November 1946, and was involved in all negotiations between the Communists and the Central Government. Heading the Communist delegation at the Peking negotiations with Nationalists to discuss peace terms in April 1949, he later became one of the leading organizers of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. One of his most publicized official acts since becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs is the negotiation of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship, which he signed in Moscow, 14 February 1950.

Communist Source

Born in Hui-an, Kiangsu in 1896 [sic]. Parents came from Shao-hsing, Chekiang. After graduation from Nankai University in Tientsin, he went to France for advanced study. He organized the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps in Paris. Chou came back in 1923 and became Secretary of the Kwangtung branch of the Chinese Communist Party, Director of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy, and Director of the Political Training Class of the Military Council. In 1930, he was one of the chairmen of the Politburo and, concurrently, Chief of the Department of Military Affairs. He was Assistant Chief of the Political Department of the Military Council during the War of Resistance and chief delegate of the Chinese Communist Party to the Chungking meeting of the former Political Consultative Conference. Vice-Chairman of the Central Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Committee, representative of the Party in the People's Political Consultative Conference, standing member of the Presidium of that Conference; he is also Premier of the State Administrative Council of the Central People's Government and, concurrently, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1950).

Chou Yang 周扬 (Courtesy name: Ch'i-yang)

US Source

Vice-Minister (one of two), of Culture; member, Committee of Culture and Education; Vice-Chairman, National Committee, All-China Federation of Literature and Arts; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member,

representing the All-China Federation of Literature and Arts, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

One of the top Communist Party cultural and educational leaders, Chou Yang was born in 1908 in I-yang, Hunan. After graduation from the Great China University in Shanghai in 1928, he did research in Marxist sociology and literature in Tokyo. Arrested in Japan in 1929 and subsequently released, he returned to China, where he was active from 1930 to 1937 in the Leftist Writers' Union in Shanghai. In 1937 Chou went to Yenan (Fu-shih) where for eight years he served as President of the University and concurrently as Dean of the Lu Hsun Academy of Arts. During this period he held the directorship of the Bureau of Education of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region Government and was also a member of the Border Region Government Council. In 1946-1947 he was President of the North China Union University in Kalgan. Following the formation of the North China People's Government, Chou served as Chairman of the North China Cultural Work Committee and as Secretary General of the Commission for Higher Education of the government. He has recently been active in the establishment of the All-China Federation of Literature and Arts.

Communist Source

None.

Chu Teh (Chu Te) 朱德 (Courtesy name: Yu-Chieh)

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat, Communist Party; Vice-Chairman (one of six), Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of five), People's Revolutionary Military Council; Commander in Chief, Chinese People's Liberation Army; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; member, representing the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

The venerated military leader of the Communist Party, Chu Teh was born in 1886 in I-lung Hsien, Szechwan Province, of a peasant family. He received his education at the Yunnan Military Academy and in Europe, particularly Berlin, from 1922 to 1926. Having previously established the Berlin branch of the Kuomintang, he also founded, in collaboration with Chou En-lai, the Berlin branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Deported from Germany for subversive activities in 1926, Chu returned to China via Moscow. In 1927, in conjunction with other military leaders, he led an open revolt against Chiang Kai-shek in Nanchang. Defeated, they attacked Szeaton and Canton. Both campaigns ended in failure and they retreated through southern Kiangsi and western Fukien. Chu joined forces with Mao Tse-tung at Ch'ing-king Mountain on the Kiangsi-Fukien border in May 1928 and was made Commander of the First Red Army Corps in 1930. Elected Commander in Chief of the Communist Armies in 1931, a post which he continues to hold, he was in charge of military tactics for the Long March in 1934 when he was also named a member of the Party's Politburo.

Chu served as a member of the Supreme National Defense Council, Commander of the Eighth Route Army and Vice-Commander of the Second War Zone, during the period of the United Front with the Kuomintang. Since the early thirties, Chu and Mao have been referred to as the duumvirate of the Chinese Communist Party. Though he is a greatly respected military leader, Chu's role is apparently the more nominal of the two, as he has never had the political stature of Mao.

Communist Source

Born on 30 November 1286, in I-lung Hsien, Szechwan. Of poor family but studied under an old-fashioned tutor at the age of five.

Chu began to participate in revolutionary activities when he was twenty-three. He joined the Tung Meng Hui before the 1911 Revolution when he was at the Yunnan Military Academy. After graduation, he served as an officer in charge of a *lien* (nominally 126 men) under Ts'ai O. When the 10 October Revolution broke out, he followed General Ts'ai O in leading a righteous rebellion in Yunnan. During the campaign for the Protection of the Constitution, he was Commander of the 3rd section of the First Army of the National Forces. He went to Europe when he was thirty-six, and became acquainted with Chou En-lai in Germany. Soon, he joined the Communist Party and found, at last, the ideal he had been pursuing consistently. During his years in Europe, he studied the theories of Marxism and Leninism industriously, and continued his revolutionary activities at the same time. Finally, the German reactionaries forced him out of the country.

After Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution, Ho Lung, Yeh Ting, and he organized and led the "August 1st" Nanchang righteous uprising, and established the Chinese people's own armed forces. Soon after, he and Chairman Mao joined hands at Ch'ing-kang Mountain and created the Soviet regime in Hunan and Kiangsi. During the ten years of civil war, they firmly upheld their struggle against dictatorship, imperialism, and feudalism. They broke out of the enemy's sieges time and again and established the laws of the revolution, called "The Three Disciplinary Laws and Eight Important Regulations." He was commander of the 1st Division of the Chinese Workers' and Farmers' Red Army, Chairman of the All-China Soviet Military Council. He was elected member of the Central Committee of the Party in 1930.

After the outbreak of the "July 7th" War of Resistance, the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, of the National Revolutionary Forces, of which he was the Commander in Chief. After the war, the Kuomintang reactionary forces attacked the people of the liberated areas. He led several million people's soldiers in angry resistance, broke the enemy's attacks, and turned his efforts into a big counteroffensive. All China was liberated after more than four years of war. Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council and, concurrently, Vice-Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council (1950).

*Feng Wen-pin 冯文彬**U.S. Source*

Member, Supreme People's Court; Secretary-General, Central Committee, China New Democracy Youth Corps; Chief, Youth Workers Department, All-China Federation of Labor; member, Executive Committee, World Federation of Democratic Youth; member, National Committee, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; Secretary, Youth Activities Committee, Communist Party Central Committee; Principal, Central Corps School, China New Democracy Youth Corps; member, representing the China New Democracy Youth Corps, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

The experienced leader of the Communist Party youth organizations, Feng Wen-pin was born in 1911 in Chu-chi, Chekiang. After two years of primary school education, he went to Shanghai in 1919 with members of his family to work in a match factory. Feng joined the Communist Youth League in 1927 and the Chinese Communist Party a year later. After 1927 he worked as an apprentice for a coal company and became active in the

trade union movement. He entered the Soviet zone of Fukien in 1930 and there engaged in youth work in the Fourth Red Army. By 1933 Feng was Secretary of the Communist Party Headquarters in Fukien and Political Commissar of the Communist Youth League. He made the Long March and on 30 July 1936 was elected 11th Secretary of the Communist Youth League. This organization was abolished in 1937 and Feng became Chairman of the youth movement of the Chinese Communist Party, a position he still holds. He was reported in 1940 and again in 1943 as a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party but evidently was not re-elected to membership in the committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 1945. He was active in the All-China Youth Congress in April 1949, was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, and a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

Native of Chu-chi, Chekiang. Forty-two years of age (1953). Was a child laborer. At eight years of age worked in a Shanghai match factory with father and younger sister. Studied in elementary school for one year. Later, studied in evening school for a period. He served as an apprentice in a coal mining corporation in 1927. He participated in the labor union movement and joined the Communist Party Youth Corps at the same time. Officially, Feng joined the Party the next year. In 1930, he was forced to leave the Shanghai Labor Union and went to the West Fukien Soviet region due to pressure from the reactionary government. He was sent to work in the Fourth Army of the Red Army and was, subsequently, Political Director in the Radio Corps, Communication Corps, and the Special Police Corps. He was Secretary of the Fukien Provincial Committee in 1933, Secretary of the National Youth Corps after the Long March, and a leader in youth work in the liberated areas during the War of Resistance. Member of the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League, Principal of the Youth League School, Executive Member of the All-China Federation of Labor, member of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth and head of the Youth Workers (1950). He is an outstanding leader of the Youth Movement (1950).

*Fu Tso-i 傅作义 (Courtesy name: I-sheng)**U.S. Source*

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Minister of Water Conservancy; member, Committee of Finance and Economics; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; specially invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, Suiyuan Military and Political Affairs Committee; Commander of the Suiyuan Military District.

The long-time warlord of Suiyuan Province who in 1948 served as Commander of the Kuomintang North China Bandit Suppression Headquarters, General Fu Tso-i was born in 1895 in Jung-ho, Shansi, the son of a middle class farming family. Following his graduation from the Paoting Military Academy in 1918, he joined the forces of Yen Hsi-shan, Shansi war lord, and served successively as a battalion, regimental, and division commander. Fu was made Commanding General of the Fifth Army and Garrison Commander of Tsentsin during the Northern Expedition and through the 1920s was in command of various Armies and Army Groups. In 1931 he became Governor of Suiyuan Province, a post he held until 1946. From 1939 to 1945 he served concurrently as Deputy Commander in Chief of the Eighth War Zone.

In July 1945, Fu was made Commander in Chief of the Twelfth War Zone and in October 1946 became Governor of Chahar. During 1947 he served as Commander of the Wanchuan (Kalgan) Pacification Headquarters and in December of that year was named Commander of the North China Bandit Suppression Headquarters, charged with the defense of North China against the Communists. Fu surrendered his troops to Communist Forces in late January 1949. Though following his surrender he occasionally has been described as a prisoner, he nonetheless was instrumental in the defection of Suiyuan Provincial authorities to the Communists and is now again in command of the Suiyuan Military District.

Communist Source

Native of Shansi. Born in 1893 [sic]. Graduate of the Paoting Military Academy. He was formerly a subordinate of Yen Hsi-shan and became famous in the defense of Chochou. He was Chairman of the Suiyuan Province and Commander of the war zone. After the Japanese surrender, he led his troops back to Pao-t'ou, Suiyuan. When the Liberation War started, he led his troops into Wanchuan and, later, took over Chahar. Tung Ch'i-wu, one of his subordinates, became Chairman of Suiyuan. During the Peking-Tientsin battle, General Fu made a righteous and firm decision to fall in line with the people. Furthermore, he went to Suiyuan in person and persuaded Tung Ch'i-wu to start a righteous rebellion. Minister of Water Conservancy of the Central People's Government and, concurrently, Chairman of the Suiyuan Military and Administrative Committee (1950).

Ho Hsiang-ming, 何香凝 (Married name: Mme. Liao Chung-k'ai)

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Procurator General's Office; Chairman, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; Honorary President, All-China Federation of Democratic Women; member, Executive Board, International Federation of Democratic Women; member, Central Standing Committee, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; member, representing the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

The widow of Liao Chung-k'ai, early associate of Sun Yat-sen, and a Finance Minister of the Provisional Government of Canton, Miss Ho Hsiang-ming was born c. 1881 in Nanchai, Kwangtung. She graduated from the Tokyo Girls' Art School and while in Japan joined the Tung Meng Hui. Following her marriage to Liao, who was assassinated in 1924, she was active in revolutionary work and was elected a member of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee in 1924. At one time Miss Ho headed the Kwangtung Provincial Kuomintang Party Headquarter's Women's Department and in 1927 was head of the Women's Department of the Executive Headquarters of the Party's Central Executive Committee. Later she was appointed a special member of the Nationalist Government in Nanking and served as Chairman of the Women's Department of the Central Kuomintang Party Headquarters. Politically inactive in the 1930's, Miss Ho was among those who protested the New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941 and were critical of the Kuomintang's part therein. She was reported to be a member of the Kwangtung branch of the China Democratic League in February 1946, and early in 1948 she, with Li Chi-shên, Li Chung-ia, and others, organized the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. Arriving in Peking 12 April 1949, Miss Ho was subsequently elected honorary President of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women. She was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. She is the mother of Liao Ch'ing-chih, member of the Communist Party Central Committee, and of Miss Liao Mêng-hsing (Cynthia Liao), for some time one of the secretaries to Mme. Sun Yat-sen.

Communist Source

Wife of the Revolutionary hero, Liao Chung-k'ai. Although more than seventy, she still possesses a youthful spirit. She has devoted herself to the revolution, doing her utmost to improve the cause of the Kuomintang, and continuing to uphold the three great policies that Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed during his later years. When she was twenty-three and studying in Tokyo, she joined the Tung Meng Hui. Liao Chung-k'ai and she were school-mates at that time. In 1924, when Dr. Sun was reorganizing the Kuomintang under the principles of his three great policies (known as the famous 1924 reorganization of the Kuomintang), Liao Chung-k'ai and she were his most powerful supporters. She was a member of the Kuomintang Central Committee and member of the Political Conference. During the War of Resistance, she traveled in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Kwei-lin, comforting wounded soldiers and doing relief work among people in distress. After the Hunan-Kwangsi big retreat, she strongly continued resistance behind the enemy lines in southeast Kwangsi. Representative of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee in the People's Political Consultative Conference, one of the chairmen in the Presidium of the Conference, and Chairman of the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs (1950).

Ho Lung 賀龍 (Courtesy name: Yün-ch'ing)

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; commander, Northwest Military Headquarters, Chinese People's Liberation Army; Chairman, Sian Military Control Commission; member representing the First Field Army, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

One of the most prominent Communist Party military leaders, Ho Lung was born in Sang-chih, Hunan, the son of a poor but locally important military official and Elder Brother Society leader. (The reported dates of Ho Lung's birth differ by as much as twenty-three years; it seems likely, however, that he was born c. 1896). He received no formal education and his early life was spent in "banditry." He joined the Tung Meng Hui by 1911. By 1925 Ho received a commission in the Hunan Provincial Army and the following year his forces were incorporated into the Nationalist Armies. At the time of the Nanchang Incident in which he participated, he commanded the Twentieth Army of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army. He joined the Communist Party in 1927, participated in the occupation of Szechow and, following the Communist defeat there, fled to Hong Kong. Later he secretly went to Shanghai but by 1928 had returned to Hunan where he established the Hunan-Hupeh Soviet. From 1930 to 1937 Ho commanded the Second Front Red Army and during these years participated in the Long March. In 1937 his army was redesignated the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, a force he commanded throughout the Sino-Japanese War. A member of the Communist Party Revolutionary Military Council by 1937, Ho was elected to membership in the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress held in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 1945. Commander of the Shensi-Suiyuan People's Liberation Army in 1946 and 1947 and later Commander of the Northwest People's Liberation Army, Ho Lung has been active in military operations in the northwest since V-J Day.

Communist Source

Native of Sang-chih, Hunan. Born in 1895, of a poor farmer family. He was commander of the 1st Division of the Ninth Army during the Northern Expedition. After serving under General Yeh Ting in the Nanchang uprising, he joined the Chinese Com-

unist Party, serving as Commander of the Second Front Army of the Red Army. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he was Commander of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army. In the Communist Army he holds a meritorious record, having won both the soldiers' and the people's hearts. After the War of Resistance, he was stationed in the Chung-t'ao Mountain area for some time, giving the enemy such a headache that he was referred to as the "appendix of North China." In the later period of the War of Resistance, he was ordered to defend Yen-an (Fu-shih). Commander of the Shansi-Suiyuan Zone of the People's Liberation Army (1950).

Hsieh Chueh-tsai 謝德哉

US Source

Member, State Administration Council; Minister of Interior; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; member, Commission of Law; member, representing social scientists in China, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A Communist Party elder, Hsieh Chueh-tsai was born c. 1883 in Ning-hsiang, Hunan, and received the Hsiu Ts'ai degree under the Manchu regime. An early member of the Kuomintang, he served during the early 1920s as an executive committee member of the Hunan Provincial Party Headquarters. In 1924 Hsieh edited the *Hunan Min Pao* in Changsha, and the following year joined the Communist Party. At the time of the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, Hsieh fled to Shanghai and from there proceeded to Manchuria, where for two years he engaged in underground activity in Mukden. He was connected with the Hunan-Hupeh Soviet from 1931 to 1933, but during the latter year went to Shanghai where he was active in the Shanghai General Labor Union. Arrested in 1933 in Shanghai by the Kuomintang, Hsieh was subsequently released. He then went to the Kiangsi Soviet where he became Secretary-General of the Soviet Government.

Hsieh participated in the Long March, became Secretary of the Shensi Provincial Soviet Government and by 1937 was the Secretary of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government, a post he held for several years. In 1943 Hsieh was Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party's Education of Party Workers Department and concurrently served as Vice-President of the Administrative College in Yen-an (Fu-shih). From 1944 to 1947 he was the Vice-Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region People's Political Council, and in 1948 and 1949 served as Minister of Justice, and member of the Government Council of the North China People's Government. He has also been Chairman of the Law Committee of the Communist Party Central Committee and was reported by Nationalist sources in December 1947 to have headed a Communist military mission to the Soviet Union.

Communist Source

Native of Ning-hsiang, Hunan. Sixty-four years of age (1953). Began his career teaching in a higher primary school. Later, Hsieh worked as Editor of the *Tung Su Jih Pao* (Popular Daily) in Changsha. During the time of the Northern Expedition, he was Chief Editor of the *Hunan Min Pao* (Hunan People's News), official paper of the Kuomintang Provincial Headquarters. After the Nationalist-Communist split, he went from Shanghai to the Kiangsi Soviet region. He participated in the 25,000-li Long March. After Peking and Tientsin were liberated, he became a member of the North China People's Government Council and head of its Department of Justice. Minister of the Interior of the Central People's Government (1950).

Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien 徐向前

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member and Chief of Staff, People's Revolutionary Military Council; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, Yangku (Taiwan) Military Control Commission; Deputy Commander, North China Military Headquarters, Chinese People's Liberation Army; member, representing the First Field Army, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A Whampoa-educated Communist military leader, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien was born c. 1902 in Wu-t'ai, Shansi, of a small landlord family. His father was a teacher and Hsu Ts'ai scholar. Hsu received an elementary education in Shansi schools and following his graduation from the Taiyuan Normal School, taught in the primary school attached to the Ch'uan Tze Middle School founded in Wu-t'ai-shan by Yen Hsi-shan. In 1921 he entered the first class of the Whampoa Military Academy, graduating six months later. For the next two years he fought in Northern China with forces opposing Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Tso-lin, and in 1926 became an instructor at the Wu-ch'ang Military and Political Academy. Hsu joined the Kuomintang in 1924 and was a Communist Party member by 1926. In 1927 he participated in the Nanchang Uprising, later led a detachment of factory workmen in the Canton Commune, and, when this latter revolt failed retreated to the Hai-lu-feng Soviet, where he was active until that government was repressed by the Nationalists. Hsu escaped to Shanghai, but by 1929 he had arrived in areas near Wu-han and later that same year became Vice-Commander of the 31st Division located in the O-yu-wan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhui) Soviet.

In 1931 Hsu had become Commander of the Fourth Front Red Army and a year later transferred the army base from the O-yu-wan Soviet to Szechwan where for three years he was in charge of military activities in the Szechwan Soviet. It was in the Szechwan Soviet that the main forces of the Communist Armies on the Long March joined with Hsu's troops. At this time an intra-Party conflict broke out, Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh advocating a continuing march north to Shensi, while Hsu and Chang Kuo-t'ao, political leader of the Szechwan Soviet, wanted to remain and develop the base in Szechwan. This conflict was partially ended when the Chiang Kai-shek Forces entered Szechwan from the east and north and the Mao-Chu policy was followed. By December 1936 Hsu's troops had entered Shensi. In 1937 he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council and that same year following the reorganization of the Communist Army, was appointed Deputy Commander of the 125th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

In the early years of the Sino-Japanese War, Hsu commanded elements of the 129th Division in Shantung and Hupeh, but Communist sources state that by 1941 his health required retirement from active army command. However, in 1943, he was reported as Chief of Staff of the United Defense Headquarters of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia and the Shansi-Suiyuan border regions. Hsu was re-elected to membership in the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945, and in 1947 and 1948 served as Commander of the Shensi-Hupeh-Shantung-Honan Military District. He has been deputy commander of the North China Military Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army since 1947 and was a member of the North China People's Government Council in 1948 and 1949. Hsu assumed directorship of the Yangku (Taiwan) Military Control Commission on 24 April 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Wu-t'ai, Shansi. Fifty-one years of age (1933). Graduate of Taiyuan Normal School. Later, as a result of his revolutionary awakening, he went to Kwangtung and graduated in the first class of Whampoa Military Academy. He joined the Northern Expedition in 1925 and fought as far as Wu-han. In 1926, he was Director of the Political Corps in the branch school of the Central Military and Administrative School. He was a member of the Communist Party at that time.

After the Nanking-Hankow split, he went back to Canton and led the workers' group participating in the Canton uprising. After its failure Ch'eng Tau-hua, he, and others went to the Hsi-feng-Lu-feng-Peng-shun (Hsi-hu-feng) Soviet region and worked in the Training Corps. He went to the Soviet region near Wu-han in June 1929 and stayed there until 1932. He was commander of the 31st Division and by contending with the reactionary army developed revolutionary strength.

In 1932, he fought westward, straight to North Szechwan, and established the North Szechwan Soviet region there. He expanded his troops to nearly one-hundred-thousand men, crushed the attacks of the troops under the Szechwan militarists, Liu T'ai-un-hou, T'ien Sung-yao, Yang Sen, and Teng Hsi-hou, and thus was able to formally establish the "Soviet Region" system.

In the beginning of the War of Resistance, he became Deputy Commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Together with General Liu Poch'eng he spearheaded the Communist Army into North China, and built up the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Region. In the Liberation War, his troops were busy fighting in southeast Shansi, northwest Honan, and in the battlefields at Shantung. Chief of Staff of the People's Revolutionary Military Council (1950).

Hsu Ping 徐平

US Source
None.

Communist Source

Alias Hsiang Hsi-p'ing. Native of Nan-kung, Hopeh. Born of a big landlord's family. Hsu joined revolutionary organizations while studying in Germany. He went to the Soviet Union and entered the Sun Yat-sen (Chungshan) University in the winter of 1925. He came back and worked in Shantung. Hsu was arrested by Sun Liang-ch'eng and imprisoned for three years. He was secretary to Chou En-lai in Chungking during the War of Resistance. When Tainan was liberated, he served as assistant Mayor. His wife, Chang Hsiang-mei, who comes from a neighboring village, is a sister of the late Miss Chang Hsi-yuan, a member of the revolutionary vanguard in Hopeh. Husband and wife have fought shoulder to shoulder in many revolutionary struggles.

Hsu T'ai 徐特立

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, Committee of Culture and Education; Vice-Director, Propaganda Department, Communist Party Central Committee; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Elderly Communist Educator and one-time teacher of Mao Tse-tung. Hsu T'ai-li was born on 19 December 1876 in Hunan of a poor peasant family. He received six years of

classical schooling and then became a school teacher. Following several years of teaching, Hsu in 1905 entered the Changsha Normal College, graduated, and became an instructor in mathematics at the college. Mao was one of his pupils at this time. Hsu was active in the 1911 Revolution that overthrew the Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty and following the establishment of the Republic served in the short-lived Hunan Provincial Parliament. In 1919, at the age of 43, Hsu joined the "worker-student" group that went to France for advanced study. He studied a year in Lyon and did part-time work in a metal factory. Later he was a student for three years at the University of Paris, earning his tuition by tutoring Chinese students in mathematics.

Hsu returned to Hunan in 1923, joined the Kuomintang, was instrumental in the establishment of two normal schools and served for several years as President of the Chungshan Women's Normal School. In 1927, at the age of 51, Hsu joined the Communist Party and the following year was sent by the Party to Moscow for two years of study at Chungshan University. Returning to China, Hsu entered the Kinings Soviet and served as Assistant Commissioner of Education of the Chinese Soviet Republic until 1934, when he was appointed Education Commissioner. He continued in this post in the Shensi-Kansu, Ningxia Soviet and Border Region Governments until 1942. He made the Long March, and by 1946 was Deputy Chief of the Information Department of the Party Central Committee, a post he still holds.

Communist Source

Native of Changsha, Hunan. His courtesy name is Mao-hsun. Seventy-five years of age (1933). Hsu tutored in a village private school in Hu Chang when he was young. During Hsian-tung's reign (1909-1911), he went to Shanghai and joined a research group studying elementary education. He then went to Japan for study and observation, but soon returned to Changsha to teach. He established a short course normal education class, the Shan-hua elementary and middle schools, and the Changsha Normal School. In 1919, when many people were going to France as "worker students," the forty-two-year-old Elder T'ai (as he was respectfully called) went to France with them. Later, he went to Moscow and studied in the Sun Yat-sen University. He resumed educational work when he came back and participated in the 25,000-li Long March of the Chinese Communist Party. Member of the Central People's Government Council; member of the Committee of Culture and Education of the State Administrative Council; executive and Standing Member of the Chinese Language Reform Association; member of the North China Higher Education Committee; member of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; and member of the Presidium of the Preparatory Committee for the First Conference of the Representatives of the A. S. China Educational Workers (1950).

Hsu T'eh-shan 许德新

US Source

None.

Communist Source

Native of Chieh-yang, Kwangtung. More than fifty years of age. Hsu T'eh-shan entered Sun Yat-sen University of Canton in 1925 and became a member of the Communist Party Youth Corps in the same year. When the 1927 Revolution failed, he was expelled by the university. He taught in an elementary school in Swatow for some time. Later, he studied in the University of Amoy for one semester, and then went to study at the Fudan University and the Labor University in Shanghai. When the Labor University closed, he entered the

College of Commerce of the National Central University and graduated in 1933. He was arrested and imprisoned in the spring of 1935, under the "White Terror," and did not regain his freedom until the outbreak of the War of Resistance. Later, Hui went to Hankow and worked on the *New China Daily*. His work in Wu-han, Chungking, Nanking, and Shanghai was on behalf of the United Front of industrial and commercial elements. Vice-Chairman of the Shanghai Committee of Finance and Economics (1950).

Hu Ch'iao-mu 胡乔木

US Source

Director, Administration of News Agencies; Secretary-General, Committee of Culture and Education; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, National Committee, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth; Group Chairman (one of fifty-one), Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

Hu Ch'iao-mu is a Northern Chinese, born c. 1900. A member of the Communist Party, he was a delegate of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth to the Preparatory Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in June 1949, but was listed as a delegate from the All-China Association of Journalists at the Conference's plenary session in September and October 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Yen-ch'eng, Kwangsu. Fifty-three years of age (1953). After graduation from National Tsinghua University, he worked in the left-wing literary circle of Shanghai. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he went to the northwest and, together with Feng Wen-pin and Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, carried on educational work in the Youth Training Class in An-wu-pao. Although the period of training was short, the young people who took this class became important personnel in the various strata of society because of the democratic ideas and the effective methods of tactics and strategy which they were taught. When the Mao Tse-tung School for Training Youth Personnel was established, Hu Ch'iao-mu became Dean of Studies, and also served as Editor in Chief of the *China Youth Magazine*. He was Mao Tse-tung's political secretary. Many editorials of the *New China Daily* were written by his sharp pen. Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Propaganda of the Communist Party, Director of the Administration of News Agencies, and Secretary-General of the Committee of Culture and Education (1950).

Huang Shao-hsiung 黃紹璜 (Courtesy name: Chi-k'uan)

US Source

Member, State Administration Council; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; leader, China Democratic Association; specially invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A former leader of the Kwangsi Clique who has held a number of high posts in the Nationalist Government, Huang Shao-hsiung was born in 1895 in Jung-hsien, Kwangsi. He graduated from the Paoting Military Academy in 1916 and for several years thereafter held military commands in Kwangsi. In 1923 he was appointed by Sun Yat-sen as Commander in Chief of the Anti-Rebel Army in Kwangsi, but was transferred later in the same year to the post of Assistant Director of the Kwangsi Pacification Bureau.

Throughout this period Huang was associated with Li Tsung-jên and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, the latter having been a classmate at Paoting. Huang was elected a reserve member of the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee in 1926, and the same year became Chairman

of the Kwangsi Provincial Government. From 1927 to 1931 he commanded the Fifteenth Army, serving concurrently a part of this time as a State Councilor of the Nationalist Government. During these years he was also active as a member of the Military Council, a member of the Canton division of the Central Political Council, and a Field Commander of the Communist Suppression Forces.

In 1932 Huang was appointed Minister of Interior, serving in that post until 1934. He became Chairman of the Chekiang Provincial Government in 1934, was transferred to the Hupeh governorship in 1936, and the following year was reappointed to the Chekiang post which he held until 1946. Throughout the Sino-Japanese War he remained primarily in Chekiang engaged, in addition to his official duties, in leading guerrilla forces against the Japanese. He served briefly in 1947 as a member of the Strategic Advisory Committee and as Vice-President of the Control Yuan and in October of that year was named a State Councilor. Huang was appointed a member of the Nationalist delegation to negotiate for peace with the Communists in the spring of 1949, and shortly before his departure for Peking was named to the Kuomintang Central Political Council. Following the breakdown in Communist-Kuomintang conversations, Huang went to Hong Kong where he called upon all Kuomintang members to denounce Chiang Kai-shek and support the Communists. For this activity he was expelled from the Kuomintang in August 1949. He returned to Peking in September to participate in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

None.

Huang Yen-p'ei 黃炎培 (Courtesy name: Jen-chih)

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council, Vice-Premier (one of four), State Administration Council, Minister of Light Industry; member, Committee of Finance and Economics, member, Central Political Bureau, Standing Committee, and Central Executive Committee, China Democratic League; member, Standing Committee, Democratic National Reconstruction Association; member, Standing Committee, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Democratic National Reconstruction Association, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Huang Yen-p'ei, prominent educator and former liberal leader, was born on 6 September 1878, in Ch'uan-sha, Kwangsu Province. He was orphaned at an early age. He has one daughter and a son, who was a member of the China Democratic League and was killed before the Nationalist evacuation of Shanghai in May 1949. Huang graduated from Nanyang College and received an honorary Ph.D. degree from St. John's University. A prolific writer on education, he was for many years the leader of the Vocational Education Association. He was a member of Sun Yat-sen's Tung Meng Hui and an organizer of the Society of Learning, an organization founded to spread new ideas and to stimulate sympathy for universal education. The Empress Dowager had Huang arrested at one time for revolutionary activity.

From 1911 to 1914, he was chief of the Education Bureau under the Military Governor of Kiangsu, and served as secretary to the Chinese Industrial Mission to the US in 1915. He has on several occasions accepted appointments as Minister of Education. In 1937, he was a member of the National Defense Advisory Council and in the following year he was a member of the People's Political Council. He was a member of the Federation of Democratic Parties in 1941, the organization which was later reorganized into the China Demo-

eratic League. In the latter organization, Huang was Chairman of the Industrial and Commercial Movement Committee.

Active in efforts to bring about rapprochement between the Kuomintang and the Communists, Huang was among those who went to Yen-an (Fu-shih) in July 1945 to solicit Communist participation in the People's Political Council. He also participated in the Political Consultative Conference in January 1946 as a member of the Vocational Education Association. Since his arrival in Peking in March 1949, Huang has taken an active part in the formation of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

Communist Source

Native of Ch'uan-sha, Kiangsu. Born in 1929. Seventy-four years of age (1953). Studied in Japan in his early years. He was active in educational work when he returned to China, and founded the National Association of Vocational Education. He has labored on behalf of the Democratic National Reconstruction Association, a political organization of national industry and commerce in which there are many progressive youth workers. His magazine, *Chen Wang (Looking Ahead)*, was the most progressive democratic periodical in the last year of reactionary control in Shanghai. His second son, Huang Ching-wu (his eldest son, Huang Fang-kang, a famous professor, died of poverty in the last years of the War of Resistance), also was very active at this time, devoting his entire efforts to the activities of the Democratic League and the Democratic National Reconstruction Association. Later, he was cruelly buried alive by Tang En-po. Representative of the Democratic National Reconstruction Association in the People's Political Consultative Conference, Vice-Premier of the State Administrative Council and, concurrently, Minister of Light Industries. One of the important figures in the Chinese Democratic League (1950).

Jao Shu-shih 饶漱石

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; First Secretary, East China Bureau, Communist Party; Political Commissioner, Third Field Army; Secretary, Shanghai Municipal Committee, Communist Party; Political Commissioner, East China Military District, Chinese People's Liberation Army; Chairman, East China Military and Political Affairs Committee; member, Standing Committee, Shanghai General Labor Union.

A Communist Party Political Commissioner, Jao Shu-shih was born in 1901 in Kiangsi. He studied at the University of Shanghai and was one of those who went to France in 1919 for further study under the "worker-student" plan promoted in China by Mao Tse-tung. He has also studied in the USSR. Jao joined the Communist Party in 1925, was active in the labor movement then being promoted by the Communist Party, and is reported to have later worked as a laborer both in the United States and in eastern Europe. While in the United States he is said to have edited the *Ch'u Kuo Shih-pao (National Salvation Times)*, a newspaper first established by Wu Yu-chang and Li Li-san in Moscow in 1934. Jao had, however, returned to China by 1939, going that same year from Yen-an (Fu-shih) to South Anhwei.

After the South Anhwei Incident in 1941 he escaped Nationalist Government encirclement, proceeding to northern Kiangsu where, with Ch'ên I, he established the Central China Administration (Bureau) of the Communist Party, and became its secretary. Concurrently he held the post of member of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army. By 1944 he was Deputy Political Commissioner of the New Fourth Army, and he became Political Commissioner the following year.

Jao was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the Seventh National Party Congress in 1945, and following the establishment of the Peking Executive Headquarters in January 1946 he was named Political Adviser to General Yeh Chien-ying. He later was the Communist Party representative on the Ch'ang-ch'un Advance Headquarters of the Peking Executive Headquarters, but returned in July 1946 to his Political Commissioner post in the New Fourth Army, a post he still retains though the army has been redesignated the Third Field Army. Jao, one of the first Communist Party officials to arrive in Shanghai following its occupation in May 1949, was appointed Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Communist Party Committee, and has been active in all Party-sponsored events in that city. He is married to Lu Tsui, French-educated Secretary of the China branch of the International Federation of Democratic Women.

Communist Source

Native of Kiangsi. Forty-eight years of age (1953). Studied in Shanghai University. Jao was a leader of the labor movement. After the failure of the Great Revolution, he did manual labor in the United States and eastern Europe. In the winter of 1939, he went to South Anhwei from Fu-shih. After the South Anhwei Incident, he returned to North Kiangsu and served as Political Commissioner in the New Fourth Army. Later, he was Secretary-General of the East China Office. In 1946, when the Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation was established in Peking and Yeh Chien-ying was the representative of the Communist Party, Jao became his Political Adviser, traveling between Peking and Yen-an (Fu-shih).

Later, Jao was appointed representative of the Communist Party in the Northeast Region Committee of Three, and he went to the northeast with Brigadier General Barrett (concurrently, attaché) of the United States. Afterwards, the Chiang Party tore up the agreements, attacked the liberated regions on a large scale, and closed down the Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation. He left Peking with Yeh Chien-ying and others for Yen-an (Fu-shih). Later, he went to North Kiangsu again and shared the leadership of the New Fourth Army with General Ch'ên I. Obviously he has made a great contribution to the Communist Party in the development of a stronghold in Central China and in the rapid rise of the ever-victorious New Fourth Army. Chairman of the East China Military and Administrative Committee (1950).

K'ang Shêng 康生 (Alias: Chao Jung)

US Source

Member, Central Committee and Politburo, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; Chairman, Shantung Provincial People's Government; Secretary, Shantung Branch, East China Bureau, Communist Party; Chief, Central Political Security Bureau, Communist Party.

K'ang Shêng, reportedly the No. 1 Communist secret police leader, was born in 1899 in Chu-ch'eng, Shantung, the son of a wealthy landlord family. He was educated at the University of Shanghai, joined the Communist Party in 1925, and was a leader in the Shanghai strikes of that same year. Following the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, K'ang was engaged in Communist underground activity in Shanghai and was elected to membership in the Party Central Committee at the Sixth National Party Congress in 1928. In 1930 he was an official of the Party Ministry of Organization. K'ang went to Moscow in 1932 for further study, remained in that city for six years, and was a Chinese Communist Party representative at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International held in Moscow in

1935. At this congress he was elected to membership on the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

Throughout his stay in Moscow, K'ang was associated with Ch'én Shao-yu, then the official representative of the Chinese Communist Party to the Comintern, and the two are co-authors of a tract entitled *Revolutionary China Today* (1934). Returning to China in 1938, K'ang again became associated with the Party Department of Organization, but by 1940 had become vice-president of the Party School in Yenan (Fu-shih). He was a member of the Party Politburo by 1943 and also was the chief of the Social Affairs Department of the Party Central Committee. K'ang has been reported chief of the secret police since 1944, though these reports cannot be authenticated. He assumed the Shantung position in March 1949.

Communist Source

Born of a big landlord family. The famous Chao Jung who participated in leading the three uprisings in Shanghai during the Great Revolution. Later started using the name, K'ang Shéng. He went to Shanghai before the first Great Revolution, entered Shanghai University, joined the Chinese Communist Party, and became an excellent revolutionary fighter. He has devoted all his efforts to revolutionary work for over twenty years. His invincible spirit throughout strife and struggle has gained for him the respect and confidence of the Chinese Communist Party. Formerly, he was President of the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party; Executive Member of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party; Chief Officer of the Shantung Branch of the Chinese Communist Party; member of the Central People's Government Council; and Governor of Shantung Province (1950).

Kao Ch'ung-min 高崇民

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, Standing Committee, China Democratic League; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Northeast People's Government; Vice-Chairman (one of four), China New Political Science Research Association; Minister of Justice, Northeast People's Government; Chairman, Control Bureau and concurrently Chairman, Northeast branch, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Vice-Chairman, (one of two), Northeast branch, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; member, representing the Northeast Liberated Area, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

The former head of the Northeast section of Sun Yat-sen's Tung Meng Hui, Kao Ch'ung-min was born c. 1892 in K'ai-yuan, Liao-ning. He later became a Kuomintang member, serving in the Northeast in various official positions. Prior to 1931 he was a secretary in the regime of Chang Hsueh-liang. His activities from 1931 to 1945 have been unreported, but in the latter year he was the Northeast representative of the National Salvation Association. Kao was made Chairman of the Antung People's Provincial Government by Communist authorities in June 1946 and in August of that same year became a Vice-Chairman of the Northeast Administrative Council. He also served as Chairman of the Culture Preservation Commission of the Council. In August 1949 Kao was elected one of three vice-chairmen of the Northeast People's Government.

Communist Source
None.

Kao Kang 高崗

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat, Communist Party; Vice-Chairman (one of six), Central People's Government Council; Chairman, Northeast People's Government; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Secretary, Northeast Bureau, Communist Party; Commander and concurrently Political Commissioner, Northeast Military District, Chinese People's Liberation Army; member, Northeast People's Government Council; Chairman, Northeast branch, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Chairman, Finance and Economic Committee, Northeast People's Government; member, representing the Northeast Liberated Area, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Kao Kang, currently the ranking Communist Party member in Manchuria, started his career as a peasant guerrilla leader in Shensi and is one of the few prominent Chinese Communists who was not associated with the main corps of the leadership until after the Party established its headquarters in Yenan (Fu-shih). He was born in 1902 in Heng-shan, Shensi, a poor peasant family, and received no formal education. Kao joined the Communist Party in 1926 and first became known during a period of famine in Shensi from 1928 to 1929 when he was active in the peasant uprisings there.

From 1928 to 1935 Kao's guerrilla troops were in frequent conflict with Nationalist Provincial Forces, but by the time the main Communist Armies had made the Long March and arrived in Shensi, Kao was one of the two principal leaders of the already established Shensi Soviet. When this Soviet was dissolved he became head of the Northwest Bureau of the Communist Party and throughout the Sino-Japanese War held various posts in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region Government.

In 1943 Kao was first reported as a member of the Party Politburo and in the same year served as President of the Racial Academy in Yenan (Fu-shih). He served in 1945 as Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region People's Political Council and as the Acting Political Commissioner of the United Garrison Forces. He was transferred to Manchuria shortly after V-J Day, serving first as Commander of the Kirin-Hailuinking Military Area and by March 1949 as Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the Communist Party. Kao was elected Chairman of the Northeast Administrative Council in May 1949 and following the establishment of the Northeast People's Government in August 1949, headed that government. He was the leader of the Industrial and Commercial Mission of the Northeast administration which negotiated a trade agreement with the USSR in Moscow in July 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Heng-shan, North Shensi. Sixty-one years of age (1953). In early years studied in Yu-lin at the Sian Normal School, then known as the hotbed of Socialism. After graduation he joined the Communist Party in order to pursue his revolutionary purposes.

After the failure of the Great Revolution, he joined hands with a farmer leader, Liu Chih-tan, to start a farmers' revolution in North Shensi. While the Central Soviet Region in Kwangsi was being surrounded and attacked, the strong fighting men, under the leadership of Kao Kang and Liu Chih-tan had already established the first Soviet Region of the Great Northwest on the desolate North Shensi frontier by guerrilla warfare. They persistently continued their guerrilla warfare in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region, strengthened the bases at Wu-li-chen, An-tung, and finally welcomed the arrival of the Great Army after their Long March. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region, with Yenan (Fu-shih) as its center, became the cradle of the present successful revolution.

He was a member of the Border Region branch of the Communist Party during the War of Resistance; later Secretary of the Northwest branch and member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. After the War of Resistance he marched with Lin Piao, Ch'ên Yün, Hsiao Chin-kuang, Li Fu-ch'un, P'êng Chên, and others into the Northeast and became one of the first leaders in organizing the People's Cavalry and supervising the National Minorities Movement. After Lin Piao, Commander of the Northeast Military Region, entered Lin-yü (Shanhaikwan), he became successor to Lin Piao as Commander of the Northeast Military Zone and concurrently member of the Northeast Political Council. The responsibility of all military and administrative affairs of the Northeast thus fell upon his shoulders. Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council and Chairman of the Northeast Area People's Government (1950).

Ku Ta-t'ün 古大存
US Source

Alternate member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party; member, representing the South China People's Liberation Army, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Kwangtung Provincial People's Government.

A leader of guerrilla units around the Kwangtung area following the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, Ku Ta-t'ün was born in 1900, in Wu-hua, Kwangtung Province. He joined the Communist Party in 1927, and in 1929 organized units along the Kwangtung-Kiangsi border. After being defeated by the Nationalist Army, he withdrew into the mountains, but resumed operations in the northeastern part of Kwangtung during the Sino-Japanese War. Although he had received no formal education, Ku was elected alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945.

Communist Source

Native of Wu-hua, Kwangtung. Formerly a farmer. Ku Ta-t'ün was one of the farmers' leaders of T'ung-chiang, Kwangtung, in the Great Revolution of 1924 and of the armed forces of the Kwangtung Communist Party in its beginning stage. After the failure of the 1927 Revolution, he continued to be active in T'ung-chiang and various other Aien. At one time he retreated to the mountainous border region of Fukien and Kwangtung, and was in close contact with the headquarters of the Communist Army in Jui-chin, Kiangsi. Later he cooperated with the Communist Army under Hsiang Ying in West Fukien. For more than twenty years, he has been connected with most of the activities of the farmers' armed forces in the various localities of T'ung-chiang, Ch'ao-an, Mei-tung, and Chia-ying (in Kwangtung). The Central People's Government selected him to be Deputy-Governor of Kwangtung Province because they believe that he will render great service by bettering the rural life in Kwangtung (1950).

Kuo Mo-jo 郭沫若 (Original name: Kuo K'ai-chen)

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Premier, State Administration Council; Chairman, Committee of Culture and Education; President, Academy of Science, State Administration Council; Vice-President, Directorate, Committee of the World Congress of Partisans of Peace; Vice-Chairman (one of five), National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, All-China Federation of Literature and Arts; member, representing non-partisan Democratic Personages, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, China Committee to Defend World Peace.

Kuo Mo-jo, well known Marxist writer, archaeologist, and historian, was born in Chia-ting, Szechwan Province, 16 November 1892. After receiving an education in a provincial middle school in Chengtu, he studied medicine in Japan, graduating from Kyushu Imperial University in 1923. He studied literature in Japan and Germany. Among some of his best known works are: *Bronze Age*, *Collection of Ancient Chinese Oracles*, and *Researches on Oracle Bones*. He was Dean of Arts at National Sun Yat-sen University in 1925 and at the same time manager of the Ta Tung magazine store in Shanghai, where he led a new literary movement of romanticism in Chinese literature.

From 1926 to 1927, Kuo was director, Propaganda Division, Revolutionary Army Headquarters, and concurrently Secretary-General, Provisional Headquarters. With the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, Kuo fled to Japan. He collaborated with Chang Nai-ch'i, now a leading member of the Democratic National Reconstruction Association, in forming anti-Japanese front movements in Shanghai after the opening of Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937. Re-admitted to the Kuomintang in 1938, he served in the Political Training Department of the National Military Council until 1945. He attended the 220th Anniversary of the Academy of Science in Moscow in June 1945, and in January of the following year served as a non-partisan delegate to the Political Consultative Conference.

An articulate critic of the Kuomintang, Kuo went to Hong Kong shortly after the outlawing of the China Democratic League in October 1947, and left for Communist China in November 1948. He is today the most prominent cultural leader in Communist China. He was chief Chinese delegate to the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace, April 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Lo-shan, Szechwan. Sixty-two years of age (1953). Studied at the Imperial University of Tokyo. Kuo Mo-jo was one of the founders of the Chung-tsun-shih. He promoted revolutionary literature and pioneered the Chinese literary and cultural revolution. He went to Kwangtung and became Dean of the College of Arts and Letters of the Chung-shan (Sun Yat-sen) University before the 1925-27 Great Revolution. He joined the army during the Northern Expedition, and was assistant and acting head of the Political Department (the head being Ts'eng Yen-tai). After the revolution failed, he fled to Swatow from Wa-han through Chu-chiang and Nanching. He finally escaped danger and went to Japan to do literary research. When he secretly came back to his fatherland, he first led the Shanghai literary world in the War of Resistance. Later the Military Council established a Political Training Board, and he was requested by all concerned to head its Third Department, the Department of Information. After the Wu-han retreat, the Political Training Board was moved to Chungking and the Bureau of Information was transformed into the Committee on Cultural Work. When the War of Resistance ended and the Political Consultative Conference was called, he served on it as a non-partisan representative. He was invited to Soviet Russia, in 1945, to attend a commemoration ceremony given by the Soviet Academy of Science; also attended the World Peace Congress in April 1949 as head of the Chinese delegation. He represented non-partisans to the People's Political Consultative Conference, and became standing member of the Presidium of the Conference. Vice-Premier of the State Administrative Council of the Central People's Government, Chairman of the Committee of Culture and Education, and concurrently President of the Academy of Sciences (1950).

Li Chi-shên 李濟深 (Courtesy name: Jên-ch'ao)**US Source**

Vice Chairman (one of six), Central People's Government; Chairman, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; Vice-Chairman (one of six), National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A former South China war lord, often in conflict with the Nationalist Government, who currently leads a dissident Kuomintang faction in collaboration with the Communist Party, Li Chi-shên was born in Wu-chow, Kwangsi, in 1886. He has six sons and five daughters. His father and grandfather were scholar-landlords. The late Hu Han-min, right-wing Kuomintang revolutionist, was one of Li's teachers. Li graduated from Liang-kuang (Kwangtung-Kwangsi) Military High School and studied for three years at the Officers' Training Academy founded by the War Advisory Council of the Ch'ing dynasty, 1908 to 1911. He also graduated from Peking Military College in 1917. A man with a long military career, Li Chi-shên was successively Chief of Staff, 22nd Division of the Revolutionary Forces, 1911; Chief of Staff, 1st Division, Kwangtung Army; Defense Commissioner of Wu-chow, Kwangsi. He assisted Sun Yat-sen in defeating Ch'ên Chiang-ming, 1924. He was Commander of Eighth Route Revolutionary Army, 1928. Well-known military figures who have served under Li are: Chang Fa-k'uei, Yu Han-hun, Ts'ai T'ing-kai, Hsueh Yueh, and Ch'ên Ch'êng. Li has also held such important political positions as: chairman, Canton branch, Central Political Council, Kuomintang, 1926 to 1928; and member, Central Executive Committee, Kuomintang, 1927.

Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army Headquarters and a State Councillor of the Nationalist Governments in 1928, Li was implicated in the revolt of the Kwangsi faction in Wu-han against the Nationalist Government in Nanking, for which he was relieved of all posts and served a period of enforced residence in Nanking. Pardonned in 1931, Li was Inspector General of Military Training in 1932 and 1933 but in 1933, when the Nineteenth Route Army revolted in Foochow and set up a "People's Government," Li was elected its chairman. For this, Li was expelled from the Kuomintang, but was again pardonned and reinstated shortly after the opening of hostilities between China and Japan. He became the Director of the Kwei-in branch of the Military Affairs Commission in 1940. Because of his outspoken criticism of the Central Government and the general restiveness of notable Kwangsi leaders and liberal elements, the Kwei-in branch was dissolved in December 1943. Li organized the People's Mobilization Committee in 1944 as a nucleus for a new democratic movement in China.

Closely associated with, but apparently not a member of the China Democratic League, Li was ousted from the Kuomintang for the second time in May 1947, for his outspoken criticism of the Party. On 1 January 1948, he organized in Hong Kong the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, pledged to the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Li was in Hong Kong from 1946 until his departure for North China in December 1948, and has been active since in events leading to the establishment of the Central People's Government. He served as a vice-chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and has participated in various Communist Party-sponsored congresses and assemblies.

Communist Source

Native of Wu-chow, Kwangsi. Sixty-seven years of age (1953). Graduate of the Army University of Peking. Before the Northern Expedition, he was Vice-President of the Whampoa Military Academy and Commander of the Fourth Army of the National Revolu-

tionary Army. He was once a member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. He organized the Fukien People's Government at Foochow in 1931 in opposition to the dictatorial and traitorous Nanking Government. His head was unbowed though he failed. During the War of Resistance, he was director of the Party Administrative Committee in the War Areas and director of the Kwei-in Office of the Military Council. He openly opposed Chiang Kai-shek's traitorous Civil War in 1947, and was expelled from the Party for the third time. The next year, he organized in Hong Kong the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang and served as its Chairman. He was a standing member of the President of the People's Political Consultative Conference.

Leader of the "People's Revolution" and Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council (1950).

Li Chu-ch'ên 李燭塵**US Source**

Member, Central People's Government Council; General Manager, Chiu Ta Salt Company; manager, Yang Li Chemical Works; member, representing Industrial and Commercial circles, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Li Chu-ch'ên, a Tientsin industrialist, was born in 1882 in Hunan. He studied chemistry and physics at the Higher Technical Institute in Tokyo, and is a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University. Returning to China in 1919, he became associated with the Chiu Ta Salt Company, of which he is now General Manager. Li has been active in the industrial scene in China for over three decades, and was one of the charter members of the Chinese National Industrial Association formed in Chungking in 1943. Though he has been affiliated with the Democratic Reconstruction Association since 1946, he was one of the non-partisan delegates to the Nationalist-sponsored Political Consultative Conference in 1946. He has also served as a member of the Planning Committee of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, non-partisan delegate to the National Assembly held in Nanking in 1946, and as a member of the Legislative Yuan. In 1947, associated with Hu Shih, Chang Po-lin, and Mei T-ch'i, Li sponsored the Association for the Promotion of Democracy in Peking and Tientsin. He was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

None.

Li Fu-ch'un 李富春**US Source**

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Northeast People's Government; member, Committee of Finance and Economics, Central People's Government; Assistant Secretary, Northeast Bureau, Communist Party; member, Northeast People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Committee of Finance and Economics, Northeast People's Government.

A Communist Party financial and economics expert and the husband of Ts'ai Ch'ang, ranking woman member of the Communist Party, Li Fu-ch'un was born in Changshu, Hunan, in 1901. Following an elementary education in China, he was among the students who went to France in 1919 for further study under the "worker-student" plan promoted in China by Mao Tse-tung and in France by Li Shih-t'ung and Wu Yü-chang. In France Li was one of the founders (1921) of the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party.

Other present-day Communist Party leaders who were founders of that branch include Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, and Li Wei-han. He married Ts'ai Ch'ang in France in 1923. The couple proceeded to Moscow for additional studies at the Oriental Workers' University.

He returned to China in 1925. The following year, he became the Party representative in Shanghai after the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927. Though his activities from 1927 to 1931 have not been reported, his wife spent this period in Moscow, as did many others of the current Communist leadership, and it is possible that he was in the Soviet Union. In 1931 he entered the Kiangsi Soviet, served in the Political Department, and later was Secretary of the Kiangsi Provincial Committee of the Party. Li made the Long March as Political Commissioner of the Third Red Army Group, and by 1940 was Director of Organization of the Party Central Committee. By 1943 he seemingly had been demoted to Vice-Director of that same department. He served during the Sino-Japanese War as Assistant Secretary-General of the Central Committee, and at the Seventh National Congress, April 1945, was re-elected to membership in that body. For a brief period in 1945 Li was Chairman of the China Liberated Areas Relief Administration. He has been in Manchuria at least since 1947; served as Vice-Chairman of the Finance and Economic Committee of the Northeast Administrative Council in 1948 and 1949, and was elected a Vice-Chairman of the Northeast People's Government on 27 August 1949. Li accompanied Chou En-lai to Moscow in January 1950 to participate in treaty negotiations with the USSR.

Communist Source

Native of Hunan. More than fifty years of age (1953). One of the earliest members of the Chinese Communist Party. When he was a worker-student in France, he formed with Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, Wang Jo-fei, and Li Wei-han a small group of the Communist Party in France. He was a famous military figure in the Northern Expedition during the Great Revolution. He joined the Kuomintang as a member of the Communist Party and served as Director of the Political Department of the Second Army in the Northern Expedition Forces. After the Great Revolution failed, he went underground for secret revolutionary work. Later, he went to the Soviet region in Kiangsi, and was one of the leaders in the 25,000-li Long March to North Shensi.

The most difficult economic period, in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, center of the Chinese Communist Party, was around 1941. They finally overcame this hardship by carrying out a large-scale production program under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, and became self-supporting in agriculture, industry, and commerce. He was the real leader in this program.

His wife is Miss Ts'ai Ch'ang, Director of the Women's Association of the Liberated Region. They were school mates in France, and are good partners in the Revolutionary Army. Vice-Chairman of the Northeast Area People's Government (1950).

Li Hsien-nien 李先念

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Chairman, Hupoh Provincial People's Government; Commander, and concurrently Political Commissioner, Hupoh Military District, Chinese People's Liberation Army; secretary, Hupoh Provincial Committee, Communist Party.

A Communist general active in Central China since 1938. Li Hsien-nien was born in 1907 in Hunggan, Hupoh, the son of a laborer, and has himself worked as a cowherd and

carpenter. Joining the Communist Party in 1929, Li became chairman of his village soviet and subsequently became a member of the Red Army. He made the Long March as Political Commissioner of the Fourth Front Red Army, and in 1936 reportedly was sent to the USSR for a year's training in a military academy.

Li was ordered by the Communist Party in 1938 to organize guerrilla warfare in Hunan and Hupoh and has since that time been in command of both irregular and regular Communist forces in that area. His guerrilla troops were reorganized in 1941 as the 6th Division of the New Fourth Army with Li as commander, and throughout the Sino-Japanese War were responsible for much of the anti-Japanese resistance in Hupoh and for the establishment of the Hupoh-Hoan-Kiangsi-Anhow Liberated Area. Li was elected to membership in the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945. His troops were attacked by Nationalist Forces in 1946, but successfully evaded capture by retreating northwest into Shensi Province. By 1947, however, Li had returned to Hupoh with his forces pressing close to Hankow. He became a Deputy Commander of the Central Plains Liberation Army under Liu Tso-ch'eng in 1948, and was appointed Chairman of the Hupoh Provincial People's Government in June 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Hungan, Hupoh. Forty-eight years of age (1953). Li was a carpenter in his early years. After joining the Chinese Communist Party, he was promoted rapidly, becoming Soviet Chairman of the Hupoh region and Captain of the Red Guards. Later he joined the Red Army and served as regiment Commander, regiment Political Commissar, divisional Commander, army Political Commissar, alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and Commander of the Chung-yuan Military Region. When the peace talks failed in April (1949), the Chinese Communist Party launched a general assault against the Kuomintang Army and appointed him Deputy Commander of the Fourth Field Army. After Wu-han was taken, he was appointed Governor of Hupoh Province.

Li Li-san 李立三 (Courtesy name: N'eng-chih; Alias: Li Man-jan)

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, State Administration Council; Minister of Labor, member, Committee of Finance and Economics; 1st Vice-Chairman, All-China Federation of Labor; Chief, Wages Department, All-China Federation of Labor, member, representing the All-China Federation of Labor, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Li Li-san, a controversial figure in the Chinese Communist movement, was born in 1900 in Liang, Hunan Province, the son of a poor peasant family. He was educated at the Hunan Provincial First Normal School, where Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Jen Pi-shih were among his fellow students. Continuing his education as a member of the "worker-student" group in France in 1919, he studied at the Sino-French University at Lyon and worked at nearby steel factories. In 1921, with Chou En-lai, Noh Jung-shen, Li Wei-han, and others who were also members of the same workers group, Li Li-san founded the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Li was expelled from France the following year, however, for participating in the student movement. In 1923, he returned to China via Moscow. For the next five years, he worked in the labor movement, which was being actively supported by the Communist Party. He served as Vice-President of the All-China Federation of Labor from 1926 to 1927 and in that capacity represented the Federation at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern in Moscow, March 1926.

Further illustrative of his prominence in the labor movement is Li's membership in the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and his leadership of the trade union organizations in Hankow and Shanghai.

The split between Kuomintang and Communists in 1927 brought a new Chinese Communist leadership to power, one working closely with the Far Eastern Comintern agents Neumann and Lominadze. Though the Party was nominally under the direction of Ch'u Ch'u-pai, the Secretary-General, Li Li-shan was its strong man and policy architect. In December 1927 Li and Neumann planned the Canton insurrection, the earliest of the large scale insurrections planned to take over the industrial cities. Its forces were recruited from industrial workers backed by revolutionary peasant troops. The failure of this Comintern Policy culminated in the failure at Chanzsha, when Communist forces, acting upon the line promoted by Li and others, took the city on 27 July 1930, only to surrender it on 5 August. The insurrectionary policy of the Chinese Communists had already been repudiated by the Comintern in meetings on 23 July 1930, though this criticism seems not to have been wholly acted upon at the Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party's Fourth Plenum in September 1930, when attacks upon Li's line were apparently soft-pedalled. Criticism came to its height, however, at the Meeting of the Party Central Political Bureau on 23 November, at which time Li resigned from the Politburo. Shortly thereafter the Chinese Communist Politburo sent him to Moscow. He left by boat, landing in Vladivostok. In Moscow in the spring of 1931 his case came before the Oriental Department of the Comintern, which heard the full confession of his mistakes. Manuilsky, one of those present, made strong criticism of Li, "who in his confessions gave up his ideas" too easily. He stated that merely confessing his mistakes was not enough; what was needed was careful study, for which he should "stay for a few months to work with the Comintern" and learn how to correct his errors. The period of study was to last fourteen years.

While in Russia, Li married a Russian. He was elected in *absentia* a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945. He accompanied Soviet troops into Manchuria the same year. Until February 1949, Li served in Manchuria as Political and Foreign Affairs Advisor to General Lin Biao. He returned to prominence in the labor field when he was elected 1st Vice-Chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor at the Sixth All-China Labor Congress, held in Harbin in 1948. He continues to hold this position, in addition to that of Minister of Labor in the Central People's Government. Despite numerous reports, both past and present, of a rift between Li and Mao Tse-tung, there is no available evidence of current disagreement.

Communist Source

Formerly named Lung-chih. Native of Hunan. About fifty-three years of age. Li Li-shan left Hunan in 1919 and went to France as a "worker-student." In France, like the other worker-students, he had to study French and make up other studies in addition to his assigned work.

It seems that he began to study Communism when he was very young. He did so, however, on a purely theoretical level, since Chinese students in France at that time did not have the advantage of working with a Communist Party organization.

A group of the worker-students in France in 1921 demonstrated against the Franco-Japan arranged by Minister Ch'u Li, and demanded that the Franco-China University, founded by Li Shih-tung and Wang Tsi-shan, be opened to the public. Secretary Wang of the Ministry was beaten and wounded by the students and one-hundred-and-four students were first arrested by the police and then imprisoned in the army prison in Lyon, France.

After having been in prison for two months, the students were taken on board the 12,000-ton SS "An-te-leh-to-pai" and deported to China.

When Li returned to Shanghai he was for some time in low spirits. Not until 1926, when the Chinese Communist Party had become comparatively better organized, did he become famous for his "Party line."

A leader of the Chinese Communist Party and Minister of Labor of the Central People's Government (1950).

Li Te-ch'uan, Miss 李德全 Married name: Mme. Fong Yu-hsiang

US Source

Minister of Public Health; member, Committee of Culture and Education; Vice-Chairman (one of three), All-China Federation of Democratic Women; member, Central Committee, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Deputy Director (one of two), Service Department, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; member, Executive Committee, International Federation of Democratic Women; member, representing the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

The widow of Fong Yu-hsiang, Christian General, leftist, and one-time North China war lord, Li Te-ch'uan, herself of leftist tendencies, was born in 1895 in T'ung-hsien, Hopeh, the daughter of a Christian pastor. She studied at the Bridgeman Girls' Middle School in Peking, the Fochow Christian College for Women, and the Hsich Ho College, Peking. She was at one time Director of Religious Education at the American Board's Mission School in Peking and at the time of her marriage to General Fong in January 1924 was Director of the Peking YWCA. Miss Li visited Moscow in 1926 with her husband. During the Sino-Japanese War she worked on the Women's Committee of the Sino-Soviet Cultural Association, and in January 1946 was one of the eight members of the Military Investigation Committee of the Political Consultative Conference.

From 1946 to 1948 Miss Li was in the United States with her husband. As a delegate to the International Assembly of Women, meeting in New York, October 1946, she demanded that the US stop all military aid to China. She returned to China via the USSR, and was reportedly in Harbin in late November 1948, where she was quoted as having made complimentary remarks about the Soviet Union, Wallace's Progressive Party, and the American Communist Party. In the same interview, Miss Li denounced the "handful of Wall Street financial oligarchs who are oppressing the majority of American people." She was elected to the Executive Committee of the International Federation of Democratic Women at its congress in Budapest, December 1948, although she did not attend the Congress. Miss Li was a delegate to the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace in April 1949, served on the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and was active in the arrangements for the Asian Women's Conference held in Peking December 1949.

Communist Source

Native of T'ung-hsien, Hopeh. Grew up in a minister's home. She left home at the age of sixteen and went to Peking to study at Bridgeman Girls' School. Because she was from a Christian family of three generations, she entered the (Peking) Union College for Women. She has a very strong physique and a frank disposition. Her face is round, complexion dark — a typical woman of the North. Formerly, she was a teacher at Bridgeman and secretary at the Peking YWCA. When she was twenty-nine she was married to General

Feng Yu-hsiang, and accompanied him to Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union on an investigation tour. During the War of Resistance, she was a leader in the troop-comforting activities of the Women's Association in Chungking and active in the Women's Committee of the Association of Sino-Soviet Cultural Relations. After V-J day, she was chairman of the Women's Fellowship Association. She organized the Child Welfare Association, actively promoting the establishment of nursery schools. When she went to the United States with General Feng Yu-hsiang, she attended the International Women's Conference sponsored by American Women's organizations. Minister of Public Health of the Central People's Government (1950).

Li Wei-han 李維漢 (Alias: Lo Mai)

US Source

Secretary-General State Administration Council; Director, Commission of the Affairs of Nationalities; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; head, United Front Department, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Standing Committee, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A French-educated Communist Party elder, Li Wei-han was commonly known as Lo Mai until 1946. He was born in 1897 in Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan, and has a brother, Li Chuan-tung, who served in 1947 as Vice-Minister of Information of the Kuomintang. He was one of those who went to France in 1919 as a member of a "worker-student" group organized in China by Mao Tse-tung, and was one of the founders with Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, and others of the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning to China he reportedly was the head of a Communist school in Hunan and later active in Party work in the Kiangsi Soviet. Li was elected to membership in the Second Chinese Soviet Central Committee at Jui-chin in 1934. He participated in the Long March and in 1936 and 1937 was director of the Department of Organization of the Party. Later he served as president of the Communist University in North Shensi. Though a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Party prior to 1945, he presumably was not re-elected to these positions at the Seventh National Party Congress, held in Yenan (Fushih) in April 1945. During 1944 and 1945 Li served as General Secretary of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, and in 1946 was a member of the Communist delegation to the Political Consultative Conference, which he attended under the name Li Wei-han. He was a member of the Communist delegation to the Peking peace negotiations with the Kuomintang in April 1949, and served as Secretary-General of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

Native of Hunan. Fifty-six years of age (1953). He joined the "worker-student" group in his youth and went to France with Chou En-lai. He made a good scholastic record although obliged to work while he studied. He was one of the founders of the Paris branch of the Chinese Communist Party when it was established in 1922. He worked in the Soviet region in Kiangsi when he returned, and later served as Chief of the Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party, the Party's "organizer-specialist." He was principal of the Party School, Secretary-General of the Northwest branch of the Party, Chief of the Party's News Bureau, and an important Party spokesman. In 1949, he, as an old-timer, was delegate of the Chinese Communist Party to the Second Peace Talk Conference. Secretary-General of the State Administrative Council of the Central People's Government (1950).

Liao Ch'eng-chih 廖承志 (Alias: Ho Liu-hua)

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; Vice-Director (one of four), Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth; Vice-Chairman (one of six), World Federation of Democratic Youth, delegate, representing the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Central Committee and concurrently, head, Liaison Department, China New Democracy Youth Corps; Vice-Chairman, China Committee to Defend World Peace.

Liao Ch'eng-chih, son of the late Liao Chung-k'ai, one time leader of the left-wing of the Kuomintang, was born in 1908 in Tokyo, where his parents were students. His mother, Ho Hsiang-ting, is Honorary Chairman of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women and Chairman of the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs. Liao attended the Catholic Primary School in Tokyo and studied at the Lingnan University middle school after going to China in 1925. In 1926, after his father's assassination, Liao returned to Japan where he attended Waseda University. He joined the Communist Party in 1927 in Japan, and the following year was deported to Shanghai for engaging in subversive activities. In 1928 he went to Germany where he studied political economy at Berlin and Hamburg universities. Requested to leave Germany, Liao went to Moscow, where he remained until 1932. Upon his return to Shanghai, he assisted Liu Shao-ch'i in organizing an underground. He was arrested by the Kuomintang in 1933, his release was effected shortly thereafter. He subsequently went to Szechwan, where he joined the Red Army, becoming Secretary of its Political Department, and in addition, participated in trade union work.

Joining Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung as they came through Szechwan on the Long March in 1935, Liao went to Yenan (Fushih), where he became Editor of the New China News Agency and the *Ch'ien-fang Jih-pao* (*Emancipation Daily*). He served as Communist Party representative in Hong Kong from 1937 to 1942, and was smuggled out of that city following the Japanese occupation, but was immediately arrested by the Nationalist Government. He remained in custody until 22 January 1946, shortly after the Political Consultative Conference. Two months later, Liao became a member of a Subcommittee of Three to take part in negotiations for settling the East River problem. From 1947 until late 1948 or early 1949, Liao was generally known as the Party Secretary of the South China Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong. Elected an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1945, he later replaced a deceased member of the Central Committee.

Communist Source

Forty-six years of age (1953). Born in Tokyo, Japan, though his parents were Kwang-tungese. Came back in 1919 and entered Lingnan University. He was one of the student movement leaders who demonstrated against the 1925 Sha-ch'i tragedy. His father was assassinated in the same year, and he went back to Japan to study at Waseda University. He was expelled in 1928 and went to Germany. At various times he worked among the Chinese sailors in Germany, Belgium, and Holland. Liao was arrested in Hamburg and deported. He went to Soviet Russia and returned in 1932. He was arrested in Shanghai for participating in the Party's underground activities. He escaped death only because his mother, Ho Hsiang-ting, bailed him out. After release, he fled to the Soviet region in North Szechwan.

After he went to Shensi in the Long March of the Red Army, he discarded his pseudonym, Ho Liu-hua, which he had used for many years.

After he arrived in Yenan (Fu-shih), he first served as Chief of the Publication Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party and Editor of the *Liberation Daily*. Later, he was head of the Hsin Hua News Agency. Liao went to Hong Kong and Kwangtung during the War of Resistance and served as Secretary of the South China branch of the Party. He came back after Hong Kong was occupied by Japan and was arrested by the Nationalist Secret Police. He was not released until the eve of the meeting of the former People's Political Consultative Conference. Member of the Central Committee of the Party, vice-chairman of the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, and chairman of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth. His younger sister, Liao Meng-hsing, is secretary to Madame Sun Yat-sen (Sung Ch'ing-ling). Her husband, Li Shao-shih, was assassinated by the Nationalist Secret Police in Chungking (1950).

Lin Feng 林風

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Northeast People's Government; member, Northeast People's Government Council; Chairman, Control Bureau and Chairman, Supervisory Committee, Northeast People's Government; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Finance and Economic Committee, Northeast People's Government; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

One of the ranking Chinese Communist officials in Manchuria, Lin Feng was born in 1909 in Wang-kuei Hsien, Heilungkiang Province, and studied at Nankai University, Tientsin. He joined the Communist Party about 1930, while still a student, was once Secretary of both the Peking and Tientsin Municipal Committees of the Communist Party, and held several posts in the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region Government prior to the Japanese surrender. In April 1945 Lin was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and served during that same year as Political Commissioner of the Shansi-Suiyuan Military District and concurrently as Secretary of the Party's Shansi-Suiyuan branch Bureau.

In Manchuria, in the spring of 1946, Lin served briefly as head of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Northeast Bureau and on 15 August 1946 was installed as Chairman of the Northeast Administrative Council, the Communist civil administration in Manchuria. He held this latter position until the establishment of the Northeast People's Government in August 1949. During this three-year period Lin also served as one of the secretaries of the Communist Party Northeast Bureau, Political Commissioner of the Liaoning-Kirin Military Area, and as a member (after December 1948) of the Mukden Military Control Commission. Lin has held his present posts in the Northeast People's Government since August 1949.

Communist Source

None.

Lin Piao 林彪

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Commander, Fourth

Field Army; Chairman, Central and South Military and Political Affairs Committee; First Secretary, Central China Bureau, Communist Party; Commander, Central China Military District; member, Standing Committee, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Lin Piao, long-time Communist and member of the Party Central Committee since 1940, is considered an able military leader, outstanding for his tactics, strategy, and remarkable memory. He was born in 1908 in Huang-an, Hupeh, the son of a factory owner. He graduated in 1924 from a middle school in Wu-chang and the following year entered the Whampoa Military Academy, where he came under the influence of Chou En-lai, then the Political Director of the Academy. Lin joined the Kuomintang in 1924 and the Communist Party in 1925. Following graduation from Whampoa in 1925, he joined the Northern Expedition, fighting in regiments led by Yeh Ting in 1926 and Chang Fak'uei in 1927. During the 1927 Nanchang Uprising, Lin's forces defected to the Communists, later participated in the abortive Canton Commune, and by early 1928 joined the armies of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh on the Kiangsi-Fukien border.

A Field Commander by 1929, Lin became in 1932 the Commander of the First Red Army Corps. He took part in the Long March to Northern Shensi, where for a time he was in charge of training military cadets. In 1937 he was appointed Commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Wounded while commanding troops against the Japanese in 1937, Lin went to the USSR in 1938 to undergo medical treatment and did not return to China until 1942. In 1943 he was in Chungking, where, with Chou En-lai, he participated in Communist Party-Kuomintang negotiations. During the remainder of the war he served as President of the Anti-Japanese University in Yenan (Fu-shih).

Lin returned to active military command in 1945, when he led troops into Manchuria, and by early 1946 was Commander of the Northeastern United Democratic Army. This Army, led by Lin, was responsible for the complete occupation of Manchuria and in January 1949 captured Tientsin. Redesignated the Fourth Field Army, it moved into Central China, capturing Hankow in late spring, 1949.

In April 1949, Lin was a member of the Communist delegation which negotiated with the Nationalists on peace terms and during the summer of the same year was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. He was active in Hankow in the fall of 1949 and was appointed Chairman of the Central and South Military and Political Affairs Committee on 2 December 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Huang-an, Hupeh. Born in 1908. Forty-five years of age (1953). Graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy. Lin joined the Youth Corps of the Communist Party as early as 1925 and was one of the participants in the famous Nanchang uprising in 1927. Later, he was a Commander of a *to* (a company, nominally of 126 soldiers) under General Chu Teh. His was the first *lien* to engage actively in guerrilla warfare. One of his men fought against an enemy force of more than twelve *lien*. They not only defeated the enemy, but also took over their stronghold.

During the 25,000-li Long March of the Red Army, he led the 1st Regiment of the Red Army. He used the "surprise attack strategy" at the Tatu River, attacking the enemy so suddenly that Liu Wen-hou's army was caught off guard and this branch of the people's army safely arrived at the Shensi-Kansu-Ningnan Border Region, the progressive anti-Japanese front.

At the Beginning of the War, General Lin Piao was ordered to go to West Shansi with his 115th Division to fight the enemy. At the battle of Ping-hung kuan, though gravely

outnumbered, he defeated the picked "crack" soldiers of the Japanese Sakagaki Division, annihilating more than three thousand. This was the one and only victory which invigorated the soldiers and people of the whole country during the first period of the War.

In 1945, General Lin Piao led the Eighth Route Army toward the northeast and, with the cooperation of the Red Army of Soviet Russia, defeated the Japanese invaders and liberated the Northeast. Later, after the outbreak of the Civil War, he led the Northeastern United Democratic Army, and repulsed many attacks of the American-equipped enemy forces until he turned the scales of war, changing from defense to counter-attack. After the liberation of the Northeast, the heroic army of one million men — the Fourth Field Army of the People's Liberation Army — marched into North China with lightning speed and liberated Peking and Tientsin. They continued of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Szechwan, and Kweichow. Chairman of the Military and Administrative Committee of the Central South Area and Commander of the Fourth Field Army (1950).

Lin Tsu-han 林祖涵 (Alias: Lin Po-ch'u)

US Source

Member, Central Committee and Politburo, Communist Party; Secretary-General, Central People's Government Council; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, China New Political Science Research Association; Member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

An old comrade of Sun Yat-sen and a veteran Communist Party official, Lin Tsu-han was born in 1882 in Lin-i, Hunan, of a landlord-scholar family. Prior to 1911 he studied in Japan, where he met Sun Yat-sen and became one of Sun's close friends and associates. After returning from Japan, Lin carried on revolutionary activity for Sun's Tung Meng Hui in Hunan Province, where he helped to overthrow the Manchu regime. For the next decade Lin was connected with the government at Peking, and followed Sun Yat-sen to Japan, where he took part in the organization of the Kuomintang and became a member of its Central Executive Committee in 1921 and 1925. He joined the Communist Party during the early 1920's, but served in the Canton Government as Chairman of the Finance Committee in 1925.

After the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, Lin went abroad. He studied in Russia and other European countries from 1927 to 1930. He is reported to have founded a Chinese workers' school in Kharkov, USSR, during this period. In 1930 Lin returned secretly to Shanghai. He made the Long March and in December 1936 was one of the Communist negotiators in the matter of the Sian Incident.

Lin, who was a good friend of Lin Sen, former President of China, is one of the few Chinese Communist leaders who has held positions in government organizations in coalition with the Kuomintang. He is reported to have held a ministerial post in the Wu-han Government, serving as Minister of Finance. He was a Communist member of the third session of the People's Political Council (PPC), meetings of which he attended from 1939 to 1941 and again in 1944. Though appointed a member of the fourth session of the PPC, he did not attend any of the meetings.

He served as Commissioner of Finance of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Soviet in 1936 and 1937, and from 1937 until the 1940 re-organization of certain border region governments was Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region Government. Lin also served in 1943 as President of the Communists' Administrative College in Yenan (Fu-shih). In

April 1949 he was one of the Communist negotiators who met with the Nationalists in Peking for peace talks, and later was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

Native of Lin-i, Hunan. Seventy-two years of age (1953). One of the five elders of the Party. Lin Po-ch'u studied at the Changtze Normal School. Later he went to Japan on a government scholarship and studied at the Higher Normal College in Tokyo. It was during this period that he first participated in revolutionary activities by joining the Hsing-Chung Hui and, later, the Tung Meng Hui, both of which were founded by Sun Yat-sen. When he came back, he was active in revolutionary work in Kirin and Hunan. At one time, he was forced to flee to Japan. He joined the Party when it was established in Shanghai and participated in the Northern Expedition during the Nationalist-Communist cooperation period. After the split, he went to Kwangsi with the Party and, at various times, did educational and financial work and served as chairman of the Committee of Finance and Finance Minister of the Kwangsi Soviet Government.

On account of his revolutionary activities, he had stayed away from his native home for twenty years. When he went back, he underwent the bitter-sweet experience best described by the well-known poem:

"I left my home town when I was young and did not come back until I was advanced in years; my local accent had not changed but my hair had turned to gray;

Children who saw me did not recognize me;

They asked smilingly: 'Stranger, where are you from?'"

Formerly, he was chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Area Government. Member of the Central Committee of the Party and member of the Central People's Government Council (1950).

Liu 刘斐 (Courtesy name: Wei-chang)

US Source

Member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; specially invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Nationalist Army who now advocates cooperation with the Communists, General Liu Fu was born in 1895 in Li-lung, Hunan. He is a graduate of the Kwangsi Military Academy, the Japanese Infantry School, and the Japanese Military Academy. Liu was at one time connected with the Kwangsi Army led by Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi and is a close associate of Pai. During the Northern Expedition he served as a staff officer of the National Revolutionary Army Headquarters and in 1931 was Educational Director of the Kwangsi Military Training Center.

During the Sino-Japanese War Lin served successively as: a section chief in the National Military Council; a department chief in the Ordnance Department; Deputy Director, Board of Military Operations, National Military Council, and, in May 1946, was appointed one of the Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff, a post he held for two years. In April 1949 he was one of the Nationalist delegates who went to Peking for peace negotiations with Communist authorities. He did not return to Nationalist China, but instead went to Hong Kong and was one of those who in August 1949 issued a statement attacking Chiang Kai-shek and calling on all to support the Communist cause.

Communist Source

Native of Hunan. During the Northern Expedition, he served under Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who thought well of him. Later, he went to Japan to spendize in

military science and became very well acquainted with Japanese military affairs. He continued to work in the Kwangsi Army upon his return and was the confidential adviser of Li and Pai. He devised plans for building up the Army and planned military expeditions at various times. Because of his remarkable accomplishments, he was promoted to the position of Vice-Minister of National Defense. A member of the delegation which went north for the Peace Talk Conference, he later attended the People's Political Consultative Conference. Member of the People's Revolutionary Military Council and member of the National Defense Small Group (1950).

Liu Ning-i 劉寧一

US Source

Vice-President (one of three) and concurrently Chief, International Liaison Department, All-China Federation of Labor; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; Vice-Chairman (one of five), China Committee to Defend World Peace; member, representing the All-China Federation of Labor, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Liu Ning-i, one of the top Chinese labor experts, was the Chinese Vice-President of the World Federation of Trade Unions from at least 1948 until its Congress in 1949. He was born in 1907, in Hopoh Province. During the early 1930's was active in labor organization among the miners in Tang-shan. He was arrested and imprisoned several times by the Kuomintang for this activity. In 1937 Liu went to Shanghai where he became a leader in the labor movement there probably until 1941. He seems to have gone to Yenai (Fu-shih) in 1943, and emerged as one of the Communist Party's labor experts following the death of Teng Fa in April 1946. He was in Chungking as a member of the Communist Party's delegation in late April 1946, was in Shanghai in June of that same year for a survey of the city's labor situation, and in that same month left Shanghai with Chu Hsueh-lan to attend the Executive Committee meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Moscow as representative of the Liberated Areas Trade Union Federation.

Back in China by late summer, Liu became Acting Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Liberated Areas Trade Union Federation, and was active in the Shanghai labor movement until November, when he returned to Yenai (Fu-shih). Liu again went to Europe, in June 1947, attending the First Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Prague and, before returning to China in February 1948, attended the Federation's Executive Committee meetings in Paris in November. On 7 July 1947, Marshall Tito officially received Liu and other WFTU delegates in Belgrade. As far as is known, Liu is the only ranking Chinese Communist to have visited Yugoslavia. Back in Europe by the spring of 1948, Liu was present at the April meeting of the WFTU Executive Committee in Rome, but was in Harbin in August of that same year to participate in the Sixth All-China Labor Congress. At this congress he was elected a Vice-President of the All-China Federation of Labor and was appointed head of the Federation's International Liaison Department. He traveled to Paris for the WFTU Executive Committee meeting in January 1949, and was Deputy Chairman of the Chinese delegation to the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace in April. Though head of the Chinese delegation to the Second Congress of the WFTU in Milan in June, Liu and the rest of the group were not granted Italian visas and did not reach Milan. At this meeting Liu Shao-ch'i, Deputy Chairman of the Communist Party's Central Committee, was appointed *in absentia* to replace Liu Ning-i as the Chinese Vice-Chairman of the WFTU, though Liu remains on the Federation's Executive Committee. Liu Ning-i traveled in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland during the summer of 1949, but returned to China by late August, where he participated in a broadcast denouncing

Tito. At the recent Trade Union Congress of Asian and Australasian Countries held in Peking, he was chosen to serve on the Congress Presidium.

Communist Source

Native of Man-ch'eng, Hopoh. Forty-eight years of age (1953). As a miner and representative of miners, he was active in the labor movement in the Tsingyuan (Paoing) and Tangshan areas during the Great Revolution of 1925-27. His positive role in that movement aroused the hatred of the reactionary Nationalist government. He was arrested three times and suffered torture and imprisonment for nearly ten years. The last time, he was imprisoned for six years and released only after the outbreak of the War of Resistance. His health was very much impaired due to this long imprisonment and he suffered near-sightedness. He took charge of the labor movement in Shanghai during the first period of the War of Resistance, and went back to Yenai (Fu-shih) to study in 1943. In April 1946, after Teng Fa had met his martyrdom, he attended the International Labor Conference, representing the Labor Union of the liberated areas. Vice-Chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor, concurrently chief of the International Liaison Department, and member of the Executive Committee of the International Labor Association (1950).

Liu Po-ch'eng 劉伯誠

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Commander, Second Field Army, Chinese People's Liberation Army; member, representing the Second Field Army, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, Southwest Military and Political Affairs Committee.

A prominent strategist in guerrilla warfare and known both as the "Ever Victorious General" and "One-Eyed Dragon," Liu Po-ch'eng was born in Szechwan Province in 1891. He comes from a fairly well-to-do family and is a graduate of an army officers' school in Chengtu. During the 1911 Revolution, Liu was an officer in Hsiang K'o-wu's army in Szechwan and later, in 1913, he was promoted to Brigade Commander. Liu successfully fought against Yang Sen, who was then cooperating with Yunn Shih-k'ai. It was in these Szechwan campaigns that Liu reportedly lost an eye. He became a member of the Kuomintang during the early twenties and did not join the Communist Party until 1926. He was Commander of the Fifteenth Revolutionary Army of the Wu-han Government, but defected to the Communists at the time of the Nanchang Uprising in 1927.

From 1928 to 1931 Liu was in Moscow, returning to China in 1931, he was made Chief of Staff to Chu Teh and President of the Communist Military Academy. On the Long March, Liu and Yeh Chien-yung alternated in the posts of Chief of Staff and Commander of vanguard troops. Liu was Commander of the Shansi-Hopoh-Shantung Honor Military District during the war, but his troops fought mainly in Shansi. He continued in this position for some time after the war. His forces, previously redesignated the Central Plains Liberation Army, are now known as the Second Field Army. On 1 November 1949 he was succeeded in his post as Mayor of Nanking, a position he had held since that city's fall to the Communists.

Communist Source

Native of Szechwan. More than fifty years of age (1953). Liu was Commander of the 126th Division of the Red Army during the period of the Long March. He is a graduate of the Red Army University in Moscow and was a favorite student of Stalin. He wrote a

book called *Co-operative Military Tactics*. He was in Russian eyes the only military strategist in the Chinese Communist Army. He was Chief of Staff of the Red Army in 1923. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he was Commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, fighting many victorious battles in the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan War Zone. Under his command the Southward Army Group of the People's Liberation Army swept across the Yangtze River Valley. He is Commander of the Second Field Army of the People's Liberation Army and was Chairman of the Military Control Committee after the liberation of Nanking. Later he was transferred to the West, where he served as Chairman of the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee (1950).

Liu Shao-chi (Liu Shao-ch'i) 劉少奇

US Source

Vice-Chairman, Central Committee and concurrently Vice-Chairman, Politburo, Communist Party; member, Secretariat, Communist Party; Vice-Chairman (one of six), Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of five), People's Revolutionary Military Council; Honorary Chairman, All-China Federation of Labor; Vice-Chairman, World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU); President, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Liu Shao-chi, the Communist Party's foremost theorist, Marxist scholar, and labor expert, is an experienced trade union organizer who today occupies a position in the Party hierarchy second to Mao Tse-tung. He was born in 1898 in Yiu-shan, Hunan Province, of a well-to-do peasant family and studied at the Hunan Provincial First Normal School in Changsha where other students at that time were Mao Tse-tung, Jen Pi-shih, and Li Li-san. After graduation, Liu briefly attended Peking University, at the time of the 4 May (1919) Movement. He soon left for the Soviet Union, where for seven months he studied Russian economics and the history of the international labor movement at the Far Eastern University in Moscow. In Moscow he was connected with the First Far Eastern Labor Conference held in 1920.

Returning to China in 1921, Liu joined the Communist Party and became associated with the young Chinese labor movement actively supported by the Party. In the early half of the 1920's he worked with Li Li-san in the Workers Labor Union of the An-yüan Coal Mines, was a founder and member of the Labor Secretariat organized by the Communists in Shanghai in 1921, and was a delegate to the All-China Labor Congresses of 1922, 1925, 1926, and 1927, where he again was in close association with Li Li-san. Though in 1922 Liu had assisted Mao Tse-tung in labor organization in Hunan, he is reported by his own statements to have supported the policies of Li Li-san when they opposed those of other Party leaders in 1929 and 1930. Deputy Chairman of the All-China General Labor Union by 1925, Liu was an active participant in the First Pan-Pacific Trade Union Congress, held in Hankow in May 1927, and was elected to membership in the Communist Party Central Committee that same year at the Fifth National Party Congress. Following the Kuo-mint'ang/Communist split, Liu worked briefly in the Manchurian labor movement, but by 1930 had returned to Shanghai where he was active in the Communist underground. In 1931 he was one of the organizers of a workers' strike in Shanghai protesting the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and later in the same year entered the Kiangsi Soviet, where for three years he was engaged in trade union organization. He was elected to the Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party in 1931, positions he still holds. During the Long

March, 1934-1935, he was Political Commissioner to P'eng Te-huai's Fifth Red Army, and subsequently did important undercover work in Peking from 1935 to 1937.

In Yen-an (Fu-shih) by 1937, Liu served as Commissioner of Labor of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government and from 1941-1943 was Political Commissioner of Ch'en I's New Fourth Army in Central China. He also served during this period as Secretary of the Central China Bureau of the Communist Party. Liu was elected Vice-Chairman of the Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945, and has frequently since been mentioned as the No. 2 man of the Party. He served as the Party's Acting Chairman in 1945, while Mao Tse-tung was in Chungking negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek. Elected Honorary Chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor in May 1949, Liu was made one of the vice-presidents of the World Federation of Trade Unions at the WFTU Conference in Milan in June 1949, and following the establishment of the Central People's Government became one of the government's vice-chairmen. A prolific writer, Liu's works frequently enunciate important Party policies.

Communist Source

Native of Hunan. Forty-nine years of age (1953). After high school, he went to Moscow for further study. Liu joined the Socialist Youth Corps in 1920 and in the spring of 1922, he worked in the secretariat of the Chinese Labor Organization Association, predecessor of the All-China Federation of Labor. In the fall of the same year, he worked in the An-yüan Labor Union of the well-known Ping-hsiang mining district. Later, he became chairman of that union, making it one of the most vital centers of the Chinese labor movement in its initial stage. In the spring of 1925, he assisted in the preparation for the Third All-China Labor Conference which was held in Canton from 1 to 7 May 1925. After a resolution was passed to organize the All-China General Labor Union, he was elected Vice-Chairman of the organization. In the summer of that year, he went to Shanghai, the storm-center of revolutionary and labor movements, to work for the Shanghai General Labor Union. The following winter he went back to Canton to work for the All-China General Labor Union. When the Northern Expedition reached Wu-han, he was in charge of the Hupei General Labor Union. He went underground after the failure of the 1925-27 Great Revolution, but remained an active leader in the revolutionary and labor movements. He went to the revolutionary base in Kiangsi in the fall of 1932 to continue his work for the All-China General Labor Union. From 1936 to 1942 he was, at various times, secretary of the North (branch) Office, the Chung-yüan (branch) Office, and the Central China (branch) Office, of the Central Committee of the Party. Member of the Central Politburo of the Party since 1922, Secretary of the Central Secretariat and concurrently Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Council since 1943. Vice Chairman of the Central People's Government Council (1950).

Liu Tzu-chiu 劉子久

US Source

Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Committee of Finance and Economics; Chief, Department of Culture and Education, All-China Federation of Labor; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Central Plains Provisional People's Government Council; member, representing the Central China Liberated Area, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Liu Tzu-chiu, little-known alternate Central Committee-man, was born c. 1901 in Hunan, and joined the Communist Party in 1928. In 1937 he became chief of the Organiza-

tion Department of the Honan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party and later became its Secretary. Liu was elected to be an alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945, and in 1949 served briefly as Minister of Education of the Central Plains Provisional People's Government. He was appointed Chief of the Department of Culture and Education of the All-China Federation of Labor in May 1949.

Communist Source
None.

Liu Ya-tzu 柳亞子 (Courtesy name: Ch'i-chi)

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, Committee of Culture and Education; Chairman, Central Supervisory Committee and concurrently Chairman, Secretariat, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; member, China Democratic League; member, representing the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, Chinese People's People Consultative Conference.

A noted poet and veteran revolutionary, Liu Ya-tzu was born in 1887 in Wu-chiang Hsien, Kiangsu, and was an early member of the T'ung Meng Hui. He was first elected to the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee in 1926, was re-elected in 1931, and served until 1941, when he was expelled from the Kuomintang for denouncing the Nationalist attack on the Communist New Fourth Army in January 1941. From 1932 to 1941 he served as Director of the History Compilation Bureau of the Shanghai Municipal Government. Liu joined the China Democratic League in 1945 and was a participant in the League's Chungking activities. He went to Hong Kong following the League's dissolution, and shortly thereafter became one of the organizers of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. Liu arrived in Communist China in April 1949.

Communist Source
None.

Lo Jui-ch'ing 羅瑞卿

US Source

Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; committee member, People's Procurator General's Office; member, State Administration Council; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; Minister of Public Security; Director, Peking Public Security Bureau; member, representing the First Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Chinese People's People Consultative Conference.

Political Commissioner of various Communist Army units since his graduation from the Hankow Military Academy. Lo Jui-ch'ing was born about 1901 in Nan-ch'ung, Szechwan Province. He was political director of units under such well-known Communist military leaders as Yeh Ting and Chou Teh. In 1929 he was Political Commissioner in the 11th Division of the New Fourth Army. During the summer of 1931, he was wounded while fighting against the "3rd Encircling and Mopping-up Unit" of the Nationalist Army. After his recovery, he was made head of the Political Defense Bureau in the First Army Group and set up intelligence organs in the Army. He became Chief of the Political Department of the 1st Column of the Shensi-Kansu detachment after having made the Long March.

Graduating in the First Class of the Red Army University in 1936, Lo subsequently became Chancellor of the Anti-Japanese University which was reorganized from the Red Army University. In 1938 he became Vice-President of the University. Later, in 1940, he became Chief of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army and a committee member of the North China Bureau of the Communist Party. Lo became alternate member of the Central Committee, Communist Party, in April 1945, and in the following year was Executive Headquarters, Lo was Chief of Staff to Yeh Chien-ying, the Communist representative. In 1947 he returned to the Shensi-Hopeh-Chahar Field District. At Peking he became Political Commissioner of the Second Army Group of North China People's Liberation Army. Other appointments which Lo received in 1949 were: Deputy Chairman (one of three), Yangku (Taiyuan) Military Control Committee, and Chief, Political Department, North China Army Area Headquarters.

Communist Source
None.

Lo Jung-huan 程榮煇

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; Procurator-General, Central People's Government; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; member, representing the Fourth Field Army, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A political commissioner long associated with Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan was born in 1903, in Hunan, and is a graduate of the University of Tsingtao (Shantung University). He joined the Communist Party in 1926, the Red Army in 1928, and by 1930 was Political Commissioner of the Fourth Red Army, then commanded by Lin Piao. When Lin was transferred to the command of the First Red Army Corps in 1932, Lo accompanied him as Political Commissioner. In 1935, Lo was Director of the Political Department of the First Army, and following the reorganization of the Communist armed forces in 1937 was made Director of the Political Department of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, the division being commanded by Lin Piao.

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War Lo was in Shantung Province, where he was one of the founders of the Communist Shantung Military Area. By 1941 he had become Acting Commander and Political Commissioner of the Eighth Route Army forces in Shantung. He joined Lin Piao's United Democratic Army in Manchuria in 1946 as Deputy Political Commissioner, and was with Lin from that time until his recent appointments in the Central People's Government. In 1949 Lo was Political Commissioner of the Peking-Tientsin Front of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Fourth Field Army, and the Central China Military Districts, all commanded by Lin. In addition, Lo was Second Secretary of the Central China Bureau of the Communist Party, the First Secretary being Lin.

Communist Source

Native of Hunan. Born in 1895. Entered Sun Yat-sen University in Canton after graduation from Changsha High School. After the failure of the Great Revolution, he joined the Nanchang uprising and the harvest-time uprising of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region. This group of armed people was later reorganized into the 1st Regiment of the

1st Division of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Army. Lo was representative of the Party. Stationed with his regiment at Ching-kang Mountain, he helped establish the Chinese Red Army, which later blossomed into the mighty Chinese People's Liberation Army. He participated in the Long March to Yen-an (Fu-shih). From the start of the War of Resistance up to the establishment of the Central People's Government, he served as Chairman of the Political Bureaus as well as Political Commissar of various divisions, armies, and field armies. During the war years, he was the Commanding Officer of the Shantung Region and Secretary of the Shantung branch Office of the Party. His long stay in Shantung enabled him to accomplish a great deal during the subsequent liberation of the province.

Upon the conclusion of the War of Resistance, he went to the Northeast with General Lin Piao and stayed with him for three or four years. While Lin Piao was the Commander in Chief of the Northeast Military Area, Lo served as his Political Commissar. Later, he went with Lin to Central China, serving as Political Commissar of the Central China Military Area as well as Political Commissar of the Fourth Field Army. After the establishment of the new government, he was appointed to be the People's Procurator-General.

Lo Lung-chi 羅隆基 (Courtesy name: Nu-sheng)

US Source

Member, State Administration Council; member, Central Political Bureau and Standing Committee, China Democratic League; member, representing the China Democratic League, and concurrently, member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A prominent member of The China Democratic League, Lo Lung-chi was born in An-fu, Kiangsu, in 1896. He is a graduate of Tsinghua University and received his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Wisconsin, 1924 and 1925, and Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1928. At the London School of Economics and Political Science from 1926 to 1927, Lo studied under Harold J. Laski. As a student abroad, Lo was active in student activities, serving as president of the Chinese Students' Federation of the United States and editor of the *Chinese Students' Quarterly*. He returned to China in 1928 and became Professor and Dean of the Political Science Department at Kuangshu University. In 1930, Lo was arrested and dismissed from Kuangshu University on the order of the Generalissimo, because of his critical political attitudes. After his liberation, he became Editor of the Catholic *I Shih Pao* in Tientsin, and joined the National Socialist Party. He also lectured at Nankai University. After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1932, Lo actively participated in the Students' Movement, agitating for the suspension of the Civil War and the forming of a united front for anti-Japanese resistance. He was also associated with Shen Chun-ju in the National Salvation Association, and was a founding and executive member of both the Peking and Tientsin branches of the Association.

From 1938 to 1941 Lo was a member of the People's Political Council and a member of the Council's Committee for Promoting Constitutional Government. Lo's program, for the limitation of executive authority, resulted in his dismissal from the National Southwest Associated University. He was also a member of the People's Political Council's Mediating Committee of Nine, which was formed to stave off Communist withdrawal from the PCC. In January 1946, Lo was a member of the Government Reorganization and Constitution Drafting Committee of the Political Consultative Conference. He supported the Communist delegation to the Conference on the distribution of seats in a projected State Council, but did not join the Communists in North China until after the fall of Shanghai, in May 1949. At present he is a member of the Standing Committee of the China New Political Science Research Association.

Communist Source

Native of Kiangsi. More than fifty years of age (1953). Graduate of Tsinghua University, he received his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. Upon his return to China he became Professor at Tsinghua University, Editor in Chief of the *I Shih Pao* in Tientsin, and co-founder of the *New Moon* magazine together with Hu Shih and P'an Kuang-tan. For a brief period he was a member of the National Socialist Party, founded by Chang Chun-mai. Later, in Chungking, he was one of the leading figures in the Democratic League, serving as the Chairman of the Propaganda Committee. Upon the failure of the earlier People's Political Consultative Conference and the consequent compulsory dissolution of the Democratic League, he retired to Nanking and Shanghai to regain his health. After the liberation of Shanghai, he went north to attend the People's Political Consultative Conference. Political Affairs member of the State Administrative Council (1950).

Lo Shu-chang 羅叔章

US Source

None.

Communist Source

Native of Hunan. Forty-six years of age (1953). Lo left home in her early years and went to Shanghai to do social work. After the failure of the Great Revolution, she was compelled to go to the South Sea Islands, where she taught until the outbreak of the War of Resistance. When she returned, she participated in the women's movement and served as a worker in the People's National Salvation Society. She organized co-operatives in Chungking to give medical supplies to the poor. Later, she helped organize the Chinese Medium- and Small-sized Factories Association, which was later dissolved by the reactionaries. After the "batter" victory (over Japan), she went back to Shanghai and took charge of the women's work of the Democratic League, Shanghai branch. She left Shanghai under the White Terror and went to the Northeast, which was then liberated.

She was Assistant Secretary-General of the Preparatory Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference and is Vice-Director of the Secretariat of the Central People's Government Council (1950).

Lu Ting-i 陸定一

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Committee of Culture and Education; Director, Propaganda Department, Central Committee, Communist Party; Vice-Chairman (one of four), China New Political Science Research Association; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

One of the Chinese Communist Party's principal publicists and Marxist thinkers, Lu Ting-i was born in 1901 in Wu-hsi, Kiangsu Province, of a well-to-do landlord family. He had two children by his first wife, who worked in the Kiangsu Soviet hospital and was killed by the Kuomintang, and three children by a second marriage. He studied railway engineering at Nanyang University, Shanghai, and joined the Communist Party in 1924. His first assignment in the field in which he is now the No. 1 Communist leader was in propaganda work with the Communist Youth League, of which Jen Pi-shih was then the Secretary. Lu worked with the Youth League until some time after the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists in 1927, when he fled to Moscow. He was a Chinese

Delegate to the World Communist Youth Meeting, held in Moscow in 1928, but returned to China in 1929 to resume his propaganda work with the Communist Youth League.

When the Kiangsi Soviet was established in December 1931, Lu was made head of the Youth League's Propaganda Department. He participated in the Long March, 1934-1935, and carried on his propaganda work in the Yenan (Fu-shih) Soviet, soon becoming head of the so-called Information Department, a position he continues to hold. In 1946, after the death of Po Ku, he became Editor in Chief of the principal Communist daily, the *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*. He was elected to the Party Central Committee at the Seventh Congress in April 1945. For the first seven months of negotiations between the Kuomintang and Communists in 1946, Lu Ting-i was one of the three chief Communist negotiators.

Communist Source

Native of Wu-hai in Kiangsu. Graduate of National Chiao'ung University, Shanghai. Joined the Chinese Communist Party in his student days. Member of the Central Committee and concurrently head of the Department of Propaganda of the Party; Vice-Chairman of the Committee of Culture and Education of the Central People's Government (1950).

Lung Y'an 雷震 (Courtesy name: Chih-chou)

U S Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; specially invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

The long-time (1928-1945) Chairman of the Yunnan Provincial Government, Lung Yun was born in 1888 in Chao-tung, Yunnan. His family belonged to a Lolo tribe. He graduated in 1912 from the Yunnan Military Academy, and started his career as a soldier in the army of T'ang Chi-yao, becoming by 1925 the Commander of the Fifth Army. He wrested control of Yunnan from T'ang in 1927, and from that date until his replacement in 1945, following a coup d'etat engineered by Chiang Kai-shek, was virtual dictator of the Province.

Though nominally allied to the Nationalist Government, prior to 1940 Lung's power in the province was undisputed. During these years he served at various times as member of the National Military Council, Commander of the Thirty-Eighth Army, Commander of the Tenth Route Army, and Commander of the Second Route Army. He was elected a reserve member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in 1931 and later became a member of the Party's Central Supervisory Committee. Lung was appointed Pacification Commander for Yunnan and Kweichow in 1936, and in 1940 was made Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters in Kunming. While he maintained an area virtually independent from government control, Lung on three occasions came to the aid of Chiang Kai-shek in defense of the Nationalist regime.

During the latter part of the Sino-Japanese War, troops and officials of the Nationalist Government entered Yunnan under an agreement with Lung, but following the Japanese surrender these troops were used in a successful coup to oust Lung from power. Lung was given the honorary post of President of the Military Advisory Council and was made a member of the Strategic Advisory Commission in 1947, when the former council was dissolved. Actually, he was under house arrest. He escaped to Hong Kong in December 1948, and shortly thereafter denounced Chiang Kai-shek and advocated cessation of the Civil War. Though Lung was a specially invited member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, he did not arrive in Peking until January 1950.

Communist Source

Native of Chao-tung, Yunnan. More than sixty years of age (1953). Graduate of the Military Academy in Yunnan. Lung was former Governor of Yunnan Province. After V-J Day, while Lu Hsiang's Yunnan army went to Ludo-China to accept the surrender of the Japanese, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Tu Yu-ming to start an incident to divest Lung Yun of his power in Yunnan. Under heavy pressure, he reluctantly went to Chungking to accept the position of Chairman of the Council of Military Advisers. Later he moved to Nanking. In 1949 he fled to Hong Kong and made a public declaration that he would work in the interests of the people. Member of the Central People's Government Council (1950).

Ma Hsu-lun 馬敘倫

U S Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, State Administration Council; Minister of Education; member, Central Political Bureau and Standing Committee, China Democratic League; member, representing the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

An authority on Chinese literature and etymology, Ma Hsu-lun was born in 1884, in Hangchow, Chekiang Province. After receiving his education under private tutors, he became Editor of the *New World* in Shanghai. In 1912 he was secretary to the military governor of Chekiang and Director of the Bureau of Printing and Engraving. Ma became a professor in Peking University in 1913, but later left Peking to join the independence movement against Yuan Shih-k'ai, in Chekiang.

Rejoining the Peking faculty after the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, he became closely connected with the student movement and was for a time wanted by the Peking Government. In 1922 he was appointed Director of Education for Chekiang, but was soon called to Peking to assume the post of Vice-Minister of Education. The following year Ma was appointed Chief of the Publicity Department of the Kuomintang office at Peking, and made several attempts at revolution during the presidency of T'sao Kun. Upon the deposition of T'sao in 1924, he again became Vice-Minister of Education. Because of his agitation against the 18 March 1926 student massacre, Ma again fled from Peking to Chekiang, where he conspired with Hsin Chao, the latter sending him to Canton as personal representative to the Canton Government. In 1927 Ma became a member of the Chekiang Political Council and was later Director of the Civil Affairs Bureau. He was appointed a counselor of the Nationalist Government in 1928, and later in the same year was appointed Vice-Minister of Education.

Prior to the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, Ma was again a professor at National Peking University. A critic of Kuomintang misadministration, shortly after V-J Day, Ma organized the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy as well as the Shanghai Federation of People's Organizations. It was as head of a delegation of the latter organization to Nanking to protest against the Civil War that Ma became a *cause celebre*. He and other members of his party were attacked by ruffians generally considered to be in the employ of the Kuomintang Secret Police, and were beaten in the Hsai-kuan Railroad Station, outside Nanking on 23 June 1946. In November of the same year, he became Secretary of the International League for the Protection of Human Rights. Following the outbreak of the China Democratic League in October 1947, he went to Hong Kong, where he apparently worked closely with the Communists.

STAT

Communist Source

Native of Hangchow, Chekiang. Sixty-four years of age (1953). Studied in the Yang-cheng Private School in Hangchow. During the 1911 Revolution, Ts'ai Yuan-pei, Shen Chun-ju, and he answered the call in Chekiang and met with glorious success. He was Minister of Education, professor at the Peking University, and chief of the Civil Administration Department of the Chekiang Provincial Government. He did not leave Shanghai during the War of Resistance, but buried himself in his books and refused to see anyone in order to avoid the enemy regime's attention. Later, he organized the Society for the Promotion of Democracy in China with Wang Ch'ieh-h'ên, Hsu Kuang-p'ing, and others. He is a well-known philologist, a bronze and stone specialist, and also a good calligrapher. He participated in the People's Political Consultative Conference as a representative of the Chinese Society for the Promotion of Democracy. Vice-Chairman of the Committee of Culture and Education of the Central People's Government (1950).

Ma Ming-fang 馬明方
US Source

Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; Deputy Secretary, Northwest Bureau, Communist Party; President, Northwest People's Revolutionary University; Chairman, Shensi Provincial People's Government; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Northwest Liberated Area, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Ma Ming-fang was born c. 1901 in Shensi and is a high school graduate. He joined the Communist Party in 1929 and was an early associate of Liu T'ai-tan and Kao Kang in the pre-1934 establishment of the Shensi Soviet. He reportedly went to the USSR in 1938 for medical treatment, returning the following year to Sinkiang Province. Arrested in 1942 by Shêng Shih-ts'ai, then Governor of Sinkiang, Ma was imprisoned until 1946. He was elected, in absentia, an alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945. Following his return to Yanan (Fu-shih) in 1946 he became associated with the Party's Northwest Bureau. Ma was named Chairman of the Shensi Provincial People's Government in December 1949.

Communist Source

None.

Ma Yin-ch'u 馬寅初
US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of two), Committee of Finance and Economics; President, Chekiang University; Vice-Chairman (one of five), China Committee to Defend World Peace; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing "non-partisan democratic personages," Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of four), East China Military and Political Affairs Committee.

Ma Yin-ch'u, one of China's foremost economists, was born in 1884 in Ch'eng Hsien, Chekiang. After receiving an elementary education in mathematics and English in a Christian high school in Shanghai, he was admitted to Peking University, Tientsin, where he studied metallurgy. Ma graduated from Yale in 1910 with a B.A. degree in economics, and subsequently received his M.A. and Ph.D. from Columbia in political economy and did advanced work in statistics at New York University. He was Professor of economics at National Peking University and concurrently advisor to the Bank of China from 1914 to

1927. Other positions which he has held are: Member, Chekiang Provincial Government, 1927; member, Legislative Yuan, 1928 to 1947; professor, Chiao-tung University, Central University, and, concurrently, Chief of Issue Department, Bank of China, 1928 to 1937.

Early in the Sino-Japanese War, Ma was given a chair in economics at Chungking University, but was imprisoned about 1940 because of his bold criticism of corruption, profiteering, and misgovernment. Released shortly before the Japanese surrender, Ma continued his denunciation of the Nationalist Government. He went to Shanghai in 1946 and for two years was one of the leading spirits in the anti-government discussions held in student and labor groups there. Critic of US policy in China, Ma entered Communist territory in March 1949. He was Deputy Head of the Chinese delegation to the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace in April 1949. Returning to China, he was active in the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and in the establishment of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

Communist Source

His former name was Yuan-shan. Native of Ch'eng Hsien, Chekiang. Seventy-two years of age, but still as healthy as a young man. He studied in the Chungshai School in Shanghai in his youth. Later he studied mining in Peiking University. Ma went to the United States in 1907 and studied economics at Yale University. After graduation in 1910, he entered the graduate school at Columbia University and obtained his Ph.D. in four years. When he came back, he was Professor at Peking University. Later, he was professor at the Central University, the Chiao-tung University, the Chekiang University, and the Chungking University, covering a period of more than twenty years. He is a famous economist. President of the Chekiang University and Vice-chairman of the Committee of Finance and Economics of the Central People's Government (1950).

Mao Tse-tung (Mao Tse-tung) 毛澤東 (Courtesy name: Jun-chih)

US Source

Chairman, Central Committee and Politburo, Communist Party; member, Secretariat, Communist Party; Chairman, Central People's Government; Chairman, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Chairman, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Mao Tse-tung, the leader of China's Communist Party, was born in 1893, in Shao-shan village, Hsiang-t'an Hsien, Hunan Province. His parents were said to be peasants of moderate circumstances. His present wife, whom he married in 1939, is Lan Ping, the former Shanghai movie actress; his divorced third wife, Ho T'ai-hên, lives in the USSR. Mao has at least two sons and a daughter.

A graduate of the Hunan Provincial First Normal School in Changsha in 1918, Mao received his entire education in China and presumably had never been out of China until December 1919, when he negotiated the Sino-Soviet Treaty with the Russians. He was a co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, along with such early Chinese Marxists as Ch'ên Tu-hsiu and Li T'ao-chao, whom he met while working in the library of Peking University about 1919. A student leader in Peking, he was also acquainted with many students who went to France under the "worker-student" plan. This group is among the hard core of the present-day leadership of the Communist Party in China.

Mao was active in the political organization of workers in 1920, and by 1922 as Secretary of the Hunan branch of the Communist Party, he was engaged in trade union organization. During the period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation in 1924, he was a reserve

member of the Kuomintang Central Committee and Secretary of the Organization Department of the Kuomintang's Shanghai Headquarters. For a brief period in 1925, Mao was Acting Minister of Information of the Kuomintang and later did intensive work organizing the All-China Peasants' Union in his native province.

For being an organizer of the Hunan Autumn Crop Uprising in September 1927, he was dismissed by the faction then in control of the Communist Party from the Central Committee and Politburo, positions to which he had been elected in 1921 and 1923. Following this abortive rebellion, Mao retired to the Kiangsi-Fukien border. In November 1927, he helped set up the first Chinese Soviet on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. The Soviet lasted only a few months. In May 1928, Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh joined forces, Mao becoming Political Commissioner of Chu's Fourth Red Army. Mao became Chairman of the Kiangsi Soviet in December 1931, though there are indications that he was again briefly ousted from the Politburo as a result of intra-party differences between leaders of the Kiangsi Soviet and those of the Party Headquarters in Shanghai who were close to the Russian representatives of the Internationale. Mao, however, retained the chairmanship of the Kiangsi Soviet and became the dominant figure of the Party Central Committee sometime during or immediately after the epochal Long March. In July 1935, he was elected to the Executive Committee of the Communist International, following which time he has been the virtual head of the Party, though his appointment as Party Chairman was not formalized until the meeting of the Seventh National Party Congress in Yenan (Fu-shih), April 1945.

In 1937 Mao was appointed Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Council and in the second period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation for the prosecution of the Sino-Japanese War, he became a member of the People's Political Council and the National Military Council. He remained at Party Headquarters in Yenan (Fu-shih) until 1945 when he went to Chungking in an effort to negotiate a settlement of the threatening Civil War. His trip to celebrate Stalin's birthday in Moscow, December 1949, was followed by protracted negotiations culminating in the signing of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship on 14 February 1950. In the post-war period, many rumors have suggested the existence of cleavages within the Communist Party ranks and possible rivals for Mao's position. His position at present is apparently secure.

Communist Source

Born in Shao-shan, Hsiang-t'an, Hsien, Hunan, in 1893. Sixty years of age (1953). In his childhood, he studied the Four Books and the Five Classics under an old-fashioned village tutor and helped his father in the fields. It was not until he graduated from the First Provincial Normal School in Changsha that his political concepts began to take shape. He participated, in 1920, in the organization of the Chinese Communist Party. He was active in the farmers' movement during the period of the Northern Expedition. After the split between the Nationalists and the Communists, he personally organized the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and started a revolutionary war. Mao has been Chairman of the Soviet Central Government, Chairman of the Central Politburo of the Party, Chairman of the Military Council of the Red Army, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party, and Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolution Military Council. He is a great leader of the Chinese people, a student of history and philosophy, and an outstanding exponent and practitioner of Marxism-Leninism. He is also the most authoritative revolutionary strategist and theorist. Chairman of the Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China (1950).

Nieh Jung-chen 聶榮臻

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chief of Staff, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Mayor of Peking; Chairman, Peking Military Control Commission; Commander, North China Military District; member, representing the Chinese People's Liberation Army Headquarters, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A French-educated chemical engineer with a long record of Red Army service, Nieh Jung-chen was born in Chiang-chin, Szechwan, in 1899, the son of a wealthy landlord. He was active in the 4 May (1919) Movement while a student in the Chungking Middle School, and was a member of the "worker-student" group that went to France for advanced study in 1920. In France, Nieh studied at the Université de Travail and the University of Paris. Having agreed not only to work toward a university degree but also to get some practical factory experience, he served for a short time at the Schneider-Crestat Arms Factory and the Renault Motor Works in Paris. Following this apprenticeship, Nieh studied briefly at the École de Travaux in Charleroi, Belgium, and probably also at the University of Brussels. While in France, he joined the Socialist Youth Corps. He seems to have joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1923 in Berlin, where he had gone for additional studies. In 1924 and 1925 Nieh was in Moscow where for six months he attended the Eastern Laborers' University and later the Red Army Academy.

Upon his return to China sometime in 1925, Nieh was made Secretary of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy, the department then headed by Chou En-lai. A member of the Nationalist armies which began the Northern Expedition in 1926, Nieh's armies were among the defecting troops which revolted against Chiang Kai-shek at Nanchang in August 1927. Here Nieh's troops joined with those of Yeh T'ing, Ho Lung, and Lin Piao and moved south to set up the Hsiao-feng Soviet in Kwangtung Province. In December 1927 those troops marched on Canton and following the failure of their attack on the city Nieh and others fled to the USSR. For the next four years he remained in the USSR, where he was said to have worked with the Comintern. By January 1932 he was back in China, working at the Kiangsi Soviet Headquarters at Jun-ching, where he became Political Commissioner to Lin Piao's Army. Nieh held this position from 1932 to 1936 and like Lin, made the Long March to Northwest China in 1934 and 1935. Subsequently he became Deputy Commander under Lin Piao of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

In 1937 Nieh helped to organize the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government and became its Chairman. His headquarters were in the Wu Tu Mountains of Shansi, an area from which he fought guerrilla operations throughout the war and from which his troops spread into Inner Mongolia after V-J Day. For a time his forces held Wanhsuan (Kakam), but after its fall to the Nationalists in September 1946 they moved to western Hopeh for a brief period. In June 1948 he was made Commander of the North China People's Liberation Army and in September a member of the North China People's Government. Following the occupation of Peking by Communist troops, Nieh was named Peking Garrison Commander. One of the Communist negotiators appointed to discuss peace terms with the Nationalists in April 1949, and also a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, he assumed the majority of Peking on 9 September 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Chiang-chin, Szechwan. More than fifty years of age (1953). Went to France in 1920 as a "worker-student" and worked in Paris. Nieh entered the Moscow Military School in 1924. He came back to China in 1925 and taught at the Whampoa Military Academy. He joined the Red Army after the failure of the Great Revolution and was Commander of the 116th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance. Under his leadership his division penetrated into Hopeh Province. He was Commander of the North China Military Zone in the Liberation War and contributed much to defeating Chiang's crack troops. Vice Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army and Mayor of Peking (1950).

*P'eng Chen 彭真**US Source*

Member, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Secretary, Peking Municipal Committee, Communist Party; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A Communist Party member who in his early years was active in trade union organization in North China, P'eng Chen is a Shansi native born in 1899. He is a high school graduate and joined the Communist Party in 1926. At one time active in the Red Army as a political worker, by 1935 he was connected with the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government. In 1944 P'eng was Director of the Party School in Yen-an (Fu-shih), and in 1945 was elected to membership on the Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat of the Party. Following the end of the Sino-Japanese War he went to Manchuria, where for over three years he was Chairman of the Northeast Bureau of the Party and Political Commissioner to Lin Biao's United Democratic Army. P'eng became Secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Communist Party in February 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Shansi. Born of a poor peasant family. Due to his determined efforts, graduated from elementary school and entered middle school at the age of twenty-one. Though a victim of the old-fashioned school system, he was soon baptized in the new ideas and determined to dedicate himself to the revolution. He joined the Youth Corps of the Chinese Communist Party and later formally joined the Party. He was a central figure in the student and labor movements in Yangku (Taiyuan). Later, as Secretary of the General Labor Union of the Cheng-ting-Taiyuan railway, he was active in organizing labor for a long period. After that, he was engaged in Party organization work in the Tientsin, Peking, and Tang-shan areas. Unfortunately, he was arrested by reactionaries and was imprisoned for six years. He went back to Yen-an (Fu-shih) from North China in 1937. Member of the Central People's Government Council and Secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Party (1950).

*P'eng T'eh-min 彭德懷**US Source*

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of four), People's Revolutionary Military Council; Deputy Commander in Chief, Chinese People's Liberation Army; Commander, First Field

Army; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, Northwest Military and Political Affairs Committee.

Deputy Commander to Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of Chinese Armies, since 1937, P'eng T'eh-min is the No. 2 man of the Chinese Communist military hierarchy. He was born in 1900 in Hsiang-t'ien, Hunan, the son of well-to-do peasants. According to reports he was unable to get along with his stepmother and, leaving home at the age of nine, he tried various ways of making a living until, in 1916, he joined the Army. He graduated from the Hunan Military Academy, and by 1927 had risen to the command of a brigade in the Kuomintang Army of Ho Chien. He broke with the Kuomintang in 1927, and joined the Communist Party. The following year, as Commander of the Fifth Red Army, he started the P'ing-chiang insurrection and established the first short-lived Hunan Soviet government.

P'eng commanded troops that captured and briefly held Changsha in 1930 and later commanded the Third Red Army Corps. In 1934 and 1935 his First Red Army Corps was the vanguard of the Long March to Shensi. P'eng served briefly in 1935 and 1936 as Commander of all Communist forces in the Northwest, relinquishing this command on the arrival of Chu Teh. Well regarded as a tactician and military expert, P'eng became Deputy Commander to Chu Teh in 1937. He still holds that post but reportedly has taken over many of Chu's functions (1950).

Communist Source

Native of Hsiang-t'ien, Hunan. Fifty-three years of age (1953). P'eng was a Brigade Commander under Ho Chien during the Northern Expedition period. In 1927, when Ho Chien started a purge, he joined the Chinese Communist Party, started the "P'ing-chiang Revolt," organized the farmers' riot, and established the first Soviet government in Hunan. He was Commander of the First Army Group of the Red Army during the Long March and was well-known for his bravery. He was Deputy Commander of the Eighth Route Army in the beginning of the War of Resistance and fought behind enemy lines in Southeast Shansi. P'eng went back to Yen-an (Fu-shih) in the later period of the War to take charge of the army's movement for correcting unorthodox tendencies and its work of discipline reform. He defeated Hu Tsung-shan. He was Deputy Commander of the People's Liberation Army. He married Miss P'u An-hua in 1942. Vice-Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council and Commander of the First Field Army (1950).

*P'eng T'eh-min 彭澤民**US Source*

Member, Central People's Government Council; Chairman, Supervisory Committee, China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; member, Central Political Bureau and Standing Committee, China Democratic League; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; member, representing the China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A prominent Third Party leader, details of whose biography are not well known, P'eng T'eh-min, an elderly, Overseas Chinese revolutionary leader, was an intimate friend of Sun Yat-sen. He was one of the leaders of the Third Party's (now named the China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party) representation in the Federation of Democratic Parties, predecessor of the China Democratic League. After the war, he became a leader of the South China branch of the China Democratic League and concurrently a member of the League's Central Executive Committee. P'eng is also listed as a member of the Kuomintang

mintang Revolutionary Committee in Hong Kong. He apparently left Hong Kong in late December 1948, arrived in Peking in February 1949, and later became a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

Native of Sui-hui, Kwangtung. Seventy-nine years of age (1953). Born and grew up in the South Sea Islands. Highly esteemed among the overseas Chinese. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen was working for the Revolution, he was the first among the Overseas Chinese to respond, and he wholeheartedly supported the Kuomintang and Minister of Overseas Chinese Affairs. After the Nanking-Hankow split, because he favored the Three Great Policies, he left Wuhan and went to Kiangsi to participate in the Nanchang Uprising. Later he escaped to Hong Kong. During that period, he made his living practicing medicine, but continued to be active in organization work for the Chinese Farmers' and Workers' Democratic Party. He was a representative of the Chinese Farmers' and Workers' Democratic Party in the People's Political Consultative Conference. Vice-Chairman of the Committee of Political and Legal Affairs of the Central People's Government (1950).

Po I-po 薄一波

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, State Administration Council; Vice-Chairman (one of two), Committee of Finance and Economics; Minister of Finance; Secretary, North China Bureau, Communist Party; member, representing the North China Liberated Area, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Po I-po was born in Ting-hsiang, Shansi, in 1907. A former subordinate of Yen Hsi-shan, he has risen in the last decade to a position of prominence among Chinese Communist leaders. He studied at the Taiyuan Normal School and later took courses at various Peking universities. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 and in 1939 became one of the leaders of the reorganized New Army, a force (originally under Yen Hsi-shan) which defected to the Communists in November 1939, after being attacked by Yen, who could no longer control it. By 1944, Po was connected with the Border government and with the Chinese Communist Forces in the Shansi-Hopch-Shantung-Honan Area under the command of veteran Communist military leader Liu Po-ch'eng. In 1945 Po was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Concurrently he was Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Military and Political Academy for Korean Cadres, Yen-an (Fu-shih). In 1947 and 1948 Po was Deputy Political Director, Central China People's Liberation Army and Commander, 8th Column, Shansi-Hopch-Shantung-Honan Military District. He became Political Director, North China Military District in September. Po served concurrently in the North China regime as a Vice-Chairman of the government's Financial and Economic Commission until its dissolution in October 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Ting-hsiang, Shansi. Forty-seven years of age (1953). Studied in the Kuo Min Normal School in Yangku (Taiyuan). Later, as a student in a university in Peking, he was active in revolutionary work and associated himself with progressive fellow-students. He was arrested in Peking in 1932 and imprisoned for more than three years. The War of

Resistance broke out soon after his release. He had already gone back to Taiyuan, and had organized the League of National Salvation by Sacrifice, which was staunchly anti-Japanese. It had more than a hundred thousand members in Shansi, and comprised political as well as armed groups called the Eight-to-the-Death Corps. When Taiyuan fell to the enemy, he led the first and second columns of this corps in holding the Southeast Shansi Area. At that time he was Director of the Southeast Shansi Administrative Office of the Shansi Provincial Government. He was elected member of the Central Committee in the Sixth All-China Delegation Conference of the Chinese Communist Party and was First Vice-Chairman of the North China People's Government and Secretary of the North China Politburo of the Party. Vice-Chairman of the Committee of Finance and Economics of the Central People's Government and, concurrently, Minister of Finance (1950).

Shao Li-tzu 邵力子 (Courtesy name: Chung-hui)

US Source

Member, State Administration Council; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; specially invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Left-wing Kuomintang member and former Chinese Ambassador to Moscow, who has long advocated a Sino-Russian rapprochement, Shao Li-tzu was born in 1882 in Shao-hsing, Chekiang, son of a Mandarin official. He received the Chu Jen degree of the Manchu dynasty in 1903, studied briefly at Aurora University in Shanghai, and graduated from Fudan University in 1907. Following a trip to Japan, Shao joined the Tung Meng Hui in 1911 and the same year edited the *Min Li Pao*, a revolutionary Shanghai newspaper sponsored by Yu Yu-jen. From 1912 to 1915 he taught school in Sian, but returned to Shanghai in 1916 as Editor of the *Min-kwo Jih-pao*, a position he held for ten years. During this period Shao also served as a professor at Fudan University. Though it is unknown whether he joined the Chinese Communist Party, Shao was one of those who met with the Comintern agent Vaitinsky in September 1920 to prepare for the founding of the Party.

A member of the Kuomintang from its inception, Shao in 1925 became chief of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy. He was elected to the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang in 1926, and later that year was sent to Moscow, where he studied briefly at Chungshan University and served as the fraternal delegate of the Kuomintang to the Seventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Returning to China in 1927, he became Chief Secretary at the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the Nationalist Revolutionary Armies, a post he held until 1931. In this capacity Shao served as private secretary to Chiang Kai-shek. He was appointed Chairman of the Kansu Provincial Government in 1932, but the following year was transferred to Shensi Province. He resigned the Shensi governorship following the Sian Incident in December 1936, and for the following two years served as Kuomintang Minister of Information. In 1939 he was, for a brief time, Secretary-General of the War Area Army and Political Work Committee, and in April 1940 was appointed Ambassador to the USSR, serving in that capacity until 1943.

Upon his return to China, Shao became Secretary-General of the People's Political Council, later served as Chairman of the National Assembly Preparatory Committee, and in 1946 was made Secretary-General of the Political Consultative Conference. Both at the National Assembly and the Political Consultative Conference, Shao called for peaceful negotiations with the Communists, and for a bettering of relations with the Soviet Union. Though he held several posts in the Nationalist Government until the summer of 1949, STAT

did not participate actively in government affairs after mid-1948. He refused to participate in Sun Fo's Cabinet. He was one of those approached in early 1948 by the Russian Ambassador, Roachin, with an offer of mediation in the Chinese Civil War. Shao was named one of the five Nationalist peace delegates for negotiations with the Communists in April 1949 and, following the collapse of these negotiations, remained in Communist areas. He is married to Miss Fu Hsieh-wên, one-time Communist Party member and graduate of Moscow's Chungshan University.

Communist Source

Native of Shao-hsing, Chekiang. Born in 1881. A Chu Jen (second degree under the old examination system) of the late Ch'ing dynasty. Graduate of the Aurora College in Shanghai. Joined the Tung M'ing Hui in his youth. Shao was Minister of Information of the Kuomintang government, Chairman of the Shensi Provincial Government, Ambassador to the USSR, and Secretary-General of the People's Political Council. Among the Kuomintang members, he can be said to have been close to, but never trusted by, Chiang Kai-shek. It is generally known that Ch'ên Pu-lei was Chiang Kai-shek's brain trust, taking charge of confidential matters. But, actually, Shao Li-tai was Chiang's Secretary-General long before Ch'ên Pu-lei. Later, he was nearly deprived of his freedom of speech because of his unyielding nature and his total inability to flatter. Later, he was appointed as one of the delegates to the Peace Talk Conference in Peking. Member of the State Administrative Council of the Central People's Government (1950).

Shên Chün-ju 沈鈞儒 (Courtesy name: Hêng-shan)

US Source

Chief Justice, Supreme People's Court; member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman and concurrently member, Central Political Bureau, Standing Committee and Central Executive Committee, China Democratic League; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; Vice-Chairman (one of five), National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Commission of Law; Chairman, National Salvation Association; Chairman, Preparatory Committee, China New Jurisprudence Research Institute; member, representing the China Democratic League, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Shên Chün-ju, a lawyer and one of the three founders of the National Salvation Association, was born in 1875 in Chia-hsing, Chekiang. His son-in-law is Fan Ch'ang-chiang, currently one of the Vice-Directors of the Administration of News Agencies. Shên obtained a Chin Shih degree during the last years of the Manchu dynasty and passed the provincial scholars' examinations, receiving the degree of Chu Jen. He is also a graduate of the Tokyo Law College. In 1911 Shên was Commissioner of Education, Chekiang Provincial Government. He was successively Senator, Peking Parliament; Procurator-General of the Procuratorate, Canton Military Government in 1912 and 1913; member and, concurrently, Chief Secretary, Political Council of the Chekiang Provincial Government, 1927; Dean of the Law College and legal practitioner, Shanghai, 1930.

In May 1936, Shên and several others formed the National Salvation Association and demanded a cessation of civil war and a united front against the Japanese. On 23 November 1936, the Central Government, in an attempt to suppress anti-Japanese and Chinese Communist activities, arrested seven officers of the National Salvation Association, including Shên. All seven were released in July 1937. Shên was a member of the National Defense Advisory Council in 1937 and 1938 and a member of its successor organization, the People's

Political Council. An active member of the China Democratic League, he was a representative of the League at the Political Consultative Conference in January 1946. The following month Shên returned to Shanghai, where in addition to participating in Democratic League activities he engaged in private legal practice. He went to Hong Kong shortly after the outlawing of the League by the Nationalist Government, in November 1947, and there served as the League's acting chairman. In the Communist areas, Shên has served since January 1949 as a Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and as a Vice-Chairman of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association Preparatory Committee.

Communist Source

Native of Chia-hsing, Chekiang. Born in 1875. Seventy-eight years of age (1953). He went to Japan to study law. Got the Chin-shih degree (the third degree under the old examination system) of the late Ch'ing dynasty at the age of thirty-one. Shên was a well-known agitator in Chekiang during the Revolution of 1911. Before the War of Resistance, he was Dean of the Shanghai College of Law and President of the Executive Board of the Shanghai Bar Association. Shên was arrested and imprisoned by the Kuomintang reactionary government in 1936 for his part in persuading the people of Shanghai to participate in the National Salvation movement. A member of the People's Political Council during the War of Resistance and a representative of the Democratic League in the former Political Consultative Conference; also a representative of the Chinese Democratic League to the People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949, serving as a standing member of the Presidium of the PPCC. Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court (1950).

Shên Yen-ying 沈雁冰 (Pen name: Mao Tun)

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; Minister of Culture; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Committee of Culture and Education; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; Vice-Chairman (one of five), China Committee to Defend World Peace; Vice-Chairman, All-China Federation of Literature and Arts; member, representing the All-China Federation of Literature and Arts, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

One of the most active and best known figures in contemporary Chinese literature, novelist Shên Yen-ying (better known as Mao Tun) was born in 1897 in T'ungchiang, Chekiang. He studied at the Nanking Technical School and Peking University, and later was associated with the Commercial Press in Shanghai. He has been prominent in the Chinese literary field for over two decades, and during his editorship of the *Short Story Monthly*, in the mid-20's, that magazine became one of the most influential literary journals in China. He was active in revolutionary work in Shanghai from 1924 to 1927, and spent the years 1928 to 1930 in Japan. The publication of his trilogy *Eclipse*, dealing with the revolutionary period of 1926-1927, won for him the title of China's leading novelist. He has continued his progressive writings, and has for years been identified with leftist intellectual groups. According to reports, Shên was not allowed to leave the environs of Chungking, though he was active in that city in the promotion of democratic movements.

In 1946 Shên was invited on behalf of the Soviet Foreign Cultural Association to visit the USSR, which he did. He returned to China in April 1947 and gave many lectures on the favorable impressions gained during his visit. By November 1947 he had gone to Hong Kong, where he was active among the Communist, fellow-traveler, and liberal groups.

He arrived in North China in January, 1949, and has participated in many Communist-sponsored cultural events. He has served on the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

Native of Tung-haiang, Chekiang. More than fifty years of age (1953). Studied natural science first in the Marine Engineering School of Nanking. Later, went to Peking and completed the college preparatory course in the National Peking University. Shen was an editor at the Commercial Press, and edited the *Hsiao Shao Yueh Pao (The Short Story Monthly)*. He undertook propaganda work in the Political Department headquarters during the Northern Expedition. After the failure of the Great Revolution, he fled to Shanghai and busied himself in writing. In the initial stage of the War of Resistance, he went far away to Sinkiang to start cultural reclamation work.

Later, he went to Yenan (Fu-shih), stayed there for some time, and became more mature in theory and outlook. He expressed his opinions to thousands of revolutionary youths by lecturing and writing for *Chinese Culture*. After he went back to Chungking, he wrote the play *In the Time of Spring* and got it produced. It spoke for the women demands and agonies of the industrial and business elements in the Interior at that time. The play was later banned.

Mr. Mao Tun was invited to visit the USSR after the Japanese surrender and was very warmly welcomed there. He came back and wrote down his first-hand impressions of conditions in that country in his *Visit to the USSR* which was published first as a serial in the *New China Daily* and, later, as a book. Though the Kuomintang Government tried to ban it, it was a record-breaking best-seller at that time.

During the Civil War, he went from Chungking to Kwangtung, to Hong Kong, and then to Shanghai, fighting with his pen continuously as the spokesman of the people. Persecution continually dogged his steps. He was forced to go to Hong Kong again in 1948. There he edited the *Hsiao Shao Yueh K'an (The Fiction Monthly)*, which became a great literary periodical in South China.

A Chinese man of letters of world renown and Minister of Culture of the (Central) People's Government (1950).

Ssu-t'u Mei-t'ang 司徒美堂

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; member, Kwangtung Provincial People's Government Council; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing Overseas Chinese, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; President of Chih-kung Tang (also known as the Hung-men Society of the Chinese Freemasons Society).

A long-time resident in the United States who for many years was prominent in Chinese communities in New York and San Francisco, Ssu-t'u Mei-t'ang was born c. 1865 in K'ai-ping, Kwangtung Province. For over thirty years he headed the On Leong Tong in the United States. Opposed to Chiang Kai-shek during the latter's period of pacification toward the Japanese, Ssu-t'u supported the Generalissimo following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. He was most active in the raising of funds among American Overseas Chinese for the war effort. Ssu-t'u was made a counselor of the Executive Yuan and later became a member of the People's Political Council. He returned to China in 1943 but within the next five years made many return trips to the United States.

In 1946, Ssu-t'u supported the coalition negotiations sponsored by the US and was the one who established within the Hung-men Society a political group named the Hung-men Min-chih Tang, which was at that time known as a democratic organization supporting the Central Government. This "party" advocated cessation of the Civil War, nationalization of the Communist and Kuomintang armies under multiparty supervision, and preservation of China's territorial integrity. However, the Min-chih Tang was at that time only one of at least four semi-political groups organized within the Chih-kung Tang, some of which had close connections with the Kuomintang and even with the CC Clique. At that time, Ssu-t'u Mei-t'ang's group was considered to be primarily representative of American members of the Hung-men Society.

Communist Source

Native of K'ai-ping, Kwangtung. Eighty-seven years of age (if living, 1953). Became an apprentice in an incense store in Hsin-hui after only three years of study in an old-fashioned school. At seventeen, suddenly gave up the unrewarding life of an apprentice and went to the United States to live the life of an Overseas Chinese.

While in America, he caught on with ideological currents of nationalism and democracy. On the one hand he persuaded the Hung-men brothers (a secret society) to join the An Leong Tang (On Leong Tong) with a view to consolidating the strength of the Overseas Chinese, and on the other he followed Dr. Sun Yat-sen in taking part in the Chinese Revolution. Later, when Dr. Sun became the Provisional President, Ssu-t'u was appointed "Keeper of the Seal" in recognition of his many services to the Republic. However, he graciously declined the post.

He came back in 1931 to convene the Five-Continent Hung-men Conference in Hong Kong. At this conference a resolution was passed to abolish the Tong and to establish in its place a political party called "The Chinese Chih-kung Party." He was made Director of the Overseas Division. Thereafter, the Chih-kung Party often expressed its opinion on national affairs. The Third Conference, held on 1 May 1947, in Hong Kong, again saw Ssu-t'u as the party spokesman, insisting on domestic peace and political democracy, and deploring one-party dictatorship and unification by force. The adoption of this program alienated the Chih-kung Party from the Kuomintang, and Ssu-t'u became increasingly more outspoken in his advocacy of the cause of the people. He joined the People's Political Consultative Conference as a representative of the Democratic Overseas Chinese.

Member of the Central People's Government Council (1950).

Su Yu 苏裕

US Source

Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Deputy Commander, Third Field Army; Vice-Chairman (one of four), East China Military and Political Affairs Council; Chairman, Nanking Military Control Commission; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, Nanking branch, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Mayor of Nanking; member, representing the Third Field Army, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, National Committee, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth.

A Communist military leader since 1927, General Su Yu was born in 1905 in Lang-yuan, Hunan, and is a graduate of the Hunan Provincial 3rd Normal School in Heng-yang. He joined the Student Corps of the Independent Regiment of Tch'ing's forces in 1927 and at the time of the Nanchang Uprising was a platoon leader. Shortly thereafter Su joined the Communist Party and accompanied Chu Teh to Chung-kang-shan, where he became a

Company Commander in the Special Service Battalion. By 1930 he was a Division Commander under Ch'en I, and the following year served as Commander of the 64th Division of Lin Piao's Fourth Red Army. From 1932 to 1935 he was Chief of Staff of the Tenth Army Corps, commanded by Fang Chih-min, and following Fang's capture by the National Government led guerrilla troops on the Kiangsi-Chekiang-Fukien border.

After the evacuation of Kiangsi by the main Communist Forces, Su, with Ch'en I, remained in that province to carry on guerrilla activities, and their troops became the nucleus of the New Fourth Army. He commanded the 1st Column (later redesignated the 1st Division) of the New Fourth Army from 1938 until 1946, served concurrently after 1941 as Acting Deputy Commander of that army, and was also Commander and Political Commissioner of the Central Kiangsu Military District. He was appointed Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army in 1946 and still retains that post, though the Army is now called the Third Field Army. Su was elected an alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945. In 1949 he commanded troops that helped capture Hsu-chou, Pang-fou (Peng-pu), and Shanghai, and was appointed Deputy Chairman (under Ch'en I) of the Shanghai Military Control Commission in May of that year, but in September was transferred to Nanking as Chairman of that city's Military Control Commission.

Communist Source

Native of Fukien. More than forty years of age (1933). Studied in the Second Normal School of Hunan. Joined the Communist Party Youth Corps at the age of eighteen. In 1927 he enlisted in the Student Corps of the 4th Army Independent Regiment stationed at Wu-chang under the command of the late General Yeh Ting. In the fall of the same year, he participated in the famous Nanchang Uprising, becoming one of China's earliest eminent Red soldiers. Thereafter he constantly followed Commander in Chief Chu Teh. When the Red Army started its Long March, he was ordered to remain to fight in the Kiangsi-troops were the first to reach the southern front along the Yangtze River. After the South Anhwei Incident, as the 1st Division commander of the New Fourth Army and, concurrently, Commander of the Central Kiangsu Military Region, he fought the Japanese in Central Kiangsu. He won all seven of the battles he fought in North Kiangsu when the Civil War first broke out. Once he retreated to defend Shantung, and then helped General Ch'en I to encircle and attack Hsu-chou and Pang-fou (Peng-pu), and liberate Nanking and Shanghai. Su was Chairman of the Nanking Military Control Committee. Vice-Chairman of the East China Military and Administrative Committee (1950).

Sun Yat-sen, Mme. 宋慶齡 (Maiden name: Sung Ch'ing-ling)

US Source

Vice-Chairman (one of six), Central People's Government; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; specially invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Mme. Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Chinese Republic and a devoted follower of her husband's social principles, was born in Shanghai in 1890, second daughter of an American-educated Christian businessman. She attended McTyre School for Girls in Macon, Georgia. Returning to China, she joined the revolutionary movement as secretary to Sun Yat-sen, and accompanied him to Japan when Yuan Shih-k'ai took action against Dr. Sun as a revolutionist. The two were married in Japan in 1915, and for the remainder of Sun's life, his wife continued to be his secretary, assistant, and interpreter.

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Although since her husband's death in 1925, Mme. Sun has not (sic) been active in politics, she has had much influence upon Chinese liberal groups. She was elected a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in 1926, served in the Wu-han Government in 1927, and went to Europe following the Communist-Kuomintang split. With the exception of a trip to China in 1929, Mme. Sun remained in Europe until 1931, mainly in Russia. In 1931 she returned to Shanghai, where she was vocal in denouncing Kuomintang reactionaries, Japanese aggression, and deviations from her husband's teachings. At this time she was closely associated with the China League for Civil Rights. Following Japanese occupation of Shanghai in 1937, Mme. Sun went to Hong Kong, where, until 1941, she served as Chairman of the China Defense League. After Pearl Harbor she lived quietly in Chungking, reportedly a virtual prisoner in her own home.

Since the war Mme. Sun has been the leader of the China Welfare Fund, and active in relief and philanthropic work. She went to Peking in August 1949 to participate in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, at which time she stated that the Communist Party "is the surest guarantee that Sun Yat-sen's three principles . . . will be successfully carried out." Though a sister of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, Mme. H. H. Kung, and T. V. Soong, politically Mme. Sun Yat-sen has been opposed to all of her family since 1927.

Communist Source

Widow of Sun Yat-sen. Born in Shanghai in 1890. Studied in the United States. She came back to China and assisted Dr. Sun Yat-sen in his revolutionary activities. She is the most progressive of the three Sung (Soong) sisters. She organized the Freedom League and took charge of the Social Welfare Foundation. She devoted herself to democratic activities.

Mme. Sun did not have any freedom in Shanghai, and kept silent under the watchful eyes of the secret police. It was not until the beginning of 1949, on the eve of Chiang's resignation, that she began to state her views. Later, she went north and attended the People's Political Consultative Conference. Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government (1950).

Sung Jen-ch'ung 宋任窮

US Source

A military officer who joined the Communist Party in 1928, Sung Jen-ch'ung was born in 1904 in Liu-yang, Hunan, and is a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy. In 1930, he was a regimental Political Commissioner in Lin Piao's forces and the following year was a Political Commissioner of the Fifth Army Corps. Sung made the Long March, and in 1937 was Commander of the Twenty-eighth Army, and following the reorganization of Communist forces served as Deputy Chief of the Political Department of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

Sung was sent to southern Hopeh early in the Sino-Japanese War and from 1940 until 1947 was Commander of the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military District. Following the Communist occupation of Nanking in April 1949, he was appointed Vice-Chairman of that city's Military Control Commission, but was relieved in September 1949, reportedly for maladministration. He was elected an alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945.

Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party.

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Communist Source

A beloved general of General Liu Po-ch'eng. When the anti-Japanese war started, he was Director of the Political Department of the 129th Division. He was Commander of the Central Hsueh Military Region during the Liberation War and was elected member of the Central Committee in the Seventh Plenary Conference of the Chinese Communist Party. Sing has been shouldering the heavy responsibility of liberating the Southwest since the establishment of the Southwest Work Corps.

T'an Ch'ên-lin 譚震林**US Source**

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; Chairman, Chekiang Provincial People's Government; Chairman, Hangchow Military Control Commission; Deputy Commander, Third Field Army; Chairman, Chekiang branch, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Secretary, Chekiang Provincial Committee, Communist Party.

T'an Ch'ên-lin was born in 1901 in Fukien and is a middle school graduate who has never been outside China. He joined the Communist Party in 1926, and was with the Communist forces during the days at Ching-kang-shan. In 1930, he was Political Commissioner of the Twelfth Army, later becoming Commander of the Fukien Military District. During the Long March T'an remained in Fukien in charge of guerrilla troops, and when the New Fourth Army was created he was appointed Political Commissioner of the Army's 2nd Column. He was subsequently transferred to North Kiangsu as Political Commissioner of the 7th Division of the New Fourth Army. Commander of the 6th Division by 1945, he became in 1947 Political Commissioner of the East China Field Army (successor of the New Fourth Army and predecessor of the Third Field Army). Elected to the Communist Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945, T'an served as Chairman of the Tsinan Military Control Commission from September 1948 until his appointment in May 1949 to the Hangchow Military Control Commission's chairmanship. He was made Chairman of the Chekiang Provincial People's Government on 19 August 1949.

Communist Source

None.

Tan Kah-kee 陳嘉庚 (Mandarin name: Ch'ên Chia-k'eng)**US Source**

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; member, representing Overseas Chinese, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

A Singapore businessman, millionaire, and philanthropist who has been generally acknowledged as the leader of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Tan Kah-kee was born c. 1873 in T'ung-an, Fukien Province, China (near Amoy). He is the father-in-law of the prominent Malayan businessman Lee Kong-chian. Tan went to Malaya in his youth and later, through his various business enterprises, amassed a considerable fortune and acquired a wide reputation for his philanthropic work. He has taken an active part in the field of education for the Chinese in Malaya and in his home district in China. In 1933, at the age of sixty, Tan retired from active business. During the 1930's he was especially active in organizing and supporting various relief funds established mainly for the welfare of

Chinese in China. At all times an outspoken critic, he attacked official corruption and poor administration in the Kuomintang Government and gradually became sympathetic toward the Communist Party.

Following his visit to Nationalist and Communist areas in China in 1910, where he seems to have been favorably impressed by the administrative system of the Communist Government at Yenan (Fu-shih), Tan broke completely with the Kuomintang. Consistently anti-Japanese, in early 1942 Tan escaped to Java where he spent the war years. Although he made a post-war visit to Chungking at the invitation of the Kuomintang Government, Tan remained unreconciled, and continued his attack on conditions existing under the Kuomintang in China. In 1946 he was proposed by the Communist Party as non-partisan delegate to the People's Political Council but declined the invitation. In the same year he sent a telegram to President Truman urging the cessation of United States aid to China. In December 1946 he established the *Nan-ch'iao Jih-pao*, a paper serving primarily as a medium to disseminate China Democratic League propaganda. Early in 1948 he reportedly visited Hong Kong, where he was reported to be Finance Head of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. Tan served as Chairman of the Singapore Overseas Chinese Conference which sent a telegram to Mao Tse-tung supporting the May (1948) Day slogans of the Chinese Communist Party.

In February 1949, he sent a congratulatory telegram to Mao Tse-tung which was answered by an invitation to visit Communist China as guest of the new regime. Tan left Singapore arriving in North China early in June 1949. He attended meetings of the People's Political Conference in September and was appointed a member of the Central People's Government Council out of the Overseas Chinese Commission. After further touring in China he returned briefly to Singapore in February 1950 but was back in China in May. Tan claims no political party membership other than an early affiliation with Sun Yat-sen's Tung Meng Hui. Since the war's end he has been associated with the China Democratic League though he is not a member.

Communist Source

Native of T'ung-an, Fukien. Eighty years of age (1953). A prominent leader of Overseas Chinese. In his early years he financially aided Dr. Sun Yat-sen to engage in revolution. The schools which he has founded and supported during the past many years include schools in Fukien: Chimei Primary School, Chimei Middle School, Chimei Normal School, Sea Products and Navigation School, Agriculture and Forestry School, Normal School for Girls, Kindergarten Normal School, Commercial School, and Amoy University; and schools in the South Seas: Nanyang Middle School, Singapore Sea Products and Navigation School, Normal School for Overseas Chinese in the South Seas, School for Overseas Chinese Girls in the South Seas, Ai-tung School, Taonan School, and Ching-fu School. Mr. Ch'ên was vigorously active not only in the educational field but also in that of the press. In 1924, he founded the *Nanyang Commercial Daily*. Delegate to the People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949. Member of the Central People's Government Council (1950).

T'an P'ing-shan 譚平山**US Source**

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, State Administration Council; Chairman, Committee of People's Supervision, member, Central Standing Committee, San Min Chu I Comrades Association, member, Executive Committee, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; member, representing the San Min Chu I Comrades Association, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

One of the principal leaders of the Chinese Communist Party from its inception until 1927, T'an P'ing-shan was born in 1887 in Kao-ming Hsien, Kwangtung. He attended schools in Canton and is a graduate of Peking University. While in Canton he rose to prominence as a student leader and was active in the Canton branch of the Socialist Youth League. T'an was one of the early members of the Chinese Communist Party, and was closely associated with the first Party Chairman Ch'ên Tu-shan. During the period of Kuomintang-Communist collaboration in the twenties, T'an served as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and as head of the Kuomintang's Organization Department. He was Director of the general strike in Canton in 1925. In November 1926 he attended the Seventh Plenum of the Comintern as a delegate of the Chinese Communist Party and was elected to the Presidium of the Comintern. T'an served as Minister of Agriculture in the Wu-han Government in 1927. Having been criticized by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee at an emergency conference of the Party on 7 August 1927 (following the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists), he was later that year ousted from the Party. Thereafter he spent many years in exile abroad.

Though one of the original members of the Third Party, T'an was later re-admitted to the Kuomintang and during the war was said to be associated with the Tai Li organization. For several years he served as an executive member of the Kuomintang San Min Chu I Youth Corps and was also a delegate to the National Assembly in 1946, and a member of the Fourth People's Political Council. T'an split with the Kuomintang sometime in 1947 and became, in 1948, with Li Chi-shên, one of the organizers of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee in Hong Kong. He left Hong Kong in the fall of 1948 for Communist-controlled areas and during the summer of 1949 served on the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

Native of Kao-ming Hsien, Kwangtung. Sixty-six years of age (1953). Graduate of the National Peking University. T'an was Editor in Chief of the *New Tide* during the 4 May Student Movement period. Li Ta-chao, Ch'ên Tu-shan, and he were at that time important figures of the revolutionary movement. In 1924, when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was re-organizing the Kuomintang in Canton and welcomed Communist elements to join the Kuomintang, he was one of the leading men in promoting the Nationalist-Communist co-operation. After the Kuomintang was reorganized, he was the first Minister of Organization. During the Wu-han government period, he served as Minister of Farmers. Later, due to the collapse of the Wu-han government, he went to Nanchang and participated in the Nanchang Uprising. Consequently, he was expelled from the Kuomintang by the Nanchang Uprising. During the War of Resistance, he joined a group of people, including Ch'ên Ming-shu, Liu Ya-tzu, Chu Yun-shan, Yang Chieh, Hsü Pao-chu, and Wang Kun-lun to found the San Min Chu I Comrades' Association in Chungking. Later, he also joined the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. Vice-Procurator-General of the Central People's Government (1950).

T'eng Hsiao-p'ing 鄧小平

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Political Commissioner, Second Field Army; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

T'eng Hsiao-p'ing, a little known Communist Political Commissioner, was born in 1900 in Kuang-an, Szechwan, and was educated in France. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1923 and by 1932 was in the Kiangsi Soviet area where reportedly he worked in the Propaganda Division of the Party's Central Committee and also edited the newspaper *Red Star*. T'eng made the Long March and subsequently was appointed Director of the Political Department of the Third Army Group. Following the reorganization of Communist forces, he became Director of the Political Department of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army and, by 1938, was a member of the North China Bureau of the Party. He was serving as Political Commissioner of the T'ai-hang Military District in 1943 and at the time of his election to the Party Central Committee in April 1945 was Political Commissioner of the Shanai-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military District. He served in this latter post until the incorporation of the forces in this district into the Second Field Army.

Communist Source

Native of Szechwan. Studied in France as one of the "worker-student" Group. He joined the Party while still in France. When he came back, he went to the Soviet Region in Kiangsi. He participated in the Long March and was Political Commissioner of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance. Member of the Central Committee of the Party (1950).

T'eng Tai-yuan 鄧代遠

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, State Administration Council; Minister of Railways; member, Committee of Finance and Economics; member, representing the Second Field Army, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

T'eng Tai-yuan, a Hunanese, born in 1905, is a middle school graduate who has done additional study in Moscow. He joined the Communist Party in 1926 and, following the Kuomintang-Communist split, was associated with P'eng Te-huai and the Fifth Red Army. He participated with P'eng in the Ping-chiang insurrection and in the establishment of the first Hunan Soviet in 1927 and later was engaged in guerrilla activities in Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupeh provinces. T'eng was Political Commissioner of the forces commanded by P'eng that in 1930 attacked Changsha. The following year he was wounded in action and went to Moscow where he seemingly remained for several years, studying military tactics and strategy.

Back in Yenan (Fu-shih) in 1938, T'eng was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Eighth Route Army and in 1940 was made Chief of Staff both of the Eighth Route Army and the Revolutionary Military Council, posts he held until about 1947. During part of this period he also served as a member of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region Government Council and in April 1945 was elected to membership in the Communist Party Central Committee. T'eng served as advisor to the Communist delegation in the Peking Executive Headquarters in 1946 and 1947, and by mid-1947 was Deputy Commander of the Shensi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army. He became a member of the North China People's Government Council in September 1948 and prior to his October 1949 appointment as Minister of Railways, served as Chief of the Railway Department of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Council.

Communist Source

None.

T'eng Tzu-hui 鄧子恢

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; member, Committee of Finance and Economics; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; Third Secretary, Central China Bureau, Communist Party; Second Political Commissioner, Central China Military District; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Central and South China Military and Political Affairs Committee.

T'eng Tzu-hui, veteran Communist leader with long experience in Central China, was born in 1897 in Lung-yen, Fukien Province, and is a graduate of a high school in Amoy. A one-time Kuomintang member, he joined the Communist Party in 1926 and was active in Party movements in his native province. By 1930 he had become Commander of the Twelfth Army, located in western Fukien. He was one of the founders of the Soviet there and became its head. T'eng was elected to membership on the Central Committee of the Kiangsi Soviet in 1931 and was also appointed People's Commissioner of Finance in that Government, a post he held until the start of the Long March. He did not make the trek to the Northwest, but returned to Fukien where for several years, associated with Cheng Ting-ch'eng, he led guerrilla troops. These troops were, about 1937, incorporated into the Communist New Fourth Army, and he became head of the Organization Bureau of the Army's Political Department.

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War, T'eng seems to have remained in Central China, serving in various capacities with the New Fourth Army. By 1939 he was the Vice-Director of the Army's Political Department, later was Political Commissioner of the Army's 4th Division, and at the time of the Japanese surrender was Chairman of the Kiangnan Liberated Area. Elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in April 1945, T'eng, by 1946, had been made Political Commissioner of the Central China Military District and also served in the Central China Bureau of the Party. He was elected Chairman of the Central Plains Provisional People's Government in March 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Lung-yen, Fukien. T'eng was Chairman of the West-Fukien Eight-Hsien Soviet Government and Minister of Finance of the Central Soviet Government. During the Long March of the Red Army, he was left stationed in West Fukien to carry on guerrilla warfare. During the first period of the War of Resistance his men were organized into the New Fourth Army under General Chang Ting-ch'eng. T'eng was made Assistant Director of the Political Department of that Army. He was elected a member of the Central Committee in the Seventh Plenary Conference of the Party and he assisted General Liu Po-ch'ang in Central China in the Liberation War. Deputy-Commander of the Central-China Military Zone and Vice-Chairman of the Central-South Military and Administrative Committee (1950).

T'eng Ying-ch'ao, Miss 鄧穎超 (Married name: Mme. Chou En-lai)

US Source

Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs, Vice-President (one of three), All-China Federation of Democratic Women; member, Board of Directors, International Federation of Democratic Women; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; member, Founders Committee, China New Jurisprudence

Research Institute; member, representing the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

The No. 2 woman in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, T'eng Ying-ch'ao (more commonly known to the western world as Mme. Chou En-lai) was born in 1903 and is a Honan native whose family moved to Tientsin while she was young. In 1920, she graduated from the Hopeh Provincial First Normal School in Tientsin and, after her graduation, taught in that institution for five years.

Early in her youth she had become a leader in Tientsin student circles. She joined the Young Communist League in 1921 and the Chinese Communist Party in 1925, shortly before her marriage to Chou En-lai. In 1926 she was elected an alternate member of the Kwangtung-Kwangsi District Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and, concurrently, Secretary of the Women's Division of this committee. In 1928 Miss T'eng became Secretary of the Women's Division of the Party, presumably appointed at the Sixth National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in Moscow in that year. She had accompanied her husband to Moscow in 1927 where they remained through 1930 and upon their return to China, Miss T'eng became active in women's work in the Kiangsi Soviet, and was elected an alternate member of the Kiangsi Soviet Central Committee in 1931. She made the Long March and during it she contracted tuberculosis and spent part of 1937 recuperating near Peking. She returned to Yanan (Fu-shih) after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and in 1938 was named a Communist representative on the People's Political Council.

Miss T'eng was in Chungking with her husband during many of the war years, serving as a representative of the Eighth Route Army in that city and also on the various People's Political Councils. However, she did not attend sessions of the Second and Fourth Councils. In April 1945, Miss T'eng became an alternate member of the Communist Party's Central Committee and Assistant Secretary of the Women's Section of the Party. The same year she was elected Vice-Chairman of the Liberated Areas Women's Federation. Aside from a few brief trips to Yanan (Fu-shih), she remained in Chungking and later, Nanking, until November 1946 when, accompanying her husband, she returned to Communist headquarters after the failure of negotiations on the implementation of agreements reached during the Political Consultative Conference, on which both she and her husband had served. She has been a member of the Board of Directors of the International Federation of Democratic Women since the Federation's Second Congress held in Budapest in December 1948.

Miss T'eng was one of the prime organizers of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women (successor to the Liberated Areas Women's Federation), representing that group at both the Preparatory Committee and plenary sessions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and was an active participant in the Asian Women's Conference held in Peking in December 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Hsin-yang, Honan. Fifty years of age (1953). Studied in the Peking National Teachers College for Women. Was twice imprisoned during the May Fourth Student Movement. She was married to Chou En-lai in Canton in 1925. Later, she went to Moscow. Upon her return she worked in the Central Office of the Party and was a member of the Women's Work Committee and of the Shenai Provincial Committee. She became a member of the People's Political Council during the period of Nationalist and Communist collaboration after the outbreak of the War of Resistance. Later, she was Chief of the Women's Department of the Yangtze River Bureau, and alternate member of the Central Committee of the Party. After the "Bitter victory" (over Japan), she went to Chungking to represent the Party at the former Political Consultative Conference. Later,

when the Conference deadlocked, she went with Chou En-lai to Shanghai, and lived quietly in the Party office on Massenet Road. Later, they flew back to Yenan (Fu-shih). Member of the Committee of Political and Legal Affairs of the State Administrative Council (1950).

Ting Ling, Miss 丁玲 (Original name: Chiang Wei-wên; Alias: Chiang Ping-chih; Alias: Chiang Ting-ling).

US Source

Member, Committee of Culture and Education; Chairman, All-China Federation of Literary Workers; reserve member, Board of Directors, International Federation of Democratic Women; member, representing the All-China Federation of Literature and Arts, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Ting Ling, probably the most prominent Chinese Communist authoress, was born in Ch'ang-té, Hunan, in 1907, the daughter of a wealthy landlord. After graduation from the Hunan Second Provincial Women's Normal School, she went to Shanghai, where she first attended the Ping Min Girls School, a progressive institution founded by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, then Secretary General of the Communist Party, and later studied Chinese literature at the University of Shanghai. While in Shanghai she married Hu Yeh-p'in, a leftist writer who, in 1931, was executed by the Kuomintang, having been captured while en route to Kiangsi to participate in the First Congress of the Kiangsi Soviet. Ting Ling's first novel, *Hsiao Shuo*, was published in 1927, and was followed by many others, which won considerable praise in literary and left-wing circles. In 1928, with her husband and Shên Tsung-wên, she organized the Red and Black Society to promote proletarian literature and also joined the Leftist Writers' League, becoming by 1931 the editor of the League's organ, *The Great Dipper*.

Though Ting Ling was originally regarded as an anarchist, she moved quickly into Communist circles, and joined the Communist Party in 1931 following her husband's death. For the next two years she lived underground in Shanghai, continuing her writing, but in 1933 was arrested by the Kuomintang and imprisoned for over two years. Released under surveillance in Nanking, she managed to escape to Sian and from there to Communist areas in North Shensi where she taught Chinese literature at the Anti-Japanese University. Later she served as a secretary in the Eighth Route Army Headquarters and was, at one time, President of the Lu Hsiin College of Arts. In Yenan (Fu-shih) she continued her writing and edited the *Trap of 45,000 Li*.

Following the Nationalist capture of Yenan (Fu-shih) in 1946, Ting Ling went to Harbin. For two years she was active in propaganda and women's work for the Party. She was a delegate to the Second Congress of the International Federation of Democratic Women, held in Budapest in December 1948, and was active in the formation of both the All-China Federation of Democratic Women and the All-China Federation of Literature and Arts. In April 1949 she was one of the Chinese delegates to the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace, and in October of that same year headed the Chinese delegation that went to Moscow to attend the celebration of the 32nd Anniversary of the Great October Revolution. While in Moscow, Ting Ling also attended the Executive Council meeting of the International Federation of Democratic Women and served as a member of the meeting's presidium.

Communist Source

Alias Chiang Wei-wên, adopting her mother's family name. Born in 1907 in Ch'ang-té, Hunan. Studied in the National Peking University and the People's University in Shanghai. She was progressive and refused to abide by conventional rules and regulations. She

became a "family rebel" when she severed relations with her family as a result of her uprising against the old family system. Ting Ling was influenced by Ch'en Tu-hsiu's new thought while studying in the People's University, and became a propagandist for the emancipation of women. She is richly endowed with literary talents, and her short stories shook the literary world of that time. Later, she cohabited with Hu Yeh-p'in and bore a son. When Hu was murdered by the Kuomintang, she was greatly shaken. She became inclined toward Communism, and joined the Left-Wingers' League. Because of her audacious, out-spoken manner, she was hated by the authorities and arrested in Shanghai in 1933. After her release she went to Yenan (Fu-shih) in North Shensi and taught Chinese literature in the Red Army University. When the *Liberation Daily* was published in 1940, she served as Editor of the Supplementary Magazine and acted as the Secretary of the Eighth Route Army. She also organized the Northwest Service Corps. After the War of Resistance, she led the Cultural Work Corps to the Northeast. She is a contemporary woman-writer of renown.

Ts'ai Ch'ang, Miss 蔡畅 (Married name: Mme. Li Fu-ch'un)

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; Chairman, All-China Federation of Democratic Women; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Executive Committee, International Federation of Democratic Women; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of five), China Committee to Defend World Peace; Chief, Women's Workers Department, All-China Federation of Labor; member, representing the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Ts'ai Ch'ang, the ranking woman member of the Communist Party, has been closely associated with its work since the early twenties. She was born in 1900 in Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan. Several members of her family were prominent early Communists. She went to France with the "worker-student" group in 1919, and in 1923 joined the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party, which had been organized there by a group of Chinese students that included Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, and Ts'ai Ho-shên (her brother). The same year, she married Li Fu-ch'un, another member of the group. Her husband, who is also a Central Committee member, is a Vice-Chairman of the Northeast People's Government.

After her term of study in France, Ts'ai Ch'ang spent 1923 and 1924 in Moscow, then returned to China in 1924 where she joined the Communist Party. She held several posts in the Kuomintang from 1925 to 1927, including that of member of the Kuomintang's General Political Department. She was also a Cultural Commissioner in the Northern Expeditionary Army. Following the Communist-Kuomintang split in 1927, she did underground work in the Wu-han area. She returned to Moscow in 1928 as a delegate of the Chinese Communist Party to the Sixth Congress of the Communist People's Government and remained in the Soviet Union until 1932. Back in China, Ts'ai Ch'ang was active in women's work in the Kiangsi Soviet and in 1931 and 1935 made the Long March to northern Shensi.

Miss Ts'ai went to the Soviet Union in 1936 for medical treatment. Returning to China in 1937 she headed, until the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the Party's Women's Department. She also served during the War as a member of the Party's Organization Department and Chief of Women's Movements in the Shensi-Kan-su-Ning-sha Border Region. She reportedly was elected an alternate member of the Communist Central Committee in 1934 and in 1940 and in 1943 is spoken of as a full member of that Committee.

At the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945 she was the only woman elected to Central Committee membership.

Ts'ai Chang served as Chairman of the Liberated Areas Women's Federation from 1945 until the establishment of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women in the spring of 1949 and in that capacity became increasingly active in the international women's movement. She attended the First Congress of the International Federation of Democratic Women in Prague in 1947, the Federation's Executive Committee meeting in Rome in May 1948, and the Second Congress of the Federation in Budapest, December 1948. She was first elected a Vice-Chairman of the Federation at the Rome meeting. In the spring of 1949 Ts'ai Chang, back in China, was the leading personality in the founding of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women and served as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Asian Women's Conference held in Peking in December 1949. She also was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's Standing Committee and a promoter of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

Communist Source

Native of Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan. Born in 1900. Her mother was a descendant of Ts'eng Kuo-fan. Her elder brother, Ts'ai Hsien, and her sister-in-law, Hsiang Ching-yu, both able leaders of the Party, were murdered by the Kuomintang reactionaries. Her mother, at the age of fifty-six, took her and her brother to France as two of the "worker-students." She joined with Chou En-lai, Teng Ying-ch'ao, Li Li-san, Li Fu-ch'ün, Li Wei-han, and other students studying in France at that time to found the Chinese Communist Party in France. Ts'ai Chang married Li Fu-ch'ün in France in 1923. Upon her return, she became a member of the Kwangtung-Hong Kong Big Strike Committee. She also worked as a laborer in a cotton mill in Shanghai in order to lead directly and organize the rank and file women workers. She went to the USSR to recuperate after the failure of the Great Revolution; she participated in the 25,000-li Long March. Her health was greatly affected because of overwork, and she went to the USSR to recuperate after the Long March. She came back after the outbreak of the War of Resistance and worked for a long time in the Organization Department of the Central Office of the Party. Member of the Central Committee of the Party, a key officer in the Central Women's Association, and Vice-Chairman of the International Democratic Women's League (1950).

Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai 蔡廷楷 (Courtesy name: Hsien-ch'u)

US Source

Member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Vice-Chairman, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; Acting Chairman, China Kuomintang Committee for the Promotion of Democracy; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Executive Committee, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; member, representing the China Kuomintang Association for the Promotion of Democracy, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai was born in Lo-tung, Kwangtung in 1900. He attended elementary and middle schools and the Wu-chow (Wuchow) Military Academy. Acting in the Revolution of 1911, Ts'ai participated in military campaigns against Yuan Shih-k'ai and in 1920 and 1927 was a member of the Nationalist Forces during the Northern Punitive Expedition as Commander of the 10th Division of the Eleventh Army. During the Northern Military Conflict in Peking, he took a leading part in the government's campaign against the Northern forces

and captured Tsinan. In recognition he was promoted to Commander of the Nineteenth Army and sent to Kiangsi to stamp out the Communists. Ts'ai is best known as the Commander of the Nineteenth Army which resisted the Japanese in Shanghai in 1932 for more than a month, contrary to government orders. The next year he participated in the brief Fukien Rebellion and served as Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Fukien People's Government. When the rebellion was suppressed, Ts'ai left China on a world tour and did not return until April 1935. He lived in retirement in Hong Kong for two years, but joined the Kwangsi Revolt in 1936.

At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Ts'ai offered his services to Chiang Kai-shek, and was appointed Commander of the Sixteenth Group Army in Kwangsi, a post he held until 1939. By 1944 he was living in retirement in Kuo-lin and had no active command of troops. He returned to Canton at the close of the war and by 1946 was in refuge in Hong Kong where he later became closely associated with Li Chi-shün and the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. He left Hong Kong for Communist-controlled areas in September 1948.

Communist Source

Native of Lo-tung, Kwangtung. Born of a peasant family. Sixty-two years of age (1953). A tailor turned soldier, he climbed from the position of private to that of General of the Army. Ts'ai became a national hero in the "January 28th" Anti-Japanese War. He gained a more mature political outlook after the "January 28th" War and organized the Fukien People's Government in Fochow with Li Chi-shün, Chiang Kuang-nai, and others, to oppose dictatorship. After the collapse of this government, he joined the Chinese People's Revolutionary League under the leadership of Li Chi-shün. Later, still under the leadership of Li, he organized the Chinese Kuomintang Society for the Promotion of Democracy and the Chinese Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. Member of the People's Revolutionary Military Council (1950).

Ts'eng Shan 曾山

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, State Administration Council; Minister of Textile Industry; member, Committee of Finance and Economics; Vice-Chairman (one of four), East China Military and Political Affairs Committee; Chairman, East China Finance and Economic Commission.

Ts'eng Shan, one of the Communist Party's leading economic experts, was born in 1900 in Chi-shan, Kiangsi. He is one of the lesser-known Party leaders who seems to have been a Kiangsi revolutionary, joining the Communist Party shortly before the establishment of the Kiangsi Soviet. In 1931 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Kiangsi Soviet, was re-elected to that post in 1934 and also served as People's Commissioner for Internal Affairs. Apparently he did not make the Long March but remained in Kiangsi, engaged in guerrilla activities. In 1935 he was reported in Shanghai, where he worked as a longshoreman. He may have spent 1936 and 1937 in Moscow but was in Yenan (Fu-shih) by late 1937. Subsequently, Ts'eng was Chief of the Department of Organization of the New Fourth Army and in 1940 was first reported as a member of the Communist Party Central Committee and as Chief of that committee's Minority Affairs Department. Japanese sources list him as a member of the Communist Politburo in 1943, and during the last years of the Sino-Japanese War he is known to have served as Director of Organization of the Communist Central China Bureau. In September 1948, Ts'eng was appointed a member of the

Finance and Economics Committee of the North China People's Government and, following the occupation of Tainan in October of that same year, he was made Vice-Chairman of the city's Military Control Commission. He seems also to have been Secretary of the Shantung Provincial Committee of the Communist Party during 1948, but was transferred to Shanghai, several posts on the Shanghai Military Control Commission, until his appointment in October 1949 as Minister of Textile Industry. During 1949 he served as Manager of the East China branch of the People's Bank.

Communist Source

Native of Kiangsi. More than forty years of age. A member of the Central Executive Committee of the Party. Ts'eng held several important positions early in the Kiangsi Soviet Government period. He was, for a time, Director of the Organization Department of the Central China Office of the Party. He is an economist, an industrial expert, and a labor movement worker. Member of the Committee of Finance and Economics of the State Administrative Council (1950).

Ts'eng Sh'eng 曾生 (Original name: Ts'eng Ch'ên-sh'eng)

US Source

Member, Kwangtung Provincial People's Government Council; Chairman, Swatow Military Control Commission; Commander, Kwangtung-Kwangsi Column, People's Liberation Army; member, Canton Military Control Commission; member, National Committee, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth.

Ts'eng Sh'eng, leader of Communist guerrillas in the East River area of Kwangtung throughout the Sino-Japanese War, was born in Hui-yang, Kwangtung, c. 1910. He received his early education in Hong Kong and later studied in Sydney, Australia, where his father owned a small shop. He returned to China in the early 1930's, and graduated from National Sun Yat-sen University, Canton, in 1934, having majored in sociology. While in Canton, Ts'eng was a leader in the student movement and was an active participant in the December, 1935, anti-Japanese student activities. Forced to flee Canton, Ts'eng went to Hong Kong where from 1936 to 1937 he worked as a seaman on coastal ships. He joined the Communist Party about this time, became a leader in the Chinese Seamen's Union in Hong Kong, and founded a middle school for the children of seamen.

In the fall of 1938 Ts'eng organized a guerrilla group of young men and women mainly from the Canton and Hui-yang (Waichow) YMCAs and Overseas Chinese students from Malaya and Indonesia. Early in the war, this detachment was temporarily merged with the Kuomintang Forces in the area, but was later attacked and ordered disbanded by the Central Government. By 1941, the guerrillas had become the East River Column of the Kwangtung People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps. These forces were responsible, after the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, for the smuggling of many top Kuomintang officials into Nationalist China, and for continued resistance to the Japanese throughout the war. The East River Column, as well as other Communist guerrillas in Kwangtung, was evacuated to Shantung Province in July 1946 under an agreement reached by the Communists and Kuomintang, but it returned to Kwangtung late in 1946 after the breakdown of Communist-Kuomintang negotiations. The troops were subsequently expanded and with Ts'eng still in command, were renamed the Kwangtung-Kwangsi Column of the People's Liberation Army. This column had occupied much of Kwangtung Province prior to the arrival of the main Communist forces in 1949. Since 1947, Ts'eng has been a member of the South China Bureau of the Communist Party. He was also named a member of the Canton

Military Control Commission following that city's occupation, but was transferred to Swatow in October 1949.

Communist Source

Native of Hui-yang, Kwangtung. About forty years of age (1953). Studied in Hong Kong in his early years. Later, he went to Sydney, Australia, to live with his father for six years. He had a full taste of anti-Chinese prejudices in Australia, where the Chinese residents were most cruelly oppressed by the white men. This environment, of course, strengthened his patriotism. Finally, he came back to China with his father and enrolled in the Education Department of the Canton University. He was a leader in the anti-Japanese student movement in Canton. When Ch'ên Chi-Cung ordered the shooting of the students, he fled to Hong Kong and became a sailor on an Empress steamship. Ts'eng came back to Hui-yang after the outbreak of the War of Resistance and organized a guerrilla band, which in time became stronger and stronger in Tung-chiang. In 1943, this band became integrated with the Communist Forces and was reorganized as the Tung-chiang Column, of which Ts'eng remained the Commander. Later, as a result of the Military Mediation Agreement, he painfully left his home, went to Chih-fu (Chiefu) to organize the Kwangtung-Kwangsi Column. After Kwangtung and Kwangsi were liberated, he returned to his home triumphantly. Member of the Kwangtung Provincial People's Government Committee (1950).

Tung Pi-wu 董必武

US Source

Member, Central Committee and Politburo, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of four), State Administration Council; Chairman, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Founders Committee, China New Jurisprudence Research Institute; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Tung Pi-wu, veteran Communist leader and one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, was born in Huang-an, Hupeh, in 1886, son of a well-to-do landlord. Following graduation from the Wuchang Middle School, he became active in anti-Manchu revolutionary organizations and by 1911 had joined the Tung Meng Hui, forerunner of the Kuomintang. During the Revolution of 1911, Tung was one of twenty Hupeh provincial Tung Meng Hui commissioners and, concurrently, was in charge of the organization's Ich'ang office. Following the establishment of the Republic he was appointed Finance Commissioner of the Hupeh Provincial Government and later served as Deputy Director of the Salt Administration in Ich'ang. In 1913 Tung went to Japan where he studied at Hosei University until 1915. During this time he became associated with Sun Yat-sen. In 1915, he returned to China but was arrested and imprisoned for six months. Following his release he returned to Japan, continued his studies, and graduated in 1917.

Again in China, Tung established the Wuhan Middle School and by 1920 was engaged in the organization of a Socialist group in Hupeh. He was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. In July 1921, Tung attended the Party's First National Congress in Shanghai as a delegate from Hupeh. After spending several years in Party underground work among the troops in Szechwan, he was active in the Peking area in 1925. During the period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, Tung was a member of the Kuomintang-Hupeh Provincial Committee and represented that committee at the Second Kuomintang National Congress at Canton in 1926, at which time he was elected an alternate member

of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee. In 1927, he was Commissioner of Industry and Mining of the Hupeh Provincial Government and, following the Kuomintang-Communist split, fled to Japan where he lived for six months. Tung then went to Moscow, remaining until 1931. He studied at the Chungshan University and later was associated with the Lenin Academy.

Tung returned to China in 1931 and the following year entered the Kiangsi Soviet, where he first worked under Ch'u Ch'u-pai, People's Commissioner for Education. During the existence of the Kiangsi Soviet, Tung served as Chairman of the Workers' and Peasants' Examination Committee and then became President of the Provisional High Court and, concurrently, President of the Central Party School. In 1934, he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Kiangsi Soviet at the Second All-China Congress of Soviets and the same year was made an alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee at the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee. Presumably he became a full member of the Party Central Committee at the Sixth Plenum held in Yen'an (Fu-shih) in 1938. He participated in the Long March and upon arrival in northern Shensi resumed his post as President of the Party School. In 1937, he served briefly as Chairman pro-tem of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia government and following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in that same year became one of the Communist representatives to the Central Government, served on the People's Political Council, and during the eight years of the War of Resistance was in Nanking and Chungking almost continuously.

In 1945 Tung was selected by the Kuomintang as a delegate to the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. Although his influence as a member of the delegation was insignificant, he was able to contact other Communist leaders and to present the Chinese Communist cause before various groups of Chinese in the United States. He resumed his position as a Communist representative to the Central Government upon his return to China and participated actively in the coalition government negotiations in 1946. After the departure of Chou En-lai for North Shensi in November 1946, Tung remained as the chief Communist representative, then evacuated to Communist territory in March 1947. He assumed the Chairmanship of the China Liberated Areas Relief Association and in September, 1948, was elected Chairman of the North China People's Government, a post he held until the establishment of the Central People's Government.

Communist Source

Native of Huang-an, Hupeh. Sixty-eight years of age (1953). Tung is a graduate of the University of Law and Jurisprudence in Japan. While in Japan, he joined the Tung M'eng Hui and commenced his revolutionary career which led to his participation in the 1911 Revolution. Later, he was Kuomintang representative of the Hupeh Province and alternate member of the Central Executive Committee. After the failure of the Great Revolution, he resolutely joined the Chinese Communist Party. Tung went to Moscow in 1928 and studied for three years. He came back to the Soviet Region in Kiangsi to set up several schools there. He participated in the Long March, and was later made Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Chinese Soviet Region in North Shensi and member of the Border Government Committee. During the War of Resistance, he was one of the Party delegates in the People's Political Council. He was also a Party delegate in the San Francisco Conference and in the Political Consultative Conference. When the North China People's Government was established, he served as Chairman, Vice-Premier of the State Administrative Council of the Central People's Government (1950).

Wang Chia-hsiang 王稼祥 (Courtesy name: Chia-ss)

US Source

Member, Central Committee and Politburo, Communist Party; Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to the USSR; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

One of the leading Russian-educated members of the Chinese Communist Party, Wang Chia-hsiang was born in 1907 in Wu-hu, Anhwei Province. His wife is Chu Hui, daughter of a Hunan educator and relative of Hsiao Chung-kuang, who is currently an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Mme. Wang was in charge of the Harbin Municipal Hospital following the Communist take-over and, like Wang Chia-hsiang, is conversant with the Russian language.

In 1925, after attending school in Shanghai, Wang went to Moscow for study at Chungshan University. There he became associated with Ch'u Shao-ssu, Chang Wai-t'ien, Po Ku, and others, all of whom are said to have been proteges of Pavel A. Mif and returned to China with Mif when the latter was appointed Communist representative. They opposed the then Party policies of Li Li-san. For his opposition, Wang is said to have been sent to Hong Kong. If this occurred, he returned to Shanghai by late 1930 since, in January 1931, he attended the Party Plenary Session which discredited Li Li-san's program. He was reportedly "re-elected to the Party Central Committee," thus, if "re-elected" is correct, he previously must have been a member of the Committee. Wang was subsequently elected a member of the Central Committee of the Central Kiangsi Soviet and appointed People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. He was previously a member of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee of the Party and also became one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Central Revolutionary Military Council. By 1934 he is reported to have been a member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party, posts he presumably held until 1942. Wang also served at one time as Director of the Political Department of the Red Army.

Ill with tuberculosis, Wang went to the USSR to recuperate after having made the Long March, but returned to China in 1937. Though Wang's name is carried on the lists of the Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat up to 1942, his activities after 1937 are unknown with the exception of one report which states that he was responsible for the English service of the Hsin Hua News Agency and for the translation of all important Russian documents during the period of his recuperation. There are indications that following his return to China Wang lost the influential position he had held in the Kiangsi Soviet Period. A "purge" in 1942, possibly connected with the "ideological remoulding movement," removed from top Party leadership several of Wang's former Communist associates and comrades with the period when Wang's activity is unreported. Though re-elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress of April 1945, his election was only to alternate membership. In 1949 he was reported to be in ill health and to have no specific assignment. Due to the death of an active member, Wang has again been placed on the Central Committee. This post, together with his recent appointment as Chinese Ambassador to Moscow, places him once more in the Party's front rank (1950).

Communist Source

Native of Chang Hsien, Anhwei. More than forty years of age (1953). Wang is a graduate of Shanghai College. He studied in Soviet Russia and is well versed in the English and Russian languages. He came back to join the revolutionary underground work immediately after the failure of the 1927 Revolution, and edited the *Workers' Bulletin*

(predecessor of the English version of a Hsin Hua periodical of the same name). Later, he went to the Kiangsuev Soviet Region and served as Director of the General Political Department of the Workers' and Farmers' Red Army. After he participated in the Long March and went to North Shensi, he continued to take charge of the political work of the People's Anti-Japanese Army. He overworked himself and suffered from tuberculosis. It took him a long period of rest before he regained his health recently. After the People's Government was established, he was appointed the First Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Soviet Russia. His wife, Dr. Chu Hui, was superintendent of the Harbin Municipal Hospital before the liberation of Peking and Tientsin. A member of the Central Committee of the Party (1950).

Wu Yu-chang 吳玉章
US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; President, North China University; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Party elder, Wu Yu-chang was born in 1877 in Jung-hsien, Szechwan, of a large landlord family and prior to the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty was sent by the government to Japan for study. He graduated from the Sixth Higher School in Japan and while in that country joined the Hsin Chung Hui, a branch of the T'ung Meng Hui. He participated actively in work to overthrow the Manchu dynasty and was one of the leaders of a group charged with the task of inciting rebellion among Manchu troops and with slaying of high government officials. Early in 1911, Wu, then in China with Sun Yat-sen, was also implicated in the plot to kill the governor of Kwangtung and was forced to flee to Japan. By October he had again returned to China and was active in Szechwan Province agitating to overthrow the Manchus.

Following Yuan Shih-k'ai's assumption of power in Peking in 1913, Wu went to France where he studied at the University of Paris and organized a unit of the Kuomintang Party. He remained in France until about 1922, established with Li Shih-ts'ang a Sino-French University in Lyon, and with Li organized an association to place "worker-student" Chinese youths in French factories. In this capacity Wu undoubtedly came into contact with many of the Chinese students such as Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, Ch'ên I, Li Fu-ch'un, and others who were, in 1921, to organize a French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Reportedly more than 1,000 Chinese students arrived in France due to the assistance of Wu's organization. He returned to China in 1922, going to Szechwan to become principal of the Szechwan Higher Normal School. In 1923, he went to Canton where he served briefly as Sun Yat-sen's secretary. He again acted as Sun's secretary in 1925. Wu had joined the Communist Party in 1924 and entered the Kuomintang Party Congress held in 1926, served as the congress's Secretary-General, and was elected by the congress to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. Following the congress Wu went again to Szechwan to do Party work among provincial troops and following the establishment of the Wu-han Government he became a member of that government's State Council. Concurrently, he had become a member of the Kuomintang Central Standing Committee. When the Communist and the Kuomintang Parties split in 1927, Wu participated with the Communists in the Nanchang Uprising, then fled to Hong Kong and eventually to France, England, and Moscow. In Moscow he reportedly studied at both the Chungshan and Eastern Workers' Universities, and by the mid-1930's was the publisher of a Moscow

Chinese-language newspaper *Ch'u Kuo Shih-pao* (National Salvation Times). It is notable that Li Li-san is reported as having been Editor of this paper in Moscow at the same time. Wu is also said to have established, in 1929, an Overseas Chinese Workers' School in Vladivostok and to have been active in overseas Chinese circles both in that city and in Khabarovsk.

He seems to have been elected to the Communist Party Central Committee at the Second Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in 1929. In 1937, when the *National Salvation Times* was moved from Moscow to Paris, Wu went there and, in the additional capacity of Chairman of the China branch of the International Peace Campaign, was active in Communist propaganda work. He did not return to China until 1938 when he was one of the Hankow representatives of the Eighth Route Army. He was named a member of the First People's Political Council that same year but went to Yenian (Fu-shih) shortly thereafter because of illness. Though after 1938 named a member of the Second, Third, and Fourth People's Political Councils, Wu does not seem to have attended any of the council meetings. In 1943 he was President of the Communist Lu Hsun School of Arts, Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Cultural Association, and President of the New Writing School. (Wu has worked out the system of Latin romanization of Chinese which the Communist Party has tried to use.) During the latter years of the Sino-Japanese War, he held the post of Chairman of the Yenian (Fu-shih) branch of the Sino-Soviet Cultural Association and was publisher of a vernacular translation of the Communist Party organ, *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*.

In December 1945, Wu went to Chungking for participation in peace talks with the Nationalist Government and was a Communist delegate on the Political Consultative Conference, but returned to Yenian (Fu-shih) in March 1946, following the stalemate in negotiations. His activities have been unreported from that time until 1949 when he became President of the North China University, a merger of the Communist universities of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Regions.

Communist Source

Native of Jung-hsien, Szechwan. Born in 1878. Seventy-five years of age (1953). He was a member of the former T'ung Meng Hui. He studied in Japan and published a magazine devoted to revolutionary propaganda. Since he came back, he has been serving the people in North Shensi by doing educational work there. Wu has also been one of the leaders of the Communist Party. Member of the Central Committee of the Party and, President of the North China University (1950).

Yeh Chi-chung 袁祖銘
US Source

A Communist Party trade expert, Yeh Chi-chung was born in 1888 in Hsin-hsing, Kwangtung, and has long been a Party member. He served in various Party posts as Inspector of a provincial committee, Secretary of a Hsien committee, and Secretary of a Regional committee. He later was head of the Political Department of the Seventh Army, was promoted to the post of Political Commissioner and Head of the Military Supplies Section of the First Front Army and during the late 1930's or early 1940's was Director of the Bureau of Military Supplies and Head of the Rear Areas Service Department of the Eighth Route Army. By 1943 Yeh had become Manager of the Shansi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Trade Company and served, concurrently, as the Border Region Commissioner of Trade.

After the Japanese surrender he went to Manchuria, where he served as Deputy Chief of Staff to Lin Biao's United Democratic Army and as a member of the Finance and Economic Committee of the Northwest Administrative Council. In July 1948 he was appointed Minister of Finance and of Commerce, but was relieved of these posts in May 1949 and appointed Vice-Chairman of the Council's Finance and Economic Committee. When the Northeast People's Government was established in August 1949, Yeh assumed the posts of Minister of Foreign Trade as well as Vice-Chairman of the Finance and Economic Committee. These positions he held until October 1949, when the Central People's Government was established and he became Vice-Chairman of the Finance and Economic Committee of the State Administration Council.

Communist Source
None.

Yeh Chien-ying 葉劍英

US Source

Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Chairman, Kwangtung Provincial People's Government; Mayor of Canton; Secretary, South China Sub-branch, Communist Party; Chairman, Canton Military Control Commission; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Southeast Military and Political Affairs Committee; Chairman, Canton branch, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Commander and concurrently Political Commissioner, Kwangtung Military District.

One of the top Communist military leaders and former Chief of Staff to Chu Teh, Yeh Chien-ying was born in Mei-hsien, Kwangtung, in 1897, the son of a Hakka merchant. He graduated from the Yunnan Military Academy in 1919 (Chu Teh is also a graduate of this academy) and joined the army of the Kwangtung war lord, Chen Ching-ming. He was later assigned to the staff of Sun Yi-shan's headquarters and, by 1923, served as a confidential secretary to Dr. Sun. During this period Yeh also held the posts of Magistrate of Chung-shan and Mei-hsien in Kwangtung. In 1926 he became an instructor at Whampoa Military Academy, reportedly on the recommendation of Chou En-lai, who was then the Director of the Academy's Political Training Department. He joined the Communist Party and became an officer in a division under the direct command of Chiang Kai-shek. He served successively under Li Chih-shen and Chang Fa-k'uei during the Northern Expedition.

Under Chang Fa-k'uei, Yeh was Chief of Staff and accompanied Chang's forces to Wu-han in 1927. When Chang's troops captured Canton from the forces of Li Chih-shen, Yeh led some of the troops in a Communist-instigated uprising which resulted in the establishment of the abortive Canton Commune on 11-13 December 1927. Nieh Jung-chén, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Chiang Tzu-hua, and Chou En-lai were others who participated in this revolt. Upon its collapse, Yeh fled to the USSR where he studied at the Soviet Red Army Military Academy. After a period of additional study in military science in Germany, he returned to China in 1931 to work in the Kiangsi Soviet, where he and Liu Po-ch'eng served alternately in the posts of Chief of Staff of the Red Army and Head of the Chinese Red Army Military Academy. He remained in Kiangsi to take command of rear guard elements at the time of the Long March, later joining the main forces in Szechwan. For the remainder of the trek to Shensi, however, he alternated with Liu Po-ch'eng as Chief of Staff and Commander of vanguard troops.

Early in 1936, Yeh Chien-ying was reportedly active in propaganda work among the officers and men of Chang Hsueh-shang's Tung-pai (Northeast) Army. When the Tung-pai Army revolted in December 1936, Yeh, Chou En-lai, and Lin Tzu-shan were some of the prominent Communist negotiators who participated in conversations which led to the Generalissimo's release and the subsequent establishment of the United Front. Yeh, Chou, and Lin served as liaison officers for the Communists in the various Nationalist capitals during the war. Yeh, however, served only until 1941 when he returned to Yenan (Fu-shih) to go on active duty until the end of the war as Chief of Staff of the Eighth Route Army.

Immediately after the December 1936 incident, Yeh was appointed head of the Communist Party's Shan office, returning to Yenan (Fu-shih) in 1937, when he was appointed Chief of Staff to Chu Teh under the Red Army reorganization. He held this post until 1949 when he was appointed a member of the Communist Revolutionary Military Council. In January 1938, Yeh was reportedly sent to the Canton area by Chiang Kai-shek to organize self-defense corps and in the following year, he became Dean of the Chinese Army Guerrilla Training School in southern Hunan.

Elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945, Yeh became active in negotiations with the Central Government on the issue of coalition government and later served as chief Communist representative at the Peking Executive Headquarters. In February 1947, following the collapse of Kuomintang-Communist negotiations, he again assumed the post of Chief of Staff. Yeh was appointed Chairman of the Peking Military Control Commission and, concurrently, Mayor after the Communist occupation of that city in January 1949. When the Nationalist delegates went to Peking to discuss peace terms in April 1949, Yeh was for the third time appointed a Communist negotiator. He was transferred to Canton in September 1949 as Chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial People's Government, Chairman of the Canton Military Control Commission, and Mayor of Canton.

Communist Source

Native of Mei-hsien, Canton. More than fifty years of age (1953). He graduated from the Yunnan Military Academy and was Director of the Training Corps of the Whampoa Military Academy during the period following the 1911 Revolution. He was Chief of Staff of the First Army during the Northern Expedition, and later Chief of Staff of Chang Fa-k'uei's army. After the Nanking-Hankow split, he returned to Kwangtung to start the Canton Uprising. Yeh went to Europe in the spring of 1928 and studied military science in Soviet Russia and Germany. He came back in the winter of 1930 and served as Chief of Staff of the Red Army and President of the Military Academy, in the Kiangsi Soviet Region. He led the vanguards into North Shensi during the Long March. When the Nationalists and the Communists co-operated again after the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he was Director of the Eighth Route Army Office in Nanking. Later, he went to various places and was, at one time, Dean of the Kuomintang-sponsored Guerrilla Training Class in Heng-shan. During the Nationalist-Communist negotiations before and after the War of Resistance, Chou En-lai, Tung Pao-wu, and he were known as the "Three Cross-borders." In the early days after the Japanese surrender, he was chief delegate of the Communist Party in the Military Mediation Headquarters. After the failure of the peace talks, he went back to Yenan (Fu-shih) and resumed his duties as Chief of Staff of the Communist Army. He was made Mayor of Peking after the liberation of the city. Commander of the Kwangtung Military Control Region, Chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial People's Government and, Mayor of Canton (1950).

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Yün Tsé 雲澤 (Alias: Wu Lan-fu)

US Source

Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Government; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; Vice-Director (one of three), Commission of the Affairs of Nationalities; Chairman, Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; member, representing the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Suiyuan Military and Political Affairs Committee.

A Mongolian alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee, Yün Tsé is the top Party official on Mongol affairs and has served since its inception in 1947 as Chairman of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government, a Chinese Communist-sponsored regime. He was born in 1904 in Tumet Banner, Suiyuan Province. He attended the Peking Mongolian-Tibetan School and is a graduate of the Chung-shan University in Moscow. He was in the USSR from 1925 to 1930. Having joined the Young Communist League in 1924, he joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Returning to China in 1930, he organized a Mongolian anti-Japanese army and participated in the rebellion of troops against the Japanese at Pai-ling-miao in 1935. Yün Tsé was the Commander of a Mongolian Banner Independent Brigade stationed at I-meng from 1937 to 1941. In 1941 he went to Yen-an (Fu-shih) where for three years he served as President of the Min-tsu Hsiieh-yuan (Racial Academy) and, concurrently, as head of the Committee of Racial Affairs of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. In 1944 he established a "democratic anti-Japanese" government in the Kechou League in south Suiyuan.


At the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, Yün Tsé became Chairman of the Chinese Communist-sponsored Inner Mongolia Autonomous Movement Association, a post he held until 1947 with the merger of that association and the Eastern Mongolia Autonomous Government into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government. He also served in 1946 as Communist Governor of Suiyuan Province. He reportedly has been in Peking frequently since that city's occupation by the Communists, and was the chief Mongol member of the Preparatory Committee who attended the Plenary sessions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Communist Source

Native of Pa-pu village of the Tumot'e (Tumet) Banner in Suiyuan. Fifty years of age (1953). He led the West Mongolia Revolutionary Movement since 1920. He went to the Oriental University in Soviet Russia for advanced study in the winter of 1925. There he was imbued with the revolutionary theories of Marxism-Leninism. He came back in 1934 and taught in a village elementary school, while secretly promoting revolutionary activities in West Mongolia. In 1937, he joined the armed activities of the Suiyuan-Mongolia Peace Preservation Troops. In 1945 he was elected alternate member of the Central Committee of the Party. In 1946 he obtained cooperation from the revolutionary forces in East Mongolia and in the same year, called a joint conference of East and West Mongolia leaders, of which he was elected Chairman. After that, Inner-Mongolia formally established an autonomous government, of which he was again elected Chairman. He represented the Inner-Mongolia Autonomous Region in the People's Political Consultative Conference. Member of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, member of the Committee of Political and Legal Affairs of the Administrative Council, Vice-Chairman of the Commission of the Affairs of Nationalities of the Administrative Council, and Chairman of the Inner-Mongolia Autonomous Government (1950).


SELECTED READING

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CHINA
Compiled and Drawn in the Cartographic Section of
the National Geographic Society for
THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE
Gilbert Grosvenor, Editor

ALBERS CONICAL EQUAL AREA PROJECTION
Scale: 1:7,000,000 OR 1:10.8 MILLION TO THE INCH
SCALE 1:7,000,000 OR 1:10.8 MILLION TO THE INCH

Principal Railways
Of First Class Importance Generally of Second Class Importance

Distances and Depths in Feet, Elevations in Feet of Spheroidal Layer
James M. Fisher, Chief Cartographer
Companion to Volume 3, National Geographic Magazine
Edited by John J. Rabe

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1948

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