

STAT

A PREFACE TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA

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P-1341

March 5, 1958

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This paper is a revision of a study originally
written as a contribution to a discussion on
foreign policy in RAND.

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Part I

SOME BASIC CONCEPTS

A. Foreign Policy: The Response to Situations

Practical thinking in the sphere of foreign policy is characteristically addressed to questions which take the general form: "What are we going to do about it?" This paper represents a more or less systematic attempt to define and clarify the "it" in the question insofar as U.S. foreign policy toward Russia is concerned. It is particularly concerned with the political rather than the military aspects of the situation, although it recognizes that these are inextricably intertwined and therefore does not undertake to deal with the former in abstraction from the latter. It is, as the title indicates, a "preface." Its purpose is not to outline a series of possible solutions to the problems posed for America at this time by Russia and her foreign policy, but merely to contribute in modest degree to the elucidation of what these problems really are. In some instances, of course, the very attempt to do this points to possible lines of American response.

Whether Russia is concerned or not, the most general description of the "it" in the foreign policy question is: a situation. It is situations about which we may do something (or fail to, as the case may be). Foreign policy may be

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regarded as the national response to situations in world affairs. Such situations are objective realities; they do not require to be recognized, or clearly grasped, in order to exist. They may be transitory, or they may endure through long periods of time. They may be an emergency like the Suez situation in October-November, 1956, or a chronic sore on the international body politic like the German situation. Further, there are situations within situations. Thus the German one has its place within a larger European situation. The latter, in turn, has its place in a total complex called the "world situation."

Insofar as the position or actions of Russia in the world are important contributing factors in the situations which confront the United States, these situations enter into the purview of U.S. policy toward Russia.

If foreign policy is the national response to situations in world affairs, what, more precisely, is to be understood by a "situation"? There appear to be three basic elements which are constitutive of situations in foreign affairs: (1) a contingency exists; that is, something factual hangs in the balance somewhere in the world, can "go one way or the other"; (2) this becomes, or tends to become, a focal point of concern, for national interests are engaged, in one way or another, in the outcome; and (3) the issue is, or may become, a reference

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point for national action, an action-context: that is, something can be done to shape or affect the outcome, to determine which way things go. The policy response is that which is done. Foreign policy is the aggregate of such policy responses.

B. The Comprehensive U.S. Foreign Policy Interest: Security

Very little generalization is possible with respect to the nature of the contingencies that give rise to international situations and the actions taken in them. About all that can be said is that actions are forthcoming when the contingencies become focal points of serious national concern. The concrete contingencies themselves are infinitely diverse in character, and the kinds of national actions taken also vary in a multitude of ways.

The one element in the structure of the foreign policy situation which readily lends itself to further general analysis is that relating to the national interests engaged. These too are, of course, diverse. Yet they have, in the case of the United States, for example, a basic common denominator. Most or all of the interests which are of any real importance in motivating American national action in world affairs can be subsumed under the broad heading of security. Security is the comprehensive U.S. foreign policy interest; what most generally motivates

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U.S. foreign policy is the interest in making the world safe -- or safer -- for the American democracy. This statement is not made in the imperative mood. It is designed not to prescribe how American foreign policy ought to be motivated but how -- broadly speaking -- it actually is motivated at the present historical juncture.

A distinction should be drawn between the primary and secondary aspects of the U.S. security interest. The primary aspect of national security is safety in the physical sense. The primary security interest is, therefore, roughly equivalent to the national interest in defense. Its ultimate guarantee is the country's military power. It is the interest in preventing the territory and population of the country from being attacked, overrun, ravaged, or otherwise grievously harmed by hostile forces from without. This interest is, manifestly, basic to U.S. foreign policy. It involves the protection of national survival.

Hardly less fundamental, however, is the secondary aspect. This involves the security of the society and its institutions, the safety of the national way of life. The only reason for speaking of it as "secondary" is that this kind of security presupposes the other kind: the security of the society presupposes the physical security of the territory and population.

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But what is meant by the security of the society? Some of the basic elements that enter into it are the stability of the prevailing order of political institutions, the soundness and stability of the national economy, and the opportunities for future national development in the social, economic, cultural, and intellectual fields. Thus, if primary security refers to the protection of American national survival, secondary security may be said to refer to the protection of American national welfare.

The interrelationships between the primary and secondary aspects of security are highly complex. If security of the society presupposes the physical security of the territory and population, it is also true in a certain sense that physical security may depend, up to a point, upon the security of the society. This is the implication, for example, of the contention frequently heard that "America's economy is its first line of defense." This might be paraphrased by saying that America's ability to sustain strong military defenses of her physical security rests in part upon the structure of American prosperity. In this instance, the primary aspect of security presupposes the secondary aspect.

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C. External Requirements of U.S. Security

American security in both the primary and secondary aspects requires certain international conditions, certain states of the world, as its external buttress. That is why we cannot very well do without a foreign policy. The shape of the world environment is necessarily of vital concern to an America bent on preserving and promoting its national security. The foreign policy is an instrument for shaping or reshaping the external environment in accordance with these needs.

Theoretically, a very powerful militarized America might remain physically secure even if isolated in a highly hostile world, even, that is, if it retired into "Fortress America" and all its world positions were lost to hostile outside forces. This is the one premise upon which it could be argued that an active American foreign policy is expendable. However, such a view is not truly tenable.

First, it is plain that American security in the secondary aspect could not be reliably maintained for very long in such a world. At best it would last for a short while. For one thing, economic autarchy would impose terribly heavy and rapidly increasing strains upon the U.S. economy. America is now on the way to becoming a have-not nation with respect to certain important mineral resources. Continued access to world sources

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of these minerals is therefore a basic requirement of American security, even physical security (i.e., military needs). And this, in turn, implies a certain order of international relations, which is to say the existence in the world of mineral-rich nations with which America can do business. This means, for example, that America has a vital interest in preventing any unfriendly power (e.g., Russia) from gaining political-economic mastery of Asia and the Middle East. The same problem may be approached from a purely political point of view. Thus, an America isolated in an undemocratic world could probably not remain for long a democratic society. Present constitutional processes would inevitably deteriorate through the introduction of far-reaching federal controls and the increasing centralization of authority which would be needed to keep the country constantly at maximum military strength and readiness. Nor would such an isolated America possess conditions most congenial to her further cultural and intellectual progress. Here again, then, the security of American society requires a certain order of international relations in which the U.S. is not isolated in an unfriendly world.

American security in its primary aspect also demands such an order of international relations. Here, however, the crux of the question is not security versus no security, but more

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security rather than less. In other words, we need not argue whether or not America could survive for long as Fortress America in a hostile world. Possibly it could survive indefinitely. But it would not possess as much physical security as an America with strategically situated and reasonably strong and dependable allies abroad in the world, or an America which formed a part of a worldwide system of ordered security. And since physical security refers to the protection of the very survival of the country, more rather than less of it is very greatly to be desired. Hence the primary security interest dictates the quest for friends and allies. This may be less true in an age of thermonuclear explosives and intercontinental ballistic missiles than at any previous period of history. These devices, that is to say, might under certain conditions free a great power from dependence upon a given order of international relations for its physical security. However, this does not necessarily follow.

D. The General Goal of U.S. Diplomacy

Generalizing the argument to this point, American territory and American society are most secure not only when America is relatively most strong in home military capabilities, but also -- and this is crucial for foreign policy -- when the world

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environment is most friendly (or least hostile to America. In short, the safer world for America is the world more friendly to America. The basic interest in making the world safe or safer for the American democracy gives rise, therefore, to an interest in making or keeping the international environment as friendly as possible to America. This is the general goal of a security-minded U.S. diplomacy.

In practice, foreign policy deals not with an "international environment" as such but with its component parts -- the sovereign national states of the world. Hence making or keeping the international environment as friendly as possible to America is a procedure which takes place in U.S. relations with a multitude of individual countries. The word "friendly," as used here, has a spectrum of possible meanings. At the low end of the spectrum it may mean no more than "not actively hostile." Somewhat higher up it may mean "co-operative for specific mutual purposes." Finally, at the upper end it means relationships of international community. Such relationships are defined by the idea of neighborliness. As Walter Lippmann writes, "The test of whether a community exists is not whether we have learned to love our neighbors but whether, when put to the test, we find that we do act as neighbors do."*

* U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Boston 1943, p. 135.

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nations which form an international community with America are those in whose relations with us, generally speaking, the principle of neighborliness prevails. The core of this principle is mutual trust.

A foreign policy addressed to making or keeping the world environment as friendly as possible to America operates selectively within this spectrum. While always in principle interested in widening the extent of the international community of which America forms a part, it does not work toward this end alone. Much of the work consists not in the extension of relations of community but rather in the reduction or repair of hostile relations, i.e., in striving to make of this or that foreign country (e.g., Tito's Yugoslavia) not a good friend of America but merely a non-enemy or a working partner for specific mutual purposes.

As a general rule -- and this means subject to possible exceptions -- the American democracy can cultivate relations of international community successfully only with countries where responsible representative government prevails, as it does, for example, in most of the countries of the Atlantic community. The reason for this, ultimately, is that the requirement of neighborliness -- mutual trust -- can rarely be met by a regime which is not of this character. Where

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authority is not founded on popular consent, the bearers of this authority are unlikely to be fully and stably trustworthy in their foreign relations. Internationally speaking, they are "security risks." From this point of view, among others, it may be said that America has a definite interest in fostering the stability and spread of free political institutions in the world. By so doing we foster opportunities for the further development of international community, in which the greater degree of security for America lies.

E. The Mutual Security Interest

This brings us to the mutual security interest, which is a keystone in the structure of contemporary American foreign policy. The essential consideration is this: If a friendlier world is a safer world, then America has an interest in the continued security of those countries which do in fact contribute, by their international relations and actions, to this end. Negatively stated, the more insecure a friendly country or working partner or even (in certain circumstances) a mere non-enemy is, the more likely is the world environment to become less friendly toward America and hence more dangerous for America. Our general level of security is linked in part with theirs, just as is theirs with ours. As a consequence,

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the national security of a large number of foreign countries becomes a fundamental interest of American foreign policy.

From America's standpoint as a world power with very heavy responsibilities and great although nevertheless limited resources for backing these up, the interest in the security of other countries must necessarily be selective. The United States, strong as it is, is not in a position to be indiscriminate in making foreign commitments involving the defense of the security of other countries. It must endeavor at all times to strike what Lippmann calls a "solvent balance" in foreign policy, which means that the country's foreign commitments are not over-extended in relation to its power and resources.* It is clear that a policy of indiscriminate U.S. underwriting of the security of all friendly and non-hostile foreign countries might, in practice, decrease rather than increase the over-all level of U.S. national security. It might, for example, by depleting U.S. resources beyond a certain point, contribute to the undermining of the economic health of the United States. It might require the maintenance of a U.S. military establishment far larger than American capacities comfortably permit. It might lead to very many risky and costly U.S. interventions

* Ibid.,

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(political and/or military) in local situations around the world where no issue which could be called truly vital to the U.S. national security interest was at stake. It might impair certain international relationships of great security value to the United States, and so on. The general result might be a less rather than more secure America.

The principle of selectivity implicit in this reasoning is that the United States has a fundamental interest in helping certain other countries to maintain their own security only insofar as this action means an over-all increment in the level of U.S. national security. This, of course, is merely a way of stating the principle of mutuality in terms of the given problem. In practice, the United States tends to underwrite the security primarily of those countries whose continued security is contributory in an especially important manner or degree to American national security. The first criterion of "especially important" is the relation of such countries to American security in the primary aspect. The countries signatory to the Atlantic Pact are, for example, of prime importance in this respect.

Under certain international circumstances, the need for the United States to be selective in pursuing the mutual security interest is offset by a consideration which is fundamentally

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psychological in character. The circumstances referred to are those in which the security of numerous smaller countries is threatened by the actions of an aggressively expanding imperial power. At such a time it may become imperative, for reasons ultimately related to U.S. security itself, to protect the security of small countries which do not qualify for assistance under the above mentioned criterion. The reason is that the fall of such countries, while it may not impair our defense potential in any significant way, will nevertheless have a profoundly depressing effect upon the international attitudes and actions of other countries whose security is more directly related to ours. The American intervention to stop the Soviet aggression in Korea is the outstanding recent case in point, possibly the outstanding case of all time. Generalizing, the principle of selectivity may at certain times be offset by what we may call the "all-or-nothing" principle in the field of world security.

F. Russia and U.S. Foreign Policy

The discussion so far has been concerned to elicit some general principles at the foundation of contemporary American foreign policy. Before concluding this part of the study it will be helpful to relate these principles to the concrete

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situation of the past decade in world politics, a situation in which Soviet Russia has been a dominating factor.

The salient fact of the international situation as it developed beginning about 1944 was the position and policies of Soviet Russia, a very large, highly militarized, formidably situated, and extremely unfriendly power which embarked upon a bid for the mastery of Eurasia and possibly other parts of the world. A series of aggressive acts, including the subversion of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the Soviet war by proxy in Korea, together with the actions Moscow took toward consolidating the positions gained by the Soviet army at the close of World War II into a closed empire, bespoke a deep antagonism toward America and the West, and a tendency to move farther and farther if unchecked toward total mastery of Eurasia, which would, then, mean for America an unfriendly Eurasia. The communist seizure of power in China and the emergence of the Sino-Soviet partnership greatly enlarged this possibility.

These developments precipitated an international situation in the sense defined earlier in the present study. First, there were certain great contingencies, things factually hanging in the balance. Broadly speaking, these were (1) the independence of all the potential victims of further Soviet expansion, meaning all or most of Eurasia; (2) the status of Russia's new imperial

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possessions, the countries which had already lost their independence, although not necessarily forever; and (3) the peace of the world, which was already being profoundly disturbed by these happenings and might break down completely as a result of Russia's past, present, and future actions.

Secondly, these contingencies became focal points of profound American concern. The American national security interest was engaged in manifold ways in the outcome. It was recognized that both the physical security of the United States and the security of the American society and way of life were at stake. It therefore seemed imperative to the government and public of the United States to do whatever might be done to protect American security in the face of the manifest direct and indirect dangers to it. In the case of the creation of the new Russian empire, the dangers to Western and indirectly U.S. security had already, in large part, materialized, and the practical policy issue, therefore, was whether they could be reduced, i.e., whether the empire could be caused to recede. The dangerous contingencies present in the other two categories had not, however, fully materialized; here, therefore, the policy problem was to prevent them from materializing. Thus, Western Europe had not yet been incorporated in the Russian empire. Many important Asian and Middle Eastern countries still remained independent. General war had not yet broken out.

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Thirdly, something could be and was done about it. These contingencies, with special reference to the as yet unmaterialized dangers, became an action-context for American foreign policy. A whole series of major U.S. international actions between 1947 and 1952, including principally the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic pact, the Berlin airlift, American rearmament, the rebuilding of Europe's defenses, and the U.S. intervention in Korea, were taken with reference to the situation as just outlined. The total pattern of American and generally Western policy response was epitomized in the term "containment." Its purport was to erect a worldwide security structure in the face of Russia (or the Russo-Chinese combination) as an aggressively expanding imperial power.

The international situation has not remained constant over the most recent years. Especially since 1953, the year of Stalin's death and Russia's first explosion of a thermonuclear device, changes have occurred in such vital variables as the technology of war, Soviet foreign policy, and international conditions both in Russia and her empire on the one hand and in the rest of the world on the other. The nature and reasons for the changes are not matters for analysis in this study. Suffice it to say that the over-all international situation has been modified as a result. Insofar as U.S. foreign policy toward

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Soviet Russia is concerned, the "it" in the question presents today a picture of continuity and change. Certain contingencies necessarily remain as focal points of U.S. concern, world peace and the status of the Soviet empire being among them. Others, such as the contingency of Soviet aggressions on the order of Korea, have come to cause less concern than in the previous period. Finally, certain new contingencies, having to do not with conquest but with the extension of Soviet influence by non-violent means, have arisen as matters for concern. In short, the pattern of the international situation has altered. Our inquiry into the "it" in the foreign policy question will relate to the situation in the new pattern. It will be useful to preface it, therefore, with a short account of the present Soviet posture in foreign policy.

G. The Present Postures of Russia and America

Stalin's death inaugurated a reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. The new orientation emerged not immediately but after the period of groping experimentation and sharp internal conflict and controversy which went on approximately from Stalin's death to Khrushchev's emergence into definite ascendancy in February, 1955. It received its official ratification at the XX Party Congress in February, 1956. It

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suffered a shattering setback later in that year with the outbreak of revolution in Hungary and associated events elsewhere, following which there was in Moscow a temporary strategic relapse into the old Stalinist posture. But the strength of the tendencies underlying the reorientation after Stalin's death is attested amply by the more recent gravitation of Soviet foreign policy back toward the post-Stalin orientation. The latter represents Soviet foreign policy as it is most likely to continue confronting us during the period of years immediately ahead.

The new posture exemplifies both continuity and change in Soviet foreign policy. On the one hand, this policy remains both generally expansive in character and generally unfriendly toward the Western democracies, and the United States in particular. In this sense we see continuity. On the other hand, change is visible both in the nature of Soviet expansiveness and the nature of Soviet unfriendliness toward America and the West. With regard to the first point, the pattern has tended to shift from an expansionism of total control to an expansionism of Soviet influence in foreign countries. With regard to the latter, the pattern shifts from Stalinist implacable hate to a different phenomenon of unfriendliness which is compounded of pride, dislike, distrust, and fear. Soviet foreign policy

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remains unfriendly toward America in its foundation, but is not in the grip of a pathological hate. The new unfriendliness expresses itself, for example, in a spirit of antagonistic rivalry with America for the first position in world politics. It does not, moreover, exclude occasional friendly overtures to America, or even a certain (perhaps the better word would be "uncertain") amount of co-operation between the two powers for purposes which may be mutual, e.g., the purpose of surviving, or for other purposes which may not be mutual although they seem to be so. On the whole, the present posture of the Soviet Union is that of a great power with a state capitalist economic pattern and an authoritarian political system, and with a combination of powerful imperialistic tendencies and revolutionary ideology in its immediate background, which is very conscious of being a great power, is and would like to remain a dynamic, expansive force in world affairs, and conceives itself as America's oncoming rival for the number-one position of leadership on the globe.*

* This general view of the situation is based on a series of analyses prepared or in preparation by this writer, including D-2936, "Soviet Foreign Policy From Stalin to Khrushchev"; D-4291, "The New Phase of the Cold War"; RM-1881, "The Psychological Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy"; and RM-1874, "The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization."

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Its assets in this undertaking are formidable, although balanced by serious liabilities which will be discussed at a later point. The sphere of which Soviet Russia still forms the hegemonic center includes approximately a third of the earth's surface and population. In Asia it embraces China, North Korea, North Viet Nam, and Mongolia; in Europe, the satellite states of Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Albania, a quasi-satellite dependency in Poland, with Yugoslavia occupying the anomalous position of an ex-satellite which is, as it were, of the Soviet sphere but not in it. In the military field, Russia is one of the two world superpowers, situated moreover in a strategically imposing and geopolitically advantageous territorial position. Economically, it is a powerful complex of expanding industrialization with a lagging agrarian economy crippled by serfdom in the form of the kolkhoz. It possesses a vigorous and ethnically diverse population, and an official ideology whose themes of national advance and renewal contain distinct elements of appeal in certain parts of the world, especially formerly backward countries just emerging into national independence and modernity. Finally, it has a unique asset for an expansive foreign policy in the form of a widely scattered network of foreign political parties and groups which give their first

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allegiance to Moscow and look to it for ideological inspiration, political direction and guidance. If recent developments have depreciated the value of this asset in some respects, they may have enhanced it in others.

There is a certain significant asymmetry between the basic postures of America and Russia as these have here been characterized. Roughly speaking, the American posture tends to be, in the broadest sense, defensive, that is, concerned on the whole with the preservation of an international status quo outside the Soviet sphere. The United States finds itself in a widely acknowledged position of leadership and foremost responsibility in a far-flung and very loose collection of diverse nations called the "free world." What all these nations have in common, politically speaking, is not internal freedom -- for some of them are by no means free societies -- but simply the good fortune of not belonging to the Soviet-dominated sphere of the world, which is not only internally unfree but also unfriendly toward us. Contemporary American foreign policy, based on the mutual security idea, presents itself as a kind of international insurance policy which is designed, in the first instance, to pay dividends in the form of American national security. It underwrites the continued strength and stability of the friendly sphere of the world, giving special attention to key

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threatened sectors, i.e., sectors most vulnerable to encroachment in one form or another from the unfriendly sphere. This is the very broad sense in which the orientation of American foreign policy may be termed defensive.

The Soviet posture, on the other hand is -- again in the broadest sense -- offensive, that is, concerned with the alteration of the international status quo outside the Soviet sphere, and this within the framework of the previously mentioned basic unfriendliness toward America and the West. In other words, in "competitive co-existence" as understood in Moscow, the Soviet Union stands at most to gain and at least to break even, but not in any event to lose; for the stakes lie wholly in the non-Soviet sphere, and the elements of the Soviet sphere itself are not -- they assume -- for competing. The Soviet sphere is envisaged as remaining an imperial system, a solid phalanx of states with Russia as the hegemonic power. However, it is crucially important to observe that "alteration of the international status quo outside the Soviet sphere" does not necessarily mean Soviet attempts to aggrandize the imperial system by incorporation of new areas into it. It may mean a change of the world political as distinguished from territorial status quo. This significant distinction must be borne in mind in appraising the meaning of the adoption by Moscow at the

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present time of "acceptance of the status quo" as a leading slogan in foreign policy. Its reference is to acceptance of the territorial status quo, but not to the political. It theoretically rules out, in other words, the idea of forcible territorial aggrandizement, but not the idea of political action designed to effect a reordering of relationships with countries outside the Soviet sphere. The general nature of this reordering might perhaps be summed up by saying that Moscow visualizes many countries outside the Soviet sphere as becoming, in the future, broadly "Russia-oriented" instead of "America-oriented."

The American defensive world posture is, as has been stressed, security-minded at the core. Now the question arises whether elements of a quest for security may not be present too in the motivation of the Soviet offensive world posture. The answer must be in the affirmative. While the motivation of the contemporary Soviet foreign policy is not reducible to the drive for security, this nevertheless unquestionably plays a big part in it. Here too security presents itself in twofold guise. There is the primary aspect (security of territory and population) and the secondary aspect (security of the society). But now we must note a very important fact, viz., that security of the society means -- for Soviet foreign

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policy -- security of the Soviet system and regime. In other words, the Soviet regime in Russia identifies the security of the society with its own security as a political structure. In this fact lie the seeds of one of the basic conundrums of American foreign policy toward Soviet Russia. Briefly, America has a differential interest in Russian security. It has no reason for wanting Russia to be physically insecure; indeed, its own national security may be promoted by Russian security in the primary aspect. On the other hand, it does have a reason for not wanting to buttress the security of the Soviet regime; for this regime is not friendly to America and the kind of society America represents. But in Soviet foreign policy these two strands are inextricably interwoven. The dilemma which this creates for American foreign policy is a problem to which we shall have occasion to return later.

Furthermore, just as the needs of American national security dictate measures to strengthen and stabilize the friendly sphere of the world, so in the case of the Soviet foreign policy the security need (as just defined) dictates measures to stabilize the Soviet imperial sphere. The vital analytic importance of the distinction between the two aspects of security shows itself again at this point. While the Soviet concern for security in the primary aspect would dictate no

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more than the continuation of the sphere as a sphere of the world non-hostile to Russia (meaning no hostile bases, no anti-Russian alliances, etc.), the concern for the security of the Soviet regime dictates the preservation of the sphere as a political entity and structure, a system of political dependencies with one-party regimes similar to the one in Russia and acknowledging its seniority. The Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolution dramatized the depth of this secondary security concern in the motivation of Soviet foreign policy. The revolution threatened the Soviet-oriented political structure in Hungary. Had it succeeded, Hungary might well have become a kind of Finland in world affairs. This represented no serious danger to the physical security of Soviet Russia. But it was a very serious danger to the security of the existing political structure of empire and, indirectly, to the security of the Soviet regime inside Russia.*

* Much Western public discussion of the problem of foreign policy toward Russia is vitiated by the failure to distinguish the two aspects of security. The tacit assumption is that security means only security in the physical sense. This leads to misleading over-simplification of the issues involved in the future of the Soviet imperial sphere. For example, it is too easily assumed that arrangements effectively neutralizing the satellite sphere in Europe as well as a corresponding area to the West of it ought to be acceptable to a Moscow concerned with its "security."

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Thus, Soviet foreign policy too has an international status quo (the Soviet imperial sphere) to preserve, and to this extent the motivation of the policy is security-minded and defensive. But if the motivation is partly defensive, it remains true that the posture is broadly offensive. Otherwise stated, it is a posture of offensive defense, based on the idea that the existing Soviet imperial sphere will be most secure not when Moscow is internationally static but rather when it pursues an active, forward, expansive policy toward various parts of the world beyond the borders of this sphere. Moreover, this posture of politically active defense is dictated by the quest for greater physical or military security for the whole Soviet sphere under circumstances in which the Western structure of containment is a fait accompli but not necessarily a fait forever accompli. Thus, in the structure of contemporary Soviet foreign policy, the security motive not only does not dictate a static international posture but, on the contrary, reinforces the original tendencies other than mere security-seeking which make it offensive and expansive.

Here, briefly sketched, is the over-all situation which the United States faces in connection with present-day Russia and its foreign policy -- the "it" in comprehensive form. To complete the sketch, however, further mention must be made of

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an element of the situation so far merely alluded to -- the revolution in military technology. This has altered the world situation radically. The development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and the means of their delivery to the present point threatens to turn any future all-out war involving the two superpowers as antagonists into an act of humanicide, destruction of the human race; and further developments presently in progress on both sides toward perfecting long-range ballistic missiles equipped with thermonuclear warheads accentuate this threat. The existence of these immensely magnified powers of destruction accentuates the potential seriousness of the dangers of armed violence in the setting of the contemporary divided world.

H. The Method of Analysis

We are now ready to turn to the effort to dissect this situation in more explicit analytic detail. As indicated earlier, this will mean (1) singling out what is contingent in the situation, what factually hangs or may hang in the balance, in short, what may or may not happen; and (2) assessing these potential developments in relation to their probable effect upon the security equation from America's point of view. To the extent that a given contingency would

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have consequences adverse to the U.S. security position, it is a "danger." To the extent that the consequences would be an improvement in the U.S. security position, it is a "desideratum." Of course, by no means every potential development in the world situation falls clearly into the one category or the other. In many cases the consequences are of mixed character, and the developments themselves are classifiable, therefore, as "ambivalent."

Analysis of this type must necessarily remain extremely crude and tentative if only for the reason that it has to make certain arbitrary assumptions about the factual outcomes of the developments with which it deals. These assumptions are, naturally, based very largely on past experience, which, however, is not always a good guide to the future. For example, the analyst would tend to assume that a future satellite rising would be crushed by Russia just as the one in Hungary was, and would assess the consequences in terms of this expectation. This is the predictable outcome, but it is not the only conceivable one.

In Part II, which follows, the emphasis falls on dangers. This stems in part from the fact that the contingencies to be considered are those, in the first instance, which current Soviet foreign policy is endeavoring to bring about. This is no guarantee that they will be brought about, but Soviet effort

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to that end is naturally a factor to be reckoned with. And since this policy, as premised, is fundamentally unfriendly to us, it is only natural that the contingencies which it seeks to realize are likely, from our point of view, to fall in the category of dangers rather than desiderata. On the other hand, no mechanical assumption can be made about this, if only because we have to reckon with the possibility of Soviet miscalculation of the manner in which certain contingencies might impinge upon the Soviet interest. For example, it might be calculated in Moscow that exchanges of students and technicians with Asian free countries would serve the Soviet interest in building a base of political influence in these countries. But in the actual event, exposure to foreign influence might affect people on the Soviet side more than people on the Asian side, or it might affect Asians in a manner harmful to the Soviet political interest. We may lay it down as a general principle, then, that one should avoid assuming that a given Soviet line of endeavor is injurious from our point of view just because the Soviet leaders consider that it will be advantageous from theirs. Even apart from Soviet miscalculation, it cannot be assumed that anything which might work in whatever way toward the Soviet advantage is automatically to the Western disadvantage. The situation is more complicated than that.

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In the assessment of dangers, it is often necessary to distinguish between two different questions, one relating to the degree of probability that a given dangerous contingency will materialize and the other relating to the kind and the degree of harm which this will inflict. We will use here the term "reality" to designate the former aspect, and "seriousness" to designate the latter. The reason for stressing this distinction is that the two things may diverge. For example, a given danger may be very real and not very serious, or, alternatively, extremely serious but not very real. To illustrate, the danger of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe is tremendously serious but not, at this time, very real, i.e., not likely to occur. On the other hand, there is a real danger that the Soviet Union will restore its intensive cultural contacts and exchange with some Western countries, which were largely broken off after Hungary, but this danger is not a serious one, i.e., little harm could result.

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32.Part IIDANGERS AND DESIDERATAA. The Dangers of Soviet Political Encroachment

Webster defines "encroachment" as follows: "Encroach.

1. To enter by gradual steps or stealth into the possessions or rights of another; to trespass; intrude. 2. To advance beyond desirable or normal limits." This is a very useful concept for an analysis of the type of danger which present-day Soviet foreign policy presents for the West. The very breadth of its meaning is suggestive of the real nature of the situation.

Let us first attempt to form a more concrete picture of what this policy is and attempts to do. It is not a policy of international quiescence. On the other hand, it is not a policy of territorial aggrandizement of the existing Soviet empire, whether by armed aggression or subversion of foreign states, save in the marginal case as will be analyzed later. The primary aim is not territorial aggrandizement but rather the political reordering of the Soviet bloc's international environment, and especially those parts of it which lie adjacent to the bloc in Asia, the Middle East and Europe. What made this undertaking possible at all was the

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psychological revolution which Stalin's death occasioned in Soviet foreign policy.*

Stalin's cold war had brought about a division of the world into (1) the Soviet bloc and (2) the America-oriented sphere, embracing very nearly everything outside the Soviet bloc and cemented together in large part by fear of Russia, which in turn was a reaction to Soviet (Stalinist) hostility in its many manifestations. This hostility was directed more or less indiscriminately against all areas outside the Soviet bloc, although not with the same force and fury against all areas. The fountainhead of the indiscriminate hostility was Stalin, specifically the psychopathology of Stalin. Consequently, his death caused it to subside and made possible the emergence of a substantially new pattern in Soviet foreign policy. The United States and main Western democracies remain in the focus of a generally continuing Soviet unfriendliness, but the hostility has subsided in intensity and, above all, ceased being indiscriminate. Now it became possible for Moscow to try to make friends with selected

* Cf. Robert C. Tucker, RM-1881, "The Psychological Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy"; RM-1949, "The Changing Pattern of Soviet Foreign Policy"; and RM-1884, "The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization," for details of an analysis of this psychological revolution.

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foreigners -- with Tito, Nehru, U Nu, the Scandinavians, the Turks, the Egyptians, the Austrians, etc. -- not because the Soviet leaders esteemed these foreigners but because such a course was extremely useful, in accordance with a rationally calculated Soviet interest. This is a highly over-simplified diagnosis of the psychological revolution, but it contains the fundamental point that has to be comprehended before anyone can grasp what post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy is all about. It involves a change from political irrationality to political rationality.

The new policy takes its start from the world as Stalin left it, a world divided between the Soviet bloc and a loose America-oriented sphere. It sets out to encroach politically upon the latter, to trespass upon this preserve by diplomatic, economic, cultural, and ideological means, i.e., by the conventional devices of modern foreign policy. In the process it imitates some of the very practices which the United States had earlier evolved in its international insurance policy, such as foreign aid, technical assistance, student exchange, cultural intercourse. However, it assimilates these practices into its own peculiar structure of motivations. The military incursions stopped as the political intrusion began. The Soviet leaders set about winding up -- though not overhastily,

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for fear of seeming weak -- the aggressions in progress (Korea, Indo-China) and many related manifestations of Stalinist cold war. Thus, the new policy has two main prongs. One is calculated non-aggression. This particularly needs to be stressed, because the political meaning of inaction is not always easy to appreciate. In this case, a most important element of the new structure of Soviet world strategy consists in not doing certain kinds of things. The other prong is active political effort to capitalize upon the resulting relaxation of fear in the non-Soviet world and induce a re-ordering of political relationships between the Soviet bloc and much of the America-oriented sphere.

Building on a base of all-round "normalization" of relations between Soviet Russia and the independent countries of Europe and Asia, the policy is designed, in the first instance, to redraw the diplomatic map, to make of the America-oriented sphere of the world or large parts of it a sphere no longer America-oriented, looking to a future day when many parts of it may become, broadly, Russia-oriented -- in the political, economic, military, cultural and ideological respects. It is, thus, an ambitiously expansive policy in its ulterior design. But in terms of its immediate goals, it is much less ambitious. It seeks to detach nations -- especially

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Asian and Middle Eastern nations -- from dependence and reliance upon the West, encouraging the middle countries to adopt a middle political position, to shift their orientation in world politics, and especially in defense, away from the West and America. Countries which adopt a middle position, particularly with regard to their defense arrangements, are called by the post-Stalin Soviet foreign-policy doctrine "peace zones." The policy looks to the eventual transformation of all or most of non-Soviet Eurasia, from the English Channel to Indonesia, into one big "peace zone." Ultimately, it presupposes, the great "peace zone" will become a zone of preponderant Soviet or Soviet-bloc influence. This, very roughly, is Moscow's image of the drama of competitive co-existence and its future outcome.

Latent in the new configuration of Soviet policy are certain dangers now to be analyzed. First however, a general comment. How we approach the assessment of these dangers will necessarily depend in part upon the underlying assumptions. In particular, it will depend on whether we proceed from the need for some kind of U.S. international insurance policy or, alternatively, from the need to preserve the international insurance policy in the form evolved during the cold war of 1945-1953, i.e., the "cold-war structure" of American foreign

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policy or "policy of containment." The new Soviet strategy of political encroachment presents very many serious dangers from a point of view which rigidly adheres to the latter. The crucial reason is that Soviet world strategy has changed. The American policy of containment was from the beginning in essence a counter-strategy, designed to meet a Soviet (Stalinist) cold war offensive. Manifestly, the rigid application of this counter-strategy will begin to yield poor results or even land its forces in deep trouble when the original offensive strategy which it was correctly designed to meet has substantially altered, in this instance to a new offensive strategy which, speaking in military parlance again, might be compared with warfare of maneuver, being a policy of political mobile maneuver.

The counter-strategy was workable in the cold war precisely because the middle countries were confronted from the Soviet side with a constant tangible threat to their security and independent existence, being reminded over and over again (Czechoslovakia, Berlin blockade, Korea, Indo-China, the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, etc.) by Stalinist hostility toward the outside world of their dependence for security upon Western and particularly American protection. Now, however, by the prong of military quiescence (calculated

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non-aggression) in their policy structure, the Soviet political generals have it in their power to lessen the felt need abroad for big-power protection, to make the middle countries feel safe or at any rate safer, i.e., less threatened by Soviet aggression, and hence to reduce their motive for participation in a continued structure of containment policy. And by the other prong, which is the pursuit of an active policy of cultivating co-operative relations with independent countries of the middle zone, they can reinforce this effect. This political offensive of mobile maneuver, symbolized by the civilian jet transports which carry negotiators of aid-and-trade agreements to capitals of neighboring independent countries, cannot be effectively met by a frozen counter-strategy of political position warfare on the part of the United States. Such a counter-strategy becomes in many ways a political anachronism.

But if we proceed -- as we shall here -- from the alternative point of view that America's purpose in world politics is not to make a success of an established configuration of policy but simply to promote the security of the United States by the best available means in the circumstances as they now exist and promise to exist in the near future, then our assessment of the dangers may justifiably be more

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moderate. For the dangers latent in the new Soviet posture, while genuinely serious at various points, are quite a different matter from the standpoint of an adaptable America in quest of security than they are from the standpoint of an America rigidly committed to a specific structure of policy as the only thinkable means of obtaining security. The adaptable America will not be so vulnerable in the basic political sense as the rigidly committed America; it will be less obsessed with the dangers latent in the new world situation and more cognizant of the opportunities that may be present for change in healthy directions. However, from this standpoint, which inquires into the dangers not in relation to an established structure of American foreign policy but in relation to the security of America as such, the problems of analysis grow highly complex. For example, the Soviet effort to normalize the once deeply disturbed relations with many independent countries of Europe and Asia would be immediately classified as a "danger" by an analyst rigidly committed to a persistent cold-war policy structure -- for it obviously is a danger to successful continued pursuit of that policy; from that point of view, whatever lifts the previous temperature of cold-war frigidity in Soviet relations with the outside world is bad and dangerous. From the other point of view,

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however, the normalization of Soviet relations with other countries is not immediately identifiable as an evil or danger, and might even be desirable. It would all depend upon the consequences for the continued security of these countries and our own, and this in turn would depend upon a great many intricate factors, including the function of normalization in the overall structure of the new Soviet world strategy.

It is to the question of danger in this latter perspective that the discussion now turns. We shall examine the dangers of Soviet political encroachment under five headings: The Neutralization of Collective Defenses, the Acquisition of Excessive Soviet Influence, the Aggrandizement of the Soviet Bloc, the Moral-Political Isolation of America, and the Preservation of the Soviet Empire.

1. The Neutralization of Collective Defenses

a. The Policy Pattern

The aim of transforming all or most of non-Soviet Eurasia into one great "peace zone" means, in the first instance, the neutralization of the system of military defenses against Russia which has been erected across the southerly arc extending from Norway to Japan. This is a central element in the new Soviet world strategy. And precisely because the

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strategy pursues a plurality of related goals, no one single motive can be specified as the driving force behind this component element. Beyond doubt, one of the strongest elements in the complex of motives is the desire to improve the physical security of the territory of the Soviet bloc, and of the Soviet Union in particular, vis-à-vis American striking power now poised around the whole circumference of the bloc. However, the policy of neutralization also pursues certain political goals connected with the improved security of the Soviet political system and the creation of better opportunities for the radiation of Soviet influence out into the future neutralized sphere. The task of assessing the dangers implicit in the policy is complicated by this intricacy of motive forces.

The policy of neutralization attempts to achieve certain objectives of military-political significance to the Soviet Union by political means. What makes this conceivable from Moscow's point of view is the fact that the strategic encirclement spoken of above is not simply a military reality, but a politico-military reality. It rests in part on a political structure of interlocking multilateral and bilateral defensive alliances and agreements of which the U.S.A. is the central power hub. This structure is largely an outgrowth and legacy of the Stalinist cold war, when fear seized many

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middle countries* and impelled them to band together for common defense. Since Stalinist Russia was in this sense critically responsible for the coming into being of the alliance structure, post-Stalin Russia can, through changes of behavior, undertake to be critically responsible for its decline and fall. That is what the policy of neutralization endeavors to do. Its points d'appuis are the middle countries. The policy is aimed, so to speak, at the middle countries but against the United States.

The policy is not rigidly committed to some one particular result or form of result. It would, of course, like to see the whole ramified system of defense alliances, beginning with NATO, dissolve; but that is no more than a paper wish and a talking point for Soviet propaganda. The real aims embrace a whole spectrum of lesser and more practicable Soviet desiderata. These are moves of one or another kind by middle countries to resign responsibilities in collective defense against Russia. At a minimum, the policy would dissuade them from increasing their responsibilities in any way; the recent

* The phrase "middle countries" as used here embraces all the countries in the sphere of the world friendly to America which participate in one way or another in the common defensive system.

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Soviet-negotiated pledge by Iran to permit no military bases on its territory is a case in point, as is the barrage of Soviet warning against permitting U.S. atomic support commands to be stationed on foreign territories in proximity to the Soviet Union. Beyond this, the policy would persuade middle governments to decrease their responsibilities under the defensive system by such various steps as requesting the United States to withdraw its personnel or evacuate its bases (cf. Iceland's tentative move in this direction not long ago), withdrawing from a given defensive alliance, declaring the country's military neutrality, and so forth.

The policy follows a definite and coherent pattern of persuasion in the pursuit of its ends. On the one hand, it seeks to persuade the middle countries that they would be safe from molestation by Russia even without the protection afforded by their affiliation with the common defensive system. The means of persuasion on this score are highly diversified. They include (1) Soviet military quiescence combined with the cessation of cold-war hostilities still in progress when Stalin died (Korea, Indo-China, etc.) and of related symptoms of official Soviet hostility to foreign governments; (2) a series of moves designed to drive home the idea that the Soviet Union does not plan to make war on

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any neighboring countries (the withdrawal from Austria, evacuation of the Soviet base in Finland, evacuation of Port Arthur, announced serious cuts in the standing Soviet military establishment, the show of affirmative interest in limitation of armaments, etc.); (3) punctilious observance of the Austrian treaty, designed to dramatize Soviet willingness to coexist in peace with small undefended neutral nations in its vicinity; (4) the practice of friendly coexistence with independent countries, with selective emphasis on the advantages of such relations with Russia when the given independent country is militarily non-aligned with the West (India, Burma, etc.); and (5) the propaganda of neutralism. On the other hand, the policy seeks to persuade these same countries that by their alignment with the Western military system they subject themselves, in event of general war, to a threat of total and utter national destruction. This is done by means of official warnings, by statements and demonstrations of Soviet military capabilities in the field of massive retaliation. Thus, the policy seeks on the one hand to persuade the middle countries that they are individually in no danger of Soviet aggression, and on the other hand that they are in very great danger of perishing in the collective holocaust which total war would initiate. In effect, the two-pronged argument wants to

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convince them that the collective security system in which they participate has ceased being a system of true mutual security as between them and the United States. They, it argues in effect, are sacrificing their own national physical security in event of total war, for the sole benefit of an American air-atomic strategy which would be willing to see them destroyed when the Russians retaliate massively against U.S. bases; and meanwhile receive nothing important in the way of present security returns, since Russia does not threaten them individually in the absence of total war. This is the pattern of persuasion which underlies the Soviet policy of neutralization. It is predicated on a set of Soviet assumptions which may be formulated as follows: (1) a situation in which there seems little present danger of conventional armed aggression from Russia is one in which exposed middle nations would be encouraged to think of military non-commitment as a possible course; (2) a situation in which total war seems to threaten their utter annihilation is one in which this possible course might also seem -- in increasing degree -- the prudent course to take.

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b. The Dangers Posed

Disregarding for the moment the issue of the relative effectiveness of the Soviet policy of neutralization, let us consider just what dangers it poses. It is plain from what has already been said that the policy is directed against U.S. interests. While the points d'appuis are the middle countries, the aim is to improve the Soviet military-political position in the world vis-à-vis Russia's principal world rival, the United States, by encroaching politically upon what was, during the Stalinist cold war, the America-oriented sphere.

Soviet neutralization of all or a large part of the system of collective defenses would seriously compromise the security position of the United States as well as other countries friendly to the United States. The serious consequences would include: (1) a worsening of the U.S. military position vis-à-vis Russia in event of war between the two; (2) a weakening of the deterrence position, possibly increasing by some undeterminable degree the danger of general war; and (3) a weakening of the secondary security benefits which the military security system provides for exposed middle countries, resulting in some possible impairment of U.S. security to the extent that it depends upon the continued security of societies now enjoying protection through a relationship to the system of collective defense.

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Further, there is the possible danger of a chain reaction in the spread of neutralism (military non-alignment) once the trend gets fairly started. That is, each instance of national resignation of responsibilities in collective defense might reinforce tendencies elsewhere to follow suit. Russia, be it noted, is in a position to reward the de-aligned country with the benefits not only of peace but also of improved relations in the economic and other fields, and at the same time subtly to remind other countries in the vicinity of the newly neutralized country that their own position remains more exposed than ever in event of general war. Thus, the combination of pressures involved in the pattern of persuasion as outlined above may grow more potent as persuasion begins to pay off -- if it does. The neutralization of Austria at Soviet initiative belongs, by the way, in this very context of political analysis. Far from signifying a "retreat" (as some observers wrongly inferred when it came), it signified an attempted major advance toward getting the new policy of neutralization under momentum. Austria was the big initial "gimmick" with which Moscow went into the diplomatic business of neutralizing collective defenses in the non-Soviet sphere.

Three broad reasons were listed above for considering that the Soviet policy of neutralization poses a serious

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possible danger to the United States. Two of the three relate to military factors. In assessing the situation from this standpoint, it must, of course, be remembered that the military aspect undergoes change as further development takes place in some fields, most notably long-range missiles. As a result of such development, the existing system of collective defenses may at some point begin to lose some of its present function from the viewpoint of planning for war and planning for deterrence. Hence a time factor enters into the assessment of the dangers of neutralization.* Beyond this, however, it must also be remembered that this is a multi-purpose Soviet policy, and not exclusively concerned with military factors. It also served political functions, as mentioned above. Further, the relative importance of these different functions

* The Soviet leaders, for understandable reasons of their own, have an interest in suggesting to foreign countries that the U.S. bases may already be in the process of becoming militarily anachronistic. Thus, Marshal Zhukov said in a speech in May, 1957: "As regards the military bases situated around the Soviet Union and people's democracies, on which the political and military leaders of the capitalist camp pin big hopes, these bases -- now that ballistic and other rockets of great power, speed and accuracy have appeared -- have already lost the significance they once had" (Pravda, May 29, 1957). The same theme has been accentuated in more recent utterances by Khrushchev and others.

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of the policy may be obscured by Soviet official pronouncements, which put the Soviet case against the bases exclusively in terms of legitimate Soviet concern for physical security. It is politically advantageous for the Russians to put the case in these terms. Further, it would be distinctly disadvantageous politically for them to assert or even hint in any way that their interest in disaligning middle countries has anything to do with a political goal related to but separate from the purely military situation. Nevertheless, the policy is a multi-purpose affair, and we should therefore expect the Soviet Government to persist in it even if, with the passage of more time, the purely military significance of the collective defense system should decline.

It follows from what has been said that any far-reaching trend of Soviet-induced neutralization of our collective defenses presents a clear and serious danger to the United States. But this does not imply that any instance of neutralization is a danger or, in other words, that U.S. security demands the preservation of the entire existing status quo in collective defense, the continued intactness at every point of the whole world structure of military security vis-à-vis Russia. On the contrary, it may be that a certain streamlining of the system of defenses would in no way weaken it for the performance

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of its essential functions in the security field in the present set of circumstances, and that on this criterion not every area now aligned with our military system need remain so. It might even be that conscious removal of some link which was both weak and non-essential would make the system itself stronger by reducing the political strain on it. But whether or not this would present a danger to the United States might depend in large measure on whether the change occurred through initiative from the West or initiative from the East. If it came about as a part payoff on the Soviet policy of neutralization, it might prove much more dangerous to the rest of the security structure -- for reasons already indicated above -- than it would be if the West itself had taken the initiative in making an adjustment.

c. How Real Are the Dangers?

The policy of neutralization germinated slowly during the first year and a half or so after Stalin's death. In early 1955 it began to unfold swiftly and seriously, first with the Austrian gambit and then a whole sequence of further

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Soviet moves associated with that one.* By mid-1956, the prospects were beginning to look promising from Moscow's viewpoint, the most notable success being Iceland's tentative decision to request a U.S. withdrawal. Then came the stormy autumn of 1956 and Russia's military suppression of revolutionary Hungary. This was a shattering setback for the policy of neutralization.

That policy, as stressed, relies on a pattern of persuasion in which one essential element is the demonstration by Moscow of its willingness to coexist in peace and friendship with small neutral countries in its vicinity, not to molest them. Austria had been exhibited as a case in point. But when Hungary in the person of its Communist premier Nagy asked to be a small country enjoying the blessings of neutrality, Moscow replied with military invasion and the reimposition of a Gauleiter regime. Understandably, the whole Soviet venture in the promotion of neutralism for non-Soviet countries suffered as a consequence of this spectacle. It exposed a

* These are analyzed in the writer's RM-1949, "The Changing Pattern of Soviet Foreign Policy." Of special importance was the series of moves subsumed there under the heading of "Operation Withdrawal," and the creation of the Warsaw Treaty system as a device for shifting the Soviet military posture in Eastern Europe to a defensive "new look."

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deep-lying duplicity in the post-Stalinist policy structure, based as it is on a modified imperialism for the Soviet bloc and, on the other hand, new ways in Soviet dealings with the outside world. The Soviet leadership, in other words, is in something of the position of a syndicate of racketeers who, having a firm monopoly of the underworld, set themselves up in a more or less legitimate business on the outside and then find, much to their inconvenience, that they must revert to gangster methods to quell certain underworld forces who would like to be dealt with on the up-and-up too. Russia will be continually plagued in the effort to conduct a legitimate diplomatic business with the outside world so long as it insists on preserving its established imperial structure.

Despite all this, however, the dangers of neutralization should not be dismissed as unreal. It is far too early to say that no harm is likely to result for the structure of military security from continuing future Soviet efforts at neutralization. Even if many weaker independent countries continue in differing degree to distrust Soviet Russia, there is a rather cogent and potentially corrosive logic in the two-pronged pattern of Soviet persuasion delineated above. Hence the question arises: Under what possible conditions might the dangers inherent in the Soviet policy of neutralization

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become considerably more real than they are today? One condition would be that Soviet Russia persists in the pattern of persuasion. This it is doing, and with the advent of the sputniks and ICBM, the Soviet argument to the middle countries has grown more "persuasive" than before. Another would be that it avoids a recrudescence of the type of situation exemplified in Hungary. This is quite possible.

A third potentially critical condition has to do not with what Russia does but with what the West and especially America do or fail to do. As has been pointed out, the Soviet policy is designed to persuade the middle countries that the America-backed military security system no longer offers them security on a basis of real mutuality. They, it is argued by word and deed, gain nothing important in time of peace, for Russia does not threaten them individually with any form of aggression, while, on the other hand, they stand to lose their very national existence, and unnecessarily, in event of general war between East and West. The conclusion follows that the middle countries reap only insecurity from this system, while America gains positions for potential activating of an air-atomic strategy of total war against Russia. This, incidentally, probably explains in large part why the official Soviet line (as restated, for example, by Khrushchev in his interview on

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"Face the Nation") holds that America is actively planning to make war on Russia. To admit otherwise would be to relax the pressure behind this pattern of persuasion of the middle countries to resign their responsibilities in the collective defense.

The third condition of potential Soviet success in neutralization -- "success" meaning various things ranging from a slackening of effort in the collective defense system to actual military disalignment in the extreme and no doubt marginal case -- would be the failure of the United States and its principal allies in counter-persuasion. By a failure in counter-persuasion is meant the failure to do what is necessary in order to persuade the middle countries that the system of collective defense, or a modification of it, does still provide security on a basis of mutuality and rationality. Doing "what is necessary" essentially means, in turn, evolving and announcing a good military strategy. To suggest what such a strategy might be is beyond the scope of this study. However, this at least may be said: Whatever a good strategy may be, it is not one which simply assures the destruction of the enemy country in a global holocaust; it is not, in short, a strategy of meaningless victory. A good strategy may be defined as one which not only promises to make the outbreak

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of war in various forms least likely, but also to maximize, in event of war, the possibilities of prosecuting it successfully under conditions of maximum protection of the territories and vital interests of oneself and one's allies and also, to the greatest feasible extent, of the peoples on the other side.

2. The Acquisition of Excessive Soviet Influence

a. The Policy Pattern

The next major topic to be considered under the dangers of Soviet political encroachment is the acquisition of excessive Soviet influence in foreign countries outside the existing Soviet empire.

The great Eurasian "peace zone" envisaged by the contemporary Soviet foreign policy would be, as has been said, a sphere of preponderant Soviet influence. Here again it is essential to recognize that we are dealing with a different policy configuration from the Stalinist, this difference being conditioned by a change of Soviet motivation growing out of Stalin's death. The Stalinist policy of cold war expressed a dynamism of Soviet control; the post-Stalinist policy of competitive coexistence expresses a dynamism of Soviet influence. The one aimed primarily to create more and more new Soviet satellites; the other aims primarily to bring more and more foreign countries under varying degrees of Soviet influence.

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The reason why Stalin's death occasioned this change of operative motivation is that the felt need for absolute control died with him.

First, a few words about the general idea of "influence," which is a broad and elastic term. A relationship of influence in international politics differs in quality from the kind of relationship in which one government is a satellite or agent or governmental front organization of the other, as the Soviet satellite regimes were in Stalin's time and more or less remain in the majority of cases even now. In the relationship of influence, the influenced state remains a real political entity in its own right. However, within this framework, it is, in varying manner and degree, dependent upon the influencing state; and in the extreme case becomes what is called a "dependency" of the latter.

But the relationship of influence can obtain without the influenced state becoming in the full sense a dependency of the other. At a minimum, for example, the influenced state will simply be in a position of endeavoring not to offend the influencing power by any steps in foreign policy, or, beyond this, to please the latter whenever possible within certain limits. This would describe the relationship of contemporary Finland to Soviet Russia. Farther along the

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influence spectrum, the influenced state may be in the position of actively co-operating with the international policies of the influencing one and emulating some of its internal policies. An example of this might be the relationship of the Nasser regime in Egypt at certain periods to Soviet Russia. And as this latter example attests, it is not to be assumed that the relationship of influence is one in which the influenced state must necessarily participate reluctantly, faute de mieux, as Finland does in its relationship with Russia.

The change of motivation from the quest for total control to the quest for influence brings with it a whole cascade of change in the range and types and means of action in Soviet foreign policy. In order to create satellite regimes, it is ordinarily necessary to overthrow existing governments by one means or another. In order to gain influence, on the other hand, you enter into relations with them. This explains the great shift toward government-to-government relations in post-Stalin foreign policy, spearheaded by the continuing drive for "normalization." Normalization, in turn, opens up a very wide field for further Soviet action to build influence in foreign countries. The means of potential influence-building are very diverse: political contacts at top levels,

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the regularization of conventional diplomatic relations, the negotiation of outstanding government-to-government issues (frontier rectifications, financial claims, repatriation of citizens, etc.), the cultivation of contacts at various official and semi-official levels, the encouragement of tourism, increases of trade, economic assistance projects, export of capital and technicians, cultural and scientific exchange, arms exports, and so on. Another important field for influence-building is the relations between political parties, and here, for example, is the context of the new Soviet drive to repair relations between Communist and Socialist parties.

The quest for Soviet influence and the Soviet policy of neutralization are interactive and mutually reinforcing. That is, the more Soviet influence develops in foreign countries, the more predisposed they may be to disalign themselves from the Western system of collective military defenses. For example, Soviet trade with Iceland (through import of its fish products) shot up sharply during the two years preceding the Icelandic parliament's decision to request a U.S. withdrawal. On the other hand, the neutralization of a given foreign country, partial or complete, is calculated to help clear the ground for the Soviet quest to build influence there.

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Neutralization promotes influence, and influence promotes neutralization. This is why it has been stressed above that the Soviet policy of neutralization must not be interpreted as narrowly military in its motivation. By the same token, however, the quest for influence must not be interpreted as exclusively political; military considerations are very much present in it too. The future Eurasian "peace zone" is often projected by Moscow's spokesmen in the image of a new "security system" which would replace "existing military blocs." More accurately, there would be two "security systems," one for Europe and the other for Asia. Under the Soviet idea of an "all-European security system," the NATO and Warsaw alliances would be dissolved, giving way to a Europe in which all states would be aligned together in a general non-aggression pact, i.e., a Europe in which Russia would be the dominant military power. Europe would have become a Soviet protectorate. The "Asian security system" would follow the same pattern save that here the dominant military power would be the Sino-Soviet partnership. Manifestly, the idea is to convert Europe and Asia into a Soviet security system. For it would be a system of dependence of European and Asian countries upon Russia as the one military superpower in their midst.

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The new Soviet quest for influence illustrates the contention that contemporary Soviet foreign policy does not respect the existing political status quo in the world, that it would change things, reshape the political environment. Moscow does not resign itself to the great Eurasian territories beyond the present Soviet empire remaining predominantly an America-oriented sphere of the world. It would make of them instead, a broadly Russia-oriented sphere. They would become, in short, militarily, politically, economically, culturally and ideologically more and more oriented toward Soviet Russia. Perhaps it would be roughly accurate to say that this ambitious policy visualizes for the future a "fellow-traveling" Eurasia, a collection of diverse countries which, each at its own pace and in its own manner, are going Soviet Russia's way. This conception does not necessarily imply any definite "time-table" of arrival at political destinations.

The image of the future Eurasian zone of preponderant Soviet influence unquestionably differentiates between the established and stable democracies of Western Europe, on the one hand, and the countries of the Arab-Afro-Asian world on the other, many of which are in transition from former colonialism and economic backwardness to modern nationhood. The Soviet policy of influence can hardly hope, at best, to

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make much more of Western Europe than a collection of Finlands. Its potentialities in Asia, Africa and the Middle East are much greater. To countries in the throes of change Russia can advertise itself as a nation which was once in their position but pulled itself up in a short space of years to the rank of a great and powerful modern state. It can offer Russia's path after the October Revolution as one which other "backward" countries might want to follow. Further, the dictatorial nature of the Soviet regime need not always be a foreign-policy liability in relations with those countries in which the drive to modernize is strong and democratic processes are still relatively weak.* Moreover, Russia has a much greater potential for ideological rapprochement with Asian socialism than with Western social democracy, which has long been predominantly anti-Soviet in thought and sentiment.

* A case in point may be the present situation in Indonesia where President Sukarno has espoused a concept of "guided democracy." In a speech at Madiun, Sukarno said: "The National Council...is a midway form of government between the Western system and the Communist system that we can adopt to the original nature of our own personality, namely, gotong rojog (mutual assistance." In reporting this speech, the New York Times (June 20, 1957, p. 4) noted, significantly, that Sukarno "flew to Madiun in his Russian Ilyushin transport plane, a gift from Soviet leaders when he visited the Soviet Union last year." Here is a good example of the new Soviet expansionism of influence in action.

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A final important point is that the internal political pattern in a number of under-developed countries, especially Arab countries, is one of contention between different political forces with rival claims for national leadership. One of these forces might be described as the traditional ruling element; the other as the radical intelligentsia, which is predominantly leftist in inclination but not Communist. In such situations, the Soviet dynamism of influence does not always place the stress on government-to-government relations. It does so if the radical intelligentsia has already come into the political ascendancy in the given country, but not necessarily if the traditional ruling element is still ascendant. In other words, the Soviet politics of influence generally bank on the radical intelligentsia rather than the traditional ruling element in these countries. Here it is well to recall an historical consideration, namely, that there is a certain broad sameness of pattern as between those situations and the one which prevailed in nineteenth-century Russia, where a traditional ruling element was opposed by a radical intelligentsia, one section of which came into power in October, 1917. The intelligentsia may play a much bigger and more politically potent role in economically underdeveloped countries than elsewhere, and the Soviet politics of influence speculate heavily on this fact.

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A brief further word on Moscow's working image of the future European zone of preponderant Soviet influence. As already suggested, the policy of influence differentiates between what can be done in Europe and what can be done in the Arab-Afro-Asian world. For the European democracies, "Finlandization" or "Austrianization" represents the probable height of Moscow's present ambitions. The European sphere of influence, if achieved, would consist very largely (apart from Soviet-bloc countries) of states which remain, as Finland does, internally free although Russia-oriented in external policy. They would accept Soviet Russia as the dominant power in Europe and a force not to be antagonized. The situation might be describable as a coordination of European national policies toward Russia. The basic political framework would be the Soviet-sponsored "all-European security system." Here it needs to be noted that in the further development of Soviet official thinking along this line in the recent period, there has appeared a trend which might be called "Soviet Europeanism." Moscow has bruited a number of proposals as supplements of the "all-European security system." One is the proposal for an "all-European" program for coordinated development of fuel and electric power resources. A third offers an "all-European" program for mutual economic and financial assistance. Meanwhile,

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Moscow continues to voice the most strenuous opposition to every scheme for European integration (Euratom, the common market, etc.) which is predicated on the existing partition of Europe and takes Western Europe as its working nucleus. The new "Soviet Europeanism," presupposing as it does a conception of Europe as a concert of separate national states under overall Russian aegis in the political, military and economic fields, reflects the policy of influence in its European variant.

Although the rise of the policy of influence marks a shift toward government-to-government relations in Soviet foreign policy, this does not mean that Soviet Russia has lost interest in the political fortunes of foreign Communist Parties or ceased to regard these as potential political assets of real importance. Far from being disregarded under the new policy, the foreign Communist Parties are being assimilated, in a sense, into the expansionism of Soviet influence. In the first place, total centralized control of the world Communist movement from Moscow has relaxed along with total centralized control within the Soviet empire and the Soviet state itself. This makes possible, to a certain extent and in certain countries, a degree of revitalization within the native Communist Party. Secondly, the new Soviet foreign policy, by shifting to the effort to cultivate close relations with many foreign

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governments rather than to overthrow them, tends to create a situation and atmosphere in which the native Communist Parties can break out of political isolation and bid actively for an influence role in the political life of their respective countries. Now that Russia strives to appear on their national horizons as a friendly foreign power, they no longer have to bear the stigma of functioning as agents of an unfriendly foreign power. On the contrary, they can bask in the reflected new respectability of their political patrons in Moscow. Thus, if Khrushchev and Bulganin show no visible interest in the Indian Communists on their travels through India, this does not mean that they really have lost interest in them or that the Communists suffer politically as a result. This is born out by the recent success of the local Communist Party in the Indian state of Kerala, where the Communists have come to power in a free election -- an unprecedented happening. The expansionism of Soviet influence stands to gain as a consequence of this, and the pattern may be repeated elsewhere.

b. The Dangers Posed

Disregarding for the moment the factual odds for or against the success of the Soviet policy of influence, what are its potential implications from the standpoint of America's interests in foreign policy? What are the stakes involved?

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Realization of the grandiose idea of transforming most or all of Eurasia along with much of Africa into a sphere of preponderant Soviet influence would very seriously endanger the security of the United States in both its aspects, primary and secondary. The dangers of neutralization, discussed earlier here, would be actualized, and the great new neutral belt in the world would be tending increasingly toward a Russia-oriented posture of neutrality; if not a part of the Soviet military system, it would at any rate function as part of the Soviet world security system. American democratic society -- its political processes, economy and culture -- would find itself in a much less friendly world milieu than at present. In general, the prospects for this form of society would be considerably diminished. On the other hand, the security of the chief unfriendly power, Soviet Russia, would be greatly enhanced. The structure of empire, as well as that of internal Soviet rule in Russia, would be more secure once the Sovietized heartland was surrounded with nations under various degrees of Soviet influence -- a cordons sanitaire in reverse.

That American security would be seriously endangered by full-scale realization of the Soviet policy hardly needs emphasizing. But what if we do not presuppose full-scale

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realization? A more likely assumption, after all, is that the Soviet expansionism of influence will achieve only some partial success in the period immediately ahead. How would the dangers be assessed on this assumption?

In the first place, there is no ground for taking the view that any Soviet influence whatever in countries of the sphere of the world friendly to America, no matter how small in extent, is a danger to them and us. Like arsenic, Soviet influence in small amounts needs not be poisonous in effect and might even -- conceivably -- have some beneficial consequences. The prerequisite of the Soviet quest for influence in foreign countries is, as has been pointed out, the policy of normalization -- and normalization implies Soviet acceptance of the existence of independent foreign governments. Within this framework, influence is sought by means of the conventional devices of great-power foreign policy, especially economic devices. Up to a point, no danger need necessarily be posed either to the given middle country or, indirectly, to the United States. For example, the security of the present non-Communist system in India is not likely to be adversely affected by the construction of a steel mill under Soviet auspices, or by Soviet orders which keep the depressed cottage shoe-making industry of Agra on its feet, or by the appearance

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of Soviet technicians in modest numbers in India. On the contrary, free India may become somewhat more secure as a consequence of these things. Nor does this exhaust the potentially beneficial consequences. For example, it is only when Russia acquires a foothold of influence in a foreign country that it runs the risk of a misstep. Briefly, as soon as the Russians acquire means of exerting influence over the policies of an independent foreign government, they are going to be powerfully tempted to do so, e.g., by threatening to cut off advantageous economic arrangements which have been set up on the base of normalization if the government fails to do thus and so. But this in turn may have the unexpected effect of immunizing the foreign government against the Soviet expansionism of influence -- and doing so in a much more effective way than any preventive propaganda from well meaning friends across the ocean could have done. The behavior of Russian emissaries dispatched to foreign countries under the policy of influence may also have an immunizing effect, may open foreign eyes to Soviet Russian realities in a way which hardly would happen if Soviet isolation from the external world continued. These reflections expose a possible dilemma at the heart of the new Soviet expansionism of influence: it will be effective only so long as it remains within the

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bounds of the Soviet attempt to cultivate co-operative relations on a conventional plane, but will boomerang just as soon as Moscow reaches for a political pay-off, presses the potential political advantages to be derived from the new pattern of relations. This needs to be balanced by a realization that Moscow may be shrewd enough in places to permit the political interest on its new policy of influence to accrue slowly and quietly in the bank, not attempting to "cash in" until circumstances warrant a strong expectation of success.

Further, one must take account of a potential boomerang effect upon Soviet policy itself. Insofar as small amounts of Soviet influence have an immunizing effect on foreign governments, the new Soviet ardor for foreign policy may cool by a number of degrees. And even in less unfavorable circumstances, the practical problems and frustrations attendant upon the effort to play a great-power part in the affairs of independent foreign nations may have a sobering effect in Moscow. In addition, pursuit of a policy of influence sets up certain possibilities that might not otherwise exist for an unwanted counter-influence on Soviet minds. The Soviet Government cannot send Russian engineers to foreign countries outside the Soviet bloc, or exchange students with them, without running a risk that the Russians will be more influenced than

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influencing with respect to political attitudes. Finally, Soviet distribution of economic largesse abroad while the Russian people go on living for the most part in the dreariest poverty is calculated to antagonize wide sections of Russian domestic opinion, with effects which may be politically significant even though not yet evident.*

Thus, there is no ground for America to take the view that any increment of Soviet influence in independent foreign countries is an unmitigated danger. From the U.S. standpoint, what is to be feared is Soviet acquisition of excessive influence. It is not an easy matter to determine the point at which Soviet influence becomes, from our point of view as well as that of the middle country concerned, "excessive." It is not something expressible in quantitative terms,** nor is the point likely

* The fact that the Soviet popular press does not talk much about the aid program for foreign countries does not mean that Russian citizens are in the dark about it. Russians know much more than their press tells them.

** It is interesting, however, to note that, according to some reports, Tito has on one occasion warned Nasser that it is unwise for any small country to tie up more than, or as much as, 25 per cent of its foreign trade with Russia. If the report is well founded, then it would appear that Tito views Soviet influence as excessive when, on the economic side, a quarter or more of a small country's commerce is with Russia.

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to be uniform for all foreign countries. Much, for example, will depend upon the stability of the existing social-political setup and economy. Broadly speaking, however, Soviet influence in a foreign country becomes excessive at the point where that country tends to grow Russia-oriented in its external and internal policies. By "Russia-oriented" is meant biased in favor of Soviet Russia. In the military field, for example, it would mean pursuing a policy of pro-Soviet neutrality. In foreign policy generally, it would mean permitting Russia to have a determining say -- or veto -- in the positions which the given country adopts on international issues (e.g., opposing U.N. condemnation of Russia's action in Hungary because any other course would offend Moscow). In international economic relations, it would mean a tendency to tie up an unhealthy amount of the country's commerce, capital imports, etc., with Russia. These are various criteria which might be employed in determining the point at which Soviet influence becomes excessive. A still more comprehensive criterion would be that Soviet influence grows excessive whenever and wherever it significantly weighs the scales toward success for the scheme of transforming Eurasia into a sphere of preponderant Soviet influence. For the United States, excessive Soviet influence so defined is a definite danger. It threatens to make the world less friendly, and therefore less secure.

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72.c. How Real Are the Dangers?

In approaching this question, it may be useful to set the situation in historical perspective. The Soviet policy of influence began, in the period from 1954 to 1956, by scoring some rather impressive initial successes, particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. But the performance was deceptive in its way. For it began with a backlog of possibility for which Stalin was largely responsible. He had, as it were, set up the situation for his successors. It was his cold war which made the international atmosphere so chilly for Moscow and froze possibilities for acquiring Soviet influence abroad. Hence the most potent resource of the post-Stalin foreign policy was, quite simply, the thaw, the ability to create a détente. And the alacrity of the positive response in many capitals probably reflected most of all a feeling of enormous relief over the détente rather than any strong desire to reorient policy toward Russia.

But this was a situation of diminishing returns for the Russians; they could call off the Stalinist cold war only once. Beyond the détente, real performance would be the major test. Performance covers a great many things. How hard is Soviet currency? How much money would the Russians be prepared to lend? On what terms? How much capital could and would they

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export? How much trade were they really prepared to engage in, and how dependably? Would there be invisible political strings attached, which Moscow soon would start to tug? What manner of men were these Russians, of whom so very little has concretely been known? What kind of relations were they going to develop now with the countries of their own sphere? A hundred questions of this kind enter into the performance equation. And when we reflect on the answers to some of them which international experience in the post-Stalin period has afforded, the danger of Soviet acquisition of excessive foreign influence may not appear so great.

Attention has already been called to the essential inconsistency in the Soviet position as between the external pursuit of the politics of influence and maintenance of an imperial system in the relations with other countries of the Soviet sphere. This is a heavy liability for the expansionism of Soviet influence. Soviet recognition of this was undoubtedly one of the reasons for efforts undertaken from 1954 on to modify intra-bloc relations in minor ways, as, for example, by dissolving most of the "mixed companies." The needs of the new Soviet foreign policy called for a modicum of de-satellization. Ironically, this culminated in the Hungarian national uprising. The suppression of this was a very great

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blow to the expansionism of influence, as to the policy of neutralization.

These considerations are reassuring ones from the Western point of view. But it would not be justified in concluding that the danger of excessive Soviet influence in foreign countries is unreal, or that it will not become real in the coming years. Any such optimism on the part of America would be unwarranted. For one thing, various elements in the performance equation might develop in the Soviet favor, especially in the economic field. Further, the degree of success which the Soviet policy of influence has scored in the Arab world, and especially in Egypt and Syria, attests to the reality of the danger. And this also helps to throw light on an important question: Under what type of conditions does the danger of Soviet acquisition of excessive influence become a real one? A big part of the answer is: under conditions such as those existing in a number of Arab countries, where traditionalism is crumbling, the social structure is unstable, and one important political force is a radical intelligentsia imbued with a malignant anti-Western nationalism. In such situations, the crucial determinant of Soviet success in acquiring excessive influence is this very local political force, or elements of it. The Russians merely play the part of

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opportunistic beneficiaries, offering arms, economic assistance, and anti-American slogans. But the anti-Western intelligentsia is itself the fulcrum of Soviet influence, a force actively gravitating toward Moscow. As an American has reported from Damascus: "'The Russians don't have to ask us to do anything,' says a leader of one of the anti-Communist parties. 'We will do anything we think they might want, we are so grateful.'"* Or as the New York Times says (June 20, 1957) of Akram Hourani, leader of the Arab Socialist Renaissance party: "Mr. Hourani, like Colonel Serraj, is not a Red, but a fanatical nationalist who believes Soviet policy suits Syria's interests." It is this hate-imbued nationalism that mainly explains the success the Soviet expansionism of influence has had in the Middle East.

3. The Aggrandizement of the Soviet Bloc

a. The Policy Pattern

We now come to the class of danger which remains uppermost in a great many minds when Russia is under consideration: the danger of further aggrandizement of Soviet Russia,

* Claire Sterling, "Syria: Communism, Nasserism, and a Man Named Serraj," The Reporter, June 27, 1957, p. 16.

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or territorial expansion of the Soviet bloc. What is feared is the appearance of new "people's democracies" in the world, particularly, of course, in countries situated in proximity to the Soviet Union.

As we know, a "people's democracy" does not typically spring into being spontaneously under pressure of popular demand; the peoples, as a rule, prefer just democracy. The aggrandizement of Soviet Russia has taken place, typically, through active if in some instances more or less veiled Soviet intervention to this end, involving aggression of one kind or another. That is, the Soviet Union has acted to suppress political forces standing in the way of the creation of a Soviet satellite regime. Yugoslavia and China are the two marginal cases, in which internal convulsions took place in conditions growing out of World War II; in both instances, however, Soviet action played an important part in the outcome. Summing up, the question whether new "people's democracies" will appear in the world is, to a very great degree, a question of what Russia is going to attempt to do, a question of Soviet foreign policy. How can the policy be characterized from this point of view? Very briefly, the situation appears to be as follows: it is not an operative aim of contemporary Soviet foreign policy to create new

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"people's democracies" in the world. More specifically, the policy is one of not aggressing against non- "people's-democratic" regimes in order to supplant them with "people's-democratic" ones.*

Thus, contemporary Soviet foreign policy operates within a certain limitation: No active effort by generally aggressive means to establish new "people's democracies." But now we come to the "other hand." For this limitation does not exclude an interest on the part of Soviet foreign policy in the emergence of new "people's democracies." For example, it leaves it open to Soviet foreign policy to work by conventional and/or non-conventional means to promote conditions in this or that country which, in Moscow's view, are best calculated to lead to further internal development in the direction of a "people's democracy." Nor does it exclude, in the marginal case, non-

* The term "aggression" is used here in a broad sense. Its meaning is not confined to situations involving the use, in one form or another, of armed violence. The sense in which I use it is one which would lead us, for example, to class the Soviet action in February, 1948, in Czechoslovakia as aggression. Other examples would be Soviet or Soviet-engineered actions in Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria in 1944-47 to suppress political forces opposed to satellization. Aggression in this broad connotation embraces active Soviet moves against regimes or political forces standing in the way of the establishment of a "people's democracy." It embraces what has been called "non-overt aggression."

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aggressive Soviet effort even in the contemporary period to "help along" a situation which might have such an outcome. The limitation would perhaps be most accurately describable in these terms: Nothing shall be done which would arouse the thought or, at any rate, enable it to be said persuasively that the Soviet Union's actions were directly and critically responsible for the appearance of the new "people's democratic regime" in country X.

This is a self-imposed limitation within the frame of reference of contemporary Soviet foreign policy. How the limitation grows out of the structure of policy as delineated in the foregoing pages is not hard to see. It would be incompatible with serious Soviet pursuit of the two great aims already discussed, neutralization of our collective defenses and the expansion of Soviet influence through Eurasia, to pursue at the same time the aim of creating new "people's democracies" by overtly or covertly aggressive means. The whole experience of the Stalinist cold war teaches the successors that satellite-building on the classical (aggressive) pattern makes the middle countries feel more dependent upon the West and America for their protection, more inclined to enter alliances which are anti-Soviet in their character and orientation, and less and less amenable to Soviet

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influence-building by the conventional devices of foreign policy. Briefly, satellite-building and influence-building are contradictory lines of action. The contemporary policy structure being built around the idea of influence-building, satellite-building must be restrained within the limits above described.*

It is important to diagnose the operative limitation in relation to the new structure of Soviet foreign policy because there has been a mistaken tendency to see it in quite different terms. Many Westerners have grasped the fact that Soviet foreign policy is, in the respect here being considered, operating under certain self-imposed limitations. But the broad tendency has been to assume that this is so because of Soviet fear of nuclear war. No one would be inclined to suggest that the Soviet leaders are unafraid of nuclear war, or that their fears on this score do not influence their contemporary foreign policy in the general direction of restraint. This, however, is probably best seen as a factor which reinforces the self-

* Here it must be stressed again that the new Soviet policy structure, centering in influence-building, grows out of the subsiding of the psychological need for absolute control (i.e., for satellites) which actuated Stalin's policy. On this, cf. RM-1881, "The Psychological Factor on Soviet Foreign Policy."

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imposed limitation. It is not correct, in other words, to view the limitation as a simple product of fear of nuclear war, as a reaction to Western "deterrence" policy. Of course, it might be argued that the question of motivation is relatively unimportant: The fact is that the Russians are operating under this self-imposed limitation. What difference does it make why? In fact, it may make all the difference between a good Western policy and a bad Western foreign policy whether or not we act not only in awareness of how the Russians are acting but also in awareness of why.

For example, if U.S. foreign policy is predicated upon the assumption that announced Western readiness to reply with military force is crucially what keeps Moscow from further satellite-building at the present time, and if this is mistaken in the sense just suggested, then U.S. policy is likely to suffer from what might be called the over-evaluation of deterrence talk. To put it very crudely in terms of analogy, if I shake my fist regularly in my neighbor's face and say "Don't you dare attack me!", at a time when my neighbor, for other reasons of his own, has no intention of attacking me, my fist-shaking will have been largely superfluous and in fact may do me considerable harm, by example, by hurting my reputation for cool-headedness in the eyes of my friends; and

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this will be still more true if, when my neighbor refrains from attacking me, I conclude that this is because I have been shaking my fist at him so strenuously and then decide that I had better go on shaking it or even shake it still more strenuously.*

b. The Dangers Posed

As already indicated, even if satellite-building is not an operative aim of the contemporary Soviet foreign policy, this does not exclude the possibility that the policy will indirectly foster the appearance in the world of new "people's democracies." Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two different ways in which this might come about within the frame of present Soviet foreign policy: (1) The marginal case of Soviet influence-building; and (2) independent political success by foreign Communist parties.

By the marginal case of Soviet influence-building is meant a situation in which the Soviet quest for influence in a foreign state is so successful that conditions locally

* The statements made here are in no way meant to suggest that the West can afford to abandon its deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia. They merely raise the question of the political uses of the deterrence posture.

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ripen for the self-transformation of the given foreign regime into a regime of the "people's democratic" type. The most obvious present candidate for such a role is Syria. This would represent a new pattern of political development, a pattern which might be described as self-satellization. The force critically responsible for the outcome would not be the Soviet Union, which would merely be helping the process along by such means as political collaboration, arms supplies, propaganda activities, economic assistance, etc. But the local radical political grouping, which might not at first be Communist in complexion but rather extreme nationalist, would be the active fulcrum; that is why "self-satellization" is the only proper designation for this marginal case in which Soviet influence leads to the appearance of a new "people's democracy." A local Communist movement is a prerequisite for the culminating phase in the marginal case.

Alternatively, the appearance of a new "people's democracy" might result from independent Communist action and success in the political struggle in certain states. This pattern would differ from the one just analyzed in that the regime in power would not itself undergo transformation into some sort of Communist or quasi-Communist regime. On the contrary, it would be displaced by a government formed by

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the native Communist Party, as the National Congress provincial government in the Indian state of Kerala has been replaced very recently by a Communist Party provincial government. This broad pattern, let us note, is not only countenanced by contemporary Soviet foreign policy; it is specifically and publicly endorsed as a political line. The line was laid down at the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956. It is the line on a "peaceful" or "parliamentary" path to communism. The essence of the idea is that Communism should achieve political victory in certain countries, as distinguished from seizure of power by subversive-conspiratorial means and/or armed aggression. It is true that the Czechoslovak case was cited as an example of a political victory of a Communist Party, whereas in fact that was a clear case of Soviet aggression. But this should not lead us to conclude that the new line is meant as a pure hoax. It quite clearly states that the local Communist Party's aim would be to revolutionize the state. It disdains to conceal the aim of transformation of the society in which the Communist Party may come to power. It is, in this aspect, much closer to Marx's Communist Manifesto than the Party line through large parts of the Stalin period of Soviet history. It differs from the Manifesto only as regards the means of

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gaining power. Instead of a grandiose class war, there will take place, it supposes, a more or less conventional political struggle in the course of which the Communist Party will acquire a dominant role or something close to it in the political life of the country concerned. Pretty obviously, what this line has in mind is the pattern of political life prevailing in newly independent countries where no stable constitutional order has as yet evolved.

The birth of new "people's democracies" means further aggrandizement of the existing Soviet bloc, and this is a danger for the United States inasmuch as its comprehensive security interest cannot but suffer as a consequence.

Aggrandizement of the Soviet or Sino-Soviet bloc is a danger to the United States in the broadest sense simply because it signifies an expansion of the sphere of the world unfriendly to America. Among the more specific adverse consequences to U.S. security in both senses, one might mention (1) the loss of strategic positions, or, alternatively, the gain by Russia of strategic positions which it does not now have; (2) the contraction of the political, economic and cultural world zone which forms the medium for the present functioning of American society and, conversely, the expansion of Russia's world zone, signifying greater security for the Soviet type of society

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and less for the American type. Further, in the event that a single country goes "people's democratic" in any key area of the world, this would possibly lead to a political chain reaction of similar events elsewhere. For example, if influential India took this path, a number of countries in the orbit of Indian influence might do so likewise.

c. How Real is This Danger?

It follows from what has been said earlier in the present section that the question regarding the reality of the danger of the birth of new "people's democracies" is not primarily a question for the Russian specialist. If this danger materializes anywhere within the contemporary terms of reference of Soviet foreign policy, the decisive forces for the change will be forces native to the country in which it occurs. On a rough estimate, one might suggest that the danger is scarcely real at all in Europe or, more broadly, the zone of NATO. The danger of aggrandizement of the Soviet bloc through the process of influence-building carried to an extreme is at this time greatest in those countries of the Arab world where a radical intelligentsia infected with a malignant nationalism is on the political make. The danger of aggrandizement of the Soviet bloc through local conquest

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of power by Communist Parties fighting in the political arena is probably greatest in certain countries of free Asia, particularly Indonesia.

A further question arises: Under what conditions might the danger, if not now real, become so? Here it might be suggested that one such condition would be the collapse of the contemporary structure of Soviet foreign policy, i.e., the structure which is governed by the concept of Soviet influence-building. For in these circumstances, Russia might possibly decide to cut its losses by taking over in an aggressive way any areas in which it had gained a good foothold in the period of influence-building (e.g., Afghanistan).

4. The Moral-Political Isolation of America

a. The Policy Pattern

To promote the intensification and spread of anti-Westernism in general and anti-Americanism in particular is one of the principal concerns of contemporary Soviet foreign policy. The underlying purpose is to achieve the moral-political isolation of Russia's principal opponents, meaning, in particular, the core of the Atlantic community -- the United States, Britain and France -- and, within this circle, especially the United States as the keystone of the Western system of political relations.

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This policy is very closely interwoven with the two main strands of Soviet foreign policy already considered. The policy of neutralization aims to displace Western and chiefly American military power from the great Eurasian belt of countries which envelop the Soviet bloc to the east, south, southwest, west, and northwest. The expansionism of influence seeks to fill the resulting power vacuum with Soviet political influence, bringing key parts of the great middle zone into a relationship of greater and greater dependency upon the Soviet bloc. The policy of moral-political isolation serves, and in turn is served by, these two Soviet policies. It is the third major element in the structure of contemporary Soviet foreign policy conceived as a policy of political encroachment.

As in the cases of the former two policies, deliberate Soviet quiescence, meaning abstention from aggressive behavior against middle countries, is crucial to the policy pattern. The policy is based on Russia's not doing certain kinds of things, specifically many kinds of things that Stalinist Russia was doing in Stalin's last years. This tends to relieve fears of Russia and its intentions which, in turn, for long had the effect of holding divisive forces within the non-Soviet world more or less in check. It unleashes these forces to do the work which they would naturally tend to do.

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Insofar as they are forces of an anti-Western and/or anti-American bent (e.g., anti-colonial sentiment, Asian neutralism, Arab nationalism, anti-capitalism, pacifism, etc.), the Russians can and do calculate that, if left to themselves and discreetly encouraged, they may in certain circumstances work to Russia's advantage, assist it to achieve its aims in foreign policy.

The pursuit of this Soviet policy line is one of the principal functions of contemporary Soviet propaganda. Political action -- plus calculated inaction -- is brought into play to further the moral-political isolation of Russia's principal opponents: For example, action along various lines to identify Russia with the aspirations of Arab nationalism against the West and Israel; action to identify Russia with Asian neutralism in the person of India against Western-oriented Pakistan; action to identify Russia with all the anti-Western forces in the former colonial nations; actions of various kinds, primarily in the sphere of propaganda, to identify Russia with those forces of Asian and European opinion which aspire to international tranquility and an end of the cold war, isolating America as the one great power whose policy motto sometimes seems to be "The cold war forever"; action to identify Russia with the trend of world opinion

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which is horrified at the whole idea of nuclear war, isolating America in this respect; action to identify Russia in the U.N. with the increasingly influential Arab-Afro-Asian bloc against the West and America, eand so forth.

b. The Dangers Posed

From the standpoint of the philosophy of American foreign policy enunciated earlier, it is a basic concern of the United States to keep the international environment as friendly as possible; for a more friendly world is, other things equal, a more secure world for America and its kind of society. The Soviet policy pattern here under consideration strikes straight against this U.S. aim; it is dedicated to making the world a more hostile setting for America, a less friendly world. The danger posed is a serious one even though the contingencies involved may be of a rather intangible kind.

In the end, no asset of U.S. foreign policy is of greater importance than the moral capital of America in international affairs. By "moral capital" is meant the fact that America has traditionally been held by many other nations in trust, affection and respect. Since this happened long before anyone thought of organizing a U.S. government propaganda service, it is obviously not something built by propaganda. It was not

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created primarily by talking but by being -- being liberal, being charitable, being trustworthy, being tolerant, being free, being peaceful in aim and temper, being interesting as a country. Just as only America herself could ever have built up this moral capital, it is only America herself who could dissipate it. No unfriendly force, such as the Foreign Office in Moscow, could ever do this. But the unfriendly force could lend an effective helping hand in the process of dissipation if America herself were moving in that direction. In short, Russia cannot achieve the moral-political isolation of America; but it can exacerbate the situation if America is engaged in her own moral-political self-isolation.

5. The Preservation of the Soviet Empire

a. The Policy Pattern

The present analysis views the dangers latent in contemporary Soviet foreign policy as being, in the first instance, dangers of Soviet political encroachment on the interests of the non-Soviet world, of which the United States is the leading power. "Encroachment," as already mentioned, implies in its broadest sense the idea of trespassing, of going beyond natural or normal limits. A policy of encroachment is, then, typically an outgoing, forward, active foreign policy, one which concerns itself to alter the status quo.

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Now, however, we come to a vitally important element of contemporary Soviet foreign policy which is stand-pat and protective, concerned to maintain a status quo, to keep things as they are. This is the policy of preserving intact the existing Soviet empire, of keeping the international positions which the Soviet Union acquired during its Stalinist empire-building phase in the aftermath of World War II. Whatever changes it would make in the technique of imperial rule, in the mode of relationships with the countries absorbed into this empire, the post-Stalin regime, and especially under Khrushchev, has made perfectly plain its determination not to preside over the liquidation of the new Russian empire. The repression of the Hungarian revolution was only the most brutal act of dramatization of this.

Thus, we are confronted with a contrast between those aspects of Soviet foreign policy, reviewed above, in which it seeks to alter a present political status quo in the world, and the aspect now under consideration, in which it seeks to preserve a status quo. However, it is quite legitimate to consider this later aspect too under the general heading of Soviet encroachment. For these very international positions which the present policy would freeze and perpetuate are products of Soviet encroachment in the past. The present

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policy is one of stabilization of a system of Soviet encroachments on the external world which created, in sum, a satellite empire for Russia.

An empire, in the broadest sense, is a system of international relations in which one state maintains hegemony over others through force, or the threat of it, pressure of various kinds, and the attempt to keep the other countries of the system in a condition of dependency. The Soviet empire is such a system of international relations today despite the relaxation of some Stalinist controls. The post-Stalin regime has been very anxious to advertise this relaxation as a transformation of the nature of the imperial system. It has wanted to make it appear that the system has ceased being imperial in character. This, for example, was the intent of the phrase "commonwealth of socialist nations" which was used in the state document issued in Moscow during the troublous days of November, 1956. It is also the intent of the phrase "world system of socialist states," which was introduced into Soviet currency at the XX Party Congress in February, 1956. But contrary to the implication of these phrases, the system of intra-bloc relations remains broadly imperial in nature, and it is set Soviet policy to keep it that way. Further, the policy envisages no retreat from present territorial

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positions. The system is to continue to prevail over all territory where the writ of "people's democracy" runs today. This includes the East German "democratic republic," as well as North Korea and North Viet-Nam, three Soviet-dominated parts of partitioned countries. In the case of Gomulka's Poland, Moscow is prepared to admit a degree of autonomy within a frame of acceptance of Russia's imperial hegemony. However, this is a grudging concession, and it is not Soviet policy to encourage other Soviet dependencies in Eastern Europe to go Poland's way.

Among the many motives behind this Soviet policy, special emphasis must fall upon the security motive. The determination of the post-Stalin regime to preserve the existing empire is governed in large part by fear for Soviet security in event of its recession. Here the distinction between the two aspects of security must be recalled. Both aspects are involved in the Soviet motivation. The existing system of territorial positions abroad, which receives its military expression on the European side in the Warsaw treaty organization and on the Asian side in the Sino-Soviet military alliance, is a large and important forward protective zone from the Soviet military standpoint. It gives Russia, for the first time in the Soviet period, a buffer sphere in both

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Europe and Asia, and a dominating military position on the European continent. These facts must be taken into consideration in assessing the political position of the Soviet military professionals. They will tend to give their support to the political element which commits itself most seriously to the preservation of the existing Soviet military positions abroad.

But important as the motive of strategic security is in the calculations of the Soviet regime and its military leadership, the motive of political security probably comes first with the ruling circle. In the first place, not even a ground defense in great depth in Europe and Asia gives the Soviet Union true military security in the nuclear age. However, from the purely political point of view, preservation of the existing structure of empire is dictated by the most urgent considerations of survival of Soviet rule. The loss of the empire would be the loss of the Soviet ideology, and with that would go the regime's whole claim to continued existence inside Russia. It would be the loss of the ideology because it would show the Soviet type of state structure to be not the "progressive" next stage of human history but just one more anti-democratic form of political existence, which a people will get rid of when it has the chance. This, as the men in

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the Kremlin know, is death to their regime. The motive of political security of the Soviet structure at home dictates the preservation at all cost of the Soviet empire abroad.

The failure to distinguish between the two aspects of the security motive underlies much Western confusion in regard to Soviet policy. It has been supposed by many Western observers that if the West could only devise some way to guarantee Russia's military security in the wake of a Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the Kremlin would then have no great objection to such withdrawal. This is the outcome of attempting to analyze Soviet motivation in terms of "security" without distinguishing between its two aspects. The weakness of the argument is immediately visible when this distinction is drawn. For then we see that while Russian strategic security might conceivably be served, or at any rate not seriously undermined, by some arrangements alternative to the existing ones in Eastern Europe, the political security of the Soviet regime would be incompatible with the collapse of the imperial structure. However, since the Soviet leaders cannot for political reasons afford to admit this openly, they naturally tend to stress for public consumption the aspect of strategic security. This further reinforces the tendencies of Western analysis to go astray in the problem.

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96.b. Situation of the Soviet Empire

Contemporary Soviet foreign policy, as argued above, eschews further empire-building in favor of influence-building, but would protect the existing imperial status quo. The Soviet Government takes the position that the empire ("world system of socialist states") is a fait accompli of universal history which must be respected as such by all nations, and that any improvement of East-West relations take place, if it takes place at all, within the framework of recognition by all concerned of history's works. This was dramatized by the calculated refusal of Khrushchev and Bulganin to discuss the "satellite question" at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. It is reflected in the current (January, 1958) Soviet slogan of mutual recognition of the "status quo," what the slogan has in mind is primarily Western recognition of the Soviet status quo on Eastern Europe and Asia. The Soviet Government denies that there is anything contingent about the further status of its empire except insofar as the Soviet Union itself may take the initiative in easing certain imperial controls or otherwise altering the techniques of empire.

The security of the non-Soviet world was endangered in many ways by the formation of the Soviet empire, and while the empire may be a fait accompli the United States and the other

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Western powers have never been willing to reconcile themselves to the idea that this fait is forever accompli. It would, of course, be naive of Western or any other statesmen to suppose that a strong Russian state could ever, or should ever, be isolated from adjacent areas of the world. Eastern Europe, in particular, has long been regarded by many as a natural Russian "special-interest" area, in the affairs of which Russia has as much right to a role of leadership as the United States has, for example, in the Western hemisphere. But an empire consisting of imposed regimes resting on force is another matter. The formation of this empire (1) greatly increased the military strategic threat posed by Russia to the West, by establishing it in forward military positions; (2) placed free countries adjacent to the empire, such as Greece and Turkey for example, in jeopardy; (3) led to the political-territorial partition of Germany and Korea, transforming both countries into areas of international tension and potential world conflict; and (4) buttressed the political security of the Soviet regime in Russia in a number of important ways, inter alia by reinforcing the ideological myth on which, ultimately, the Soviet regime in Russia rests. These were the principal dangers which materialized as a result of the formation of the Soviet empire. And even though the empire-building phase

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of postwar Russian foreign policy may now have ceased, the existence of the empire remains inevitably a source of very deep concern to the West and the United States as well as to the satellite peoples themselves and other small countries in the vicinity of Russia and China.

At this time, moreover, the development of events has shown that the status of the Soviet empire is far more "contingent" than Moscow will officially admit, and this quite apart from what the United States or other Western powers may do about it. The condition of the empire is unstable, as even Moscow obliquely confesses when its Party journal Kommunist says that the watchword of present policy is "consolidation of socialist countries."* (Italics added.) Both at the level of the regimes in power in some countries of the empire and among the populations, there are at work today centrifugal forces. As Hungary and Poland have shown, when the forces above and the forces below come together, the consequences can be history-making. In Hungary, the result was a national insurrection, which Russia suppressed by force of arms. In Poland, it was the formation of a semi-autonomous Communist regime.

* Kommunist, No. 5, April, 1957, p. 15.

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Inasmuch as it may be within the capability of the United States to exert a certain influence over further developments along these various lines in the Soviet empire, not only by what it says and does but by what it refrains from saying and doing, it is important to see what they mean, that is, how they affect our foreign-policy interests as defined earlier in this study. Let us now try to evaluate the situation in these terms.

We may start with the simple fact that a condition of instability now infects the Soviet imperial system, and that centrifugal forces are at work within it. A new element of contingency has now entered into the situation. However, there are at present very close limitations on this contingency. It would be useless, for example, to bank on a cataclysmic collapse of the Soviet empire. For there are no indications that such a turn of events is within the realm of realistic possibility. By its action in Hungary, in particular, the Soviet regime served notice of its willingness and determination to use overwhelming force to prevent the revolutionary collapse of a satellite regime and the emergence of a free political system on its ruins, as would have happened in revolutionary Hungary. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet regime has both the capability and intention to

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suppress any future national insurrections in countries of the empire. Thus, the realistic prospect in the empire is not a prospect of collapse or cataclysm but rather of continued sub-surface instability in the system of relations and conceivably of further developments elsewhere along the Polish line. It is also possible that the Hungarian situation will repeat itself elsewhere, but if this should happen the outcome is not likely to differ from the outcome in Hungary. These, at any rate, are our assumptions.

c. Implications of the Situation in the Empire

The simple fact that a condition of instability infects the Soviet imperial system is highly consequential. The implications may conveniently be assessed under three headings, as follows.

(1) Implications for Soviet Empire-Building

The instability in the imperial system is not calculated to whet Muscovite appetite for further empire-building in the near future. In a period when "consolidation of socialist countries" -- meaning consolidation of the imperial system -- is the watchword of Soviet policy, when Russia is hard put to preserve the political status quo on a satisfactory basis, the Soviet leadership is unlikely to be seriously concerned to add to its imperial holdings. Further, some aspects

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of the situation are such that Moscow might have reason to fear that the addition of more new "people's democracies" might add to its own imperial political problems. Who could tell, for example, whether a "people's democratic" Italy under Togliatti might not tend to gravitate more in the direction of Belgrade and/or Warsaw, thus strengthening intra-imperial tendencies which give Moscow much concern?

Generalizing, we may say that imperial instability of the kind which has become evident inside the Soviet bloc is calculated, on the whole, to reinforce Soviet quiescence in the field of further empire-building. This in itself reduces the danger presented by Soviet Russia to Western and specifically to American security. It is a plus in the foreign-policy balance sheet.

However, it is extremely important not to overestimate this factor. The contemporary Soviet abandonment of an active empire-building policy (in favor of the influence-building policy) has to be seen and explained in the context of the whole structure of present post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy, as analyzed earlier. It should be pointed out in this connection that the shift of pattern in foreign policy took place rather well in advance of the recent manifestations of

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imperial instability. The latter, then, are correctly diagnosed as a factor which simply reinforces a definite pre-existing tendency of Soviet foreign policy to refrain from further empire-building on the pattern of the period of years immediately following World War II. It is important to stress this point because otherwise it might be inferred that we should foment further instability in the Soviet empire in order to dissuade Moscow from returning to the empire-building policy. Whether or not we should do this, it is probably not by any means a necessary precondition of restraining Russia from the quest for new satellites. The principle of economy of effort in foreign policy requires emphasis of this point.

(2) Implications for Soviet Foreign-Policy Successes

The present situation inside the Soviet empire is, for a number of reasons, not conducive to Soviet success in the pursuit of such major elements of foreign policy as those reviewed above under the heading of the policy of neutralization, the policy of influence, and the policy of moral-political isolation of America. In other words, the dangers latent in these policies are less real than they might otherwise be as a consequence of the conditions now prevailing in the Soviet empire.

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This point has already been touched upon above and need not be reconsidered now in detail. Briefly, the new Soviet foreign policy requires for its purposes of international persuasion that the Soviet empire be given a face toward the external world which would lend some credence to the phrase "commonwealth of socialist states." But recent events, and especially the Hungarian ones, dramatized as nothing had ever done before the essentially imperialistic nature of Soviet policy within the bloc. It is a question, moreover, whether in the long range the spectacle of Soviet-Polish relations may not be more adverse to the prospects for Soviet foreign policy than even the Hungarian events were. The latter exposed the Soviet state in the role of a brutal counter-revolutionary force in world affairs -- but only briefly, followed by the peace of political death in Hungary, whereas the present situation in Soviet-Polish relations show some sign of becoming a long-drawn-out drama of Russian imperial pretensions versus Polish claims to an autonomous position within the framework of acceptance of Russia as the leading country of the Eastern bloc. If so, these relations will continually remind independent countries of the difficulties and dangers which any small country is likely to encounter when it comes into the orbit of Soviet political power and

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influence. In short, the "immunizing" effect of Hungary was a great one-shot affair; the "immunizing" effect of the spectacle of Soviet-Polish relations may represent a lengthy series of "booster" shots.

Another significant effect of the new situation in the empire upon Soviet prospects in foreign policy has to do with the economic factor. The policy of influence relies heavily upon the weapon of Soviet foreign economic policy. Soviet capabilities in the field of capital export and Soviet control of economic relations within the Eastern bloc govern in significant measure the effectiveness of this weapon. Instability within the empire tends to deplete the economic resources which Russia has available for an active economic policy abroad in the non-Soviet world, and to impair the economic controls. For example, the Gomulka regime has taken steps to place its economic relations with Russia on a less exploitative basis than before, and has made certain claims on Russia growing out of past economic exploitation -- claims likely to have an educational effect on a number of countries (India, etc.). Peking has apparently taken advantage of imperial instability to reassert and press home still more strongly its own claims to a greater share of Soviet economic resources. The Hungarian revolution momentarily blotted out the economy of an important

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component of the Eastern European economic complex, with much resultant damage to Soviet economic plans and expectations. In all these ways the instability in the empire adversely affects the economic and political-economic sides of Soviet foreign policy, helping to neutralize the dangers implicit in this policy from our standpoint. Here again, incidentally, the effect of the Hungarian events was probably much less important over a longer period than the effect of the Polish developments. For Hungary's economy, once restored, will remain a satellite economy, whereas the economic consequences of Gomulka may go on plaguing Moscow for a long time to come.

One further important consideration has to do with Germany. The existing condition of instability in Eastern Europe deprives Soviet foreign policy of its flexibility so far as Germany is concerned. The Soviet policy-makers probably realize down deep that the partition of Germany cannot be a perpetual fact of international life. Some day, they know, it will have to come to an end, and it is very much in the interests of the new active Soviet foreign policy to bring this about at Soviet initiative and in a way which best conduces to Soviet interests -- as was done in Austria. In other words, while the contemporary Soviet foreign policy would preserve existing Soviet international positions intact, the German position

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constitutes in a certain sense an exception; it can be held indefinitely, but not perpetually. To relinquish it at the right time, in the right way, and with maximum benefit and minimum sacrifice for Soviet Russia, is an interest of Moscow's German policy.

But the spread of instability in Eastern Europe has rigidified the German policy. The Eastern German satellite is sort of stopper of the whole Eastern European imperial system. The structure of that system could scarcely survive the removal of the stopper -- at any rate at this time and in the immediate future. The flinty negativism of the present Soviet attitude on the reunification of Germany reflects this fact. And this, of course, is a big liability for Soviet foreign policy. Not only does it prevent Moscow from using the German position in a mobile diplomatic offensive. It keeps the Soviet Union in the damaging position of having to thwart indefinitely a settlement which is recognized universally as one of the chief prerequisites of a real and lasting international détente. The Soviet policies of neutralization, influence, and moral-political isolation of the West and America suffer very considerably as a result.

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(3) Military-Strategic Implications

The spread of instability in Russia's Eastern European empire has a whole series of significant military-strategic implications from our point of view. They are ambivalent in relation to the strategic security of America and the West, meaning that they have their favorable side and their unfavorable side as well.

Taking the unfavorable side first, it is clear that imperial instability creates a certain danger of hostilities which might not otherwise exist; and while these would be local hostilities within the Russian sphere, there can be no guarantee in the present state of the world that local hostilities anywhere will remain localized. The campaign of the Russian army against the revolutionary people of Hungary is not necessarily the last event of its kind that we are likely to witness in the coming few years. It was, after all, merely the most serious of a whole sequence of such events in the post-Stalin period, beginning with the June 17, 1953 uprising in Eastern Germany, various concentration-camp risings inside Russia, the riots in Georgia in early 1956, etc. However, the Hungarian episode does have a peculiar historical significance: it cast a die. It made a drastic reform of Soviet imperial policy much less likely than it might have been

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before. And it made it much more probable that any future Hungarian situation, whether in Hungary or another satellite, would be dealt with by the Soviet regime in the same general way as it dealt with Hungary. In short, having once shown itself in an openly counter-revolutionary role, it will be easier for the Soviet regime to do this again if events push it in that direction.

There is a further danger of Russian diversionary moves of a military or quasi-military nature. That is, at a time when world attention is fixed on a Soviet repressive policy in its empire, Moscow looks for opportunities to divert attention to other parts of the world. This pattern was visible in November, 1956, when in the midst of the Hungarian situation Moscow did everything possible to divert world attention to the Suez crisis, and in so doing went to the length of threatening to send Soviet volunteers to Egypt. This is the pattern, in part, of a diversionary move.

Looking at the situation now from the other point of view, it is evident that the Soviet offensive potential suffers as a consequence of instability in Eastern Europe. And this means that, militarily speaking, the Soviet Union is less dangerous to the security of the non-Soviet world in general and America in particular now than before. While it still remains in firm military control of the Eastern European areas as a whole, the

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situation in the empire very considerably weakens the Soviet strategic position for waging war against the West from the place d'armes in Eastern Europe. Stating this in terms of the broadest kind of a formula, we may say that the satellites have become, on the whole, a strategic liability to Russia rather than a strategic asset. The loyalty of their populations to the existing regimes, and the dependability of their armies in event of Russo-Western armed hostilities, are more than questionable, and the Russians, if they were in doubt about this before, cannot be any longer. The situation now is that we have in Eastern Europe not so many Russian divisions plus so many satellite divisions, but rather minus. For in event of Russo-Western armed hostilities, Russian divisions would have to be used to hold down the satellite nations and their armies.

It is questionable whether, from this point of view, Hungary or Poland represents the greater weakening of the Soviet strategic position. It might seem superficially that Hungary does. For there a regime has collapsed, Soviet military rule was instituted behind a satellite facade, and Russia is in the position of having to supervise the policing of a sullen repressed population. Nevertheless, it is probable that the Polish development represents a more significant

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weakening of the Soviet military position. For there a Communist regime of a country which is in popular temper both anti-Soviet and anti-Russian has achieved a measure of independence of action. And this country now has an army of approximately thirty divisions which is potentially an anti-Soviet fighting force. Hungary has nothing of the kind. It would probably not be stretching the truth too far to say that the largest conventional contribution to the military strength of NATO in event of a Soviet assault on the West is being made, today, by Poland.

B. The Dangers of Armed Violence

1. The Seriousness of these Dangers

It is scarcely necessary at this time to argue the view that military conflict situations in East-West relations, i.e., situations of armed violence involving clashes of interest if not of actual forces of Russia and the West, pose most serious dangers to our security as well as that of others. The worst thing that can befall a nation, after all, is to be destroyed. Situations of armed violence in the thermonuclear age carry the ultimate threat -- the threat of national extinction. The contingency of war rightly arouses far deeper concern now than ever before, for the stake involved in whether

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or not this contingency materializes may be national or human survival.

The effect of recent developments in military technology is to blur the traditionally important distinctions between "victory" and "defeat" in war. If, for example, one were speaking of the dangers of war in strictly traditional terms, it would be necessary to start by distinguishing between the danger of involvement in war and the danger of being defeated in war. While this distinction is not necessarily devoid of all meaning today, existing circumstances focus concern to an unprecedented degree on the contingency of international armed violence as such. For it is characteristic of international armed violence that it can spread and grow into a situation of total war, and in total war today the concept of victory has become all but meaningless.

Of course, it cannot be taken for granted that total war will develop out of any future situation of armed violence which directly or indirectly involves Russia and the West. It is possible for armed violence to take place without evolving into total war. Therefore, the concept of "success" and "failure" in war has not yet lost all meaning. Further, it cannot be said that any situation of armed violence in which the interests of East and West are pitted against each

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other must prove an unmitigated evil from our standpoint. Thus, the Soviet use of armed violence to suppress the Hungarian revolution had, as noted earlier, certain consequences which might be regarded as favorable from our point of view: It helped to neutralize dangers of Soviet political encroachment on the external world.

Despite these qualifications, however, the contingency of international armed violence, and particularly when the interests of East and West are involved, is to be regarded as a serious danger. For it is potentially the beginning of total war, and total war now means something verging on humanicide. The many lesser reasons for regarding international armed violence as a danger to U.S. security may be disregarded.

The question of the seriousness of the dangers of armed violence is not, therefore, one which need be considered at length in what follows. The primary concern here will be with the question of the reality of these dangers.

2. Soviet Policy and Armed Violence

An effort has been made in the foregoing pages to examine the dangers presented by contemporary Soviet Russia in terms of the structure of its foreign policy. The policy

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has been described as one of political encroachment. Various meanings or forms of "encroachment" have been touched upon. They involve Soviet attempts to alter the political status quo in the world. However, this policy of encroachment is not a policy of territorial aggrandizement by conquest. Therefore, it is not a policy which is calculated to produce Soviet initiative in the resort to international armed violence. In fact, the structure of this foreign policy is such as to militate strongly against such Soviet initiative. To put it bluntly, the policies of neutralization, influence, and moral-political isolation of America tend to inhibit Soviet initiative in the resort to armed violence.

This important conclusion needs to be qualified as follows:

(1) Contemporary Soviet foreign policy does not under all circumstances exclude initiative in the resort to international armed violence. As indicated earlier, for example, the Soviet regime will not hesitate to use military force to suppress a national insurrection on the Hungarian model in one of the satellite countries.

(2) If contemporary Soviet foreign policy tends to forego the deliberate use of armed force, since it does not now seek aims which require the use of armed force for their attainment, this does not mean that it foregoes the threat

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or show of armed force. On the contrary, much emphasis is placed on the display of Soviet military power and the theme of Machtpolitik is prominent in Soviet official pronouncements. These have their logical place in the structure of contemporary Soviet foreign policy; they serve certain ends which it pursues, such as the neutralization of middle countries.

(3) Although the dangers which this foreign policy poses are, on the whole, dangers of non-violent Soviet encroachment, these are not necessarily unrelated to certain dangers of armed violence. For example, Soviet political encroachment upon the Middle East was pursued, in part, through the policy of arms export to Egypt. This aroused intense Israeli fears and, in the end, precipitated the Israeli invasion of Egypt and the Suez crisis. Russia did not take the initiative in resorting to armed violence. But its policy of political encroachment was, indirectly, a vital precipitating cause of the outbreak of international armed violence at Suez in November, 1956.

(4) Even though Soviet Russia does not take the initiative in resorting to armed violence, it may become involved in such violence. What the structure of present Soviet policy specifically tends to inhibit is not Soviet participation in armed violence but Soviet initiative in resorting to it. Therefore, the present structure of Soviet foreign policy is

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not incompatible with a more or less militarist Soviet posture in world affairs. More precisely, the posture is not one of shrinking at the very idea of international armed violence or even at Soviet participation in it. The Soviet threat to dispatch "volunteers" to aid the embattled Nasser is a case in point.*

It is obvious, therefore, that the dangers of armed violence still exist as contingencies for American foreign policy toward Russia. The fact that contemporary Soviet foreign policy is a policy of political encroachment rather than territorial conquest, that it does not require the use of armed violence for achievement of its aims, and that the nature of these political aims indeed tends to inhibit Moscow from taking the initiative in resorting to armed violence -- all this does not mean that there is no longer any danger of armed violence to be considered.

* Those students of Soviet affairs who explain the relative military quiescence of Russia in the post-Stalin period exclusively or even primarily as a fear response to Western (U.S.) deterrence policy have a big problem here. To put it crudely, their theory explains too much. In accordance with it, the Russians ought to be much more quiescent than they have been. They ought to be afraid not only of initiating armed violence but of countenancing it or participating in it if it occurs. But they are not. This problem is not hard to solve, on the other hand, if we approach it in terms of the altered structure of Soviet foreign policy as analyzed above.

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The range of imaginable possibilities extends from total war in the extreme case to various situations of international armed violence on a local scale. Let us now consider these contingencies, concentrating on the question of Russia's role.

3. Dangers of Local Armed Violence

According to the view stated above, the dangers of local armed violence are now extremely serious in character because of the possibility that local armed violence may graduate into total war. If, in other words, we take total war as the supreme danger confronting us, we have to ask the question: Under what circumstances might total war occur? One very important kind of circumstance under which total war might occur is the circumstance of armed violence on an initially local scale, in which the interests if not the actual forces of East and West are pitted against each other. Accordingly, we must now ask: How real are the dangers of local armed violence in the sense just defined? In answering the question, we will focus attention on Russia as the active factor.

First, a general observation. We often hear the argument at the present time that there is a growing danger of what is variously called "limited war," "local war" or "small

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war," as distinguished from "total" or "general" war. This is thought to be in some way a consequence of the advent of nuclear "mutual deterrence." According to one version of the argument, total war now has become exceedingly improbable because of the total danger latent in it, and in this new situation the danger of limited wars increases. Alternatively and more concretely, it is argued that the danger of total war remains more or less constant while, at the same time, the danger of limited wars has now increased. General Nathan Twining has succinctly stated this position:

It is not true, however, that the reason for small wars becoming an increasing threat is that the other form of conflict -- total war -- has become less of a threat. If anything, the reverse is true. The threat of limited war has increased because the Soviets have acquired a greater capability to wage general war, and can, therefore, undertake a limited aggression with less fear of total retaliation.*

It is the argument in this latter form which is serious and requires critical comment:

General Twining's argument assumes a constant Soviet aggressive intent of a kind which would naturally find

* Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. House of Representatives. Eighty-Fifth Congress. First Session. Part I. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, 1957, p. 916. (Italics added)

expression in attempts at territorial aggrandizement by aggressive means. The development by Russia of a nuclear counter-deterrent capability leads him then, quite logically, to infer that Soviet "limited aggressions" are more likely now than before. The difficulty with this argument lies in the underlying premise on the constancy of Soviet motivation. The premise projects the Stalinist past into the post-Stalin present of Soviet foreign policy. If, however, the conception of the new structure of contemporary Soviet foreign policy developed earlier in this study is a correct one, then this premise is faulty and we are led to the conclusion that the danger of small wars growing out of direct or indirect Soviet aggression on a local scale has probably decreased now, not increased. This is not to say, however, that it has vanished. Nor, of course, are deliberate Soviet or Soviet-engineered local armed aggressions the only source of future international conflicts on a local scale. Moreover, as will be argued below, the new Soviet policy structure has its own new kind of potentiality of sowing the seeds of international violence.

We may now proceed to consider a number of concrete possible contingencies of international armed violence on a local scale for which Soviet Russia might be directly or indirectly responsible.

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a. Soviet Aggressions by Proxy

This is the case which General Twining's argument has in mind ("indirect aggression and local seizures of power by other Communist forces"). The classic instance is the Soviet aggression by proxy in Korea.

As just suggested, the danger of such Soviet aggressions has decreased in the post-Stalin period despite the fact that during this time the Soviet capability of waging general war has immensely progressed. Such actions were an integral part of the late Stalinist pattern of Soviet foreign policy. They do not, however, belong in any integral way to the new post-Stalin configuration as analyzed here, but, on the contrary, tend to be excluded or at least inhibited by it. A Soviet aggression by proxy -- such as a resumption of the Korean conflict, for example -- would directly conflict with the requirements of the new foreign policy of political encroachment. So long as this foreign policy remains in force, Soviet limited aggressions or aggressions by proxy are exceedingly improbable.

The danger cannot, on the other hand, be dismissed as wholly unreal. If, for example, the new structure of Soviet foreign policy were to crumble and collapse as a result of internal changes at the seat of Soviet power, the danger of

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aggressions by proxy might become a real one in certain places, such as places in which the policy of influence had established a foothold for Soviet Russia (Afghanistan, Syria, etc.). However, the collapse of the new structure of foreign policy does not seem likely at this time. Nor is it at all certain that a reversion to the late Stalinist pattern in respect of limited aggressions would result if the new structure did collapse.

The danger of limited aggressions of a direct kind, i.e., with the use of Soviet armed forces, is still less than the danger of aggressions by proxy.

b. Soviet Instigation of Armed Violence

As had been noted above, the contemporary policy of Soviet political encroachment can, wittingly or unwittingly on the part of the Soviet policy-makers, lead to the outbreak of international armed violence. The politics of alteration of the political status quo in the non-Soviet world are fraught with potentialities of international mischief. When a great power sets out to make trouble for opposing great powers in such areas of the world as Southeast Asia and the Middle East, where animosities are rife and the equilibrium of political relationships is exceedingly delicate, anything can

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happen. When it starts to use the export of arms as a chief instrument of this policy, the possibilities of violent dénouements multiply. This Soviet policy was, as already noted, critically responsible for precipitating the Suez crisis. By upsetting or threatening to upset a quasi-equilibrium between two hostile forces, Arab nationalism on the one hand and the state of Israel on the other, Moscow precipitated international armed violence. The same basic pattern of Soviet action is visible in offers of Soviet arms to India, which is embroiled in political conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, and to Afghanistan, which has grievances against Pakistan.

The question may be raised whether the Soviet policy is one of deliberate instigation of international armed violence. There is some reason to doubt that it is. For example, some evidence exists in support of the view that it was not Moscow's intention to foment an Arab-Israeli war by the arms shipments to Nasser, but merely to aggravate the situation in the Middle East and to promote the policies of neutralization, influence, and moral-political isolation of the West and America. But the question of deliberateness is not crucial. The fact is that the Soviet Government took a course of action which objectively instigated the outbreak of international armed

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violence in the Middle East. It did so in full knowledge of the delicate state of the equilibrium of forces in that region. It necessarily was aware of the explosive potentialities of its policy of arms export. Hence we may conclude that the Soviet Government was at the very least fully prepared to accept these risks and these potentialities. It was not deterred by the thought that armed violence might result. This is the most important fact of the situation. Contemporary Soviet foreign policy is not afraid of taking action of a political nature which is capable of indirectly instigating international armed violence.

This is not only a serious danger. It is, to a very considerable degree, a new one. It is a source of potential armed violence which belongs to the pattern of the new Soviet foreign policy but did not belong to the pattern of its Stalinist predecessor.

c. Soviet Military Intervention

Another danger of armed violence which may flow from the new structure of Soviet foreign policy is the danger of Soviet military intervention in conflict situations abroad. By "military interventions" are meant armed actions undertaken at the decision of the Soviet Government by men officially

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classed as "volunteers." These would be undertaken only in international conflict situations in which the Soviet intervention would be regarded in wide sections of world opinion as action undertaken in a "rightful cause." It is specifically this fact which explains why such military interventions are not inhibited by the new structure of foreign policy to the extent that Soviet aggressions by proxy are. In other words, the type of actions under consideration here would bear a real character of military interventions as distinguished from planned acts of aggression. A recent instance, which did not, however, go beyond the threat of intervention, was the officially sponsored organization of Soviet "volunteers" to go to the aid of Nasser during the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion. Thus, this danger is, as it were, a complement of the danger of Soviet instigation of armed violence through political action abroad. Once Soviet foreign policy has precipitated a situation of armed violence in international affairs, there is the further danger that Soviet military intervention will aggravate the situation. This is an extremely serious danger in that it always involves a possibility that the United States will be forced to intervene on its own to redress the balance.

A further kind of international situation involving a danger of Soviet military intervention must be mentioned as

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at least an outside possibility. This is the case of Soviet military assistance to a Communist or Communist-dominated foreign regime which has come to power by more or less non-violent means but finds itself threatened by violent overthrow. Here again we are dealing with a type of situation which would be distinctly novel, a situation associated with the new structure of Soviet foreign policy. Under the Stalinist policy, the danger was always a danger of armed violence to install a puppet regime in power. Under the new policy, this danger greatly recedes. But under the new dispensation, as argued earlier, foreign Communist Parties have obtained some small measure of autonomy, and for this and a number of other related reasons may become more formidable as a political force in their countries than before. This is encouraged by the new Soviet foreign policy, which visualizes Communist governments coming to power by a "parliamentary path," i.e., through more or less non-violent political struggle in the arena of national life. As has also been suggested earlier, we cannot rule out all possibility of success for this course, especially in certain non-European countries (Indonesia for example). This brings us to the danger of Soviet military intervention. Let us suppose that a Communist or Communist-dominated coalition regime came to power in an Asian country, unassisted by Russia.

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It is quite possible or probable that this would lead to internal strife in the country concerned, in the midst of which the new regime might appeal to Moscow for help to remain in power as the legitimate government. In these circumstances, which are improbable perhaps but by no means inconceivable, there is a very real danger that the Soviet Government would respond with military assistance, including perhaps an expeditionary force of Soviet "volunteers."

d. Soviet Suppression of Satellite Revolts

Soviet military action to suppress a national rising in a satellite country, such as that which occurred in Hungary, might be classed under the heading of a military intervention. However, in the case of Hungary there was no question of Soviet "volunteers." It was an official military action by the Soviet army. This and similar possible actions in the future deserve to be listed under a separate heading.

It follows from what has been said above (Section II-A-5-a) that the Soviet Government will not stop short of employing its armed forces to suppress revolts of satellite populations which threaten to unseat the local regime and take the country concerned out of the imperial system. Further, the action in Hungary meant a burning of Soviet bridges. If

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there was any soul-searching in high places in Moscow last November in the face of the prospect of going before the world as an openly counter-revolutionary force, there is likely to be less in event of a repetition of that situation or something bordering on it.

Whether armed violence breaks out again on a major scale in the Soviet empire depends, then, on circumstances in the subject countries themselves. This danger may not be very real at the present time, but it cannot be dismissed from consideration.

4. The Danger of General War

In conclusion, we must consider briefly the supreme danger -- the danger of general or total war in which the two military superpowers, the United States and Russia, and antagonists. The fact that this is the supreme danger scarcely needs stressing. Such a war would not only threaten the extinction of contemporary urban civilization in the chief warring countries. It might lead, through genetic and other after-effects of the use of nuclear weapons on a very large scale, to the extinction of human civilization, to humanicide. This is the war in which "victory" has become meaningless, the war which nobody wins.

Many have discerned in this fact a possible guarantee that such a war will not occur. "Mutual deterrence," it is thought,

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will bar the way to that catastrophe. A more realistic view, it seems to me, is that expressed by General Twining in his testimony which was cited above:

It is sometimes said that a total war waged with modern weapons of mass destruction would be mutual suicide, and that, therefore, this kind of war has abolished itself. I think this is a dangerous fallacy. We must recognize the fact that total war is no less a potential threat today, when both sides possess atomic weapons, than it was several years ago when we alone had them.*

As General Twining rightly says, it is a fallacy to suppose that total war has abolished itself just because its consequences would be so predictably catastrophic. It might just as well turn out the other way -- that man abolishes himself by total war. Other species have undergone extinction. Why not man? There is no guarantee against it.

a. The Soviet Position

Soviet official thinking in the contemporary period does not appear to be committed to the notion of general war as either a desirable or an unavoidable dénouement of the existing international situation. Further, the present Soviet regime is extremely unlikely to initiate general war as a

* Ibid.

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deliberate act of policy or, alternatively, to take aggressive military actions of great consequence, such as an aggression against Western Europe, which would probably provoke a general war.

It is not the public pronouncements of the Soviet leaders which underly this judgment. It would be possible, of course, to cite those as collateral evidence. One could cite, in particular, various recent public statements to the effect that wars are not inevitable any more, and other expressions which seem to reflect an awareness in high Soviet circles that nuclear war would be catastrophic in its consequences for Russia. But one cannot construct a good judgment out of these public statements. The proper basis for assessment of the Soviet position in relation to general war is an analysis of the actual structure of contemporary Soviet foreign policy. For such an analysis, if it is valid, tells you what the regime concerned is factually endeavoring to achieve in international politics. And the orientation of any regime toward war, including general war, is primarily a function of this, i.e., of its operative foreign policy, rather than of the general principles which it publicly espouses.

The operative terms of reference of contemporary Soviet foreign policy are such that the only type of situation in

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which the Soviet Government is likely to initiate armed violence with the use of its own forces is one which threatens the loss of an important imperial position. The foreign policy of political encroachment not only does not require the resort to armed violence as a means of pursuit of its operative ends; it actually sets up certain positive inhibitions to the Soviet use of violence, or, otherwise stated, places a premium on Soviet military quiescence. On the other hand, the operative Soviet foreign policy may be productive of international armed violence of a different kind than that involved in Soviet aggressions or aggressions by proxy -- a point which has been stressed above. Thus, the Soviet policy, while not a policy of military aggression, also does not shrink at situations of violence. It is not a policy governed by anxiety lest guns go off somewhere. It boldly seeks to reshape an international political status quo, confident that Soviet military power affords ample protection in case, as has happened at Suez and only too easily might happen again, delicate political equilibriums are upset with violent consequences.

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130.b. The Concept of Ordered Security

The conclusion which emerges from the previous section is that general war is neither inevitable nor even probable, but that it is possible, and that "mutual deterrence" is no certain preventive. The ultimate danger is, therefore, a real danger. The essence of the philosophy of peace through mutual deterrence is the idea of an automatic equilibrium system. There has never in the world been an automatic equilibrium system which is not capable of breaking down in certain circumstances, and there certainly never will be. The equilibrium system involved in mutual deterrence can break down too. In fact, it is much more likely than most such systems to break down because of the extreme delicacy of many of the factors and forces and relations involved.

The circumstances in which mutual deterrence may break down are numerous. The type of situation in which general

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war would be most likely to start despite mutual-deterrence mechanisms is one in which international armed violence is in progress on a limited scale and the vital interests of the powers on both sides, East and West, are engaged in the outcome. Such situations, as this study has emphasized, are by no means excluded from the standpoint of the foreign policy which the Soviet Union is following at the present time.

If the danger of general war remains a real one despite the situation of mutual deterrence, what conditions would have to be met in order to reduce further if not eliminate this danger? In simplified terms, the requisite would be a system of what might be called "ordered security." By this it is meant that the prevention of general war would not be left to any automatic equilibrium system but would be sought further through the conscious, purposeful organizing of the conditions of peace, aimed at what might be described as the "elimination of accidents." Negotiations recently in progress between East and West on the subject of mutual inspection systems to prevent surprise attacks may be mentioned as an illustration of what the concept of ordered security means.

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132.c. The Political Implications of Ordered Security

A certain broad image of the world and of the role of U.S. foreign policy in this world has been developed in the present study. According to this image, there is an unfriendly sphere of the world dominated by Soviet Russia. This is the primary fact of the world situation as confronted by the United States. The foreign policy of the United States is motivated by a concern for security, meaning both strategic security and the security of the American democracy as a way of life. This concern to be secure in the world dictates a derivative concern for the security of those countries which make up the sphere of the world friendly to America. Such countries are divided into three broad categories: those which are simply non-hostile to America, those with which America has developed working partnerships for specific mutual purposes, and those with which America has relationships of community.

In accordance with this conception, the problem of U.S. foreign policy has presented itself all along up to this point as one of maintaining the security of the United States and the friendly sphere of the world as against the unfriendly sphere dominated by our principal opponent, Soviet Russia. Naturally, such a conception makes no provision for American

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concern for the security of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it has been indicated or implied at various points that the American interest is in conflict with any such concern. Now, however, as the argument comes to its conclusion, it is necessary to take a critical view of this presupposition. For the concept of ordered security transcends our framework as developed earlier.

The crucial point about the idea of ordered security is that it implies mutual security on a certain plane as between East and West. To be more precise, the quest for a system of ordered security would mean that the security of our opponent, Soviet Russia, becomes for us a desideratum, a means of increasing our own security -- and vice versa. And this, of course, takes us outside the framework of building security against the unfriendly sphere. In accordance with the concept of ordered security, the security of Soviet Russia becomes, in a certain sense and to a certain degree, our own security concern, and ours in its turn must become, in a certain sense and to a certain degree, a Russian security concern. Whether this is a practicable proposition is not a matter for consideration here. What is under consideration is simply the implications of the idea of ordered security. On the basis of what has been said, it now becomes clear that these

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implications are quite far-reaching. They affect the whole foreign-policy universe. A world of ordered security as between East and West, even if the concrete ordering of security is only on a fairly rudimentary plane, becomes a different universe of foreign policy from the one we have known in the recent past.

In analyzing these implications, it is essential to observe the distinction which has been drawn here between the two aspects of security. The concept of ordered security implies that Soviet security becomes, in a certain sense, our concern, and vice versa. But what sense? This, of course, will depend upon the approach adopted. It would be possible to argue that our concern under a system of ordered security would be exclusively a concern for the physical or strategic security of the Soviet Union or the Soviet sphere, and not for the security of the Soviet regime and system. If so, we would have to reckon with the fact that while the Soviet regime is, as noted earlier, concerned to maintain the physical security of Russia, it is also -- and predominantly -- concerned with its own security as a regime in power and a system in being. Accordingly, if it entered into a system of ordered security, it would wish and strive to do so only in such a way and on such terms as would, in its own eyes, improve the physical

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security of Russia and at the same time the political security of the Soviet system, meaning not only the political structure of power inside Russia but the existing imperial system. Our interest, on the other hand, would be an interest in entering into a kind of system of ordered security which would make Russia physically more secure but would not make the Soviet regime politically more secure. Naturally, this presents a problem of very great complexity.